

**Social capital dynamics and collective action:
the role of subjective satisfaction in a common pool resource experiment**

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ONLINE APPENDIX

Appendix A. Tables and Figures




Figure A1. *Distribution of amount returned by trustees in the second trust game round*

Table A1. *Variable legend*

| 1a. Experiment variables | | 1b. Socio-demographic variables | |
|--|--|---------------------------------|--|
| Trustee | Dummy variable (DV)= 1 if the respondent played as trustee in the TG | Age | Respondent's age |
| AmountReturned_TrustGame (First Round) | Player's contribution in the I round of trust game | Female | DV=1 if the respondent is female |
| AmountReturned_TrustGame (Second Round) | Player's contribution in the II round of trust game | Married | DV=1 if the respondent is married |
| Change_In_Amount_Returned (TrustGames) | Difference between the player's contribution in the second and first round of the trust game | Widowed | DV=1 if the respondent is widowed |
| CPRG Withdrawal ratio | Amount withdrawn by the participant in the Common Pool Resource Game divided by the maximum the individual can withdraw (150 KSh) | Separated | DV=1 if the respondent is separated |
| CPRG Group withdrawal ratio | Amount withdrawn by the three remaining participants in the CPRG divided by the maximum they can withdraw (450 KSh) | Years of schooling | Respondent's years of schooling |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 1 | Difference between the amount withdrawn by the player and the average amount withdrawn by the other players in the 1st round of the CPRG | Children | Number of children |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 2 | Difference between the amount withdrawn by the player and the average amount withdrawn by the other players in the 2nd round of the CPRG | House members | Number of house components |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 3 | Difference between the amount withdrawn by the player and the average amount withdrawn by the other players in the 3rd round of the CPRG | Food expenditure day | daily food expenditure for the respondent's family |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 4 | Difference between the amount withdrawn by the player and the average amount withdrawn by the other players in the 4th round of the CPRG | Unemployed | DV= 1 if the respondent is unemployed |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 5 | Difference between the amount withdrawn by the player and the average amount withdrawn by the other players in the 5th round of the CPRG | Kikuyo | DV=1 if the respondent is from the ethnic group "Kikuyo" |
| Withdrawal difference from average (as 5 rounds average) | Average difference between the amount withdrawn by the player and the average amount withdrawn by the other players in the five rounds of the CPRG | Luo | DV=1 if the respondent is from the ethnic group "Luo" |
| Participant in the full information CPRG | DV=1 if the respondent participates in the CPRG non-anonymity treatment | Lubian | DV=1 if the respondent is from the ethnic group "Lubian" |
| CPRG Very Satisfied | DV =1 if the participant in the CPRG declared a satisfaction level in the game equal to 4 or 5 | Luhya | DV=1 if the respondent is from the ethnic group "Luhya" |
| CPRG Pretty Satisfied | DV =1 if the participant in the CPRG declared a satisfaction level in the game equal to 3 | Muslim | DV=1 if the respondent is Muslim |
| CPRG Not Satisfied | DV =1 if the participant in the CPRG declared a satisfaction level in the game equal to 1 or 2 | Mfi | DV= 1 if the respondent is member of a microfinance institution |
| CPRG Satisfied | DV =1 if CPRG Very Satisfied = 1 or CPRG Pretty Satisfied = 1 | Volunteer | DV= 1 if the respondent volunteers more than once a month |
| Trust index | Average of the answers to the five questions on trust (see questionnaire) | Control | DV=1 if the respondent has not played the CPRG between the two TGs |
| Amount_Sent_by_Trustor (strategy method) | Hypothetical amounts sent by the trustor – 10 choices, varying from 5 KSh to 50 KSh (see Experimental instructions in the Appendix) | CPRG payoff | Respondent's payoff for the CPRG randomly selected round. |
| Friends | Number of people known by name in the CPRG | Risk averse | DV=1 if the respondent is risk averse (has chosen lotteries with the payoffs at closer distance - see questionnaire) |
| Ethnic fragmentation | Ethnic fragmentation index in CPRG groups measuring the likelihood that four randomly drawn members belong to different ethnic groups = $1 - \sum(\text{fraction of members belonging to each of the ethnic groups})^2$. NB: if =0, fully ethnic-homogeneous group; if =1, fully ethnic-heterogeneous group | Sociability | =1 if the respondents says that he meets friends, attends cultural events and goes to the movies, pop music concerts, dancing, disco, sports events more than monthly (at least weekly or daily) |
| | | Negative reciprocity | DV= 1 if the respondent is more betrayal averse. Betrayal aversion is "high" if respondents circle on average 6-7 on the Likert Scale for negative reciprocity (see questionnaire). |

Gender fragmentation

Gender fragmentation index in CPRG groups measuring the likelihood that four randomly drawn members belong to different gender groups = $1 - \sum(\text{fraction of members belonging to each of the two gender groups})^2$. NB: if =0, fully gender-homogeneous group; if =0.50, fully gender-heterogeneous group

Impatient

DV=1 if the respondent is highly impatient (has chosen the lottery with payoffs at higher distance, i.e. need higher payoff in the future to be willing to wait - see questionnaire)

Table A2. *Summary statistics*

| Experimental variables | | | | | | Socio-demographic variables | | | | | |
|--|------|-------|-----------|---------|-------|-----------------------------|------|-------|-----------|-----|-------|
| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| Amount_Returned_TrustGame (First round) | 202 | 24.16 | 11.25 | 5 | 60 | Age | 404 | 27.84 | 8.2 | 18 | 60 |
| Amount_Returned_TrustGame (Second round) | 201 | 25 | 11.17 | 5 | 50 | Female | 404 | 0.52 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Change_In_Amount_Returned (TrustGames) | 201 | 0.82 | 8.61 | -30 | 45 | Married | 404 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| CPRG Withdrawal ratio | 304 | 0.69 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 | Widowed | 404 | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 |
| CPRG Group withdrawal ratio | 304 | 0.69 | 0.17 | 0.23 | 0.97 | Separated | 404 | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 1 | 304 | 0.17 | 39.55 | -112.5 | 112.5 | Years of schooling | 403 | 11.33 | 3.05 | 0 | 18 |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 2 | 3034 | 0 | 34.53 | -103.75 | 112.5 | Children | 404 | 1.36 | 1.71 | 0 | 10 |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 3 | 304 | 0.1 | 37.39 | -110 | 112.5 | House members | 404 | 4.53 | 2.42 | 0 | 23 |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 4 | 304 | 0.18 | 35.23 | -101.25 | 112.5 | Food expenditure day | 403 | 269 | 141 | 50 | 1,000 |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 5 | 304 | 0.14 | 37.88 | -112.5 | 112.5 | Unemployed | 404 | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Withdrawal difference from average (as 5 rounds average) | 304 | 0.12 | 26.63 | -75 | 112.5 | Kikuyo | 404 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Participant in the full information CPRG | 304 | 0.51 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 | Luo | 404 | 0.4 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| CPRG Very Satisfied | 304 | 0.7 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 | Lubian | 404 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| CPRG Pretty Satisfied | 304 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 | Luhya | 404 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Trust index | 401 | 1.87 | 0.48 | 1 | 3.4 | Muslim | 404 | 0.22 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |
| Sociability | 403 | 0.76 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 | Mfi | 404 | 0.52 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Friends | 403 | 0.3 | 0.63 | 0 | 3 | Volunteer | 404 | 0.41 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Ethnic fragmentation | 304 | 0.55 | 0.15 | 0 | 0.75 | Risk averse | 404 | 0.46 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Gender fragmentation | 304 | 0.4 | 0.11 | 0 | 0.5 | Negative reciprocity | 404 | 0.22 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | | | Impatient | 404 | 0.45 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | | | Trustee | 404 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |

