Supplementary Material

to

A Trump Effect on the EU's Popularity?
The U.S. Presidential Election as a Natural Experiment

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This supplementary material contains the following robustness checks:

Robustness checks

1.   Placebo analysis

To ensure that the results presented are not spurious, we ran a range of robustness checks. First, to ascertain that the results were not due to a general volatility of the EU's popularity during the examined time frame, we constructed a placebo analysis.[1] Here, the notion was to pretend that the treatment occurred between November 6-7 (instead of November 8-9) and test whether a significant effect could still be found. To do so, the treatment dummy (regression discontinuity) was recoded to change its value to 1 on November 7, so before the actual election took place. Table S1 illustrates the result. Model 1, estimated without controls, shows a significant treatment effect. However, this significance vanishes once $\beta(Z - c)$ and $\gamma T(Z - c)$ are controlled for in model 2. This means that, in line with our expectations, there is no immediate jump in the EU's popularity on November 7. Rather, the positive placebo-treatment effect in model 1 is likely spurious, resulting from the impact of the higher EU popularity after Trump's *actual* election on the placebo-treatment variable. Model 3 further demonstrates that the placebo-treatment effect remains non-significant after controlling for exogenous covariates. A second placebo analysis, pretending the elections took place on November 7-8 (table available upon request), reconfirms this finding of a significant placebo-treatment effect that becomes non-significant once time is controlled for. These patterns provide clear evidence that a significant jump in the EU's popularity actually occurred *only* after the real election night (November 8-9). Thus, it is possible to exclude the alternative explanation that the U.S. election simply coincided with a general upward trend in the EU's popularity during the time frame of the study.

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[1] Regarding the importance of placebo analyses for checking the validity of natural experiments, see Sekhon and Titiunik (2012).

Table S1. Robustness check: Placebo analysis (pretending the treatment occurred between 6-7 November). DV: EU popularity index.

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.06**	(0.02)	0.06	(0.07)	0.02	(0.07)
Treatment*Days			0.08	(0.04)	0.04	(0.04)
Days (mean-centered)			-0.06	(0.04)	-0.03	(0.04)
Female (1=yes)					0.03*	(0.01)
Age					-0.00***	(0.00)
Occupation						
White collar					(ref)	
Self-employed					-0.04	(0.03)
Manual					-0.11***	(0.02)
Homemaker					-0.13***	(0.04)
Unemployed					-0.34***	(0.03)
Retired					-0.06*	(0.03)
Student					0.48***	(0.06)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)					0.07***	(0.02)
Education (in years)					0.01***	(0.00)
Country dummies					✓	
Constant	-0.06**	(0.02)	-0.14*	(0.07)	0.10	(0.09)
Observations	18,477		18,477		18,477	
R^2	0.00		0.00		0.14	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. Increased sample size due to the inclusion of observations interviewed on November 9. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S2. Descriptive statistics excluding respondents age > 63.

	Control group (N=4544)				Treatment group (N=7458)				Δ means
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max	
EU popularity index	-0.049	1.06	-3.02	2.62	0.074	1.04	-3.02	2.62	-0.123***
Education (in years)	17.9	6.68	0	26	17.8	6.53	0	26	0.102
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1	0.53	0.50	0	1	-0.009
Occupation									
Self-employed	0.090	0.29	0	1	0.098	0.30	0	1	-0.008
White collar	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1	-0.000
Manual worker	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.26	0.44	0	1	-0.009
Homemaker	0.050	0.22	0	1	0.050	0.22	0	1	-0.001
Unemployed	0.092	0.29	0	1	0.087	0.28	0	1	0.005
Retired	0.091	0.29	0	1	0.084	0.28	0	1	0.007
Student	0.093	0.29	0	1	0.088	0.28	0	1	0.005
Age	42.1	13.2	15	63	41.8	13.1	15	63	0.260
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.69	0.46	0	1	0.70	0.46	0	1	-0.016

Note: Based on Eurobarometer 86.2, own calculations, not weighted; SD=Standard deviation, education was top-coded at 26 years to reduce the influence of outliers. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S3. Robustness check: Excluding respondents older than 63 years. DV: EU popularity index.

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.123***	(0.020)	0.041*	(0.019)	0.077*	(0.039)
Treatment*Days					0.012	(0.015)
Days (mean-centered)					-0.014	(0.013)
Female (1=yes)			0.058**	(0.018)	0.058**	(0.018)
Age			-0.008***	(0.001)	-0.008***	(0.001)
Occupation						
White collar			(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed			-0.046	(0.034)	-0.046	(0.034)
Manual			-0.115***	(0.025)	-0.116***	(0.025)
Homemaker			-0.146**	(0.044)	-0.146***	(0.044)
Unemployed			-0.363***	(0.037)	-0.362***	(0.037)
Retired			-0.177***	(0.039)	-0.176***	(0.039)
Student			0.373***	(0.073)	0.372***	(0.073)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)			0.067***	(0.020)	0.067***	(0.020)
Education (in years)			0.015***	(0.003)	0.015***	(0.003)
Country dummies			✓		✓	
Constant	-0.049**	(0.016)	0.272**	(0.085)	0.242**	(0.090)
Observations	12,002		12,002		12,002	
R^2	0.00		0.15		0.15	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. Excluding respondents older than 63 years. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

2.   Balancing the sample by excluding older respondents

Second, an additional test was run to make sure the findings were not due to the minor sample imbalances observed (Table 1). The most salient imbalance is the overrepresentation of retired (Δ means = .043, $p < .001$) and older people (Δ means = 1.591, $p < .001$) in the control group compared to the treatment group. Given this imbalance, the evidence could be a spurious effect of younger people being more in favor of the EU. In order to make sure that this is not the case, the estimations calculated in Table 2 were rerun, excluding everyone older than 63 from the sample. The resulting sample is better balanced in terms of age and retirement, and no more significant differences between control and treatment group can be found (Table S2). Replicating the findings from Table 2 with this younger, balanced sample shows that the Trump effect remains significant (Table S3).

