<u>Supplementary Appendix for "Interest or Ideology? Why American Business Leaders Opposed the Vietnam War"</u>

Exploratory Factor Analysis

I conducted exploratory factor analysis using the survey questions listed in Table 2 to determine whether I should use a single latent variable to measure business leaders' domestic political ideology, or multiple latent variables. Tables A.1 and A.2 present the uniqueness scores and factor loadings for a one factor and two factor model respectively, estimated using maximum likelihood estimation and varimax rotation using the 'factanal' command in R. The results of a hypothesis test for factor sufficiently yields a p-value of 0.000943 and 0.107 for the one and two factor models, respectively, indicating that the questions in the Russet and Hanson (1973) survey load onto two distinct latent variables that correspond to two dimensions of domestic political ideology.

Many questions load strongly onto the first factor, which I label as a general dimension of domestic political ideology, while the question that loads strongest onto the second factor (#21) asks about racial integration in schools. I therefore label this second dimension to be a "racial policy" dimension of domestic political ideology comprised of responses to question 21 and question 20, which asks about the cause of "negro riots" in cities.

Table A.1: Factor Analysis Results, 1 Factor

Question	Uniqueness	Factor Loading
Q_7b	0.868	0.364
Q_15	0.735	0.514
Q_16	0.751	0.499
Q_17	0.678	0.567
Q_18	0.625	0.612
Q_19	0.582	0.647
Q_20	0.792	0.456
Q_21	0.772	0.477

Table A.2: Factor Analysis Results, 2 Factors

Question	Uniqueness	Factor Loading 1	Factor Loading 2
Q_7b	0.874	0.303	0.185
Q_15	0.736	0.476	0.194
Q_16	0.762	0.400	0.278
Q_17	0.689	0.501	0.245
Q_18	0.619	0.470	0.400
Q_19	0.468	0.719	0.120
Q_20	0.785	0.438	0.153
Q_21	0.427	0.185	0.734

Validation of IRT Models

　　　　As described in the body of the article, I estimated a graded response model (GRM) to construct my scaled measures of domestic policy and racial policy preferences since my survey responses are ordinal responses rather than dichotomous response (Cai et. al. 2016). I validated the results of these models in two main ways. First, by assessing the pairwise correlations between the responses to individual survey questions included in the scales, and second by assessing the item response category characteristic curves (IRCCs).

　　　　Table A.3 presents the results of these pairwise correlations in terms of the Kendall rank correlation coefficient, often referred to as Kendall's τ for the domestic policy scale. Table A.4 presents the results of these pairwise correlations in terms of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, or Spearman's ρ for the domestic policy square. The upper right diagonal of each table reports the correlation coefficient for each pairwise correlation while the lower left diagonal of each table reports the p-value for each correlation coefficient. The question numbers and wording align to Table 2 in the body of the article. All pairwise correlation coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level, which implies that these questions are both related to a latent dimension.

Table A.3: Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient, Domestic Policy Score

	q_7b	q_15	q_16	q_17	q_18	q_19
q_7b	*****	0.18	0.182	0.213	0.172	0.205
q_15	<0.001	*****	0.246	0.254	0.258	0.311
q_16	<0.001	<0.001	*****	0.226	0.228	0.244
q_17	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	*****	0.318	0.325
q_18	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	*****	0.33
q_19	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	*****

Table A.4: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient, Racial Policy Score

	q_7b	q_15	q_16	q_17	q_18	q_19
q_7b	*****	0.2	0.206	0.237	0.19	0.233
q_15	<0.001	*****	0.277	0.286	0.284	0.351
q_16	<0.001	<0.001	*****	0.256	0.253	0.277
q_17	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	*****	0.352	0.368
q_18	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	*****	0.365
q_19	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	*****

Figures A.1 – A.6 present the IRCC curves associated with each question in the domestic policy scale. In these curves we are looking for the probability of a lower ordinal response to each scale item to be associated with lower levels of the underlying trait (θ) and higher ordinal responses to be associated with higher levels of θ. This is precisely what we see in Figures A.1 – A.6. This further implies that the IRT model is an appropriate measure for the underlying trait of domestic policy preferences/ideology.

