Andy Baker and Dalton Dorr, Labor Informality and the Vote in Latin America: A Meta-analysis. *Latin American Politics and Society* vol. 64, no. 2 (Summer 2022).

ONLINE APPENDIX

A. Analyses of Vote Choice in 2018/19 LAPOP

The dependent variable *Vote choice (nominal)* measures the ideology of the candidate each respondent voted for in the most recent election (From LAPOP question vb3: "Who did you vote for in the last presidential election of 20##?"). It codes these choices as (1) leading leftist candidate, (2) leading centrist candidate, and (3) leading rightist candidate. The coefficients reported in Tables A1 and A2 are the multinomial logit (MNL) coefficients from equations that differentiate voters for the left (1) from voters for the right (3, treated as the base category). In some countries, coefficients for (1) versus (2) were also estimated, but they are not reported. Note that we code the leading non-leftist as 3 in every country that had just two major candidates.

The dependent variable *Vote choice (continuous)* also measures the ideology of the candidate that each respondent voted for in the most recent election, but it does so with a more informative scale. Responses are valued from 1 (rightist) to 20 (leftist) based on scores assigned by the Wiesehomeier-Benoit dataset (Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009). Tables A3 and A4 display the OLS regression coefficients from 17 regressions: 16 from single-country samples and one from a sample of all 16 countries.

**Table A1: Impact of Informality on Left Vote in Latin America:
MNL models, Part I**

	Mexico	Guate-mala	El Salvador	Hon-duras	Nic-aragua	Costa Rica	Ecuador
Informal Worker	0.045	-0.704	0.271	0.394	0.094	-0.092	-0.197
	(0.339)	(0.372)	(0.284)	(0.275)	(0.548)	(0.260)	(0.567)
Education	-0.030	-0.043	0.041	0.103*	-0.038	0.142*	-0.270
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.067)	(0.032)	(0.090)
Woman	-0.707	-0.050	0.098	-0.726*	0.957	-0.313	-0.269
	(0.319)	(0.377)	(0.274)	(0.259)	(0.658)	(0.255)	(0.535)
Age (logged)	-0.496	-0.889	0.152	-0.247	0.862	-0.145	0.061
	(0.470)	(0.613)	(0.420)	(0.317)	(0.753)	(0.380)	(0.787)
Urbanicity	-0.107	0.099	0.052	0.043	0.024	0.124	-0.080
	(0.156)	(0.114)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.162)	(0.092)	(0.169)
Constant	4.978*	2.365	-0.709	-0.320	-0.412	-0.945	6.716*
	(1.988)	(2.360)	(1.649)	(1.263)	(2.950)	(1.460)	(3.253)
Observations	507	230	288	377	254	353	442

Note: Dependent variable is *Vote choice (nominal)*, with vote for the leading rightist candidate as the base category. Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients from multinomial logit models with standard errors in parentheses. Samples are limited to informal and formal workers.
* = $p < .05$.

**Table A2: Impact of Informality on Left Vote in Latin America:
MNL models, Part II**

	Bolivia	Peru	Paraguay	Chile	Uruguay	Brazil	Argentina
Informal Worker	0.499	0.310	-0.305	0.214	-0.236	0.552*	0.072
	(0.599)	(0.541)	(1.659)	(0.356)	(0.393)	(0.249)	(0.218)
Education	-0.259	0.243*	0.831	0.232*	-0.002	-0.009	-0.081*
	(0.106)	(0.075)	(0.637)	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Woman	0.328	-0.917	-0.139	0.105	0.385	0.674*	0.236
	(0.586)	(0.553)	(1.690)	(0.304)	(0.330)	(0.240)	(0.202)
Age (logged)	1.000	-0.243	-14.101	-1.503*	-0.760	0.616	0.047
	(0.998)	(0.802)	(8.982)	(0.529)	(0.569)	(0.391)	(0.336)
Urbanicity	-0.307	-0.295	0.184	0.056	0.210	-0.347*	-0.003
	(0.195)	(0.146)	(0.706)	(0.111)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.092)
Constant	3.931	-2.973	28.628	1.046	3.931	-2.661	0.362
	(4.134)	(3.223)	(21.686)	(2.170)	(2.200)	(1.578)	(1.377)
Observations	482	173	305	333	491	448	482

Note: Dependent variable is *Vote choice (nominal)*, with vote for the leading rightist candidate as the base category. Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients from multinomial logit models with standard errors in parentheses. Samples are limited to informal and formal workers.
* = $p < .05$.

