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Appendix A: Additional models

Models with all substantive variables

In Tables A1 and A2.

Table A1: Own-industry tariff coverage and firms' exclusion requests

	%-age chance of requesting exclusion					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Coverage of Own Industry by Section 301 tariffs:						
Covered	−0.11***	−0.12***	−2.73***	−1.90***	−6.03***	−2.76+
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(1.13)	(1.54)
Firm size (H1):						
Large	−0.03	−0.20***				
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Large·Covered	1.04***	0.79***				
	(0.04)	(0.05)				
Ownership of subsidiaries in China (H2):						
China subsidiary	1.93***	−0.78**	1.79***	−0.47	1.56*	−0.39
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.65)	(0.72)
China sub.·Covered	7.72***	4.71***	7.44***	4.63***	6.30***	3.70***
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.48)	(0.73)	(0.83)
Imports from China (H3):						
ln Imports	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.03	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)
ln Imports·Covered	0.01***	0.01***	0.17***	0.23***	0.34***	0.45***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Input-sourcing:						
Input coverage		−0.04		−0.31		−1.07
		(0.03)		(0.42)		(1.54)
Large·Input coverage		0.23***				
		(0.02)				
China sub.·Input coverage		3.75***		3.42***		3.10***
		(0.14)		(0.24)		(0.42)
ln Imported Inputs		−0.01+		−0.39***		−0.82**
		(0.01)		(0.10)		(0.32)
ln Imported Inputs·Input coverage		0.00		0.06		0.18
		(0.00)		(0.05)		(0.19)
Exporting:						
ln Exports		0.00		0.03*		0.12+
		(0.00)		(0.02)		(0.06)
ln Exports·Covered		0.00		−0.11***		−0.28**
		(0.00)		(0.03)		(0.09)
Additional controls:						
Foreign subsidiary	2.60***	2.70***	2.16***	2.21***	2.24***	2.35***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Foreign branch	3.41***	3.30***	5.36***	5.34***	6.63***	6.59***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.35)	(0.36)
Publicly traded	−0.00	0.10	0.19	0.26*	−0.16	−0.13
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.24)
List 2	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.65***	−0.65***	−1.67***	−1.65***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.30)	(0.31)
List 3	0.02**	0.01	0.54***	0.09	1.17***	0.06
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.33)	(0.40)
List 4A	−0.01*	−0.02**	−0.37***	−0.59***	−0.67*	−1.26***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.30)	(0.33)
Intercept	0.01	0.07	−0.06	2.44**	−1.01	3.46
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.30)	(0.75)	(1.28)	(2.52)
N	958896	942976	124964	122980	26716	25704
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm sample	All	All	L/VL	L/VL	Very large	Very large

Notes: All models are weighted OLS with weighted OLS standard errors. $^{***}p < 0.001, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{+}p < 0.1$.

Table A2: Revenues and exclusion requests among publicly traded firms

	%-age chance of requesting exclusion	
	1	2
Coverage of Own Industry by Section 301 tariffs:		
Covered	−8.98***	−4.99+
	(1.78)	(2.82)
Firm size (H1):		
ln Revenue	0.05	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.07)
ln Revenue·Covered	0.47***	0.37***
	(0.07)	(0.09)
Ownership of subsidiaries in China (H2):		
China subsidiary	4.14***	2.49*
	(0.90)	(1.02)
China sub.·Covered	4.52***	1.80
	(1.06)	(1.23)
Imports from China (H3):		
ln Imports	0.11+	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.08)
ln Imports·Covered	0.24**	0.35***
	(0.09)	(0.11)
Input-sourcing:		
Input coverage		1.91
		(2.67)
ln Revenue·Input coverage		0.11*
		(0.05)
China sub.·Input coverage		2.98***
		(0.65)
ln Imported Inputs		−0.50
		(0.46)
ln Imported Inputs·Input coverage		−0.31
		(0.31)
Exporting:		
ln Exports		0.10
		(0.11)
ln Exports·Covered		−0.26+
		(0.15)
Additional controls:		
Foreign subsidiary	0.43	0.44
	(0.40)	(0.42)
Foreign branch	6.95***	6.96***
	(0.58)	(0.60)
Publicly traded	−2.43***	−2.44***
	(0.46)	(0.49)
List 2	0.95+	−0.27
	(0.50)	(0.61)
List 3	−1.11*	−1.70***
	(0.46)	(0.51)
List 4A	1.10	1.10
	(6.55)	(6.73)
Intercept	−2.20	0.23
	(2.14)	(3.86)
N	12008	11400
Industry FE	Yes	Yes
Firm sample	Public	Public

Notes: All models are weighted OLS with weighted OLS standard errors. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{+}p < 0.1$.

Robustness checks

One key question for robustness is whether we have operationalized the idea of *tariff coverage* in an appropriate fashion. In the top half of Table A3, we examine alternative operationalizations. In column 1, we recreate our findings from column 2 of Table 2 for the sake of comparison. Recall that 'Covered' is equal to one if any of the firms' 6-digit NAICS industries is mapped to by at least one tariff code on the list. In the second and third columns, we use a coverage measure based on the number and share of the firms' 6-digit NAICS industries that are mapped to by at least one tariff exclusion request. In columns 4-5, we construct a new measure based off of HTS 8 codes. For each 6-digit industry of a firm, we examine the proportion of HTS 8 codes falling in that industry that are covered by a list's tariffs. In column 4 we average that metric across a firm's 6-digit NAICS industries; in column 5 we sum the metric across the firm's 6-digit NAICS industries. While the size of the coefficients naturally change because these variables are all measured on different scales, we find the directional consistency of the results across the different measures to be striking.

