Matthew M. Singer, Conditional Accountability for the Economy, Crime, and Corruption Across Latin American Party Systems. *Latin American Politics and Society* vol. 62, no. 4 (winter 2020).

Web Appendix-

Web Appendix 1: Question Wording

Government Approval: Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President [Incumbent]? (4) Very good, (3) Good, (2) Neither good nor bad (fair), (1) Bad, or (0) Very bad.

National Economy is Getting Better: "Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (2) Better, (1) Same, (0) Worse"

Feels Unsafe in Neighborhood: "Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (0) Very safe, (1) Somewhat safe, (2) Somewhat unsafe, (3) Very unsafe."

Asked to Pay a Bribe: Coded from a series of questions: "In the last twelve months, did [actor] ask you for a bribe? (0) No (1) Yes." The list included the following actors: government employee, police officer, local government official, or the courts. If the person was asked to pay a bribe in any of these places they are coded as a 1 and if they were never asked to pay a bribe they are coded as a 0.

Left-Right Proximity to the Ruling Party: One challenge in measuring left-right congruence between the incumbent and the respondent is estimating the incumbent's placement on the left-right scale. In an ideal world, we would have data where respondents are asked about how the president should be scored (Golder and Stramski 2010) that would ensure that placements of the executive and the voter are based on a common scale. Yet these data do not exist except for a handful of Latin American countries. Thus we follow Powell (2009) and others and measure the incumbent's position using expert surveys. In particular, we use Wiesehomeier and Benoit's expert survey to estimate the left-right position of each president. The survey was conducted between 2006 and 2007 and asks experts on party competition in the 18 countries studied here to place the major parties in each country as well as the sitting president on the left-right scale. From this survey, I generated a measure of the president's ideology, using the average placement of the president in the cases where the president at the time of the AmericasBarometer survey was the same president covered in the Wiesehomeier and Benoit expert survey and using the average position of the ruling party when the president was different from the one at the time of the expert survey. The challenge was that the Wiesehomeier and Benoit expert survey uses a 1-20 scale while the left-right self-placement question in the AmericasBarometer is asked along a 1-10 scale. I thus rescaled the left-right scores from the expert survey by the following transformation $LRPres_{rescaled}=(LRPres_{original}-1)*9/19+1$.

I then measure respondent self-placement using answers to the question:

> On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

I then compare respondents' self-placements with my estimated presidents' positions by calculating a measure of left-right proximity, measured as for respondent *i* in country-year *j*

$$Proximity_{ij}=10-|LRRespondent_{ij}-LRPresident_{j}|$$

High values designate individuals who have very similar left-right placements as the president.

Female: Coded by the interviewer (0) male or (1) female

Wealth: This variable is an income quintile measure coded from a factor analysis that looks at which of the following household goods the respondent reported owning: phone (landline or cellular), tv, refrigerator, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, washing machine, a computer, a motorcycle, and the number of cars they own. The measure, generated by the AmericasBarometer staff, then break respondents into quintiles within each country by doing a factor analysis of these various goods to see which ones cluster together, separating urban and rural respondents who might not have access to these goods at the same level (e.g. if indoor plumbing is not as widely available). High values represent the wealthier quintiles.

Age: respondents were asked the year that they were born and, form that, their age is calculated. I generated dummy variables for each decade (26-35, 36-45, etc. until 66+).

Education: Coded from the question

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?
_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1^0	2^0	3^0	4^0	5^0	6^0
None	0					
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11	12
University	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Post-secondary, not university	13	14	15			

Coded as according to the table above.