Table A3: Impact of Informality on Left Vote in Latin America: OLS Models, Part I

	Mexico	Guate-mala	El Salvador	Honduras	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Panama	Ecuador
Informal Worker	0.171	-0.518	0.919	0.740	-0.126	-0.176	0.593	-0.015
	(0.383)	(0.424)	(1.060)	(0.604)	(0.360)	(0.383)	(0.352)	(0.459)
Education	-0.022	-0.042	0.141	0.193*	-0.018	0.124*	0.037	-0.341*
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.121)	(0.060)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.059)
Woman	-0.904*	-0.132	0.400	-1.383*	0.736*	-0.056	0.158	0.298
	(0.382)	(0.409)	(1.022)	(0.552)	(0.352)	(0.367)	(0.351)	(0.448)
Age (logged)	-0.873	-0.975	0.396	-0.759	0.496	-1.192*	0.272	-0.240
	(0.529)	(0.647)	(1.573)	(0.690)	(0.479)	(0.553)	(0.545)	(0.616)
Urbanicity	-0.156	0.139	0.243	0.058	0.050	0.134	-0.199	-0.268*
	(0.173)	(0.126)	(0.324)	(0.183)	(0.105)	(0.134)	(0.102)	(0.136)
Constant	18.894*	10.161*	8.817	8.913*	9.698*	13.057*	4.156	19.181*
	(2.221)	(2.547)	(6.191)	(2.751)	(1.900)	(2.138)	(2.206)	(2.592)
Observations	507	300	290	415	261	441	308	452

Note: Dependent variable is *Vote choice (continuous)*. Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Samples are limited to informal and formal workers.
* = *p* <.05.

Table A4: Impact of Informality on Left Vote in Latin America: OLS Models, Part II

	Bolivia	Peru	Paraguay	Chile	Uruguay	Brazil	Argentina	Dom. Rep.	Lat. Am.
Informal Worker	0.324	0.033	0.075	-0.162	-0.090	0.947*	0.004	0.212	0.196
	(0.300)	(0.250)	(0.100)	(0.573)	(0.386)	(0.457)	(0.387)	(0.109)	(0.107)
Education	-0.104*	0.102*	0.010	0.202*	0.015	-0.002	-0.096	0.040*	0.015
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.012)	(0.081)	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.014)	(0.032)
Woman	0.193	-0.335	-0.039	0.051	0.483	0.895*	0.156	-0.289*	0.019
	(0.253)	(0.237)	(0.099)	(0.510)	(0.301)	(0.434)	(0.355)	(0.112)	(0.137)
Age (logged)	-0.011	-0.208	-0.229	-0.723	-1.198*	0.739	-0.261	0.453*	-0.242
	(0.409)	(0.359)	(0.139)	(0.876)	(0.520)	(0.673)	(0.585)	(0.189)	(0.146)
Urbanicity	-0.112	-0.192*	0.018	0.097	0.355*	-0.514*	0.084	0.001	-0.008
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.033)	(0.181)	(0.114)	(0.211)	(0.161)	(0.034)	(0.048)
Constant	17.966*	6.358*	6.370*	8.799*	14.639*	5.698*	10.388*	7.812*	10.527*
	(1.707)	(1.496)	(0.570)	(3.692)	(2.016)	(2.703)	(2.406)	(0.764)	(1.149)
Observations	483	466	415	363	509	473	510	428	6,621

Note: Dependent variable is *Vote choice (continuous)*. Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Samples are limited to informal and formal workers. Rightmost column contains results from a multilevel model with all 16 countries. (Estimated variance components not shown).
* = *p* <.05.

We also ran these models including a measure of wealth. (These are available from the authors upon request). The inclusion of wealth never changed the magnitude of the coefficient on informality in any substantial way. In fact, wealth was statistically significant in only four of sixteen countries.