Table A3. Satisfaction about peers' behavior in the Common Pool Resource Game and socio-demographic characteristics

| | Group | A. Very sat. (1) vs rest of sample (0) | | | B. Very and Pretty sat. (1) vs Not sat. (0) | | | C. Very sat. (1) vs Not sat. (0) | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|---|--------|---------------------------------|--|--------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|
| | | Obs. | Mean | <i>z stat</i> <i>p-value</i> | Obs. | Mean | <i>z stat</i> <i>p-value</i> | Obs. | Mean | <i>z stat</i> <i>p-value</i> |
| <i>Age</i> | 0 | 47 | 30.09 | 2.17 | 23 | 29.88 | 0.64 | 23 | 29.88 | 1.02 |
| | 1 | 105 | 27.22 | 0.03 | 129 | 27.79 | 0.52 | 105 | 27.22 | 0.31 |
| <i>Female</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.54 | -0.21 | 23 | 0.45 | -1.04 | 23 | 0.45 | -0.92 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.56 | 0.83 | 129 | 0.57 | 0.30 | 105 | 0.56 | 0.36 |
| <i>Married</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.46 | 2.16 | 23 | 0.41 | 0.84 | 23 | 0.41 | 1.23 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.28 | 0.03 | 129 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 105 | 0.28 | 0.22 |
| <i>Separated</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.13 | 1.53 | 23 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 23 | 0.09 | 0.59 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.06 | 0.13 | 129 | 0.08 | 0.83 | 105 | 0.06 | 0.55 |
| <i>Widowed</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.02 | -0.52 | 23 | 0.05 | 0.35 | 23 | 0.05 | 0.16 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.04 | 0.61 | 129 | 0.03 | 0.73 | 105 | 0.04 | 0.87 |
| <i>Years of schooling</i> | 0 | 47 | 10.85 | -0.11 | 23 | 11.36 | 0.78 | 23 | 11.36 | 0.65 |
| | 1 | 105 | 11.10 | 0.91 | 129 | 10.97 | 0.44 | 105 | 11.10 | 0.51 |
| <i>House members</i> | 0 | 47 | 4.65 | -0.69 | 23 | 4.55 | -0.60 | 23 | 4.55 | -0.65 |
| | 1 | 105 | 4.78 | 0.49 | 129 | 4.77 | 0.55 | 105 | 4.78 | 0.51 |
| <i>Food expenditure day</i> | 0 | 47 | 265.65 | 1.34 | 23 | 263.64 | 0.72 | 23 | 265.65 | 0.91 |
| | 1 | 105 | 241.06 | 0.18 | 129 | 246.02 | 0.47 | 105 | 241.06 | 0.36 |
| <i>Unemployed</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.13 | -1.62 | 23 | 0.14 | -0.94 | 23 | 0.14 | -1.13 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.25 | 0.11 | 129 | 0.22 | 0.35 | 105 | 0.25 | 0.26 |
| <i>Muslim</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.24 | 0.97 | 23 | 0.14 | -0.72 | 23 | 0.14 | -0.40 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.17 | 0.33 | 129 | 0.20 | 0.47 | 105 | 0.17 | 0.69 |
| <i>Mfi now</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.54 | 1.52 | 23 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 23 | 0.50 | 0.78 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.41 | 0.13 | 129 | 0.44 | 0.61 | 105 | 0.41 | 0.44 |
| <i>Volunteer</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.39 | -0.96 | 23 | 0.36 | -0.88 | 23 | 0.36 | -0.96 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.48 | 0.34 | 129 | 0.47 | 0.38 | 105 | 0.48 | 0.34 |
| <i>Risk averse</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.63 | 0.57 | 23 | 0.64 | 0.42 | 23 | 0.64 | 0.48 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.58 | 0.57 | 129 | 0.59 | 0.68 | 105 | 0.58 | 0.63 |
| <i>Negative reciprocity</i> | 0 | 47 | 0.17 | 0.99 | 23 | 0.27 | 2.09 | 23 | 0.27 | 1.93 |
| | 1 | 105 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 129 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 105 | 0.11 | 0.05 |

Notes: The table compares socio-demographic characteristics of different groups of participants in the Common Pool Resource Game according to their declared level of satisfaction about other players' behavior in the game. Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon rank-sum) tests are used as two-tailed non parametric tests for detecting group distributional differences in rank. The null hypothesis is that the underlying distributions of the socio-demographic characteristic in row headers in the two subgroups are not significantly different from each other. The third comparison (C) is between the sample of very satisfied vs. that of not satisfied, without considering the pretty satisfied individuals.

Table A4. *Non-parametric tests for difference in mean: participants in the Common Pool Resource Game (1) vs. control group (0)*

| Variable | Group | Obs. | Mean | z-stat, p-value |
|----------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|
| Age | 1 | 50 | 25.41 | -1.76 |
| | 0 | 152 | 28.18 | 0.08 |
| Female | 1 | 50 | 0.50 | -0.65 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.55 | 0.52 |
| Married | 1 | 50 | 0.32 | -0.20 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.34 | 0.84 |
| Separated | 1 | 50 | 0.04 | -0.94 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.08 | 0.35 |
| Widowed | 1 | 50 | 0.06 | 0.85 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.03 | 0.40 |
| Years of schooling | 1 | 50 | 11.90 | 2.06 |
| | 0 | 152 | 11.03 | 0.04 |
| Food expenditure day | 1 | 50 | 254.90 | 0.07 |
| | 0 | 151 | 249.27 | 0.94 |
| Kikuyo | 1 | 50 | 0.08 | -0.12 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.09 | 0.90 |
| Luo | 1 | 50 | 0.42 | -0.01 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.42 | 0.99 |
| Lubian | 1 | 50 | 0.14 | 0.53 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.11 | 0.59 |
| Luhya | 1 | 50 | 0.24 | 0.86 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.18 | 0.39 |
| Muslim | 1 | 50 | 0.18 | -0.27 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.20 | 0.79 |
| Mfi | 1 | 50 | 0.58 | 1.54 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.45 | 0.12 |
| Volunteer | 1 | 50 | 0.34 | -1.33 |
| | 0 | 152 | 0.45 | 0.18 |

Notes: The table compares socio-demographic characteristics of participants in the Common Pool Resource Game with those of the control group of non-participants and provides two-tailed non-parametric tests for the difference in mean. Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon rank-sum) tests are used as two-tailed non parametric tests for detecting group distributional differences in rank. The null hypothesis is that the underlying distributions of the socio-demographic characteristic in row headers in the two subgroups are not significantly different from each other.

