Selecting Chief Justices by Peer Vote

Paper previously titled "Selecting Leaders by Peer Vote: Evidence from State Supreme Courts"

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Online Appendix

This appendix reports results concerning whether the effects of choice-level variables are conditioned by state-level institutions. The primary models reported in the manuscript include contest fixed effects, which effectively "control for" all factors that are constant within a contest. Indeed, these fixed effects prohibit including contest-level variables as independent predictors. These contest-level predictors can be included, however, through interactions with choice-level predictors (Allison 2009). We consider five contest-level predictors: whether the chief justice unilaterally assigns opinions, whether the justices face contestable elections, court professionalism, court size, and whether vote choice is visible among colleagues.

Chief Justice Opinion Assignment Power

Langer et al. (2003) find that the relationship between ideological congruence with the court majority/state elite and the probability of being voted chief by one's peers is conditioned by whether the chief justice enjoys unilateral opinion assignment power. To replicate this test on a new sample with a new estimation estimation strategy (see the manuscript for further details), we use data on whether the chief justice of a state peak court enjoys opinion assignment power from McConkie (1976), Hall (1990), and Hughes, Wilhelm, and Vining (2015). Table 1 presents results from a series of models interacting the chief justice assigns opinions indicator with each of the theoretically relevant explanatory variables. The person of color indicator is the exception; since there were no people of color in contests where chiefs assign opinions in our sample, the interaction is collinear with the fixed effects. Model 9 displays results including each interaction. Model 1 presents the primary baseline results for comparison. Overall, the primary results are stable across specifications. Moreover, BIC values, which penalize model complexity more than AIC values, indicate that none of the interactive specifications improve model fit over the primary specification.

Table 1: Conditional Effects of Chief Justice Opinion Assignment

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Senior Never Chief	2.551*	2.486*	2.567*	2.570*	2.553*	2.549*	2.566*	2.558*	2.466*
	(0.271)	(0.293)	(0.273)	(0.274)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.293)
Experience	0.344*	0.344*	0.367*	0.342*	0.344*	0.350*	0.357*	0.345*	0.366*
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.090)
Experience Squared	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.013*	-0.013*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Woman	-0.299	-0.293	-0.339	-0.144	-0.302	-0.322	-0.310	-0.288	-0.122
	(0.318)	(0.318)	(0.326)	(0.331)	(0.317)	(0.326)	(0.319)	(0.320)	(0.328)
Person of Color	0.026	0.019	0.049	0.024	0.035	0.046	0.039	0.026	0.060
	(0.348)	(0.346)	(0.352)	(0.349)	(0.349)	(0.351)	(0.352)	(0.348)	(0.348)
% Dissent	-0.058*	-0.059*	-0.060*	-0.060*	-0.056*	-0.058*	-0.059*	-0.058*	-0.057*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Same Party as Court Majority	0.407	0.404	0.313	0.461	0.401	0.289	0.333	0.400	0.318
	(0.338)	(0.339)	(0.357)	(0.348)	(0.340)	(0.380)	(0.335)	(0.335)	(0.376)
Same Party as Governor	-0.351	-0.336	-0.390	-0.359	-0.354	-0.390	-0.492	-0.372	-0.463
	(0.315)	(0.315)	(0.331)	(0.318)	(0.315)	(0.331)	(0.349)	(0.318)	(0.345)
Same Party as Legislature	-0.436	-0.459	-0.365	-0.395	-0.426	-0.410	-0.339	-0.342	-0.269
	(0.330)	(0.335)	(0.360)	(0.336)	(0.332)	(0.337)	(0.333)	(0.391)	(0.388)
Chief Assigns		-0.788	0.374	-0.357	-0.549	-1.043	-1.249	-0.478	-1.440
		(0.493)	(0.845)	(0.362)	(0.416)	(0.643)	(0.639)	(0.433)	(1.847)
Chief Assigns x Senior Never Chief		0.403							1.551
		(0.703)							(1.129)
Chief Assigns x Experience			0.101						0.394
			(0.189)						(0.333)
Chief Assigns x Experience Squared			-0.017						-0.038
			(0.010)						(0.020)
Chief Assigns x Woman				-2.318					-4.260*
				(1.445)					(2.148)
Chief Assigns x % Dissent					-0.012				-0.060
					(0.040)				(0.050)
Chief Assigns x Same Party as Majority						0.660			0.211
						(0.823)			(1.025)
Chief Assigns x Same Party as Governor							0.910		1.432
							(0.688)		(1.187)
Chief Assigns x Same Party as Legislature								-0.364	0.200
								(0.746)	(1.024)
Intercept	-2.861*	-2.840*	-2.923*	-2.873*	-2.889*	-2.771*	-2.754*	-2.849*	-2.890*
	(0.572)	(0.573)	(0.588)	(0.577)	(0.575)	(0.592)	(0.588)	(0.572)	(0.606)
Observations	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122
AIC	780	782	777	779	782	782	781	782	778
BIC	826	832	832	829	833	832	831	832	863
Contest Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<0.05. Robust standard errors clustered by contest are in parentheses. The outcome variable is an indicator scored 1 if a justice is voted chief and 0 otherwise.

