Supplementary Materials for:

The Long-Term Impact of Social Movements and Repression on Democratic Attitudes

(Short Title: Social Movements and Democratic Attitudes)

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Abstract

Democracy movements in authoritarian regimes usually fail and are repressed, but may still affect attitudes and norms of participants and bystanders. We exploit several features of a student movement to test for enduring effects of social movements on democratic attitudes. College students were the core of the movement and had wide exposure to the ideas and activities of the movement, as well as the suppression of the movement. College-bound high school students had limited exposure to the movement and its activities. Time of college entry could in theory be manipulated and endogenous, so we also use birthdate as an exogenous instrument for enrollment year. Applying a fuzzy regression discontinuity, we test for the impact of exposure to the movement on long-term attitudes. We find significant attitudinal differences between those in college during the movement, and those who started college post-movement. These results are strongest for alumni of the four universities that were most connected to the movement.

Keywords: China, Democracy Movements, Democratic Attitudes

Appendix: Additional Tests and Analysis Details

Notes on Pre-analysis Plan

Two modifications was made to the analysis plan, and several additional analyses were added. First, in the plan we noted that the school enrollment cutoff was in June. That was a mistake; the actual birthday cutoff is September 1. Second, the Intrinsic-Instrumental index that combined the Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Income Equality, and Economic Growth variables was not preregistered, nor was the second Intrinsic-Instrumental scale, which excluded Political Rights. Third, the additional fuzzy RDD models using the interaction of X, X^2, and X^3 with D was suggested by a reviewer. Fourth, the robustness checks were not preregistered. Fifth, the separate analysis of the four core universities and the other universities and the related tests was also not pre-registered, but was suggested by Victor Shih.

A copy of our pre-registration plan is included at the end of this supplemental material.

Robustness Checks

Our design is, we believe, the cleanest test of the impact of a democracy movement in an authoritarian regime that is practically possible. However, it has several possible problems which we discuss in this section. In particular, we examine the correlation between treatment and time, the possibility of selection bias from our sample frame, and the possibility of self-selection into the control group. Finally, we will test for self-selection in the control group and heterogeneity between treatment and control group.

Regarding the first issue, because respondents' assignment to treatment is primarily determined by age, those in college during Tiananmen are now older than those who attended college post-Tiananmen. Everything that is correlated with being older or starting school one or more years later is thus also correlated with exposure to the movement: the Tiananmen cohort has more professional experience, has slightly higher income, and is more likely to be divorced. The age difference between the treatment and control group could, however, be correlated with an almost endless list of possible confounding variables that correlate with age: differences in school uniforms, popular games and songs, and different favorite cartoon characters.

However, most of these potential confounders should not be associated with political attitudes, and those variables that are purported to have a relationship with attitudes run counter to our hypotheses. For example, older respondents should be less supportive of democracy, while our hypothesis is that the older Tiananmen cohort is more supportive of democracy. Thus, any age-based effects are biased against our null hypothesis and should make our findings more robust.

The second potential problem is that of sampling problems. In particular, we note that there are only 317 treated respondents, but there are 891 post-Tiananmen respondents. One might suspect that the Tiananmen cohort is less-likely to answer surveys, or that this difference reflects some other form of attrition. Many students were expelled from college after the June 4th Incident, others were exiled or imprisoned. Presumably

Table A.1: Sampling Frame and Late College Attendance

Subject	Birth Year	Age Enrolled	Year Enrolled	Tiananmen Cohort?	Age 2015	In Sample Frame?
1	1970	18	1988	Yes	45	Yes
2	1970	25	1995	No	45	Yes
3	1971	18	1989	No	44	Yes
4	1971	25	1996	No	44	Yes

Number in Tianamen Cohort: 1
Number in Post-Tiananmen Cohort: 3
Mean Age in Tiananmen Cohort: 18.00
Mean Age in Post-Tiananmen Cohort: 22.67

the college graduation rate was lower for the Tiananmen cohort, and our design naturally selects only those that in fact did graduate. The result might be a biased and smaller sample of the original Tiananmen cohort.

However, upon closer examination, the smaller Tiananmen cohort appears to be due to our sampling frame. We sampled on respondents' current ages, but some respondents did not go directly to college. One respondent was 25 years old when s/he started college. About 200 of the control subjects were the right age to be in college during Tiananmen, but in fact only started college after the Incident. If everyone had gone to college at exactly the "right" age, then there would be 522 treatment and 686 control respondents. Note that there is no way to balance these cases out with students that went to school much earlier in life - because they were too young to attend college then. We also cannot balance these subjects with students who were in college during the movement, but were older, because our sample frame excludes them.

Consider four hypothetical students, illustrated in Table A.1. Two were born in 1970 and were old enough to be in the Tiananmen cohort, but only one attended college at age 18 - the other attended college later in life. Two additional subjects were born in 1971 and would have been 18 and could have enrolled in college in the fall of 1989, after the Incident. Again, one of these delayed enrollment. However, without any selection bias or reluctance to answer questions, our sampling frame naturally results in a larger post-Tiananmen cohort, and an older post-Tiananmen cohort. We hope to conduct a follow-up survey with a broader frame, but such a study will require a larger (and more expensive) sample.

This design feature results in there being more students in the control than in the treatment group, and is magnified by several other factors. One is that access to higher education expanded beginning in the 1990's, so that there were more college admits after Tiananmen than before. Another is that during the 1980's, the central government assigned graduates to jobs, many outside of Beijing - so fewer graduates from the Tiananmen cohort are currently living in Beijing than from the post-Tiananmen cohort.

This last point raises several issues of selection bias for the treatment group. Perhaps the sample frame fails to capture subjects who were removed from the sampling frame by the Chinese government. Members of the Tiananmen cohort might have been more likely to be assigned to jobs far from Beijing. It is also possible that individuals could have been removed from the population directly by the state. Some activists

were killed, some were expelled, others were jailed or exiled. In all cases, those punished or assigned to jobs far from Beijing were presumably the most active in the movement. Consequently, those individuals missing from our dataset should also have had the strongest support for democracy. Removing them from the sample should thus weaken any observed effects and make our findings more robust.