Web Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Table 1

Table A1 and A2 below contains the descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis. As explained below, I recode the government approval variable so that low levels represent high levels of approval and vice versa because the HLM software estimates its ordered models such that positive values on the coefficients predicted increased likelihoods of being at the lowest value of the DV. Thus by flipping the dependent variable the coefficients become

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for the Whole Sample

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Government Approval-Scale Flipped for Modeling	1.81	1.00	0	4
State of the Economy Compared to 12 Months Ago	0.74	0.73	0	2
Feels Safe in the Neighborhood	1.66	0.94	0	3
Not a Corruption Victim in Last 12 Months	0.85	0.36	0	1
Corruption is Rare	0.80	0.85	0	3
Left-Right Proximity to the Ruling Party	6.70	2.11	0.47	10
Female	0.51	0.50	0	1
Income Quintile	1.96	1.42	0	4
Age	2.87	1.56	1	6
Education	9.30	4.52	0	18
Effective Number of Parties	3.77	2.13	1.07	13.27

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for People Who Voted for the President in the Last Election

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Government Approval-Scale Flipped for Modeling	1.44	0.93	0	4
State of the Economy Compared to 12 Months Ago	0.89	0.76	0	2
Feels Insecure in the Neighborhood	1.70	0.94	0	3
Corruption Victim in Last 12 Months	0.86	0.35	0	1
Corruption is Rare	0.85	0.86	0	3
Left-Right Proximity to the Ruling Party	7.06	1.98	0.47	10
Female	0.51	0.50	0	1
Income Quintile	1.91	1.41	0	4
Age	3.13	1.51	1	6
Education	8.99	4.59	0	18
Effective Number of Parties	3.77	2.13	1.07	13.27

Web Appendix 3: Full Results with Demographic Controls

In order to conserve space, the results in Table 1 and Table 2 do not contain the coefficients for the demographic controls or for the intercept and cut points. Tables A3 and A4 below contain the full results for those models.

Table A3: Full Results of Table 1

	Full Sample				Voted for the President in the Last Election			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Evaluation of the National Economy	0.824***	0.824***	0.800***	0.790***	0.741***	0.740***	0.723***	0.715***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.017)
Effective Number of Parties (ENP)	-0.087º	-0.043	-0.032	0.027	-0.173***	-0.074	-0.076	0.006
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.084)
National Economy*ENP		-0.040**		-0.045**		-0.013		-0.041***
		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.013)		(0.008)
Feels Safe in Neighborhood	0.185***	0.184***	0.186***	0.184***	0.192***	0.191***	0.191***	0.188***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Feels Safe*ENP		-0.010*		-0.012**		-0.010*		-0.018***
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Not Asked for a Bribe	0.233***	0.235***			0.187***	0.177***		
	(0.029)	(0.029)			(0.031)	(0.030)		
No Bribery*ENP		-0.017				-0.034*		
		(0.014)				(0.015)		
Corruption is Rare			0.203***	0.201***			0.158***	0.159***
			(0.011)	(0.011)			(0.012)	(0.012)
No Corruption*ENP				-0.011º				-0.008
				(0.006)				(0.006)
Proximity to the President	0.111***	0.110***	0.123***	0.117***	0.051	0.050***	0.058***	0.057***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Proximity*ENP		-0.023***		-0.028***		-0.015**		-0.019***
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.005)		(0.003)
Age	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.011***	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.063***	0.066***	0.068***	0.068***	0.050*	0.051*	0.045*	0.045*
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Wealth Quintile	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.003	-0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)

Education	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.006*	-0.006*	0.018***	0.018***	0.022***	0.022***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Intercept	-2.947	-3.144	-2.944	-2.930	-2.558	-2.548	-2.345	-2.327
	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.154)	(0.151)	(0.138)	(0.211)
Threshold 1	2.402	2.402	2.430	2.430	2.524	2.525	2.520	2.505
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Threshold 2	4.748	4.747	4.836	4.836	5.087	5.088	5.152	5.126
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Threshold 3	6.070	6.069	6.247	6.247	6.401	6.401	6.587	6.560
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Variance Components								
Country-Year	0.451	0.522	0.368	0.355	0.729	0.697	0.482	0.637
Country	0.123	0.120	0.120	0.122	0.284	0.278	0.234	0.661
National Economy	0.105	0.101	0.086	0.080	0.084	0.084	0.059	0.007
Feels Safe	0.007	0.007	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.000	0.000
No Bribery	0.067	0.055			0.030	0.026		
Corruption is Rare			0.007	0.007			0.001	0.002
Proximity	0.017	0.015	0.014	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.004	0.000
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Female	0.011	0.007	0.000	0.000	0.019	0.019	0.000	0.000
Wealth Quintile	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.000
Education	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Number of Observations	136,621	136,621	109,092	109,092	51,889	51,889	42,111	42,111
Number of Country-Years	105	105	87	87	104	104	86	86
Number of Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Multi-Level Ordered Logistic Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses ° p<0.10, * <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two tailed test)								

