Supporting Information

Contents

A1   Identification of Group Bills

California state law does not require groups to be listed as sponsors. However, I provide a few pieces of evidence to demonstrate that even though legislators are not statutorily required to list outside sponsors, legislators follow a strong norm of listing this information. The first piece of evidence that I present is the presence of controversial group sponsors in the dataset. Figure A1 displays the bill analysis for A.B. 2906 which was introduced in the 2001-2002 session of the California state legislature. The analysis clearly indicates that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company sponsored the bill. While the issue remains that groups may hesitate to put their organization's name on bills that are likely to be fail, the presence of highly controversial groups listed as sponsors provides preliminary evidence that legislators do not censor the bills listed as sponsored because of the type of group.

Figure A1: *Bill analysis for A.B 2906 introduced in the 2001-2002 session of the California state legislature. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company is prominently listed as the bill's sponsor.*


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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
             Jerome Edgar Horton, Chair
AB 2906 (Horton) - As Amended:  April 18, 2002


SUBJECT  :    Tobacco settlement agreement: escrow compliance.

This bill is sponsored by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and
is intended to protect participating tobacco manufacturers
from nonparticipating manufacturers, and indirectly protect
California's settlement payments under the MSA.
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Figure A2: *Excerpts from bill analyses for A.B. 3773 (left) and A.B. 4203 (right). These bills that were floated by the FBI posing as Gulf Shrimp Fisheries, Inc. and Peach State Capitol, Inc. in the late 1980s. These fake entities are clearly listed as sponsoring the bills.*

Additionally, I retrieved bill analysis files from bills that were part of an FBI sting in the late 1980s. Gwen Moore, a California State Assembly member for nearly 15 years, was targeted in an FBI sting operation. According to the public papers archive, she "agreed to carry two bills (AB 3773 and AB 4203) that were written by undercover agents in exchange for $10,500 in illegal campaign contributions" (http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c8ks6trs/entire_text/). While Moore was not convicted, her legislative aide was convicted of "extortion, conspiracy, racketeering, money laundering, and income tax evasion" (http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c8ks6trs/entire_text/). The bill analyses for legislative sessions prior to 1993 are not available digitally. Gwen Moore's papers are available via the California State Archives and I obtained the bill analyses for those bills that were part of the FBI sting. Figure A2 presents excerpts from

the bill analyses. Both of these analyses clearly list the fake company as the sponsor on the bill analysis. The legislator's willingness to proclaim the sponsors on these bills despite the alleged corruption demonstrates the very strong norm of revealing the sponsor on bill analyses.

A2   Robustness Check on Group Sponsorship Classification

I preform a robustness check that involves randomly assigning some bills that are classified as "not sponsored" and fail to be chaptered to the "sponsored" bills category. A high percentage of bills are already classified as group bills from the bill analyses, but what if some bills that fail to pass are wrongly classified as unsponsored? This skewed mixup toward bills that do not become law being miscategorized may occur if the groups wish to appear successful (to their donors, other groups, or current/future legislative collaborators). The group may attempt to have the legislative partner not list their name on the bill analysis, if there is fear that the bill may fail.

I classify a random samples of 5%, 10%, 15%, and 50% of bills that are categorized as non-sponsored and fail passage to be classified as group sponsored. In other words, I take a random sample of the non-sponsored and non-chaptered bills and treat them as group sponsored in these tests. Subsequently, I run OLS regressions on these samples to see if the substantive result that group sponsorship is significantly and positively associated with passage is undone by misclassification. Since I am not aware of information on the 'true' percentage of state bills that come from groups, I choose these percentages to see if the results would change if a large portion and a majority of bills are sponsored bills. The 50% misclassified category is the percentage for which the statistical significance first disappears for the sponsored bills variable.

	Chaptered				
	Original	Additional 5%	Additional 10%	Additional 15%	Additional 50%
Group Bills	0.443***	0.381***	0.325***	0.277***	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Local	−0.011	−0.015	−0.020	−0.017	−0.030*
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Urgency	0.144***	0.150***	0.154***	0.160***	0.177***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Bill Length	0.026***	0.032***	0.037***	0.041***	0.059***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Cosponsors	0.004***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	−0.032	−0.063	−0.077*	−0.096*	−0.087*
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)
N	8344	8344	8344	8344	8344
R-squared	0.213	0.173	0.139	0.112	0.034
F Statistic (df = 7; 8336)	321.477***	248.529***	191.964***	150.235***	42.067***