A third potential criticism is that the effect was driven by the repression and political re-education, not participation in the movement. As mentioned previously, after the movement some students were expelled, some faculty fired, and military education became mandatory at the most politicized campuses. In addition, a new curriculum emphasizing patriotism was introduced in schools, press freedom reduced, civil society restricted, and the state's grip on society tightened. Perhaps, then the differences in attitudes we observed between the Tiananmen and post-Tiananmen cohorts reflected this repression. In other words, instead of the movement increasing democratic attitudes, the repression reduced democratic attitudes.

One way to partially test for this is by comparing the attitudes of the class of 1989 with members of the Tiananmen cohort who graduated later. Both groups were exposed to the movement, but those that graduated in 1989 were not in college in the fall of 1989 or later, and thus did not participate in the on-campus military training or political re-education. Thus, if the repression reduced democratic attitudes, we should see a difference between the class of 1989 and later graduates from the Tiananmen cohort. If the effect was entirely driven by the movement and the re-education program did not have any impact, then there should be no difference between them.

Table A.2 compares the class of 1989 with later graduates from the Tiananmen cohort. We test for a difference between those that graduated in 1989 and other members of the Tiananmen cohort who graduated later. On every measures, there is no statistically significant difference between the two samples.

The class of 1989 and later graduates of the Tiananmen cohort were all exposed to the movement. However, only those graduating after 1989 would have been on campus for military training or reeducation programs. The small and insignificant difference between them is evidence that it was participation in the movement which drove the results, not the post-Tiananmen environment on campus. However, given few observations, the power of this test is quite low. In addition, it may be that the temporary re-education programs did not have an impact, but the enduring censorship and political controls which both the class of 1989 and later graduates experienced.

Lastly, we address the issues of selection bias and heterogeneity that potentially threaten the validity of our empirical results. Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001) emphasize that the crucial assumption of a valid RD design is that all other variables except for the treatment conditions should be continuous with respect to the running variable. As we have a random sample, this assumption should be satisfied at the individual level. Some aggregate level measures, however, can shape students' attitudes but are probably not well balanced between treatments and controls. For instance, a student may be more conservative if he grew up in rural area. If the observations from rural and urban areas are not randomly selected, then our estimates of treatment effects will be biased. Table A.3 reports on Chi-Square tests on the relationship

Table A.2: No difference between Class of 1989 and Younger Members of Treatment Group

	Grad Year		
	1989	1990+	Diff
Demand			
μ	6.61	6.94	-0.33
se	(0.44)	(0.13)	(-0.239)
n	41	276	
Supply			
μ	5.2	5.17	0.03
se	(0.46)	(0.16)	(-0.002)
n	41	275	
Support			
μ	1.41	1.77	-0.35
se	(0.53)	(0.19)	(-0.223)
n	41	275	
Civil Liberty			
μ	7.75	7.66	0.09
se	(0.41)	(0.16)	(-0.017)
n	40	276	
Political Rights			
μ	7.37	6.86	0.5
se	(0.41)	(0.17)	(-0.578)
n	41	276	
Income Equality			
μ	5.83	5.56	0.27
se	(0.52)	(0.18)	(-0.132)
n	41	276	
Economic Growth			
μ	6.71	6.97	-0.27
se	(0.48)	(0.15)	(-0.144)
n	41	276	
Intrinsic - Instrumental Scale			
μ	2.58	1.99	0.59
se	(1.28)	(0.35)	(-0.261)
n	40	276	

Figures shown are the means for each dependent variable, the standard error of the mean, and the number of observations. None of the differences are statistically significant, suggesting that the post-1989 political re-education and suppression are not confounding our results.

between predetermined variables and assignment to treatment. In no case are there significant differences across treatment and control groups.

Table A.3: Pearsons Chi-Squared Tests for Pre-determined Characteristics

	Gender	Where raised	High School
1988-1989			
χ^2	0	0.06	0.66
P-value	1	0.81	0.72
n	266	266	223
1987-1990			
χ^2	3.39	1.67	5.44
P-value	0.34	0.64	0.49
n	522	522	438
1986-1991			
χ^2	3.77	5.35	5.75
P-value	0.58	0.37	0.84
n	745	745	610
1985-1992			
χ^2	5.08	7	7.23
P-value	0.65	0.43	0.93
n	962	962	790
1984-1993			
χ^2	6.63	10.95	12.69
P-value	0.68	0.28	0.81
n	1102	1102	924

Notice the Tiananmen Movement was repressed in the early June of 1989 and the freshmen entered college in September 1989. It was very likely that students who started college in 1989 were very conservative as high schools teachers or parents would not allow active students went to college in Beijing. Certainly, it was also possible that the 1989 cohort were political driven - too many political oriented students went to college in Beijing in the fall of 1989. In these cases, even if we have a random sample in Beijing, our observations can be highly heterogeneous and our estimates in empirical results can be driven by the possibly very conservative 1989 cohort. Table A.3 conducts similar Chi-Square tests on the potential heterogeneous concern of unobserved attitudes variables in the control group and there is no any concrete evidence showing that the 1989 cohort is different from the rest in controls in terms of understanding of democracy or democratic attitudes.

