Melina Altamirano, Sarah Berens, and Franziska Deeg, Varieties of Economic Vulnerability: Evidence on Social Policy Preferences and Labor Informality from Mexico. *Latin American Politics and Society* 64, 2 (Summer 2022).

Supplementary Material

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Table A: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.
Dependent Variables:					
Pension	2.781	0.970	1	4	1263
Health care	2.972	0.947	1	4	1276
Prospera (CCT)	2.962	0.994	1	4	1199
Progressive taxation	2.590	0.691	1	3	1281
Independent Variables:					
Formal/Informal Worker	0.365	0.482	0	1	802
Employed and Non-employed	2.055	0.887	1	3	1387
Labor Market Particip. (Informal, Formal, Unemployed)	1.342	0.566	1	3	842
Formal to Informal in Future	0.531	0.500	0	1	241
Informal to Formal in Future	0.335	0.473	0	1	513
Household Composition					
Informal HH	0.591	0.492	0	1	651
Formal HH	0.233	0.423	0	1	651
Mixed HH, Formal Resp.	0.078	0.269	0	1	651
Mixed HH, Informal Resp.	0.097	0.296	0	1	651
Secure LM History	0.517	0.500	0	1	802
Controls:					
Age	42.02	12.589	18	82	1400
Female	0.474	0.499	0	1	1400
Education	5.703	1.786	1	10	1397
Wealth	4.099	1.530	1	7	1378
Dependants	0.550	0.498	0	1	1250
Corruption Perc.	3.038	0.937	1	4	1359
Union Member	0.039	0.195	0	1	1368
Job Insecurity	2.337	0.990	1	4	778
CCT received	0.026	0.160	0	1	1400
Vote Choice					
Didn't vote	0.322	0.467	0	1	1297
Anaya (PAN)	0.214	0.411	0	1	1297
Meade (PRI)	0.070	0.256	0	1	1297
AMLO (Morena)	0.340	0.474	0	1	1297
Rodríguez Calderón (Indep.)	0.022	0.148	0	1	1297
Blank Ballot	0.025	0.158	0	1	1297
None	0.006	0.078	0	1	1297
Urban	0.724	0.447	0	1	1375
State	0.5	0.500	0	1	1400

Source: PQMex Survey 2018.

Table B: Ordered Probit Regression: Household Composition

	(1) Pension	(2) Health Care	(3) Prospera	(4) Prog. Tax
Informal HH	-0.599***	-0.390**	-0.501**	-0.402*
(Ref. cat.: Formal HH)	(0.149)	(0.142)	(0.156)	(0.168)
Mixed HH, Formal Resp.	-0.202	0.069	-0.424*	-0.545*
	(0.199)	(0.207)	(0.191)	(0.239)
Mixed HH, Informal Resp	-0.525**	-0.292	-0.244	-0.312
	(0.198)	(0.210)	(0.214)	(0.247)
Controls				
Age	-0.029	-0.058	-0.030	-0.017
	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.047)
Age^2	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Female	0.374***	0.358**	0.279*	-0.149
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.139)
Education	-0.057	0.003	-0.055	-0.245***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.057)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.117*	-0.080	-0.152**	0.132*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.064)
Dependants	-0.344**	-0.298**	-0.394**	0.226+
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.122)	(0.131)
Urban	-0.059	-0.110	-0.279*	-0.058
	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.143)
Puebla	-0.232*	-0.020	-0.172	0.262*
	(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.125)	(0.128)
/				
cut1	-3.175***	-3.102***	-3.567***	-2.660*
	(0.934)	(0.775)	(0.901)	(1.035)
cut2	-2.325*	-2.314**	-2.854**	-1.861+
	(0.927)	(0.778)	(0.905)	(1.043)
cut3	-1.315	-1.337+	-1.994*	
	(0.924)	(0.779)	(0.901)	
Observations	576	583	546	596

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; all models include survey weights. PQMex Survey 2018.

