

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Interview with the First Lady by Adam Clymer; RE: private info [partial] (2 pages)	09/30/1994	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 First Lady's Office
 First Lady's Press Office (Lissa Muscatine)
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FOLDER TITLE:

FLOTUS Press Office Interview Transcripts Volume V 10/19/94--04/10/97 [Binder] :
 [9/30/94 Clymer, Adam New York Times Part 2 of 2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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September 30, 1994

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST LADY
BY ADAM CLYMER, NEW YORK TIMES
THE WHITE HOUSE
PART 2 OF 2

MRS. CLINTON: The President said they had a great event last night.

MR. CLYMER: He was -- the President was very good.

MRS. CLINTON: Well, good. Good.

MR. CLYMER: I went out there. I had the impression that the President's interest (inaudible) beyond the time that he spent in the House, I think the Kennedys were showing every picture in the place, which would take quite a -- takes quite a while.

MRS. CLINTON: He was. They showed him a lot. It really was a great experience. But I guess I was -- I just didn't understand. This was a big fund raiser. There were like 750, 800 people there, according to the President.

MR. CLYMER: Yes. Well, they raised 750, but they had fewer than that there. (Inaudible). I would like to be today on the record, unless there's something you want to say.

Anyway. As I sort of transcribed it and read it and thought about what you said (inaudible) -- let me raise one thing about that. It may say sometime -- and plainly, you don't want to about (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: Right.

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MR. CLYMER: But some of your sort of generic descriptions of the problems that you're having. If I talk to Lisa and say, "(Inaudible)," is that okay?

MRS. CLINTON: Let's do that.

MR. CLYMER: Rather than trying to go over the whole --

MRS. CLINTON: And there may be a different way of saying it that I wouldn't mind saying, too.

MR. CLYMER: Sure.

MRS. CLINTON: Okay.

MR. CLYMER: But as I looked over the conversation, I think you identified three sets of (inaudible). One was perhaps taking a lot of well-intentioned, thoughtful advice from Congressional leaders that didn't work, on things like scheduling and priorities or using the statement of principles, as opposed to a bill, or staying on details (inaudible). It doesn't necessarily prove that doing the opposite would have worked brilliantly, but those things did not seem to have worked.

The second area is a sense of being let down by some Republicans, by some groups that were basically your friends and well-intentioned on the smaller issues but on the bigger picture and also by not getting what you thought you were reasonably entitled to from business or the consideration given some of those in office. Is that a fair --

MRS. CLINTON: I think so. And I don't want to give the impression that we had a right to expect any of that. Because I think it's fair to say that people act in their own self-interest. And that's the basis for the political give-and-take.

But the definition of "self-interest" and the commitment to certain positions was not a stable one, so that our effort to find the middle or to reach agreement with individuals and groups was a constantly evolving process, as opposed to some more fixed universe, where you could tell what people's positions were and move toward them and make the necessary compromises in order to get folks on board.

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MR. CLYMER: Another thing, I think (inaudible). This is perhaps a slightly different category. I think you were saying that you underestimated how your own (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: Yes. Both how virulent and how effective they would be at controlling the debate through persistent misrepresentation that we could never adequately refute. And again, that was to be expected. I read everything I could find about what President Truman had gone through. I read about the Medicare and the Medicaid, you know, debates and struggles. I read about the Nixon proposal. I read about Carter's efforts with respect to health care.

So I was not under any illusion about how organized and strong the opposition to health care reform would be. But I did not appreciate how sophisticated they would be in conveying messages that were effective politically, even though substantively wrong, and that we could never quite get back into the discussion in an effective manner. Because we did not have the financial resources to combat every attack that appeared on either the TV or the radio or also in direct mail, where I think some of the most effective opposition surfaced.

MR. CLYMER: (Inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: Have you ever seen the collection of direct mail that we have compiled?

MR. CLYMER: No.

MRS. CLINTON: You might want to take a look at it. It went to millions and millions of people.

MR. CLYMER: I don't see very many of the lists, so

MRS. CLINTON: You'll never talk to me again after you read it.