Table A.4 tests whether there is a "1989 effect" on democratic attitudes. Perhaps the entering class in the fall of 1989 was less (or more) politically active than normal. Any such effects should have dissipated over time as it became clear that the situation on campus was stabilized. The table reports chi-square tests comparing the distribution of the dependent variables for the fall 1989 cohort and later cohorts. There is no

Table A.4: Pearsons Chi-Squared Tests for 1989 Effect in Control Group

Variable	1989-90	1989-91	1989-92	1989-93	1989-94
Demand					
χ^2	4.55	6.86	6.14	5.55	7.19
P-value	0.92	0.74	0.8	0.85	0.71
n	308	473	648	785	891
Supply					
χ^2	8.29	10.14	8.59	8.03	7.94
P-value	0.6	0.43	0.57	0.63	0.64
n	308	473	648	785	891
Support					
χ^2	16.65	28.96	25.01	21.13	19.44
P-value	0.48	0.05	0.16	0.33	0.43
n	308	473	648	785	891
Political Rights					
χ^2	17.19	16	15.41	14.52	13.6
P-value	0.07	0.1	0.12	0.15	0.19
n	308	473	648	785	891
Civil Liberty					
χ^2	4.57	4.27	3.87	3.15	2.89
P-value	0.87	0.93	0.95	0.98	0.98
n	307	472	647	784	890
Income Equality					
χ^2	8.08	5.82	6.48	5.65	4.7
P-value	0.62	0.83	0.77	0.84	0.91
n	308	473	647	784	890
Economic Growth					
χ^2	15.93	14.02	15.08	14.99	12.99
P-value	0.07	0.17	0.13	0.13	0.22
n	308	473	648	785	891
Democ Scale					
χ^2	27.1	29.21	28.85	28.87	29.12
P-value	0.35	0.4	0.63	0.63	0.66
n	307	472	646	783	889

evidence of a 1989 effect, that is, there is no evidence that there was self-selection bias in the control group immediately after the Tiananmen Incident.

We also estimated regression models within the control group (not shown), using an indicator variable for "1989 Cohort" as a predictor. As with the chi-square tests, there is no evidence that the 1989 cohort is any different than the rest of the control group. Finally, we conducted placebo tests, comparing treatment effects with different cutoff points, again with no challenge to our findings.

Notes on Sampling Frame

We sampled from 40-50 year-old college graduates in Beijing. This frame is not perfect. The ideal population consists of everyone who was in college in the spring of 1989 in Beijing, and everyone who did not start until shortly thereafter. Identifying this population would be difficult as survey firms only have age and education for members of their panels, not the exact time that individuals were enrolled in college. Furthermore, if we were to sample more broadly and ask if respondents had been in college in the spring of 1989, they might be less likely to respond to the survey, given the sensitive events of that time period. The cost of using our sampling frame (40-50 year old college graduates currently living in Beijing) is that we will miss those that did not graduate from college, we will include those who returned to college later in life when higher education greatly expanded (for example, an 18-year old in 1989 who did not go to college until 2005), and we will miss those who moved out of Beijing. Furthermore, it is possible that some of our respondents did not go to college in Beijing at all but moved there after graduation. We obviously do not have data on attitudes of those killed when the protests were suppressed or living outside of China.

First Stage Models

In the paper, only one of the first stage models for the fuzzy regression discontinuity models is presented, the first-stage model used in models 3 and 4 of the full dataset. Below, all first-stage models are presented, including those used for models 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and for the full dataset, the core universities, and the non-core universities.

Table A.5: First Stage Models for Fuzzy RDD, Models 3 and 4, All Universities

	1988-1989	1987-1990	1986-1991	1985-1992	1984-1993	1984-1994
Intercept	0.364**	0.253**	0.252**	0.237**	0.233**	0.225**
	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Cutoff	0.082	0.184**	0.208**	0.262**	0.268**	0.285**
	(0.085)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Birthday-Cutoff	−0.183**	−0.166**	−0.140**	−0.106**	−0.094**	−0.085**
	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
R^2	0.152	0.336	0.450	0.501	0.505	0.511
Num. obs.	262	514	734	944	1084	1190

* .05; +.10

Dependent variable is T, with $T = 1$ indicating exposure to the movement and $T = 0$ indicating a lack of exposure.

Table A.6: First Stage Models for Fuzzy RDD, Models 5 and 6, All Universities

	1988-1989	1987-1990	1986-1991	1985-1992	1984-1993	1984-1994
Intercept	0.463**	0.301**	0.277**	0.257**	0.253**	0.244**
	(0.069)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Cutoff	−0.047	0.052	0.077	0.109**	0.103**	0.117**
	(0.100)	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Birthday-Cutoff	−0.301**	−0.285**	−0.244**	−0.207**	−0.200**	−0.187**
	(0.068)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Squared Birthday-Cutoff	−0.058	0.017*	0.017**	0.014**	0.015**	0.015**
	(0.036)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Cubed Birthday-Cutoff	−0.001	0.016**	0.010**	0.006**	0.005**	0.005**
	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
R^2	0.171	0.359	0.484	0.547	0.560	0.568
Adj. R^2	0.158	0.354	0.481	0.546	0.558	0.566
Num. obs.	262	514	734	944	1084	1190
RMSE	0.459	0.395	0.346	0.314	0.298	0.287

* .05; +.10

Dependent variable is T, with $T = 1$ indicating exposure to the movement and $T = 0$ indicating a lack of exposure.

Table A.7: First Stage Models for Fuzzy RDD, Models 3 and 4, Core Universities

	1988-1989	1987-1990	1986-1991	1985-1992	1984-1993	1984-1994
Intercept	0.364**	0.253**	0.252**	0.237**	0.233**	0.225**
	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Cutoff	0.082	0.184**	0.208**	0.262**	0.268**	0.285**
	(0.085)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Birthday-Cutoff	−0.183**	−0.166**	−0.140**	−0.106**	−0.094**	−0.085**
	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
R^2	0.152	0.336	0.450	0.501	0.505	0.511
Num. obs.	262	514	734	944	1084	1190

* .05; +.10

Dependent variable is T, with $T = 1$ indicating exposure to the movement and $T = 0$ indicating a lack of exposure.

