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Appendix 1: Survey Question Wording for Variables Used in the Analysis

Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Survey

Satisfaction with Democracy: In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with the way democracy works in your country. (3) Very satisfied, (2) Satisfied, (1) Unsatisfied, (0) Very unsatisfied."

Confidence in the Electoral Agency: "In relation to the following persons, groups, and institutions, I would like to know how much confidence do they deserve as they act in the public interest-the electoral organization?" (0) No confidence, (1) Little confidence, (2) Some confidence, (3) Much confidence.

Confidence in Last Elections: How much confidence do you have in the elections that you were elected in? use a scale which goes from 1 "minimum confidence" to "5 maximum confidence"

Level of Democracy: Coded from the Varieties of Democracy Project's (Coppedge et al. 2018) electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy). According to the codebook, "The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two." High values represent stronger correspondence to democratic norms.

Belongs to a Different Party than the President: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent belongs to the president's party and 0 otherwise.

Not President Party*Democracy: A multiplicative interaction term between the V-Dem measure of democracy and the measure of incumbent partisanship.

GDP Growth Rate: The weighted average of the GDP growth rate in the year of the survey and in the previous year, such that if the most common survey month was m then the weighted average is $(m/12)*\text{Growth}_t+(12-m)/12*\text{Growth}_{t-1}$.

Female: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent self-reports as female and 0 otherwise.

Age: Self-reported age in years.

Education: From the question "what are the highest level of official studies that you completed? 1. None, 2. Primary, 3. Secondary, 4. Technical school university, 5. Higher university, 6. Postgraduate."

(Variables in web appendix models)

Left-right: from the question "On this card there is a series of boxes that go from left to right. What box would you put yourself in given your political ideas? 1 Left, 10 right."

Country fixed-effects: dummy variables for 17 of the 18 countries in the hemisphere, with Argentina as the omitted case.

Government Status: Coded from the question "Do you consider yourself a member of the government or the opposition." I then divided non-presidential party members into those that self-identify as being part of the government and those that self-identify as being part of the opposition.

Polity: Coded by the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Gurr 2020), the Polity2 score measures the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, the constraints on the executive, and the competitiveness and regulation of political competition. High values represent increased openness and competitive political competition.

Election Quality: Coded from the Varieties of Democracy Project's (Coppedge et al. 2018) measure of whether the election was free and fair (v2elfrfair). This variable is coded by experts about each national election. The question is "Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?" Response options were "0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences." V-Dem then provides an index score for each election. I measure the quality of democracy by looking at the fairness of the last election before each survey. High values represent more fairness.

Per Capita GDP: Taken from the October 2020 release of the World Economic Outlook dataset by the IMF, this is the per capita GDP in constant 2017 international dollars.

Polarization: This measure draws on Dalton (2008)'s scheme for coding the left-right differentiation in a system by taking the average deviation from the ideological mean, weighted by party size. Singer (2016) calculated this for Latin American legislatures by estimating parties' positions using the PELA elites data with the left-right question described above. I have updated the data to include all PELA surveys in the analysis.

Latin American Public Opinion Project

Satisfaction with Democracy: "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (country)? (3) Very satisfied, (2) Satisfied, (1) Dissatisfied, (0) Very dissatisfied."

Belief that the Country is Democratic: "In your opinion, is country very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic? (3) Very democratic, (2) Somewhat democratic, (1) Not very democratic, (0) Not at all democratic."

Trust in the Election Agency: "On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].... I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number." ... "To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?" High values represent high levels of trust.

Trust in Elections: Coded on the same scale as *Trust in the Election Agency,* "To what extent do you trust elections in this country?" High values represent high levels of trust.

Level of Democracy: Coded from the Varieties of Democracy Project's (Coppedge et al. 2018) electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy). Described above.

Voted for a Losing Presidential Candidate: Coded from the questions, "Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)? [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST]", and, if yes, "Who did you vote for in the last presidential election of [year]?" A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent voted for a candidate other than the president and 0 if they abstained or voted for the winner.

Abstained in the last Election: Coded from the question asking about previous vote choice; this dummy variable takes the value of 1 if they abstained and 0 otherwise.

Voted for Loser*Democracy, Abstained*Democracy: A multiplicative interaction term between having voted for a losing candidate/abstained and the V-dem measure of democracy.

GDP Growth Rate: The weighted average of the GDP growth rate in the year of the survey and in the previous year, such that if the most common survey month was m then the weighted average is $(m/12)*\text{Growth}_t+(12-m)/12*\text{Growth}_{t-1}$.

Lives in Rural Area: Coded by the survey firm from the country's census definition, 0 if urban, 1 if rural.

Wealth Quintile: As described in the text, this variable is an income quintile measure coded from a factor analysis that looks at which of the following household goods the respondent reported owning: phone (landline or cellular), tv, refrigerator, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, washing machine, a computer, a motorcycle, and the number of cars they own.

Female: Coded by the interviewer (0) male or (1) female

Education: Coded from the question

	1^0	2^0	3^0	4^0	5^0	6^0
ED. How many years of schooling have you completed? _____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**						
None	0					
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11	12
University	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Post-secondary, not university	13	14	15			

Age: A series of dummy variables based on respondents' self-reported ages. The baseline is ages 18-25. Then there are dummy variables for age 26-35, age 36-45, age 46-55, age 56-65, and age 66+.

Ethnicity: a series of dummy variables from the question "Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race? [If respondent says Afro-country, mark (4) Black] (1) White, (2) Mestizo, (3) Indigenous, (4) Black, (5) Mulatto, (7) Other" with an additional category of "Moreno" in Venezuela that I combined with other. I generated a dummy variable for each of these categories, with white as the excluded category.

 (Variables in web appendix models)

Opposition partisan, No partisanship: Coded from two questions. "Do you currently identify with a political party?" then, if yes "Which political party do you identify with?", with respondents choosing for a list of parties from each country.

*Opposition partisan*democracy, No partisanship*democracy*: A multiplicative interaction between the two dummy variables for partisanship and the measure of democratic quality.

Left-right self-placement: "Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number."

Country fixed-effects: Dummy variables for 17 of the 18 Latin American presidential democracies, with Mexico as the excluded category.

Polity Score, Election Quality, Per Capita GDP, and *Polarization* as described above. *Polarization* is coded as missing if the measurement was not done for a legislature that was in session at the time of the survey.

Appendix 2: List of Cases in the Analyses

Because question wording varies by survey wave, the sample of country-years differs in each analysis. The inclusion of cases in each analysis is as detailed below; the AmericasBarometer surveys are listed by survey wave:

Parliamentary Elites-Satisfaction with Democracy

País	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Argentina			1		1		1					
Bolivia	1				1					1		
Chile	1				1				1			
Colombia	1					1			1			
Costa Rica	1				1				1			
Ecuador				1				1				1
El Salvador	1			1			1			1		
Guatemala			1				1				1	
Honduras	1				1				1			
Mexico	1				1			1			1	
Nicaragua		1					1					1
Panamá				1					1			
Paraguay			1					1				
Perú	1				1	1						
Rep. Dom	1					1						1
Uruguay					1					1		
Venezuela											1	
Brazil					1				1			

Parliamentary Elites-Confidence in Election Agency

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Argentina			1				1		1		1					
Bolivia														1		
Chile	1				1				1				1			

País	1994	1995	1996	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2010	2015
Colombia					1				1		1				
Costa Rica	1				1			1			1				
Ecuador		1					1				1				1
El Salvador		1			1		1				1		1		
Guatemala	1		1				1				1			1	
Honduras	1				1			1			1				
Mexico			1		1			1			1			1	
Nicaragua	1					1					1				1
Panamá	1		1				1				1				
Paraguay		1					1				1				
Perú					1			1	1						
Rep. Dom		1			1			1							1
Uruguay				1				1					1		
Venezuela													1		
Brazil				1				1			1				

Parliamentary Elites-Confidence in Elections

País	1994	1995	1996	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2010	2015
Argentina			1	1					1				1		
Bolivia			1	1				1			1			1	1
Chile	1			1			1				1				
Colombia				1				1			1				
Costa Rica	1			1			1				1				
Ecuador	1			1				1							
El Salvador	1			1	1			1			1				
Guatemala				1			1		1				1		
Honduras	1			1			1				1				
Mexico		1		1		1			1		1				
Nicaragua				1			1					1			
Panamá							1		1						
Paraguay			1	1				1					1		

Country													
Perú	1				1				1				
Rep. Dom	1			1			1		1				
Uruguay		1			1			1					
Venezuela	1			1									
Brazil								1				1	

Latin American Public Opinion Project-Satisfaction with Democracy

Country	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Argentina		1	1	1	1	1	1
Bolivia		1	1	1	1	1	1
Brazil		1	1	1	1	1	1
Chile	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Colombia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dominican Republic	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ecuador	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
El Salvador	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Guatemala	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Honduras	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mexico	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nicaragua	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Panama	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Paraguay		1	1	1	1	1	1
Peru	1	1		1	1	1	1
Uruguay	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Venezuela	1	1	1	1	1	1	

Latin American Public Opinion Project-Country is Democratic

Country	2006	2008	2012	2014	2016	2018
Argentina		1	1	1		
Bolivia		1	1	1		

Country						
Brazil		1	1	1		
Chile	1	1	1	1		
Colombia	1	1	1	1		
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1		
Dominican Republic	1	1	1	1		
Ecuador	1	1	1	1		
El Salvador	1	1	1	1		
Guatemala	1	1	1	1		
Honduras	1	1	1	1		
Mexico	1	1	1	1		
Nicaragua	1	1	1	1	1	1
Panama	1	1	1	1		
Paraguay		1	1	1		
Peru	1	1		1		
Uruguay	1	1	1	1		
Venezuela	1	1	1	1	1	

Latin American Public Opinion Project-Confidence in Election Agency

Country	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Argentina		1	1	1	1	1	1
Bolivia		1	1	1	1	1	1
Brazil		1	1	1	1	1	1
Chile	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Colombia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dominican Republic	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ecuador	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
El Salvador	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Guatemala	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Honduras	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mexico	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Nicaragua	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Panama	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Paraguay		1	1	1	1	1	1
Peru	1	1		1	1	1	1
Uruguay	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Venezuela	1	1	1	1	1	1	

Latin American Public Opinion Project-Confidence in Elections

Country	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Argentina	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bolivia	1	1	1	1	1	1
Brazil	1	1	1	1	1	1
Chile	1	1	1	1	1	1
Colombia	1	1	1	1	1	1
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dominican Republic	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ecuador	1	1	1	1	1	1
El Salvador	1	1	1	1	1	1
Guatemala	1	1	1	1	1	1
Honduras	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mexico	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nicaragua	1	1	1	1	1	1
Panama	1	1	1	1	1	1
Paraguay	1	1	1	1	1	1
Peru	1		1	1	1	1
Uruguay	1	1	1	1	1	1
Venezuela	1	1	1	1	1	

Results with Full Demographic Variables

To save space, we excluded the results for the various demographic controls. Those results are produced in full below in Tables A1 and Table A2.

