Appendix

Accounting for Uncertainty

Since our measures of state policy liberalism are themselves model estimates with their own associated uncertainty, there is a degree of error around the point estimates we employ. Readers may be concerned that this uncertainty leads the results presented in the body of the paper to be crisper than they would be if they accounted for this additional source of error. We therefore reestimated the models to incorporate this error by resampling from the posterior distribution of the state policy economic/social liberalism measure 1000 times and using these samples as our outcome variables. This means that the new, re-sampled measure of state-year policy liberalism is a draw from a normal distribution, with its mean the Caughey and Warshaw measure for that state-year, and its standard deviation the standard error of that measure. Effectively, this means that we create 1000 datasets, which differ randomly on Y. Each of these draws is then regressed on our measure of competition—the Folded Ranney index—as well as the same control variables used in the previous section. Again, the models employ state and year fixed effects. We combined the results of these 1000 regressions through the multiple imputation method developed by Rubin (1987) and used by Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014) in a similar context.[17]

The results of the uncertainty regression are shown in Figure A1. To enable easier comparison with the original results, the confidence interval from the regular version of the

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[17]The coefficient estimates of the m (in our case 1000) datasets and therefore regressions are averaged, whereas the standard errors are calculated according to the following formula:

$$\sqrt{\frac{1}{m}\sum_{k=1}^{m} s_k^2 + (1 + \frac{1}{m})\sigma_\beta^2}$$

where s_k^2 is the within-dataset variance in standard errors, and σ_β^2 is the between-dataset variance in coefficients.

regression is represented as a solid bar. The point estimate itself does not change in an uncertainty regression. The confidence interval of the uncertainty regression is represented as a dotted line.

Figure A1 shows that controlling for uncertainty has very little impact on our findings. For economic policy, the dotted line is only marginally longer than the solid one, representing only a moderate increase in the confidence intervals. This is owed to the fact that the economic state policy measure contains relatively little uncertainty. The confidence intervals for economic policy do not overlap with zero at any point. This means that our finding of an increase in party competition leading to an increase in state economic policy liberalism remains statistically significant.

The social policy liberalism measure, on the other hand, is less reliable, resulting in a larger increase of the confidence intervals.[18] However, given that the coefficient is already not statistically significant in the regular version of the regression, the uncertainty regression changes little.

Overall, the positive and significant correlation between economic policy liberalism and competition still supports Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2—competition causes state social policy liberalism to move in the conservative direction favored by the have-nots—is still not supported. The results of the uncertainty analysis can also be found in Table A4.

Party Control

We also test whether the relationship between competition and policy outcomes works differently in states where the legislature is overwhelmingly controlled by either party. This

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[18]This increased uncertainty exists, in part, because the social policy estimates are created entirely using categorical variables. Empirically, the social policy measure for a given state can vary much more widely between years, and it sometimes changes even without any actual changes in policy for that year (to account for overall trends across states). These factors all lead to greater uncertainty.

Figure A1: Results of an uncertainty regression, wherein the dependent variable, Caughey & Warshaw's state social/economic policy liberalism measure, is regressed on the Folded Ranney index. The confidence interval from the regular version of the regression, as shown in Figure 4, is represented as a solid bar. The dotted line shows the larger confidence interval from the uncertainty regression. The findings are robust to the use of an uncertainty regression. Full regression results are provided in Table A4.

allows us to determine whether Democrats and Republicans react differently to challenges to a beneficial status quo. To this end, we divide the sample into three parts: States that are either solidly Republican (>60% Republicans in the legislature), solidly Democratic (>60% Democrats), or competitive (neither party controls more than 60% of seats). Then we estimate a multivariate model.

The results (see Figure A2) are as expected: In Democratic states, more competition leads to more conservative policy, which is true to a similar extent for both economic and social policy. In states in which neither party dominates the legislature, greater competition has no effect on social policy, and only a very small and positive effect on economic policy in the 8 and 10-year aggregations. Given that these states are already competitive, a further increase in competitiveness does not have much of an effect.[19] In states that are solidly Republican,

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[19]See also Figure 6 for the nonparametric regression, which shows that once competition reaches a certain point, further increases do not lead to corresponding changes in policy.

