

Online Appendix

This online appendix contains supplemental information for Tolley, Besco and Sevi's article, "Who Controls the Purse Strings? A Longitudinal Study of Gender and Donations in Canadian Politics."

Appendix A provides information on changes to the political finance regime, as well as detailed model results for the figures shown in the main paper. Appendix B provides supplemental analysis on other points of interest as indicated in the main text.

Appendix A

Political Donations: Summary of Legislative Changes

DATE	LEGISLATION	CHANGE
1974	<i>Election Expenses Act</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Anyone can donate (individuals, public/private corporations, governments, trade unions, etc.). - No max/limit to donation. - If the donation amount exceeds \$100 (in the form of money, goods, or services), the name of the donor and amount contributed must to be disclosed.
2003 – In effect January 2004	<i>An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act (political financing)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ban on corporate and union donations to political parties and an annual limit of \$1,000 that these entities may contribute to candidates, nomination contestants and riding associations collectively. - Limits on individual donations. Citizens and permanent residents may annually contribute \$5,000 in total to each registered party and its candidates, constituency associations and nomination contestants, collectively; plus a maximum of \$5,000 to leadership contestants; and a maximum of \$5,000 to independent candidates. - Requirement that constituency associations now register as political entities and report political contributions to them, as well as an extension of finance regulations to nomination and leadership campaigns. - Provisions to increase the public funding of political parties with registered parties receiving a quarterly allowance based on the number of votes obtained by the party in the prior election.
2007	<i>The Federal Accountability Act</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Complete ban on corporate and union donations to political campaigns. - Individual donations limited to \$1,000 in any calendar year to each registered party; \$1,000 in any calendar year to the constituency associations, nomination contestants and candidates of each registered party; \$1,000 to leadership contestants in a particular leadership

		contest; and \$1,000 to an independent candidate in an election. - Limits adjusted annually to account for inflation.
2011	Phasing out of the per-vote subsidy	- The phasing out of the per-vote subsidy to political parties was announced in the 2011. By spring 2015, the subsidy had been eliminated.
2014 – In effect January 2015	<i>The Fair Elections Act</i>	- Increase of individual annual donations limit from \$1,000 to \$1,500 (to registered parties, electoral district associations and party candidates, party leadership contestants, and independent candidates in an election). - Individual limit increases by \$25 each year.

Models to Support Figures in Main Text

Gender of Donors Over Time (Figure 1)

VARIABLES	All Donations	Large Donations
	Woman Donor	Woman Donor
1994.electionyear	0.10*** (0.02)	0.07* (0.04)
1995.electionyear	0.16*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)
1996.electionyear	0.14*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.04)
1997.electionyear	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.04)
1998.electionyear	0.15*** (0.01)	0.07* (0.04)
1999.electionyear	0.15*** (0.01)	0.06 (0.04)
2000.electionyear	0.14*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.03)
2001.electionyear	0.28*** (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)
2002.electionyear	0.08*** (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)

2003.electionyear	0.15***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.04)
2004.electionyear	0.22***	-0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.04)
2005.electionyear	0.22***	-0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2006.electionyear	0.21***	0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2007.electionyear	0.30***	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.04)
2008.electionyear	0.30***	0.08**
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2009.electionyear	0.33***	0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2010.electionyear	0.35***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2011.electionyear	0.35***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2012.electionyear	0.42***	0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2013.electionyear	0.44***	0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2014.electionyear	0.44***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2015.electionyear	0.46***	0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2016.electionyear	0.42***	0.18***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2017.electionyear	0.38***	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2018.electionyear	0.29***	0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
2019.electionyear	0.27***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.97***	-1.02***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
Observations	4,455,928	332,691

Note: logistic regression, gender of donor is DV.

Standard errors in parentheses

**** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Size of Donations, by Gender of Donors, Over Time (Figure 2)

VARIABLES	Amount of Donation
WomanDonor	-16.24** (7.23)
1994.electionyear	-12.90** (6.44)
1995.electionyear	-18.55*** (6.61)
1996.electionyear	13.51** (6.22)
1997.electionyear	44.51*** (5.34)
1998.electionyear	-5.42 (6.15)
1999.electionyear	-1.99 (6.05)
2000.electionyear	33.61*** (4.99)
2001.electionyear	-37.02*** (6.93)
2002.electionyear	188.80*** (7.78)
2003.electionyear	269.96*** (7.29)
2004.electionyear	-52.44*** (4.84)
2005.electionyear	-61.03*** (4.49)
2006.electionyear	13.95*** (4.39)
2007.electionyear	-120.11*** (4.54)
2008.electionyear	-82.99*** (4.30)
2009.electionyear	-97.97*** (4.41)
2010.electionyear	-117.24*** (4.44)
2011.electionyear	-93.98*** (4.22)
2012.electionyear	-132.12***