Table A4: Full Results of Table 2

	Full Sample		Voted for the President in the Last Election	
	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
Evaluation of the National Economy	0.770***	0.755***	0.725***	0.690***
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.032)
Single Party Majority (MAJORITY)	0.317°	-0.384	0.547*	0.477*
	(0.186)	(0.281)	(0.232)	(0.233)
National Economy*MAJORITY	0.150*	0.162*	0.054	0.108°
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.059)
Feels Safe in Neighborhood	0.162***	0.164***	0.168***	0.160***
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Feels Safe*MAJORITY	0.083***	0.083***	0.078***	0.103***
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Not Asked for a Bribe	0.229***		0.203***	
	(0.035)		(0.037)	
No Bribery*MAJORITY	-0.045		-0.051	
	(0.058)		(0.065)	
Corruption is Rare		0.176***		0.141***
		(0.012)		(0.014)
No Corruption*MAJORITY		0.098***		0.062*
		(0.023)		(0.026)
Proximity to the President	0.088***	0.107***	0.047***	0.057***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Proximity*MAJORITY	0.073**	0.057*	0.014	-0.002
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.021)
Age	0.003***	0.003***	0.011***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.054***	0.068***	0.049*	0.046*
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Wealth Quintile	-0.032***	-0.028***	-0.003	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Education	-0.009**	-0.006*	0.018***	0.022***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Intercept	-3.033	-4.496	-2.546	-2.461
	(0.112)	(0.164)	(0.151)	(0.145)
Threshold 1	2.403	2.431	2.525	2.523
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Threshold 2	4.749	4.837	5.087	5.154
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Threshold 3	6.070	6.248	6.400	6.588

	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.039)
Variance Components				
Country-Year	0.452	1.073	0.648	0.467
Country	0.099	0.136	0.217	0.200
National Economy	0.096	0.078	0.083	0.047
Feels Safe	0.005	0.001	0.003	0.001
No Bribery	0.059		0.031	
Corruption is Rare		0.005		0.001
Proximity	0.016	0.014	0.011	0.005
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Female	0.012	0.001	0.018	0.001
Wealth Quintile	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.001
Education	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Number of Observations	136,621	109,092	51,889	42,111
Number of Country-Years	105	87	104	86
Number of Countries	18	18	18	18
Multi-Level Ordered Logistic Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses ° p<0.10, * <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two tailed test)				

Appendix 4: Robustness Checks

The results in Table 1 include all cases in Latin America, but raise the question of whether the outlier case of Brazil is driving the results. In this appendix, I test whether Brazil is serving as an influential observation in two ways. First, in Table A5 I exclude all Brazilian survey-years from the analyses. There are significant interaction terms between electoral fragmentation and feeling safe, such that this variable's importance for government approval drops in more fragmented countries. The other relationships in Table 1, however, are somewhat affected by the exclusion of Brazil. There is a significant and negative interaction term between electoral fragmentation and economic evaluations in the entire sample but not among voters who voted for the winner (the negative interaction term is in the expected direction but is not significant at even the marginal 0.10 level). Then interaction terms between the party system fragmentation and corruption victimization are negative but not significant in either sample while the effect of corruption perceptions is significantly reduced by the party system in the whole sample but not among the sample of previous incumbent supporters.