Table C: Ordered Probit Regression: Future Employment Prospects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pension		Health Care		Prospera		Prog. Tax	
Formal to Informal	-0.010		-0.369*		-0.266		-0.790***	
	(0.179)		(0.183)		(0.192)		(0.202)	
Informal to Formal in Future		-0.099		-0.048		-0.256		-0.761***
		(0.149)		(0.147)		(0.159)		(0.154)
Controls								
Age	0.060	-0.005	-0.116	-0.061	0.004	-0.056	-0.053	-0.037
	(0.108)	(0.054)	(0.091)	(0.040)	(0.068)	(0.049)	(0.084)	(0.051)
Age^2	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001*	-0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.089	0.360**	0.310	0.521***	0.227	0.289*	0.258	-0.150
	(0.190)	(0.136)	(0.193)	(0.140)	(0.202)	(0.144)	(0.220)	(0.168)
Education	-0.055	-0.012	0.026	0.086	-0.101	-0.035	-0.252**	-0.093
	(0.092)	(0.057)	(0.092)	(0.057)	(0.120)	(0.063)	(0.096)	(0.062)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.035	-0.125*	0.020	-0.123*	0.048	-0.156**	0.138	0.073
	(0.098)	(0.054)	(0.089)	(0.058)	(0.115)	(0.057)	(0.106)	(0.069)
Dependants	-0.541**	-0.243+	-0.446*	-0.206	-0.754***	-0.336*	0.451*	0.281+
	(0.200)	(0.147)	(0.192)	(0.140)	(0.215)	(0.156)	(0.214)	(0.162)
Urban	-0.101	-0.103	-0.397	-0.116	-0.283	-0.348*	-0.290	0.007
	(0.230)	(0.134)	(0.241)	(0.141)	(0.255)	(0.142)	(0.268)	(0.173)
Puebla	-0.231	-0.404**	0.000	-0.109	-0.075	-0.306*	0.653**	0.175
	(0.192)	(0.140)	(0.186)	(0.134)	(0.206)	(0.152)	(0.202)	(0.156)
/								
cut1	-1.505	-1.961	-4.707*	-2.485**	-2.716+	-3.946***	-3.697*	-2.654*
	(2.276)	(1.253)	(1.912)	(0.827)	(1.471)	(1.077)	(1.826)	(1.151)
cut2	-0.580	-1.149	-3.827*	-1.716*	-2.107	-3.244**	-2.951	-1.750
	(2.296)	(1.247)	(1.909)	(0.833)	(1.456)	(1.071)	(1.825)	(1.166)
cut3	0.439	-0.073	-2.831	-0.645	-1.090	-2.335*		
	(2.312)	(1.247)	(1.916)	(0.839)	(1.443)	(1.059)		
Observations	190	394	190	401	176	367	195	409

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; all models include survey weights. PQMex Survey 2018.

Table D: Ordered Probit Regression: Social Policy Preferences and Labor Market Dualization Disaggregated

	(1) Pension	(2) Health Care	(3) Prospera	(4) Prog. Tax
Labor Market Participants				
Informal	-0.302*	-0.227+	-0.299*	0.297*
(Ref. cat.: formal)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.134)	(0.142)
Unemployed	-0.740**	-0.325	-0.556*	0.426
	(0.254)	(0.229)	(0.232)	(0.325)
Controls				
Age	-0.027	-0.052	-0.036	-0.006
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.043)
Age^2	0.000	0.001+	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.372***	0.340**	0.264*	-0.199
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.136)
Education	-0.034	-0.001	-0.081+	-0.164**
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.110*	-0.071	-0.101*	0.076
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.058)
Dependants	-0.374***	-0.325**	-0.433***	0.227+
	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.117)	(0.125)
Urban	-0.072	-0.165	-0.335**	0.065
	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.139)
Puebla	-0.340**	-0.097	-0.277*	0.270*
	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.121)	(0.121)
/				
cut1	-2.892**	-3.020***	-3.693***	-1.495
	(0.888)	(0.722)	(0.824)	(0.939)
cut2	-1.991*	-2.219**	-2.967***	-0.675
	(0.884)	(0.725)	(0.823)	(0.952)
cut3	-1.007	-1.188	-2.040*	
	(0.884)	(0.729)	(0.815)	
Observations	648	655	614	668

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; all models include survey weights. PQMex Survey 2018.

Table E: Ordered Probit Regression: Social Policy Preferences and Labor Market Dualization: History

	(1) Pension	(2) Health Care	(3) Prospera	(4) Prog. Tax
Secure LM History	0.392***	0.452***	0.198	0.293*
	(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.126)	(0.136)
Age	-0.029	-0.068*	-0.033	-0.016
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.045)
Age^2	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.384***	0.392***	0.291*	-0.103
	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.116)	(0.133)
Education	-0.041	-0.024	-0.045	-0.244***
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.052)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.126**	-0.084+	-0.140**	0.102+
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.060)
Dependants	-0.369***	-0.324**	-0.418***	0.227+
	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.120)	(0.126)
Urban	-0.076	-0.144	-0.303*	-0.076
	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.140)
Puebla	-0.282*	-0.071	-0.239*	0.339**
	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.120)	(0.121)
/				
cut1	-2.518**	-3.066***	-3.103***	-2.186*
	(0.902)	(0.709)	(0.879)	(0.978)
cut2	-1.655+	-2.220**	-2.374**	-1.407
	(0.897)	(0.712)	(0.884)	(0.986)
cut3	-0.646	-1.248+	-1.515+	
	(0.898)	(0.713)	(0.879)	
Observations	618	624	585	637

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; all models include survey weights. PQMex Survey 2018.