Figure A2: Results of three multivariate models of party competition on policy liberalism, on subsets of the dataset, including state-years in which the legislature is controlled by more than 60% Democrats, Republicans, or neither. When Democrats control a large portion of the legislature, greater competition leads to more conservative policy. Under Republicans control, greater competition leads to more liberal policy. When neither party enjoys a large majority, even greater competition has little effect.

the effect is more complicated. Greater competition leads to moderately more liberal social policy (except for the 4-year aggregation, where the effect is not statistically significant), but a much greater increase in economic policy liberalism. Ergo, when Republicans control a state legislature and are then confronted with a threat to their power, they countersteer much more heavily in the economic rather than the social domain.

Even so, Figure A2 tells a consistent story: When one party enjoys controls a large part of the legislature, greater competition leads to policy changes in the other direction. Evidently, parties favor placating their detractors over risking the loss of their favorable position. This finding is to be expected and demonstrates that with respect to party control, our model works as intended.

Electoral Competition

Comparing Party and Electoral Competition

The theory and discussion presented in the body of the paper focuses on *party competition* as measured with the Folded Ranney Index. However, the literature on competition in the American states varies in the emphasis it places on competition in individual electoral contests versus competition for a party's control of government. One might expect that the same mechanism might connect electoral competition and policy liberalism. It is electoral competition, after all, that motivates party leaders to expand their base of support and extend an olive branch to those who traditionally do not participate in the political process, the have-nots. Indeed, in their classic work on electoral competition in the U.S. states Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) suggest:

> [E]lected officials in competitive areas will be highly responsive to constituency needs, due to the risk of electoral defeat... [D]ue to higher overall levels of voter participation in competitive environments, lower socioeconomic class interests will constitute a greater share of the electorate in competitive states than in non-competitive states. Therefore, in striving to represent the interests of their constituents, elected officials in competitive states will provide benefits to lower socioeconomic interests to a greater degree—and will display a greater propensity to support liberal policies (955).

However, because *parties* (and not individual legislators) control the passage of legislation in the states, we expect the results to be less pronounced for this measure of competition; this is one reason why the analysis in the paper focuses on party competition.

Still, we also examined the effect of electoral competition on policy liberalism. Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) (HVD) developed a measure of district-level electoral competition, incorporating the percent of the vote received by the winning candidate, their margin of victory (to account for more than two candidates), if the seat is considered safe (was won

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by more than 55%), and if the race was contested by the two major parties (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). Like the Ranney index, each of these variables is averaged over time and across districts to produce a single summary measure of the state's competitiveness. However, while the Folded Ranney index captures competition between parties for control of government, the HVD index captures competition to retain an average seat in the state legislature. Moreover, because the data necessary to calculate the HVD index is available only in recent decades, the use of the HVD index to test our hypotheses has the consequence of drastically reducing the number of observations available to estimate our models.

The HVD and Folded Ranney indices are distinct, both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, the two measures tap different ways in which competition could impact policy liberalism (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012). The Folded Ranney Index captures the effect of competition in government for legislative power. If parties exist to advance the goals of their members by crafting policies that increase their chances of reelection (Aldrich 2011), we would expect greater levels of competition to be associated with expansionism. This measure does not, however, examine how the electoral environment influences party leaders in government. By contrast, the Holbrook and Van Dunk measure provides us with a district-level measure of electoral competition that better accounts for the context of the race, the presence of another major party candidate or a credible third party challenger. In this way, the Holbrook and Van Dunk index provides race-specific information that can be useful for district-level applications. We again employ indicators of competition at 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10-year levels of aggregation (Klarner 2013).[20]

The empirical relationships among these measures is also telling. The HVD measure is only correlated with the Folded Ranney index at $r = 0.46$. Figure A3 shows the median value of both measures of competition over time; there is a downward trend in district-level competition according to the HVD index, though competition has been relatively stable by the Folded Ranney Index.

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[20]All discussion of the summary statistics for these measures uses a 6-year aggregation.

Figure A3: Median values of competition, by year. Data from Klarner (2013)). The range of the Folded Ranney Index is 0.5-1, the range of the HVD index is 0-1.

