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ONLINE APPENDIX

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Appendix Part 1. Alternative Models

In the main manuscript, a roll is defined as when the majority of a party votes in opposition to a measure that passes in spite of that opposition. To identify rolls, we focus on the number of yes and no votes each party caucus takes to identify the majority position. However, occasionally a majority of a party's caucus will abstain rather than mostly vote yes or no. In the main results, we ignore these votes and simply identify the party's position based on the number of yes and no votes, even if most of the party abstained. While it is possible including these votes is influencing the results, we believe it is unlikely to have much substantive effect on our results. Most importantly for our analysis, it is exceedingly rare for the PRI or PAN to abstain as their majority position. Among all the recorded roll call votes taken from 1998-2015, we identified 2 votes where the PRI's majority position was abstain. For the PAN, a majority of deputies abstained on

8 votes across the same time period. However, for the PRD abstaining is more common. We identified 26 different roll call votes where a majority of PRD deputies abstained from 1998-2015. While we have no reason to believe including these votes will affect our results, here we present alternative models to those presented in the manuscript where we exclude all roll call votes where either the PRI, PAN or PRD abstained as their majority position. Thus, we exclude 1.1 percent of our sample due to these abstention votes. See Table A1 below for the models.

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5		
	$H_{1\&2}$ (presidential initiatives only)			H_3 (legislative initiatives only, all terms)			H_3 (legislative initiatives only, 58th, 59th & 61st legislatures)			H_4 (amendments to presidential initiatives)			H_4 (amendments to legislative initiatives)		
	b	s.e.	sig.	b	s.e.	sig.	b	s.e.	sig.	b	s.e.	sig.	b	s.e.	sig.
President's party	-3.11	0.73	*	-0.40	0.10	*	-0.41	0.13	*	-1.84	0.36	*	0.31	0.18	
Median party	-2.69	0.58	*	-2.01	0.17	*	-3.07	0.40	*	-2.33	0.41	*	-2.32	0.31	*
Constant	-2.02	0.30	*	-1.41	0.10	*	-2.20	0.13	*	-0.96	0.17	*	-0.43	0.14	*
N (observations)	2865			20197			10925			2564			3213		
N(votes)	376			2676			1443			344			435		
Log likelihood	-942.95			-5512.79			-2650.67			-1162.62			-1295.01		
AIC	1901.91			11041.58			5311.34			2341.24			2606.02		
BIC	1949.59			11104.89			5347.83			2388.03			2654.62		
P(Roll | Med. Party=0, Pres. Party=0)	0.154	0.010		0.096	0.003		0.083	0.004		0.245	0.013		0.176	0.010	
P(Roll | Med. Party=0, Pres. Party=1)	0.008	0.005		0.067	0.006		0.057	0.006		0.050	0.016		0.222	0.024	
P(Roll | Med. Party=1, Pres. Party=0)	0.013	0.007		0.014	0.002		0.004	0.002		0.032	0.013		0.022	0.006	
P(Roll | Med. Party=1, Pres. Party=1)	0.001	0.001		0.010	0.002		0.003	0.001		0.005	0.003		0.029	0.009	

Appendix Table A1. Predicting Rolls on Presidential and Legislative Initiatives

Note: *p<.05, two-tailed. Fixed effects for legislative term included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by vote. Unit of analysis is the party-vote. Predicted probabilities are reported along with delta-method standard errors. These models exclude roll call votes where majority position of PRI, PAN or PRD was abstain. We also exclude all roll call votes where we could not identify the original sponsor on bills coming from the Senate.

As is apparent in Table A1, when we exclude roll call votes where a major party decided to abstain, the results are very similar to those presented in the manuscript.

In the main manuscript, we also consider budget votes on the expenditure portion of the budget (*Presupuesto de Egresos*) to be legislative initiatives. While the executive branch has the exclusive constitutional right to propose the budget, the actual expenditure bill is generally a creation of the legislature. Here, we replicate the results coding these budget votes as presidential initiatives in Table A2 to demonstrate this decision has only a minor influence on our results.

