Building Autocracy From Above and Below: The Co-construction of Putin's Popularity After

Crimea

Supplementary Appendix

Table of Contents:

A. Robustness Checks: Difference in Difference

In the main paper, we ran individual level fixed effects models. As these separate out the effects of any time invariant factors, they are equivalent to difference in difference models. As Table A1 shows, running difference in difference models with the same covariates gives us the same substantive results.

Table A1 Difference in Difference Models

	Change in State TV Cons.	Change in Political Interest	Change in Political Discussion
Outcome	Positive Emotions Index	Positive Emotions Index	Positive Emotions Index
Diff-in-diff	0.142	0.204	0.272
Standard Error	0.0569	0.0972	0.0889
Observations	1,898	1,900	1,570
R-squared	0.212	0.166	0.174
Mean control t(0)	1.804	2.286	2.322
Mean treated t(0)	2.060	2.365	2.322
Diff t(0)	0.257	0.0789	0.000
Mean control t(1)	2.278	2.616	2.465
Mean treated t(1)	2.678	2.899	2.737
Diff t(1)	0.399	0.283	0.272

In the next two tables we look not at changes in collective engagement but at levels and the relationship with emotions. A2 presents the relationship using OLS regression with standardized betas in round 1 and A3 shows the relationships in round 2. The results strongly confirm the effects we show with the change models. In round 1, before Crimea there is a relationship between state television watching and emotional engagement, but the relationship is substantially larger in round 2 – the effects of watching television are much stronger. Even more

interestingly, there is no relationship between interest in politics and emotional engagement or

discussing politics and emotional engagement before Crimea. Afterwards both of these

relationships are statistically significant and substantively important.

Table A2. Effects of TV, Interest and Discussion in Round 1

VARIABLES	(1) Emotions Index	(2) Emotions Index	(3) Emotions Index
State TV	0.21		
	(7.51)		
Follow Politics		0.04	
		(1.41)	
Discussion			-0.00
			(-0.02)
Live	-0.11	-0.14	-0.12
	(-3.96)	(-5.09)	(-3.69)
Private Sector	-0.05	-0.07	-0.06
	(-1.95)	(-2.46)	(-1.90)
Wealth	0.04	0.04	0.07
	(1.29)	(1.28)	(2.23)
Education	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06
	(-1.49)	(-1.58)	(-1.80)
Age	-0.03	0.02	0.02
	(-0.98)	(0.55)	(0.66)
Family Econ	0.21	0.22	0.23
	(7.72)	(7.70)	(7.40)
Observations	1,201	1,201	989
R-squared	0.12	0.08	0.08

t-statistics in parentheses

Table A3 Effects of TV, Interest and Discussion in Round 2

VARIABLES	(1) Emotions Index	(2) Emotions Index	(3) Emotions Index
State TV	0.30		
	(8.32)		
Follow Politics		0.13	
		(3.39)	
Discussion Index			0.15
			(3.64)
Live	-0.07	-0.13	-0.12
	(-2.01)	(-3.43)	(-2.93)
Private Sector	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08
	(-1.97)	(-2.11)	(-1.90)
Wealth	0.08	0.08	0.08
	(2.20)	(2.10)	(1.96)
Education	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
	(-1.44)	(-1.47)	(-1.25)
Age	-0.04	0.00	-0.00
	(-0.99)	(0.01)	(-0.00)
Family Econ	0.23	0.24	0.26
	(6.66)	(6.50)	(6.47)
Observations	697	699	581
R-squared	0.17	0.11	0.12

t-statistics in parentheses

Did internet news have a different effect than state tv news? In table A4, we replace state television news consumption with a 4 category variable (never, monthly, weekly, daily) looking at news consumption on the internet. The results are very similar to the effects of watching state television news, though the size of the effect is smaller – about 30 percent smaller. In fact, unsurprisingly, consumption of state television news and internet news are correlated at about .3 – not extremely high, but correlated nonetheless. It seems, as the rest of our results suggest, that interest in news whether on tv or on the internet is similarly related to increasing emotional connection. Of course, while there is plenty of evidence on the nature of the coverage on state television, we know little about what we actually being consumed on the internet. It is quite possible that much of what is being consumed is simply state television news, repackaged in different formats.