Table A.8: First Stage Models for Fuzzy RDD, Models 5 and 6, Core Universities

	1988-1989	1987-1990	1986-1991	1985-1992	1984-1993	1984-1994
Intercept	0.578**	0.345**	0.296**	0.276**	0.293**	0.285**
	(0.107)	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Cutoff	0.105	0.229*	0.289**	0.295**	0.232**	0.240**
	(0.179)	(0.118)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.066)
Birthday-Cutoff	−0.320**	−0.267**	−0.186**	−0.169**	−0.187**	−0.180**
	(0.151)	(0.079)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Squared Birthday-Cutoff	−0.058	−0.004	0.004	0.005	0.007**	0.007**
	(0.049)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Cubed Birthday-Cutoff	0.032	0.020*	0.006**	0.005**	0.005**	0.005**
	(0.030)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
R^2	0.238	0.414	0.550	0.604	0.610	0.619
Adj. R^2	0.199	0.399	0.543	0.599	0.605	0.614
Num. obs.	84	164	240	302	330	353
RMSE	0.424	0.389	0.337	0.313	0.307	0.300

* .05; +.10

Dependent variable is T, with $T = 1$ indicating exposure to the movement and $T = 0$ indicating a lack of exposure.

Table A.9: First Stage Models for Fuzzy RDD, Models 3 and 4, Non-Core Universities

	1988-1989	1987-1990	1986-1991	1985-1992	1984-1993	1984-1994
Intercept	0.312**	0.242**	0.251**	0.232**	0.218**	0.208**
	(0.067)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Cutoff	0.010	0.102	0.117**	0.191**	0.220**	0.240**
	(0.100)	(0.066)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Birthday-Cutoff	−0.218**	−0.182**	−0.158**	−0.111**	−0.091**	−0.080**
	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)
R^2	0.173	0.336	0.433	0.468	0.466	0.470
Num. obs.	178	350	494	642	754	837

* .05; +.10

Dependent variable is T, with $T = 1$ indicating exposure to the movement and $T = 0$ indicating a lack of exposure.

Table A.10: First Stage Models for Fuzzy RDD, Models 5 and 6, Non-Core Universities

	1988-1989	1987-1990	1986-1991	1985-1992	1984-1993	1984-1994
Intercept	0.413**	0.278**	0.263**	0.246**	0.231**	0.222**
	(0.088)	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Cutoff	−0.121	−0.023	−0.029	0.029	0.047	0.065
	(0.122)	(0.077)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Birthday-Cutoff	−0.333**	−0.296**	−0.289**	−0.224**	−0.202**	−0.186**
	(0.081)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Squared Birthday-Cutoff	−0.056	0.026**	0.029**	0.019**	0.018**	0.018**
	(0.048)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Cubed Birthday-Cutoff	−0.002	0.017**	0.014**	0.007**	0.005**	0.004**
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
R^2	0.189	0.365	0.486	0.535	0.542	0.548
Adj. R^2	0.171	0.358	0.482	0.532	0.539	0.545
Num. obs.	178	350	494	642	754	837
RMSE	0.446	0.384	0.335	0.304	0.286	0.273

* .05; +.10

Dependent variable is T, with $T = 1$ indicating exposure to the movement and $T = 0$ indicating a lack of exposure.

Full Results

Tables 7 and 8 in the paper show only the impact of T on dependent variables. Following are full models used to estimate those effects, including controls.

Table A.11: Impact of Movement on Attitudes across Models, Instruments, and Covariates - Core 4 Universities Only

This table repeats the analysis from Table 7, but only includes respondents who attended one of the four most active universities. One-sided tests per preregistration plan.

	OLS		TSLS $T = f(X, D)$		$T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Dem Support	0.96 *	0.82 *	0.64 +	0.70 +	0.86 *	0.75 +
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Intrinsic vs.	1.81 *	1.41 *	1.05	1.05	1.51 *	1.14 +
Instrumental	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.90)	(0.88)	(0.86)	(0.86)
Demand	0.0296	0.0755	-0.0883	-0.1012	-0.0287	-0.0005
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Supply	-0.93 *	-0.75 *	-0.73 *	-0.80 *	-0.89 *	-0.75 *
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)
Civil	0.055	-0.018	0.120	0.018	0.215	0.072
Liberties	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Political	0.34	0.29	0.24	0.20	0.31	0.26
Rights	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Income	-0.87 *	-0.74 *	-0.58	-0.67 +	-0.74 *	-0.63 +
Equality	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Economic	-0.54 *	-0.40 +	-0.11	-0.16	-0.24	-0.18
Growth	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.38)
I-I Scale	1.47 *	1.12 *	0.80	0.85	1.20 +	0.88
w/o Pol Rights	(0.58)	(0.57)	(0.76)	(0.74)	(0.73)	(0.72)
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
n (range)	362-364	362-364	353-353	353-353	353-353	353-353

* .05; +.10

Table A.12: Impact of Movement on Attitudes across Models, Instruments, and Covariates - Only Low-Participation Universities

This table repeats the analysis from Table 7, but only includes respondents who attended one of the less-mobilized universities. One-sided tests per preregistration plan.