A second key question is whether we have operationalized *requests for tariff exclusion* appropriately. As we described in the main text, firms could request exclusion for only one HTS code or for dozens of unique HTS codes covered by a list. To investigate whether the varying intensity of exclusion requests might affect our findings, we examine the logged number of unique 10-digit HTS codes for which a firm requested exclusion as the main dependent variable (DV). We do so in the lower half of Table A3. This part of the table recreates all of the models from above but using this alternative DV. Note that we multiply the DV by 100 so that the coefficient on the *Large* and *China subsidiary* variables in Column 1, for example, should be interpreted as the percentage increase in the number of exclusion requests when the variable switches from a zero to a one. The coefficient on the ln *Imports* variable is itself multiplied by 100, so it is should be interpreted as the percentage increase in the number of unique exclusion requests if *Imports* increases by 1%. We see very similar findings across the models using this alternative outcome variable.

Table A3: Own-industry tariff coverage and firms' exclusion requests

Coverage measure:	Covered	# Cvrd.	Pr. Cvrd.	Avg. HTS cvrd.	Sum HTS cvrd.
	%-age chance of requesting exclusion				
Coverage of Own Industry by Section 301 tariffs:					
Coverage measure	−0.12***	−0.12***	−0.13***	−0.16***	−0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Firm size (H1):					
Large	−0.03	0.08**	−0.02	0.22***	0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Large·Coverage measure	1.04***	0.59***	1.59***	1.56***	0.91***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Ownership of subsidiaries in China (H2):					
China subsidiary	1.93***	2.94***	2.01***	3.55***	4.23***
	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.14)
China sub.·Coverage measure	7.72***	2.93***	12.55***	18.60***	5.77***
	(0.25)	(0.08)	(0.32)	(0.44)	(0.13)
Imports from China (H3):					
ln Imports	−0.00	−0.00+	−0.00**	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ln Imports·Coverage measure	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	958896	958896	958896	887888	958896
	logged # of Unique HTS Codes Requested				
Coverage of Own Industry by Section 301 tariffs:					
Coverage measure	−0.14***	−0.16***	−0.19***	−0.21***	−0.27***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Firm size (H1):					
Large	−0.15***	0.01	−0.13***	0.15***	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large·Coverage measure	1.42***	0.79***	2.14***	2.29***	1.26***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Ownership of subsidiaries in China (H2):					
China subsidiary	2.12***	3.27***	2.67***	3.69***	4.73***
	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.19)
China sub.·Coverage measure	11.60***	4.68***	17.88***	31.71***	10.13***
	(0.33)	(0.10)	(0.43)	(0.58)	(0.18)
Imports from China (H3):					
ln Imports	−0.05	−0.17	−0.24*	0.02	−0.13
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)
ln Imports·Coverage measure	0.93***	1.07***	2.11***	1.22***	1.75***
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.17)
N	958896	958896	958896	887888	958896

Notes: All models are weighted OLS with weighted OLS standard errors. $^{***}p < 0.001, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{+}p < 0.1$. All models include firm-level controls, 3-digit industry fixed effects, list fixed effects. Sample is all goods-producing firms.

Examining exporting and fears of retaliation

In this section, we present results on exporting and its interaction with tariff coverage, in order to explore the idea that exporting firms might be using the exclusion process to prevent retaliation on their own exports by China. We begin by showing the estimated coefficients on ln Exports and its interaction with Covered from Table 2 model 3. These are presented in the top half of Table A4 in model 1. We then consider some other model permutations, including models among only L/VL firms and very large firms in columns 2 and 3. In

the lower half of the table, we drop the interactions between the final product offshoring and input-sourcing variables and the coverage and input coverage variables, respectively, in order to further explore the export measure in a less stringent model setup.

Table A4: Own-industry tariff coverage and firms' exclusion requests

	1	2	3
	%-age chance of requesting exclusion		
Models with final product/input-sourcing interactions:			
Covered	-0.12^{***}	-1.90^{***}	-2.76^{+}
	(0.03)	(0.40)	(1.54)
ln Exports	0.00	0.03^{*}	0.12^{+}
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.06)
ln Exports·Covered	0.00	-0.11^{***}	-0.28^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.09)
N	942976	122980	25704
Models without final product/input-sourcing interactions:			
Covered	-0.05^{+}	-0.81^{*}	-0.74
	(0.02)	(0.36)	(1.42)
ln Exports	-0.00	-0.05^{**}	-0.03
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.06)
ln Exports·Covered	0.00^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.10
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.07)
N	942976	122980	25704
Firm-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Final product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Input-sourcing controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
List FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm sample	All	L/VL	Very large

Notes: All models are weighted OLS with weighted OLS standard errors. $^{***}p < 0.001, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{+}p < 0.1$. All models include firm-level controls, 3-digit industry fixed effects, list fixed effects. Sample is all goods-producing firms.

Overall we don't see a strongly consistent pattern that firms in industries that export more are more likely to file exclusion requests when their goods are covered. This is even true among only the largest firms. For instance, while we see such a pattern in the specifications in the lower half of the table in models 1 and 2, we don't see that pattern in model 3 or when the other major variables are controlled for in the top half of the table.