Figure A.1: IRCC Curve Question 7b

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Item: q_7b

Figure A.2: IRCC Curve Question 15

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Item: q_15

Figure A.3: IRCC Curve Question 16

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Item: q_16

Figure A.4: IRCC Curve Question 17

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Item: q_17


Figure A.5: IRCC Curve Question 18

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Item: q_18

Figure A.6: IRCC Curve Question 19

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Item: q_19

Table A.5 presents the results of these pairwise correlations in terms of the Kendall rank correlation coefficient, often referred to as Kendall's τ for the racial policy scale. Table A.6 presents the results of these pairwise correlations in terms of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, or Spearman's ρ for the racial policy scale.

Table A.5: Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient, Racial Policy Score

	q_20	q_21
q_20	*****	.163
q_21	<0.001	*****

Table A.6: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient, Racial Policy Score

	q_20	q_21
q_20	*****	.182
q_21	<0.001	*****

Figures A.7 and A.8 present the IRCC curves associated with each question in the racial policy scale.

Figure A.7: IRCC Curve Question 20

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Item: q_20

Figure A.8: IRCC Curve Question 21

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Item: q_21

Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression

Figure A.9 reports graphically the marginal effects from the logistic regression model, Model 1 in Table 3, in the body of the paper. The substantive effects are in the same direction and similar size to those estimated using the linear probability model. Business leaders from internationalist firms are 15.3% more likely to oppose the Vietnam War than business leaders from domestic oriented firm (14.7% more likely to oppose according to linear probability model). Similarly, business leaders with a one standard deviation more restrictive view of domestic civil rights and liberties are 11.5% less likely to oppose the Vietnam War (10.7% less likely to oppose according to the linear probability model).

Figure A.9: Marginal Effects from Table 3

Robustness Check #1: Alternate Domestic Policy Scale

Table A.7 reports the results of my first robustness check, re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper using an alternate domestic policy scale that removes survey questions that might plausibly be measuring a respondent's foreign policy views versus domestic policy views. If this is the case, then including these responses in a measure of domestic political ideology may bias may bias that measure.

Specifically, two questions in my domestic policy scale, questions 7b and 19 from the Russett and Hanson (1973) survey may be measuring respondents' foreign policy opinions fairly directly, since they ask respondents about their views of domestic communism, which might be a proxy for views about the Soviet Union and international communism, and about the role of the FBI and military intelligence, who both targeted domestic anti-war activists. The concern is that

9

these attitudes may bias subsequent analysis in favor of finding a relationship between ideology and support for the war since the domestic ideology measure will draws explanatory power by linking foreign policy attitudes and concerns about essentially unrelated domestic issues.

To mitigate this concern I first re-estimated a domestic policy scale using an identical procedure to that in laid out in the paper while dropping questions 7b and 19. I then re-estimated models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper using this new measure.

Table A.7: Results w/ Alternate Domestic Policy Scale

	Opposition to War	
	logistic	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)
Internationalist	0.669**	0.144**
	(0.046, 1.291)	(0.010, 0.277)
Domestic Policy	−0.035***	−0.008***
	(−0.051, −0.018)	(−0.012, −0.004)
Racial Policy	−0.004	−0.001
	(−0.010, 0.002)	(−0.002, 0.0004)
Age	−0.202	−0.046
	(−0.507, 0.103)	(−0.116, 0.024)
Veteran	14.579	0.729
	(−1,034.807, 1,063.966)	(−0.221, 1.680)
Wartime Service	0.489	0.113
	(−0.131, 1.109)	(−0.030, 0.256)
CONSTANT	−13.265	0.073
	(−1,062.653, 1,036.123)	(−0.930, 1.075)
AIC	481.07	
McFadden	0.056	
Observations	364	364
R-squared		0.073
Adjusted R-squared		0.058
Residual standard error		0.479 (df = 357)

Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Robustness Check #2: Results w/o Ideology

   Another potential concern with the results in Table 3 is the potential endogeneity of a business leader's political ideology to a business' economic circumstances if, for instance, internationalist business select different types of leaders than domestic-oriented businesses. If so, business leaders' domestic political ideology should be considered a "post-treatment" variable. I therefore re-estimate the model results in Table 3 without including a business leader's domestic political ideology. I find identical results (Table A.8) to those reported in Table 3.