Table A1: Legislative Elites' Evaluations of the State of Democracy in their Country-Results with Full Controls

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Trust in the Electoral Agency		Confidence in Last Elections	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Level of Democracy	-0.273	-0.373	0.262	0.147	0.518	0.299
	(0.318)	(0.310)	(0.452)	(0.439)	(0.570)	(0.562)
Belongs to a Different Party than the President	-0.567***	-2.037***	-0.522***	-2.334***	-0.637***	-2.447***
	(0.081)	(0.318)	(0.093)	(0.382)	(0.082)	(0.336)
Not President Party*Democracy		2.149***		2.623***		2.630***
		(0.454)		(0.540)		(0.478)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.009	-0.009	-0.047*	-0.047*	0.078**	0.074**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Female	-0.040	-0.040	-0.027	-0.027	-0.124***	-0.124***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.012	-0.012	0.017	0.017	0.034**	0.034**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	2.424	2.488	2.139	2.205	2.405	2.565
	(0.226)	(0.221)	(0.316)	(0.308)	(0.441)	(0.434)
Variance Components						
Country	0.011	0.010	0.038	0.033	0.150	0.146
Not President's Party	0.065	0.061	0.130	0.128	0.136	0.131
Country-Year	0.302	0.202	0.500	0.357	0.375	0.242
Individual-Level	0.385	0.385	0.562	0.562	0.817	0.817
N, Individual-Level	3929	3929	5067	5067	5390	5390
N, Country-Years	50	50	64	64	65	65
N, Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
χ^2	55.44***	98.80***	39.75***	74.02***	88.75***	147.06***
Multilevel Linear Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)						

Table A2: Mass Publics' Evaluations of Democratic Quality in their Country-Full Controls

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Country is Democratic		Trust in Election Agency		Trust in Elections	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Level of Democracy	-0.096	-0.122	-0.275	-0.315	-0.509	-0.563	0.046	-0.048
	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.303)	(0.300)	(0.615)	(0.611)	(0.667)	(0.660)
Voted for a Losing	-0.240***	-0.734***	-0.274***	-0.973***	-0.592***	-2.477***	-0.713***	-2.862***
Presidential Candidate	(0.019)	(0.071)	(0.033)	(0.107)	(0.080)	(0.261)	(0.085)	(0.238)
Voted for		0.725***		1.036***		2.826***		3.196***
Loser*Democracy		(0.102)		(0.154)		(0.380)		(0.343)
Abstained in the last	-0.158***	-0.313***	-0.192***	-0.465***	-0.486***	-0.982***	-0.660***	-1.414***
Election	(0.012)	(0.049)	(0.018)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.152)	(0.045)	(0.162)
Abstained*Democracy		0.228***		0.405***		0.745***		1.124***
		(0.070)		(0.096)		(0.223)		(0.234)
GDP Growth Rate	0.016**	0.016**	0.007	0.007	-0.011	-0.011	0.024	0.023
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Lives in Rural Area	0.068***	0.068***	0.028***	0.028***	0.221***	0.221***	0.252***	0.252***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.002*	0.002*	-0.001	-0.001	0.003*	0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wealth Quintile	-0.003*	-0.003*	0.004	0.004	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.017	-0.017	-0.119***	-0.119***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Age 26-35	-0.051***	-0.051***	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.210***	-0.210***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Age 36-45	-0.051***	-0.051***	0.017*	0.017*	-0.130***	-0.130***	-0.141***	-0.141***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age 46-55	-0.050***	-0.050***	0.006	0.006	-0.129***	-0.129***	-0.110***	-0.110***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age 56-65	-0.035***	-0.035***	0.036***	0.036***	-0.057**	-0.057**	0.015	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age 66+	0.020*	0.020*	0.071***	0.071***	0.014	0.014	0.163***	0.163***

	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Mestizo	-0.031***	-0.031***	0.000	0.000	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.068***	-0.068***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Indigenous	-0.005	-0.005	-0.011	-0.011	-0.044	-0.045	-0.130***	-0.130***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Black	-0.035***	-0.035***	0.010	0.010	-0.027	-0.027	-0.149***	-0.150***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Mulatto	-0.041***	-0.040***	-0.017	-0.016	-0.033	-0.032	-0.080**	-0.080**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Other Race	-0.036**	-0.036**	-0.027	-0.027	0.038	0.038	-0.046	-0.046
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Constant	1.655	1.674	2.007	2.035	4.582	4.618	4.114	4.178
	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.213)	(0.211)	(0.431)	(0.429)	(0.457)	(0.452)
Variance Components								
Individual Level	0.491	0.491	0.610	0.610	3.122	3.122	3.197	3.197
Country-Year Level	0.031	0.031	0.025	0.024	0.133	0.131	0.097	0.095
Country-Year: Voted for a Losing Candidate	0.042	0.029	0.072	0.043	0.506	0.297	0.492	0.212
Country-Year: Abstained	0.014	0.012	0.020	0.015	0.109	0.093	0.129	0.093
Country Level	0.018	0.018	0.063	0.062	0.269	0.265	0.306	0.298
N: Level 1	145,973	145,973	84,049	84,049	109,618	109,618	89,373	89,373
N: Level 2	120	120	70	70	82	82	71	71
N: Level 3	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
χ^2	1288.8***	1425.6***	289.4***	416.2***	679.7***	798.1***	1041.4***	1289.6***
Multilevel Linear Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$ (two-tailed)								

Appendix 4: Models as Ordered Logit Models

In the text, I model all the variables as linear models despite most of the variables being 4-point and 5-point ordered scales. I do this for the ease of presentation and of computation. However, in this appendix I present the results using ordered logit specifications to establish that the model specification is not substantively affecting the results. The models from the PELA analysis are analyzed as standard ordered logits estimated in STATA. However, STATA was unable to estimate a hierarchical ordered logit for the Lapop data. So I use instead the software program HLM to estimate the models for the two 4-point ordered models, although it does so with a constant and N-2 thresholds for an N-category ordered variable instead of the more traditional N-1 cut points. Those results are presented below in Table A1 and Table A2.

There are two small differences between these results and those in the paper. The first is that the probability of giving a positive score for an average legislator is higher when democracy is string than when it is weak whereas in the linear models in the paper that estimated correlation is null. In both cases, however, that is driven by those who don't belong to the president's party, as presidential co-partisan elites do not see their evaluations of democracy covary at all with democratic quality.

The second difference is with regards to people who voted for the president in the mass sample. While this group still does not have evaluations of democracy that positively covary with the level of democracy, in Table A2's Model 4 we see that winners have a significant negative correlation between the level of democracy and their evaluation of how democratic their country is; winners in not-democratic countries are more likely to say their country is democratic than are winners in the most democratic countries in the sample.

The other main results do not change, however: people who don't support the president have negative evaluations of democratic performance and electoral procedures and management bodies when countries are not democratic but become more positive when democracy approves while president party supporters do not. This confirms that it is election losers who are sensitive to democratic quality, not election winners.

Table A3: Ordered Model of Legislative Elites' Evaluations of the State of Democracy in their Country

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Trust in the Electoral Agency		Confidence in Last Elections	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Level of Democracy	5.820***	-0.930	7.032***	0.517	6.641***	3.030
	(1.121)	(1.914)	(1.443)	(2.040)	(1.358)	(1.718)
Belongs to a Different Party than the President	-1.941***	-6.667***	-1.382***	-5.974***	-1.456***	4.024***
	(0.295)	(1.147)	(0.262)	(1.075)	(0.175)	(0.779)
Not President Party*Democracy		6.935***		6.695***		3.786***
		(1.638)		(1.527)		(1.121)
GDP Growth Rate	0.027	0.026	-0.125*	-0.126*	0.085	0.086
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.064)

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Female	-0.127	-0.129	-0.084	-0.084	-0.246***	-0.244***
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Age	-0.006	-0.006	0.001	0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	-0.020	-0.021	0.032	0.032	0.065*	0.065*
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Cut #1	-0.891	-5.494	0.778	-3.687	0.466	-1.977
	(0.832)	(1.341)	(1.049)	(1.439)	(1.041)	(1.263)
Cut #2	1.543	-3.059	2.652	-1.812	1.487	-0.954
	(0.834)	(1.339)	(1.050)	(1.439)	(1.041)	(1.263)
Cut #3	5.231	0.626	5.038	0.574	3.228	0.789
	(0.838)	(1.338)	(1.051)	(1.438)	(1.041)	(1.263)
Cut #4					5.173	2.735
					(1.041)	(1.263)
Variance Components						
Country	0.306	0.302	0.761	0.754	0.627	0.638
President's Party	3.750	2.639	3.680	2.710	1.536	1.228
Country-Year	0.423	0.410	0.722	0.714	0.928	0.922
Individual-Level						
N, Individual-Level	3,929	3,929	5,067	5,067	5,390	5,390
N, Country-Years	50	50	64	64	65	65
N, Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
Multilevel Ordered Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)						

Table A4: Ordered Model of the Mass Public's Evaluations of the State of Democracy in their Country

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Country is Democratic	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Level of Democracy	0.537	0.247	-0.258	-1.139*
	(0.278)	(0.412)	(0.521)	(0.528)
Voted for a Losing Candidate	-0.667***	-1.958***	-0.639***	-2.352***
	(0.055)	(0.229)	(0.059)	(0.187)
Loser*Democracy		1.908***		2.537***
		(0.328)		(0.268)
Abstained	-0.445***	-0.800***	-0.446***	-1.093***
	(0.031)	(0.151)	(0.024)	(0.085)
Abstained*Democracy		0.528*		0.962***
		(0.216)		(0.123)
GDP Growth Rate	0.054***	0.054***	0.017*	0.016*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)

Rural	0.189***	0.189***	0.060***	0.060***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Wealth Quintile	-0.005	-0.005	0.009	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education	-0.016***	-0.016***	0.004	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	-0.109***	-0.110***	-0.045***	-0.045***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mestizo	-0.080***	-0.078***	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Indigenous	-0.007	-0.005	-0.028	-0.027
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Black	-0.093***	-0.092***	0.017	0.018
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Mulatto	-0.118***	-0.116***	-0.054	-0.053
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Other Race	-0.099	-0.098	-0.076	-0.076
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Age 26-35	-0.145***	-0.145***	-0.043*	-0.043*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age 36-45	-0.145***	-0.145***	0.047*	0.048*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age 46-55	-0.142***	-0.144***	0.030	0.031
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Age 56-65	-0.097***	-0.099***	0.100***	0.101***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Age 66+	0.065**	0.062**	0.198***	0.197***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Intercept	-3.209	-3.022	-1.170	-0.574
	(0.198)	(0.288)	(0.376)	(0.380)
Threshold 2	2.954	2.953	2.195	2.195
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Threshold 3	5.432	5.432	4.169	4.170
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Variance Component				
Country-Year	0.409	0.409	0.077	0.066
Election Loser	0.338	0.244	0.218	0.120
Abstained	0.093	0.096	0.020	0.012
Country	0.007	0.004	0.298	0.295
N: Level 1	145,973	145,973	84,049	84,049
N: Level 2	120	120	70	70
N: Level 3	18	18	18	18
Ordered Model, Standard Error in Parentheses				
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001				

Appendix 5: Results Controlling for Left-Right Self Placement

I did not control for left-right self-placement in the models because I did not have strong priors about how it would associate with specific support for democracy. As a robustness test, I replicate the interaction terms models from Table 1 and Table 2 below in Table A1 (parliamentary elites) and Table A2 (the mass public) with a control for left-right self-placement.. The substantive results do not change-there is never an estimate in which presidential supporters become less positive about democracy when its quality weakens.