Table F: Ordered Probit Regression: Social Policy Preferences and Labor Market Dualization, Additional Control: Corruption Perception

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pension		Health Care		Prospera		Prog. Tax	
Workers								
Informal	-0.397**	-0.259*	-0.306**	-0.211+	-0.262+	-0.096	-0.106	-0.011
(Ref. cat.: formal)	(0.126)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.136)	(0.123)	(0.147)	(0.133)
All								
Non-employed		-0.560***		-0.483***		-0.500***		0.290+
		(0.121)		(0.122)		(0.129)		(0.151)
Controls								
Age	-0.028	-0.048*	-0.061+	-0.052*	-0.032	-0.044*	-0.006	-0.025
	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.026)
Age^2	0.000	0.001**	0.001*	0.001**	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Female	0.389***	0.328***	0.388***	0.357***	0.318**	0.343***	-0.171	-0.130
	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.118)	(0.101)	(0.136)	(0.121)
Education	-0.047	0.004	-0.011	0.013	-0.061	0.007	-0.237***	-0.160***
	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.093*	-0.102**	-0.058	-0.063+	-0.120*	-0.132***	0.132*	0.060
	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.060)	(0.053)
Dependants	-0.319**	-0.353***	-0.306*	-0.262**	-0.401**	-0.391***	0.313*	0.032
	(0.122)	(0.086)	(0.122)	(0.093)	(0.145)	(0.096)	(0.146)	(0.118)
	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.085)	(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.056)
Urban	-0.097	-0.037	-0.142	-0.156+	-0.324**	-0.270**	-0.110	0.050
	(0.114)	(0.089)	(0.120)	(0.091)	(0.124)	(0.091)	(0.145)	(0.123)
Puebla	-0.231*	-0.326***	-0.012	-0.069	-0.188	-0.244**	0.348**	0.145
	(0.113)	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.086)	(0.124)	(0.092)	(0.124)	(0.107)
Corruption Perc.	-0.075	-0.009	-0.010	0.074+	-0.036	0.020	-0.034	-0.028
/								
cut1	-3.028**	-3.118***	-3.157***	-2.788***	-3.451***	-3.219***	-2.099*	-2.382***
	(0.931)	(0.513)	(0.769)	(0.478)	(0.961)	(0.549)	(1.049)	(0.617)
cut2	-2.178*	-2.171***	-2.328**	-1.978***	-2.734**	-2.476***	-1.307	-1.703**
	(0.924)	(0.516)	(0.776)	(0.485)	(0.963)	(0.556)	(1.056)	(0.624)
cut3	-1.167	-1.183*	-1.363+	-0.961*	-1.895*	-1.524**		
	(0.923)	(0.513)	(0.777)	(0.487)	(0.957)	(0.552)		
Observations	603	1053	607	1067	568	997	619	1067

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; all models include survey weights. PQMex Survey 2018.

Table G: Ordered Probit Regression: Additional Controls: Job Insecurity and Union Membership

	(1) Pension	(2) Health Care	(3) Prospera	(4) Prog. Tax
Informal	-0.264*	-0.248*	-0.168	-0.192
	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.140)	(0.141)
Controls				
Age	-0.003	-0.057+	-0.053	-0.030
	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.043)
Age^2	0.000	0.001*	0.001+	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.319**	0.379***	0.320**	-0.012
	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.135)
Education	-0.117**	-0.030	-0.060	-0.194***
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.063	-0.096*	-0.148**	0.140*
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.057)
Urban	0.043	-0.063	-0.325**	-0.164
	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.143)
Puebla	-0.230*	-0.098	-0.161	0.330**
	(0.105)	(0.100)	(0.112)	(0.122)
Job Insecurity	0.000	-0.097+	-0.050	-0.124*
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.056)
Union member	0.412*	-0.102	0.048	0.303
	(0.188)	(0.167)	(0.211)	(0.229)
/				
cut1	-2.154*	-3.325***	-3.671***	-2.687**
	(0.930)	(0.757)	(0.816)	(0.959)
cut2	-1.241	-2.462**	-2.962***	-1.940*
	(0.951)	(0.756)	(0.819)	(0.965)
cut3	-0.236	-1.416+	-2.060*	
	(0.939)	(0.776)	(0.809)	
Observations	680	685	641	701

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; all models include survey weights. PQMex Survey 2018.