Table A4 Individual Fixed Effects Model with Internet News

VARIABLES	(1) State TV
Internet News	0.11
	(2.92)
Live Journal	0.08
	(1.93)
Private Sector	0.01
	(0.13)
Wealth	0.05
	(0.92)
Education	0.18
	(2.33)
Age	0.36
	(1.75)
Family Economy	0.08
	(2.28)
Observations	1,408
R-squared	0.04
Number of PanelResp	712

One possible objection to the argument we make here is to say that it is not increased emotional engagement with the state, but an increased sense of external threat that makes citizens rally around the flag. This would be a related objection to the issue of nationalism addressed in Table 3 of the main paper. To consider this objection, in Table A5, we rerun Table 3 replacing state nationalism with a measure of the threat to the country from the US. Table A6 does the same but using a measure of threat from Ukraine. The measure is a five point scale (1=ally, 2=partner, 3=neutral, 4=rival, 5=enemy).

The results are essentially the same and very similar to Table 3 in the main paper. It is clear that a sense of threat plays a role in boosting approval ratings for Putin, but there does not seem to be any relationship between threat and the evaluations of corruption or the past. In fact, once we control for emotions, there is some suggestion of a negative relationship between threat from the US and threat from Ukraine and perceptions of the economic future – a perfectly reasonable response.

Table A5 US Threat Versus Emotions

VARIABLES	(1) Approval	(2) Approval	(3) High Level Corrupt	(4) High Level Corrupt	(5) Low Level Corrupt	(6) Low Level Corrupt	(7) Econ Fut	(8) Econ Fut	(9) 1990s	(10) 1990s
Positive Emotions		0.63		-0.27		-0.24		0.43		0.14
		(20.50)		(-5.81)		(-5.19)		(11.97)		(3.63)
US Threat	0.16	0.07	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.00	-0.07	-0.01	-0.03
	(4.17)	(2.25)	(-1.12)	(-0.28)	(-0.21)	(0.57)	(-0.11)	(-2.00)	(-0.19)	(-0.69)
Live	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.00	-0.03	0.07	0.06
	(1.20)	(0.26)	(0.47)	(0.84)	(1.47)	(1.85)	(0.01)	(-0.79)	(1.76)	(1.50)
Private Sector	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.04	-0.04
	(1.09)	(1.17)	(1.15)	(1.28)	(0.54)	(0.65)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(-0.80)	(-0.80)
Wealth	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.06	-0.12	-0.11	0.08	0.05	0.14	0.12
	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.71)	(0.90)	(-1.70)	(-1.59)	(1.43)	(1.04)	(2.40)	(2.23)
Education	0.10	-0.02	-0.00	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.18	0.11	0.02	-0.01
	(1.22)	(-0.29)	(-0.04)	(0.61)	(0.16)	(0.64)	(2.20)	(1.40)	(0.24)	(-0.07)
Age	0.21	-0.02	-0.06	0.01	-0.10	-0.03	0.55	0.40	0.30	0.25
	(1.00)	(-0.14)	(-0.24)	(0.04)	(-0.38)	(-0.13)	(2.58)	(2.08)	(1.42)	(1.20)
Family Econ	0.11	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.01	-0.01
	(2.95)	(2.04)	(0.46)	(1.14)	(0.52)	(1.03)	(2.24)	(1.33)	(0.17)	(-0.22)
Observations	1,273	1,273	1,314	1,314	1,332	1,332	1,384	1,384	1,359	1,359
R-squared	0.06	0.45	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.20	0.02	0.04
Number of PanelResp	690	690	704	704	700	700	710	710	705	705