MR. CLYMER: I've started calling in the 800 numbers on some of the stuff on the theory that we'll get another (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: Did they ever send you stuff?

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MR. CLYMER: (Inaudible). Something else that has struck me as perhaps an even greater problem was that people kept making comparisons. We have (inaudible) of Social Security and Medicare. There's a profound difference (inaudible) in both Houses.

MRS. CLINTON: Right. And a Depression and a recent assassination.

MR. CLYMER: I think those were technically the causes of the charge.

MRS. CLINTON: But there was not only the political majority but the emotional commitment to push for public action.

MR. CLYMER: Well, one could know that you didn't start off (inaudible). I wondered, in view of that and the other problems you talked about, was your proposal perhaps full of lumps, the things that you were willing to compromise on that you talked about the other day become liabilities to you instead of lifting you up, and that is how the other guys got the baseball?

MRS. CLINTON: Well, that is something I think -- well, I know I miscalculated because I always saw the Health Security Act as an opening offer, a document to become the basis for political decision making. It was constructed to be deconstructed.

And what I never anticipated is that the first offer would be used as the means for deominizing the entire process, so that we did everything we thought we could do to make that clear when it was introduced by talking about how the President was open to new ideas, there was no pride of authorship, there was only one bottom line universal coverage. Because at that time, universal coverage had a majority of support and still does. But in the Congress, I was going to say. In the Congress.

I mean, you had -- between the Democrats, who were either single payer types, universal coverage managed completion types, and the Republicans, who were signed on to some form of universal coverage, you had a very hefty working majority, so that we knew we would have to move off of mandatory alliances and the form of the premium cap and the size of the benefit package. But we anticipated doing that.

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What we did not anticipate is that our first offer would be viewed as an ultimatum by the opponents and, therefore, used to try to undermine the process of reaching agreement around the basic principles. So it was something we continued to struggle with and decided that maybe the best way to encourage the process of decision making was through the Congressional committees, because they were the major players.

So we pulled back and talked only about principles and continued to talk about the plan but at every turn said that everything in there, except for the bottom line, is open to discussion. "If you," meaning any opponent, "have a better idea or a better approach, let us hear from it." And that's what I think we never adequately got across to people. And we were then painted as being inflexible or unwilling to negotiate, when that's how we saw the whole process.

Now, what we were not willing to do was to negotiate and get nothing in return. I mean, to give up on chunks of a coherent plan that would work and was well received by the Congressional Budget Office and outside analysts. And so people who attacked portions of it without offering an alternative were not really negotiating.

MR. CLYMER: Or even without offering their votes.

MRS. CLINTON: Yes. Exactly.

MR. CLYMER: "You take this out, I'll vote for it."

MRS. CLINTON: Yes. That was not happening. So the demonization of the Health Security Act was the biggest problem that we faced. And what we attempted to do was to keep talking about the principles while we searched for ways to hammer out legislative compromise that would still guarantee universal coverage.

It was funny. A House Democrat told me that she had gone to her district, and I thought, very smartly, picked people to be advocates for each different approach that was embodied in legislation -- proposed legislation, but without identifying any. So somebody spoke for single payer, somebody spoke for the President's plan, somebody spoke for managed competition and insurance reform, et cetera, and in front of a very large audience.

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And then, she had people interacting with the speakers, not only by questioning, but by having little voting tablets on their desks, so that they could vote for each proposal. And the President's proposal won.

But then, when it was identified as the President's proposal, people started to get antsy, because they thought maybe the person who had explained it to them had somehow either not understood it or missed all of the propaganda that they had been receiving over TV, radio, and through direct mail.

And this representative told me that it was such a stunning experience for her. But it was also like that headline that appeared in a number of papers back in the spring, which was, "It's the Clinton Plan People Like; They Just Don't Know It."

So we were stuck with a difficult position, since we had presented a coherent plan that would have worked but which we were more than willing to make changes off of and analyze the changes that we thought were doable. And we couldn't quite get that across.

MR. CLYMER: Was this district -- was the plan popular or unpopular?

MRS. CLINTON: Unpopular. Very conservative.

MR. CLYMER: That is another problem for the President in general (inaudible) the Clinton plan (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: Well, I think that --

MR. CLYMER: You know, because of other subjects.

