**Online Appendix**
**"Fiscal Accountability in Gubernatorial Elections"**

This online appendix shows the results of using an alternative estimator to check the robustness of the results for the six models presented in Table 2 of the article. In addition, we also present the results of models that separate Republican and Democratic races to examine the partisan effects of fiscal accountability.

For the alternative estimator, we use random-effects models for our panel of states instead of fixed effects because one of our main variables of the analysis, Governor's Budget Powers, is time-invariant and state fixed effects would be collinear (or nearly) with this variable. We do use year fixed effects to account for any shocks to the economy, such as recessions, that would most likely affect all states in the analysis for that year.

Table 1A shows the results of random-effects models for the six models presented in Table 2 of the article. The results of these alternative models are nearly the same as those models reported in Table 2, with one notable exception. There is an odd coefficient for the interaction term between Fiscal Health and Governor's Budget Powers in the model for Unified Government (Column 6 of Table 1A). It suggests that stronger fiscal health coupled with stronger budget authority for the governor decreases voter support for the incumbent party under unified government.   Since this is an isolated result and we consistently found that fiscal health had positive effects in the other models, we do not give it much weight.

**Appendix Table 1A. Fiscal Policy Accountability in Gubernatorial Elections, 1982-2013, Random-Effects Models**

| *Independent Variables* | All Races | Incumbent Races | Cases of Unified Government | All Races w/ Interactions | Incumbent Races w/ Interactions | Unif. Government w/ Interactions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **% Δ Real Per Capita Spending** | .06*** (.02) | -.00 (.04) | .07* (.05) | .05 (.08) | -.13 (.13) | -.27** (.16) |
| **Fiscal Health** | .09* (.02) | .02 (.04) | .08** (.05) | -.14** (.07) | -.13* (.09) | .53** (.24) |
| **% Δ Real Per Capita Spending X Gov's Budget Powers** | -- | -- | -- | .00 (.02) | .04 (.04) | .08** (.04) |
| **Fiscal Health X Gov's Budget Powers** | -- | -- | -- | .05*** (.02) | .04* (.03) | -.12** (.06) |
| % Δ Real State Per Capita Income | -.11* (.08) | .13 (.12) | -.11 (.13) | -.10 (.09) | .12 (.13) | -.09 (.13) |
| % Δ Real National Per Capita Income | .05 (.07) | .09 (.11) | .05 (.12) | .04 (.07) | .08 (.11) | .05 (.12) |
| Unified Government | 1.42* (.88) | .05 (1.27) | -- | 1.34* (.89) | -.05 (1.31) | -- |
| State Ideology | .06*** (.02) | -.03 (.04) | .10** (.05) | .07*** (.03) | -.03 (.04) | .10** (.05) |
| Presidential Approval | .07*** (.03) | .07* (.05) | -.00 (.05) | .07** (.03) | .07* (.05) | -.00 (.05) |
| Midterm Election | -.73 (1.69) | 1.53 (1.97) | 14.06 (3.60) | -.67 (1.72) | 1.09 (2.06) | 27.57*** (5.39) |
| Gov Same Party as President | 1.06 (1.42) | -1.13 (2.49) | 1.21 (2.99) | 1.13 (1.43) | -.94 (2.56) | 1.61 (2.82) |
| Midterm X Same Party as President | -6.20*** (1.73) | -3.84** (2.23) | -4.30* (3.14) | -6.12*** (1.75) | -3.78** (2.24) | -4.92* (2.99) |
| Governor's Budget Powers | .29 (.51) | -.12 (.67) | .31 (.88) | .00 (.02) | .04 (.04) | .08** (.04) |
| Ln Challenger Campaign Spending Per Voter | -2.17*** (.47) | -4.25*** (.72) | -2.75*** (.75) | -2.26*** (.48) | -4.27*** (.70) | -3.13*** (.77) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ln Incumbent Party Campaign Spending Per Voter | 1.56** (.74) | -1.27* (.98) | 1.61 (1.29) | 1.56** (.73) | -1.16 (.97) | 2.13* (1.30) |
| Incumbent Running | 7.68*** (.87) | -- | 6.09*** (1.27) | 7.60*** (.87) | -- | 6.25*** (1.26) |
| Incumbent % of Major Party Vote$_{t-1}$ | .01 (.06) | .06 (.07) | .06 (.09) | -.00 (.06) | .07 (.07) | .06 (.09) |
| State Fixed Effects | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Year Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .52 | .50 | .51 | .52 | .51 | .53 |
| N | 392 | 213 | 173 | 392 | 213 | 173 |

*$P<.10$ (one-tailed) **$P<.05$ (one-tailed) ***$P<.01$ (one-tailed)

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Method used is ordinary least squares regression clustered on state. Dependent variable is percentage of incumbent party's share of major party vote.