We begin by examining the bivariate relationship between the concepts using linear regressions that also include state and year fixed effects. The results of that procedure are shown in Figure A4 and Table A3. The results of this analysis provide some evidence that electoral competition has a similar relationship with the two types of policy liberalism: more electoral competition is associated with a higher degree of economic liberalism but a lessened degree of social liberalism. This relationship holds for all four time aggregations. As an example, a change across the range of the 4-year HVD index results in a 0.5 unit decrease in social liberalism—the difference between Florida and Tennessee in 2010—and a 0.54 unit increase in economic liberalism, a margin that is roughly equivalent to going from Maryland to California.

Figure A5 presents the results of multivariate models that include lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, and gubernatorial control (see Table A1 for the corresponding regression table). The results for economic liberalism are fully robust: more electoral competition is associated with a greater degree of economic liberalism. The effect size is 0.72—comparable to the difference between Wisconsin and California. However, all of the 95% confidence intervals cross the zero line in the social policy regressions. We therefore

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Figure A4: Results of bivariate linear regressions of electoral competition (the HVD index) on policy liberalism for 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10- year levels of aggregation. Each point corresponds to the coefficient estimate for competition in a linear regression model. The figure includes 95% confidence intervals for each estimate. Full regression results are provided in Table A3.

are unable to conclude that there is a relationship between electoral competition and social policy liberalism.

This same conclusion can be drawn from the uncertainty analysis, the results of which are shown in Figure A6 (as well as Table A5). Again, there is a robust relationship between electoral competition and economic policy liberalism. This relationship holds across time aggregations. Again, there is no evidence of a relationship between electoral competition and social policy liberalism; this conclusion also holds across time aggregations in the uncertainty regression.

The over-time analysis of the HVD-based model (see Figure A7) yields a similar conclusion as the version based on the Folded Ranney index. For most of the time periods under investigation, the findings conform to the results of the main model. If anything, the results for the HVD model are a bit cleaner in the sense that periods where the evidence points against our hypotheses are shorter. That being said, the HVD measure is available only since the 1970s (ranging until 2011, compared to 2010 for the Folded Ranney index), so the period of observation is shorter. Furthermore, the confidence intervals, especially for the social policy model, are larger.

The results of the nonparametric regression for the electoral competition model can be

Figure A5: Results of linear regressions of electoral competition (the HVD index) on policy liberalism for 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10- year levels of aggregation. The models include lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, and gubernatorial control. Each point corresponds to the coefficient estimate for competition in a linear regression model. The figure includes 95% confidence intervals for each estimate. Full regression results are provided in Table A1.

found in Figure A8 and Tables A8 and A9. For economic policy (Figure A8, left-hand panel), the effect of competition is almost linear (apart from a few bumps) and in the expected direction. For social policy, the nonlinearities are so strong that no clear trend is apparent. The extremely large confidence intervals at both ends add to this problem. That being said, this means that the overall finding from from the body of the paper – that there is no significant (and negative) effect of competition on social policy liberalism – is also repeated here.

With respect to party control (see Figure A9), the findings largely conform to those for party competition (see Figure A2), with a few small changes: One, under strong Democratic control, competition has a greater effect (while the direction remains the same). Under Republican control, there is no difference in the magnitude of the effect on the two policy areas (whereas in the Folded Ranney model, more competition leads to more liberal economic than social policy). For states that aren't controlled by a large one-party majority, greater competition does lead to more liberal economic policy, while social policy remains unaffected.

Figure A6: Results of an uncertainty regression wherein the dependent variable, Caughey & Warshaw's state social/economic policy liberalism measure, is regressed on the HVD index. The confidence interval from the regular version of the regression, as shown in Figure A5, is represented as a solid bar. The dotted line shows the larger confidence interval from the uncertainty regression. The findings are robust to the use of an uncertainty regression. Full regression results are provided in Table A5.

Figure A7: Over-time analysis of the effect of electoral competition on policy liberalism. The values for any single year are the results of a model conducted on that year and the 7-years to either side. The figure shows that there is a considerable amount of variation in the results over time, but that more often than not, they conform to our main model.

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
Figure A8: Predicted values of economic (left-hand panel) and social (right-hand panel) policy liberalism, given a certain level of electoral competition (HVD Index), from a a generalized additive model with a smoothed competition term. The figure includes 95% confidence intervals. Full regression results are provided in Tables A8 and A9.

