*State Politics & Policy Quarterly*

Online Appendix for:

**“Off-Cycle and Out of Sync: How Election Timing Influences Political Representation”**

Michael T. Hartney, Boston College, michael.hartney@bc.edu

Sam Hayes, Boston College, hayessl@bc.edu

**Table 1A:** **Differences between Registered California Democrat and Republican Voters in Support for Local School Spending**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Item** | Democrats | Republicans | Difference |
| (1) Raise parcel tax | 74% | 40% | ***34\**** |
| (2) Easier to raise parcel tax | 61% | 34% | ***27\**** |
| (3) Support bond  | 82% | 53% | ***29\**** |
| (4) Support all three items | 43% | 16% | ***27\**** |

*Note*. Indicates difference statistically significant (p<.01)

Each row of Table 1A is a difference-in-means test showing the difference between registered Republican and Democratic voters in California when it comes to their willingness to support different proposals to increase taxes and raise more funding for their local public schools. The purpose of this analysis is to confirm that the measure of citizen ideological conservatism that we use in Table 1 of the paper – the partisan voter registration advantage that Republicans hold over Democrats in a given school district– is a good proxy for a district’s fiscal policy preferences in local school politics. Specifically, we examined survey data from the Public Policy Institute of California’s (PPIC) annual “Californians and Education” survey carried out in April 2016. In the four separate difference-in-means tests shown here in Table 1A, we confirm that partisanship is a good proxy for a voter’s attitudes on fiscal policy debates in local school politics. Below is the specific wording of each item we examined for differences between Democrats and Republicans.

**(1) *Raise parcel tax for schools*** (Q24 on April 2016 PPIC survey)

What if there was a measure on your local ballot to increase local parcel taxes to provide more funds for the local public schools? Would you vote yes or no?

(Q24 on April 2016 PPIC survey)

**(2) *Make it easier to raise parcel tax for schools*** (Q25 on April 2016 PPIC Survey)

Do you think it’s a good idea or a bad idea to replace the two-thirds vote requirement with a 55 percent majority vote for voters to pass local parcel taxes for the local public schools?

**(3) *Support for a bond measure to increase local school funding*** (Q23 on April 2016 PPIC survey)

If your local school district had a bond measure on the ballot to pay for school construction projects, would you vote yes or no?

**Table 2A: Impact of Election Timing on Citizen-Board General Ideological Congruence**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables  |  (1) |  (2) | (3) |
|   |   |   |  |
| District Conservatism (TW) | 0.101 | 0.137 | 0.567 |
|   | (0.112) | (0.119) | (0.453) |
| On-Cycle Election | 0.115 | 0.101 | 0.357 |
|   | (0.073) | (0.074) | (0.249) |
| **On-Cycle\*TW**  | **0.440\*\*\*** | **0.409\*\*\*** | **1.263\*\*** |
|  | **(0.166)** | **(0.171)** | **(0.602)** |
| District size (log enrollment) |  | -0.013 | -0.056 |
|   |  | (0.021) | (0.063) |
| % Poor students |  | -0.119 | -0.812 |
|   |  | (0.169) | (0.532) |
| % White students |  | -0.020 | -0.347 |
|   |  | (0.205) | (0.566) |
| Constant | 2.437\*\*\* | 2.610\*\*\* | 1.295 |
|   | (0.058) | (0.329) | (0.949) |
| Observations | 214 | 214 | 214 |
| *R*2  | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.08 |
| *Note*. Dependent variable is board economic conservatism. Columns 1-2 model a board’s average (aggregated) conservatism on a 1-3 scale (where higher values denote a more conservative board). Column 3 is a binary measure indicating whether a board is majority conservative. Entries are OLS coefficients (Columns 1 and 2) and probit coefficients (Column 3) with standard errors in parentheses. All measures are two-tailed tests, except for the on-cycle interaction because it is testing a one-directional hypothesis. *\* p<.1 \*\* p<.05 \*\*\* p<.01* |

Each column of Table 2A is a separate regression model. The three sets of estimates shown here in Table 2A are an exact replication of the estimates shown in Table 1 of the main paper, with one exception. In the main paper, the analysis in Table 1 measures District Conservatism using the % registration advantage in each school district that Republicans hold over Democrats. Here in Table 2A we show that our results in Table 1 are robust to using an alternative measure of District Conservatism: Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s (TW) measure of citizen conservatism. TW use hundreds of thousands of survey responses to generate estimates of citizen conservatism within small geographic units (e.g., cities, counties, state legislative districts) using multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP). We leverage the fact that TW report these estimates at the level of state legislative assembly districts, which we then allocate (by population) to estimate citizen policy conservatism for all of the California school districts in our sample. Using data from the California Department of Education that report the % of each school district that is composed of citizens from each state assembly district (i.e., geographic overlap) we compute a simple weighted average (based on population) of the TW conservatism measure for each school district. As Columns 1-3 of Table 2A show, using this alternative measure of citizen conservatism, we find substantively identical results to the main estimates in Table 1 of our paper that instead rely on partisan registration to measure citizen conservatism.