Table A6 Ukraine Threat Versus Emotions

VARIABLES	(1) Approval	(2) Approval	(3) High Level Corrupt	(4) High Level Corrupt	(5) Low Level Corrupt	(6) Low Level Corrupt	(7) Econ Fut	(8) Econ Fut	(9) 1990s	(10) 1990s
Positive Emotions		0.63		-0.27		-0.24		0.43		0.14
		(20.50)		(-5.81)		(-5.19)		(11.97)		(3.63)
Ukraine Threat	0.16	0.07	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.00	-0.07	-0.01	-0.03
	(4.17)	(2.25)	(-1.12)	(-0.28)	(-0.21)	(0.57)	(-0.11)	(-2.00)	(-0.19)	(-0.69)
Live	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.00	-0.03	0.07	0.06
	(1.20)	(0.26)	(0.47)	(0.84)	(1.47)	(1.85)	(0.01)	(-0.79)	(1.76)	(1.50)
Private Sector	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.04	-0.04
	(1.09)	(1.17)	(1.15)	(1.28)	(0.54)	(0.65)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(-0.80)	(-0.80)
Wealth	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.06	-0.12	-0.11	0.08	0.05	0.14	0.12
	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.71)	(0.90)	(-1.70)	(-1.59)	(1.43)	(1.04)	(2.40)	(2.23)
Education	0.10	-0.02	-0.00	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.18	0.11	0.02	-0.01
	(1.22)	(-0.29)	(-0.04)	(0.61)	(0.16)	(0.64)	(2.20)	(1.40)	(0.24)	(-0.07)
Age	0.21	-0.02	-0.06	0.01	-0.10	-0.03	0.55	0.40	0.30	0.25
	(1.00)	(-0.14)	(-0.24)	(0.04)	(-0.38)	(-0.13)	(2.58)	(2.08)	(1.42)	(1.20)
famecon	0.11	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.01	-0.01
	(2.95)	(2.04)	(0.46)	(1.14)	(0.52)	(1.03)	(2.24)	(1.33)	(0.17)	(-0.22)
Observations	1,273	1,273	1,314	1,314	1,332	1,332	1,384	1,384	1,359	1,359
R-squared	0.06	0.45	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.20	0.02	0.04
Number of PanelResp	690	690	704	704	700	700	710	710	705	705

In all the regressions in the main paper we take into account age by looking at age cohorts (20s, 30, 40s etc) and we find very little effect. In this section, we take a closer look at generational effects to see if there are non-linearities in age effects by adding a squared age variable. Table A7 reproduces Table 1 in the main paper, but including the squared age variable. As we see, the age square variable is never significant, but it does make age significant in models 2 and 3. It seems, that there is mixed evidence that older respondents may have been more likely to become more emotionally invested.

In Table A8, we find that once we include emotions, the age effects tend to disappear – even for approval.

Table A7 Generational Effects on Emotions

VARIABLES	(1) Positive Emotions	(2) Positive Emotions	(3) Positive Emotions
State TV	0.17	-	-
	(3.67)		
Follow Politics	-	0.31	-
		(7.46)	
Discuss Politics	-	-	0.26
			(5.04)
Live Journal	0.06	0.05	0.11
	(1.62)	(1.40)	(2.34)
Private Sector	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.15)
Wealth	0.05	0.03	0.01
	(0.93)	(0.67)	(0.23)
Education	0.18	0.17	0.22
	(2.36)	(2.24)	(2.72)
Age	1.16	1.26	1.45
	(1.75)	(1.94)	(2.02)
Age Squared	-0.76	-0.89	-1.10
	(-1.31)	(-1.56)	(-1.78)
Family Economy	0.09	0.07	0.08
	(2.42)	(2.01)	(1.96)
Observations	1,403	1,404	1,172
R-squared	0.05	0.10	0.09
Number of PanelResp	711	711	667