					$T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$	
	OLS		$T = f(X, D)$			
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Dem Support	-0.15	-0.19	-0.46 +	-0.49 +	-0.23	-0.30
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Intrinsic vs. Instrumental	-0.027	-0.043	0.310	0.344	0.144	0.200
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Demand	0.043	0.050	-0.241	-0.207	-0.103	-0.075
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Supply	0.19	0.24	0.22	0.29	0.13	0.22
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Civil Liberties	-0.052	0.027	0.152	0.251	-0.134	-0.055
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Political Rights	0.36 +	0.42 *	0.60 *	0.68 *	0.41	0.50 +
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Income Equality	0.258	0.313 +	0.279	0.317	0.055	0.095
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Economic Growth	0.074	0.174	0.157	0.264	0.070	0.145
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.24)
I-I Scale w/o Pol Rights	-0.39 +	-0.46 +	-0.29	-0.33	-0.26	-0.30
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
n (range)	843-844	843-844	836-837	836-837	836-837	836-837

* .05; +.10

Table A.13: Full Results from Models of Demand, All Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	6.84**	6.65**	6.87**	6.77**	6.85**	6.75**
	(0.07)	(0.35)	(0.08)	(0.36)	(0.08)	(0.36)
T	0.06	0.08	−0.16	−0.12	−0.08	−0.05
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Education		0.01		0.00		−0.00
		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)
CCP Member		0.45**		0.39**		0.39**
		(0.13)		(0.14)		(0.14)
Govt. Job		−0.17		−0.16		−0.16
		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.15)
Income		0.01		0.00		0.00
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Married		0.05		0.03		0.03
		(0.27)		(0.27)		(0.27)
R^2	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	1208	1208	1190	1190	1190	1190
RMSE	2.22	2.21	2.22	2.22	2.22	2.22

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Demand from Table 7. In that Table, only the coefficients for Movement or $T = 1$ were shown.

Table A.14: Full Results from Models of Perceived Supply of Democracy, All Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	5.55**	5.24**	5.54**	5.43**	5.53**	5.42**
	(0.09)	(0.41)	(0.10)	(0.41)	(0.09)	(0.41)
T	−0.37**	−0.22	−0.38	−0.30	−0.36	−0.24
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Education		−0.37**		−0.44**		−0.44**
		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)
CCP Member		0.54**		0.48**		0.48**
		(0.15)		(0.16)		(0.16)
Govt. Job		0.56**		0.61**		0.61**
		(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)
Income		−0.05		−0.06		−0.06
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Married		0.39		0.31		0.31
		(0.31)		(0.31)		(0.31)
R^2	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04
Num. obs.	1207	1207	1190	1190	1190	1190
RMSE	2.60	2.55	2.59	2.54	2.59	2.54

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Supply from Table 7. In that Table, only the coefficients for Movement or $T = 1$ were shown.

Table A.15: Full Results from Models of Support for Democracy, All Universities

	OLS		TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models $T = f(X, D)$		$T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	1.29**	1.42**	1.34**	1.33**	1.32**	1.33**
	(0.10)	(0.46)	(0.11)	(0.46)	(0.10)	(0.46)
T	0.43**	0.29	0.23	0.18	0.28	0.19
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Education		0.37**		0.44**		0.44**
		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.13)
CCP Member		−0.09		−0.09		−0.09
		(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)
Govt. Job		−0.73**		−0.77**		−0.77**
		(0.19)		(0.19)		(0.19)
Income		0.06		0.06		0.06
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Married		−0.33		−0.29		−0.29
		(0.35)		(0.35)		(0.35)
R^2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03
Num. obs.	1207	1207	1190	1190	1190	1190
RMSE	2.88	2.85	2.88	2.84	2.88	2.84

$^{**}p < 0.05, \, ^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Support from Table 7. In that Table, only the coefficients for Movement or $T = 1$ were shown.

Table A.16: Full Results from Models of Political Rights as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, All Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	6.46**	5.99**	6.44**	6.03**	6.45**	6.03**
	(0.10)	(0.46)	(0.11)	(0.46)	(0.10)	(0.46)
T	0.47**	0.46**	0.50*	0.54**	0.49**	0.54**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Education		−0.07		−0.09		−0.09
		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.13)
CCP Member		0.32*		0.29*		0.29
		(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)
Govt. Job		−0.27		−0.25		−0.25
		(0.19)		(0.19)		(0.19)
Income		0.11**		0.10**		0.10**
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Married		0.20		0.20		0.20
		(0.34)		(0.35)		(0.35)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	1208	1208	1190	1190	1190	1190
RMSE	2.84	2.83	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85

$^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Political Rights from Table 7. In that Table, only the coefficients for Movement or $T = 1$ were shown.

Table A.17: Full Results from Models of Civil Liberties as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, All Universities

| | | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | OLS | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	7.60**	6.67**	7.56**	6.69**	7.60**	6.72**
	(0.08)	(0.40)	(0.09)	(0.40)	(0.09)	(0.40)
T	0.07	0.09	0.22	0.27	0.08	0.12
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Education		−0.11		−0.13		−0.12
		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)
CCP Member		0.36**		0.35**		0.34**
		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.15)
Govt. Job		−0.10		−0.11		−0.12
		(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)
Income		0.13**		0.13**		0.13**
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Married		0.53*		0.50*		0.50*
		(0.30)		(0.30)		(0.30)
R^2	0.00	0.02	−0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	1206	1206	1190	1190	1190	1190
RMSE	2.50	2.49	2.50	2.49	2.50	2.49

$^{**}p < 0.05, \, ^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Civil Liberties from Table 7. In that Table, only the coefficients for Movement or $T = 1$ were shown.

Table A.18: Full Results from Models of Income Equality as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, All Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	5.92**	5.71**	5.92**	5.89**	5.93**	5.89**
	(0.10)	(0.48)	(0.11)	(0.48)	(0.11)	(0.48)
T	−0.33*	−0.18	−0.32	−0.24	−0.36	−0.25
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Education		−0.40**		−0.45**		−0.45**
		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.13)
CCP Member		0.59**		0.56**		0.56**
		(0.18)		(0.18)		(0.18)
Govt. Job		0.17		0.21		0.21
		(0.20)		(0.20)		(0.20)
Income		−0.08		−0.09*		−0.09*
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Married		0.73**		0.64*		0.64*
		(0.36)		(0.36)		(0.36)
R^2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03
Num. obs.	1207	1207	1189	1189	1189	1189
RMSE	3.00	2.96	2.99	2.96	2.99	2.96

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Income Equality from Table 7. In that Table, only the coefficients for Movement or $T = 1$ were shown.