These results suggest that Brazil is an influential observation. However, given the relatively small number of countries and the clustered nature of electoral fragmentation within countries, reducing the sample also reduces the statistical power we have available to evaluate the effect of fragmentation. Thus in Table A6 I try an alternative method to minimize the effect of the most fragmented legislatures from Brazil while still using observations form that case by capping the effective number of parties at 10. All the interaction terms remain negative as expected and only two are not significant at conventional levels. There is no significant interactive relationship between economic perceptions and party fragmentation among the sample of previous incumbent supporters when bribe victimization is controlled for but there is when corruption victimization is controlled for. Then the interaction term for corruption perceptions is not significant at conventional levels among those who voted for the president in the previous election.

Taken together, the results in Tables A3 and A4 suggest that the effect of the party system on electoral accountability is not completely robust to the sample and the model specifications. Conclusions about the effect of corruption seem to be particularly contingent upon the inclusion or exclusion of Brazil, a case in which corruption voting may be weakened by factors beyond its fragmented party system (Pavao 2018). Yet most of the interaction terms between electoral fragmentation and perceived government are negative and significantly different from 0 at conventional levels even when I take steps to mitigate the effect of Brazil on the analysis, suggesting that a fragmented party system does generally reduce accountability.

Table A5: Model of Presidential Approval with All Brazil Years Excluded

	Full Sample				Only Respondents Who Previously Voted for the President			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Evaluation of the National Economy	0.821***	0.819***	0.800***	0.790***	0.744***	0.744***	0.732***	0.730***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Effective Number of Parties (ENP)	-0.052	-0.020	-0.035	0.027	-0.242**	-0.157°	-0.205*	-0.147
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.090)
National Economy*ENP		-0.050**		-0.044*		-0.032		-0.035
		(0.015)		(0.017)		(0.022)		(0.023)
Feels Safe in Neighborhood	0.185***	0.183***	0.186***	0.183***	0.194***	0.193***	0.195***	0.193***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Feels Safe*ENP		-0.012*		-0.013***		-0.016°		-0.026**
		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.008)		(0.008)
Not Asked for a Bribe	0.242***	0.240***			0.201***	0.198***		
	(0.027)	(0.027)			(0.032)	(0.032)		
No Bribery*ENP		-0.019				-0.029		
		(0.014)				(0.024)		
Corruption is Rare			0.203***	0.201***			0.160***	0.159***
			(0.011)	(0.011)			(0.012)	(0.012)
No Corruption*ENP				-0.010°				-0.012
				(0.006)				(0.009)
Proximity to the President	0.110***	0.107***	0.123***	0.116***	0.057***	0.057***	0.067***	0.066***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Proximity*ENP		-0.029***		-0.030***		-0.019*		-0.010°
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.006)
Age	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.068***	0.070***	0.068***	0.068***	0.049*	0.050*	0.055**	0.055**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)

Wealth Quintile	-0.034***	-0.037***	-0.028***	-0.028***	0.001	0.001	0.007	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Education	-0.011***	-0.013***	-0.006*	-0.006*	0.020***	0.020***	0.023***	0.023***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Intercept	-2.936	-2.930	-2.944	-2.930	-2.408	-2.407	-2.392	-2.388
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Threshold 1	2.401	2.401	2.430	2.429	2.540	2.541	2.540	2.541
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Threshold 2	4.747	4.748	4.836	4.835	5.119	5.119	5.173	5.173
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Threshold 3	6.088	6.088	6.247	6.246	6.488	6.488	6.616	6.615
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Variance Components	0.421	0.418	0.368	0.354	0.644	0.622	0.515	0.503
Country-Year	0.128	0.127	0.120	0.121	0.258	0.259	0.473	0.223
Country	0.104	0.097	0.086	0.080	0.085	0.081	0.263	0.062
National Economy	0.006	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.005	0.022	0.000
Feels Safe	0.048	0.050			0.031	0.030		
No Bribery			0.007	0.007			0.039	0.001
Corruption is Rare	0.017	0.014	0.014	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.053	0.003
Proximity	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Age	0.006	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.000
Female	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.000
Wealth Quintile	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.000
Education	0.821	0.819	0.800	0.790	0.744	0.744	0.732	0.730
N Respondents	130,012	130,012	105,295	105,295	48,496	48,496	39,902	39,902
N Country-Years	99	99	83	83	99	99	83	83
N Countries	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17