Table A5. *Common Pool Resource Game difference with the group mean, only treatment sample*

| Regressor | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Participant in the full information CPRG | 2.458 (1.823) | 2.300 (1.831) | 2.243 (1.881) | 0.970 (1.822) | 0.505 (1.822) | 0.548 (1.825) |
| Friends | -1.427 (1.067) | -1.193 (1.036) | -1.168 (1.048) | -1.321 (1.112) | -1.012 (1.106) | -1.015 (1.119) |
| Amount_Returned_TrustGame (First Round) | -0.445*** (0.0832) | -0.470*** (0.0853) | -0.473*** (0.0864) | -0.440*** (0.0883) | -0.463*** (0.0939) | -0.461*** (0.0932) |
| Ethnic fragmentation | -1.510 (8.261) | 1.429 (7.834) | 1.368 (7.909) | -2.460 (5.934) | -1.004 (6.052) | -0.989 (6.058) |
| Gender fragmentation | -15.91* (8.581) | -16.31* (8.701) | -15.85* (8.661) | -13.78* (7.413) | -13.87* (7.553) | -14.06* (7.502) |
| CPRG very satisfied | 8.347** (3.362) | 8.829** (3.455) | 8.634** (3.412) | 8.563*** (3.113) | 8.604*** (3.267) | 8.693*** (3.332) |
| CPRG pretty satisfied | 7.941** (3.384) | 8.277** (3.424) | 8.245** (3.408) | 7.813** (3.568) | 7.913** (3.654) | 7.953** (3.681) |
| CPRG payoff | 0.0234 (0.0263) | 0.0334 (0.0224) | 0.0340 (0.0227) | 0.00970 (0.0250) | 0.0199 (0.0213) | 0.0197 (0.0217) |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 1 | 0.0263 (0.0347) | | | 0.0212 (0.0324) | | |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 2 | -0.0393 (0.0406) | | | -0.0341 (0.0408) | | |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 3 | -0.0148 (0.0401) | | | -0.0469 (0.0366) | | |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 4 | 0.0132 (0.0409) | | | 0.0455 (0.0402) | | |
| Withdrawal difference from average in round 5 | -0.0107 (0.0397) | | | -0.0210 (0.0351) | | |
| Withdrawal difference from average (as 5 rounds average) | | -0.0416 (0.0520) | -0.0534 (0.0562) | | -0.0455 (0.0473) | -0.0375 (0.0535) |
| Withdrawal difference from average (as 5 rounds average) * Participant in the full information CPRG | | | 0.0356 (0.0957) | | | -0.0235 (0.103) |
| Socio-demographic controls | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | NO |
| N | 151 | 151 | 151 | 152 | 152 | 152 |
| R ² | 0.519 | 0.512 | 0.513 | 0.430 | 0.412 | 0.413 |

Notes: Regressions are run with OLS and clustered robust standard errors and include only the trustees who participated in the CPRG (treatment group). The dependent variable is the change in average trustee's transfer from the first to the second TG. Sociodemographic controls include all regressors of table 2 which are not explicitly mentioned. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A6. *Determinants of the change in Trustees' transfer from the first to the second Trust Game*

| Regressor | TR send 5 | TR send 10 | TR send 15 | TR send 20 | TR send 25 | TR send 30 | TR send 35 | TR send 40 | TR send 45 | TR send 50 |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Constant | 5.53* (2.96) | 7.80* (4.66) | 7.22 (7.22) | 10.63 (8.10) | 3.51 (7.61) | 15.81 (11.12) | 9.50 (11.33) | 3.79 (10.86) | 15.08 (11.73) | 31.52* (16.05) |
| Amount_Returned_TrustGame (First Round) | -0.71*** (0.08) | -0.59*** (0.11) | -0.45*** (0.12) | -0.44*** (0.10) | -0.43*** (0.09) | -0.48*** (0.11) | -0.58*** (0.10) | -0.51*** (0.09) | -0.47*** (0.08) | -0.54*** (0.09) |
| Participant in the full information CPRG | 0.12 (0.98) | 0.81 (1.27) | 2.04 (1.70) | 1.93 (1.92) | 1.40 (1.98) | 0.31 (3.01) | -0.97 (3.21) | -0.71 (3.36) | -1.22 (3.77) | -5.13 (4.86) |
| Friends | -0.31 (0.36) | -1.61*** (0.61) | -0.65 (0.70) | -1.19 (0.87) | -0.41 (1.36) | -0.75 (1.42) | -0.64 (2.23) | -1.37 (1.95) | -0.89 (1.92) | -0.68 (2.26) |
| Ethnic fragmentation | -1.70 (2.73) | -3.34 (4.13) | -1.33 (4.64) | -2.86 (4.27) | -1.57 (5.55) | -1.73 (5.97) | -5.52 (7.13) | -3.56 (8.20) | -6.95 (8.86) | -0.89 (10.82) |
| Gender fragmentation | 1.23 (2.00) | 1.72 (2.17) | 2.17 (3.48) | 2.26 (4.03) | 3.77 (4.02) | -1.24 (7.19) | 6.41 (6.98) | 7.52 (7.22) | 0.78 (8.37) | -4.29 (10.93) |
| CPRG Very Satisfied | 1.52** (0.62) | 3.81*** (1.16) | 6.77*** (1.86) | 9.84*** (2.58) | 10.47*** (3.02) | 12.46*** (4.17) | 10.92** (4.69) | 9.69* (5.31) | 10.53* (5.70) | 8.89 (8.26) |
| CPRG Pretty Satisfied | -0.13 (0.60) | 1.33 (1.16) | 3.27* (1.87) | 5.10* (2.68) | 6.26* (3.25) | 6.82 (4.46) | 12.80** (5.10) | 13.39** (6.11) | 13.38** (6.70) | 17.96* (9.47) |
| CPRG Withdrawal ratio | -1.15 (2.08) | -5.38 (4.00) | -2.96 (4.05) | -9.84 (6.11) | -6.14 (6.50) | -11.66 (9.35) | 6.63 (8.37) | 2.60 (8.64) | -10.28 (10.55) | -9.03 (13.88) |
| CPRG Group withdrawal ratio | -0.20 (3.63) | 3.52 (6.30) | -3.76 (6.44) | 1.11 (9.56) | 6.79 (6.65) | 6.02 (10.27) | 6.18 (12.81) | 16.93 (12.92) | 26.95* (13.80) | 17.53 (17.57) |
| N | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 |
| R ² | 0.62 | 0.53 | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.36 | 0.36 |