Table A.19: Full Results from Models of Economic Growth as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, All Universities

	OLS		TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models $T = f(X, D)$		$T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	7.29**	7.27**	7.24**	7.34**	7.26**	7.36**
	(0.08)	(0.37)	(0.09)	(0.38)	(0.09)	(0.38)
T	−0.35**	−0.16	−0.13	−0.03	−0.21	−0.09
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Education		−0.62**		−0.65**		−0.65**
		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)
CCP Member		0.54**		0.53**		0.52**
		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.14)
Govt. Job		0.51**		0.57**		0.57**
		(0.16)		(0.16)		(0.16)
Income		−0.01		−0.02		−0.02
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Married		0.34		0.25		0.25
		(0.28)		(0.28)		(0.28)
R^2	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
Num. obs.	1208	1208	1190	1190	1190	1190
RMSE	2.40	2.34	2.40	2.33	2.40	2.33

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Economic Growth from Table 7. In that Table, only the coefficients for Movement or $T = 1$ were shown.

Table A.20: Full Results from Models of Intrinsic-Instrumental Democracy Scale, All Universities

| | OLS | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
| | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | | | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	0.85**	−0.34	0.85**	−0.53	0.86**	−0.51
	(0.17)	(0.79)	(0.18)	(0.79)	(0.18)	(0.79)
T	1.21**	0.88**	1.17**	1.08**	1.13**	0.99**
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.42)
Education		0.85**		0.89**		0.89**
		(0.21)		(0.22)		(0.22)
CCP Member		−0.44		−0.45		−0.46
		(0.30)		(0.30)		(0.30)
Govt. Job		−1.06**		−1.14**		−1.15**
		(0.33)		(0.33)		(0.33)
Income		0.33**		0.34**		0.34**
		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)
Married		−0.32		−0.18		−0.18
		(0.59)		(0.59)		(0.59)
R^2	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.06
Num. obs.	1205	1205	1189	1189	1189	1189
RMSE	5.01	4.90	4.97	4.85	4.97	4.85

$^{**}p < 0.05, \ ^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Intrinsic-Instrumental Scale of Democracy from Table 7. In that Table, only the coefficients for Movement or $T = 1$ were shown.

Table A.21: Full Results from Models of Demand, Only Four Core Universities

| | OLS | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
| | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | | | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	6.93**	7.23**	6.95**	7.30**	6.92**	7.28**
	(0.15)	(0.59)	(0.17)	(0.60)	(0.17)	(0.60)
T	0.03	0.08	−0.11	−0.11	−0.04	−0.02
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Education		−0.20		−0.17		−0.18
		(0.16)		(0.16)		(0.16)
CCP Member		0.77**		0.63**		0.64**
		(0.25)		(0.26)		(0.26)
Govt. Job		−0.45*		−0.42		−0.41
		(0.27)		(0.28)		(0.28)
Income		−0.04		−0.05		−0.05
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Married		0.20		0.18		0.17
		(0.41)		(0.42)		(0.42)
R^2	0.00	0.03	−0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	364	364	353	353	353	353
RMSE	2.28	2.26	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.27

$^{**}p < 0.05, \ ^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Demand for Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.22: Full Results from Models of Perceived Supply of Democracy, Only Four Core Universities

	OLS		TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models $T = f(X, D)$		$T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	5.21**	5.18**	5.23**	5.44**	5.20**	5.40**
	(0.18)	(0.68)	(0.20)	(0.69)	(0.20)	(0.69)
T	−0.93**	−0.75**	−1.03**	−1.00**	−0.94**	−0.84**
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)
Education		−0.50**		−0.57**		−0.57**
		(0.18)		(0.19)		(0.18)
CCP Member		0.67**		0.58*		0.60**
		(0.29)		(0.30)		(0.30)
Govt. Job		0.54*		0.63**		0.64**
		(0.32)		(0.32)		(0.32)
Income		−0.12*		−0.12*		−0.12*
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)
Married		0.80*		0.71		0.70
		(0.48)		(0.48)		(0.48)
R^2	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.12	0.03	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.10
Num. obs.	364	364	353	353	353	353
RMSE	2.70	2.61	2.70	2.59	2.70	2.59

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Supply for Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.23: Full Results from Models of Support for Democracy, Only Four Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	1.72**	2.05**	1.72**	1.86**	1.72**	1.88**
	(0.22)	(0.86)	(0.25)	(0.87)	(0.24)	(0.87)
T	0.96**	0.82**	0.92*	0.89*	0.90*	0.82*
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Education		0.30		0.39*		0.39*
		(0.23)		(0.23)		(0.23)
CCP Member		0.10		0.05		0.04
		(0.37)		(0.38)		(0.38)
Govt. Job		−1.00**		−1.05**		−1.05**
		(0.40)		(0.40)		(0.40)
Income		0.07		0.07		0.07
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)
Married		−0.60		−0.53		−0.53
		(0.60)		(0.61)		(0.61)
R^2	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.05
Num. obs.	364	364	353	353	353	353
RMSE	3.32	3.28	3.33	3.28	3.33	3.28