Contestable Elections

The value of a chief justice designation may be higher where justices face greater retention pressure. To examine the conditional effect of retention pressure, we follow standard practice (e.g., Goelzhauser and Cann 2014) and use an indicator scored 1 for states where justices face contestable elections and 0 otherwise. Information on retention system comes from Lindquist (2007). Table 2 presents results from a series of models interacting the contestable elections indicator with each of the theoretically relevant explanatory variables. Model 10 displays results including each interaction. Model 1 presents the primary baseline results for comparison. Overall, the primary results are stable across specifications. Moreover, BIC values generally indicate that the baseline model best fits the data.[1] Nonetheless, two results are worth noting. First, the effect of a 0-1 change in the senior never chief variable on the probability of selection is smaller in states with contestable elections. Second, the effect of a 0-1 change in the same party as the court majority indicator on the probability of selection is positive in states with contestable elections but otherwise indistinguishable from zero. Figure 1 displays these results.



Figure 1: Conditional Effects of Contestable Elections

[1] We also fit split-sample models for contestable elections and other retention methods. The results are similar.

Table 2: Conditional Effects of Competitive Elections

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Senior Never Chief	2.510*	2.878*	2.502*	2.522*	2.516*	2.513*	2.526*	2.513*	2.510*	2.899*
	(0.262)	(0.313)	(0.261)	(0.263)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.262)	(0.322)
Experience	0.361*	0.377*	0.313*	0.365*	0.360*	0.363*	0.369*	0.358*	0.360*	0.293*
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.099)
Experience Squared	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.012*	-0.014*	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Woman	-0.281	-0.309	-0.261	-0.449	-0.291	-0.281	-0.238	-0.283	-0.267	-0.587
	(0.316)	(0.325)	(0.316)	(0.382)	(0.317)	(0.318)	(0.311)	(0.317)	(0.319)	(0.431)
Person of Color	0.035	-0.010	0.030	0.021	-0.183	0.021	0.053	0.028	0.031	-0.117
	(0.346)	(0.344)	(0.347)	(0.346)	(0.415)	(0.345)	(0.355)	(0.348)	(0.345)	(0.439)
% Dissent	-0.058*	-0.056*	-0.059*	-0.058*	-0.057*	-0.048*	-0.056*	-0.058*	-0.057*	-0.052*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Same Party as Court Majority	0.394	0.412	0.407	0.406	0.406	0.381	0.036	0.418	0.380	0.037