Table A5: Specific Support for Democracy Among Parliamentary Elites, Controlling for Left-Right Self-Placement

	Satisfaction with Democracy	Trust Election Agency	Confidence in Election
Opposition Party Member	-1.803***	-2.154***	-2.094***
	(0.298)	(0.374)	(0.340)
Quality of Democracy	-0.490	-0.024	0.995
	(0.521)	(0.744)	(0.867)
Opposition*Democracy	1.813***	2.381***	2.169***
	(0.425)	(0.531)	(0.485)
Left-Right Self Placement	0.046***	0.040***	0.065***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)
GDP Growth	-0.002	-0.025	0.036
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.040)
Female	-0.040	-0.030	-0.117***
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.034)
Age	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.012	0.015	0.034**
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Constant	2.275***	2.012***	1.904**
	(0.364)	(0.522)	(0.644)
Random-effects			
Country (Level 3)	0.018	0.080	0.123
Country-Year: Opposition Party	0.164	0.320	0.233
Country-Year: Left-Right	0.003	0.004	0.007
Country-Year: Residual	0.049	0.141	0.347
Individual (Level 1)	0.364	0.538	0.765
Chi square	124.86***	92.57***	163.21***
N Country	18	18	18
N Country-Year	50	64	65
N Respondents	3876	4990	5272

Table A6: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Mass Public, Controlling for Left-Right Self-Placement

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Country is Democratic		Trust in Election Agency		Trust in Elections	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Level of Democracy	-0.114	-0.147	-0.311	-0.355	-0.440	-0.503	-0.681	-0.783
	(0.284)	(0.282)	(0.384)	(0.382)	(0.768)	(0.762)	(0.961)	(0.955)
Voted for Losing Candidate	-0.216***	-0.656***	-0.249***	-0.936***	-0.541***	-2.289***	-0.637***	-2.654***
	(0.017)	(0.061)	(0.031)	(0.097)	(0.073)	(0.236)	(0.080)	(0.224)
Loser*Democracy		0.646***		1.017***		2.621***		3.001***
		(0.088)		(0.139)		(0.344)		(0.323)
Abstained	-0.136***	-0.267***	-0.169***	-0.429***	-0.424***	-0.836***	-0.564***	-1.259***
	(0.011)	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.064)	(0.036)	(0.139)	(0.043)	(0.158)
Abstained*Democracy		0.193**		0.388***		0.621**		1.034***
		(0.066)		(0.093)		(0.203)		(0.228)
GDP Growth Rate	0.017**	0.017**	0.007	0.007	-0.012	-0.011	0.043*	0.042*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Left-Right Self Placement	0.013***	0.013***	0.006	0.006	0.050***	0.050***	0.061***	0.061***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Lives in Rural Area	0.062***	0.062***	0.024***	0.024***	0.220***	0.220***	0.241***	0.241***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wealth Quintile	-0.003*	-0.003*	0.004	0.004	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.010*	-0.010*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.025***	-0.025***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.104***	-0.104***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mestizo	-0.029***	-0.029***	0.003	0.003	-0.054***	-0.054***	-0.051**	-0.052**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Indigenous	0.004	0.004	-0.010	-0.010	-0.033	-0.033	-0.088**	-0.088**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Black	-0.036***	-0.036***	0.008	0.009	-0.025	-0.025	-0.163***	-0.164***

	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Mulatto	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.009	-0.008	-0.028	-0.026	-0.075*	-0.075*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Other Race	-0.031*	-0.031*	-0.015	-0.015	0.039	0.039	-0.031	-0.032
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Age 26-35	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.018*	-0.018*	-0.116***	-0.117***	-0.193***	-0.193***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age 36-45	-0.050***	-0.050***	0.012	0.012	-0.123***	-0.123***	-0.116***	-0.117***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age 46-55	-0.046***	-0.046***	0.012	0.013	-0.110***	-0.110***	-0.082***	-0.082***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Age 56-65	-0.036***	-0.036***	0.040***	0.040***	-0.030	-0.029	0.034	0.035
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Age 66+	0.010	0.010	0.070***	0.070***	0.001	0.001	0.162***	0.162***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Intercept	1.589	1.612	1.986	2.016	4.227	4.267	4.185	4.255
	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.271)	(0.269)	(0.536)	(0.532)	(0.665)	(0.660)
Random Effect								
Country (Level 3)	0.062	0.061	0.109	0.106	0.388	0.380	0.810	0.795
Country-Year: Residual	0.030	0.020	0.061	0.033	0.415	0.236	0.427	0.182
Country-Year: Left-Right	0.011	0.010	0.017	0.013	0.084	0.072	0.114	0.084
Country-Year: Voted for a Losing Candidate	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Country-Year: Abstained	0.039	0.039	0.035	0.035	0.214	0.212	0.142	0.140
Respondent	0.488	0.488	0.602	0.602	3.036	3.036	3.079	3.079
	1078.8***	1218.4***	249.9***	380.0***	590.7***	705.6***	868.2***	1081.3***
N Country	124,395	124,395	69454	69454	91231	91231	77710	77710
N Country-Year	120	120	70	70	82	82	71	71
N Respondents	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$ (two-tailed tests)								

Appendix 6: Results Controlling for Country Fixed Effects

The models in Table 1 and Table 2 have the level of democracy in a country as the only country-level control. In order to assure that omitted country-level factors are not driving the results, in Table A5 and A4 I add country-specific fixed effects to the baseline elite and mass models. These variables have the added effect of making the estimates of democratic quality become a within-estimator, meaning that the models look at changes within countries in democratic quality and how parties respond to them. Both models are estimated as linear models because the inclusion of country-specific fixed effects makes the models computationally challenging.

Even when fixed effects are added, there still are no models where presidential supporters are willing to express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy; if anything, evaluations of democracy among presidential supporters are significantly lower when democracy improves in 5 of the 7 models in Table A5 and A4, including all three elite models. Election losers continue to respond, however, to improvements in electoral quality.

Table A7: Specific Support for Democracy Among Parliamentary Elites with Country Fixed Effects

	Satisfaction with Democracy	Trust Election Agency	Confidence in Election
	[1]	[2]	[3]
Opposition Party Member	-2.017***	-2.308***	-2.432***
	(0.336)	(0.398)	(0.341)
Quality of Democracy	0.906	-1.374	0.210
	(0.829)	(0.930)	(0.925)
Opposition*Democracy	2.129***	2.588***	2.596***
	(0.481)	(0.566)	(0.486)
GDP Growth	-0.009	-0.068***	0.044
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.029)
Female	-0.047	-0.033	-0.125***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.035)
Age	-0.002	0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.010	0.016	0.034**
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Bolivia	0.073	-1.122	0.001
	(0.164)	(0.337)	(0.286)
Chile	0.231	0.605	0.768
	(0.157)	(0.209)	(0.295)
Colombia	0.960	0.176	0.586
	(0.203)	(0.257)	(0.401)
Costa Rica	0.064	0.145	0.312
	(0.169)	(0.218)	(0.303)
Ecuador	0.147	-0.809	-0.020

	(0.179)	(0.221)	(0.332)
El Salvador	0.680	-0.257	0.023
	(0.172)	(0.232)	(0.386)
Guatemala	0.669	0.267	0.671
	(0.185)	(0.234)	(0.370)
Honduras	0.935	-0.160	0.207
	(0.244)	(0.285)	(0.378)
Mexico	0.347	0.135	-0.103
	(0.148)	(0.199)	(0.325)
Nicaragua	0.688	-0.656	-0.090
	(0.300)	(0.304)	(0.378)
Panamá	0.360	0.596	0.921
	(0.161)	(0.196)	(0.364)
Paraguay	0.541	0.529	0.415
	(0.203)	(0.252)	(0.369)
Perú	0.196	0.427	-0.576
	(0.156)	(0.217)	(0.358)
Rep. Dom	0.627	-0.044	-0.500
	(0.215)	(0.237)	(0.337)
Uruguay	0.516	0.758	0.855
	(0.183)	(0.230)	(0.338)
Venezuela	0.432	-1.525	-0.462
	(0.384)	(0.528)	(0.404)
Brazil	0.187	-0.016	-0.050
	(0.162)	(0.216)	(0.354)
Constant	1.170	3.307	2.608
	(0.634)	(0.727)	(0.816)
Random-effects Parameters			
Country-Year: Opposition Party	0.227	0.381	0.242
Country-Year: residual	0.022	0.063	0.150
Level 1	0.385	0.562	0.818
N Country	18	18	18
N Country-Year	50	64	65
N Respondents	3,876	4,990	5,272
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses			
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed); significance tests for fixed effects omitted			

Table A8: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Mass Public with Country Fixed Effects

	Satisfaction with Democracy	Country is Democratic	Trust in Elections	Trust in Election Agency
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]

Level of Democracy	-0.542	-1.133**	-0.101	-2.194**
	(0.313)	(0.372)	(0.947)	(0.758)
Voted for Losing Candidate	-0.734***	-0.974***	-2.861***	-2.478***
	(0.071)	(0.107)	(0.238)	(0.261)
Loser*Democracy	0.724***	1.037***	3.195***	2.827***
	(0.102)	(0.154)	(0.343)	(0.380)
Abstained	-0.313***	-0.466***	-1.414***	-0.983***
	(0.049)	(0.067)	(0.162)	(0.153)
Abstained*Democracy	0.228***	0.407***	1.122***	0.746***
	(0.070)	(0.097)	(0.234)	(0.223)
GDP Growth	0.019***	0.010*	0.031*	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Lives in Rural Area	0.068***	0.028***	0.252***	0.221***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Education	-0.006***	0.002*	0.004*	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wealth Quintile	-0.003*	0.004	-0.008	-0.007
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Female	-0.039***	-0.018***	-0.119***	-0.017
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Mestizo	-0.031***	0.001	-0.068***	-0.055***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Indigenous	-0.005	-0.010	-0.129***	-0.044
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Black	-0.035***	0.010	-0.149***	-0.026
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Mulatto	-0.040***	-0.016	-0.079**	-0.032
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Other Race	-0.036**	-0.027	-0.046	0.038
	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.041)
Age 26-35	-0.051***	-0.019*	-0.210***	-0.132***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Age 36-45	-0.051***	0.017*	-0.141***	-0.130***
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Age 46-55	-0.050***	0.006	-0.110***	-0.129***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Age 56-65	-0.035***	0.036***	0.015	-0.057**
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Age 66+	0.020*	0.071***	0.163***	0.014
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Guatemala	-0.077	-0.232	-0.222	-0.857
	(0.091)	(0.102)	(0.204)	(0.216)
El Salvador	0.045	-0.080	0.300	-0.598
	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.195)	(0.205)

Honduras	-0.058	-0.293	-0.262	-1.508
	(0.112)	(0.119)	(0.302)	(0.264)
Nicaragua	0.056	-0.197	0.884	-1.153
	(0.120)	(0.129)	(0.371)	(0.284)
Costa Rica	0.387	0.807	0.527	0.695
	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.300)	(0.286)
Panama	0.096	0.264	-0.093	-0.156
	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.219)	(0.231)
Colombia	-0.042	0.155	-0.315	-0.976
	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.195)	(0.247)
Ecuador	0.086	0.038	0.428	-1.015
	(0.088)	(0.095)	(0.196)	(0.215)
Bolivia	0.156	0.202	0.170	-0.675
	(0.092)	(0.104)	(0.195)	(0.216)
Peru	-0.090	0.038	-0.062	-0.600
	(0.096)	(0.108)	(0.212)	(0.237)
Paraguay	-0.154	-0.331	-0.125	-1.905
	(0.094)	(0.106)	(0.205)	(0.250)
Chile	0.202	0.363	0.752	0.512
	(0.109)	(0.122)	(0.282)	(0.275)
Uruguay	0.565	0.894	1.646	0.731
	(0.112)	(0.127)	(0.291)	(0.283)
Brazil	0.124	0.347	-0.447	-0.619
	(0.104)	(0.125)	(0.246)	(0.284)
Venezuela	0.233	0.300	1.427	-0.576
	(0.126)	(0.136)	(0.346)	(0.298)
Argentina	0.230	0.307	0.528	-0.898
	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.237)	(0.254)
Dominican Republic	0.016	0.358	-0.148	-0.231
	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.206)	(0.230)
Constant	1.849	2.422	3.915	6.255
	(0.217)	(0.259)	(0.630)	(0.534)
Random Effect				
Respondent (Level 1)	0.491	0.610	3.197	3.122
Country-Year (Level 2)	0.026	0.017	0.069	0.095
Country-Year: Voted for the Loser	0.029	0.043	0.212	0.298
Country-Year: Abstained	0.013	0.015	0.093	0.094
χ^2	1520.2***	672.1***	1575.5***	987.1***
N Country	18	18	18	18
N Country-Year	120	70	71	82
N Respondents	145,973	84,049	89373	109,618
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses				
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed); significance tests for fixed effects ommitted				

Appendix 7: Mass Survey Results Modeling Support for the President by Partisanship Instead of Previous Vote

In the models of mass-evaluations of democratic performance in the text, I focus on previous electoral support to measure presidential support both to mirror the large literature on the loser's consent (e.g. Anderson et al. 2005) and because partisanship is weak in many Latin American countries. In Table A9 I show that this specification choice is not driving the results by looking at whether those who self-identify with a party other than the president's or who don't have a partisan affiliation respond differently to the level of democracy than do those who self-identify with the president's party.