Table A8 Generational Effects on Approval, Corruption, the Future and the Past

VARIABLES	(1) Approval	(2) Approval	(3) High Level Corrupt	(4) High Level Corrupt	(5) Low Level Corrupt	(6) Low Level Corrupt	(7) Econ Fut	(8) Econ Fut	(9) 1990s	(10) 1990s
Discussion	0.22	0.06	-0.21	-0.15	-0.19	-0.15	0.16	0.06	0.15	0.13
	(4.01)	(1.29)	(-3.28)	(-2.29)	(-3.12)	(-2.36)	(3.00)	(1.11)	(2.86)	(2.35)
Positive Emotions		0.61		-0.23		-0.16		0.41		0.09
		(16.47)		(-4.23)		(-3.12)		(9.30)		(2.01)
Live	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.09	0.10	0.02	-0.02	0.08	0.07
	(1.17)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.61)	(1.65)	(1.97)	(0.40)	(-0.54)	(1.70)	(1.48)
Private Sector	0.07	0.05	0.13	0.14	-0.00	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(1.05)	(1.07)	(1.70)	(1.80)	(-0.06)	(0.03)	(0.57)	(0.55)	(0.17)	(0.15)
Wealth	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.16	-0.15	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.09
	(-0.18)	(-0.17)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(-2.10)	(-2.12)	(0.78)	(0.75)	(1.49)	(1.48)
Education	0.14	-0.01	-0.02	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.21	0.12	-0.01	-0.03
	(1.61)	(-0.08)	(-0.15)	(0.45)	(0.16)	(0.55)	(2.43)	(1.49)	(-0.10)	(-0.34)
Age	1.64	0.72	0.75	1.00	0.35	0.52	1.56	0.98	0.55	0.42
	(2.31)	(1.29)	(0.82)	(1.12)	(0.40)	(0.60)	(2.07)	(1.39)	(0.76)	(0.58)
Age Square	-1.37	-0.69	-0.62	-0.81	-0.57	-0.70	-0.89	-0.44	-0.24	-0.14
	(-2.26)	(-1.44)	(-0.80)	(-1.06)	(-0.77)	(-0.96)	(-1.36)	(-0.73)	(-0.38)	(-0.22)
Family Economy	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.07	0.00	-0.01
	(2.81)	(2.16)	(1.36)	(1.80)	(2.27)	(2.56)	(2.36)	(1.73)	(0.01)	(-0.17)
Observations	1,085	1,085	1,115	1,115	1,130	1,130	1,172	1,172	1,157	1,157
R-squared	0.08	0.43	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.20	0.03	0.04
Number of PanelResp	643	643	653	653	656	656	667	667	661	661

B. Robustness Checks: Weighting for Panel Attrition

In carrying out our analysis, we invited for re-interview all of the respondents from round 1. Not all responded, of course, and it is possible that there is some systemic component to the choice to answer questions in the second round. If this were so, then our results would be biased. In this section, we describe a test to identify whether panel attrition systemically affects our results.

As noted in the paper, one potentially serious form of panel attrition would be if opponents or critics of President Putin were systematically less likely to respond to our survey. Whether this was true in Round 1 or not, we cannot know for certain, though we did have many more critics than supporters in the initial survey. However, we can show that there was no such component to attrition. In fact, mean approval in Round 1 among those who did not answer in Round 2 was statistically indistinguishable from those who did (mean approval in Round 1 of those who dropped out of the sample was 2.5 and 2.4 for those who remained in the sample) .

Nevertheless, there are a range of other variables that might systematically affect the likelihood of attrition. To test to see if any of them play a role, we model the likelihood of responding to second round of the survey as a probit distribution using the full range of covariates in our main models. Table B.1 presents the results.

Table B.1 Probit Model Predicting Likelihood of Remaining of Answering in Round 2

VARIABLES	(1) Remain in Sample
Approval R2	-0.09
	(-0.99)
Follow Politics	-0.00
	(-0.02)
Non Voter	0.10
	(1.15)
Prokhorov	0.02
	(0.28)
Ziuganov	0.00
	(0.02)
Private Sector	0.04
	(0.46)
Wealth	0.18
	(2.21)
Education	-0.06
	(-0.78)
Female	-0.06
	(-0.75)
Age	0.10
	(1.21)
Moscow	0.03
	(0.42)
Finances Better	0.02
	(0.29)
Observations	1,059

Probit coefficients. Z-statistics in parentheses.

As the model suggests, there is very little evidence of a systematic component to attrition. The only significant variable is that richer respondents were more likely to reply and the chi-square for the regression as a whole is .47.

In Table B2, we rerun the analysis of Table 1 in the main paper using attrition weights calculated for each individual as the inverse of the probability of remaining in the same

calculated from Table B1. The results hold for each of state television, political interest and

political discussion.

Table B2: Table 1 from main paper with attrition weights

VARIABLES	(1) Positive Emotions	(2) Positive Emotions	(3) Positive Emotions
State TV	0.15		
	(3.18)		
Interest		0.30	
		(7.09)	
Discussion			0.26
			(4.95)
Live	0.06	0.05	0.10
	(1.54)	(1.24)	(2.11)
Private Sector	0.02	0.04	0.03
	(0.44)	(0.80)	(0.48)
Wealth	0.08	0.06	0.05
	(1.36)	(1.15)	(0.83)
Education	0.18	0.16	0.22
	(2.18)	(2.01)	(2.66)
Age	0.35	0.29	0.26
	(1.69)	(1.40)	(1.09)
Economy	0.09	0.07	0.07
	(2.24)	(1.84)	(1.76)
Observations	1,221	1,226	1,039
R-squared	0.05	0.11	0.09
Number of PanelResp	616	618	585