Table A.8: Results w/o Ideology

	Opposition to War	
	logistic	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)
Internationalist	0.676**	0.153**
	(0.068, 1.284)	(0.017, 0.289)
Age	−0.211	−0.051
	(−0.508, 0.086)	(−0.122, 0.021)
Veteran	14.467	0.709
	(−1,034.920, 1,063.853)	(−0.261, 1.678)
Wartime Service	0.383	0.092
	(−0.224, 0.990)	(−0.054, 0.238)
CONSTANT	−13.781	−0.042
	(−1,063.168, 1,035.607)	(−1.052, 0.967)
AIC	492.10	
McFadden	0.020	
Observations	362	362
R-squared		0.025
Adjusted R-squared		0.014
Residual standard error		0.490 (df = 357)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1	

Robustness Check #3: Results w/ No Controls

I next check the robustness of the findings in table 3 to estimating the models without control variables. The results (Table A.9) are consistent with the results presented in Table 3.

Table A.9: Results w/ No Controls

| | Opposition to War | |
| | *logistic* | *OLS* |
	(1)	(2)
Internationalist	0.326	0.074
	$(-0.160, 0.811)$	$(-0.036, 0.184)$
Domestic Policy	-0.153^{***}	-0.035^{***}
	$(-0.231, -0.075)$	$(-0.051, -0.019)$
Racial Policy	-0.005^{**}	-0.001^{**}
	$(-0.010, -0.0001)$	$(-0.002, -0.00001)$
CONSTANT	0.958^{***}	0.725^{***}
	$(0.510, 1.407)$	$(0.624, 0.826)$
AIC	650.25	
McFadden	0.033	
Observations	491	491
R-squared		0.044
Adjusted R-squared		0.039
Residual standard error		0.483 (df = 487)

Notes:	$^{***}p < .01;\ ^{**}p < .05;\ ^{*}p < .1$

Robustness Check #4: Alternate DV, Include "Don't Know" as "Oppose"

Table A.10 reports the results of my fourth robustness check, re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper with an alternate coding of the dependent variable that codes all respondents who answered "don't know" as opposing the Vietnam War. This accounts for the possibility that business leaders censored their opposition to the war due to normative or social pressures and reported "don't know" when they actually opposed the war. The results are consistent with the results presented in Table 3, as all coefficients are in the same direction although the coefficients on the trade orientation and domestic policy variables are only statistically significant at the p <.1 rather than p < .05 level.

Table A.10: Results w/ Alternate DV, Don't Know as Oppose

| | Opposition to War | |
| | logistic | OLS |
	(1)	(2)
Internationalist	0.573*	0.119*
	(−0.038, 1.183)	(−0.008, 0.247)
Domestic Policy	−0.141***	−0.033***
	(−0.220, −0.061)	(−0.050, −0.015)
Racial Policy	−0.004	−0.001
	(−0.009, 0.002)	(−0.002, 0.0005)
Age	−0.228	−0.052
	(−0.525, 0.069)	(−0.118, 0.015)
Veteran	14.666	0.748
	(−1,034.720, 1,064.053)	(−0.191, 1.688)
Wartime Service	0.568*	0.130*
	(−0.033, 1.170)	(−0.007, 0.268)
CONSTANT	−13.328	0.059
	(−1,062.716, 1,036.060)	(−0.928, 1.045)
AIC	523.88	
McFadden	0.043	
Observations	403	403
R-squared		0.056
Adjusted R-squared		0.042
Residual standard error		0.474 (df = 396)

Notes: ***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

Robustness Check #5: Alternate DV, Include "Don't Know" as "Not Oppose"

Table A.11 reports the results of my fifth robustness check, re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper with an alternate coding of the dependent variable that codes all respondents who answered "don't know" as not opposing the Vietnam War. This accounts for the possibility that business leaders censored their opposition to the war due to normative or social pressures and reported "don't know" when they actually didn't oppose the war. The results are identical with the results presented in Table 3.