The top row confirms that there is no indicator of democratic evaluations that are positively correlated with the quality of democracy among presidential co-partisans. Just like those who voted for the president, those who self-identify with the party are just as satisfied with democracy and just as trusting of electoral agencies and processes when democracy is strong as when it is weak. The one difference from the results in Table 2 is that those who identify with the president's party are less likely to say their country is democratic when expert surveys say that democracy is strong; this is consistent with the results in Appendix 4 that model these variables as ordered variables.

Opposition partisans and independents, in contrast, are significantly more likely to be responsive to the level of democracy. In each case the interaction terms are significant and positive and for all the variables except the question about whether the country is a democracy, evaluations of democracy become significantly more positive when democracy improves for both independents and opposition partisans. These results confirm that the partisan rationalization of democratic failures among election winners is not dependent upon how support for the president is operationalized.

Table A9: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Mass Public by Partisanship

	Satisfaction with Democracy	Country is Democratic	Trust in Election Agency	Trust in Elections
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Level of Democracy	-0.220	-0.795*	-1.004	-0.261
	(0.205)	(0.315)	(0.629)	(0.644)
Opposition Partisan	-0.749***	-0.953***	-2.606***	-3.236***
	(0.080)	(0.116)	(0.294)	(0.257)
Opposition*Democracy	0.657***	0.953***	2.864***	3.522***
	(0.114)	(0.167)	(0.428)	(0.373)
No Partisanship	-0.543***	-0.743***	-1.814***	-2.234***
	(0.061)	(0.086)	(0.194)	(0.179)
No Party*Democracy	0.403***	0.668***	1.677***	1.857***
	(0.087)	(0.124)	(0.282)	(0.262)
GDP Growth Rate	0.010	0.002	-0.027*	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.014)

Lives in a Rural Area	0.069***	0.033***	0.220***	0.249***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Education	-0.008***	0.000	-0.004**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Wealth Quintile	-0.005***	0.002	-0.011**	-0.013**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	-0.034***	-0.014**	-0.004	-0.102***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Mestizo	-0.032***	0.000	-0.054***	-0.066***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Indigenous	-0.007	-0.010	-0.030	-0.121***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Black	-0.040***	-0.002	-0.044	-0.165***
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Mulatto	-0.037***	-0.023	-0.025	-0.073*
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Other Race	-0.034**	-0.031	0.016	-0.072*
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Age 26-35	-0.041***	-0.002	-0.084***	-0.133***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Age 36-45	-0.043***	0.027***	-0.101***	-0.079***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Age 46-55	-0.043***	0.021*	-0.084***	-0.035
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Age 56-65	-0.035***	0.032**	-0.034	0.074***
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Age 66+	0.014	0.060***	0.022	0.209***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Intercept	1.895	2.501	5.255	4.777
	(0.142)	(0.223)	(0.439)	(0.440)
Random Effect				
Country (Level 3)	0.024	0.084	0.256	0.281
Country-Year (Level 2)	0.025	0.019	0.132	0.075
Country-Year: No Partisanship	0.033	0.047	0.362	0.231
Country-Year: Opposition Partisan	0.020	0.027	0.155	0.111
Respondent (Level 1)	0.489	0.609	3.114	3.168
χ^2	1871.0***	439.7***	901.4***	1589.1***
N Respondents	160,660	90,484	119,444	101,242
N Country-Year	120	70	82	71
N Country	18	18	18	18
Multilevel Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses				
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two tailed)				

Appendix 8: Results Dropping on Country at a Time

The models in Table 1 and Table 2 are based on all available cases. This raises the possibility that one outlier case is driving the results. In Table A10 and Table A11 below, I report partial results from the PELA and Lapop data respectively, sequentially dropping on case at a time. I present only the results for the polyarchy data and its interactions because those are the variables where my main theoretical interest lies.

The results in Table A10 and Table A11 are largely consistent with those in the main text. In particular, in no case does dropping a case change the significance tests regarding the effect of democracy on winners (it remains insignificant in every model), the gap between presidential voters/co-partisans and non-presidential supporters (in every case it remains negative and significant), or the positive interactive relationship between non-supporting the president and support for democracy. Dropping Nicaragua from the PELA elite sample or Venezuela from the Lapop mass sample reduces the size of these gaps, but not substantially (they remain significantly different from 0). The one result that does seem to be country specific is with regards to abstainers-the differential response of winner and abstainers to the level of democracy is not significant at conventional levels for two of the four dependent variables when Venezuela is excluded. Yet the main pattern of the data showing that winners and losers differ in how they respond to democracy when evaluating its current performance is not being driven by a single country.

Table A10: Specific Support for Democracy Among Legislative Elites, Dropping One Country at a Time

		Democratic Satisfaction (SE)		Confidence Electoral Agency (SE)		Confidence in Last Election (SE)	
Drop Argentina	Loser	-2.102***	(0.321)	-2.367***	(0.395)	-2.447***	(0.336)
	Polyarchy	-0.433	(0.327)	0.123	(0.462)	0.299	(0.562)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.292***	(0.462)	2.694***	(0.564)	2.630***	(0.478)
Drop Bolivia	Loser	-1.958***	(0.307)	-2.268***	(0.372)	-2.578***	(0.339)
	Polyarchy	-0.327	(0.311)	0.158	(0.442)	0.189	(0.584)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.090***	(0.438)	2.559***	(0.526)	2.882***	(0.488)
Drop Brazil	Loser	-2.010***	(0.331)	-2.260***	(0.399)	-2.496***	(0.335)
	Polyarchy	-0.301	(0.323)	0.654	(0.391)	0.117	(0.543)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.100***	(0.479)	2.495***	(0.572)	2.689***	(0.478)
Drop Chile	Loser	-1.972***	(0.340)	-2.273***	(0.409)	-2.457***	(0.344)
	Polyarchy	-0.302	(0.337)	0.017	(0.485)	0.423	(0.586)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.038***	(0.496)	2.516***	(0.590)	2.599***	(0.492)
Drop Colombia	Loser	-2.158***	(0.321)	-2.397***	(0.396)	-2.462***	(0.360)
	Polyarchy	-0.388	(0.322)	0.159	(0.459)	0.143	(0.582)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.273***	(0.455)	2.691***	(0.557)	2.656***	(0.522)
Drop Costa Rica	Loser	-2.206***	(0.338)	-2.658***	(0.397)	-2.544***	(0.347)
	Polyarchy	-0.593	(0.334)	-0.131	(0.464)	0.345	(0.582)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.439***	(0.494)	3.173***	(0.575)	2.747***	(0.490)

Drop Dominican Republic	Loser	-2.055***	(0.331)	-2.314***	(0.392)	-2.492***	(0.348)
	Polyarchy	-0.407	(0.330)	0.142	(0.461)	0.710	(0.572)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.164***	(0.470)	2.584***	(0.550)	2.706***	(0.494)
Drop Ecuador	Loser	-1.938***	(0.315)	-2.172***	(0.364)	-2.595***	(0.350)
	Polyarchy	-0.348	(0.307)	0.153	(0.446)	0.137	(0.595)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.062***	(0.448)	2.471***	(0.512)	2.877***	(0.509)
Drop El Salvador	Loser	-2.138***	(0.288)	-2.451***	(0.356)	-2.443***	(0.342)
	Polyarchy	-0.381	(0.285)	0.009	(0.424)	0.300	(0.573)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.236***	(0.409)	2.746***	(0.499)	2.618***	(0.488)
Drop Guatemala	Loser	-2.148***	(0.320)	-2.526***	(0.396)	-2.138***	(0.350)
	Polyarchy	-0.438	(0.301)	0.074	(0.464)	0.469	(0.591)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.262***	(0.454)	2.831***	(0.554)	2.251***	(0.490)
Drop Honduras	Loser	-2.190***	(0.342)	-2.592***	(0.404)	-2.500***	(0.344)
	Polyarchy	-0.408	(0.335)	0.018	(0.441)	0.434	(0.582)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.334***	(0.482)	2.936***	(0.562)	2.683***	(0.484)
Drop Mexico	Loser	-2.050***	(0.330)	-2.329***	(0.397)	-2.584***	(0.357)
	Polyarchy	-0.375	(0.312)	0.156	(0.453)	0.203	(0.580)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.162***	(0.471)	2.613***	(0.560)	2.796***	(0.501)
Drop Nicaragua	Loser	-1.657***	(0.353)	-1.795***	(0.418)	-2.305***	(0.339)
	Polyarchy	0.064	(0.330)	0.839	(0.448)	0.410	(0.596)
	Loser*Polyarchy	1.637***	(0.494)	1.930***	(0.581)	2.420***	(0.479)
Drop Panama	Loser	-2.030***	(0.325)	-2.330***	(0.392)	-2.350***	(0.341)
	Polyarchy	-0.368	(0.317)	0.120	(0.433)	0.406	(0.581)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.133***	(0.467)	2.611***	(0.558)	2.521***	(0.483)
Drop Paraguay	Loser	-2.050***	(0.326)	-2.453***	(0.381)	-2.422***	(0.338)
	Polyarchy	-0.383	(0.318)	0.065	(0.451)	0.264	(0.567)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.160***	(0.465)	2.741***	(0.536)	2.576***	(0.482)
Drop Peru	Loser	-2.031***	(0.328)	-2.325***	(0.390)	-2.500***	(0.346)
	Polyarchy	-0.332	(0.313)	0.139	(0.453)	0.196	(0.582)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.134***	(0.472)	2.596***	(0.554)	2.685***	(0.488)
Drop Uruguay	Loser	-2.079***	(0.334)	-2.335***	(0.404)	-2.340***	(0.342)
	Polyarchy	-0.608	(0.305)	-0.073	(0.460)	0.318	(0.569)
	Loser*Polyarchy	2.221***	(0.484)	2.627***	(0.580)	2.481***	(0.484)
Drop Venezuela	Loser	-1.841***	(0.337)	-2.150***	(0.402)	-2.483***	(0.355)
	Polyarchy	-0.284	(0.325)	0.180	(0.458)	0.057	(0.555)
	Loser*Polyarchy	1.888***	(0.478)	2.378***	(0.566)	2.697***	(0.512)
Partial Results from Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001							

Table A11: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Mass Public, Dropping One Country at a Time