t-statistics in parentheses

C. Recruitment and Sample

The survey was conducted with a leading Russian market research firm, Synovate ComCon, with financing from The Smith Richardson Foundation. Synovate ComCon invited a sample of their opt-in internet panel of 350 000 participants from cities all over Russia. Panel members are recruited on-line via a network of banners inviting them to share their opinions but without stating the possibility of earning money. Once registered in the panel members might be chosen at random to answer surveys. Invitations are sent to the respondent's e-mail account. Upon receiving an invitation, respondents follow the link from the message. Participation in the survey brings some points, which can be further transferred to the mobile phone number account or to charity funds, or some other purposes. Each panel member can participate in the survey not more than once in 2 months.

For the income screener, respondents were asked, "How would you describe the financial status of your family?" Only respondents who placed themselves 3 or higher on the following scale proceeded to the full questionnaire: "1) not enough money even for food, 2) We can buy food but it would be hard for us to buy clothes, 3) We can buy food and clothes, but it would be hard for us to buy a television, fridge or washing machine, 4) We can buy major household appliances, but would not afford a new car, 5) Our earnings are enough for anything but such expensive things like a dacha or an apartment, 6) No financial difficulties, could buy a dacha or apartment if needed."

In terms of the population sampled, the Internet survey differs from a nationally representative sample in four main ways. First, the Internet sample only covers Moscow, St. Petersburg and large cities with population of over 1 million. This group makes up 31.8 percent of the national population. Second, we required respondents to have at least some higher

education, limiting ourselves to 32.3 percent of the national sample. Third, we only sampled Internet users – a group that made up 59 percent of the national sample. Finally, we required that our respondents have enough money to cover food and necessities. This criterion is harder to translate into a national sample as most such surveys asked respondents to place themselves in specific income categories. However, we might think of our sample as approximating the top 3 income categories of the 5 income categories typically used by the leading national survey company in Russia, the Levada Center. This would correspond to people in households with income over R15 000 per month (about $450), capturing some 66.4 percent of the national sample. Putting all these criteria together 11.3 percent of those in a nationally representative sample conducted by Levada in March 2012 also fit the criteria for the internet survey.

The sampling strategy we adopted offers a number of significant advantages over a classic nationally representative sample. In order to learn about a relatively small group such as the Russian opposition, we need a tailored sample that will provide us with significant numbers of people willing to oppose the incumbent regime. While broad national surveys indicate some level of opposition, the population sampled here demonstrates considerably higher levels, at least in Round 1. This is important because the more balanced distribution of opinion in this group means we can expect more meaningful answers to survey questions and greater statistical power. Clearly, however, this advantage is also a drawback -- the specific distribution of attitudes and opinions we find are not representative of patterns in the population as a whole. Nevertheless, since we are not interested in making point estimates related to the population as a whole, this drawback is less important than obtaining variation on the dependent variables.

<u>D: Robustness Tests: Reversing the relationships between mediators and outcomes</u>

In this section we investigate the possibility that all our mediators and outcomes in the second stage of the analysis in the paper are not in fact related in the way we suggest, but instead are all endogenous to some unobserved factor that is excluded. If this were the case, then we should see the independent variables (state television use), the mediator (positive emotions) and the outcomes (approval, corruption perceptions and economic sentiment) all move together regardless of the way in which we set up the analysis.

To see whether this is the case, we introduce each of our supposed outcome variables into regressions predicting the other outcome variables one at a time. If all these outcomes are driven by some unobserved factor then they should all be correlated with one another. They are not. Instead, while there are certainly relationships between the variables, as we would expect, there are logical differences in the patterns of correlation consistent with the mediation story told in the paper, but inconsistent with all our results being driven by some unobserved factor.

In Table D1 we regress approval ratings against positive motions and state television and all the other outcome variables one by one, using OLS regression with individual level fixed effects. We find that changing positive emotions remains the largest driver of changes in approval, while the effect of state television use in the right direction but for the most part not quite statistically significant. Corruption perceptions (both high and low level) are statically significant and in the right direction though substantively very small (especially compared to positive emotions. The same is true of perceptions of the economic future. Changes in past economic perceptions are not related to changes in approval.