	(0.330)	(0.340)	(0.327)	(0.332)	(0.328)	(0.328)	(0.365)	(0.335)	(0.328)	(0.402)
Same Party as Governor	-0.290	-0.266	-0.319	-0.292	-0.294	-0.273	-0.263	-0.409	-0.303	-0.369
	(0.304)	(0.308)	(0.307)	(0.306)	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.312)	(0.390)	(0.313)	(0.396)
Same Party as Legislature	-0.421	-0.432	-0.423	-0.413	-0.429	-0.430	-0.517	-0.440	-0.557	-0.535
	(0.322)	(0.326)	(0.324)	(0.325)	(0.322)	(0.320)	(0.323)	(0.327)	(0.365)	(0.361)
Elected		1.666*	0.427	1.202*	1.395*	2.001*	-0.055	1.114	1.042	-2.387
		(0.418)	(0.875)	(0.522)	(0.408)	(0.830)	(0.739)	(0.568)	(0.689)	(1.479)
Elected x Senior Never Chief		-1.299*								-1.380*
		(0.547)								(0.578)
Elected x Experience			0.200							0.382
			(0.187)							(0.207)
Elected x Experience Squared			-0.009							-0.015
			(0.009)							(0.010)
Elected x Woman				0.469						0.926
				(0.643)						(0.671)
Elected x Person of Color					0.499					0.181
					(0.694)					(0.743)
Elected x % Dissent						-0.024				-0.011
						(0.029)				(0.033)
Elected x Same Party as Majority							1.727*			1.780*
							(0.746)			(0.809)
Elected x Same Party as Governor								0.355		0.278
								(0.613)		(0.687)
Elected x Same Party as Legislature									0.531	0.074
									(0.773)	(0.835)
Intercept	-3.010*	-3.349*	-2.746*	-3.033*	-3.021*	-3.210*	-2.822*	-2.916*	-2.995*	-2.566*
	(0.569)	(0.616)	(0.629)	(0.569)	(0.572)	(0.635)	(0.587)	(0.596)	(0.574)	(0.741)
Observations	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154
AIC	810	804	813	812	812	812	806	812	812	807
BIC	856	854	869	862	862	862	857	863	862	898
Contest Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<0.05. Robust standard errors clustered by contest are in parentheses. The outcome variable is an indicator scored 1 if a justice is voted chief and 0 otherwise.

Court Professionalism

The value of a chief justice designation may be higher on more professionalized courts. Moreover, there is greater interbranch competition with increased professionalization (Black and Shay 2018; Bosworth 2017; Miller, Ringsmuth, and Little 2016).[2] Data on court professionalism come from Squire (2008). Table 3 presents results from a series of models interacting court professionalism with each of the theoretically relevant explanatory variables. Model 10 displays results including each interaction. Model 1 presents the primary baseline results for comparison. Overall, the primary results are stable across specifications. Moreover, BIC values indicate that none of the interactive specifications improve model fit over the primary results.