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Support for Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.24: Full Results from Models of Political Rights as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Only Four Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	6.95**	6.53**	6.95**	6.56**	6.94**	6.55**
	(0.18)	(0.71)	(0.20)	(0.73)	(0.20)	(0.73)
T	0.34	0.29	0.27	0.23	0.31	0.25
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Education		−0.06		−0.05		−0.05
		(0.19)		(0.20)		(0.20)
CCP Member		0.58*		0.51		0.51
		(0.31)		(0.32)		(0.32)
Govt. Job		−0.61*		−0.55		−0.55
		(0.33)		(0.34)		(0.34)
Income		0.08		0.07		0.07
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)
Married		0.36		0.35		0.34
		(0.50)		(0.51)		(0.51)
R^2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	364	364	353	353	353	353
RMSE	2.74	2.72	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Political Rights for Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.25: Full Results from Models of Civil Liberties as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Only Four Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	7.94**	6.19**	7.86**	6.20**	7.87**	6.22**
	(0.16)	(0.63)	(0.18)	(0.64)	(0.18)	(0.64)
T	0.05	−0.02	0.28	0.18	0.24	0.13
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Education		0.07		0.09		0.09
		(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)
CCP Member		0.39		0.34		0.34
		(0.27)		(0.28)		(0.28)
Govt. Job		−0.18		−0.20		−0.20
		(0.29)		(0.30)		(0.30)
Income		0.13**		0.13**		0.13**
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Married		1.14**		1.06**		1.06**
		(0.44)		(0.44)		(0.44)
R^2	0.00	0.04	−0.00	0.03	−0.00	0.03
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.02	−0.00	0.02	−0.00	0.02
Num. obs.	362	362	353	353	353	353
RMSE	2.45	2.42	2.43	2.41	2.43	2.41

$^{**}p < 0.05, {}^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Civil Liberties for Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.26: Full Results from Models of Income Equality as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Only Four Core Universities

	OLS		TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models $T = f(X, D)$		$T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	5.50**	4.55**	5.46**	4.74**	5.47**	4.72**
	(0.21)	(0.80)	(0.23)	(0.80)	(0.23)	(0.80)
T	−0.87**	−0.74**	−0.76*	−0.77*	−0.77*	−0.69
	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Education		−0.37*		−0.43**		−0.43**
		(0.21)		(0.22)		(0.22)
CCP Member		1.27**		1.29**		1.30**
		(0.34)		(0.35)		(0.35)
Govt. Job		0.08		0.17		0.17
		(0.37)		(0.37)		(0.37)
Income		−0.05		−0.05		−0.05
		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)
Married		1.27**		1.14**		1.14**
		(0.56)		(0.56)		(0.56)
R^2	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.07
Num. obs.	364	364	353	353	353	353
RMSE	3.14	3.05	3.13	3.04	3.13	3.04

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Income Equality for Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan..

Table A.27: Full Results from Models of Economic Growth as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Only Four Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	6.63**	6.82**	6.53**	6.97**	6.54**	6.97**
	(0.18)	(0.72)	(0.21)	(0.72)	(0.20)	(0.72)
T	−0.54*	−0.40	−0.24	−0.22	−0.25	−0.19
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Education		−0.54**		−0.57**		−0.57**
		(0.19)		(0.19)		(0.19)
CCP Member		0.66**		0.66**		0.66**
		(0.31)		(0.32)		(0.32)
Govt. Job		0.28		0.37		0.37
		(0.33)		(0.34)		(0.34)
Income		−0.06		−0.07		−0.07
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)
Married		0.56		0.36		0.36
		(0.50)		(0.50)		(0.50)
R^2	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04
Num. obs.	364	364	353	353	353	353
RMSE	2.78	2.73	2.78	2.72	2.78	2.72

$^{**}p < 0.05, {}^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Economic Growth for Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.28: Full Results from Models of Intrinsic-Instrumental Democracy Scale, Only Four Core Universities

	OLS		TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models $T = f(X, D)$		$T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	2.76**	1.30	2.82**	1.05	2.81**	1.08
	(0.42)	(1.62)	(0.46)	(1.61)	(0.46)	(1.61)
T	1.81**	1.41**	1.55*	1.39	1.58*	1.25
	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.88)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.85)
Education		0.94**		1.03**		1.04**
		(0.43)		(0.43)		(0.43)
CCP Member		−0.93		−1.10		−1.11
		(0.70)		(0.71)		(0.71)
Govt. Job		−1.19		−1.29*		−1.30*
		(0.75)		(0.75)		(0.75)
Income		0.31*		0.32*		0.32**
		(0.16)		(0.16)		(0.16)
Married		−0.30		−0.10		−0.09
		(1.12)		(1.13)		(1.13)
R^2	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.06
Num. obs.	362	362	353	353	353	353
RMSE	6.29	6.17	6.24	6.09	6.24	6.09

$^{**}p < 0.05,\ ^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Intrinsic-Instrumental Scale of Democracy for Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.29: Full Results from Models of Demand, Only Non-Core Universities

	OLS		TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models $T = f(X, D)$		$T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	6.80**	6.43**	6.85**	6.57**	6.82**	6.54**
	(0.09)	(0.46)	(0.09)	(0.47)	(0.09)	(0.47)
T	0.04	0.05	−0.21	−0.16	−0.08	−0.05
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Education		0.10		0.08		0.07
		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.13)
CCP Member		0.33**		0.30*		0.30*
		(0.16)		(0.16)		(0.16)
Govt. Job		−0.08		−0.07		−0.07
		(0.18)		(0.18)		(0.18)
Income		0.04		0.03		0.03
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Married		−0.00		−0.03		−0.02
		(0.36)		(0.36)		(0.36)
R^2	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	844	844	837	837	837	837
RMSE	2.19	2.19	2.19	2.19	2.19	2.19

$^{**}p < 0.05,\ ^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Demand for Non-Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.30: Full Results from Models of Perceived Supply of Democracy, Only Non-Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	5.66**	5.04**	5.65**	5.18**	5.66**	5.19**
	(0.10)	(0.53)	(0.11)	(0.53)	(0.10)	(0.53)
T	0.19	0.24	0.15	0.23	0.12	0.20
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Education		−0.11		−0.18		−0.18
		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.15)
CCP Member		0.44**		0.40**		0.40**
		(0.18)		(0.18)		(0.18)
Govt. Job		0.40*		0.43**		0.43**
		(0.20)		(0.20)		(0.20)
Income		0.06		0.05		0.05
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Married		0.03		0.01		0.00
		(0.41)		(0.41)		(0.41)
R^2	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	843	843	837	837	837	837
RMSE	2.50	2.49	2.50	2.49	2.50	2.49