Table D1 Approval, Emotions and Other Outcomes.

VARIABLES	(1) Approval	(2) Approval	(3) Approval	(4) Approval
Positive Emotions	0.61	0.63	0.58	0.63
	(18.57)	(19.67)	(17.15)	(19.97)
High Level Corr.	-0.05	-	-	-
	(-2.00)			
Low Level Corr.	-	-0.08	-	-
		(-2.91)		
Future Econ	-		0.14	-
		-	(4.17)	
1990s Econ	-	-	-	0.02
				(0.60)
State TV	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.05
	(1.90)	(1.79)	(1.33)	(1.28)
Live	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(-0.04)
Private Sector	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.05
	(1.58)	(0.99)	(1.23)	(1.17)
Wealth	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.05
	(1.47)	(1.40)	(0.94)	(1.05)
Education	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(-0.27)	(-0.35)	(-0.54)	(-0.31)
Age	0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.00
	(0.11)	(0.03)	(-0.28)	(-0.01)
Economy	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.06
	(2.40)	(2.14)	(1.78)	(2.11)
Observations	1,232	1,245	1,288	1,267
R-squared	0.45	0.46	0.46	0.44
Number of PanelResp	684	684	693	685

t-statistics in parentheses

In Table D2, we repeat the analysis for high level corruption. Again we find results consistent with our mediation story and inconsistent with an endogeneity story. Changes in high level corruption perceptions are correlated with approval (as we know from Table D1) and with low level corruption perceptions (model 2), but not at all with economic perceptions of either the

future or the past. Positive emotions (on a seven point scale) is again substantively very

important in driving corruption perceptions.

Table D2 High Level Corruption, Emotions and Other Outcomes

VARIABLES	(1) High Level Corr.	(2) High Level Corr.	(3) High Level Corr.	(4) High Level Corr.
Positive Emotions	-0.18	-0.16	-0.26	-0.26
	(-2.66)	(-3.87)	(-5.05)	(-5.48)
Approval	-0.13	-	-	-
	(-2.00)			
Low Level Corr.	-	0.47	-	-
		(13.06)		
Future Econ	-	-	-0.03	-
			(-0.67)	
1990s Econ	-	-	-	-0.03
				(-0.66)
State TV	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.79)	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.36)
Live	0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.47)	(-0.22)	(0.58)	(0.66)
Private Sector	0.10	0.06	0.08	0.08
	(1.47)	(1.00)	(1.30)	(1.21)
Wealth	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.04
	(1.14)	(1.36)	(0.48)	(0.52)
Education	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.06
	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.67)	(0.59)
Age	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Economy	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.05
	(1.55)	(0.55)	(1.28)	(1.21)
Observations	1,232	1,311	1,332	1,310
R-squared	0.06	0.26	0.06	0.05
Number of PanelResp	684	700	704	699

t-statistics in parentheses

In Table D3, we look at low level corruption perceptions. As we might expect from D1

and D2, changes in low level corruption perceptions are correlated with changes in approval and

high level corruption perceptions, but not with economic perceptions of the past and future.

Table D3 Low Level Corruption, Emotions and Other Outcomes

VARIABLES	(1) Low Level Corr.	(2) Low Level Corr.	(3) Low Level Corr.	(4) Low Level Corr.
Positive Emotions	-0.09	-0.10	-0.21	-0.22
	(-1.35)	(-2.34)	(-4.21)	(-4.62)
Approval	-0.19	-	-	-
	(-2.91)			
High Level Corr.	-	0.47	-	-
		(13.06)		
Future Econ	-	-	-0.02	-
			(-0.38)	
1990s Econ	-	-	-	0.02
				(0.37)
State TV	0.05	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.82)	(-0.41)	(-0.21)	(-0.34)
Live	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08
	(1.25)	(1.88)	(1.65)	(1.67)
Private Sector	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(1.11)	(0.13)	(0.51)	(0.50)
Wealth	-0.06	-0.14	-0.12	-0.13
	(-0.82)	(-2.34)	(-1.93)	(-1.96)
Education	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.06
	(0.71)	(0.05)	(0.68)	(0.64)
Age	-0.08	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06
	(-0.32)	(-0.33)	(-0.20)	(-0.26)
Economy	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.05
	(1.25)	(0.89)	(1.17)	(1.13)
Observations	1,245	1,311	1,350	1,329
R-squared	0.05	0.26	0.05	0.04
Number of PanelResp	684	700	704	699

t-statistics in parentheses

In Table D4, we look at the correlates of changes in future economic perceptions. As before, these are unrelated to corruption perceptions, but correlated with approval and changes in perceptions of the economy in the 1990s.