3.   Testing the effect of imbalances between countries in fieldwork distribution

As Figure 2 in the article shows, the distribution of respondents across dates is not exactly the same in all countries. Here, we test whether countries being overrepresented in relative terms before or after the election affects the outcome. To do so, we compare the share of each country in the control group to its share in the treatment group. The result is shown in the last column of Table S4: A significant positive Δ means implies that the country was overrepresented in the sample before the election (control group), a significant negative Δ means implies that it was overrepresented in the sample after the election (treatment group) and a non-significant Δ means implies that the country was equally represented before and after the election. For example, Germany represents 8.6 percent of respondents in the control group, but only 3.2 percent of respondents in the treatment group. The share of German respondents in the control group is thus significantly larger than the share of German respondents in the treatment group (5.4 percent, $p<.001$). Overall, we find that 12 countries were overrepresented in the control

group as compared to the treatment group (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania), and vice versa in 8 countries (Ireland, UK, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia). In 7 countries, there was no significant over- or underrepresentation (Finland, Sweden, Czech Republic, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovenia).

Table S4: Descriptive statistics by country.

Country	Control group		Treatment group		Δ means
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
France	0.045	0.21	0.025	0.15	0.020***
Belgium	0.052	0.22	0.044	0.20	0.008*
Netherlands	0.050	0.22	0.031	0.17	0.019***
Germany	0.086	0.28	0.032	0.18	0.054***
Italy	0.045	0.21	0.027	0.16	0.018***
Luxembourg	0.025	0.16	0.016	0.12	0.009***
Denmark	0.039	0.19	0.031	0.17	0.008*
Ireland	0.017	0.13	0.051	0.22	-0.035***
UK	0.028	0.16	0.053	0.22	-0.025***
Greece	0.060	0.24	0.041	0.20	0.019***
Spain	0.029	0.17	0.042	0.20	-0.013***
Portugal	0.027	0.16	0.044	0.20	-0.016***
Finland	0.049	0.22	0.043	0.20	0.006
Sweden	0.041	0.20	0.042	0.20	-0.001
Austria	0.050	0.22	0.041	0.20	0.008*
Cyprus	0.024	0.15	0.012	0.11	0.012***
Czech Republic	0.040	0.19	0.042	0.20	-0.002
Estonia	0.031	0.17	0.021	0.14	0.010***
Hungary	0.030	0.17	0.044	0.20	-0.014***
Latvia	0.031	0.17	0.034	0.18	-0.003
Lithuania	0.037	0.19	0.028	0.17	0.008**
Malta	0.020	0.14	0.013	0.12	0.007
Poland	0.033	0.18	0.033	0.18	-0.000
Slovakia	0.019	0.14	0.056	0.23	-0.037**
Slovenia	0.041	0.20	0.040	0.20	0.000
Romania	0.013	0.11	0.063	0.24	-0.051***
Croatia	0.041	0.20	0.049	0.22	-0.008*

Note: Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Next, we run two models (Table S5) in which we exclude the countries overrepresented in the sample after the election (Model 1) or those overrepresented in the sample before the election (Model 2). In both cases, the main finding remains intact: Respondents who were interviewed after the surprise election of Trump held significantly more positive views of the EU than those interviewed before the election (δ^{RD} =.060, p < .05 and δ^{RD} =.098, p < .01, respectively). This shows that our finding of a positive Trump effect on the EU's popularity does not result from the fact that some countries are over- or underrepresented on either side of the external shock. Rather, it is robust against these imbalances in fieldwork.

Table S5. Robustness check for imbalances in fieldwork. DV: EU popularity index.

	(1) Excluding countries overrepresented in the sample after the election		(2) Excluding countries overrepresented in the sample before the election	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.060*	(0.025)	0.098**	(0.033)
Female (1=yes)	0.055*	(0.026)	0.083**	(0.030)
Age	-0.003*	(0.001)	-0.008***	(0.001)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.006	(0.028)	0.105***	(0.031)
Education (in years)	0.028***	(0.003)	0.013**	(0.005)
Occupation				
White collar	(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.245***	(0.053)	0.013	(0.061)
Manual	-0.163***	(0.040)	-0.028	(0.042)
Homemaker	-0.277***	(0.069)	-0.067	(0.065)
Unemployed	-0.516***	(0.060)	-0.370***	(0.063)
Retired	-0.058	(0.046)	-0.014	(0.055)
Student	0.846***	(0.094)	0.194	(0.119)
Constant	-0.516***	(0.101)	0.184	(0.126)
Observations	6,923		5,283	
R^2	0.05		0.04	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

4.   Propensity score matching and nearest neighbor matching

Additionally, we ran robustness checks using various matching methods. We found further evidence for a significant, positive Trump Effect, even when matching on relevant observable covariates (e.g., an average treatment effect of .11 for propensity score matching [$p < 0.000$] and .11 for nearest-neighbor matching [$p < 0.000$]). Thus, the Trump effect based on matching is even larger than the one we estimated in Table 3, Model 2 (and roughly equivalent to the Trump effect found when estimating Model 1 without covariates). Thus, matching also reconfirms our finding of a positive, significant Trump effect on the EU's popularity.