MRS. CLINTON: I think that the political atmosphere that we have been working in during the last 20 months has been extremely negative and, unfortunately, partisan. And the President's willingness to keep tackling tough issues and to make the best decisions that could be made doesn't often satisfy people on either extreme of any issue, which is one of the reasons why I think historically, we will be so applauded because of how he has maneuvered through this time to create the most substantial legislative record in decades.

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But you pay a big price. The price of being a reformer who tries to bring competing positions together and moves from high flown rhetoric to actual policy making is always a difficult position. It was Mark Twain who said, "The two things you should never watch being made were sausage and legislation." Have I got that right? Was it him? I take you word for it.

MR. CLYMER: We'll both end up checking.

MRS. CLINTON: I'll take your word for it. But the thing that is so clear to me is that if the President had, upon taking office, continued to talk about issues and to give great speeches about the challenges facing America and the problems here and abroad but had not actually tried to do anything much about domestic politics, he would be extremely popular today, because he can give the greatest speeches. He can connect with people unlike anybody that I think we have had in American politics for a long time.

But once you move from rhetorical positioning to policy making, you move into the political realm. And it is not a pretty sight. It is, in a democracy, a messy one at best. But this President has the old-fashioned idea that he was elected to actually do something and not just promote a certain political ideology and point fingers at all the causes for our current problems in America.

So he knew that it was a big risk to actually address the deficit or to try to get the Brady bill passed or the crime bill passed or take on NAFTA and all the other things which have engendered extraordinary political opposition.

I mean, one of the great myths about my husband is that he doesn't want to make anybody mad. Well, for a man as smart as he is who doesn't want to make anybody mad, he had done a terrific job of making an enormous number of people mad for, I think, good reasons. I mean, I think it's a badge of honor to have the National Rifle Association be opposed to you because you beat them not once, but four times in four separate votes.

But when you have that intensity of opposition because you're trying to do something that you believe is right for the country, then not only do you have intense opponents, but you have intense opponents with resources who

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can go out and muddy the waters for everybody else, as well.

So there is, I think, a lot of good reasons why this President has the level of opposition that he has. And, of course, health care, which is such a complicated and important issue, would have engendered opposition anyway. But on top of the huge agenda he was also taking on, it was a big load to carry.

MR. CLYMER: Let's come back to something we talked about the other day, and that was sort of the (inaudible). (Inaudible). And you have taken on not only a party that you (inaudible), but a lot of substantial (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: The opposition did not surprise me. The personal nature of a lot of the attacks surprised me. But I don't have any problem with people being opposed to any policy that they disagree with. I think that's the democratic process. But I don't think I was prepared for the amount of resources that were readily available for the opposition.

And I don't know that I was prepared for how difficult a task it was to rebut the opposition. Because in a campaign, particularly at the Presidential level, if you stay on your toes, you don't let charges go unanswered, if they are out there, but you have the resources at your hands to do that.

What we basically had available was the coverage that could be obtained in the so-called "free press," which I think, on balance was very fair. I mean, I believe that there were a number of stories which pointed out that the President's plan would not deprive people of choice of doctors, for example.

MR. CLYMER: The Wall Street Journal did a series of -- their editorial page (inaudible) saying (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: Yes. So I think, in general, the press rebutted a lot of the claims. But if you don't rebut it in the forum in which the message is delivered, it goes un rebutted. So that means, if you don't have a radio campaign and a TV campaign, and if you don't even know about the direct mail campaign, the people who are being influenced by that kind of opposition are going to remain influenced.

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That is one of the really difficult parts of waging a policy campaign, as opposed to an electoral campaign. Because in an electoral campaign, you know, not every candidate has equal resources, but you know what the format is, you know how to get across your message. And this was just much more difficult to do.

And even the people who worked very hard to help had different takes on the message, which further muddied the waters. You know, it was difficult to get a single positive response. It's much easier to get a single negative campaign going, so that if your message is, "I'm against it; it's bad for you," that's easier than, "That's not quite true; let me explain to you why it is not true and give you some examples."