Figure A9: Results of three multivariate models of electoral competition on policy liberalism, on subsets of the dataset, including state-years in which the legislature is controlled by more than 60% Democrats, Republicans, or neither. When Democrats control a large portion of the legislature, greater competition leads to more conservative policy. Under Republicans control, greater competition leads to more liberal policy. When neither party enjoys a large majority, even greater competition only leads to marginally more liberal economic policy.

Tabular Regression Results

This section provides tabular regression results for the analyses presented in the body of the paper and in this appendix.

Table A1: Results of linear regressions of electoral competition (the HVD index) on policy liberalism for 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10- year levels of aggregation. The models include lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, gubernatorial control, and the percentage of black citizens, as well as state and year fixed effects.

	Dependent variable:							
	Social Policy Liberalism				Economic Policy Liberalism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
HVD Index (4 Years)	−0.174 (0.121)				0.701*** (0.119)			
HVD Index (6 Years)		−0.225* (0.131)				0.866*** (0.129)		
HVD Index (8 Years)			−0.178 (0.138)				0.896*** (0.136)	
HVD Index (10 Years)				−0.186 (0.156)				1.214*** (0.147)
Mass Social Liberalism (t-1)	0.620*** (0.047)	0.601*** (0.048)	0.602*** (0.048)	0.596*** (0.052)				
Mass Economic Liberalism (t-1)					−0.133 (0.085)	−0.227*** (0.087)	−0.219** (0.087)	−0.384*** (0.090)
Gubernatorial PID (t-1)	0.011 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.070*** (0.015)	0.072*** (0.015)	0.072*** (0.015)
Legislative Strength (t-1)	0.275*** (0.091)	0.279*** (0.094)	0.285*** (0.094)	0.313*** (0.103)	0.397*** (0.086)	0.368*** (0.088)	0.374*** (0.088)	0.445*** (0.092)
Percent Black (t-1)	0.015 (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	0.032*** (0.012)	0.074*** (0.009)	0.080*** (0.010)	0.080*** (0.010)	0.081*** (0.011)
Constant	0.130 (0.112)	0.095 (0.120)	0.060 (0.121)	0.071 (0.140)	−0.288*** (0.110)	−0.430*** (0.117)	−0.426*** (0.117)	−0.846*** (0.131)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,975	1,877	1,877	1,681	1,975	1,877	1,877	1,681
R^2	0.902	0.908	0.908	0.916	0.922	0.928	0.928	0.937
Adjusted R^2	0.898	0.904	0.904	0.911	0.918	0.924	0.924	0.934

Note: $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

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Table A2: Results of bivariate linear regressions of party competition (the Folded Ranney index) on policy liberalism for 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10- year levels of aggregation. The models include lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, and gubernatorial control as well as state and year fixed effects.

	Dependent variable:							
	Social Policy Liberalism				Economic Policy Liberalism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Folded Ranney Index (4 Years)	−0.479*** (0.077)				0.140* (0.083)			
Folded Ranney Index (6 Years)		−0.494*** (0.082)				0.214** (0.089)		
Folded Ranney Index (8 Years)			−0.509*** (0.086)				0.300*** (0.093)	
Folded Ranney Index (10 Years)				−0.514*** (0.090)				0.371*** (0.097)
Constant	0.644*** (0.115)	0.654*** (0.118)	0.674*** (0.120)	0.733*** (0.123)	0.188 (0.124)	0.207 (0.128)	0.107 (0.130)	0.128 (0.132)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,445	3,349	3,253	3,157	3,445	3,349	3,253	3,157
R^2	0.774	0.778	0.783	0.789	0.776	0.780	0.787	0.796
Adjusted R^2	0.766	0.770	0.775	0.781	0.767	0.772	0.780	0.788

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table A3: Results of bivariate linear regressions of electoral competition (the HVD index) on policy liberalism for 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10- year levels of aggregation. The models include lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, and gubernatorial control as well as state and year fixed effects.