Table H: Ordered Probit Regression: Social Policy Preferences and Labor Market Dualization, Additional Control: CCT Received

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pension		Health Care		Prospera		Prog. Tax	
Workers								
Informal	-0.392**	-0.229+	-0.296*	-0.200+	-0.239+	-0.070	-0.156	-0.050
(Ref. cat.: formal)	(0.124)	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.129)	(0.121)	(0.140)	(0.131)
All								
Non-employed		-0.566***		-0.465***		-0.471***		0.230
		(0.119)		(0.117)		(0.123)		(0.144)
Controls								
Age	-0.026	-0.047*	-0.058+	-0.055**	-0.029	-0.046*	-0.012	-0.022
	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.025)
Age^2	0.000	0.001**	0.001*	0.001**	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Female	0.375***	0.346***	0.368***	0.346***	0.288*	0.315**	-0.107	-0.073
	(0.108)	(0.093)	(0.109)	(0.093)	(0.116)	(0.099)	(0.133)	(0.120)
Education	-0.049	0.015	-0.009	0.019	-0.054	0.013	-0.221***	-0.146***
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.044)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.103*	-0.098**	-0.060	-0.056	-0.125*	-0.126***	0.112+	0.039
	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.061)	(0.051)
Dependants	-0.377***	-0.364***	-0.320**	-0.235**	-0.424***	-0.367***	0.239+	0.005
	(0.110)	(0.080)	(0.111)	(0.089)	(0.118)	(0.092)	(0.126)	(0.107)
CCT received	0.006	0.155	0.104	0.175	0.088	0.063	0.543	0.284
	(0.455)	(0.251)	(0.346)	(0.268)	(0.447)	(0.261)	(0.354)	(0.274)
Urban	-0.082	-0.027	-0.137	-0.155+	-0.316**	-0.274**	-0.072	0.052
	(0.112)	(0.087)	(0.117)	(0.088)	(0.120)	(0.089)	(0.140)	(0.119)
Puebla	-0.257*	-0.318***	-0.051	-0.082	-0.223+	-0.258**	0.333**	0.140
	(0.112)	(0.087)	(0.107)	(0.085)	(0.120)	(0.091)	(0.121)	(0.104)
/								
cut1	-2.856**	-2.936***	-3.079***	-2.991***	-3.287***	-3.227***	-2.133*	-2.212***
	(0.955)	(0.511)	(0.744)	(0.466)	(0.897)	(0.502)	(1.024)	(0.611)
cut2	-2.003*	-1.994***	-2.251**	-2.165***	-2.562**	-2.496***	-1.355	-1.547*
	(0.949)	(0.513)	(0.746)	(0.470)	(0.898)	(0.505)	(1.033)	(0.615)
cut3	-0.993	-1.009*	-1.288+	-1.152*	-1.703+	-1.534**		
	(0.948)	(0.511)	(0.748)	(0.471)	(0.894)	(0.501)		
Observations	618	1080	624	1096	585	1027	637	1094

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
PQMex Survey 2018.

Table I: Ordered Probit Regression: Social Policy Preferences and Labor Market Dualization, Additional Control: Vote Choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pension		Health Care		Prospera		Prog. Tax	
Workers								
Informal	-0.404**	-0.227+	-0.337**	-0.218+	-0.281*	-0.090	-0.152	-0.015
(Ref. cat.: formal)	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.128)	(0.146)	(0.136)
All								
Non-employed		-0.559***		-0.477***		-0.460***		0.322*
		(0.123)		(0.124)		(0.127)		(0.146)
Controls								
Age	-0.015	-0.045*	-0.056	-0.057**	-0.031	-0.045*	-0.017	-0.042+
	(0.044)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.047)	(0.025)
Age^2	0.000	0.001**	0.001+	0.001**	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Female	0.344**	0.347***	0.379**	0.350***	0.249*	0.318**	-0.174	-0.121
	(0.116)	(0.096)	(0.115)	(0.096)	(0.122)	(0.102)	(0.138)	(0.123)
Education	-0.066	-0.005	-0.023	0.009	-0.055	0.009	-0.268***	-0.172***
	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.046)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.120*	-0.098*	-0.088+	-0.065+	-0.162**	-0.140***	0.106+	0.033
	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.064)	(0.053)
Dependants	-0.414***	-0.379***	-0.355**	-0.254**	-0.459***	-0.371***	0.233+	-0.061
	(0.114)	(0.083)	(0.115)	(0.094)	(0.122)	(0.096)	(0.131)	(0.111)
Urban	-0.026	0.011	-0.122	-0.134	-0.252*	-0.266**	-0.050	0.052
	(0.116)	(0.093)	(0.126)	(0.097)	(0.127)	(0.097)	(0.149)	(0.122)
Puebla	-0.265*	-0.333***	-0.048	-0.073	-0.227+	-0.257**	0.347**	0.173
	(0.116)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.089)	(0.127)	(0.095)	(0.127)	(0.105)
Vote Choice								
Anaya (PAN)	0.062	0.059	0.265+	0.168	0.000	0.074	0.432*	0.566***
(Ref. cat.: did not vote)	(0.144)	(0.117)	(0.146)	(0.133)	(0.176)	(0.126)	(0.189)	(0.144)
Meade (PRI)	-0.359+	-0.175	0.262	0.054	-0.226	-0.214	0.331	0.346+
	(0.213)	(0.164)	(0.227)	(0.185)	(0.229)	(0.173)	(0.265)	(0.200)
AMLO (Morena)	-0.202	-0.154	0.069	-0.018	-0.121	-0.069	0.123	0.369**
	(0.144)	(0.107)	(0.143)	(0.109)	(0.160)	(0.120)	(0.147)	(0.118)
Rodríguez Calderón (Indep.)	0.129	-0.165	0.645	0.195	-0.577	-0.303	0.743+	0.827*
	(0.339)	(0.254)	(0.471)	(0.278)	(0.405)	(0.248)	(0.410)	(0.356)
Blank Ballot	-0.365	-0.818**	-0.298	-0.541+	-0.590*	-0.421+	0.069	0.396
	(0.268)	(0.264)	(0.311)	(0.283)	(0.298)	(0.254)	(0.450)	(0.305)
None	-0.842	-0.133	-0.471+	-0.142	-0.797*	-0.283	-0.278	0.089
	(1.022)	(0.428)	(0.245)	(0.143)	(0.329)	(0.180)	(0.410)	(0.704)
/								
cut1	-2.880**	-3.054***	-3.158***	-3.107***	-3.538***	-3.320***	-2.447*	-2.592***
	(0.980)	(0.513)	(0.772)	(0.484)	(0.852)	(0.498)	(1.023)	(0.604)
cut2	-2.040*	-2.108***	-2.315**	-2.268***	-2.810**	-2.582***	-1.649	-1.912**
	(0.975)	(0.513)	(0.774)	(0.487)	(0.852)	(0.501)	(1.031)	(0.607)
cut3	-1.001	-1.110*	-1.371+	-1.268**	-1.959*	-1.628**		
	(0.974)	(0.510)	(0.773)	(0.487)	(0.846)	(0.497)		
Observations	565	991	572	1007	534	941	587	1011