$^{**}p < 0.05, {}^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Supply for Non-Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.31: Full Results from Models of Support for Democracy, Only Non-Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	1.14**	1.40**	1.19**	1.39**	1.16**	1.35**
	(0.10)	(0.55)	(0.11)	(0.56)	(0.11)	(0.56)
T	−0.15	−0.19	−0.36	−0.39	−0.20	−0.25
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Education		0.21		0.26		0.25
		(0.15)		(0.16)		(0.16)
CCP Member		−0.12		−0.11		−0.10
		(0.19)		(0.19)		(0.19)
Govt. Job		−0.47**		−0.50**		−0.50**
		(0.21)		(0.21)		(0.21)
Income		−0.03		−0.02		−0.02
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Married		−0.03		−0.03		−0.02
		(0.43)		(0.43)		(0.43)
R^2	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	843	843	837	837	837	837
RMSE	2.61	2.60	2.62	2.61	2.61	2.61

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Support for Non-Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.32: Full Results from Models of Political Rights as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Only Non-Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	6.30**	6.02**	6.26**	6.06**	6.28**	6.08**
	(0.11)	(0.61)	(0.12)	(0.62)	(0.12)	(0.61)
T	0.36	0.42*	0.51	0.60*	0.43	0.52
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Education		−0.27		−0.33*		−0.32*
		(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)
CCP Member		0.23		0.21		0.21
		(0.21)		(0.21)		(0.21)
Govt. Job		−0.06		−0.05		−0.05
		(0.23)		(0.24)		(0.24)
Income		0.08		0.08		0.08
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Married		0.27		0.28		0.27
		(0.47)		(0.47)		(0.47)
R^2	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	844	844	837	837	837	837
RMSE	2.87	2.87	2.87	2.87	2.87	2.87

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Political Rights for Non-Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.33: Full Results from Models of Civil Liberties as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Only Non-Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	7.48**	7.35**	7.45**	7.37**	7.50**	7.44**
	(0.10)	(0.53)	(0.11)	(0.54)	(0.10)	(0.54)
T	−0.05	0.03	0.09	0.20	−0.13	−0.05
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Education		−0.38**		−0.42**		−0.41**
		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.15)
CCP Member		0.39**		0.37**		0.36**
		(0.18)		(0.18)		(0.18)
Govt. Job		−0.02		−0.01		−0.01
		(0.20)		(0.21)		(0.21)
Income		0.08		0.08		0.08
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Married		0.16		0.17		0.15
		(0.41)		(0.41)		(0.41)
R^2	0.00	0.02	−0.00	0.02	−0.00	0.02
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	844	844	837	837	837	837
RMSE	2.51	2.50	2.52	2.51	2.52	2.50

$^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Civil Liberties for Non-Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.34: Full Results from Models of Income Equality as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Only Non-Core Universities

| | | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	6.07**	6.04**	6.09**	6.21**	6.10**	6.22**
	(0.11)	(0.61)	(0.12)	(0.62)	(0.12)	(0.62)
T	0.26	0.31	0.12	0.15	0.07	0.10
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Education		−0.26		−0.32*		−0.31*
		(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)
CCP Member		0.29		0.25		0.25
		(0.21)		(0.21)		(0.21)
Govt. Job		0.08		0.09		0.09
		(0.23)		(0.24)		(0.24)
Income		−0.02		−0.03		−0.03
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Married		0.26		0.24		0.23
		(0.47)		(0.47)		(0.47)
R^2	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	843	843	836	836	836	836
RMSE	2.88	2.88	2.88	2.88	2.88	2.88

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Income Equality for Non-Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.35: Full Results from Models of Economic Growth as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Only Non-Core Universities

| | | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | OLS | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	7.52**	7.12**	7.49**	7.11**	7.51**	7.14**
	(0.08)	(0.44)	(0.09)	(0.45)	(0.09)	(0.45)
T	0.07	0.17	0.15	0.26	0.07	0.16
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Education		−0.45**		−0.47**		−0.47**
		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.13)
CCP Member		0.43**		0.42**		0.42**
		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.15)
Govt. Job		0.49**		0.53**		0.53**
		(0.17)		(0.17)		(0.17)
Income		0.09*		0.08*		0.08*
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Married		0.10		0.10		0.09
		(0.34)		(0.35)		(0.35)
R^2	0.00	0.04	−0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.03	−0.00	0.03	−0.00	0.03
Num. obs.	844	844	837	837	837	837
RMSE	2.13	2.10	2.14	2.10	2.14	2.10

$^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Economic Growth for Non-Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Table A.36: Full Results from Models of Intrinsic-Instrumental Democracy Scale, Only Non-Core Universities

| | OLS | | TSLS - Fuzzy RDD Models | | | |
| | | | $T = f(X, D)$ | | $T = f(X, X^2, X^3, D)$ | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	0.20	0.21	0.13	0.10	0.17	0.16
	(0.15)	(0.84)	(0.17)	(0.86)	(0.17)	(0.85)
T	−0.03	−0.04	0.33	0.38	0.15	0.21
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Education		0.06		0.04		0.05
		(0.24)		(0.24)		(0.24)
CCP Member		−0.10		−0.09		−0.10
		(0.29)		(0.29)		(0.29)
Govt. Job		−0.65**		−0.68**		−0.68**
		(0.32)		(0.33)		(0.33)
Income		0.10		0.11		0.11
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)
Married		0.06		0.11		0.09
		(0.65)		(0.66)		(0.65)
R^2	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	843	843	836	836	836	836
RMSE	3.98	3.98	3.99	3.99	3.99	3.98

$^{**}p < 0.05, {}^{*}p < 0.1$

Full results of models of Intrinsic-Instrumental Scale of Democracy for Non-Core Universities. One-sided tests per pre-registration plan.

Pre-analysis Plan: EGAP 20150825