[2]We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

Table 3: Conditional Effects of Court Professionalism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Senior Never Chief	2.510*	2.661*	2.516*	2.512*	2.516*	2.521*	2.538*	2.496*	2.513*	3.091*
	(0.262)	(1.016)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.262)	(0.263)	(0.265)	(0.262)	(0.264)	(1.085)
Experience	0.361*	0.361*	0.351	0.360*	0.359*	0.364*	0.373*	0.358*	0.363*	0.480
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.272)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.319)
Experience Squared	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.015	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.022
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.015)
Woman	-0.281	-0.277	-0.280	-0.013	-0.313	-0.297	-0.235	-0.287	-0.251	-0.692
	(0.316)	(0.317)	(0.317)	(1.058)	(0.318)	(0.314)	(0.311)	(0.316)	(0.317)	(1.145)
Person of Color	0.035	0.031	0.037	0.040	-2.824	0.087	-0.006	0.028	0.029	-3.532
	(0.346)	(0.343)	(0.345)	(0.346)	(1.781)	(0.345)	(0.351)	(0.345)	(0.344)	(1.953)
% Dissent	-0.058*	-0.058*	-0.057*	-0.057*	-0.056*	-0.106*	-0.059*	-0.058*	-0.057*	-0.137*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.052)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.063)
Same Party as Court Majority	0.394	0.391	0.382	0.387	0.387	0.380	-1.823	0.472	0.288	-1.361
	(0.330)	(0.330)	(0.334)	(0.332)	(0.327)	(0.334)	(1.216)	(0.352)	(0.343)	(1.384)
Same Party as Governor	-0.290	-0.282	-0.299	-0.286	-0.276	-0.300	-0.189	-1.341	-0.299	-0.890
	(0.304)	(0.310)	(0.305)	(0.306)	(0.302)	(0.307)	(0.291)	(1.271)	(0.307)	(1.216)
Same Party as Legislature	-0.421	-0.420	-0.419	-0.425	-0.437	-0.416	-0.587	-0.460	-2.246	-1.957
	(0.322)	(0.321)	(0.326)	(0.324)	(0.320)	(0.323)	(0.326)	(0.327)	(1.354)	(1.367)
Court Professionalism		-22.493*	-22.984*	-22.702*	-22.900*	-24.255*	-28.018*	-24.725*	-21.056*	-27.970*
		(6.826)	(7.437)	(6.645)	(6.717)	(6.782)	(7.688)	(7.198)	(6.848)	(9.050)
Court Professionalism x Senior Never Chief		-0.256								-0.906
		(1.674)								(1.747)
Court Professionalism x Experience			0.007							-0.197
			(0.417)							(0.495)
Court Professionalism x Experience Squared			0.003							0.013
			(0.020)							(0.024)
Court Professionalism x Woman				-0.420						0.621
				(1.686)						(1.781)
Court Professionalism x Person of Color					4.040					5.094
					(2.535)					(2.789)
Court Professionalism x % Dissent						0.077				0.130
						(0.079)				(0.096)
Court Professionalism x Same Party as Majority							3.636			2.713
							(2.060)			(2.336)
Court Professionalism x Same Party as Governor								1.605		1.068
								(1.881)		(1.846)
Court Professionalism x Same Party as Legislature									3.065	2.373
									(2.258)	(2.371)
Intercept	-3.010*	12.516*	12.842*	12.654*	12.761*	13.622*	15.983*	13.980*	11.603*	15.938*
	(0.569)	(4.827)	(5.192)	(4.713)	(4.766)	(4.795)	(5.295)	(5.068)	(4.814)	(6.130)
Observations	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154
AIC	810	812	814	812	810	811	809	812	810	818
BIC	856	863	870	863	861	862	859	862	861	909
Contest Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<0.05. Robust standard errors clustered by contest are in parentheses. The outcome variable is an indicator scored 1 if a justice is voted chief and 0 otherwise.

Court Size

Having more court seats may increase competition for the chief justice designation. Information on court size comes from Lindquist (2007). Table 4 presents results from a series of models interacting court size with each of the theoretically relevant explanatory variables. Model 10 displays results including each interaction. Model 1 presents the primary baseline results for comparison. Overall, the primary results are stable across specifications. Moreover, BIC values indicate that the baseline model best fits the data. Nonetheless, one results is worth noting. The positive effect of a 0-1 change in the senior never chief variable on the probability of selection increases across the range of court size values, suggesting that the seniority norm becomes stronger as court size increases, perhaps as a way to dampen competition for the designation. Figure 2 plots the results.