Appendix Table A2. Predicting Rolls on Presidential and Legislative Initiatives (with budget votes coded as presidential initiatives)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5		
	$H_{1\&2}$ (presidential initiatives only)			H_3 (legislative initiatives only, all terms)			H_3 (legislative initiatives only, 58th, 59th & 61st legislatures)			H_4 (amendments to presidential initiatives)			H_4 (amendments to legislative initiatives)		
	b	s.e.	sig.	b	s.e.	sig.	b	s.e.	sig.	b	s.e.	sig.	b	s.e.	sig.
President's party	-2.79	0.60	*	-0.41	0.10	*	-0.41	0.13	*	-0.46	0.19	*	-0.29	0.26	
Median party	-2.79	0.58	*	-2.00	0.17	*	-2.93	0.37	*	-1.64	0.24	*			
Constant	-1.84	0.27	*	-1.43	0.10	*	-2.15	0.13	*	-1.03	0.15	*	-0.18	0.12	
N (observations)	3069			20251			10957			3447			2107		
N(votes)	403			2684			1447			467			326		
Log likelihood	-1038.80			-5591.48			-2680.88			-1524.11			-1015.40		
AIC	2093.61			11198.96			5371.76			3064.23			2044.79		
BIC	2141.84			11262.29			5408.27			3113.39			2084.36		
P(Roll | Med. Party=0, Pres. Party=0)	0.158	0.009		0.098	0.003		0.084	0.004		0.207	0.011		0.211	0.012	
P(Roll | Med. Party=0, Pres. Party=1)	0.012	0.007		0.068	0.006		0.057	0.006		0.143	0.020		0.169	0.031	
P(Roll | Med. Party=1, Pres. Party=0)	0.012	0.007		0.015	0.002		0.005	0.002		0.049	0.011		0		
P(Roll | Med. Party=1, Pres. Party=1)	0.001	0.001		0.010	0.002		0.003	0.001		0.032	0.008		0		

Note: *p<.05, two-tailed. Fixed effects for legislative term included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by vote. Unit of analysis is the party-vote. Predicted probabilities are reported along with delta-method standard errors. These models code all votes on the budget as presidential initiatives. We also exclude all roll call votes where we could not identify the original sponsor on bills coming from the Senate.

As can be seen in Table A2, we continue to find support for all of our hypotheses across all the models, and for the most part, the predicted probability of being rolled differs little when comparing the results in this table to Table 3 in the manuscript. There are a few exceptions, however. Since there are a substantial number of amendment votes to the budget bill, the decision to code the amendments to the budget as an amendment to

a legislative or presidential initiative has an influence on the results of Model 4. We find in Model 4 that presidential parties that do not contain the median legislator face substantial rolls (0.14 probability of being rolled), when we code amendments to budget votes as amendments to presidential initiatives. This result presents much stronger support for Hypothesis 4 in the manuscript compared to what is presented in Table 3 of the manuscript.

The president's party is often defeated on amendments to the budget. Under President Zedillo (PRI, 1994-2000), the PRI lost 9 amendment votes to the budget in the last two years of his term, and only 1 additional amendment vote on other presidential initiatives. Under President Fox (PAN, 2000-2006), the PAN lost 17 amendment votes on the budget, and an additional 4 amendment votes on other presidential initiatives. Under President Calderón (PAN, 2006-2012), the PAN lost 3 amendment votes on the budget, and an additional 4 amendment votes on other presidential initiatives. Under Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI, 2012-2018), the PRI lost 3 amendment votes on the budget during the first three years of his term, but did not lose a single amendment vote on other presidential initiatives.

In Model 5 of Table A2, we had to exclude the median party from the analysis, since when we consider budget votes as presidential initiatives, the median party was never rolled on any amendment to an initiative that originated in the legislature from 1998-2015.

Appendix Part 2. Spatial Positions of Mexican Parties along Left-Right Dimension

   In the manuscript, we identify the PRI as the median party and the PAN as on the right. Here we justify this decision along with a discussion of where to place other parties in the Chamber of Deputies. While few studies exist on dimensionality in voting in the Chamber of Deputies, most studies suggest the Mexican party system is fairly programmatic and competition falls along a traditional left-right dimension (Casar 2016; Cantú and Desposato 2012; Klesner 2005). There is also widespread consensus regarding placement of the three major parties (Casar 2016; Díaz-Jiménez and Vivero-Avila 2015; Paolino 2009). The National Action Party (PAN) falls on the right of the ideological spectrum, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) falls on the left, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is somewhere in the center, although closer to the PAN than the PRD. However, since there are numerous minor parties with somewhat ambiguous ideological leanings relative to the major parties, we largely rely on the University of Salamanca's Parliamentary Elites Survey for Mexico, which asks individual deputies to place political parties on a left-right scale.[1] Other work also suggests relying on survey estimates of ideological placement is superior to relying on roll-call votes alone (Saiegh 2009; Zucco Jr. and Lauderdale 2011). We have survey data of Mexican deputies from 1997-2015 and there is widespread stability in the placement of parties across time, as demonstrated in Table A3.