Table A.11: Results w/ Alternate DV, Don't Know as Not Oppose

| | Opposition to War | |
| | logistic | OLS |
	(1)	(2)
Internationalist	0.729**	0.167**
	(0.150, 1.308)	(0.036, 0.298)
Domestic Policy	−0.174***	−0.037***
	(−0.264, −0.084)	(−0.055, −0.020)
Racial Policy	−0.004	−0.001
	(−0.009, 0.002)	(−0.002, 0.0004)
Age	−0.169	−0.041
	(−0.459, 0.122)	(−0.109, 0.028)
Veteran	14.385	0.685
	(−1,035.002, 1,063.772)	(−0.280, 1.650)
Wartime Service	0.338	0.081
	(−0.258, 0.933)	(−0.060, 0.222)
CONSTANT	−13.453	0.033
	(−1,062.841, 1,035.934)	(−0.980, 1.046)
AIC	543.53	
McFadden	0.051	
Observations	403	403
R-squared		0.065
Adjusted R-squared		0.051
Residual standard error		0.487 (df = 396)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1	

Robustness Check #6: Alternate IV, Ordinal Trade Orientation

Table A.12 reports the results of my sixth robustness check, re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper with an alternate coding of trade orientation as a three-level ordinal independent variable as opposed to a binary independent variable. The results are consistent with the results presented in Table 3. All coefficients are in the same direction, although the ordinal measure of trade orientation isn't statistically significant. This is still consistent with the predictions of the economic consequences perspective in so far as we should expect business leaders with the highest exposure to international trade to be the most likely to

oppose wars relative to all other businesses, while the prediction about opposition to war by business leaders with middling exposure to international trade is less precise.

Table A.12: Results w/ Alternate IV, Ordinal Trade Orientation

	Opposition to War	
	logistic	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)
Internationalist	0.214	0.048
	(−0.076, 0.504)	(−0.017, 0.114)
Domestic Policy	−0.182***	−0.040***
	(−0.277, −0.087)	(−0.059, −0.021)
Racial Policy	−0.004	−0.001
	(−0.009, 0.002)	(−0.002, 0.0005)
Age	−0.218	−0.051
	(−0.522, 0.087)	(−0.121, 0.019)
Veteran	14.359	0.683
	(−1,035.028, 1,063.746)	(−0.269, 1.635)
Wartime Service	0.514	0.121*
	(−0.103, 1.130)	(−0.023, 0.265)
CONSTANT	−13.360	0.051
	(−1,062.748, 1,036.028)	(−0.968, 1.069)
AIC	480.65	
McFadden	0.051	
Observations	362	362
R-squared		0.067
Adjusted R-squared		0.051
Residual standard error		0.481 (df = 355)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1	

15

Robustness Check #7: Alternate IV, Summated Rating Scale of Domestic Policy Preferences

      Table A.13 reports the results of my seventh robustness check, re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper with an alternate coding of the domestic policy preferences variable using a summated rating score as opposed to the factor score estimate from the IRT model. The results are consistent with the results presented in Table 3.

Table A.13: Results w/ Alternate IV, Summated Rating Scale Domestic & Racial Policy

	Opposition to War	
	logistic	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)
Internationalist	0.640*	0.103
	(−0.031, 1.311)	(−0.023, 0.229)
Domestic Policy (sum)	−0.304***	−0.059***
	(−0.398, −0.210)	(−0.075, −0.042)
Racial Policy (sum)	0.005	0.003
	(−0.225, 0.235)	(−0.043, 0.050)
Age	−0.145	−0.030
	(−0.470, 0.179)	(−0.095, 0.036)
Veteran	15.531	0.665
	(−1,714.614, 1,745.677)	(−0.228, 1.558)
Wartime Service	0.561*	0.114*
	(−0.106, 1.227)	(−0.021, 0.249)
CONSTANT	−10.044	0.884*
	(−1,740.190, 1,720.102)	(−0.075, 1.843)
AIC	432.37	
McFadden	0.149	
Observations	362	362
R-squared		0.179
Adjusted R-squared		0.165
Residual standard error		0.451 (df = 355)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1	