Notes: Regressions are run with OLS and clustered robust standard errors and include only the trustees who participated in the CPRG (treatment group). The dependent variable is the change in average trustee's transfer from the first to the second TG. Regressions are run separately for each level of trustor's transfer and do not include socio-demographic controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A7. *Determinants of the change in Trustees' transfer from the first to the second Trust Game*

| Regressor | TR send 5 | TR send 10 | TR send 15 | TR send 20 | TR send 25 | TR send 30 | TR send 35 | TR send 40 | TR send 45 | TR send 50 |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Participant in the full information CPRG | 0.0128 (0.936) | 0.680 (1.157) | 1.450 (1.443) | 1.318 (1.677) | 1.693 (1.879) | 0.0205 (2.601) | 0.804 (3.014) | 1.412 (3.292) | 0.539 (3.696) | -3.891 (4.627) |
| Friends | -0.304 (0.349) | -1.590** (0.625) | -0.623 (0.714) | -1.183 (0.847) | -0.462 (1.342) | -0.749 (1.387) | -0.948 (2.295) | -1.534 (1.977) | -0.908 (1.910) | -0.799 (2.257) |
| Amount_Returned_TrustGame (First Round) | -0.714*** (0.0753) | -0.591*** (0.111) | -0.436*** (0.121) | -0.439*** (0.105) | -0.430*** (0.0942) | -0.469*** (0.115) | -0.585*** (0.0976) | -0.523*** (0.0946) | -0.475*** (0.0845) | 0.541*** (0.0902) |
| Ethnic fragmentation | -1.748 (2.786) | -3.400 (4.367) | -1.716 (4.776) | -3.003 (4.247) | -1.107 (5.589) | -1.648 (5.796) | -3.546 (7.283) | -1.867 (8.395) | -5.781 (9.136) | 0.375 (10.86) |
| Gender fragmentation | 1.258 (2.072) | 1.681 (2.342) | 2.532 (3.423) | 2.054 (3.937) | 2.876 (4.070) | -1.813 (7.223) | 3.469 (7.233) | 5.421 (7.741) | -0.921 (8.668) | -6.410 (11.09) |
| CPRG payoff | 0.000173 (0.00727) | -0.00359 (0.0127) | 0.000903 (0.0120) | 0.00438 (0.0185) | 0.00589 (0.0185) | 0.00224 (0.0254) | 0.0383 (0.0338) | 0.00952 (0.0356) | -0.0123 (0.0366) | 0.00983 (0.0488) |
| CPRG very satisfied | 1.484** (0.590) | 3.834*** (1.161) | 6.642*** (1.778) | 9.784*** (2.443) | 10.66*** (2.999) | 12.54*** (4.069) | 11.50** (4.583) | 10.31* (5.248) | 11.21** (5.673) | 9.437 (8.157) |
| CPRG pretty satisfied | -0.110 (0.594) | 1.469 (1.082) | 3.284* (1.788) | 5.271** (2.442) | 6.451** (3.172) | 7.082* (4.273) | 12.76** (5.172) | 13.57** (6.159) | 13.95** (6.747) | 18.35* (9.472) |
| N | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 |
| R ² | 0.613 | 0.512 | 0.324 | 0.323 | 0.353 | 0.329 | 0.427 | 0.378 | 0.349 | 0.354 |

Notes: The table reports results about determinants of the change in average trustee's transfer from the first to the second Trust Game. Regressions are run with OLS and clustered robust standard errors and include only the trustees who participated in the Common Pool Resource Game (treatment group). Regressions are run separately for each level of trustor's transfer and do not include socio-demographic controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A8. *The impact of satisfaction with peers in the Common Pool Resource Game on changes in trustworthiness – compounded estimates*

| Regressor | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Participant in the full information CPRG | -0.750 (1.969) | -0.750 (1.971) | -0.193 (1.923) | -0.749 (1.970) | -0.193 (1.924) |
| Friends | -1.357 (1.039) | -1.358 (1.039) | -0.872 (1.056) | -1.356 (1.039) | -0.869 (1.056) |
| Amount_Returned_TrustGame (First Round) | -0.517*** (0.0797) | -0.517*** (0.0782) | -0.522*** (0.0709) | -0.518*** (0.0799) | -0.523*** (0.0711) |
| CPRG Withdrawal ratio | -14.02** (6.723) | -14.01** (6.724) | -11.97 (7.853) | -14.03** (6.726) | -11.98 (7.856) |
| CPRG Group withdrawal ratio | 25.61** (10.43) | 25.61** (10.44) | 26.26** (12.02) | 25.61** (10.44) | 26.27** (12.02) |
| Ethnic fragmentation | -0.0672 (0.143) | -0.0673 (0.143) | 0.0493 (0.163) | -0.0671 (0.143) | 0.0495 (0.163) |
| Gender fragmentation | -0.292* (0.151) | -0.292* (0.152) | -0.177 (0.151) | -0.291* (0.151) | -0.177 (0.151) |
| CPRG payoff | 0.0575** (0.0242) | 0.0575** (0.0242) | 0.0707*** (0.0257) | 0.0576** (0.0242) | 0.0707*** (0.0257) |
| CPRG very satisfied | 8.906*** (3.036) | 2.096 (2.561) | 8.379*** (3.049) | 8.904*** (3.035) | 8.378*** (3.049) |
| CPRG pretty satisfied | 8.681** (3.591) | -3.134 (3.414) | 8.997*** (3.253) | 8.679** (3.591) | 8.996*** (3.252) |
| Amount_Sent_by_Trustor (strategy method) | 0.751*** (0.109) | 0.513*** (0.174) | 0.760*** (0.0982) | 0.593*** (0.113) | 0.598*** (0.107) |
| CPRG very satisfied* Amount_Sent_by_Trustor | | 0.248 (0.181) | | | |
| CPRG pretty satisfied* Amount_Sent_by_Trustor | | 0.430** (0.213) | | | |
| [Amount_Sent_by_Trustor (strategy method)] ² | | | | 0.00291 (0.00177) | 0.00297* (0.00178) |
| Socio-demographic controls | NO | NO | YES | NO | YES |
| N | 1,520 | 1,520 | 1,510 | 1,520 | 1,510 |
| Participants | 152 | 152 | 151 | 152 | 151 |
| R ² | 0.392 | 0.399 | 0.445 | 0.392 | 0.446 |

Notes: The table reports results about determinants of the change in average trustee's transfer from the first to the second Trust Game. Regressions are run with OLS and include only the trustees who participated in the Common Pool Resource Game (treatment group). Regressions are run over the entire set of the trustee's strategy set and the trustor's hypothetical transferred amount is controlled for through the variable *Amount_Sent_by_Trustor (strategy method)*. Sociodemographic controls include all regressors of table 3 which are not explicitly mentioned. Robust standard errors clustered at participant's level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A9. *Individual and group withdrawal ratios in the Common Pool Resource Game, treatment sample only - WLS Estimates*

| Regressor | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| | CPRG very satisfied | Δ TG | CPRG pretty satisfied | Δ TG |
| Age | -0.0460** (0.0188) | | -0.0350** (0.0171) | |
| Female | 0.452 (0.297) | | 0.415 (0.278) | |
| Years of schooling | -0.106* (0.0577) | | -0.0887* (0.0535) | |
| Negative reciprocity | -0.706* (0.362) | | -0.678** (0.341) | |
| Sociability | 0.110 (0.414) | | 0.0926 (0.379) | |
| Trust index | -0.268 (0.294) | | -0.281 (0.286) | |
| Impatient | 0.503* (0.306) | | 0.280 (0.285) | |
| Risk averse | -0.423 (0.307) | | -0.315 (0.287) | |
| Food expenditure day | -0.000912 (0.00106) | | -0.000942 (0.00100) | |
| Participant in the full information CPRG | | -1.819 (2.090) | | -1.872 (1.884) |
| Friends | | 0.912 (1.211) | | 0.531 (1.110) |
| Amount_Returned_TrustGame (First Round) | | -0.658*** (0.109) | | -0.653*** (0.105) |
| Ethnic fragmentation | | -0.137 (7.076) | | -2.595 (6.236) |
| Gender fragmentation | | -20.57** (10.38) | | -18.38* (9.688) |
| CPRG payoff | | 0.0540** (0.0273) | | 0.0403* (0.0237) |
| CPRG very satisfied | | 7.003*** (2.342) | | |
| CPRG pretty satisfied | | | | 6.234*** (2.181) |
| N | 127 | 127 | 149 | 149 |
| R ² | | 0.622 | | 0.604 |

Notes: The table provides results of specifications (11) and (12) of table 3 re-estimated through WLS. The weights are the inverses of the individuals' propensity score (PS). PS results are reported in columns 1 and 3 while WLS estimates in columns 2 and 4. The dependent variables in the WLS regressions are the change in average trustee's transfer from the first to the second TG (Δ TG). The dependent variables in the PS models are: i) *CPRG very satisfied* – column 1 - excluding *CPRG pretty satisfied* individuals, and ii) *CPRG pretty satisfied* - column 3. These variables are dummies equal to 1 for individuals very or pretty satisfied respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix B. Instructions for Enumerators

INTRODUCTION

Hi, thanks for being here. You have already won KSh 150 just for participating.