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[1] Parliamentary Elites survey data, Universidad de Salamanca. http://americo.usal.es/oir/elites/.

Table A3. Mean Left-Right Placement of Parties According to Federal Deputies (1=left, 10=right)

	LVII 1997-2000	LVIII 2000-2003	LIX 2003-2006	LX 2006-2009	LXI 2009-2012	LXII 2012-2015
PRI	6.93	6.09	6.29	6.23	6.32	6.28
s.d.	*2.38*	*2.01*	*1.52*	*1.70*	*2.23*	*1.97*
PAN	8.94	9.27	9.17	9.55	9.43	8.66
s.d.	*1.48*	*1.08*	*1.04*	*0.72*	*1.15*	*1.32*
PRD	2.68	2.56	2.79	2.29	3.14	2.94
s.d.	*1.57*	*1.19*	*1.42*	*1.35*	*3.66*	*1.66*
PVEM	5.95	7.10	6.91	6.42	6.60	6.94
s.d.	*1.55*	*1.82*	*1.57*	*1.49*	*1.92*	*1.61*
PT	3.86	2.93	3.55	2.71	1.80	2.31
s.d.	*1.67*	*1.41*	*1.47*	*1.29*	*1.18*	*1.43*
CONV/MC		n/a	4.93	3.70	3.67	2.64
s.d.			*1.54*	*1.45*	*1.53*	*1.69*
PANAL				n/a	6.43	n/a
s.d.					*1.89*	
PSN		n/a				
PAS		n/a				
PASC				n/a		

Source: Universidad de Salamanca, Parliamentary Elites Survey. Survey question: On a scale where 1 is left and 10 is right, where would you place the following parties? (Respondents did not place their own parties). Cell entries in italics are standard deviations.

One can observe in Table A3 the PRI is slightly center-right, and both the Mexican Ecologist Green Party (PVEM) and the New Alliance Party (PANAL) are virtually indistinguishable from the PRI. The spatial overlap between these three parties is not surprising given that PANAL is the result of a splinter from the PRI, and the PVEM has been a reliable electoral coalition partner for the PRI since 2003. The PAN occupies the right of the ideological spectrum, while the left is more fragmented among

the PRD, The Convergence Party/Citizen's Movement (CONV/MC)[2], and the Labor

Party (PT). The PRD originally was further to the left of the both CONV/MC and PT,

although more recently there has been a reversal between PRD and PT.

Most importantly, for our purposes, the PRI is consistently placed by federal

deputies in the center, to the left of the PAN and the right of the PRD. These results are

similar based on deputies' placement of the parties in the Chamber, or when we consider

self-placement along the left-right dimension (see Díaz-Jiménez and Vivero-Avila 2015).

However, the survey data is not sufficient to place all parties who won seats in the

Chamber of Deputies on a left-right continuum. To account for these missing data, we

use ideal points generated from roll call votes using W-Nominate (Poole et al. 2011) to

identify the placement of the missing parties relative to parties identified in the surveys.

We do not use ideal points to justify the placement of the major parties precisely because

W-Nominate is better understood at identifying government-opposition dynamics, rather

than left-right placement (Hix and Noury 2016; Jones, Hwang and Micozzi 2009; Zucco,

Jr. 2009). However, it is the best available alternative for identifying the relative location

of small parties.

In general, ideal points generated from roll call votes confirm the placement of

parties based on the survey data. For the 2000-2003 term, ideal points place the Social

Alliance Party (PAS) on the left, between the PRD and PT, and the Nationalist Society

Party (PSN) on the center-right between the PRI and PVEM. For the 2006-2009 term,

ideal points place the Alternative Social Democratic and Peasant Party (PASC) on the

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[2] Originally called the Convergence Party, the party changed its name during the 2009-2012 term to Citizen's Movement.

center-left between CONV and PRI. In 2014, the PRD's presidential candidate from 2006 and 2012 established the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) as a new party, drawing most of its congressional delegation from the Citizen's Movement (MC). Therefore, we place MORENA on the far left, followed by MC, PT and PRD, respectively. We also place PANAL in between the PRI and PVEM during the 2012-2015 term, which is similar to its placement during the 2009-2012 term.