5.   Testing alternative measures for the subgroup analyses

To support the findings regarding the social divides and the shift in the support base of the EU, four additional subgroup analyses were conducted using alternative indicators. First, dividing the sample into three subgroups by national *unemployment rate* was employed as another proxy for its degree of having been affected by economic crises (based on World Bank [2017] data). The results (Figure S1; full model descriptives available in Table S6) largely reconfirm the pattern found for the individual-level perceived economic situation of the country (Figure 4 and Table A1 in the main article). In countries with low and medium unemployment, small— albeit non-significant—increases in EU popularity occurred in response to Trump's victory. In countries with high unemployment, however, the situation is different: compared to the other two groups, the EU was quite unpopular initially. Yet after Trump's surprise victory, the EU's popularity increased significantly in this group ($\delta^{RD} = .104$, $p < .001$). While the EU was still less popular among countries with high unemployment compared to those with medium and low unemployment after the election, the gap narrowed significantly (significance tested using interaction terms, results not shown). This again indicates that it is specifically the countries most ridden by economic turmoil that "rallied 'round the EU's flag" in response to the Trump

shock. The only divergence from the pattern found for the perceived economic situation of the country in the main analysis is that here, EU popularity rates are higher among countries with *medium* unemployment compared to those with low unemployment.

Second, we look at the *change rates in unemployment* as something people are potentially more affected by than the absolute level of unemployment itself. This measure was calculated by subtracting the 2016 country-level unemployment rate from the 2007 country-level unemployment rate (based on Eurostat [2018] data). The results (Table S7) show a pattern that is consistent with those previously found for the individual-level perceived economic situation of the country and the country-level absolute amount of unemployment: it is also specifically countries with a high increase in unemployment that experience as significant, positive Trump effect on the EU's popularity, confirming the pattern that crisis-ridden countries experienced the largest Trump effects on the EU's popularity.

Third, as an alternative indicator to political orientation, we draw on the *ideology* index along the globalization-centered conflict line created by Teney et al. (2014), which divides respondents into cosmopolitans, utilitarians, libertarians, and communitarians. For details on the creation of these four dimensions using Eurobarometer data see Teney et al. (2014). The resulting subgroup analysis (Table S8) reveals that it is particularly communitarians among whom the EU becomes more popular as a response to Trump's victory, not cosmopolitans. This is in line with the previous analysis on political orientation, which showed that it is particularly the right that experienced the largest Trump effect, since "communitarianism refers to the support of closing borders in order to favor and protect constitutive communities" (Ibid.: 580). Thus, although communitarians are generally less favorable towards European integration than cosmopolitans (Ibid.), their position on the EU has shifted as a result of Trump's election, supporting our interpretation that the increased popularity of the EU is not primarily cosmopolitan or liberal in nature.

Fourth, as yet another alternative indicator to political orientation, *territorial identification* was used. In line with existing research, people on the right were suspected to identify more often as "national," while those on the left and in the center might more likely feel they are "European." The results again fit the pattern obtained previously for political orientation: respondents who felt at least partly European had higher initial support rates of the EU but did not perceive the EU as more popular after Trump's surprise victory, while those with an exclusively national identity did find the EU significantly more appealing after Trump's election (Figure S2 and Table S9).[2]

One objection to this robustness check could be that having a (partly) European identity is too similar to two variables that are part of the DV, namely "feeling attached to the EU" and "feeling like being an EU citizen" (items 10 and 11 in Table 2), thus creating an endogeneity problem. To ensure that the results in Table S9 are not endogenous, an additional regression was conducted with a reduced factor as DV that does not contain the two items in question. The results resemble those presented in Table S9 (not shown), showing that this potential endogeneity problem does not in fact distort the outcome. Another objection to our subgroup analyses based on political orientation and territorial identification is that these two variables could also have been affected by the treatment, i.e. the surprise election of Donald Trump, just like the popularity of the EU. This potential issue is addressed in the following robustness check.

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[2] Note that only 247 respondents are contained in the "Only European" group. This low number may be responsible for the rather odd low EU popularity values in this group. Alternatively, those identifying as "Only European" could also be particularly critical about the concrete form of institutionalized European integration.

Figure S1. Treatment effect of the US presidential election. Subgroup analysis by *unemployment*.

Note: Based on regression presented in Table S6. Control variables, including the country dummies, are set at their mean value. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure S2. Treatment effect of the US presidential election. Subgroup analysis by *territorial identification*.

Note: Based on regression presented in Table S9. Control variables, including the country dummies, are set at their mean value. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table S6. Subgroup analysis by *unemployment rate*. DV: EU popularity index.

	Low unemployment		Medium unemployment		High unemployment	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.02	(0.03)	0.01	(0.03)	0.10***	(0.03)
Female (1=yes)	0.09**	(0.03)	-0.01	(0.02)	0.01	(0.03)
Age	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.00*	(0.00)	-0.00**	(0.00)
Occupation						
White collar	(ref)		(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.16**	(0.06)	-0.07	(0.05)	0.04	(0.06)
Manual	-0.13**	(0.04)	-0.07	(0.04)	-0.14**	(0.04)
Homemaker	-0.05	(0.08)	-0.17**	(0.06)	-0.09	(0.07)
Unemployed	-0.36***	(0.08)	-0.29***	(0.07)	-0.38***	(0.06)
Retired	-0.08	(0.05)	-0.08	(0.04)	0.01	(0.05)
Student	0.48***	(0.11)	0.35***	(0.10)	0.54***	(0.11)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.15***	(0.03)	0.06*	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)
Education (in years)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01**	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)
Country dummies	✓		✓		✓	
Constant	-0.28*	(0.12)	0.43***	(0.11)	0.09	(0.12)
Observations	5,353		5,616		5,316	
R2	0.08		0.11		0.17	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Low unemployment=first tercile of the distribution of unemployment rates of the sampled countries; Medium unemployment=second tercile; High unemployment=third tercile. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2 and World Bank data, not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S7. Subgroup analysis by *unemployment change rate* (i.e., 2016 unemployment rate – 2007 unemployment rate, split in terciles). DV: EU popularity index.