		Democratic Satisfaction (SE)		Country is Democratic (SE)		Confidence in Elections (SE)		Confidence in Election Agencies (SE)	
Drop Argentina	Loser	-0.743***	(0.072)	-0.980***	(0.109)	-2.886***	(0.243)	-2.489***	(0.264)
	Polyarchy	-0.128	(0.200)	-0.349	(0.307)	0.023	(0.682)	-0.565	(0.610)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.747***	(0.104)	1.054***	(0.157)	3.256***	(0.353)	2.853***	(0.387)
	Abstainer	-0.319***	(0.050)	-0.469***	(0.068)	-1.420***	(0.168)	-0.980***	(0.154)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.243***	(0.072)	0.418***	(0.098)	1.133***	(0.245)	0.732***	(0.226)
Drop Bolivia	Loser	-0.729***	(0.070)	-0.978***	(0.104)	-2.840***	(0.241)	-2.464***	(0.265)
	Polyarchy	-0.163	(0.198)	-0.409	(0.303)	-0.046	(0.681)	-0.872	(0.632)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.732***	(0.100)	1.058***	(0.150)	3.193***	(0.347)	2.815***	(0.385)
	Abstainer	-0.311***	(0.049)	-0.466***	(0.067)	-1.414***	(0.167)	-0.979***	(0.155)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.232***	(0.070)	0.415***	(0.097)	1.135***	(0.241)	0.737***	(0.227)
Drop Brazil	Loser	-0.732***	(0.074)	-0.978***	(0.111)	-2.885***	(0.247)	-2.508***	(0.271)
	Polyarchy	-0.200	(0.205)	-0.353	(0.315)	0.123	(0.674)	-0.416	(0.632)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.719***	(0.107)	1.044***	(0.162)	3.231***	(0.360)	2.881***	(0.400)
	Abstainer	-0.310***	(0.051)	-0.453***	(0.069)	-1.406***	(0.168)	-0.993***	(0.158)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.222**	(0.073)	0.382***	(0.101)	1.100***	(0.245)	0.762***	(0.234)
Drop Chile	Loser	-0.773***	(0.074)	-1.009***	(0.112)	-2.916***	(0.251)	-2.558***	(0.274)
	Polyarchy	-0.148	(0.207)	-0.354	(0.316)	-0.221	(0.686)	-0.748	(0.632)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.796***	(0.108)	1.102***	(0.164)	3.299***	(0.368)	2.977***	(0.407)
	Abstainer	-0.332***	(0.051)	-0.477***	(0.071)	-1.471***	(0.169)	-1.063***	(0.158)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.261***	(0.075)	0.428***	(0.104)	1.222***	(0.249)	0.890***	(0.234)
Drop Colombia	Loser	-0.742***	(0.074)	-0.989***	(0.112)	-2.885***	(0.242)	-2.569***	(0.267)
	Polyarchy	-0.056	(0.199)	-0.279	(0.315)	-0.058	(0.662)	-0.507	(0.636)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.731***	(0.105)	1.051***	(0.159)	3.207***	(0.347)	2.923***	(0.385)
	Abstainer	-0.316***	(0.051)	-0.461***	(0.070)	-1.424***	(0.166)	-1.022***	(0.158)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.231***	(0.073)	0.400***	(0.100)	1.132***	(0.239)	0.785***	(0.228)
Drop Costa Rica	Loser	-0.744***	(0.076)	-1.022***	(0.113)	-2.907***	(0.252)	-2.639***	(0.271)
	Polyarchy	-0.235	(0.201)	-0.477	(0.303)	-0.104	(0.707)	-0.826	(0.628)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.744***	(0.111)	1.122***	(0.166)	3.283***	(0.371)	3.118***	(0.402)

	Abstainer	-0.340***	(0.052)	-0.524***	(0.067)	-1.488***	(0.171)	-1.158***	(0.150)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.272***	(0.076)	0.509***	(0.099)	1.236***	(0.252)	1.045***	(0.223)
Drop Dominican Republic	Loser	-0.740***	(0.074)	-0.980***	(0.110)	-2.807***	(0.242)	-2.457***	(0.263)
	Polyarchy	-0.185	(0.202)	-0.281	(0.305)	-0.349	(0.674)	-0.668	(0.617)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.729***	(0.105)	1.038***	(0.157)	3.143***	(0.346)	2.822***	(0.382)
	Abstainer	-0.325***	(0.050)	-0.468***	(0.068)	-1.451***	(0.164)	-0.986***	(0.155)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.241***	(0.071)	0.406***	(0.099)	1.162***	(0.235)	0.748***	(0.226)
Drop Ecuador	Loser	-0.730***	(0.073)	-0.968***	(0.110)	-2.873***	(0.246)	-2.469***	(0.270)
	Polyarchy	-0.040	(0.197)	-0.165	(0.306)	0.059	(0.680)	-0.108	(0.594)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.716***	(0.104)	1.021***	(0.158)	3.202***	(0.353)	2.803***	(0.392)
	Abstainer	-0.310***	(0.049)	-0.458***	(0.068)	-1.427***	(0.167)	-0.971***	(0.156)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.224***	(0.071)	0.394***	(0.098)	1.140***	(0.240)	0.722**	(0.228)
Drop El Salvador	Loser	-0.740***	(0.072)	-0.984***	(0.106)	-2.905***	(0.228)	-2.493***	(0.246)
	Polyarchy	-0.113	(0.200)	-0.326	(0.308)	-0.053	(0.663)	-0.713	(0.632)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.728***	(0.103)	1.044***	(0.151)	3.236***	(0.328)	2.844***	(0.356)
	Abstainer	-0.320***	(0.050)	-0.480***	(0.067)	-1.432***	(0.161)	-0.997***	(0.151)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.234***	(0.071)	0.421***	(0.096)	1.142***	(0.232)	0.772***	(0.219)
Drop Guatemala	Loser	-0.769***	(0.072)	-1.005***	(0.108)	-2.988***	(0.231)	-2.583***	(0.265)
	Polyarchy	-0.125	(0.197)	-0.311	(0.302)	-0.074	(0.686)	-0.629	(0.646)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.759***	(0.101)	1.065***	(0.155)	3.318***	(0.330)	2.923***	(0.382)
	Abstainer	-0.342***	(0.048)	-0.488***	(0.066)	-1.470***	(0.161)	-1.007***	(0.158)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.256***	(0.068)	0.426***	(0.094)	1.175***	(0.231)	0.764***	(0.228)
Drop Honduras	Loser	-0.829***	(0.076)	-1.075***	(0.109)	-3.068***	(0.255)	-2.815***	(0.274)
	Polyarchy	-0.151	(0.210)	-0.422	(0.308)	-0.239	(0.694)	-0.646	(0.639)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.844***	(0.106)	1.161***	(0.154)	3.455***	(0.360)	3.244***	(0.390)
	Abstainer	-0.341***	(0.054)	-0.498***	(0.070)	-1.428***	(0.181)	-1.036***	(0.170)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.262***	(0.076)	0.446***	(0.100)	1.139***	(0.257)	0.808***	(0.243)
Drop Mexico	Loser	-0.738***	(0.073)	-0.983***	(0.109)	-2.874***	(0.246)	-2.486***	(0.265)
	Polyarchy	-0.133	(0.198)	-0.313	(0.307)	-0.096	(0.676)	-0.558	(0.617)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.725***	(0.104)	1.036***	(0.156)	3.202***	(0.353)	2.819***	(0.385)
	Abstainer	-0.315***	(0.050)	-0.469***	(0.067)	-1.415***	(0.167)	-0.986***	(0.153)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.228**	(0.072)	0.404***	(0.097)	1.127***	(0.240)	0.737***	(0.224)

Drop Nicaragua	Loser	-0.708***	(0.082)	-0.951***	(0.127)	-2.279***	(0.244)	-2.136***	(0.294)
	Polyarchy	0.037	(0.221)	0.025	(0.374)	0.335	(0.726)	0.075	(0.724)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.690***	(0.114)	1.003***	(0.178)	2.426***	(0.344)	2.363***	(0.418)
	Abstainer	-0.270***	(0.056)	-0.405***	(0.080)	-1.060***	(0.180)	-0.827***	(0.176)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.169*	(0.079)	0.331**	(0.112)	0.662**	(0.254)	0.542*	(0.251)
Drop Panama	Loser	-0.726***	(0.073)	-0.968***	(0.110)	-2.857***	(0.246)	-2.486***	(0.271)
	Polyarchy	-0.154	(0.196)	-0.537	(0.302)	0.063	(0.673)	-0.692	(0.632)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.708***	(0.105)	1.023***	(0.160)	3.183***	(0.356)	2.848***	(0.397)
	Abstainer	-0.306***	(0.049)	-0.458***	(0.068)	-1.407***	(0.167)	-0.983***	(0.157)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.210**	(0.071)	0.389***	(0.100)	1.109***	(0.243)	0.746***	(0.232)
Drop Paraguay	Loser	-0.752***	(0.072)	-0.996***	(0.107)	-2.919***	(0.238)	-2.534***	(0.259)
	Polyarchy	-0.137	(0.189)	-0.343	(0.280)	-0.072	(0.677)	-0.394	(0.556)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.742***	(0.103)	1.054***	(0.153)	3.249***	(0.340)	2.875***	(0.375)
	Abstainer	-0.329***	(0.049)	-0.486***	(0.064)	-1.471***	(0.161)	-1.016***	(0.150)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.244***	(0.070)	0.423***	(0.092)	1.176***	(0.231)	0.775***	(0.219)
Drop Peru	Loser	-0.726***	(0.072)	-0.970***	(0.109)	-2.833***	(0.240)	-2.469***	(0.267)
	Polyarchy	-0.073	(0.189)	-0.279	(0.305)	0.025	(0.676)	-0.635	(0.627)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.705***	(0.104)	1.029***	(0.158)	3.119***	(0.348)	2.806***	(0.392)
	Abstainer	-0.307***	(0.049)	-0.462***	(0.068)	-1.387***	(0.162)	-0.964***	(0.154)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.214**	(0.071)	0.398***	(0.098)	1.058***	(0.235)	0.706***	(0.226)
Drop Uruguay	Loser	-0.779***	(0.074)	-0.996***	(0.114)	-2.951***	(0.248)	-2.445***	(0.278)
	Polyarchy	-0.249	(0.175)	-0.443	(0.297)	-0.578	(0.600)	-0.839	(0.626)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.808***	(0.108)	1.079***	(0.168)	3.368***	(0.365)	2.772***	(0.412)
	Abstainer	-0.367***	(0.048)	-0.509***	(0.068)	-1.586***	(0.152)	-1.065***	(0.160)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.322***	(0.071)	0.480***	(0.101)	1.424***	(0.224)	0.872***	(0.238)
Drop Venezuela	Loser	-0.485***	(0.062)	-0.619***	(0.094)	-2.731***	(0.264)	-1.885***	(0.263)
	Polyarchy	0.102	(0.189)	0.042	(0.298)	0.471	(0.654)	-0.259	(0.640)
	Loser*Polyarchy	0.402***	(0.087)	0.580***	(0.132)	3.022***	(0.374)	2.054***	(0.374)
	Abstainer	-0.162***	(0.045)	-0.300***	(0.065)	-1.212***	(0.171)	-0.587***	(0.146)
	Abstainer*Polyarchy	0.029	(0.064)	0.193*	(0.092)	0.853***	(0.243)	0.226	(0.209)
Partial Results from Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001									

Appendix 9: Results Controlling for Per Capita GDP

Levels of democracy often reflect the level of development in a country, although this relationship is not as consistent in Latin America as it is on other regions (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2014). Thus, it is possible that the relationships described in the text reflect the level of development in the country more than they do the quality of democracy. In Tables A10 and A11 I add per capita GDP, taken from the World Economic Outlook database to the models reported in the text. While belief that their country is democratic and confidence in electoral institutions is higher among the mass public in countries where the government is wealthier, the other measures of specific support for democracy are not significantly correlated with the level of development. More importantly, the basic patterns documented in the text about how election winners differ in their response to fluctuations in election quality from election losers are not changed by the addition of this control.