Robustness Check #8: Alternate IV, Individual Scale Items

Table A.14 reports the results of my eighth robustness check, re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper with an alternate coding of the domestic policy preferences variable using the individual scale item responses as opposed to the factor score estimate from the IRT model. The results are harder to interpret since they disaggregate the potential effect of a business leader's policy preferences on their opposition to war across different questions, when answers to these questions are known to be correlated with each other based on the results of the IRT model. That said, these results do appear to be consistent with the results presented in Table 3. The responses to many individual domestic policy questions are negatively correlated with opposition to the war and the trade orientation variable is in the same direction as the models in Table 3, although is only statistically significant at the $p < .1$ level rather than $p < .05$ level.

Table A.14: Results w/ Alternate IV, Scale Item Responses

| | Opposition to War | |
| | logistic | OLS |
	(1)	(2)
Internationalist	0.684*	0.114*
	(−0.007, 1.374)	(−0.011, 0.238)
Question 7b	−0.395**	−0.081***
	(−0.704, −0.086)	(−0.141, −0.021)
Question 15	−0.418**	−0.074**
	(−0.791, −0.044)	(−0.142, −0.005)
Question 16	0.152	0.033
	(−0.156, 0.460)	(−0.025, 0.092)
Question 17	−0.132	−0.025
	(−0.417, 0.152)	(−0.080, 0.030)
Question 18	−0.525***	−0.086**
	(−0.904, −0.145)	(−0.154, −0.018)
Question 19	−0.608***	−0.114***
	(−0.934, −0.281)	(−0.175, −0.053)
Question 20	−0.320*	−0.058*
	(−0.679, 0.040)	(−0.125, 0.010)
Question 21	0.278	0.050
	(−0.064, 0.619)	(−0.015, 0.115)
Age	−0.131	−0.026
	(−0.474, 0.212)	(−0.092, 0.039)
Veteran	15.413	0.631
	(−1,714.733, 1,745.558)	(−0.257, 1.520)
Wartime Service	0.407	0.078
	(−0.281, 1.096)	(−0.056, 0.212)
CONSTANT	−9.172	0.983**
	(−1,739.319, 1,720.975)	(0.023, 1.942)
AIC	423.97	
McFadden	0.19	
Observations	362	362
R-squared		0.223
Adjusted R-squared		0.197
Residual standard error		0.443 (df = 349)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1	

Robustness Check #9: Dropping Domestic Policy Ideology Outliers

Table A.15 reports the results of my ninth robustness check, re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper while dropping domestic policy ideological outliers. As Figure 1 in the paper demonstrates, my scaled measure of domestic policy preferences is heavily right skewed. I re-estimated the results by removing ideological outliers above the 75th, 90th, and 95th percentile. As the results in Table A.15 indicate, the results in Table 3 are robust to dropping the top 25% (columns 1 and 2), 10% (columns 3 and 4), and 5% (columns 5 and 6) of respondents on the domestic policy scale.