Table D4 Future Economic Perceptions, Emotions and Other Outcomes

VARIABLES	(1) Econ Fut	(2) Econ Fut	(3) Econ Fut	(4) Econ Fut
Positive Emotions	0.30	0.41	0.44	0.41
	(5.97)	(10.41)	(11.60)	(11.32)
Approval	0.21	-	-	-
	(4.17)			
High Level Corr.	-	-0.02	-	-
		(-0.67)		
Low Level Corr.	-	-	-0.01	-
			(-0.38)	
Econ 1990s	-	-	-	0.08
				(2.13)
State TV	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.78)	(0.91)	(0.93)
Live	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(-0.83)	(-0.79)	(-0.77)	(-0.99)
Private Sector	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(-0.42)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.64)
Wealth	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.03
	(1.06)	(1.75)	(1.29)	(0.67)
Education	0.08	0.15	0.10	0.14
	(0.99)	(1.93)	(1.28)	(1.79)
Age	0.33	0.43	0.44	0.37
	(1.70)	(2.14)	(2.25)	(1.93)
Economy	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(1.71)	(1.70)	(1.63)	(1.73)
Observations	1,288	1,332	1,350	1,377
R-squared	0.23	0.20	0.22	0.21
Number of PanelResp	693	704	704	706

t-statistics in parentheses

Finally, in Table D5, we repeat the analysis for perceptions of the 1990s. These are correlated with future economic perceptions, but not with approval, nor with corruption perceptions.

Table D5 1990s Economic Perceptions, Emotions and Other Outcomes

VARIABLES	(1) Econ 1990s	(2) Econ 1990s	(3) Econ 1990s	(4) Econ 1990s
Positive Emotions	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.10
	(2.03)	(3.28)	(3.46)	(2.23)
Approval	0.03	-	-	-
	(0.60)			
High Level Corr.	-	-0.02	-	-
		(-0.66)		
Low Level Corr.	-	-	0.01	-
			(0.37)	
Future Econ	-	-	-	0.09
				(2.13)
State TV	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.98)	(0.80)	(0.92)
Live	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(2.04)	(1.41)	(1.41)	(1.43)
Private Sector	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05
	(-0.73)	(-0.82)	(-0.94)	(-0.87)
Wealth	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.08
	(1.58)	(1.83)	(1.36)	(1.45)
Education	-0.04	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01
	(-0.48)	(-0.34)	(-0.02)	(-0.16)
Age	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.27
	(1.50)	(1.60)	(1.63)	(1.33)
Economy	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02
	(-0.42)	(-0.79)	(-0.21)	(-0.49)
Observations	1,267	1,310	1,329	1,377
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Number of PanelResp	685	699	699	706

t-statistics in parentheses

In this section, we repeat the mediation analysis using our other two measures of participation in the Crimean rally – changes in political interest and changes in political discussion. Overall the findings are very similar to the results with changes in political discussion presented in the main paper. The ACME is statistically significant for all outcomes, while the proportion of the effects mediated are, if anything, larger. Television has no direct effect (none of the direct effects are statistically significant) and only the direct effect of interest on approval is significant.

Table E1 Main Paper Table 2 with State Television News

	Approval	High Level Corruption	Low Level Corruption	Economic Future	Experience of the 1990s
ACME	.07	-.04	-.03	.04	.02
	[.03, .11]	[-.06, -.02]	[-.05, -.01]	[.02, .07]	[.01, .03]
ADE	.04	.02	-.01	.02	.04
	[-.02, .09]	[-.07, .10]	[-.09, .08]	[-.03, .07]	[-.03, .11]
Total	.10	-.02	-.03	.06	.06
	[.04, .17]	[-.11, .04]	[-.12, .05]	[.01, .12]	[-.02, .13]
% Mediated	.66	.60	.44	.67	.28
	[.35, 1.31]	[-8.93, 9.07]	[-6.15, 7.54]	[.26, 2.56]	[-1.82, 2.81]

OLS regressions with individual fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.