	Low increase in unemployment		Medium increase in unemployment		High increase in unemployment	
Treatment group (1=yes)	-0.02	(0.03)	0.04	(0.03)	0.12***	(0.03)
Female (1=yes)	0.09**	(0.03)	0.05	(0.03)	-0.05	(0.03)
Age	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.00*	(0.00)	-0.00**	(0.00)
Occupation						
White collar	(ref)		(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.14*	(0.06)	-0.04	(0.06)	-0.01	(0.06)
Manual	-0.06	(0.04)	-0.14***	(0.04)	-0.15***	(0.04)
Homemaker	-0.12	(0.07)	-0.07	(0.10)	-0.12	(0.06)
Unemployed	-0.29***	(0.07)	-0.28***	(0.07)	-0.44***	(0.06)
Retired	-0.06	(0.05)	-0.06	(0.05)	-0.04	(0.05)
Student	0.38**	(0.12)	0.57***	(0.10)	0.48***	(0.11)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.13***	(0.03)	0.09**	(0.03)	-0.01	(0.03)
Education (in years)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)
Country dummies	✓		✓		✓	
Constant	-0.32*	(0.13)	-0.04	(0.11)	0.12	(0.12)
Observations	5,816		5,179		5,290	
R^2	0.10		0.09		0.21	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Low increase in unemployment=first tercile of the distribution of unemployment increases of the sampled countries; Medium increase in unemployment=second tercile; High increase in unemployment=third tercile. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2 and Eurostat data, not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S8. Subgroup analysis by *ideology* following Teney et al. 2014. DV: EU popularity index.

	Cosmopolitan (>.6)		Utilitarian (>.6)		Communitarian (>.6)		Liberitarian (>.6)	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.02	(0.02)	0.14	(0.08)	0.15***	(0.04)	-0.04	(0.06)
Female (1=yes)	-0.01	(0.02)	0.06	(0.08)	0.16***	(0.05)	0.07	(0.06)
Age	-0.00**	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.00)	-0.01**	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)
Occupation								
White collar	(ref)		(ref)		(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.04	(0.04)	-0.20	(0.16)	-0.04	(0.09)	-0.17	(0.11)
Manual	-0.02	(0.03)	-0.10	(0.11)	-0.11	(0.07)	-0.01	(0.09)
Homemaker	-0.02	(0.05)	-0.40*	(0.16)	-0.13	(0.11)	0.05	(0.15)
Unemployed	-0.13**	(0.05)	-0.63***	(0.17)	-0.42***	(0.08)	-0.19	(0.12)
Retired	-0.01	(0.03)	-0.23	(0.14)	-0.12	(0.08)	-0.03	(0.10)
Student	0.26***	(0.07)	0.12	(0.29)	0.02	(0.19)	0.18	(0.24)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.05*	(0.02)	-0.03	(0.08)	0.05	(0.05)	0.05	(0.06)
Education (in years)	0.01**	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
Constant	0.50***	(0.09)	0.48	(0.32)	-0.30	(0.21)	-0.01	(0.24)
Observations	7,546		773		2,213		1,350	
R^2	0.12		0.16		0.19		0.13	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S9. Subgroup analysis by *territorial identification*. DV: EU popularity index.

	[Nationality] only		[Nationality] and European		European and [nationality]		European only	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.07*	(0.03)	0.02	(0.02)	0.01	(0.06)	0.10	(0.13)
Female (1=yes)	0.11***	(0.03)	-0.00	(0.02)	-0.05	(0.06)	0.04	(0.14)
Age	-0.00*	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	0.00	(0.01)
Occupation								
White collar	(ref)		(ref)		(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.04	(0.06)	-0.05	(0.04)	-0.00	(0.11)	0.00	(0.25)
Manual	-0.12**	(0.04)	-0.01	(0.03)	-0.03	(0.09)	0.19	(0.23)
Homemaker	-0.08	(0.07)	-0.04	(0.05)	0.06	(0.16)	0.21	(0.31)
Unemployed	-0.41***	(0.06)	-0.14***	(0.04)	-0.16	(0.14)	0.28	(0.25)
Retired	-0.05	(0.05)	-0.03	(0.03)	0.14	(0.10)	0.21	(0.24)
Student	0.10	(0.11)	0.14	(0.07)	0.57*	(0.22)	0.86	(0.47)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.05	(0.03)	0.04*	(0.02)	0.02	(0.07)	-0.02	(0.14)
Education (in years)	-0.01	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.02*	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)
Country dummies	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Constant	0.03	(0.13)	0.63***	(0.08)	0.03	(0.29)	-0.52	(0.69)
Observations	5,642		9,217		975		247	
R^2	0.17		0.12		0.14		0.25	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

## 6.	Are political orientation or territorial identification not exogenous?

One objection to our subgroup analyses based on political orientation and territorial identifica-tion could be that these two variables could also have been affected by the treatment, i.e., the surprise election of Donald Trump, just like the popularity of the EU. To test whether this is the case, we ran two additional probit models (Table S10), predicting whether respondents shift in their political orientation or are more likely to identify as national or European depending on treatment assignment.

Table S10. Probit regression predicting the probability of being in the treatment group.