	(4.29)
2013.electionyear	-130.61***
	(4.22)
2014.electionyear	-121.52***
	(4.18)
2015.electionyear	-131.75***
	(3.99)
2016.electionyear	-159.53***
	(4.11)
2017.electionyear	-172.52***
	(4.07)
2018.electionyear	-61.38***
	(4.90)
2019.electionyear	-50.00***
	(7.05)
WomanDonor#1994.electionyear	-5.14
	(12.00)
WomanDonor#1995.electionyear	-7.54
	(12.14)
WomanDonor#1996.electionyear	-14.40
	(11.50)
WomanDonor#1997.electionyear	-21.67**
	(10.12)
WomanDonor#1998.electionyear	-13.66
	(11.33)
WomanDonor#1999.electionyear	-19.87*
	(11.17)
WomanDonor#2000.electionyear	-17.85*
	(9.30)
WomanDonor#2001.electionyear	-54.59***
	(12.36)
WomanDonor#2002.electionyear	-32.19**
	(14.52)
WomanDonor#2003.electionyear	-33.21**
	(13.36)
WomanDonor#2004.electionyear	-35.43***
	(8.95)
WomanDonor#2005.electionyear	-47.61***
	(8.37)
WomanDonor#2006.electionyear	-39.58***
	(8.22)
WomanDonor#2007.electionyear	-27.17***
	(8.40)

WomanDonor#2008.electionyear	-29.75***
	(8.02)
WomanDonor#2009.electionyear	-30.07***
	(8.17)
WomanDonor#2010.electionyear	-19.23**
	(8.21)
WomanDonor#2011.electionyear	-26.57***
	(7.87)
WomanDonor#2012.electionyear	-23.32***
	(7.94)
WomanDonor#2013.electionyear	-32.29***
	(7.84)
WomanDonor#2014.electionyear	-36.34***
	(7.78)
WomanDonor#2015.electionyear	-24.26***
	(7.50)
WomanDonor#2016.electionyear	-15.96**
	(7.68)
WomanDonor#2017.electionyear	-15.29**
	(7.63)
WomanDonor#2018.electionyear	-17.55*
	(8.99)
WomanDonor#2019.electionyear	-28.47**
	(12.58)
Constant	319.69***
	(3.80)
Observations	4,454,265
R-squared	0.01

*Note: OLS regression, DV is monetary donations in dollars.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Donations by Party (Figure 3)

VARIABLES	Woman Donor
NDP	0.61*** (0.02)
BQ	0.10** (0.05)
Conservative	-0.22*** (0.02)
1994.electionyear	0.19*** (0.03)
1995.electionyear	0.15*** (0.03)
1996.electionyear	0.21*** (0.03)
1997.electionyear	0.04* (0.02)
1998.electionyear	0.26*** (0.03)
1999.electionyear	0.19*** (0.03)
2000.electionyear	0.13*** (0.02)
2001.electionyear	-0.01 (0.04)
2002.electionyear	0.03 (0.04)
2003.electionyear	0.11*** (0.03)
2004.electionyear	-0.00 (0.02)
2005.electionyear	0.03 (0.02)
2006.electionyear	0.25*** (0.02)
2007.electionyear	0.30*** (0.02)
2008.electionyear	0.31*** (0.02)
2009.electionyear	0.30*** (0.02)
2010.electionyear	0.30***

	(0.02)
2011.electionyear	0.38***
	(0.02)
2012.electionyear	0.37***
	(0.02)
2013.electionyear	0.44***
	(0.02)
2014.electionyear	0.37***
	(0.02)
2015.electionyear	0.52***
	(0.02)
2016.electionyear	0.55***
	(0.02)
2017.electionyear	0.56***
	(0.02)
2018.electionyear	0.48***
	(0.02)
2019.electionyear	0.52***
	(0.02)
NDP#1994.electionyear	-0.21***
	(0.04)
NDP#1995.electionyear	-0.17***
	(0.04)
NDP#1996.electionyear	-0.21***
	(0.04)
NDP#1997.electionyear	-0.07**
	(0.03)
NDP#1998.electionyear	-0.21***
	(0.04)
NDP#1999.electionyear	-0.13***
	(0.04)
NDP#2000.electionyear	-0.08***
	(0.03)
NDP#2001.electionyear	-0.01
	(0.05)
NDP#2002.electionyear	0.02
	(0.05)
NDP#2003.electionyear	-0.04
	(0.05)
NDP#2004.electionyear	0.16***
	(0.03)
NDP#2005.electionyear	0.10***
	(0.03)

