Additional Materials
The Legislative Matching Game: Committee Matching and Effective Legislating in the States
Manuscript SPPQ-18-0072

Robustness Checks

This section provides some additional empirical models and quantities of interest not presented in the manuscript, but estimated to ensure the robustness of the findings to alternative specifications.

Random Slope Models

To ensure the robustness of the models presented in the manuscript, I also estimate random slope models (Table A1) and replicate the quantities of interest (Figures A1 & A2) presented in the main text. The results show that the substantive findings do not change with the inclusion of a random slope for majority party membership.

[Table A1, Figures A1 & A2 about here]

Dealing with Time

The models in the manuscript include observations from two legislative sessions across 12 states. In this robustness check I demonstrate that the results presented there are robust to the inclusion of both year and chamber random intercepts as well as year-chamber intercepts. Table A2 presents the estimates for models replicating 3c in the manuscript with the addition of including temporal random intercepts. Additionally, figures A3 & A4 present the corresponding quantities of interest.

[Table A2, Figures A3 & A4 about here]

Committee Jurisdictions and Bill Topics

It is possible that the policy jurisdictions of legislative committees in the states are not generally adhered to and that bills will be assigned to committees, not based on their topic, but based on their primary sponsor's committee assignments. If bills are being sent to their

author's committees regardless of substantive topics, then the measure of committee agenda distance will produce values that are much smaller than they should be. To ensure that this is not the case I have examined the topics and titles for bills assigned to three randomly selected committees in the sample chambers.[1] Table A3 shows the results of this analysis.

[Table A3 about here]

In table A3 we see that the vast majority of bills are substantively related to the committee to which they are sent. Of the three committees examined here, more than 90% of bills sent to these committees fit the committee jurisdiction. Additionally, the trend uncovered by the data is that bills sponsored by committee members are more likely, not less, to conform to the committee's jurisdiction, although this relationship is not statistically significant.

[1] Committees without clear jurisdictions were omitted from possible selection.

Tables & Figures

Table A1: The Interactive Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance, Party Status, and Gatekeeping Powers on Legislative Effectiveness in State Lower Chambers

	Model A1a		Model A1b		Model A1c	
Fixed Effects:						
Interactions						
C-A Distance	-0.723^{***}	(0.046)	-0.544^{***}	(0.066)	-0.506^{***}	(0.102)
Majority Party	0.301^{**}	(0.102)	0.410^{***}	(0.102)	0.381^{*}	(0.174)
Gatekeeping	-0.221	(0.177)	-0.230	(0.177)	-0.207	(0.182)
C-A-D×Majority			-0.331^{***}	(0.089)	-0.139	(0.132)
C-A-D×Gatekeeping					-0.066	(0.134)
Gatekeeping×Majority					0.065	(0.210)
C-A-D×Maj.×GK					-0.391^{*}	(0.179)
Legislator Variables						
Extremism	-0.022	(0.024)	-0.022	(0.024)	-0.022	(0.024)
Democrat	-0.078^{*}	(0.032)	-0.075^{*}	(0.032)	-0.075^{*}	(0.032)
Leader	-0.155	(0.082)	-0.144	(0.082)	-0.121	(0.082)
Com. Chair	0.131^{***}	(0.025)	0.123^{***}	(0.025)	0.122^{***}	(0.025)
Control Com.	0.082^{**}	(0.028)	0.084^{**}	(0.028)	0.082^{**}	(0.028)
Tenure (Yrs)	0.005^{***}	(0.002)	0.005^{***}	(0.002)	0.005^{***}	(0.002)
# Bills Sponsored	0.018^{***}	(0.001)	0.018^{***}	(0.001)	0.018^{***}	(0.001)
# Coms	0.021	(0.012)	0.020	(0.012)	0.018	(0.012)
Vote Margin	0.058^{*}	(0.028)	0.058^{*}	(0.028)	0.055^{*}	(0.028)
Chamber Variables						
Chamber Bills	-0.000^{***}	(0.000)	-0.000^{***}	(0.000)	-0.000^{***}	(0.000)
Chamber Seats	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)
Professionalization	-0.059	(0.346)	-0.065	(0.346)	-0.072	(0.345)
2013 Session	-0.016	(0.019)	-0.018	(0.019)	-0.018	(0.019)
Constant	1.292^{***}	(0.226)	1.259^{***}	(0.225)	1.251^{***}	(0.226)
Random Effects:						
Var(Majority Party)	$.109^{***}$	(.049)	$.100^{***}$	(.046)	$.102^{***}$	(.046)
Var(Constant)	$.064^{***}$	(.029)	$.064^{***}$	(.029)	$.064^{***}$	(.029)
Var(Residual)	$.187^{***}$	(.005)	$.186^{***}$	(.005)	$.185^{***}$	(.005)
Chambers	12		12		12	
N	2392		2392		2392	
AIC	2903.682		2892.097		2883.210	
Log Likelihood	-1431.841		-1425.049		-1417.605	
ρ	.256		.257		.258	

$^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$

NOTE: Estimates are coefficients from a hierarchical linear model with varying intercepts and slope (majority party). Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A1: The Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance (+1SD) on State Legislative Effectiveness Scores by Party Status (From Model A1b)



NOTE: The changes in the dependent variable shown above were calculated based on the estimates from Table A1, Model A1b and reflect the result of an increase in committee-agenda distance by one standard deviation (.23).