Tables 2A and 3A below report the results separately for Republican and Democratic races to examine whether fiscal accountability varies by party. Overall, the results do not show overwhelming evidence that one party is rewarded or punished more than the other. The results in Table 2A do show that Republicans seem to be rewarded more consistently than Democrats for higher spending, but these findings do not carry over into the interactive models in Table 3A. In the interactive models in Table 3A, Democratic incumbents (Column 4) also appear to benefit from higher spending when they have stronger budget powers. Democratic incumbents are the only ones who are rewarded for stronger fiscal health as shown in Column 4 of Table 2A. We would note that under no circumstances did voters punish Republicans or Democrats for higher spending or larger budgetary balances.

**Appendix Table 2A. Fiscal Policy Accountability in Gubernatorial Elections, 1982-2013, Republican and Democratic Races**

| *Independent Variables* | All Republican Races | All Democratic Races | Republican Incumbent Races | Democratic Incumbent Races | Unified Republican Government | Unified Democratic Government |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **% Δ Real Per Capita Spending** | .12*** | .02 | .09* | -.05 | .14** | -.06 |
| | (.04) | (.04) | (.06) | (.05) | (.07) | (.06) |
| **Fiscal Health** | .01 | .01 | -.03 | .09* | .05 | .08 |
| | (.06) | (.05) | (.07) | (.07) | (.09) | (.12) |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .46 | .42 | .36 | .40 | .38 | .35 |
| N | 189 | 203 | 108 | 105 | 77 | 96 |

*P<.10 (one-tailed) **P<.05 (one-tailed) ***P<.01 (one-tailed)

Note:  Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.  Method used is ordinary least squares regression clustered on state.  Dependent variable is percentage of incumbent party's share of major party vote. Not shown are control variables, which are the same as those in Table 2 of the article.

**Appendix Table 3A. Fiscal Policy Accountability in Gubernatorial Elections, 1982-2013, Republican and Democratic Races With Interaction Terms**

| Independent Variables | All Republican Races w/ Interactions | All Democratic Races w/ Interactions | Republican Incumbent Races w/ Interactions | Democratic Incumbent Races w/ Interactions | Unified Republican Government w/ Interactions | Unified Democratic Government w/ Interactions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **% Δ Real Per Capita Spending** | .05 (.16) | -.01 (.20) | .12 (.22) | -.33* (.22) | .32 (.34) | -.38 (.30) |
| **Fiscal Health** | -.18 (.26) | -.23 (.25) | -.09 (.42) | -.02 (.36) | .25 (.50) | -.15 (.83) |
| **% Δ Real Per Capita Spending X Gov's Budget Powers** | .02 (.05) | .01 (.05) | -.01 (.07) | .08* (.06) | -.04 (.09) | .09 (.08) |
| **Fiscal Health X Gov's Budget Powers** | .06 (.07) | .07 (.06) | .02 (.12) | .03 (.09) | -.06 (.15) | .06 (.22) |
| **Governor's Budget Powers** | -.65 (.74) | .20 (.85) | -.87 (1.29) | -.83 (1.15) | -.62 (1.89) | .26 (1.49) |
| Adjusted R² | .45 | .42 | .35 | .40 | .37 | .34 |
| N | 189 | 203 | 108 | 105 | 77 | 96 |

*P<.10 (one-tailed) **P<.05 (one-tailed) ***P<.01 (one-tailed)

Note:  Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.  Method used is ordinary least squares regression clustered on state.  Dependent variable is percentage of incumbent party's share of major party vote. Not shown are control variables, which are the same as those in Table 2 of the article