NDP#2006.electionyear	-0.09***
	(0.03)
NDP#2007.electionyear	-0.10***
	(0.03)
NDP#2008.electionyear	-0.10***
	(0.03)
NDP#2009.electionyear	-0.09***
	(0.03)
NDP#2010.electionyear	-0.07**
	(0.03)
NDP#2011.electionyear	-0.19***
	(0.03)
NDP#2012.electionyear	-0.15***
	(0.03)
NDP#2013.electionyear	-0.21***
	(0.03)
NDP#2014.electionyear	-0.10***
	(0.03)
NDP#2015.electionyear	-0.31***
	(0.02)
NDP#2016.electionyear	-0.28***
	(0.03)
NDP#2017.electionyear	-0.34***
	(0.02)
NDP#2018.electionyear	-0.37***
	(0.03)
NDP#2019.electionyear	-0.41***
	(0.05)
BQ#1994.electionyear	-0.36***
	(0.07)
BQ#1995.electionyear	-0.20***
	(0.07)
BQ#1996.electionyear	-0.24***
	(0.07)
BQ#1997.electionyear	0.07
	(0.06)
BQ#1998.electionyear	-0.30***
	(0.08)
BQ#1999.electionyear	-0.23***
	(0.07)
BQ#2000.electionyear	-0.02
	(0.06)
BQ#2001.electionyear	0.35***

	(0.12)
BQ#2002.electionyear	0.19*
	(0.12)
BQ#2003.electionyear	-0.02
	(0.11)
BQ#2004.electionyear	0.05
	(0.06)
BQ#2005.electionyear	0.09
	(0.06)
BQ#2006.electionyear	-0.03
	(0.06)
BQ#2007.electionyear	-0.05
	(0.07)
BQ#2008.electionyear	-0.28***
	(0.06)
BQ#2009.electionyear	-0.24***
	(0.06)
BQ#2010.electionyear	-0.28***
	(0.06)
BQ#2011.electionyear	-0.16***
	(0.06)
BQ#2012.electionyear	-0.52***
	(0.08)
BQ#2013.electionyear	-0.64***
	(0.08)
BQ#2014.electionyear	-0.30***
	(0.07)
BQ#2015.electionyear	-0.60***
	(0.06)
BQ#2016.electionyear	-0.53***
	(0.07)
BQ#2017.electionyear	-0.58***
	(0.07)
BQ#2018.electionyear	-0.50***
	(0.10)
BQ#2019.electionyear	-0.61***
	(0.13)
Conservative#1994.electionyear	-0.17***
	(0.04)
Conservative#1995.electionyear	-0.06
	(0.04)
Conservative#1996.electionyear	-0.10***
	(0.04)

Conservative#1997.electionyear	-0.02
	(0.03)
Conservative#1998.electionyear	-0.12***
	(0.04)
Conservative#1999.electionyear	-0.01
	(0.04)
Conservative#2000.electionyear	0.05
	(0.03)
Conservative#2001.electionyear	0.21***
	(0.06)
Conservative#2002.electionyear	0.32***
	(0.06)
Conservative#2003.electionyear	0.28***
	(0.05)
Conservative#2004.electionyear	0.20***
	(0.03)
Conservative#2005.electionyear	0.28***
	(0.03)
Conservative#2006.electionyear	0.01
	(0.03)
Conservative#2007.electionyear	0.04
	(0.03)
Conservative#2008.electionyear	0.04
	(0.03)
Conservative#2009.electionyear	0.14***
	(0.03)
Conservative#2010.electionyear	0.14***
	(0.03)
Conservative#2011.electionyear	0.01
	(0.02)
Conservative#2012.electionyear	0.06**
	(0.03)
Conservative#2013.electionyear	0.04
	(0.02)
Conservative#2014.electionyear	0.10***
	(0.02)
Conservative#2015.electionyear	-0.09***
	(0.02)
Conservative#2016.electionyear	-0.14***
	(0.02)
Conservative#2017.electionyear	-0.21***
	(0.02)
Conservative#2018.electionyear	-0.14***

	(0.03)
Conservative#2019.electionyear	-0.22***
	(0.04)
Constant	-1.04***
	(0.02)
Observations	4,425,748

Note: logistic regression, gender of donor is DV.