Figure A2: The Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance (+1SD) on State Legislative Effectiveness Scores given Party Status and Committee Gatekeeping Powers (From Model A1c)



NOTE: The changes in the dependent variable shown above were calculated based on the estimates from Table A1, Model A1c and reflect the result of an increase in committee-agenda distance by one standard deviation (.23).

Table A2: The Interactive Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance, Party Status, and Gatekeeping Powers on Legislative Effectiveness in State Lower Chambers: Temporal Random Intercepts

	Model A2a		Model A2b	
Fixed Effects:				
Interactions				
C-A Distance	-0.402^{***}	(0.097)	-0.403^{***}	(0.097)
Majority Party	0.214^{***}	(0.065)	0.214^{***}	(0.074)
Gatekeeping	-0.553	(0.329)	-0.584^{*}	(0.246)
C-A-D×Majority	-0.326^{**}	(0.116)	-0.323^{**}	(0.117)
C-A-D×Gatekeeping	-0.171	(0.130)	-0.163	(0.131)
Gatekeeping×Majority	0.216^{**}	(0.074)	0.217^{***}	(0.074)
C-A-D×Majority×Gatekeeping	-0.270	(0.166)	-0.277	(0.167)
Legislator Variables				
Extremism	-0.043^{*}	(0.020)	-0.044^{*}	(0.020)
Democrat	-0.078^{***}	(0.022)	-0.079^{***}	(0.022)
Leader	0.064	(0.084)	0.063	(0.084)
Com. Chair	0.152^{***}	(0.024)	0.152^{***}	(0.024)
Control Com.	0.081^{**}	(0.029)	0.080^{**}	(0.029)
Tenure (Yrs)	0.005^{**}	(0.002)	0.005^{**}	(0.002)
# Bills Sponsored	0.019^{***}	(0.001)	0.019^{***}	(0.001)
# Coms	0.030^{*}	(0.012)	0.030^{*}	(0.012)
Vote Margin	0.057^{*}	(0.028)	0.057^{*}	(0.029)
Chamber Variables				
Chamber Bills	-0.000^{**}	(0.000)	-0.000^{***}	(0.000)
Chamber Seats	-0.002	(0.001)	-0.002^{*}	(0.001)
Professionalization	0.054	(0.406)	0.053	(0.622)
2013 Session	-0.021	(0.325)	-0.022	(0.163)
Constant	1.493^{***}	(0.325)	1.542^{***}	(0.293)
Random Effects:				
Var(Year-Constant)	0.000	(0.000)		
Var(Chamber-Constant)	0.162^{***}	(0.068)		
Var(Chamber-Year-Constant)			0.156^{***}	(.046)
Var(Residual)	$.195^{***}$	(.006)	$.196^{***}$	(.006)
Chambers	12		12	
N	2392		2392	
AIC	2987.940		3038.535	
Log Likelihood	-1469.970		-1496.268	
ρ	.453		.443	

$^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$

NOTE: Estimates are coefficients from a hierarchical linear model with varying intercepts. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A3: The Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance (+1SD) on State Legislative Effectiveness Scores by Party Status (From Model A2a)



NOTE: The changes in the dependent variable shown above were calculated based on the estimates from Table A1, Model A1b and reflect the result of an increase in committee-agenda distance by one standard deviation (.23).

Figure A4: The Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance (+1SD) on State Legislative Effectiveness Scores given Party Status and Committee Gatekeeping Powers (From Model A2b)



NOTE: The changes in the dependent variable shown above were calculated based on the estimates from Table A1, Model A1c and reflect the result of an increase in committee-agenda distance by one standard deviation (.23).

Table A3: Bill Topics and Committee Jurisdictions Tend to Align for Both In-Committee Sponsored and Out-Committee Sponsored Bills

	Does Topic Match Committee Jurisdiction?*		
	Yes	No	Totals
Alaska Education Committee[a]			
Primary Sponsor is on Committee	46	1	47
	97.87%	2.13%	100%
Primary Sponsor is not on Committee	36	2	38
	94.74%	5.26%	100%
Michigan Agriculture Committee[b]			
Primary Sponsor is on Committee	47	7	54
	87.04%	12.96%	100%
Primary Sponsor is not on Committee	17	5	22
	77.27%	22.73%	100%
Virginia Transportation Committee[b]			
Primary Sponsor is on Committee	122	10	132
	92.42%	7.58%	100%
Primary Sponsor is not on Committee	165	20	185
	89.19%	10.81%	100%

* Bill topics were coded by hand based on OpenStates' bill titles and subjects.
[a] p-value for the $\chi^2 = .436$
[b] p-value for the $\chi^2 = .290$
[c] p-value for the $\chi^2 = .332$
P-value for the combined χ^2 statistic = .218