Table A12: Specific Support for Democracy Among Parliamentary Elites, Controlling for Per Capita GDP

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Trust in the Election Agency		Confidence in Last Election	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Level of Democracy (V-Dem)	-0.551	-0.633	-0.618	-0.738	0.376	0.153
	(0.408)	(0.397)	(0.519)	(0.506)	(0.655)	(0.645)
Does Not Belong to the President's Party	-0.569***	-2.036***	-0.517***	-2.344***	-0.636***	-2.447***
	(0.082)	(0.318)	(0.093)	(0.380)	(0.082)	(0.336)
Not President Party*Level of Democracy		2.146***		2.643***		2.631***
		(0.455)		(0.537)		(0.478)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.004	-0.004	-0.034	-0.033	0.075**	0.071**
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Per Capita GDP	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.040	-0.041	-0.027	-0.027	-0.125***	-0.124***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.012	-0.012	0.017	0.017	0.034*	0.034**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	2.457	2.520	2.199	2.272	2.402	2.561
	(0.228)	(0.223)	(0.295)	(0.287)	(0.440)	(0.434)
Variance Components						
Country	0.013	0.012	0.030	0.026	0.149	0.145
Country-Year: Not President Party	0.303	0.202	0.499	0.354	0.375	0.242
Country-Year	0.062	0.058	0.114	0.111	0.136	0.131
Individual	0.385	0.385	0.562	0.562	0.817	0.817
χ^2	56.5***	99.5***	49.1***	84.4***	89.0***	147.3***
N Individuals	3,929	3,929	5,067	5,067	5,390	5,390
N Country-Years	50	50	64	64	65	65
N Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$ (two-tailed tests)						

Table A13: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Mass Public, Controlling for Per Capita GDP

	Satisfaction with Democracy	(SE)	Country is Democratic	(SE)	Confidence in Electoral Institutions	(SE)	Confidence in Elections	(SE)
	[1]		[2]		[3]		[4]	
Level of Democracy	-0.120	(0.207)	-0.590*	(0.284)	-0.916	(0.591)	-0.015	(0.711)
Voted for a Losing Candidate	-0.734***	(0.071)	-0.973***	(0.107)	-2.477***	(0.261)	-2.862***	(0.238)
Losing Candidate*Democracy	0.725***	(0.102)	1.035***	(0.154)	2.825***	(0.380)	3.196***	(0.343)
Abstained	-0.313***	(0.049)	-0.465***	(0.067)	-0.981***	(0.153)	-1.414***	(0.162)
Abstained*Democracy	0.228***	(0.070)	0.405***	(0.096)	0.744***	(0.223)	1.124***	(0.234)
GDP Growth Rate	0.015**	(0.005)	0.006	(0.005)	-0.012	(0.012)	0.023	(0.015)
Per Capita GDP	-0.001	(0.001)	0.001***	(0.001)	0.001**	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)
Rural Area	0.068***	(0.004)	0.028***	(0.006)	0.221***	(0.013)	0.252***	(0.015)
Wealth Quintile	-0.003*	(0.001)	0.004	(0.002)	-0.007	(0.004)	-0.008	(0.005)
Female	-0.039***	(0.004)	-0.018***	(0.005)	-0.017	(0.011)	-0.119***	(0.012)
Education	-0.006***	(0.001)	0.002*	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.002)	0.004*	(0.002)
Age 26-35	-0.051***	(0.005)	-0.019*	(0.008)	-0.132***	(0.016)	-0.210***	(0.018)
Age 36-45	-0.051***	(0.006)	0.017*	(0.008)	-0.130***	(0.017)	-0.141***	(0.019)
Age 46-55	-0.050***	(0.006)	0.006	(0.009)	-0.129***	(0.019)	-0.110***	(0.021)
Age 56-65	-0.035***	(0.007)	0.036***	(0.011)	-0.057**	(0.022)	0.015	(0.024)
Age 66+	0.020*	(0.008)	0.071***	(0.012)	0.014	(0.025)	0.163***	(0.026)
Mestizo	-0.031***	(0.005)	0.000	(0.007)	-0.056***	(0.014)	-0.068***	(0.016)
Indigenous	-0.005	(0.009)	-0.011	(0.013)	-0.044	(0.025)	-0.130***	(0.027)
Black	-0.035***	(0.010)	0.010	(0.015)	-0.027	(0.029)	-0.150***	(0.030)
Mulatto	-0.040***	(0.010)	-0.016	(0.016)	-0.032	(0.031)	-0.080**	(0.031)
Other Race	-0.036**	(0.013)	-0.027	(0.022)	0.038	(0.041)	-0.046	(0.038)
Constant	1.675***	(0.137)	1.810***	(0.196)	4.184***	(0.415)	4.192***	(0.467)
Variance Components								
Individual Level	0.491	(0.002)	0.610	(0.003)	3.122	(0.013)	3.197	(0.015)

Country-Year Level	0.031	(0.005)	0.021	(0.005)	0.123	(0.023)	0.094	(0.020)
Voted for a Loser	0.029	(0.004)	0.043	(0.008)	0.297	(0.049)	0.212	(0.039)
Voted for an Abstainer	0.012	(0.002)	0.015	(0.003)	0.094	(0.017)	0.093	(0.018)
Country Level	0.018	(0.009)	0.046	(0.018)	0.208	(0.087)	0.303	(0.121)
N Individuals	145,973		84,049		109618		89,373	
N Country-Years	120		70		82		71	
N Countries	18		18		18		18	
χ2	1425.59***		429.02***		805.89***		1289.78***	
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)								

Appendix 10: Results Controlling for Polarization

The text focuses on how winners and losers respond to the extent of democracy when evaluating the state of democracy in their country. Recent work has suggested that tolerance for undemocratic actions by their "side" increases in polarized party systems where the risks of the other side gaining power are perceived to be greater (e.g. Singer 2018, Svolik 2019). This raises the question of whether views of democracy are also clouded by the level of polarization. In particular, do electoral losers (winners) report lesser (greater) satisfaction and confidence when their rivals for power are ideologically distinct? To test this, in Tables A12 and A13 I interact winning-losing status with a measure of ideological polarization developed by Singer (2016), which codes the degree to which parties in Latin American legislatures are ideologically distinct. Previous work has shown that this measure affects a wide range of voting behaviors (e.g. Carlin et al. 2015, Singer 2016). I include this interaction term with and without the interaction between election status and democratic quality to ensure that multicollinearity does not change the results. Because this data does not exist for some Latin American countries, the mass sample sizes are smaller than those in Table 2 in the text.

The addition of the control for polarization and its interaction makes one small change to the results reported in the text; abstainers do not differ from winners in how the level of democracy correlates with evaluations that their country is democratic, but all the other main conclusions remain the same as in the text. More interestingly, there is no evidence that specific support for democracy correlates with the level of polarization in a given country nor that it exacerbates the gap between election winners and election losers. The implication is that losing to an ideologically distant rival does not necessarily lead respondents to believe that democracy is flawed, even if other work suggests that it does lead them to be more likely to justify a deviation from democracy in the future. Polarization in Latin America at least does not cloud judgement about actual performance in the past of democracy but it can motivate the public to undermine it in the future.

While these results do not change the substantive results presented in the text, the apparent non-effect of polarization merits further research.

Table A14: Specific Support for Democracy Among Latin American Elites, Controlling for Polarization

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Trust in the Election Agency		Confidence in Last Election	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Level of Democracy (V-Dem)	-0.287	-0.388	0.203	0.087	0.553	0.329
	(0.318)	(0.310)	(0.449)	(0.437)	(0.565)	(0.558)
Does Not Belong to the President's Party	-0.496**	-2.060***	-0.232	-2.099***	-0.401*	-2.273***
	(0.171)	(0.363)	(0.188)	(0.437)	(0.167)	(0.380)
Not President Party*Level of Democracy		2.157***		2.505***		2.552***
		(0.460)		(0.544)		(0.483)
Polarization	-0.030	-0.031	-0.101	-0.106	0.100	0.090
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.122)	(0.120)
Polarization*Level of Democracy	-0.050	0.012	-0.210	-0.111	-0.188	-0.096
	(0.105)	(0.089)	(0.119)	(0.106)	(0.116)	(0.099)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.011	-0.010	-0.052**	-0.052**	0.079**	0.075**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Female	-0.040	-0.040	-0.027	-0.027	-0.124***	-0.124***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.012	-0.012	0.017	0.017	0.034**	0.035**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	2.482	2.548	2.335	2.411	2.254	2.428
	(0.257)	(0.251)	(0.361)	(0.351)	(0.468)	(0.461)
Variance Components						
Country	0.011	0.010	0.037	0.031	0.144	0.141
Country-Year: Not President Party	0.301	0.202	0.473	0.347	0.360	0.239
Country-Year	0.065	0.061	0.125	0.124	0.136	0.130
Individual	0.385	0.385	0.562	0.562	0.817	0.817
χ^2	56.2***	99.0***	46.3***	78.6***	94.0***	149.8***

N Individuals	3,929	3,929	5,067	5,067	5,390	5,390
N Country-Years	50	50	64	64	65	65
N Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$ (two-tailed tests)						

Table A15: Specific Support for Democracy Among Mass Public, Controlling for Polarization

	Satisfaction with Democracy			Country is Democratic		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Level of Democracy	0.101	0.124	0.103	0.115	0.156	0.116
	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.277)	(0.279)	(0.277)
Voted for Losing Candidate	-0.513***	-0.169***	-0.484***	-0.721***	-0.152**	-0.669***
	(0.061)	(0.031)	(0.068)	(0.095)	(0.052)	(0.110)
Loser*Level of Democracy	0.449***		0.441***	0.715***		0.693***
	(0.087)		(0.087)	(0.133)		(0.135)
Abstained	-0.199***	-0.116***	-0.171***	-0.342***	-0.157***	-0.343***
	(0.047)	(0.022)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.032)	(0.075)
Abstained*Level of Democracy	0.084		0.077	0.249**		0.249**
	(0.067)		(0.067)	(0.090)		(0.092)
Polarization	-0.013	-0.010	-0.010	-0.059	-0.055	-0.058
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Loser*Polarization		-0.025	-0.017		-0.053	-0.026
		(0.020)	(0.018)		(0.033)	(0.029)
Abstained*Polarization		-0.018	-0.016		-0.010	0.000
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.020)	(0.020)
GDP Growth	0.008	0.008	0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Rural	0.064***	0.064***	0.064***	0.029***	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Wealth Quintile	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.017**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mestizo	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Indigenous	-0.012	-0.013	-0.012	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Black	-0.047***	-0.047***	-0.047***	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mulatto	-0.042***	-0.043***	-0.042***	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Other Race	-0.054***	-0.055***	-0.054***	-0.022	-0.022	-0.022
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Age 26-35	-0.047***	-0.047***	-0.047***	-0.020*	-0.020*	-0.020*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age 36-45	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***	0.015	0.015	0.015

	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age 46-55	-0.055***	-0.055***	-0.055***	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age 56-65	-0.039***	-0.039***	-0.039***	0.036***	0.036***	0.036***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age 66+	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.072***	0.072***	0.072***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	1.567	1.547	1.563	1.851	1.817	1.848
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.200)	(0.202)	(0.200)
Variance Component						
Country	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.038	0.039	0.038
Country-Year	0.033	0.033	0.032	0.025	0.025	0.025
Country-Year: Loser	0.016	0.020	0.016	0.026	0.037	0.026
Country-Year: Abstainer	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.011	0.012	0.011
Individual	0.484	0.484	0.484	0.608	0.608	0.608
χ^2	1253.1***	1185.4***	1259.3***	381.4***	312.3***	383.8***
Individuals	130,476	130,476	130,476	79,916	79,916	79,916
Country-Years	106	106	106	66	66	66
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)						

Table A15: Specific Support for Democracy Among Mass Public, Controlling for Polarization (Continued)

	Confidence in Elections			Confidence in Election Courts		
	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
Level of Democracy	0.254	0.350	0.253	-0.326	-0.273	-0.324
	(0.691)	(0.698)	(0.690)	(0.617)	(0.620)	(0.617)
Voted for Losing Candidate	-2.753***	-0.610**	-2.703***	-2.090***	-0.326**	-1.995***
	(0.265)	(0.197)	(0.292)	(0.261)	(0.147)	(0.299)
Loser*Level of Democracy	3.106***		3.104***	2.339***		2.301***
	(0.383)		(0.383)	(0.374)		(0.378)
Abstained	-1.382***	-0.485***	-1.229***	-0.756***	-0.402***	-0.723***
	(0.177)	(0.104)	(0.191)	(0.154)	(0.074)	(0.177)
Abstained*Level of Democracy	1.111***		1.105***	0.457*		0.443*
	(0.257)		(0.250)	(0.221)		(0.224)
Polarization	0.052	0.060	0.060	-0.068	-0.064	-0.065
	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Loser*Polarization		-0.042	-0.035		-0.119	-0.048
		(0.125)	(0.087)		(0.088)	(0.074)
Abstained*Polarization		-0.110	-0.107		-0.031	-0.017
		(0.066)	(0.057)		(0.045)	(0.044)
GDP Growth	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.027	-0.027	-0.027