MR. CLYMER: We talked the other day about the hopes you had of reconciliation -- I've gone back and read the notes. And I have a strong sense that one, Bird said, "No, you couldn't do the whole thing." (Inaudible) Senate rules (inaudible), but that it remained possible through some elements for a reconciliation. Some of the stuff (inaudible) and that it wasn't so much people in the Senate as the concerns of bringing down the deficit (inaudible). Am I right about that?

MRS. CLINTON: I don't know, Adam. Because when Senator Bird said no to the whole reform package, that pretty much stopped our considering it. I believe there were some concerns, though, about how you would break apart the pieces of it and inject that into an already very difficult budgetary process, if you couldn't also give some of the additional positive reasons for it. So I think -- you know, it all ended up at the same place which, basically, it couldn't get done.

MR. CLYMER: Some of the other things that (inaudible) of your mistakes --

MRS. CLINTON: Both omission and commission.

MR. CLYMER: You mentioned a couple the other day you talked about. Assuming in the last fall, that once Congress came back and (inaudible), Congress came back and there was this feeling of (inaudible). But anyway, your expectation there was that (inaudible). There are some others that various others (inaudible).

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One -- I think the one that Ira would offer, first of all, is, in retrospect, too secretive in the initial process (inaudible) suspicious, and the voters were (inaudible) balance. Let me just run through some.

There's a sort of contradictory sound. One says that you were asleep at the switch and sullen. And the other one is that you were too combative, that you were (inaudible) with the insurance industry (inaudible). The fact that both arguments are made suggests that neither (inaudible) possibly could both be right (inaudible). You talked before about that. (Inaudible).

And I'm surprised at (inaudible) -- when you see how many people turn up at fund raisers who may not want -- don't particularly want everyone in town to know that (inaudible). I'm surprised that you couldn't raise more money.

MRS. CLINTON: Oh, we raised a lot of money. I mean, we raised millions and millions of dollars. I don't know what the final count is, but we probably spent 12, \$15 million. I don't know exactly. But the opposition spent 300 million, according to Newsweek.

MR. CLYMER: And 100 according to Annenberg.

MRS. CLINTON: And 120 according to Annenberg. So, you know, you don't have to match people dollar-for-dollar in either political campaigns or policy campaigns, but you have to have enough. And part of what we were up against is that the DNC was raising money for lots of other things.

I mean, the DNC did an incredible job raising money for Democratic candidates. That is their primary purpose. So in addition to doing that, they added onto it raising money for the health care initiative. And then, you know, we did very well. And under normal circumstances, it might have been enough. But it was certainly not enough.

MR. CLYMER: What about the secretiveness?

MRS. CLINTON: Well, I think there were some mistakes made then, but I had a little bit of a question about exactly what they were and how we could have done differently. There has never been a more open legislative

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drafting process in the history of the republic, as far as I know.

I mean, when you have hundreds and hundreds of people, many of them from the Hill, involved in drafting the legislation, that is unprecedented. I mean, it was a very different way of trying to do policy. And when the bill itself is drafted by the Congressional legislative drafters, that's hardly a secretive process.

I think this all got started because of the right wing group that filed suit under the FACA Act against the process. And I think I made a mistake in viewing that as such an obvious partisan -- not even partisan -- such an obvious radical right tactic that I didn't think anyone would see it as a serious indictment of the most open legislative process that I had ever heard about. And I was wrong about that.

But I think the bigger mistake was in not providing some regular contact with the press. And I do think that was a mistake. And the only explanation for it is, again, everybody involved with health care was basically told not to talk to the press because of the budget and that people didn't want articles appearing about the health care legislation, when everybody was focused on trying to get the deficit reduction package passed, so that we could at least have everybody's attention, where it was thought needed at the time.

So I think that what was viewed as a very prudent legislative reason undercut the relationships that could have existed between people working on health care, and members of the press could have been better communicative for what was going on. But I don't know how you call a process that has hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of people involved and which involves the Congress at every step of the way and for which there was an enormous public outreach from the very first day about what we were doing a "secret process."