There may be some controversy regarding our decision to identify the PRI as the median party and the PAN as the right leaning party through all terms studied here. W-Nominate ideal points place the PAN on the right when the PAN controls the presidency, but in the center during PRI presidencies. The PRI shifts towards the right according to W-Nominate when it controls the presidency. However, the survey data presented here in Table 2 suggest substantial stability in the placement of the PAN and PRI across time. While there is certainly a robust debate regarding the ideological placement of the PRI, the systematic flipping between the PAN and PRI based on W-Nominate scores based on who controls the presidency cannot be easily explained by radical changes in the ideological placement of the parties, nor do deputies themselves demonstrate any evidence of radical ideological shifts in the survey data presented above.

On their own, W-Nominate scores provide no information on the content of the underlying dimensions upon which legislators vote. Thus, it is up to scholars to identify the content of this dimension. We make an assumption, which is supported by many studies in Mexico, that the primary dimension of policy conflict within the legislature is based on left-right ideology, and that individual legislators and parties can be organized along this single dimension from the extreme left to the extreme right. Identifying the

median party only makes sense within a unidimensional policy space, since it is the party (or legislator) that occupies the median on the left-right dimension that we consider to be the median party. If we do not make an assumption about the underlying policy space, then the concept of the median party is somewhat nonsensical.

If we assume that the primary dimension of policy conflict with the Mexican chamber is ideological and parties can be placed along this dimension from left to right, then the PRI is the median party throughout all terms we study here. If we are agnostic about the underlying policy dimension and rely solely on W-Nominate, then the PRI is the median party until 2012, and the PAN is the median party from 2012-2015. From an empirical standpoint, if we just recode the median party from 2012-2015, most of our results would hold. However, from a theoretical standpoint, if we assume policy space is organized from left to right based on ideology, this assumption helps us understand a number of other observable patterns in the data. First, from 2000 on, the PRI is almost never rolled on any roll call vote even when they are in opposition. This outcome, and our theoretical framework which identifies the PRI as the median party, better explains this than if the PRI were the right leaning party in one term. Second, while the most common voting coalitions in the Chamber are PRI-PAN-PRD, or PRI-PAN, we also occasionally observe PRI-PRD voting coalitions. PAN-PRD coalitions against the PRI are almost never observed past 2000. If the PRI was on the right, and the PAN was the median, then we should assume we would see more PAN-PRD voting coalitions in the Chamber, but that is not the case. Assuming the PRI occupies the median in left-right policy space best explains these patterns. Third, assuming policy is organized along a left-right dimension helps explain why the PRI-PAN voting coalition is very common.

Since the PAN is on the right throughout this period, and occupies the presidency from 2000-2012, their closest option in left-right policy space to form a majority voting coalition is the PRI, not the PRD. If we make no assumptions about the underlying policy dimension, then it is hard to explain why the PAN did not also form majority voting coalitions with the other large opposition party, the PRD, especially when the PAN controlled the presidency.

After identifying the relative placement of political parties along the left-right spectrum, we plot each party for each term based on their seat share to identify which party holds the median. Figure 1 below plots the distribution of parties for the 1997-2012 period, and Figure 2 plots the distribution of parties for the 2012-2015 period. In every case, the PRI is the median party.

Appendix Figure 1. Left-right spatial distribution of parties in Mexican Chamber of Deputies based on seat share, 1997-2012

Appendix Figure 2. Left-right spatial distribution of parties in Mexican Chamber of Deputies based on seat share, 2012-2015

Appendix Part 3. The Legislative Process in Mexico

Norms regarding the Mexican federal legislative process are contained in 4 different juridical texts: a) the Mexican Constitution (1917); b) the Organic Law of the General Congress (1999); c) the Rules of the Chamber of Deputies (2010); and d) the Rules of the Senate (2010).