Table A.15: Results, Dropping Domestic Policy Ideology Outliers

	Opposition to War					
	logistic	OLS	logistic	OLS	logistic	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Internationalist	0.868**	0.174**	0.722**	0.153**	0.735**	0.156**
	(0.101, 1.635)	(0.021, 0.327)	(0.070, 1.374)	(0.015, 0.290)	(0.100, 1.371)	(0.022, 0.290)
Domestic Ideology	−0.315	−0.069	−0.207**	−0.048**	−0.256***	−0.059***
	(−0.728, 0.098)	(−0.163, 0.025)	(−0.395, −0.019)	(−0.091, −0.004)	(−0.391, −0.122)	(−0.089, −0.030)
Racial Ideology	−0.004	−0.001	−0.005*	−0.001*	−0.004	−0.001
	(−0.010, 0.003)	(−0.002, 0.001)	(−0.011, 0.001)	(−0.002, 0.0002)	(−0.010, 0.002)	(−0.002, 0.0004)
Age	−0.219	−0.048	−0.221	−0.050	−0.203	−0.045
	(−0.579, 0.141)	(−0.129, 0.033)	(−0.541, 0.099)	(−0.123, 0.023)	(−0.514, 0.108)	(−0.116, 0.025)
Veteran	15.891	0.784	15.624	0.736	14.746	0.764
	(−1,714.255, 1,746.036)	(−0.167, 1.735)	(−1,714.522, 1,745.769)	(−0.217, 1.689)	(−1,034.641, 1,064.133)	(−0.185, 1.713)
Wartime Service	0.492	0.110	0.455	0.105	0.471	0.107
	(−0.225, 1.208)	(−0.055, 0.274)	(−0.183, 1.093)	(−0.043, 0.253)	(−0.154, 1.097)	(−0.036, 0.250)
CONSTANT	−14.549	0.019	−14.179	0.094	−13.429	0.036
	(−1,744.695, 1,715.597)	(−0.994, 1.033)	(−1,744.325, 1,715.967)	(−0.914, 1.101)	(−1,062.817, 1,035.959)	(−0.966, 1.038)
AIC	355.67		433.23		459.78	
McFadden	0.037		.038		.071	
Observations	270	270	327	327	349	349
R-squared		0.046		0.049		0.071
Adjusted R-squared		0.024		0.031		0.055
Residual standard error		0.477 (df = 263)		0.480 (df = 320)		0.478 (df = 342)

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Robustness Check #10: Dropping Racial Policy Ideology Outliers

Table A.16 reports the results of my tenth robustness check, re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 3 in the body of the paper while dropping racial policy ideological outliers. I re-estimated the results by removing racial policy ideological outliers above the 75th, 90th, and 95th percentile. As the results in Table A.16 indicate, the results in Table 3 are robust to dropping the top 25% (columns 1 and 2), 10% (columns 3 and 4), and 5% (columns 5 and 6) of respondents on the domestic policy scale.

Table A.16: Results, Dropping Racial Policy Ideology Outliers

	Opposition to War					
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*logistic*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Internationalist	1.020***	0.209***	0.680**	0.147**	0.680**	0.147**
	(0.248, 1.791)	(0.055, 0.363)	(0.057, 1.304)	(0.013, 0.280)	(0.057, 1.304)	(0.013, 0.280)
Domestic Ideology	−0.165***	−0.036***	−0.184***	−0.040***	−0.184***	−0.040***
	(−0.263, −0.068)	(−0.055, −0.017)	(−0.279, −0.089)	(−0.059, −0.022)	(−0.279, −0.089)	(−0.059, −0.022)
Racial Ideology	−0.014***	−0.003***	−0.004	−0.001	−0.004	−0.001
	(−0.024, −0.005)	(−0.005, −0.001)	(−0.010, 0.002)	(−0.002, 0.0004)	(−0.010, 0.002)	(−0.002, 0.0004)
Age	−0.203	−0.045	−0.214	−0.050	−0.214	−0.050
	(−0.547, 0.142)	(−0.121, 0.031)	(−0.520, 0.091)	(−0.119, 0.020)	(−0.520, 0.091)	(−0.119, 0.020)
Veteran			14.612	0.734	14.612	0.734
			(−1,034.774, 1,063.999)	(−0.216, 1.684)	(−1,034.774, 1,063.999)	(−0.216, 1.684)
Wartime Service	0.679*	0.155*	0.486	0.114	0.486	0.114
	(−0.034, 1.392)	(−0.004, 0.315)	(−0.133, 1.105)	(−0.029, 0.257)	(−0.133, 1.105)	(−0.029, 0.257)
CONSTANT	1.474**	0.821***	−13.356	0.055	−13.356	0.055
	(0.074, 2.873)	(0.515, 1.128)	(−1,062.744, 1,036.032)	(−0.948, 1.057)	(−1,062.744, 1,036.032)	(−0.948, 1.057)
AIC	355.67		433.23		459.78	
McFadden	0.037		.038		.055	
Observations	275	275	362	362	362	362
R-squared		0.115		0.073		0.073
Adjusted R-squared		0.098		0.058		0.058
Residual standard error		0.472 (df = 269)		0.479 (df = 355)		0.479 (df = 355)

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1