Today we are going to play some games in which you can earn additional money depending on how you play. So it is in your interest to put as much effort as possible and behave truthfully! Please, do not talk with each other unless we tell you explicitly and take the games seriously.

We will have in total three sessions in which you will play some games replicating daily-life situations. The games will allow you to make positive payoffs which will be converted in real money at the end of the day. The games end with a survey and if you answer to all the questions you will be given an extra amount of money.

You will be given the instruction of each game in each session by an experimenter. In case of doubts, please do not hesitate to ask him/her questions. Make sure you understand the games perfectly and ask – if necessary – for more examples.

After the final survey, you will have to wait until we calculate the total sum of money you won.

To sum up, your total earning will be equal to: show-up fee + what you earn in the game sessions + extra sum (from 0 to 195 KSh) for completing a final survey.

INDIVIDUAL SESSION¹

As already said, today you are given the chance to play and earn real money. We start with the individual session in which you will be asked some questions and depending on how you answer you earn additional money. So try to do your best!

The game you play now is based on an exchange of money among two individuals who does not know to each other. You are playing with someone from your village but you do not know his/her identity. We will give to both of you 50 KSh.

The first player has to choose how much of this amount to keep for him/herself and how much to send to the other player. He/she can send from 0 to the 50 KSh.

Then we take the sum he/she decided to send, multiply it by three and give it to the second player.

The second player has to decide how much of the amount received (in addition to the initial amount we previously gave to him/her) to return back to the first player. He/She can choose an amount between 0 and the total amount he/she has and we give the sum to the first player. Then the game ends.

Let's make an example: if you are chosen to play as *player one*, you are given 50 KSh. You have to decide how much to send to the other player knowing that the sum you choose will be multiplied by three and that the other player can decide to send you back some or no money. If, for instance, you keep for yourself 30 KSh and send to the second player 20 KSh, he/she will receive 60 KSh and have to decide how much to send you back. If he/she sends you back 30 KSh, you will receive this amount of money and your final pay-off will be 30 (what you received) + 30 (what you were left with after sending money) = 60 KSh. Is that clear?

If instead you have been chosen to play as *player two*, you are given 50 KSh and you have to decide how much to give back to player one for each amount he/she may send to you: i.e. *how much money do you return if player one sends you 10 KSh? How much if he/she sends you 20 KSh?* And so on until 50 KSh. Do not worry if it is not perfectly clear at this stage: you will see that you understand better while playing.

Now let's start the game.

P1) You are chosen to play as *Player 1*. So you have to decide how much of the amount we give to you to send to player 2, knowing that we will multiply it by three and player two might send you back some or no money.

¹ Instructions for the experimenters (the general framework of the game is already discussed in the previous parts of this document). NB: In the second individual session, before the second trust game specify that the individual will be paid just for one of the two individual sessions so encourage him/her to put the same level of effort as the one of the previous game. At the end of the previous trust game and before the survey, toss a coin to select for which among the two trust games the player will be paid for.

1. **How much of your initial wealth of 50 KSh would you give to the other player?** KSh _____
2. **How much money do you think that the other player will give you back?** (you can earn KSh 20 for correct guess) _____
3. **Why did you give the money to the other person?** (it is possible to provide multiple responses based on priority order)
 - † a) *I trust him*
 - † b) *I hope that he will give me back the same or more than that I gave him*
 - † c) *It makes me feel good that he gains money*
 - † d) *I don't like a different treatment between me and him*

P2) You are chosen to play as *Player 2*. We give to you 50 KSh. You have to decide for each possible amount sent by the first player, how much you feel like to return. Keep in mind that what the first player might send you is multiplied by three by us.

For example, we will be asking you how much would you send back to player 1 if he/she sent to you 10 KSh, which we multiply by three so that you will finally get 30.

1. How much money do you give back in each case:

- If the other person sends you 5 KSh and you receive 15 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 10 KSh and you receive 30 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 15 KSh and you receive 45 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 20 KSh and you receive 60 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 25 KSh and you receive 75 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 30 KSh and you receive 90 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 35 KSh and you receive 105 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 40 KSh and you receive 120 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 45 KSh and you receive 135 KSh you would give him back* _____
- If the other person sends you 50 KSh and you receive 150 KSh you would give him back* _____

2. **How much money do you expect the first player has sent to you?** (you can earn KSh 20 for correct guess) _____
3. **We will ask the first player to guess how much money you decided return. What do you think he/she will answer?** (you can earn KSh 20 for correct guess) _____
4. **Why did you give back the money to the other person?** (it is possible to provide multiple responses based on priority order)
 - † [1] *I'm a person one can rely on*
 - † [2] *I don't like that he gets much less than me*
 - † [3] *It makes me feel good that he gains money*
 - † [4] *I don't like a different treatment between me and him*

GROUP SESSION

a) Treatment A

In this game you play in a group of four persons. Please do not talk to each other unless I explicitly allow you. As you can see, on the table there is a pot with 600 KSh which I assign to the whole group for a common project (it can be whatever you want).

From this pot, you have to decide how much to take for yourself and how much keep into the pot. So each of you can secretly choose to take from the pot an amount of money from 0 to 150 KSh. Notice that the sum of money left in the pot after all of you have decided if and how much to withdraw will be doubled and equally distributed to you. So the amount which will be left into the pot, and so the additional money you can earn, will depend on what each of you have decided to withdraw from it.

Some examples will help you in understanding better the game.

- If all of you decide to take all the 150 KSh the pot will be empty, so no additional money will be left to me to double and split equally among you. So your final earning will be 150 KSh.
- If instead all of you decide to take 0 KSh from the pot, there will be 600 KSh for me to double. Hence I will equally divide 1200 KSh among you so that each of you will earn 300 KSh.
- If two of you decide to take all 150 KSh while the other two decide to take 0 KSh, in the pot there will be 300 KSh which I will double to 600 KSh. In this case, all of you will receive 150 KSh more but the guys that took already 150 KSh now will have a total payoff of 300 KSh while the other guys that took 0 KSh will earn 150 KSh.

Of course all of you can take from the pot a sum of money which goes from 0 to 150 KSh, not necessarily 0 or 150!

Moreover, you do not know what the others took from the pot nor their final payoff.

I will give to each of you a piece of paper on which you secretly write your IDCODE and how much you are willing to withdraw from the pot. Then each of you will hand the paper to me, I will make the calculations and distribute an envelope containing a piece of paper with your payoff. It is absolutely forbidden to talk to each other during this step.