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Table A1: *Robustness check on potential misclassification of non-sponsored bills. Column 1 presents the results for the original classification of sponsored bills for comparison. This analysis switches a random sample of 5% (Column 2), 10% (Column 3), 15% (Column 4), or 50% (Column 4) of non-sponsored and non-chaptered bills to be treated as sponsored bills in this analysis.*

Table A1 presents the results from this exercise. The regressions are run on Assembly bills from the 2009-2014 sessions. For reference, the model for the "true" group bills identified in the bill analysis is presented in Column 1. The coefficient on group sponsorship from the bill analysis identification is 0.437. While the magnitude of the relationship between the group bill variable and passage decreases as noise is added to the measure, it retains significance and stays high. These results show that a substantial amount of misclassification can occur without altering the substantial or statistical significance of the relationship between group sponsorship and passage. To move the coefficient out of statistical significance at the .1 level, 50% of non-sponsored bills that fail to pass would need to be misclassified as non-sponsored when they should be listed as sponsored. This would equate to 60% of introduced bills sponsored by groups. While this volume of sponsored bills may be plausible, this is a huge degree of misclassification. Given that these

groups are doing some work in sponsorship, it is unlikely that that large

A potentially fruitful, but currently unexplored way of examining the possibility that groups hid their sponsorship when the bill is controversial or at high risk of failure would be to examine those bill analyses introduced before and after the bill analyses were posted online. The desire for groups to appear successful with their bill sponsorship activities may be attenuated after the bill analyses are posted online. A wider range of people and fellow groups would be able to view the success of individual groups after the bill analyses are publicly accessible. Unfortunately, looking at bill sponsorship before and after this information was listed online is difficult because of the date at which the legislature started posting the analyses. Per individual email communication with the California State Library and Government Code section 10248(5), the bills were posted online starting January 1, 1994. The data prior to the 1993-1994 session is available only in archives, so I leave this data collection project and analysis for future work.

While legislators are not statutorily required to list extra-legislative sponsors, they seem to follow the norm of doing so. I provide an example of a controversial sponsor, as well as an instance where we would expect the legislator to leave off the sponsor if the legislators censor the sponsorship listings. Additionally, a robustness test provides strong evidence that substantial misclassification of unsuccessful group bills as non-group bills would not substantively alter the results presented.

A3   Group Type

As touched on in the main text, the entities that sponsor bills vary drastically. A substantial portion of the sponsors are state-level agencies or municipal entities or agencies. Bills proposed by the executive branch are a different phenomenon when compared to bills proposed by a corporation or organized group. Different strategic interactions may be at play with bills sponsored by governmental versus corporate interests. While cities and agency officials can and do lobby the legislature in California (Baeder 2014), under California's Political Reform Act, "public agency lobbyists *may not*: Contribute to or raise public funds for any candidate for elective office. Candidates also are prohibited from accepting such funds" (http://www.westerncity.com/Western-City/

January-2010/The-Rules-on-Lobbying-What-Every-Local-Official-Should-Know/). Thus, sepa-rately examining the trajectory of bills sponsored by these entities versus other groups may reveal the role of information provision without the complicating consideration of campaign contribu-tions. This analysis provides some evidence that campaign contributions from these sponsoring organizing are not driving the finding that these bills pass at a higher rate than non-sponsored bills.

I conduct the matching analysis on the subset of bills that are *not* agencies or municipal entities. Table A2 presents the effect sizes for the subsetted matching. Column 1 presents the original results, which lump all sponsors together.[14] Column 2 (Non Agency/Municipal) matches bills with that have at least one non-agency and non-municipal sponsor with a completely non-sponsored bill. Column 3 (Only Agency/Municipal) presents the results for a matching analysis with bills that have only an agency or municipal sponsor listed, matched with a completely non-sponsored bill. These results show that the agency or municipal sponsorship is most strongly associated with passage. However, the non-agency and non-municipal matching coefficient shows that these bills are still significantly and substantively associated with passage.

	Combined	Non Agency/Municipal	Only Agency/Municipal
OLS (ATE)	0.41	0.24	0.41
	0.02	0.02	0.02
Matching ATE	0.39	0.21	0.4
	0.02	0.03	0.03
Matching ATT	0.4	0.17	0.38
	0.02	0.03	0.03
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A2: *ATT=average treatment effect for the treated, ATE=average treatment effect. The stan-dard errors in the matching analyses are Abadie-Imbens.*

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[14]In contrast to the main text, resolutions are excluded from this analysis. I do this in order to focus on substantive bills. The covariates are Majority Party Status of Author, Local, Urgency, Cosponsors, and Length.