	Dependent variable:							
	Social Policy Liberalism				Economic Policy Liberalism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
HVD Index (4 Years)	-0.499^{***} (0.125)				0.537^{***} (0.118)			
HVD Index (6 Years)		-0.561^{***} (0.135)				0.711^{***} (0.128)		
HVD Index (8 Years)			-0.528^{***} (0.142)				0.725^{***} (0.134)	
HVD Index (10 Years)				-0.493^{***} (0.158)				1.037^{***} (0.145)
Constant	0.557^{***} (0.099)	0.578^{***} (0.103)	0.543^{***} (0.103)	0.622^{***} (0.112)	0.209^{**} (0.094)	0.105 (0.097)	0.119 (0.097)	-0.108 (0.103)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,016	1,916	1,916	1,716	2,016	1,916	1,916	1,716
R^2	0.887	0.894	0.894	0.902	0.917	0.922	0.922	0.932
Adjusted R^2	0.881	0.889	0.888	0.897	0.913	0.918	0.918	0.928

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A4: Results of uncertainty regressions of party competition (the Folded Ranney index) on policy liberalism for 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10- year levels of aggregation. The models include lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, and gubernatorial control, and the percentage of black citizens, as well as state and year fixed effects. In these models, the Caughey & Warshaw standard errors are at their full size.

	Dependent variable:							
	Social Policy Liberalism				Economic Policy Liberalism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Folded Ranney Index (4 Years)	−0.126 (0.152)				0.718*** (0.121)			
Folded Ranney Index (6 Years)		−0.121 (0.161)				0.843*** (0.129)		
Folded Ranney Index (8 Years)			−0.114 (0.169)				0.970*** (0.136)	
Folded Ranney Index (10 Years)				−0.071 (0.177)				1.104*** (0.144)
Mass Social Liberalism (t-1)	0.644*** (0.078)	0.635*** (0.078)	0.629*** (0.078)	0.624*** (0.078)				
Mass Economic Liberalism (t-1)					1.056*** (0.103)	1.053*** (0.105)	1.044*** (0.107)	1.047*** (0.109)
Gubernatorial PID (t-1)	0.021 (0.030)	0.020 (0.030)	0.019 (0.030)	0.023 (0.030)	0.044* (0.024)	0.045* (0.024)	0.044* (0.025)	0.043* (0.025)
Legislative Strength (t-1)	0.046 (0.125)	0.051 (0.128)	0.079 (0.131)	0.105 (0.134)	1.040*** (0.094)	1.043*** (0.097)	1.032*** (0.099)	1.023*** (0.102)
Percent Black (t-1)	0.040*** (0.008)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.040*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.007)
Constant	0.089 (0.250)	0.088 (0.252)	0.070 (0.253)	0.096 (0.256)	−0.992*** (0.188)	−0.982*** (0.191)	−0.817*** (0.199)	−0.922*** (0.199)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,443	3,347	3,251	3,155	3,443	3,347	3,251	3,155
Average R²	0.62	0.627	0.636	0.644	0.734	0.738	0.743	0.749
Average Adjusted R²	0.605	0.613	0.622	0.631	0.724	0.728	0.733	0.739

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: Results of uncertainty regressions of electoral competition (the HVD index) on policy liberalism for 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10- year levels of aggregation. The models include lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, gubernatorial control, and the percentage of black citizens, as well as state and year fixed effects. In these models, the Caughey & Warshaw standard errors are at their full size.

	Dependent variable:							
	Social Policy Liberalism				Economic Policy Liberalism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
HVD Index (4 Years)	-0.171 (0.243)				0.704^{***} (0.235)			
HVD Index (6 Years)		-0.221 (0.270)				0.869^{***} (0.262)		
HVD Index (8 Years)			-0.175 (0.284)				0.898^{***} (0.275)	
HVD Index (10 Years)				-0.187 (0.321)				1.213^{***} (0.311)
Mass Social Liberalism (t-1)	0.619^{***} (0.097)	0.602^{***} (0.100)	0.603^{***} (0.100)	0.597^{***} (0.108)				
Mass Economic Liberalism (t-1)					-0.139 (0.168)	-0.234 (0.176)	-0.225 (0.176)	-0.392^{**} (0.192)
Gubernatorial PID (t-1)	0.011 (0.030)	0.019 (0.030)	0.019 (0.030)	0.015 (0.031)	0.060^{**} (0.029)	0.070^{**} (0.030)	0.071^{**} (0.030)	0.071^{**} (0.031)
Legislative Strength (t-1)	0.278 (0.184)	0.282 (0.194)	0.287 (0.195)	0.314 (0.214)	0.400^{**} (0.168)	0.373^{**} (0.178)	0.378^{**} (0.178)	0.449^{**} (0.196)
Percent Black (t-1)	0.016 (0.019)	0.020 (0.021)	0.020 (0.021)	0.032 (0.024)	0.074^{***} (0.018)	0.080^{***} (0.019)	0.080^{***} (0.019)	0.081^{***} (0.023)
Constant	0.124 (0.226)	0.091 (0.246)	0.056 (0.246)	0.070 (0.285)	-0.293 (0.217)	-0.435^{*} (0.237)	-0.429^{*} (0.238)	-0.851^{***} (0.276)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,975	1,877	1,877	1,681	1,975	1,877	1,877	1,681
Average R^2	0.787	0.796	0.796	0.809	0.829	0.834	0.834	0.844
Average Adjusted R^2	0.777	0.785	0.785	0.798	0.82	0.826	0.826	0.836