You will play the game for some rounds until I will tell you the game is ended. Please, notice that we will randomly pay you for just one round, according to the following procedure. You on each envelope I distribute to you there is a number indicating the n. round you have just played. When I will declare the end of the game, each of you will extract a number from a bag. The number extracted will indicate the round in which your payoff will be converted in real money. So for example, if you extract the number 1, the payoff you had in the first round will be converted in real money at the end of the whole session.

Any questions so far?

So now let me see whether you understood the game before starting. *What happens if three of you withdraw 50 KSh from the pot while the other player take 0 KSh?*

- o In the pot will remain ____ KSh [correct answer: $600 - (50 * 3) = 450$ KSh].
- o This amount will be doubled and I will distribute to each of you ____ [(450*2)/4 = 225 KSh]
- o So the three players who have taken 50 KSh will finally earn ____ [correct answer: $225 + 50 = 275$ KSh]
- o The other player who decided to take 0 will earn ____ [correct answer: 225 KSh].

b) Treatment NA

In this game you play in a group of four persons. Please do not talk to each other unless I explicitly allow you. As you can see, on the table there is a pot with 600 KSh which I assign to the whole group for a common project (it can be whatever you want).

From this pot, you have to decide how much to take for yourself and how much keep into the pot. So each of you can secretly choose to take from the pot an amount of money from 0 to 150 KSh. Notice that the sum of money left in the pot after all of you have decided if and how much to withdraw will be doubled and equally distributed to you. So the amount which will be left into the pot, and so the additional money you can earn, will depend on what each of you have decided to withdraw from it.

Some examples will help you in understanding better the game.

- If all of you decide to take all the 150 KSh the pot will be empty, so no additional money will be left to me to double and split equally among you. So your final earning will be 150 KSh.
- If instead all of you decide to take 0 KSh from the pot, there will be 600 KSh for me to double. Hence I will equally divide 1200 KSh among you so that each of you will earn 300 KSh.

- If two of you decide to take all 150 KSh while the other two decide to take 0 KSh, in the pot there will be 300 KSh which I will double to 600 KSh. In this case, all of you will receive 150 KSh more but the guys that took already 150 KSh now will have a total payoff of 300 KSh while the other guys that took 0 KSh will earn 150 KSh.

Of course all of you can take from the pot a sum of money which goes from 0 to 150 KSh, not necessarily 0 or 150!

I will give to each of you an piece of paper on which you write your IDCODE and how much you are willing to withdraw from the pot. Then each of you will hand the paper to me, and will announce publicly to the other members how much he/she decided to withdraw. Then I will make the calculations and distribute to each of you a piece of paper on which is written - and visible to everybody - the corresponding payoff. It is absolutely forbidden to talk to each other during this step.

You will play the game for some rounds until I will tell you the game is ended. Please, notice that we will randomly pay you for just one round, according to the following procedure. On each envelope I distribute to you there is a number indicating the n. round you have just played. When I will declare the end of the game, each of you will extract a number from a bag. The number extracted will indicate the round in which your payoff will be converted in real money. So for example, if you extract the number 1, the payoff you had in the first round will be converted in real money at the end of the whole session.

Any questions so far?

So now let me see whether you understood the game before starting. *What happens if three of you withdraw 50 KSh from the pot while the other player take 0 KSh?*

- In the pot will remain ____ KSh [*correct answer: $600 - (50 * 3) = 450$ KSh*].
- This amount will be doubled and I will distribute to each of you ____ [*$(450 * 2) / 4 = 225$ KSh*]
- So the three players who have taken 50 KSh will finally earn ____ [*correct answer: $225 + 50 = 275$ KSh*]
- The other player who decided to take 0 will earn ____ [*correct answer: 225 KSh*].

THE SURVEY

Thanks a lot for your patience. Now, if you answer to all the following questions, at the end of the survey you will be given the chance to win from 0 to 195 additional KSh. Your identity will be kept anonymous and we will really appreciate if you can answer in a truthful way.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Thanks a lot for your patience. Now, if you answer to all the following questions, at the end of the survey you will be given the chance to win from 0 to 195 additional KSh. Your identity will be kept anonymous and we will really appreciate if you can answer in a truthful way.

EXPERIMENTER NAME _____ DATE _____ H _____

Participant N. _____

1. GENERAL DEMOGRAPHICS

1.1 Sex: † [1] Female

† [2] Male

1.2 Age/year of birth: _____

1.3 Civil status: † [1] Unmarried

† [2] Cohabitant

† [3] Married

† [4] Separated

† [5] Divorced

† [6] Widowed

1.4 What is your height: _____

1.5 What is your weight: _____

1.6 How many years have you attended the school? _____

1.7 How many years has your father attended the school? _____

1.8 How many years has your partner attended the school? _____

1.9 How many people do usually live in your house? _____

1.10 How many children do you have? _____

1.11 Where was your last child born? † [1] Home

† [2] Rural clinic

† [3] Hospital

† [4] Other

† [5] No children

2. ETHNIC INFORMATION and RELIGION

2.1 What is your ethnic group? [write without asking if possible].

[1] Kikuyu,

[2] Luo,

[3] Luhya,

[4] Kamba,

[5] Meru,

[6] Kisii,

[7] Kalenjin,

[8] Masai,

[9] Mijikenda,

[10] Taita,

[11] Somali,

[12] Pokot,

[13] Turkana,

[14] Bajuni,

[15] Kuria,

[16] Teso,

[17] Rendille,

[18] Embu,

[19] Borana,

[20] Samburu,

[21] Arab,

[22] Swahili,

[23] Indian,

[24] Gabra,

[25] Kenyan
only or doesn't
think in those
terms,

[26] Others

[27] Refused to
answer,

[28] Don't
know.

2.2 Think about the condition of your Ethnic Group. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?

[1] Much better,

[2] Better,

[3] Same,

- [4] Worse,
- [5] Much worse,
- [6] Not applicable,
- [7] Don't know,
- [8] Refused to answer,

2.3 How often is your ethnic group treated unfairly by the government?

- [1] Never,
- [2] Sometimes,
- [3] Often,
- [4] Always,
- [5] Not applicable,
- [6] Don't know,
- [7] Refused to answer,

2.4 Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a from your Ethnic Group. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?

- [1] I feel only (R's ethnic group),
- [2] I feel more (R's ethnic group) than Kenyan,
- [3] I feel equally Kenyan and (R's ethnic group),
- [4] I feel more Kenyan than (R's ethnic group),
- [5] I feel only Kenyan,
- [6] Not applicable,
- [7] Don't know,
- [8] Refused to answer,

2.5 What is your religion, if any? _____

0=None, 1=Christian only, 2=Muslim only, 995=Other, 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don't know.

2.6 How important is religion in your life?

- | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| [1] Not at all important, | [4] Very important, |
| [2] Not very important, | [5] Refused to answer, |
| [3] Somewhat important, | [6] Don't know. |

QUESTIONS ON THE GAME SESSIONS (only for participants in the PGG) (6)

6.1 Have you ever participated in games similar to the one implemented in the individual sessions (the first and the last you played alone with the experimenter)?