Table E2 Main Paper Table 2 with Interest in Politics

Table 2 Causal Mediation Analysis

	Approval	High Level Corruption	Low Level Corruption	Economic Future	Experience of the 1990s
ACME	.25 [.19, .33]	-.10 [-.15, -.06]	-.08 [-.13, -.04]	.13 [.09, .17]	.05 [.02, .09]
ADE	.08 [.01, .16]	-.08 [-.21, .05]	-.09 [-.21, .05]	.03 [-.06, .11]	.10 [-.02, .22]
Total	.34 [.24, .44]	-.18 [-.31, -.05]	-.16 [-.29, -.03]	.16 [.07, .25]	.15 [.04, .26]
% Mediated	.75 [.58, .98]	.54 [.25, 1.89]	.53 [.20, 2.05]	.81 [.50, 1.80]	.34 [.11, 1.36]

OLS regressions with individual fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.

F: Other Measures of Nationalism

In the main text we use a measure of state centric nationalism to show that it was changing emotions more than changing levels of nationalism that account for the phenomena we see. Of course, this is not the only way to measure nationalism in the context of a multinational, multiconfessional state like Russia. In their 'political anthropology' of nationalism, Aronoff and Kubik (2013, ch. 5) usefully distinguish between three ideal types of nationalist attachment – ethnic republican, ethnonationalist and civic – that map broadly onto the three Weberian ideal types of legitimation, with concomitant effects for politics in societies where one or another type of attachment dominate. These attachments correspond well to different elements in what, until recently, was a quite divided nationalist movement in Russia.

There are at least three major strains within politicized nationalism in Russia today. One is based largely on an ethnic conception of the Russian nation. This strain itself includes a number of different elements across the political spectrum, from fascist skinheads gangs in Russia's big cities to "liberal" nationalists like Alexei Navalny who stress ethnicity and the separateness of people from the Caucasus and Central Asia.

A second strain emphasizes not the separateness of the peoples on the Eurasian plain, but rather the importance of uniting them together under a strong Russian state. This strain, which dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century is today associated most closely with the so-called Eurasianist movement and its current figure-head Aleksandr Dugin. The Eurasianist tendency is thought to be particularly strong among elements of the Red Army leadership (Clover 2016), but also has deep roots in the intellectual traditions that are believed to have shaped thinking in the Soviet foreign policy and intelligence establishments (Bassin 2016). This is the measure we use.

Third, there is a powerful Orthodox strain in Russian nationalist politics, with many leading politicians emphasizing Orthodoxy as a way to bring the nation together. This tendency was marked under the Presidency of Boris Yeltsin, but has been particularly noticeable since the protests of 2011-12.

In addition to these politicized nationalist attachments, there is a long-standing but largely apolitical sense of the uniqueness and magnificence of Russian culture. This form of cultural pride has long been a feature of the Russian intelligentsia – including those who stand politically apart from the country's rulers – and culture remains an important part of what many people believe to be the Russian identity today.

In our survey research, we attempted to measure each of these elements, but the one that changed the most and so performs as the best alternative to emotions in a regression context is state nationalism. We show the changes by round for each measure in Table F1. The table shows the percentage of respondents expressing different levels of importance for each option. The important point is that only the statist conception of nationalism increases between rounds – the rest of the options remain largely static and so cannot explain the changes we observe in the paper.

Table F1 Changes in Different Types of Nationalism Between Rounds – Percentage of

respondents

Statist	Round 1	Round 2
Absolutely not important	5	3
Not important	5	5
Neither important nor not	13	10
Quite important	38	36
Very important	40	45

Ethnic	Round 1	Round 2
Absolutely not important	5	5
Not important	5	4
Neither important nor not	11	13
Quite important	33	36
Very important	46	43

Orthodoxy	Round 1	Round 2
Absolutely not important	22	22
Not important	10	7
Neither important nor not	15	18
Quite important	27	26
Very important	27	27

Culture	Round 1	Round 2
Absolutely not important	2	2
Not important	2	3
Neither important nor not	8	7
Quite important	37	35
Very important	51	53