	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Rural	0.261***	0.261***	0.261***	0.223***	0.223***	0.223***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wealth Quintile	-0.015**	-0.015**	-0.015**	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	-0.106***	-0.106***	-0.106***	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Mestizo	-0.080***	-0.080***	-0.080***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.057***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Indigenous	-0.153***	-0.153***	-0.153***	-0.055*	-0.055*	-0.055*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Black	-0.166***	-0.165***	-0.166***	-0.047	-0.047	-0.047
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Mulatto	-0.070*	-0.070*	-0.070*	-0.036	-0.037	-0.036
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Other Race	-0.052	-0.052	-0.052	0.024	0.024	0.024
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Age 26-35	-0.199***	-0.199***	-0.199***	-0.128***	-0.128***	-0.128***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age 36-45	-0.138***	-0.138***	-0.138***	-0.131***	-0.131***	-0.131***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Age 46-55	-0.128***	-0.128***	-0.128***	-0.125***	-0.125***	-0.125***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age 56-65	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.050*	-0.051*	-0.050*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Age 66+	0.136***	0.135***	0.135***	0.023	0.022	0.023
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Constant	3.980	3.903	3.969	4.573	4.532	4.568
	(0.508)	(0.513)	(0.508)	(0.454)	(0.456)	(0.454)
Variance Component						
Country	0.248	0.253	0.247	0.246	0.248	0.246
Country-Year	0.113	0.115	0.112	0.130	0.131	0.130
Country-Year: Loser	0.223	0.484	0.222	0.253	0.378	0.252
Country-Year: Abstainer	0.096	0.124	0.089	0.081	0.086	0.080
Individual	3.185	3.185	3.185	3.108	3.108	3.108
χ^2	1036.8***	864.2***	1054.1***	723.2***	654.7***	724.4***
Individuals	76808	76808	76808	103888	103888	103888
Country-Years	60	60	60	77	77	77
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18

Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses.
* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$ (two-tailed tests)

Appendix 11: Elite Survey Results Controlling for Governing Status by Non-Presidential Partisans

The results in the paper differentiate members of/voters for the president's party with all other people. However, coalition politics could potentially change these dynamics by creating a class of the public/elites that are not fully winners but are not actually losers either because they form part of the government. Extant scholarship on presidential politics has not looked if coalition politics changes the winner-loser gap. Thus, a question for the analysis in this paper is whether the president's coalition members ignore the declines in democratic quality or not.

Coding all parties as members of the president's coalition or not is outside of the scope of the present paper. However, we can begin to look at that question by using a question that was asked on a subset of PELA elite surveys about whether the MP considers themselves "part of the government or opposition." While nearly all of the president's co-partisans consider themselves government members, a substantial number of non-presidential parties also do. In Table A16 I break the non-presidential partisans into these two gaps and look at whether they differ in their response to changes in the level of democracy. Because this question is asked in only a subset of the surveys, I look only at two indicators of evaluations of democracy: satisfaction with democracy and trust in the election agency.

The results in Table A16 show that self-identified governmental elites who do not belong to the president's party do acknowledge when democracy is going badly more than members of the president's party do (although the interactive relationship is not quite significant at conventional levels in the analysis of democratic satisfaction in Model 2). As a result, in the weakest democracies, there is a significant gap between the president's party and those who support the government but do not belong to that party in terms of how democracy is seen. Yet the response of that group to changes in democracy is much smaller than is the response of members of opposition parties. Then even self-described opposition partisans continue to recognize when democracy improves. This again suggests that the dynamics of winning have a particular effect to create a blind eye among these individuals that the winner's self-perceived allies are not fully immune from but which they are not fully captured by either.

While this issue is beyond the scope of this initial paper, further work should explore it by coding more fully the coalition alignments at the country-level to see if these perceptions reflect coalition status and then looking at whether any effects of coalitions differs by institutional arrangements and also by extending this analysis of elites to the masses.

Table A16: Specific Support for Democracy Among Latin American Elites, Differentiating Among Non-Presidential Partisans

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Trust in the Election Agency	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Level of Democracy (V-Dem)	-0.252	-0.357	0.553	0.451
	(0.317)	(0.309)	(0.427)	(0.420)
Does Not Belong to the President's Party but Self-Describes as "Government"	-0.252**	-0.908*	-0.339**	-1.432**
	(0.087)	(0.378)	(0.121)	(0.512)

Self-Describes as "Opposition"	-0.630***	-2.137***	-0.673***	-2.674***
	(0.079)	(0.306)	(0.114)	(0.436)
Not President Government Party*Polity		1.020		1.671*
		(0.532)		(0.723)
Opposition Party*Polity		2.201***		2.931***
		(0.437)		(0.623)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.011	-0.010	-0.052**	-0.052**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Female	-0.045	-0.046	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.007	-0.008	0.022	0.021
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	2.413	2.477	1.964	2.023
	(0.225)	(0.220)	(0.304)	(0.299)
Variance Components				
Country	0.012	0.012	0.008	0.007
Country-Year: Not President Party	0.284	0.184	0.570	0.387
Country-Year	0.062	0.058	0.151	0.146
Individual	0.372	0.371	0.536	0.534
χ^2	147.5***	209.2***	85.4***	129.1***
N Individuals	3,696	3,696	3,487	3,487
N Country-Years	50	50	48	48
N Countries	18	18	18	18

Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses.
* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$ (two-tailed tests)

Appendix 12: Using Polity as the Democracy Measure Instead of V-Dem

The results in the text focus on the V-Dem measure of election quality. In order to demonstrate that the results are not contingent upon the choice of democracy measure, in Table A17 and A16 I model it using the POLITY2 indicator of democratic competition. The results are the same as those presented in the text. In no country are perceptions of democratic performance on average correlated with the level of democracy. For both the elites and the masses, this occurs because while losers/non-presidential partisans change their evaluations of democratic performance as the level of democracy changes, supporters of the president's party do not. Thus, the Polity results confirm those that were obtained using the V-Dem democracy measure.

Table A17: Specific Support for Democracy Among Latin American Legislative Elites, Measuring the Level of Democracy Using Polity Instead of V-Dem

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Trust in the Election Agency		Confidence in Last Election	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Polity Democracy Score	-0.046	-0.056	0.087	0.071	-0.007	-0.017
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Does Not Belong to the President's Party	-0.567***	-2.457***	-0.522***	-2.784***	-0.636***	-1.876***
	(0.082)	(0.382)	(0.092)	(0.484)	(0.082)	(0.355)
Not President Party*Polity		0.237***		0.282***		0.161***
		(0.047)		(0.059)		(0.045)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.006	-0.006	-0.054**	-0.053**	0.075**	0.073**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Female	-0.040	-0.040	-0.026	-0.026	-0.124***	-0.124***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Age	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.012	-0.012	0.017	0.017	0.034**	0.034**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	2.586	2.662	1.651	1.759	2.832	2.909
	(0.273)	(0.264)	(0.371)	(0.361)	(0.346)	(0.343)
Variance Components						
Country	0.012	0.011	0.023	0.019	0.178	0.171
Country-Year: Not President Party	0.303	0.191	0.495	0.355	0.379	0.310
Country-Year	0.062	0.058	0.134	0.129	0.131	0.128
Individual	0.385	0.386	0.562	0.562	0.817	0.817
χ^2	56.4***	106.0***	42.4***	75.9***	87.7***	112.1***
N Individuals	3,929	3,929	5,067	5,067	65	65
N Country-Years	50	50	64	64	5,390	5,390
N Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)						

Table A18: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Mass Public, Measuring the Level of Democracy Using Polity Instead of V-Dem

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Believes Country is Democratic		Confidence in the Electoral Court		Confidence in Elections	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Polity Score	-0.011	-0.014	-0.009	-0.013	-0.035	-0.040	-0.026	-0.029
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Loser	-0.240***	-0.668***	-0.274***	-0.880***	-0.592***	-1.901***	-0.713***	-1.741***
	(0.019)	(0.069)	(0.033)	(0.089)	(0.080)	(0.253)	(0.085)	(0.328)
Loser*Polity		0.054***		0.079***		0.170***		0.131***
		(0.008)		(0.011)		(0.032)		(0.040)
Abstainer	-0.158***	-0.328***	-0.192***	-0.457***	-0.486***	-0.939***	-0.660***	-0.920***
	(0.012)	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.133)	(0.045)	(0.186)
Abstainer*Polity		0.022***		0.034***		0.059***		0.033***
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.017)		(0.023)
GDP Growth Rate	0.016**	0.016**	0.006	0.006	-0.012	-0.012	0.022	0.022
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Rural	0.068***	0.068***	0.028***	0.028***	0.221***	0.221***	0.252***	0.252***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.002	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.003	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wealth Quintile	-0.003*	-0.003*	0.004	0.004	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.017	-0.017	-0.119***	-0.119***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Mestizo	-0.031***	-0.032***	0.000	0.000	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.068***	-0.068***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Indigenous	-0.005	-0.005	-0.011	-0.011	-0.044	-0.044	-0.130***	-0.130***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Black	-0.035***	-0.035***	0.010	0.010	-0.027	-0.027	-0.149***	-0.150***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)

Mulatto	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.017	-0.017	-0.033	-0.033	-0.080**	-0.080**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Other Race	-0.036**	-0.036**	-0.027	-0.028	0.038	0.038	-0.046	-0.046
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Age 26-35	-0.051***	-0.051***	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.210***	-0.210***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Age 36-45	-0.051***	-0.051***	0.017*	0.017*	-0.130***	-0.130***	-0.141***	-0.141***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age 46-55	-0.050***	-0.050***	0.006	0.006	-0.129***	-0.129***	-0.110***	-0.110***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age 56-65	-0.035***	-0.035***	0.036***	0.036***	-0.057**	-0.057**	0.015	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age 66+	0.020*	0.020*	0.071***	0.072***	0.014	0.015	0.163***	0.163***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Constant	1.677	1.700	1.893	1.924	4.508	4.546	4.351	4.373
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.296)	(0.296)	(0.354)	(0.354)
Variance Components								
Country	0.018	0.017	0.056	0.055	0.253	0.252	0.300	0.299
Country-Year: Loser	0.042	0.031	0.072	0.041	0.506	0.370	0.492	0.427
Country-Year: Abstainer	0.014	0.012	0.020	0.014	0.109	0.093	0.129	0.125
Country-Year	0.031	0.031	0.026	0.026	0.134	0.133	0.096	0.096
Individual-Level	0.491	0.491	0.610	0.610	3.122	3.122	3.197	3.197
χ^2	1289.2***	1409.4***	289.1***	440.0***	680.2***	758.8***	1041.9***	1069.3***
N Individuals	145,973	145,973	84049	84049	109,618	109,618	89,373	89,373
N Country Years	120	120	70	70	82	82	71	71
N Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)								

Appendix 13: Election Integrity/Cleanliness

As an additional robustness test, I use an indicator of election quality developed by the V-dem team. This indicator asks the experts to score whether the election was sufficiently free that the results match the public's preferences or not. The results are the same as those presented in the text for the more extensive democracy battery. In no country are perceptions of democratic performance on average correlated with election cleanliness. For both the elites and the masses, this occurs because while losers/non-presidential partisans change their evaluations of democracy as the cleanliness of elections changes, respecting elections that are clean and voicing frustration when they are not, supporters of the president's party do not have their opinions reflect how clean the election was.