Article 71 of the Mexican Constitution grants the Executive, federal deputies, senators, state legislatures, and citizens[3] (in an equivalent number of at least 0.13% of the national list of voters), with the right to promote constitutional amendments, as well as bills to modify other federal norms. As Mexico has a bicameral structure at the national level, all bills (except for the ones attempting to change b, c and d above, must be submitted to a chamber of origin (which can be either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate) and then, these projects must undergo the same process in a chamber of revision (which is the opposite of the chamber of origin).

Since 2012, constitutional article 71 states that the first day of every ordinary legislative session,[4] the Mexican President can sponsor up to 2 non-constitutional amendments -or to select up to 2 bills that were presented in previous periods and did not receive committee action- to receive a high priority treatment. Priority Executive bills must be discussed in committees and approved or rejected by the chamber of origin within 30 days. In case the bill does not receive a committee review (*dictamen*) by the

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[3] The right of citizens to sponsor bills was granted in a 2012 constitutional reform.
[4] There are two periods of ordinary sessions in the Mexican federal legislative chambers. One starts in February and ends in April, while And the other starts in September and ends in December.

30th day after its introduction to the chamber, it must be discussed and voted upon directly on the chamber´s floor, without prior committee discussion.

The Constitution also establishes the Executive's exclusive right to draft and submit the yearly budget to the Chamber of Deputies. While article 74 focuses on the Chamber of Deputies' exclusive prerogative to discuss and approve this bill, no other actor aside from the President can draft a budgetary proposal in the Mexican policymaking process.

Since rules of both chambers define bill sponsorship as an unrestricted right, authorized sponsors can promote as many projects as they wish. Legislators are allowed to remove their bills from the process as long as these have not received a committee review. Legislators may present bills as unique authors, with other lawmakers endorsing the bill (*suscritos*), or as a group (which can be the whole caucus, only some members of the caucus, as a whole committee, as certain members of the committee, as members of different caucuses, and as members of the same state).

Once a project is drafted, the *Mesa Directiva* (MD) makes an initial review of the text, to determine if it meets the technical requirements established in the procedural rules of the chamber. Should the bill not meet these requirements, it is returned to its author(s) who must generate the necessary changes in no more than one day. According to the internal rules of both chambers, every bill that meets the normative technical requirements must be scheduled by the MD within the next two sessions, for being later submitted to committee for review.

Once scheduled, the MD president submits the bill to one or more committees. All bills must be subject to review by a committee. Once a committee has reviewed a bill and drafted a committee report *(dictamen)*, the MD cannot prevent the committee report from

being scheduled for a plenary vote. However, the MD still has some veto power earlier in the process when it suggests sponsors must make technical changes to their bills. Exceptional cases in which an issue can be waived of committee review are: a) when a 2/3 floor supermajority defines the project as an urgent bill; and b) when a committee exceeds the review time and its procedural rights are precluded.

Ordinary committees are assembled at the beginning of every 3-year legislative period. Chairs as well as other associates of committees are appointed (and can be removed at any time) by the *Junta de Coordinación Política* (JCP). As exclusive members of the JCP, caucus leaders hold a monopoly over assigning committee chairs after agreeing upon which committees each party will preside. The only restriction is that chairs must be distributed among caucuses according to each party´s floor presence.

Committees have a time limit for drafting a committee report.[5] This time lapse can be extended once in the process, at the committee chair's request. A report is an informed, technical and political document that expresses the committee's opinion on a bill or group of bills regarding the same issue. As such, reports must be endorsed by a 50%+1 majority of the committee's members. Standing committees have constructive, amendatory vetoes, since these organs can modify, delete or add contents to a bill or even mix contents of different bills when drafting their report. Their agenda power is institutionally granted as every bill must receive a committee review before it moves to the next step of the legislative process. Committees can also make a negative review that

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[5] Which is 30 natural days for secondary law and chamber rules amendments, and 90 days for constitutional reforms. These can be extended up to twice the initial time limit in cases where the committee chair formally requests an extension and the MD grants it.

sustains the reasons why a bill or group of bills should be dismissed. However, this is a weak veto since these rejections must be supported by a floor majority.

Internal rules of the Chamber establish that if a committee has not drafted a report after receiving the bill within its time limit, the committee's right to produce a report is precluded. In such cases, the MD president must program the unattended project for a direct floor vote. Such projects must receive a 2/3 floor majority for their approval. Otherwise, the issue is considered definitively dismissed.