Figure 2: Conditional Effect of Being Senior Never Chief by Court Size

Table 4: Conditional Effects of Court Size

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Senior Never Chief	2.510*	-0.357	2.504*	2.512*	2.514*	2.517*	2.517*	2.511*	2.506*	-0.408
	(0.262)	(1.261)	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.264)	(0.261)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(1.331)
Experience	0.361*	0.341*	0.017	0.361*	0.364*	0.365*	0.359*	0.361*	0.366*	0.163
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.538)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.612)
Experience Squared	-0.013*	-0.013*	0.002	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.030)
Woman	-0.281	-0.248	-0.274	-0.425	-0.267	-0.289	-0.290	-0.281	-0.285	-0.034
	(0.316)	(0.320)	(0.321)	(1.756)	(0.317)	(0.316)	(0.316)	(0.316)	(0.317)	(1.905)
Person of Color	0.035	0.084	0.035	0.034	1.868	0.079	0.018	0.034	0.036	2.348
	(0.346)	(0.369)	(0.348)	(0.347)	(2.024)	(0.347)	(0.348)	(0.347)	(0.346)	(2.685)
% Dissent	-0.058*	-0.056*	-0.057*	-0.058*	-0.058*	-0.128	-0.058*	-0.058*	-0.058*	-0.073
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.085)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.090)
Same Party as Court Majority	0.394	0.388	0.420	0.393	0.392	0.402	-0.622	0.395	0.409	-1.348
	(0.330)	(0.321)	(0.336)	(0.332)	(0.331)	(0.334)	(1.662)	(0.330)	(0.333)	(1.762)
Same Party as Governor	-0.290	-0.292	-0.316	-0.289	-0.284	-0.303	-0.301	-0.312	-0.268	-0.359
	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.297)	(0.304)	(0.305)	(0.308)	(0.303)	(1.465)	(0.304)	(1.570)
Same Party as Legislature	-0.421	-0.359	-0.455	-0.420	-0.418	-0.415	-0.449	-0.422	0.378	1.658
	(0.322)	(0.316)	(0.312)	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.325)	(0.317)	(0.321)	(1.516)	(1.739)
Court Size		-0.234	-0.239	0.006	0.007	-0.092	-0.142	0.005	0.123	-0.390
		(0.227)	(0.453)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.247)	(0.319)	(0.253)	(0.293)	(0.703)
Court Size x Senior Never Chief		0.458*								0.468*
		(0.203)								(0.215)
Court Size x Experience			0.053							0.031
			(0.090)							(0.103)
Court Size x Experience Squared			-0.002							-0.001
			(0.004)							(0.005)
Court Size x Woman				0.022						-0.035
				(0.256)						(0.293)
Court Size x Person of Color					-0.264					-0.332
					(0.296)					(0.403)
Court Size x % Dissent						0.011				0.002
						(0.013)				(0.014)
Court Size x Same Party as Majority							0.165			0.301
							(0.252)			(0.290)
Court Size x Same Party as Governor								0.004		0.012
								(0.218)		(0.251)
Court Size x Same Party as Legislature									-0.131	-0.356
									(0.241)	(0.297)
Intercept	-3.010*	-1.512	-1.530	-3.039*	-3.053*	-2.300	-2.130	-3.030*	-3.666*	-0.342
	(0.569)	(1.319)	(2.569)	(1.282)	(1.275)	(1.537)	(1.848)	(1.526)	(1.572)	(4.025)
Observations	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154
AIC	810	805	815	814	814	813	814	814	814	818
BIC	856	861	876	870	870	869	869	870	870	914
Contest Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<0.05. Robust standard errors clustered by contest are in parentheses. The outcome variable is an indicator scored 1 if a justice is voted chief and 0 otherwise.

Secret Voting

To examine whether internal procedures condition the effect of choice-level variables, we requested information from the state supreme courts in our sample on (1) whether the votes are public and (2) whether judges are aware of each other's votes. With respect to whether the justices' votes are public, all but Idaho provided information and in each reporting state the justices' votes are not reported externally to the press or other entities. Getting information on whether the justices were aware of each other's votes proved more difficult. Of states that reported this information, Alaska, Arizona, Kentucky, and Michigan indicated that the justices are aware of each other's votes; Oklahoma (Civil), Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington reported that votes were secret among the justices.

Since there is no variation among reporting states with respect to whether votes are released to the public, we cannot test for potential moderating effects. We can, however, test for moderating effects with respect to whether votes are secret internally. Table 5 presents results from a series of models interacting the indicator for whether votes are secret internally with each of the theoretically relevant explanatory variables. Model 10 displays results including each interaction. Model 1 presents the primary baseline results for comparison. Overall, the primary results are mostly stable across specifications. The dissents variable, however, is not statistically distinguishable from zero, though this sub-sample includes a more than 40 percent data reduction due to state failures to provide the relevant information. BIC values mostly indicate that the baseline model best fits the data. One results is worth noting. The effect of a 0-1 change in the senior never chief variable on the probability of selection is positive in states with secret votes but indistinguishable in states where votes are visible. Figure 3 plots the results.