Table A19: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Legislative Elites, Measuring the Level of Democracy Using the Quality of the Last-Election Instead of a General Measure of Polyarchy

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Trust in the Election Agency		Confidence in Last Election	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Election Quality Last Election	-0.019	-0.032	0.064	0.050	0.116	0.077
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.101)	(0.100)
Does Not Belong to the President's Party	-0.568***	-0.858***	-0.522***	-0.913***	-0.637***	-1.162***
	(0.081)	(0.112)	(0.093)	(0.132)	(0.082)	(0.113)
Not President Party*Election Quality		0.273***		0.361***		0.479***
		(0.080)		(0.094)		(0.083)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.011	-0.011	-0.047*	-0.046*	0.074**	0.071**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Female	-0.040	-0.040	-0.027	-0.027	-0.124***	-0.124***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.012	-0.012	0.017	0.017	0.034	0.034
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	2.266	2.278	2.248	2.254	2.648*	2.699**
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.207)	(0.204)
Variance Components						
Country	0.010	0.009	0.033	0.029	0.156	0.155
Country-Year: Not President Party	0.300	0.239	0.499	0.401	0.372	0.233
Country-Year	0.067	0.065	0.132	0.130	0.133	0.126
Individual	0.385	0.385	0.562	0.562	0.817	0.817
χ^2	55.1***	78.0***	40.0***	61.4***	89.8***	154.0***
N Individuals	3,929	3,929	5,067	5,067	5,390	5,390
N Country-Years	50	50	64	64	65	65
N Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$ (two-tailed tests)						

Table A20: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Mass Public Measuring the Level of Democracy Using the Quality of the Last-Election Instead of a General Measure of Polyarchy

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Country is Democratic		Confidence in Electoral Court		Confidence in Elections	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Election Quality Last Election	0.025	0.022	0.023	0.017	0.057	0.050	0.117	0.104
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Voted for Election Loser	-0.240***	-0.334***	-0.274***	-0.419***	-0.591***	-0.958***	-0.713***	-1.161***
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.080)	(0.100)	(0.085)	(0.095)
Loser*Election Quality		0.089***		0.138***		0.375***		0.441***
		(0.019)		(0.031)		(0.073)		(0.066)
Abstainer	-0.158***	-0.177***	-0.192***	-0.246***	-0.486***	-0.556***	-0.660***	-0.788***
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.060)
Abstainer*Election Quality		0.018		0.052**		0.072		0.128**
		(0.012)		(0.018)		(0.040)		(0.042)
GDP Growth	0.014**	0.014**	0.005	0.005	-0.015	-0.015	0.023	0.023
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Rural	0.068***	0.068***	0.028***	0.028***	0.221***	0.221***	0.252***	0.252***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.002*	0.002*	-0.001	-0.001	0.003*	0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wealth Quintile	-0.003*	-0.003*	0.004	0.004	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.017	-0.017	-0.119***	-0.119***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Mestizo	-0.031***	-0.031***	0.000	0.000	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.067***	-0.068***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Indigenous	-0.005	-0.005	-0.011	-0.011	-0.044	-0.044	-0.129***	-0.130***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Black	-0.035***	-0.035***	0.010	0.010	-0.027	-0.027	-0.149***	-0.149***

	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Mulatto	-0.041***	-0.040***	-0.017	-0.016	-0.033	-0.033	-0.080**	-0.080**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Other Race	-0.036**	-0.036**	-0.027	-0.027	0.038	0.038	-0.045	-0.045
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Age 26-35	-0.051***	-0.051***	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.210***	-0.210***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Age 36-45	-0.051***	-0.051***	0.017*	0.017*	-0.130***	-0.130***	-0.141***	-0.141***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age 46-55	-0.050***	-0.050***	0.006	0.006	-0.129***	-0.129***	-0.110***	-0.110***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age 56-65	-0.035***	-0.035***	0.036***	0.036***	-0.057**	-0.057**	0.015	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age 66+	0.020*	0.020*	0.071***	0.071***	0.014	0.014	0.163***	0.163***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Constant	1.568	1.571	1.801	1.807	4.190	4.197	4.032	4.044
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.167)	(0.166)
Variance Components								
Country	0.017	0.016	0.053	0.053	0.221	0.219	0.303	0.299
Country-Year: Loser	0.042	0.035	0.072	0.056	0.506	0.381	0.491	0.296
Country-Year: Abstainer	0.014	0.013	0.020	0.017	0.109	0.103	0.129	0.112
Country-Year	0.031	0.031	0.026	0.026	0.140	0.139	0.093	0.092
Individual	0.491	0.491	0.610	0.610	3.122	3.122	3.197	3.197
χ^2	1289.7***	1346.2***	289.4***	346.5***	679.6***	730.8***	1044.0***	1163.7***
N Individuals	145,973	145,973	84,049	84,049	109,618	109,618	89,373	89,373
N Country-Years	120	120	70	70	82	82	71	71
N Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)								

Appendix 14: Controlling for Less Exogenous Controls, LAPOP Data

In the analysis in the paper, I control for government performance using the growth rate at the time of the survey because it is exogenous to the citizens' preferences. However, the individual-level surveys ask them questions about how the economy is doing, whether they feel safe in their neighborhood, and the level of corruption in the country that might tap into democratic support but which might also be endogenous to the respondents' baseline levels of support for the incumbent. To ensure that the results are robust to the specification choice and do not reflect by choice of controls, I add those three variables along with a measure of interpersonal trust that previous work has suggested might make people also more likely to trust political institutions and the democratic status quo. The results in Table A21 below show that the basic results don't change with these controls: winners remain much more positive about the level of democracy and about elections and election institutions when democracy is weak than are those who abstained or who voted for a losing candidate. Nor do those who voted for the president express lower levels of satisfaction or trust in democracy or elections when democracy is weak than when it is strong.

Table A21: Specific Support for Democracy Among the Mass Public Measuring the Level of Democracy Controlling for Individual-Level Perceptions of Government Performance

	Satisfaction with Democracy		Believes Country is Democratic		Trust Election Agency		Trust Elections	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Polyarchy	-0.058	-0.089	-0.235	-0.295	-0.310	-0.382	0.502	0.367
	(0.169)	(0.168)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.583)	(0.580)	(0.604)	(0.594)
Voted for a Losing	-0.188***	-0.596***	-0.209***	-0.749***	-0.434***	-1.920***	-0.588***	-2.398***
Candidate	(0.019)	(0.075)	(0.028)	(0.109)	(0.069)	(0.266)	(0.085)	(0.274)
Loser*Polyarchy		0.601***		0.785***		2.186***		2.718***
		(0.108)		(0.154)		(0.381)		(0.399)
Abstained	-0.125***	-0.243***	-0.153***	-0.387***	-0.398***	-0.772***	-0.578***	-1.255***
	(0.012)	(0.050)	(0.017)	(0.068)	(0.036)	(0.155)	(0.050)	(0.189)
Abstained*Polyarchy		0.174*		0.342***		0.552*		1.022***
		(0.072)		(0.098)		(0.223)		(0.277)
Change in National	0.144***	0.144***	0.131***	0.131***	0.269***	0.269***	0.351***	0.351***
Economy	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Feels Safe in Neighborhood	0.073***	0.073***	0.045***	0.045***	0.114***	0.114***	0.134***	0.134***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Corruption is Rare	0.063***	0.063***	0.006	0.006	0.214***	0.214***	0.185***	0.185***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Interpersonal Trust	0.053***	0.053***	0.075***	0.075***	0.124***	0.124***	0.142***	0.142***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Rural Area	0.026***	0.026***	0.000	0.000	0.138***	0.138***	0.164***	0.164***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income Quintile	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.000	0.000	-0.007	-0.007	-0.016**	-0.016**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	-0.010*	-0.010*	0.001	0.002	0.015	0.015	-0.033*	-0.033*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mestizo	-0.020***	-0.020***	0.000	0.000	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.044*	-0.044*

	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Indigenous	-0.005	-0.005	-0.023	-0.023	-0.044	-0.044	-0.137***	-0.137***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Black	-0.035**	-0.035**	0.007	0.007	-0.036	-0.035	-0.117**	-0.117**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Mulatto	-0.041***	-0.040***	-0.009	-0.008	-0.045	-0.044	-0.047	-0.046
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Other Race	-0.023	-0.023	-0.013	-0.012	0.091*	0.091*	0.051	0.051
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Age 26-35	-0.025***	-0.025***	-0.007	-0.007	-0.077***	-0.077***	-0.151***	-0.151***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Age 36-45	-0.019***	-0.019***	0.030***	0.030***	-0.062***	-0.062***	-0.087***	-0.087***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age 46-55	-0.020**	-0.020**	0.016	0.016	-0.071***	-0.070***	-0.030	-0.030
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Age 56-55	-0.014	-0.014	0.037***	0.038***	-0.005	-0.005	0.034	0.035
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Age 66+	0.025**	0.025**	0.055***	0.055***	0.055*	0.056*	0.150***	0.150***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Constant	1.339***	1.360***	1.709***	1.751***	3.555***	3.605***	3.043***	3.130***
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.198)	(0.197)	(0.420)	(0.418)	(0.423)	(0.416)
Random-effects Parameters								
Country	0.013	0.013	0.056	0.055	0.227	0.225	0.205	0.199
Country-Year: Loser	0.033	0.025	0.051	0.035	0.357	0.248	0.358	0.184
Country-Year: Abstainer	0.010	0.009	0.015	0.013	0.084	0.076	0.110	0.083
Country-Year	0.019	0.019	0.017	0.017	0.112	0.111	0.076	0.074
Individual	0.449	0.449	0.580	0.580	2.964	2.965	2.934	2.934
χ^2	6212.2***	6316.5***	2464.1***	2553.2***	3789.7***	3868.1***	2969.8***	3136.3***
N Individuals	107,466	107,466	75,601	75,601	95,479	95,479	54,216	54,216
N Country-Years	102	102	68	68	78	78	53	53
N Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)								

Web Appendix 15: Estimating the Slope for Polyarchy Among those Who Don't Support the President's Party

The results in Table 1 and Table 2 test whether the correlation between democratic performance and democratic attitudes differs by party membership/previous party vote choice. The interaction term tests the hypothesis that correlation differs, but does not test whether the resulting correlation is itself significantly different from 0. Thus below I estimate the conditional slopes for each of the subsamples. The results in Table A22 show that elites who don't belong to the president's party have a significant correlation between their views of democracy and the level of democracy ion their country. The results in Table shows that the same is true for those who did not vote for the president's party but is not true for those who abstained.

Table A22: Estimated Slope for Democracy Variable for Presidential Party MPs and MPs from Other Parties

	Democratic Satisfaction	Trust in Electoral Agency	Confidence in Last Elections
Slope for Level of Democracy Among MP's Who Belong to the President's Party	-0.373	0.147	0.299
	(0.310)	(0.439)	(0.562)
Slope for Level of Democracy Among MP's Who Don't Belong to the President's Party	1.775***	2.770***	2.929***
	(0.524)	(0.666)	(0.699)
Calculated from Table 1, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)			

Table A23: Estimated Slope for Democracy Variable Among the Public by Presidential Vote

	Democratic Satisfaction	Country is Democratic	Trust in Electoral Agency	Trust in Elections
Slope for Level of Democracy Among Those Who Voted for the President's Party	-0.122	-0.315	-0.563	-0.048
	(0.194)	(0.300)	(0.611)	(0.660)
Slope for Level of Democracy Among Those Who Voted for a Losing Party	0.603**	0.720*	2.263***	3.148***
	(0.217)	(0.335)	(0.716)	(0.739)
Slope for Level of Democracy Among Those Who Abstained in the Last Election	0.106	0.090	0.182	1.076
	(0.204)	(0.312)	(0.646)	(0.695)
Calculated from Table 2, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)				