Multi-Level Ordered Logit Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. Estimated with HLM 7.
° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)

Appendix Table A6: Model of Presidential Approval with the Effective Number of Parties Capped at 10

	Full Sample				Voted for the President in the Last Election			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Evaluation of the National Economy	0.826*** (0.033)	0.829*** (0.032)	0.801*** (0.033)	0.961*** (0.067)	0.741*** (0.032)	0.812*** (0.062)	0.723*** (0.030)	0.873*** (0.034)
Effective Number of Parties (ENP)	-0.077 (0.047)	-0.041 (0.048)	-0.034 (0.049)	0.025 (0.052)	-0.172** (0.061)	-0.114° (0.064)	-0.080 (0.063)	0.003 (0.085)
National Economy*ENP		-0.044** (0.015)		-0.046** (0.017)		-0.019 (0.014)		-0.042*** (0.008)
Feels Safe in Neighborhood	0.185*** (0.010)	0.186*** (0.010)	0.186*** (0.007)	0.229*** (0.015)	0.192*** (0.012)	0.233*** (0.022)	0.191*** (0.011)	0.257*** (0.021)
Feels Safe*ENP		-0.010* (0.005)		-0.012** (0.004)		-0.011* (0.005)		-0.018*** (0.005)
Not Asked for a Bribe	0.237*** (0.027)	0.230*** (0.027)			0.187*** (0.030)	0.302*** (0.062)		
No Bribery*ENP		-0.027* (0.014)				-0.034* (0.016)		
Corruption is Rare			0.203*** (0.011)	0.241*** (0.023)			0.158*** (0.012)	0.188*** (0.024)
No Corruption*ENP				-0.011° (0.006)				-0.008 (0.006)
Proximity to the President	0.111*** (0.013)	0.111*** (0.012)	0.123*** (0.013)	0.224*** (0.027)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.117*** (0.023)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.131*** (0.012)
Proximity*ENP		-0.026*** (0.006)		-0.029*** (0.007)		-0.018*** (0.005)		-0.020*** (0.003)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)
Female	0.065*** (0.014)	0.065*** (0.014)	0.068*** (0.012)	0.068*** (0.012)	0.050* (0.022)	0.051* (0.022)	0.045* (0.019)	0.045* (0.019)
Wealth Quintile	-0.037*** (0.007)	-0.038*** (0.007)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)
Education	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.006*	-0.006*	0.018***	0.018***	0.022***	0.022***

	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Intercept	-2.664	-2.946	-2.815	-3.024	-1.597	-1.819	-2.043	-2.338
	(0.203)	(0.104)	(0.206)	(0.216)	(0.273)	(0.279)	(0.267)	(0.374)
Threshold 1	2.402	2.402	2.430	2.429	2.524	2.525	2.520	2.505
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Threshold 2	4.747	4.747	4.836	4.835	5.087	5.088	5.152	5.126
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Threshold 3	6.068	6.069	6.247	6.246	6.401	6.401	6.587	6.560
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Variance Components								
Country-Year	0.459	0.454	0.368	0.355	0.643	0.632	0.482	0.634
Country	0.113	0.113	0.121	0.122	0.287	0.277	0.234	0.655
National Economy	0.104	0.100	0.086	0.080	0.084	0.083	0.059	0.007
Feels Safe	0.007	0.007	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.001	0.001
No Bribery	0.049	0.048			0.028	0.024		
Corruption is Rare			0.007	0.007			0.001	0.002
Proximity	0.017	0.015	0.014	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.004	0.001
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Female	0.009	0.010	0.000	0.000	0.020	0.021	0.001	0.001
Wealth Quintile	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.001
Education	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
Number of Observations	136,621	136,621	109,092	109,092	51,889	51,889	42,111	42,111
Number of Country-Years	105	105	87	87	104	104	86	86
Number of Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Multi-Level Ordered Logistic Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses ° p<0.10, * <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two tailed test)								