A4 Bill Summary Statistics

	Non-Group Sponsored	Group Sponsored
% Resolutions	10.88	6.40
% Urgency Bills	6.33	7.50
% Local Bills	80.86	76.75
Mean Bill Length	1398.36	2047.46
Mean # Cosponsors	4.26	3.62

Table A3: Descriptive statistics on non-group sponsored bills passage rates compared to group sponsored bills in the 2009-2014 Assembly.

Figure A3: *Density plots of bill length by sponsorship status.*

A5 Logistic Regressions of Bill Passage

These bill-level regressions model bill passage through committee, Assembly, Senate, and final enactment. I conduct a series of logistic regressions of bill passage on group sponsorship and include a set of control variables potentially relevant to bill passage. These regressions are run on the 1995-2014 Assembly bill data, and exclude resolutions and special session legislation. Table

A4 displays logistic regression models of passage through the committee stage, passage through the lower chamber, and passage through the upper chamber. A number of covariates, on the bill and bill's author, that have been shown to alter the chances of bill passage are included (bill level: *urgency bill*, *local bill*, *bill length*, *consent calendar*; legislator level: *author's years of service*, *author's distance from the chamber median*). These results show that group sponsorship is a statistically and substantively significant predictor of bill passage through each of these stages. This result is striking, and provides initial evidence that, even controlling for a host of characteristics important to bill passage, group sponsorship remains an important predictor of bill enactment. Group-sponsored bills are more likely to pass through each stage compared to bills without a sponsor.

	Dependent variable:		
	Pass Committee	Pass Lower	Pass Upper
Group Sponsored	2.24***	2.23***	1.89***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Local Bill	0.07***	0.07***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urgency Bill	−0.13***	−0.12***	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log Bill Length	1.20***	1.15***	0.90***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Session FE?	✓	✓	✓
Observations	29,453	29,453	29,453
Log Likelihood	−16,237.41	−16,330.70	−16,414.74
Akaike Inf. Crit.	32,502.81	32,689.40	32,857.47
Note:			*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A4: Assembly Bill Progress (Logistic Regressions): *These models report logistic regression coefficients with session fixed effects. The dependent variable for the models are dichotomous indicators 1) of bill passage through committee, 2) passage through the lower chamber, and 3) passage through the upper chamber, respectively.*

Table A6 reports logistic models of Assembly bill final passage (also known as chaptered bills in the California state legislature). The group sponsorship coefficient is robust to adding in a number of different variables that are expected to matter a great deal for bill passage. In Model 1, I include the *consent calendar* variable which indicates that the bill did not receive opposition from any legislator or group in a hearing. Even including this variable, which is intimately tied to a bill's success, does not decrease the significance of the group sponsorship variable. Additionally, the author's legislator experience (*lower terms*) and ideological distance from the chamber median (*distance from House Median*) are significant but do not detract from the substantive importance of the group sponsor coefficient (included in Model 2).

To test whether lobbying by groups on sponsored bills explains differential passage rate, I include indicator variables for whether there was group support or opposition listed on the bill analyses. The bill analyses contain lists of the groups that submit letters of support or opposition towards the bill. Figure A4 shows an example of a bill analysis on which four groups supported the bill and none opposed.

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                        POSITIONS

Support:  Bet Tzedek Legal Services (co-sponsor)
          California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform
      (co-sponsor)
          AARP California
          Consumer Attorneys of California

Oppose:None received
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Figure A4: *Example of group positions on a bill.*

For the 2011-2012 session of the lower chamber, I collected data on the number of groups that support or oppose the bill. Shown in Model 4 of Table A6, adding indicator variables for the presence of support and opposition does not alter the substantive results of the logistic regressions of group sponsorship on bill passage. This analysis provides support for the conclusion that group sponsorship contributes to bill passage above and beyond mere group support on a bill.