	(1) Testing political orientation		(2) Testing territorial identification	
Political Orientation				
Left	(ref)			
Center	0.038	(0.025)		
Right	0.054	(0.029)		
Territorial identification				
National and European			(ref)	
National			-0.008	(0.022)
European and national			-0.054	(0.043)
European only			-0.035	(0.082)
Education (in years)	-0.006*	(0.003)	-0.006*	(0.003)
Female (1=yes)	0.018	(0.022)	0.018	(0.021)
Age	-0.003**	(0.001)	-0.003**	(0.001)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.024	(0.023)	0.023	(0.022)
Occupation				
Self-employed	0.062	(0.045)	0.046	(0.042)
White collar	(ref)		(ref)	
Manual	0.029	(0.033)	0.006	(0.031)
Homemaker	-0.029	(0.058)	-0.040	(0.054)
Unemployed	0.022	(0.048)	-0.035	(0.045)
Retired	-0.049	(0.039)	-0.075*	(0.036)
Student	-0.227**	(0.083)	-0.227**	(0.078)
Constant	0.491***	(0.086)	0.533***	(0.080)
Observations	14,150		16,081	
AIC	18,944.17		21,509.93	
BIC	19,042.414		21,617.523	
Pseudo-R²	0.003		0.003	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. $* \, p < 0.05$, $** \, p < 0.01$, $*** \, p < 0.001$.

The resulting models reveal that neither political orientation nor any of the categories of terri-torial identification significantly predict being in the treatment group. Thus, we can conclude

that political orientation and territorial identification are not affected by the treatment as such and that our effects are not a spurious outcome of treatment assignment.

Note that the significant effects of education, age, the student category, and the retired category of the occupation variable in Table S10 point to minor imbalances in the sample that are addressed (a) in the main analysis by including control variables in the central model (Table 3, Model 2 and 3), and (b) in the robustness check presented in section 2 of this Supplementary Material.

7. Does political sophistication mediate the Trump effect?

Is it possible that people who know more about politics and the EU in particular are more affected by the election of Donald Trump in their attitudes towards the EU? In other words, does political sophistication mediate the Trump effect? To test this hypothesis, we create a new political sophistication variable from a set of three questions (QA16 in Eurobarometer 86.2) in which respondents were asked "For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false." The three statements are:

- "The EU currently consists of 28 Member States"
- "The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each Member State"
- "Switzerland is a Member State of the EU"

Respondents could answer with "True" or "False." We combine the responses to these three questions in an additive political sophistication index in which respondents could score from 0 (no correct answer) to 3 (all answers correct). To test whether political sophistication mediates the Trump effect on the EU's popularity, we run an additional regression model in

which we include political sophistication and the interaction between political sophistication and being in the treatment group (Table S11). As Model 1 in Table S11 reveals, the interaction is not significant. This suggests that the size of the Trump effect on the EU's popularity was not affected significantly by how politically sophisticated respondents were, i.e., how much knowledge about the EU they had.

8.   Is there an East/West or a South/North divide?

Furthermore, we tested whether there is an East-West or a South-North[3] divide regarding the size of the Trump effect on the EU's popularity (Models 2 and 3 in Table S11). We find no significant East-West divide (Model 2 in Table S11). However, there is a significant difference between South and North in that the Trump effect is significantly larger in the South (Model 3 in Table S11). Note that this is in line with our subgroup analyses of the perceived economic situation of the country (Figure 4 and Table A1 in the main article), unemployment rate, and change in unemployment rate (section 5 of this Supplementary Material), since it is predominantly countries in the South of the EU that are economically struggling and that are mostly affected by the crises. Since these indicators of economic stratification have higher explanatory power than the fact of being located in the South per se, we decided to present (one of) them as the subgroup analysis in the main article.

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[3] We used the classification of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Staatenkunde e.V. to assign countries to East, West, North, and South (available at http://www.staatenkunde.de/dgfs/datenbank/db-sb.php?sb=15&k=4, accessed 24/5/2018).

Table S11. Robustness check including political sophistication, East/West split, South/North split. DV: EU popularity index.

	(1) Political sophistication		(2) East/West		(3) South/North	
Treatment group (1=yes)	-0.004	(0.063)	0.040*	(0.017)	0.029	(0.018)
Political sophistication	0.104***	(0.015)				
Political sophistication * treatment group	0.014	(0.019)				
East (1=yes, 0=West)			0.532***	(0.070)		
East * Treatment group			0.034	(0.047)		
South (1=yes, 0=North)					0.442***	(0.064)
South * Treatment group					0.091*	(0.043)
Female (1=yes)	0.044**	(0.016)	0.029	(0.016)	0.029	(0.016)
Age	-0.005***	(0.001)	-0.004***	(0.001)	-0.004***	(0.001)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.066***	(0.017)	0.074***	(0.017)	0.074***	(0.017)
Occupation						
White collar	(ref)		(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.050	(0.032)	-0.055	(0.033)	-0.054	(0.033)
Manual	-0.098***	(0.024)	-0.113***	(0.024)	-0.114***	(0.024)
Homemaker	-0.094*	(0.040)	-0.116**	(0.041)	-0.117**	(0.041)
Unemployed	-0.333***	(0.036)	-0.357***	(0.037)	-0.356***	(0.037)
Retired	-0.039	(0.028)	-0.053	(0.028)	-0.054	(0.028)
Student	0.386***	(0.061)	0.443***	(0.062)	0.442***	(0.062)
Education (in years)	0.011***	(0.002)	0.014***	(0.002)	0.014***	(0.002)
Constant	-0.836***	(0.089)	-0.612***	(0.080)	-0.608***	(0.080)
Observations	16,285		16,285		16,285	
R^2	0.14		0.14		0.14	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

9. Using a standard single item as DV

A further objection to our analysis could be that the dependent variable we use in the main analysis to measure the EU's popularity is not a standard measure. As already stated in the main article, there are several reasons for the decision to use this index, including the desire to capture the multifaceted nature of an abstract concept such as the EU's popularity in a comprehensive way and the absence of standard measures of EU support in this particular Eurobarometer survey. However, there is one item on "trust in the EU" that is commonly utilized in analysis like ours. We use this item here to rerun our main model to check whether results can be replicated using this single item.