So I think that was a political attack that worked. But what we should have tried to figure out is, given the constraints of the budgetary debate, how could we have been more forthcoming with the press so that the press wouldn't have bought in to the right wing attack about the secret process.

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MR. CLYMER: One of the things that some of my friends over at the White House (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: You know, I think if you -- I mean, I was on the road constantly in the spring of '93. I think if you went back and looked at the clippings, I had press avails in every town I was in. I did newspaper interviews. I did radio interviews. I did one-on-one television interviews. And most of my activity, because as what I saw as my public role, was occurring outside of Washington.

But I had intensive press contacts, which I would be glad to have Lisa give you an example of. So I don't understand that. I mean, I will be the first to tell you, I am bewildered by what the standards for press coverage are that are now, but I don't have any animosity toward the press as an institution or as the individuals who comprise it.

But I have a lot of questions as a citizen about what is newsworthy anymore and what is the basis for information that is reported? Oftentimes, not even sourced, or sourced so vaguely that it's hard to know what the real agenda is. So I have questions that I think most American citizens do now about the way the press is operating.

But I don't have any animosity against the press. I just wish I understood better how the press was defining its role and how certain journalists were justifying what is apparently a rather significant departure from previous standards of conduct.

MR. CLYMER: How do you understand (inaudible)? (Inaudible) refer to (inaudible) as President (inaudible). But can you give me some kind of sense of where you were involved, where he was involved, where -- I mean, where there were different things you focused on? From time to time, I would get an account of a meeting (inaudible) you weren't (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: Oh, far from it. I mean, everything I did and everything in that plan represented his position. Because he came into this with a very well-developed set of ideas about what he thought would work, drawn from his experience as a governor and more recently, from his being the governor who co-chaired a commission about health care and then as the Presidential candidate.

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I mean, it was really his idea to try to marry managed competition and universal coverage in a way that would promote cost containment and quality and choice that resulted in a hybrid, which everyone who knows a lot about health care reform that I have spoken with, you know, really thought was an incredibly useful way of trying to get different points of view melded together in a system that would work, that was a uniquely American response to health care.

And at every step of the way, the final decisions were made by the President. And we didn't do anything without his finally deciding that he was willing to sign off on it. Now, he also understood better than anybody else that this was meant to be a negotiating document, this piece of legislation. And that's what we thought would happen.

So he had a very clear appreciation about, you know, what might have to be changed. But he always had his bottom line principles in mind. But I would say of all the people in the Administration who attended meetings about health care reform between January of '93 and August of '94, Bill Clinton had a better understanding, a deeper appreciation of both the fiscal and the institutional issues associated with health care than anybody else.

And it's not just because he's my husband. I think he's really wonderful because he really understands this issue. And he is absolutely convinced that if we don't address it, we are undermining our future economic well being, and are further driving wedges between classes of people in this country that will eventually undermine the democratic process.

But, you know, Milan was in a lot of those meetings. And he would be there. And he would be arguing over arcane econometric actuarial analyses. And he would cut right through it. He would say, you know, "What are you guys talking about? If you look on page 4 of that analysis, if you turn to page 12, you'll realize that those are mutually inconsistent, and we can't do that. We have got to do something else."

So I always felt relieved, actually, because he would be the person who would ultimately make the decisions. And --

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MR. CLYMER: Even when you thought he made the wrong one?

MRS. CLINTON: I never thought he made the wrong one.

MR. CLYMER: Never? You never argued? I mean, you never took a position and he disagreed with you?

MRS. CLINTON: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. That would often happen. But, you know, my view of what my role was is to help facilitate his policy. So even though we might have a discussion about, you know X approach versus Y approach, most of the time, he persuaded me that whatever his position was was the right position, because he knew so much more about it than either I or most people.

He raised questions that after, you know, it had been vented by everybody in the Administration, were new questions, because --

MR. CLYMER: Can you give me a for instance or a time when he disagreed with you?

MRS. CLINTON: Well, no, I probably can't, because I don't want to talk about my conversations with him. But there were many times when he would just cut through the debate and, you know, illustrate an issue in a way that nobody else had even thought about before.