Importantly, I categorize the bills according to topic, and include topic fixed effects in Model 3 of Table A6. The California legislature lists a short topic for every piece of legislation. While these are called topics, there are 38,191 unique topics for 57,802 bills. For the 2009-2014 period,

there are 11,024 unique topics for 14,978 bills. Thus, to group the bills into meaningful categories, we need to further merge these topics into groups. I use keyword searches to group these topics into the Policy Agendas Project categories for bills from 2009-2014. I use the Policy Agendas Project codebook (https://www.comparativeagendas.net/pages/master-codebook) to place the bills into bins by conducting keyword searches of the topics. For example, the California topic of 'Energy: solar energy' for A.B. 1027 introduced in the 2009-2010 session would be coded as a bill related to "energy". I add the category of 'firearms, alcohol, tobacco, and drugs' since these topics come up frequently in California legislation, but are not easily categorized from referencing the Policy Agendas Project codebook. Sponsorship remains a substantial and significant predictor of passage even after including these topic fixed effects.

The table, A5 below shows the number of bills placed into each of the categories. There are 8,534 assembly bills for 2009-2014. I include these topic fixed effects.

Category	Number
Agriculture	151
Civil Rights	216
Culture	20
Defense	13
Domestic Commerce	604
Education	1076
Energy	280
Environment	620
Firearms, Alcohol, and Tobacco	133
Government Operations	808
Health	756
Housing	192
Immigration	6
Labor	506
Law Crime	907
Macroeconomics	525
Public Lands	85
Social Welfare	268
Technology	69
Transportation	496
Veterans	65
Other	738

Table A5: *2009-2014 Assembly Bills categorized into Policy Agendas Project related categories.*

	Passage			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Sponsored	1.45***	1.16***	2.01***	1.77***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Bill Length	0.10***	0.06***	0.15***	0.10*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Local Bill	−0.09*	−0.06	0.02	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.11)
Urgency Bill	0.87***	1.03***	0.80***	0.60**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.19)
Consent Calendar	2.11***			
	(0.03)			
Republican Author	−0.59***			
	(0.03)			
Lower Terms		0.02*		
		(0.01)		
Dist from House Median		−0.42***		
		(0.03)		
Group Sponsor * Lower Terms		−0.00		
		(0.02)		
Group Sponsor * Dist from House Median		0.39***		
		(0.03)		
Support				1.35***
				(0.12)
Opposition				−1.12***
				(0.11)
Topic FE	✗	✗	✓	✗
Session FE	✓	✓	✓	NA
Sessions Included	1993-2014	1993-2009	2009-2014	2011-2012
Observations	31,500	23,562	7,699	2,700
Log Likelihood	−15,228.61	−13,388.48	−4,140.16	−1,410.48
Akaike Inf. Crit.	30,491.22	26,808.95	8,334.32	2,834.96

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A6: Assembly Bill Passage (Logistic Regressions): *Logistic regression coefficients with session fixed effects. For each model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of bill passage.*

A6 Democrats and Republicans Combined Legislator-Level Regressions, for the Assembly

	(1) # Group Bills	(2) # Non Group Bills
Republican Party	4.50 (4.63)	9.45 (7.27)
2nd Term	-0.95** (0.35)	-0.92 (0.55)
3rd Term	-3.43*** (0.41)	-4.26*** (0.65)
Vote Share	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Chair	1.61*** (0.47)	4.32*** (0.74)
Leader	0.19 (0.73)	4.15*** (1.15)
Constant	8.34* (4.09)	30.42*** (6.42)
Observations	794	794
R^2	0.77	0.68

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7: Assembly Regressions: *Seemingly unrelated regression coefficients regressions of number of group sponsored bills authored by legislator i and number of non-group bills authored by legislator i on the number of terms in the Assembly. Legislator fixed effects included for all models.*

	(1)	(2)
	# Group Bills that Became Law	# Non Group Bills that Became Law
Republican Party	-1.96	-5.91*
	(2.00)	(2.53)
# Group Bills Introduced	0.57***	
	(0.02)	
# Non Group Bills Introduced		0.16***
		(0.01)
2nd Term	0.26	0.95***
	(0.15)	(0.19)
3rd Term	0.14	0.93***
	(0.19)	(0.23)
Vote Share	-0.03**	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Chair	0.17	1.48***
	(0.21)	(0.26)
Leader	-0.49	0.22
	(0.32)	(0.40)
Constant	4.61**	4.84*
	(1.77)	(2.26)
Observations	794	794
R^2	0.90	0.74

Standard errors in parentheses

$* \ p < 0.05, \ ** \ p < 0.01, \ *** \ p < 0.001$

Table A8: Assembly Regressions: *Seemingly unrelated regression coefficients regressions of number of group sponsored bills authored by legislator i that pass and number of non-group bills authored by legislator i that pass on the number of terms in the Assembly. Legislator fixed effects included for all models.*