Table S12. Logit regression. DV: Trust in the EU.

	(1)	
Treatment group (1=yes)	.130***	(0.033)
Female (1=yes)	0.056	(0.033)
Age	-0.005**	(0.001)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.049	(0.036)
Education (in years)	0.036***	(0.005)
Occupation		
White collar	(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.286***	(0.067)
Manual	-0.250***	(0.050)
Homemaker	-0.161	(0.087)
Unemployed	-0.551***	(0.073)
Retired	-0.082	(0.059)
Student	1.085***	(0.129)
Constant	-0.679***	(0.131)
Observations	15,673	
AIC	21,280.41	
BIC	21,372.328	
Pseudo R^2	0.015	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Respondents were asked the following question: "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it." Respondents could decide between "Tend to

trust" and "Tend not to trust" (in our case in the EU). Given these binary response categories, we draw on a logit regression model (Table S12). Results are in line with our analysis based on the more complex EU popularity measure. Respondents who were interviewed after the surprise election of Donald Trump are more likely to express trust in the EU (δ^{RD} =.130, p < .001). Even the relative size of the effect is rather similar to that reported in the main analysis: here, the Trump effect is equivalent to the effect of 3.6 years of education, compared to 3.2 in the main analysis (one should be careful though when interpreting logit regression coefficients in their relative size and strength). Hence, this robustness check confirms that our finding of a significant, positive effect of Trump's election on the EU's popularity in Europe does not depend on the specific measure of EU support used.

10. Could the Trump effect actually be a general "U.S. presidential election effect"?

Is it possible that the supposed "Trump effect" has nothing to do with the personality of Donald Trump? Perhaps U.S. presidential elections affect the EU's popularity in Europe regularly, in which case we would have to speak of a general "U.S. presidential election effect" rather than a "Trump effect." To test this eventuality, we searched for older Eurobarometer surveys that coincided with U.S. elections. Looking at the last eight U.S. presidential elections (i.e., going back until 1988), only one other election coincided with a Eurobarometer in a way that allows to have sufficient cases on both sides of the event, namely Barack Obama's second election, which took place on November 6, 2012. We draw on the Eurobarometer 78.1, which had its fieldwork period around this election (November 3 to 18, 2012). For this robustness check, we carried out logistic regressions using the trust question as specified above in robustness check number 9 (see Table S12), as the variables available in Eurobarometer 78.1 do not allow to replicate the more sophisticated EU popularity index used in the main analysis of the article. The resulting models are shown in Table S13. We find *no* significant effect for the Obama

election on trust in the EU. Hence, while we are not able to test the relation for a larger number of U.S. presidential elections, we can state that the boost in the EU's popularity that occurred after Trump's election did not occur after Obama's second election. This lends credibility to the assumption that we are truly dealing with an impact on the EU's popularity that was specifically induced by the election of Donald Trump rather than by a U.S. presidential election in general.

Table S13. Logit regression, external shock: Obama's 2012 reelection. DV: Trust in the EU.

	(1) Without country dummies		(2) With country dummies	
Treatment group	-0.047	(0.032)	0.003	(0.034)
Female (1=yes)	-0.084**	(0.029)	-0.107***	(0.029)
Age	0.000	(0.001)	0.002	(0.001)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	-0.028	(0.030)	0.035	(0.031)
Education (in years)	0.055***	(0.004)	0.050***	(0.005)
Occupation				
White collar	(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.132*	(0.058)	-0.069	(0.060)
Manual	-0.196***	(0.045)	-0.260***	(0.046)
Homemaker	-0.119	(0.067)	-0.113	(0.071)
Unemployed	-0.481***	(0.056)	-0.462***	(0.057)
Retired	-0.152**	(0.052)	-0.225***	(0.054)
Student	1.604***	(0.109)	1.537***	(0.119)
Country dummies			✓	
Constant	-1.258***	(0.114)	-1.449***	(0.144)
Observations	22,076		22,076	
AIC	29,167.58		28,272.74	
BIC	29,263.602		28,576.823	
Pseudo R2	0.019		0.051	

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 78.1 (2012), not weighted. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

11.   Could the Trump effect actually be an effect caused by other events?

Another possibility is that the difference in public opinion on the EU before and after the election date is not due to Trump's victory but to national holidays and commemoration days regarding the end of World War I, the Holocaust and the end of Communism in Eastern

Europe.[4] The events include 11 November, marking the end of World War I, which is celebrated in France, Belgium, Poland, and the UK. In the UK, public celebrations cumulate in the "remembrance Sunday," which in 2016 was November 13. Germany has a similar commemoration day ("Volkstrauertag"), which in 2016 was also on November 13. Furthermore, November 9 is of historic significance to Germany due to the "Reichsprogromnacht" of November 9, 1938 and the fall of the Berlin wall, marking the end of communism in Eastern Europe on November 9, 1989. All these commemorations are present in the collective memories of the respective countries (in some more than in others). The media generally report on them and in some countries, people are even having a day off on 9 November (which in 2016 resulted in a long weekend). Hence, between 9 and 13 November, people across Europe are repeatedly reminded of the horrors of war, holocaust, and totalitarian regimes and European integration is officially portrayed as a project of peace, security and freedom in Europe. Thus, the increase of popularity of the EU in the days after Trump's election could result not (only) from a Trump effect, but from these anniversaries.