B. Meta-Regression Analysis of Vote Choice

Table B1: Meta Regression Analyses: Explaining the Effects of Informality on Vote Choice

	Model 1: Estimates from Binary or Nominal Models (Figure 2A)	Model 2: Estimates from Continuous Models (Figure 2B)
Substantive Features		
Organizational density	0.580 (1.872)	1.208 (1.531)
Employment protection legislation	0.251 (0.130)	0.193 (0.183)
Left previously initiated CCT	0.016 (0.156)	-0.064 (0.182)
Year	0.023 (0.024)	0.039 (0.032)
Researcher Decisions		
Controls for income	0.145 (0.297)	
Benefits definition	0.042 (0.483)	
Unpublished	-0.207 (0.273)	-0.321 (0.396)
Constant	-47.645 (48.511)	-79.764 (64.812)
Observations	33	30

Note: Dependent variable is effect sizes of informality on *Vote choice (nominal)* for model 1 and *Vote choice (continuous)* for model 2. Vote for the right is the base category in the original regressions. Entries are weighted least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Cases are weighted by the inverse of the original estimate's standard error.

C. Alternative Model Specifications

Table C1: Meta Regression Analyses: Explaining the Effects of Informality on Turnout: Alternative Model Specifications to Those in Table 2

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Substantive Features							
Organizational density	1.153[†] (0.670)						
Mass-based party system		-0.030 (0.079)					
Compulsory voting			-0.096[†] (0.056)				
Year				-0.014* (0.006)			
Researcher Decisions							
Controls for income	1.075* (0.355)	1.108* (0.369)	1.056* (0.360)	-0.032 (0.121)	0.085 (0.116)		
Benefits definitions	No variation	No variation	No variation			0.003 (0.175)	
Unpublished	No variation	No variation	No variation				0.035 (0.128)
Constant	-0.458 (0.118)	-0.241 (0.051)	-0.123 (0.083)	27.707* (12.930)	-0.267 (0.039)	-0.260 (0.171)	-0.260* (0.039)
Observations	34	35	35	41	41	41	41

Note: Dependent variable is effect sizes of informality on turnout. Entries are weighted least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Cases are weighted by the inverse of the original estimate's standard error. $* = p < .05$. $† = p < .10$.

Table C2: Meta Regression Analyses: Explaining the Effects of Informality on Vote Choice (Nominal): Alternative Models Specifications to Those in Table B1 (model 1)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Substantive Features					
Organizational density	0.164 (1.900)				
Employment protection legislation		0.182 (0.106)			
Left previously initiated CCT			0.135 (0.131)		
Year				$0.032^{\dagger}$ (0.019)	
Researcher Decisions					
Controls for income	0.245 (0.265)	0.127 (0.246)	0.169 (0.251)	0.333 (0.236)	0.238 (0.235)
Benefits definition	0.043 (0.501)	0.041 (0.481)	0.042 (0.486)	0.040 (0.466)	0.041 (0.476)
Unpublished	0.018 (0.145)	0.049 (0.135)	0.017 (0.137)	-0.284 (0.226)	0.034 (0.123)
Constant	0.023 (0.587)	-0.319 (0.532)	-.017 (0.137)	64.234 (39.070)	0.048 (0.483)
Observations	33	34	34	35	35

Note: Dependent variable is effect sizes of informality on vote choice (nominal). Entries are weighted least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Cases are weighted by the inverse of the original estimate's standard error. $* = p <.05.$ $^{\dagger} = p <.10.$

Table C3: Meta Regression Analyses: Explaining the Effects of Informality on Vote Choice (Nominal): Alternative Model Specifications to Those in Table B1 (model 2)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Substantive Features					
Organizational density	1.004 (1.365)				
Employment protection legislation		0.150 (0.150)			
Left previously initiated CCT			0.055 (0.153)		
Year				0.039 (0.027)	
Researcher Decisions					
Controls for income	No variation	No variation	No variation	0.494[†] (0.285)	0.185 (0.188)
Benefits definition	No variation	No variation	No variation	No variation	No variation
Unpublished	0.063 (0.144)	0.144 (0.156)	0.110 (0.145)	-0.300 (0.319)	0.112 (0.115)
Constant	-0.110 (0.235)	-0.273 (0.337)	0.013 (0.134)	-77.530 (54.371)	0.036 (0.097)
Observations	30	31	31	34	34

Note: Dependent variable is effect sizes of informality on vote choice (continuous). Entries are weighted least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Cases are weighted by the inverse of the original estimate's standard error. $* = p < .05$. $† = p < .10$.