Figure 3: Conditional Effect of Senior Never Chief

Table 5: Conditional Effects of Secret Voting

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Senior Never Chief	1.827*	0.753	1.833*	1.836*	1.826*	1.839*	1.819*	1.808*	1.810*	0.690
	(0.425)	(0.569)	(0.426)	(0.430)	(0.423)	(0.424)	(0.426)	(0.427)	(0.427)	(0.559)
Experience	0.406*	0.399*	0.307*	0.410*	0.411*	0.406*	0.410*	0.409*	0.426*	0.410*
	(0.136)	(0.146)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.172)
Experience Squared	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.010	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.015*	-0.015
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Woman	-0.159	-0.193	-0.165	0.099	-0.203	-0.164	-0.151	-0.157	-0.142	0.107
	(0.426)	(0.450)	(0.432)	(0.559)	(0.429)	(0.428)	(0.427)	(0.426)	(0.426)	(0.523)
Person of Color	0.831	0.840	0.818	0.765	1.143	0.819	0.832	0.832	0.827	0.945
	(0.621)	(0.661)	(0.621)	(0.616)	(0.750)	(0.625)	(0.624)	(0.620)	(0.620)	(0.732)
% Dissent	-0.015	-0.008	-0.016	-0.017	-0.013	-0.021	-0.016	-0.015	-0.013	-0.005
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.028)
Same Party as Court Majority	0.321	0.287	0.371	0.354	0.316	0.338	0.463	0.399	0.289	0.177
	(0.523)	(0.483)	(0.519)	(0.531)	(0.518)	(0.535)	(0.706)	(0.563)	(0.537)	(0.552)
Same Party as Governor	-0.286	-0.075	-0.289	-0.298	-0.270	-0.293	-0.240	-0.155	-0.308	-0.049
	(0.429)	(0.424)	(0.418)	(0.427)	(0.430)	(0.431)	(0.420)	(0.541)	(0.438)	(0.464)
Same Party as Legislature	-0.687	-0.698	-0.741	-0.669	-0.717	-0.718	-0.708	-0.733	-0.343	-0.192
	(0.558)	(0.553)	(0.558)	(0.557)	(0.559)	(0.573)	(0.551)	(0.575)	(0.736)	(0.648)
Secret Vote		-1.452*	-1.931	-0.474	-0.333	-0.818	-0.296	-0.255	-0.582	-2.246
		(0.515)	(1.563)	(0.377)	(0.482)	(0.709)	(0.710)	(0.768)	(0.366)	(2.476)
Secret x Senior Never Chief		2.248*								2.488*
		(0.858)								(1.020)
Secret x Experience			0.229							0.137
			(0.273)							(0.321)
Secret x Experience Squared			-0.009							-0.004
			(0.012)							(0.014)
Secret x Woman				-0.699						-1.322
				(0.881)						(1.264)
Secret x Person of Color					-0.825					-0.687
					(1.157)					(1.553)
Secret x % Dissent						0.019				0.005
						(0.045)				(0.060)
Secret x Same Party as Majority							-0.410			0.869
							(0.896)			(1.246)
Secret x Same Party as Governor								-0.451		-0.680
								(0.851)		(0.864)
Secret x Same Party as Legislature									-0.996	-2.373
									(1.000)	(1.468)
Intercept	-3.916*	-3.736*	-3.454*	-3.943*	-3.984*	-3.809*	-4.053*	-4.084*	-3.976*	-3.676*
	(0.924)	(0.947)	(0.827)	(0.917)	(0.947)	(0.926)	(0.956)	(0.957)	(0.922)	(0.909)
Observations	476	476	476	476	476	476	476	476	476	476
AIC	354	344	357	355	355	356	356	356	355	355
BIC	391	385	403	397	397	397	397	397	397	430
Contest Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<0.05. Robust standard errors clustered by contest are in parentheses. The outcome variable is an indicator scored 1 if a justice is voted chief and 0 otherwise.

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