To test whether this is the case, we ran several additional analyses. A first indicator was already presented in the main article. Analyses of Google Trends data revealed that only "election," "Trump," "election results," "Donald Trump," "election 2016," "Clinton," and "polls" appear as date-specific keywords during the time period under study. None of the memorial days mentioned above (or any other events) are among the top salient results. This can be seen as a first indicator that Trump's surprise victory in the election was far more salient than these national holidays and commemoration days.

As a second, more thorough analysis of this matter, we first identified countries with relevant anniversaries (France, Belgium, Poland, UK, Germany, Italy, and Denmark, due to

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[4] We are very grateful to an anonymous reviewer who made this important observation and provided the following detailed account of such memorial days.

their commemoration celebrations of the world wars, as well as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania due to their former membership in the Eastern Block). To test the robustness of our results against the competing explanation of a "memorial day effect," we then excluded these countries from our model. Results are shown in Table S14. They reveal that once these countries are excluded, the positive effect of the presidential election on the EU's popularity remains significant and even increases a bit in size. This strongly suggests that the significant treatment effect is not due to the yearly public anniversaries but actually due to Trump's unexpected victory in 2016.

Table S14. Excluding countries with commemoration holidays. DV: EU popularity index.

	(1)	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.07***	(0.02)
Female (1=yes)	0.02	(0.02)
Age	-0.00***	(0.00)
Occupation		
White collar	(ref)	
Self-employed	0.01	(0.04)
Manual	-0.13***	(0.03)
Homemaker	-0.06	(0.05)
Unemployed	-0.36***	(0.04)
Retired	-0.01	(0.04)
Student	0.37***	(0.08)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.07***	(0.02)
Education (in years)	0.01**	(0.00)
Constant	-0.40***	(0.10)
Observations	9,769	
R^2	0.16	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 86.2, not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

As a further, and perhaps even more rigorous test, we reran our analysis with a Eurobarometer from a previous year in which no presidential election took place, but whose fieldwork occurred during the same time frame. This is not the case with many past Eurobarometer surveys, but the Eurobarometer 80.1 with fieldwork from November 2 to 17, 2013 allows to conduct such

an analysis of a seasonal placebo effect. As with the "U.S. presidential election effect" robustness check presented above (section 10 of this Supplementary Material), we use the simple "trust in the EU" indicator as dependent variable since the Eurobarometer 80.1 does not contain all the items of the EU popularity index used in our main analysis. The results are shown in Table S15. There is no significant treatment effect. This means that we can exclude the possibility that an increase in the EU's popularity occurs regularly every year due to seasonal effects caused by the memorial days described above (or any other event we may not have considered yet). We thus have further evidence suggesting that the "Trump effect" on the EU's popularity is actually due to the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president in November 2016.

Table S15. Seasonal placebo analysis, logit regression. DV: Trust in the EU.

	(1) Without country dummies		(2) With country dummies	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.037	(0.028)	0.058	(0.030)
Female (1=yes)	-0.045	(0.029)	-0.081**	(0.030)
Age	-0.003**	(0.001)	-0.003	(0.001)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.086**	(0.030)	0.191***	(0.031)
Education (in years)	0.060***	(0.004)	0.048***	(0.005)
Occupation				
White collar	(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	-0.223***	(0.060)	-0.157*	(0.063)
Manual	-0.176***	(0.045)	-0.260***	(0.046)
Homemaker	-0.122	(0.068)	-0.138	(0.070)
Unemployed	-0.417***	(0.055)	-0.357***	(0.057)
Retired	-0.091	(0.051)	-0.163**	(0.053)
Student	1.506***	(0.110)	1.293***	(0.119)
Country dummies			✓	
Constant	-1.336***	(0.111)	-1.636***	(0.142)
Observations	22,040		22,040	
AIC	29,096.16		27,840.45	
BIC	29,192.172		28,144.477	
Pseudo R2	0.019		0.063	

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, based on Eurobarometer 80.1 (2013), not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

12. Replicating the Trump effect with another survey

In yet another major robustness check, we test whether the Trump effect is peculiar to this particular survey, the Eurobarometer 86.2. We do so by replicating the analysis using a different survey, namely the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS covers a wide range of questions on attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral patterns and is conducted every two years. The fieldwork of the eighth round of the ESS contains the time around the 2016 U.S. presidential election (see Figure S3). Regarding the research problem of this study, that is, estimating the causal effect of Donald Trump's election on the EU's popularity, the ESS carries several limitations compared to the Eurobarometer:

1) The Eurobarometer encompasses a broader range of variables measuring EU support. Based on the Eurobarometer data, it was possible to create an extensive index measuring the EU's popularity (see Table 2 in the main article). Using the ESS, it was necessary to limit ourselves to one item indicating to which extent respondents support further EU integration. Thus, we argue that the Eurobarometer provides a more solid base for constructing a comprehensive measure of public opinion toward the EU.

2) The fieldwork of the ESS spans a lengthy time frame (August 2016 to July 2017). Thus, observations around the time of the presidential election are comparatively thin. However, we were able to circumvent this restriction by expanding the examined time frame slightly (now encompassing November 1-19; see Figure S3). Still, measuring the short-term effect of Trump's election on the EU's popularity is rather difficult given this restriction.

3) The drawn-out fieldwork of the ESS also inhibits valid subgroup comparisons around the time of the election, which, however, represent a central part of our analysis.

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4) Although the general socio-demographic covariates are very well balanced, with no significant differences between the ESS-based control and treatment group (see Table S17), countries are not equally well balanced (see Figure S3). In some countries, the fieldwork started only after the U.S. presidential election had already taken place (e.g., France, Iceland, Poland, and Russia).

5) Unlike the Eurobarometer, the ESS does not cover all EU member states.