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
PQMex Survey 2018.

Table J: Ordered probit regression: Social Policy Preferences and Labor Market Dualization: Future Employment; Additional Control: Vote Choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pension		Health Care		Prospera		Prog. Tax	
Formal to Informal	0.076		-0.232		-0.130		-0.790***	
	(0.211)		(0.197)		(0.216)		(0.209)	
Informal to Formal		-0.014		0.113		-0.190		-0.874***
		(0.163)		(0.161)		(0.180)		(0.169)
Controls								
Age	0.041	0.017	-0.150	-0.053	-0.009	-0.049	-0.080	-0.057
	(0.113)	(0.055)	(0.096)	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.050)	(0.090)	(0.053)
Age^2	-0.001	-0.000	0.002	0.001+	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.129	0.312*	0.376+	0.508**	0.264	0.237	0.254	-0.212
	(0.191)	(0.151)	(0.198)	(0.157)	(0.213)	(0.156)	(0.225)	(0.174)
Education	-0.115	-0.048	-0.062	0.057	-0.135	-0.036	-0.305**	-0.135+
	(0.097)	(0.060)	(0.096)	(0.062)	(0.119)	(0.067)	(0.101)	(0.069)
Wealth (AMAI)	-0.034	-0.134*	0.042	-0.152*	0.060	-0.211***	0.152	0.056
	(0.107)	(0.058)	(0.090)	(0.061)	(0.121)	(0.059)	(0.109)	(0.073)
Dependants	-0.635**	-0.264+	-0.517*	-0.260+	-0.903***	-0.355*	0.494*	0.324+
	(0.212)	(0.158)	(0.208)	(0.145)	(0.227)	(0.164)	(0.223)	(0.169)
Urban	0.008	-0.036	-0.378	-0.089	-0.203	-0.270+	-0.261	0.028
	(0.241)	(0.142)	(0.268)	(0.155)	(0.263)	(0.153)	(0.268)	(0.184)
Puebla	-0.302	-0.373*	0.004	-0.072	-0.107	-0.283+	0.576**	0.232
	(0.200)	(0.147)	(0.203)	(0.142)	(0.242)	(0.163)	(0.215)	(0.163)
Vote Choice:								
Anaya (PAN)	0.324	0.014	0.463+	0.393*	0.273	0.030	0.375	0.266
(Ref. cat.: did not vote)	(0.244)	(0.180)	(0.246)	(0.186)	(0.292)	(0.248)	(0.299)	(0.256)
Meade (PRI)	-0.234	-0.580*	0.831*	0.343	-0.365	-0.120	0.312	0.074
	(0.310)	(0.275)	(0.407)	(0.273)	(0.370)	(0.272)	(0.400)	(0.335)
AMLO (Morena)	0.101	-0.386*	0.239	-0.073	-0.148	-0.105	-0.365	0.215
	(0.261)	(0.180)	(0.241)	(0.178)	(0.303)	(0.217)	(0.260)	(0.190)
Rodríguez Calderón (indep.)	-0.130	0.513	0.118	0.647	-0.605	0.423	-0.099	4.837***
	(0.856)	(0.626)	(0.712)	(0.559)	(1.012)	(0.506)	(0.555)	(0.308)
Blank Ballot	0.078	-0.444	0.098	-0.471	0.067	-0.775*	-0.115	0.488
	(0.476)	(0.290)	(0.501)	(0.334)	(0.516)	(0.300)	(0.544)	(0.579)
None	4.896***	-0.842	-0.435	-0.468+	0.029	-0.711+	4.636***	-0.515
	(0.399)	(1.061)	(0.306)	(0.265)	(0.409)	(0.396)	(0.395)	(0.456)
/								
cut1	-2.082	-1.859	-5.512**	-2.499**	-3.089*	-4.007***	-4.768*	-3.307**
	(2.390)	(1.291)	(2.009)	(0.859)	(1.543)	(1.092)	(1.959)	(1.189)
cut2	-1.145	-1.056	-4.631*	-1.715*	-2.515+	-3.304**	-3.928*	-2.366*
	(2.412)	(1.282)	(2.001)	(0.863)	(1.517)	(1.085)	(1.954)	(1.200)
cut3	-0.071	0.052	-3.595+	-0.684	-1.442	-2.420*		
	(2.430)	(1.280)	(2.000)	(0.869)	(1.497)	(1.071)		
Observations	171	356	171	364	158	330	177	374