I just can't even emphasize how strongly he feels, but more than that, how much he knows about this issue and what it's doing to the country. So I just regret that for whatever combination of reasons, both the passion and the knowledge he brought to this issue were somehow undermined or lost because of the process that we followed.

And when it's all said and done, whatever criticism anybody has or whatever anybody thinks we should have done or shouldn't have done, the bottom line is, we didn't get it done. So I regret that deeply, because I think it's very important that we continue to struggle with the need for change in the system. And he's not going to give up on it.

MR. CLYMER: (Inaudible) the Congress (inaudible). But with that, regardless of it, do you have any sense from this (inaudible) of what sort of direction (inaudible)?

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
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
MRS. CLINTON: Well, I mean, we're still having lots of discussions about that, so I don't have any position that anybody has agreed on that I can talk about. But I believe that it will be become apparent to citizens over the next months that many of the problems that the President and those who favored reform are trying to address have not gone away and, in fact, are back and probably getting a little worse.

So the pressure for health care reform, now that the press of a legislative calendar has been relieved, I think, will build again. And then, it will be -- you know, the President will have to do an assessment about what the Congress looks like, how we can better articulate what he's attempting to achieve, what are doable steps in legislation, what can be done through regulatory changes or executive action. And all of that is being looked at right now.



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MR. CLYMER: (Inaudible)?

MRS. CLINTON: Liz?

MR. CLYMER: I'm referring to the President's remarks last night. What about Republicans? You had considered that some Republicans will be with you, and those were encouraged, to some degree, as the President moved forward with (inaudible) -- (End tape 1, side 1.)

MRS. CLINTON: The personal thing about it was the way the Republican party moved for a partisan position on health care. And it was difficult to understand at first, because whenever we attempted to make changes in our proposal that we thought they favored, they would move away from the very positions they had once advocated.

And I do want people to know that, at least from our perspective, we tried very hard. We spent an enormous amount of time. We took from previous Republican health bills certain features of the President's bill that we happened to think were good ideas but which we thought would help us create a relationship with those Republicans that would lead to some good compromises.

And we, of course, believed that with the 24 Republican Senators who had committed themselves to universal coverage, there was grounds for negotiation between us. But we never were able to get to that point.

And I regret that very much, because there were a number of Republicans in both the House and Senate who repeatedly told me they wanted to be involved with health care reform, thought there were ways to work out every objection that they had to employer mandate or cost containment, but they were successively discouraged from ever engaging in any substantial discussions that could have led to those changes being made.

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And that was a personal disappointment. Because I guess I thought that with a good core group committed to universal coverage, there ought to have been a way to work out the details.

MR. CLYMER: (Inaudible) involve the Congress again, you're going to have to find ways to work this out.

MRS. CLINTON: That's right. And I look forward to that. I mean, some of my best personal working relationships with were with some of the Republicans. And I have no reason to doubt that they are as disappointed as we are that this did not come to pass this time. But they have a political atmosphere that was difficult for them, just as the Democrats did.

And as I said in my speech yesterday, I mean, I don't think all this conversation about who won or lost in Washington, whether it be the President or me or Republicans or Democrats really is relevant. Because what's important is that we keep on working together to try to address this issue. Because it's the American people who are going to win or lose.

I mean, when the Congress recesses, every member of Congress is going to have health benefits. So if they're back in the District and they get in a car accident, they don't have to worry. And that's not true for large numbers of their constituents in every single district in this country.

But that's what I think people ought to be worried about and not, you know, doing postmortems on the process that has just ended or trying to handicap the future horse race but instead, putting our heads together and trying to really solve this problem.

MR. CLYMER: And this is a small (inaudible). You were not in any sense dismissive of really (inaudible). This wasn't something (inaudible).

MRS. CLINTON: No. No. I was hopeful that something could have come out of it. And both the President and I have said repeatedly that we encouraged it and were pleased to see members who had not previously been involved in health care discussions because they weren't on committees

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of jurisdiction getting involved.

Because I happen to believe the more you know about this problem, the better off we will be in fashioning a solution. So I was very hopeful that something could come out of that.

MR. CLYMER: Okay. Well, thank you.

MRS. CLINTON: Thank you.

(END OF SPEECH)

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