- | | |
|---|----------------------|
| † | [1] Yes |
| | [0] No |
| | [2] Don't remember |
| | [3] Refuse to answer |

6.2 If yes, how many times? _____

6.3 When was the last time it happened?

- | | | |
|---|-------------------|----------------------|
| † | [0] < 1 year ago | [5] 5-6 years ago |
| | [1] 1-2 years ago | [6] 6-7 years ago |
| | [2] 2-3 years ago | [7] > 7 year ago |
| | [3] 3-4 years ago | [8] Don't remember |
| | [4] 4-5 year ago | [9] Refuse to answer |

6.4 Which real-life situation have this game reminded to you? _____

6.5 [If played as player 1 - "trustor"]

- How much money would you need to send in order to define it a "friendly action" ? KSh_____

6.6 [If played as player 2 - "trustee"]

- 6.6.1 How much money would you need to receive in order for you to define it a "friendly action"? KSh_____

- 6.6.2 How much money would you need to return in order to define it a "friendly action" ? KSh_____

6.7 Have you ever participated in games similar to the one implemented in the group session (the one you played in group with other people)? †

[1] Yes

[2] Don't remember

[0] No

[3] Refuse to answer

6.8 If yes, how many times? _____

6.9 When was the last time it happened?

[0] < 1 year ago

[5] 5-6 years ago

[1] 1-2 years ago

[6] 6-7 years ago

[2] 2-3 years ago

[7] > 7 year ago

[3] 3-4 years ago

[8] Don't remember

[4] 4-5 year ago

[9] Refuse to answer

6.10 Which real-life situation have this game reminded to you? _____

Questions about the GROUP GAME (the one you played in group with other people),

6.11. a) How satisfied are you with the behaviour of your peers?

† [5] Very satisfied

† [4] Satisfied

† [3] Pretty satisfied

† [2] Not very satisfied

† [1] Not satisfied at all

Please fill the table below

| | 6.11.b) People know by name 0= no 1 = yes | 6.11.c) type of relationship 1 = relative; 2 = aquatinted; 3 = colleague; 4 = good friend; 5 = other _____ | 6.11.d) n. of hours on average spent with him/her in a week | 6.11.e) reason 1 = work 2 = leisure 3 = other _____ |
|----------|---|---|---|--|
| Person 1 | | | | |
| Person 2 | | | | |
| Person 3 | | | | |

HAPPINESS (7)

7.1 How satisfied are you with your life? †

[5] Very satisfied

[2] Not very satisfied

[4] Satisfied

[1] Not satisfied at all

[3] Pretty satisfied

7.2 In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?

[1] Very bad,

[5] Very good,

[2] Fairly bad,

[6] Don't know,

[3] Neither good nor bad,

[7] Refused to answer.

[4] Fairly good,

7.3 In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other Kenyans?

[1] Much worse,

[5] Much better,

[2] Worse,

[6] Don't know,

[3] Same,

[7] Refused to answer

[4] Better,

TRUST/TRUSTWORTHINESS (8)

8.1 Are the people that you trust...

- | | |
|--|---|
| [1] Almost all from the same ethnic group as yours | [4] Mostly from a different ethnic group than yours |
| [2] Mostly from the same ethnic group as yours | [5] Almost all from a different ethnic group than yours |
| [3] About evenly divided between the same ethnic group as yours and others | [6] Don't know |
| | [7] Refuse to answer. |

8.2 How much do you agree on the following statements:

- | | |
|---|-----------------------|
| a) <i>"In general, one can trust people"</i> | |
| [1] Strongly agree | [4] Disagree |
| [2] Agree | [5] Strongly disagree |
| [3] Neither agree nor disagree | [6] Can't choose |
| | [7] Refuse to answer |
| b) <i>"Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody"</i> | |
| [1] Strongly agree | [4] Disagree |
| [2] Agree | [5] Strongly disagree |
| [3] Neither agree nor disagree | [6] Can't choose |
| | [7] Refuse to answer |
| c) <i>"When dealing with strangers, it is better to be cautious before trusting them"</i> | |
| [1] Strongly agree | [4] Disagree |
| [2] Agree | [5] Strongly disagree |
| [3] Neither agree nor disagree | [6] Can't choose |
| | [7] Refuse to answer |
| d) <i>"There are only a few people I can trust completely"</i> | |
| [1] Strongly agree | [4] Disagree |
| [2] Agree | [5] Strongly disagree |
| [3] Neither agree nor disagree | [6] Can't choose |
| | [7] Refuse to answer |
| e) <i>"If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you"</i> | |
| [1] Strongly agree | [4] Disagree |
| [2] Agree | [5] Strongly disagree |
| [3] Neither agree nor disagree | [6] Can't choose |
| | [7] Refuse to answer |
| f) <i>"Most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right"</i> | |
| [1] Strongly agree | [4] Disagree |
| [2] Agree | [5] Strongly disagree |
| [3] Neither agree nor disagree | [6] Can't choose |
| | [7] Refuse to answer |

8.3 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

- [1] Most people can be trusted
- [2] Can't be too careful
- [3] Other, depends _____
- [4] Don't know

8.4 How much do you trust each of the following types of people:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| a) <i>Your relatives?</i> | |
| 0=Not at all, | 7= Not applicable, i.e., no relatives |
| 1=Just a little, | 8=Don't know, |
| 2=I trust them somewhat, | 10=Refused to answer, |
| 3=I trust them a lot, | |
| b) <i>Other people you know?</i> | |
| 0=Not at all, | 3=I trust them a lot, |
| 1=Just a little, | 8=Don't know, |
| 2=I trust them somewhat, | 9=Refused to answer, |
| c) <i>Other Kenyans?</i> | |
| 0=Not at all, | 2=I trust them somewhat, |
| 1=Just a little, | 3=I trust them a lot, |

4=Don't know,

5=Refused to answer,

8.4 Do you think of yourself as a *trusting* person? Are you...

- [1] Very trusting
- [2] Somewhat trusting
- [3] Somewhat distrusting

- [4] Very distrusting
- [5] Don't know
- [6] Refuse to answer

8.5 Do you think of yourself as a *trustworthy* person? Are you...

- [1] Very trustworthy
- [2] Somewhat trustworthy
- [3] Somewhat untrustworthy

- [4] Very untrustworthy
- [5] Don't know
- [6] Refuse to answer

8.6 In case of economic problems, to whom do you ask for help?

- [1] Family
- [2] Friends
- [3] Moneylenders
- [4] Church

- [5] Other organization_____
- [6] Other people_____
- [7] Nobody

SOCIABILITY/ALTRUISMS/VOLUNTEERING (9)

9.1 Do you belong to any group?

- [1] Sporting group
- [2] Neighbour group
- [3] Religious group
- [4] Community groups
- [5] Cultural group (music, dance, etc.)