Figure S3. Relative frequency of observations, ESS Round 8.

Note: Figure is based on a restricted sample around the US presidential election (1-19 December). Dashed lines denote trends for individual countries surveyed in the ESS.

Due to these limitations, the ESS would not have been ideal for the main analysis, but we believe it still provides a unique opportunity to replicate the central finding based on a different data source. Table S16 shows the results from the ESS regression models. The dependent variable now stems from a single item in which respondents were asked to rate, on a 1–10 scale,

if EU integration has "gone too far" (0) or "should go further" (10). The results replicate the findings from the Eurobarometer very well. Again, a significant Trump effect was found ($\delta^{RD} = .22$, p $< .01$). Furthermore, this ESS-based Trump effect is again roughly equivalent to the effect that three additional years of education have on a person's opinion on EU integration ($3 \times \beta^{edu} = 3 \times .07 = .21 < \delta^{RD} = .22$). This astonishingly precise replication of the results from the main analysis provides an even stronger case to claim causality. What was found is not a spurious effect of the data but rather a general Trump effect that can even be reproduced with different data.

Table S16. Robustness check: Main model replicated with ESS data. DV: EU integration should go further (Scale: 1-10).

	(1)		(2)	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.23**	(0.07)	0.22**	(0.07)
Female (1=yes)			0.02	(0.07)
Age			-0.00	(0.00)
Occupation				
In Paid Work				(ref)
Homemaker			0.30	(0.17)
Unemployed			-0.41**	(0.16)
Retired			-0.00	(0.13)
Student			0.96***	(0.14)
Other			0.28	(0.39)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)			0.11	(0.08)
Education (in years)			0.07***	(0.01)
Constant	4.64***	(0.06)	3.80***	(0.21)
Observations	5,082		5,082	
R^2	0.002		0.027	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Own calculations, based on ESS Round 8, not weighted. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table S17. Descriptive statistics, European Social Survey.

	Control group (N=2,274)				Treatment group (N=2,808)				
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Δ Means
EU integration scale	4.64	2.64	0	10	4.87	2.64	0	10	-0.23**
Education (in years)	13.2	3.60	0	26	13.3	3.69	0	26	-0.04
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1	0.50	0.50	0	1	0.01
Occupation									
In Paid Work	0.55	0.50	0	1	0.54	0.50	0	1	0.00
Homemaker	0.048	0.21	0	1	0.047	0.21	0	1	0.00
Unemployed	0.059	0.24	0	1	0.064	0.25	0	1	-0.01
Retired	0.26	0.44	0	1	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.01
Student	0.074	0.26	0	1	0.084	0.28	0	1	-0.01
Other	0.010	0.10	0	1	0.010	0.099	0	1	0.00
Age	48.7	18.5	15	95	48.5	18.3	15	97	0.15
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.65	0.48	0	1	-0.01

Note: ESS Round 8, own calculations, not weighted; SD=Standard deviation, education was top-coded at 26 years to reduce the influence of outliers. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

13. Did people become more chauvinistic or more cosmopolitan post-Trump?

A final test concerns the question of what mechanism is behind the rally effect. Do people become more patriotic and chauvinistic in the face of an external threat, or do they become more supportive of a liberal and (to some extent) cosmopolitan supranational institution that stands in stark contrast to Trumps ideals? To shed light on this issue, we rerun our main model with two different dependent variables that relate to patriotism/chauvinism and cosmopolitanism. Drawing on Kuhn et al. (2017), we include *political ideology*, where a shift to the right could be seen as an indicator of more patriotism and chauvinism, as well as *positive attitudes towards immigration* as an indicator of cosmopolitanism.

Table S18. Model with different DV's representing chauvinism vs. cosmopolitanism.

	(1) DV: Political ideology		(2) DV: Positive feelings toward immigrants from EU	
Treatment group (1=yes)	0.07	(0.04)	-0.01	(0.01)
Female (1=yes)	-0.14***	(0.04)	-0.01	(0.01)
Age	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)
Occupation				
White collar	(ref)		(ref)	
Self-employed	0.27***	(0.07)	-0.02	(0.03)
Manual	-0.05	(0.06)	-0.08***	(0.02)
Homemaker	0.14	(0.10)	-0.10**	(0.03)
Unemployed	-0.15	(0.08)	-0.11***	(0.03)
Retired	-0.02	(0.07)	-0.09***	(0.02)
Student	-0.48***	(0.15)	0.63***	(0.05)
Urban (=1, 0=rural)	-0.11**	(0.04)	0.04**	(0.01)
Education (in years)	-0.01	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.00)
Country dummies	✓		✓	
Constant	5.65***	(0.18)	2.33***	(0.06)
Observations	14,150		15,918	
R^2	0.03		0.09	

Note: Treatment group: Interviewed after November 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses. EB 86.2, own calculations, not weighted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

To operationalize political ideology, we apply the political orientation variable used for the subgroup analysis in the main article in its original 10-categories scale version (which is better suited as a DV in OLS regression). To include attitudes towards migration, we used a

Eurobarometer item in which respondents were asked whether "Immigration of people from other EU member states … evokes a positive or negative feeling" (QB4), allowing the four response categories "very positive," "fairly positive," "fairly negative," and "very negative." The findings (Table S18) show no significant Trump effect on any of these two variables. In other words, while the EU became more popular in response to Trump's surprise victory, especially among the right and in countries that are economically struggling, Europeans did not themselves become more chauvinistic or cosmopolitan because of Trump's election (in specific, they did not become more favorable of immigration or shift to the right in their political ideology). Thus, it seems that Trump's surprise victory changed the political composition of the EU's base of support (in that the right became more favorable) but did not change the political orientation of Europeans per se (e.g., to the right).

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