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; all models include survey weights. PQMex Survey 2018.

Table K: Ordered probit regression: Social Policy Preferences and Labor Market Dualization: Household Constellation, Additional Control: Vote Choice

	(9) Pension	(10) Health Care	(11) Prospera	(12) Prog. Tax
Informal HH	-0.610***	-0.424**	-0.572***	-0.384*
(Ref. cat.: Formal HH)	(0.160)	(0.152)	(0.163)	(0.176)
Mixed HH, Formal Resp.	-0.239	0.034	-0.510**	-0.511*
	(0.207)	(0.217)	(0.196)	(0.255)
Mixed HH, Informal Resp.	-0.577**	-0.372	-0.340	-0.342
	(0.207)	(0.230)	(0.228)	(0.253)
Controls				
Age	-0.019	-0.056	-0.032	-0.020
	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.047)
Age^2	0.000	0.001+	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Female	0.324**	0.362**	0.225+	-0.214
	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.128)	(0.143)
Education	-0.078+	-0.007	-0.053	-0.283***
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.060)
Wealth (Income)	-0.133*	-0.109*	-0.191***	0.125+
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.066)
Dependants	-0.392***	-0.342**	-0.438***	0.218
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.127)	(0.137)
Urban	0.004	-0.096	-0.212	-0.032
	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.152)
Puebla	-0.248*	-0.024	-0.188	0.279*
	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Vote Choice:				
Anaya (PAN)	0.031	0.278+	-0.020	0.322+
(Ref. cat.: did not vote)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.182)	(0.194)
Meade (PRI)	-0.448*	0.243	-0.276	0.344
	(0.221)	(0.241)	(0.239)	(0.285)
AMLO (Morena)	-0.232	0.109	-0.120	0.140
	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.168)	(0.157)
Rodríguez Calderón (indep.)	0.064	0.613	-0.626	0.654
	(0.347)	(0.484)	(0.398)	(0.438)
Blank Ballot	-0.485+	-0.348	-0.743*	-0.054
	(0.270)	(0.311)	(0.309)	(0.439)
None	-1.213	-0.659*	-1.106***	-0.312
	(1.186)	(0.276)	(0.222)	(0.478)
cut1	-3.268**	-3.177***	-3.878***	-2.823**
	(1.007)	(0.804)	(0.884)	(1.039)
cut2	-2.430*	-2.376**	-3.161***	-2.006+
	(0.998)	(0.806)	(0.883)	(1.048)
cut3	-1.388	-1.423+	-2.309**	
	(0.995)	(0.804)	(0.876)	
Observations	526	534	498	548

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; all models include survey weights. PQMex Survey 2018.