A committee report can approve or reject a bill (or a group of bills regarding the same issue) on its general content. However, in case any committee member does not agree with the whole committee report, or even with a part of it, the member can present a minority report document known as a "*voto particular*". These minority reports can be drafted by one or more committee members. While minority reports are reserved for discussion until the committee report reaches the floor stage, committee chairs must include their content as part of the original report.

Also, legislators who drafted the bill or bills included in the committee report are allowed to present their own *voto particular* even if the authors are not members of the reviewing committee. These *votos particulares* can be presented in case the author(s) of the bill(s) consider the essence of their proposal was distorted by the committee's report.

Once the committee -or committees- involved in the report reach a majority decision on the general content of an issue, the text is submitted to the MD. Members of the MD must then schedule the report for floor discussion and a subsequent vote.

During the floor stage, reports must be voted upon first regarding their general content and then on reserved aspects of the bill from the minority reports/*votos*

particulares. For issues unanimously approved by all committee members, the MD, with previous endorsement of the JCP, announces a speaker that will present the general content of the report. After debate is open to all floor members, the issue is programmed for a roll-call vote. Approval of constitutional amendments requires a 2/3 majority vote, while every other reform only requires a 50%+1 (absolute) majority.

When a report contains particular votes of committee members or reservations from its authors, it is also subject to a floor vote on its general contents with a previous debate, but only if the report is defeated (which means it did not receive enough floor votes). *Votos particulares* are read by their authors to the rest of the Chamber in a floor discussion.

If a committee generates a negative review that rejects a bill, meaning that an absolute majority of committee members agreed to dismiss the issue, the refusal must be also discussed on the chamber's floor. The chair or any other committee member (assigned by a majority vote within committee) must communicate the motives for such rejection to the rest of the legislators in a floor discussion. After these arguments are debated on the floor, the MD president must call for a vote to determine (by a 50%+1 majority) if the committee´s rejection is accepted or if the issue must return to the same committee for further analysis and a new review, which must be drafted within the same original time limit. In case the floor approves the committee's rejection, then the bill or bills that motivated the report, are completely dismissed from the process.

In case a positive committee review does not garner the required floor votes, the MD president must open a new floor vote to determine (by a 50%+1 majority) if the issue is to be definitively dismissed or if it should be returned to the committee for a new

review that must be ready within the next 20 days (unless it is a preferential bill that can take up to 30 days).

Discussions of minority reports and other reservations to the committee's majority report, can begin only after the report has been approved in its general terms on the floor. Piecemeal discussions start with any legislator on the floor, presenting amendments on one or more than one article of the report under discussion. After every reservation presented by legislators has been debated, the House Speaker calls for a floor vote over each of these issues. Depending on their nature (if they are constitutional amendments or not), different majorities are required for the approval of *votos particulares.* Issues that do not gather the required majority, are not to be included in the reform.

The aforementioned process is only for the origin chamber. Once a committee report is approved by the floor, the MD must draft a new document called a *minuta,* which contains the committee's report as well as any modifications it may have suffered during the floor debate. In case the general contents of the *minuta* do not reach enough votes in the revision chamber's floor, the project is returned to the chamber of origin with the observations presented by the revision chamber. The committee that made the original report must make a new document that includes the observations made by the revision chamber. This new document is discussed on the chamber of origin's floor. Once it is approved, the new *minuta* is sent back to the revision chamber, which can approve the project on its new terms and thus submit it to the Executive. In case the project (again) does not gather enough votes in the revision chamber, it cannot be further discussed during the same ordinary session.

In case the revision chamber agrees with the general content of a *minuta*, but rejects some of its contents (or suggests changes to only a segment of the project), the text is submitted for a new review in the chamber of origin, but only to modify those parts that the revision chamber rejected, leaving all other parts of the project untouched. Once again, this new review is discussed on the chamber of origin's floor. When it is approved, the new *minuta* is sent back to the revision chamber, which can approve the project on its new terms and thus submit it to the Executive. Or, in case the project (again) does not gather enough votes in the revision chamber, it cannot be further discussed during the same period of ordinary sessions.

However, if both houses agree by a 50%+1 majority of their members present at the time of the vote, that a law can be published only with the articles on which there was an inter-chamber settlement, the articles on which the chambers agreed, are discussed on both chambers floors, and then (in case they gathered the respective majorities in both chambers), these articles are submitted to the Executive for approval.

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