- [6] Political Party
- † [7] NGO
- † [8] Other_____
- † [9] No

9.2 How do you spend your free time? Please indicate how often you engage on average in each of the following activities.

| Activity | Never (0) | Seldom (1) | Monthly (2) | Weekly (3) | Daily (4) |
|--|--------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| a. Going to cultural events (such as concerts, theater, lectures, etc.) | | | | | |
| b. Going to the movies, pop music concerts, dancing, disco, sports events | | | | | |
| c. Doing sports yourself | | | | | |
| d. Artistic or musical activities (playing music/singing, dancing, acting, painting, photographie) | | | | | |
| e. Meeting with friends, relatives or neighbors | | | | | |
| f. Helping out friends, relatives or neighbors | | | | | |
| g. Volunteer work in clubs or social services | | | | | |
| h. Involvement in a citizens' group, political party, local government | | | | | |
| i. Attending church, religious events | | | | | |
| j. Other_____ | | | | | |

BETRAYAL AVERSION (10)

10.1 How much do you agree on the following statements:

a) *If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the costs*

- [1] Strongly agree
- [2] Agree
- [3] Neither agree nor disagree

- [4] Disagree
- [5] Strongly disagree
- [6] Can't choose
- [7] Refuse to answer

b) *If someone offends me, I will also offend him/her*

- [1] Strongly agree
- [2] Agree
- [3] Neither agree nor disagree

- [4] Disagree
- [5] Strongly disagree
- [6] Can't choose
- [7] Refuse to answer

EVENTS AFTER 2007 (11)

11.1 Now I would like to ask you some questions about the events that followed the December 2007 general elections. As you know, there were outbreaks of violence in various parts of the country. Please tell me if YOU PERSONALLY were affected in any of the following ways:

- | | | |
|---|----------|----------------------|
| a) <i>The destruction or closure of a business?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| b) <i>Loss of a job?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| c) <i>Personal injury?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| d) <i>Damage to personal property?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| e) <i>The destruction of home?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| f) <i>Eviction from home?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| g) <i>Your parents' death?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| h) <i>Stayed in the same dwelling in the same area?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| i) <i>Moved in with relatives or others in the same area?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| l) <i>Relocated to another rural area in Kenya?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| m) <i>Relocated to another part of town?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| n) <i>Relocated to another town in Kenya?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |
| o) <i>Relocated outside Kenya?</i> | [1] Yes | [2] Don't remember |
| | † [0] No | [3] Refuse to answer |

11.2 What was the name of the village or town where you lived before the December 2007 elections?

3. WEALTH PROXIES

3.1 How many rooms do you have in your house? _____

3.2 What is the ownership status of your house?

| |
|-----------------|
| [1] You own it |
| [2] Rented |
| [3] Occupied |
| [4] Other _____ |

3.3 What material are the walls of the main dwelling predominantly made of?

- | | |
|-----------------|---------------------------|
| [1] Stone, | [4] Mud/Cement |
| [2] Brick/Block | [5] Wood only |
| [3] Mud/Wood | [6] Corrugated iron sheet |

[7] Grass/Straw

[9] Other _____

[8] Tin

3.4 What material is the roof of the main dwelling predominantly made of?

[1] Corrugated iron sheet

[5] Grass

[2] Tiles

[6] Tin

[3] Concrete

[7] Other _____

[4] Asbestos sheet

3.5 What is the main source of water for the household?

[1] Piped into dwelling

[6] Protected spring

[10]

[2] Piped into plot

[7] Rainwater collection

Tankers/Truck/Vendor

[3] Public tap

[8] Unprotected dug well/spring

[11] Bottled water

[4] Tube/Well/borehole with pump

[9]

[12]

[5] Protected dug well

River/Lake/ponds/streams

Other _____

3.6 What type of toilet facilities does the household use?

[1] Flush toilet

[5] Bucket

[2] Ventilated improved pit latrine

[6] None

[3] Uncovered pit latrine

[7]

Other

[4] Covered pit latrine

3.7 Which of the following items does your household own?

[1] Radio

[7] Refrigerator

[2] Black and white television

[8] Sofa

[3] Colour television

[9] Wardrobe

[4] Bicycle

[10] Desktop

[5] Motorcycle

[6] Car

3.8 How far is the closest water well (source) from your house? _____

3.9 How much do you usually spend for food for your family per day? _____

4. MARKET EXPOSITION

4.1 What is your major type of employment?

† [0] Unemployed

† [1] Informal job / self-employed (i.e. agriculture, fruit sellers, etc.) = "Fua Kali"

† [2] Informal job / salaried (i.e. cooks, teacher, cleaning) = "Kibarua"

† [3] Formal job / self-employed

† [4] Formal job / salaried (i.e. employed in a factory/local government, etc.)

† [5] Other _____

[6] Don't know

[7] Refuse to answer

4.2 Do you work outside this village?

[1] Yes

[0] No

| If YES, where? | 4.2.1 h/day worked there | 4.2.2 Days/week worked there | 4.2.3 Weeks/year worked there | 4.2.4 n. of people/day you |
|----------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
|----------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|--|--|--|---|
| | | | | usually interact with on the job |
| A. Other village | | | | |
| B. In the city | | | | |
| C. In another city | | | | |
| D. In another country | | | | |

4.3 Did you work outside this village in the past?

[1] Yes

[0] No

| If YES, where? | 4.3.1 h/day usually worked there | 4.3.2 Days/week usually worked there | 4.3.3. Weeks/year usually worked there | 4.3.4 n. of people/day you used to interact with on the job |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|--|
| A. Other village | | | | |
| B. In the city | | | | |
| C. In another city | | | | |
| D. In another country | | | | |

5. INCOME

Description of YOUR PERSONAL earnings.

Please fill in the table below:

| Activity | 5.1.1 Earnings per day | 5.1.2 Days worked/Year | 5.1.3 Hours worked/day |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. | | | |
| 2. | | | |
| 3. | | | |
| <i>TOTAL</i> | | | |

Description of YOUR FAMILY's weekly earnings:

† 5.2.1 Husband/wife _____

† 5.2.2 Son/daughter _____

† 5.2.3 Other members _____

5.3 Do you have other sources of non work income (subsidies, donations, etc.)?

[0] no†

[1] from the church

† [2] from the state

† [3] from private persons

† [4] from development agencies/NGOs

† [5]remittances from relatives

† [6] rents

† [7] other _____

5.4 How much did you save approximately last week in percent of your earnings? _____

9. CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY

You and one of your friends of the village have to meet somewhere.

12.1.1 Where do you ask him to meet? _____

12.1.2 Which day of the week? _____

12.1.3 What hour? _____

12.2 Tell me the first name of a person you have in mind _____

12.3 Tell me the first name of a mountain you have in mind _____

12.4 Tell me the first name of a famous actor you have in mind _____

12.5 Tell me the first name of a famous musician you have in mind _____


12.6 Tell me the first name of a famous politician you have in mind _____

12.7 Tell me the first name of a famous religious leader you have in mind _____

10. DISCOUNT RATES

Please choose one between the following four pairs of hypothetical payments.

Would you prefer _____




11. RISK AVERSION & PAYOFF FOR PARTICIPATION TO THE SURVEY

We now let you choose *how much* you are paid for answering in this interview.

In each of the following lotteries, there are two alternative payoffs expressed in KSh. Each alternative has 50% probability of been realized.

After you have selected a lottery, we will toss a coin to pin down the payoff and add it to your final earnings.

Please choose one of the following lotteries _____



14.1 You have chosen lottery____. [toss a coin].

14.2 Before ending, surprise question: Are you, generally speaking a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risk?

[Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: "risk averse" and the value 10 means: "fully prepared to take risks". You can use the values in between to make your estimate.]

(risk averse) [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] (Fully prepared to take risks)

You win____ for participating in this survey.