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A. parametric coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	t-value	p-value
(Intercept)	-0.3652	0.0986	-3.7055	0.0002
Mass Economic Liberalism (t-1)	1.1038	0.0675	16.3553	< 0.0001
Gubernatorial PID (t-1)	0.0489	0.0159	3.0771	0.0021
Legislative Strength (t-1)	1.0003	0.0629	15.9045	< 0.0001
Percent Black (t-1)	0.0141	0.0045	3.1592	0.0016
B. smooth terms	edf	Ref.df	F-value	p-value
Folded Ranney Index (4 Years)	6.1644	7.3253	18.6671	< 0.0001

Table A6: Results of generalized additive model with a smoothed competition (4-year Folded Ranney index) term on economic policy liberalism. The model also includes linear lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, gubernatorial control, and the percentage of black citizens, as well as state and year fixed effects.

A. parametric coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	t-value	p-value
(Intercept)	0.0375	0.0948	0.3960	0.6922
Mass Social Liberalism (t-1)	0.6482	0.0384	16.8870	< 0.0001
Gubernatorial PID (t-1)	0.0152	0.0153	0.9939	0.3204
Legislative Strength (t-1)	-0.0202	0.0611	-0.3309	0.7408
Percent Black (t-1)	0.0302	0.0043	6.9868	< 0.0001
B. smooth terms	edf	Ref.df	F-value	p-value
Folded Ranney Index (4 Years)	7.1043	8.1561	5.7128	< 0.0001

Table A7: Results of generalized additive model with a smoothed competition (4-year Folded Ranney index) term on social policy liberalism. The model also includes linear lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, gubernatorial control, and the percentage of black citizens, as well as state and year fixed effects.

A. parametric coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	t-value	p-value
(Intercept)	-0.0686	0.0830	-0.8265	0.4086
Mass Economic Liberalism (t-1)	-0.1291	0.0843	-1.5312	0.1259
Gubernatorial PID (t-1)	0.0578	0.0145	3.9712	0.0001
Legislative Strength (t-1)	0.4350	0.0854	5.0912	< 0.0001
Percent Black (t-1)	0.0791	0.0091	8.6540	< 0.0001
B. smooth terms	edf	Ref.df	F-value	p-value
HVD Index (4 Years)	8.5223	8.9389	11.1107	< 0.0001

Table A8: Results of generalized additive model with a smoothed competition (4-year HVD index) term on economic policy liberalism. The model also includes linear lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, gubernatorial control, and the percentage of black citizens, as well as state and year fixed effects.

A. parametric coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	t-value	p-value
(Intercept)	0.0208	0.0861	0.2418	0.8090
Mass Social Liberalism (t-1)	0.6113	0.0488	12.5347	< 0.0001
Gubernatorial PID (t-1)	0.0074	0.0149	0.4992	0.6177
Legislative Strength (t-1)	0.2953	0.0904	3.2651	0.0011
Percent Black (t-1)	0.0194	0.0097	2.0014	0.0455
B. smooth terms	edf	Ref.df	F-value	p-value
HVD Index (4 Years)	6.5824	7.7827	4.2580	0.0001

Table A9: Results of generalized additive model with a smoothed competition (4-year HVD index) term on social policy liberalism. The model also includes linear lagged controls for public opinion, legislative control, gubernatorial control, and the percentage of black citizens, as well as state and year fixed effects.