Figure A: Social Policy Preferences and Economic Vulnerability (with robust clustered standard errors for municipality)



Figure B: Conjoint: Results for Average Respondent



Figure C: Conjoint: Interaction of Access and Financing



Figure D: Conjoint: Interaction of Policy and Expansion vs Retrenchment



Figure E: Conjoint: Household Constellations: Purely Formal HH and Informal HH



Figure F: Conjoint: Household Constellations: Mixed Households



Figure G: Conjoint: Vote Choice

Table L: Cross Tables: Social Policy, Tax Preferences & Labor Market Dualization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Pension			**Health Care**			**Prospera**			**Prog. Tax**		
	Strongly Disagree/ Somewhat disagree	Strongly Agree/ Somewhat Agree	*Total*	Strongly Disagree/ Somewhat disagree	Strongly Agree/ Somewhat Agree	*Total*	Strongly Disagree/ Somewhat disagree	Strongly Agree/ Somewhat Agree	*Total*	Strongly Disagree/ Somewhat disagree	Strongly Agree/ Somewhat Agree	*Total*
Informal	182	276	458	133	330	463	124	306	430	143	328	471
	39.74	60.26	100	28.73	71.27	100	28.84	71.16	100	30.36	69.64	100
	66.42	59.35	61.98	63.94	61.8	62.4	61.69	61.45	61.52	56.52	64.82	62.06
Formal	92	189	281	75	204	279	77	192	269	110	178	288
	32.74	67.26	100	26.88	73.12	100	28.62	71.38	100	38.19	61.81	100
	33.58	40.65	38.02	36.06	38.2	37.6	38.31	38.55	38.48	43.48	35.18	37.94
Total	274	465	739	208	534	742	201	498	699	253	506	759
	37.08	62.92	100	28.03	71.97	100	28.76	71.24	100	33.33	66.67	100
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

For each category (Formal, Informal, Total), the first row presents the Frequency, the second one Row Percentages, and the third one Column Percentages. Source: PQMex Survey 2018.

Supplementary Material

Section A: Survey Information

Our standardized public opinion survey was collected in November 2018 (after the US midterm elections) in two states of Mexico, Querétaro and Puebla, indicated by a darker color in Figure S1. The representative, random, face-to-face household survey with 1,400 respondents (700 per state) was conducted in collaboration with the Mexico City based survey company Beltrán, Juárez y Asociados (BGC).

In order to test the questionnaire with regard to wording, complexity and length prior to the actual data collection, we made use of cognitive interviews of the questionnaire and focus group interviews with students of the Colegio de México (Colmex) in Mexico City during field research in September-October 2018. We went through the questionnaire with the students (cognitive interviews of questionnaire) and asked participants about their understanding of various survey items, giving particular attention to the experimental parts of the questionnaire. The discussion in the focus group interviews about the topic was moderated by one of the authors. By listening to the group discussions, we learnt about the knowledge of respondents about different social policies and the common wording used. These tasks resulted in a first round of revision and helped reduce the complexity of survey items, making them more accessible for Mexican citizens from various backgrounds.

Additionally, BGC collected 60 pre-test interviews in Puebla and Queŕetaro that we subsequently analyzed to improve wording and item organization. Here, the entire questionnaire was tested with a random sample of target group respondents. After the pilot, the enumerators, who conducted the pre-tests, provided feedback on the questionnaire in the de-briefing meeting. We received helpful feedback on wording, flow and context specificity of the questionnaire and adjusted the questionnaire accordingly. We trained all enumerators prior to the field period to reduce interviewer effects. In this meeting, every survey item was discussed and read out loud by one of the enumerators. We devoted much time to the training of the Conjoint experiment since the enumerators were instructed to read it to the respondents while, at the same time, showing the tablet to the respondent, giving her the chance to directly follow the interviewer. The experienced enumerators, who already participated in the pre-test of the survey, were the team leaders in the final field period of the survey, providing advice and support to their team of enumerators in the field.

The target population of the survey was Mexican citizens older than 18, residing in the randomly selected households. The enumerators were instructed to ask first to interview the head of the household. If the head of the household was not available, enumerators spoke with a member of the household who had the capacity to respond to questions on household expenses and income. To design the sample, all households in the two states had a probabilistic, non-zero probability of being randomly selected. As sample frame, the survey company used census statistics at Geo-Electoral Scales according to the latest Population and Housing Census of 2010. The selection of the sample was carried out by means of a multistage sample, in which the first stage of selection, the primary sampling unit PSU, was the precinct. The PSU is a conglomerate of sections. A conglomerate is defined as the set of units of the same municipality and socioeconomic level. The conglomerates are selected considering the probability proportional to their population. Socio-economic strata are calculated by undertaking a main component analysis with census variables that range from possession of goods to access to particular services. This index is stratified into four socioeconomic levels using Dalenius' optimal stratification technique.

The second stage of selection consists of a random draw of two units within each cluster. Each

Figure S1: Map of Mexico, Puebla and Querétaro indicated by darker color

unit can be selected with a probability proportional to its size. Blocks and dwellings are then randomly selected with a systematic type of sampling with equal probability and random start. Enumerators were asked to cover the entire block and not just one side. If an insufficient number of households were willing to participate, enumerators had back-up blocks that were randomly selected following the above described procedure. If the sample design included potentially dangerous areas, it was substituted by another area to guarantee enumerators' safety.

Section B: Sampling Diagnostics

Our sampling strategy produced a sample with similar characteristics of basic socio-demographic variables (gender, age, employed, education level, informal worker, married, household income) as a nationally representative survey collected within the AmericasBarometer (Latin American Public Opinion Project, LAPOP) for Mexico at a similar point in time.[1] We show descriptive statistics for our full sample collected in Puebla and Querétaro (N=1,400) and the LAPOP for Mexico that was collected in 2018 (N=1,580) in Table S1 and S2. Our sample reaches very similar values regarding means and variance for these basic characteristics. Only monthly household income is slightly higher in our sample (we recoded the LAPOP income bracket categories to fit with our income brackets coding to allow comparison between the two surveys), which might be explained by the fact that both Puebla and Querétaro are rather in the middle of the income distribution, so that the nationally representative sample of LAPOP covers more states with a much poorer income structure. When identifying informal sector workers through consent to the question about making regular contributions to the public pension scheme (our survey contains the exact same question), we reach a very similar value for the average share of informal sector workers. To check the validity of our data regarding attitudinal items, we compare the answer behavior to our question on preferences for redistribution (item ROS4 in LAPOP ["The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality

[1]We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org.

between the rich and the poor"] (answer scale 1-7; recoded into 1-5=0 – lower support and 6-7=1 – strong support, in the PQMex Survey, we recoded our scale which runs from 1-4 into1-3=0 – lower support and 4=1 – strong support).

Table S1: Descriptive Statistics, overall sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Female	0.474	0.499	0	1	1400
Age	42.02	12.59	18	82	1400
Working	0.579	0.494	0	1	1389
Redistribution	0.413	0.493	0	1	1313
Education Level	6.111	1.496	1	10	1397
Informal Worker	0.705	0.456	0	1	801
Married	0.728	0.447	0	1	1395
Monthly Household Income	2.565	0.826	1	4	1093
Observations	1400				

Source: PQMex Survey 2018.

Table S2: Descriptive Statistics LAPOP 2018 Mexico

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Female	0.509	0.500	0	1	1580
Age	42.09	17.03	18	88	1580
Working	0.531	0.499	0	1	1571
Redistribution	0.498	0.500	0	1	1557
Education Level	5.506	2.373	1	10	1568
Informal Worker	0.685	0.465	0	1	826
Marital Status	0.597	0.491	0	1	1574
Monthly Household Income	1.876	0.862	1	4	1389
Observations	1580				

Source: LAPOP 2018.

Section C: Conjoint Analysis

Table S3 lists the attributes and attribute levels of the conjoint experiment. Every respondent received the conjoint three times. Categories were randomly drawn among all four dimensions. All categories had approximately the same likelihood of appearing which is also visible in the frequency of appearance for all categories shown in Table S3 (last column shows absolute frequency as well as percentages). We pre-tested the conjoint in focus group interviews, with students at El Colegio de México in September 2018 and with 60 pre-tests of randomly selected respondents by BGC. We explicitly used neutral language in the design of the conjoint to avoid giving party cues. We deliberately chose to refer to type of policies (e. g. health services') instead of using the program names, since the latter are often associated with party politics. Moreover, we use an egotropic wording for the introductory text that instructs the respondent according to which baseline the respondent should evaluate the policy packages. In order to hold the baseline constant across respondents, only one dimension can be chosen. We employ the egotropic dimension ("Think about which would bring you the most benefits") as it is the classical dimension used in the political economy literature."

The conjoint was surveyed at the beginning of the questionnaire (after asking about social policy attitudes and gathering information on labor market status) to ensure that respondents were not mentally exhausted. Furthermore, splitting the conjoint sets in three different subsets according to their order in which the respondent received them shows no significant differences.

Table S3: Attributes and Categories

Types of policy:	old-age pensions	1683 (20.0 %)
	health service	1703 (20.3 %)
	housing credit	1630 (19.4 %)
	financial support for low-income households	1697 (20.2 %)
	day care centers	1687 (20.0 %)
Beneficiary:	universal - everyone has access	2787 (33.2 %)
	workers with written contract	2782 (33.1 %)
	only those in need	2831 (33.7 %)
What should be done:	increase benefits	2735 (32.5 %)
	reduce benefits	2798 (33.3 %)
	keep benefits as they are	2867 (34.1 %)
Form of financing:	only with contributions from workers with written contract and government	2822 (33.6 %)
	with contributions from the government with increased taxes	2747 (32.7 %)
	with contributions from the government increasing taxes from people with higher incomes	2831 (33.7 %)