Standard errors in parentheses

**** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Type of Donation (Figure 4)

VARIABLES	Woman Donor
National Party (election year)	0.34***
	(0.01)
National Party (non-election year)	0.34***
	(0.01)
Local Party (election year)	0.25***
	(0.01)
Local Party (non-election year)	0.26***
	(0.01)
Constant	-0.94***
	(0.01)
Observations	4,455,918

Note: logistic regression, gender of donor is DV.

Donations to Candidates is reference category.

*Standard errors in parentheses *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Gender Affinity by Year (Figure 5)

VARIABLES	Woman Donor
Woman Candidate	0.22*** (0.04)
1997	0.06** (0.03)
2000	0.22*** (0.02)
2004	0.16*** (0.03)
2006	0.11*** (0.03)
2008	0.27*** (0.03)
2011	0.27*** (0.03)
2015	0.26*** (0.03)
WomanCandidate#1997	-0.04 (0.05)
WomanCandidate#2000	-0.08 (0.05)
WomanCandidate#2004	-0.07 (0.05)
WomanCandidate#2006	0.08 (0.05)
WomanCandidate#2008	-0.09 (0.06)
WomanCandidate#2011	-0.07 (0.06)
WomanCandidate#2015	-0.05 (0.05)
Minister	-0.25*** (0.03)
NDP	0.51*** (0.02)
BQ	0.34*** (0.03)
Conservative	-0.14***

	(0.01)
Incumbent	-0.03**
	(0.02)
Elected	0.07***
	(0.02)
Result	-0.00***
	(0.00)
Constant	-1.13***
	(0.03)
Observations	140,489

Note: logistic regression, gender of donor is DV.

Standard errors in parentheses

**** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Gender Affinity by Party (Figure 6)

VARIABLES	Woman Donor
WomanCandidate	0.19*** (0.02)
NDP	0.53*** (0.02)
BQ	0.33*** (0.03)
Conservative	-0.13*** (0.02)
WomanCandidate # NDP	-0.02 (0.04)
WomanCandidate # BQ	0.07 (0.07)
WomanCandidate # Conservative	-0.06* (0.04)
Minister	-0.22*** (0.03)
Incumbent	-0.03* (0.02)
Elected	0.06*** (0.02)
Result	-0.00*** (0.00)
Electionyear	0.01*** (0.00)
WomanCandidate	
Constant	-23.54*** (1.81)
Observations	143,376

Note: logistic regression, gender of donor is DV.


Standard errors in parentheses

**** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Appendix B: Supplemental Analysis


Additional Party Figures

Below are two figures related to Figure 3 in the main text. The first is generated using the same model as Figure 3 but also shows the Bloc Québécois (see Appendix A for the table). The second is a similar model but separates the Reform Party and the PC party during the 1994-1998 period. Notably, there is little difference in the proportion of women between the Reform and PC parties.



Gender of Donors by Party, with Bloc Donations Included

Note: Predicted probabilities shown. n= 1,448,746.



Donations with a Divided Right

Predicted probabilities shown. n= 245,773.

VARIABLES	Woman Donor
NDP	0.61*** (0.02)
Reform	-0.20*** (0.03)
PC	-0.26*** (0.03)
1994.electionyear	0.19*** (0.03)
1995.electionyear	0.15*** (0.03)
1996.electionyear	0.21*** (0.03)
1997.electionyear	0.04* (0.02)
1998.electionyear	0.26*** (0.03)
NDP#1994.electionyear	-0.21*** (0.04)
NDP#1995.electionyear	-0.17*** (0.04)
NDP#1996.electionyear	-0.21*** (0.04)
NDP#1997.electionyear	-0.07** (0.03)
NDP#1998.electionyear	-0.21*** (0.04)
Reform#1994.electionyear	-0.10** (0.05)
Reform#1995.electionyear	-0.06 (0.05)
Reform#1996.electionyear	-0.06 (0.04)
Reform#1997.electionyear	0.00 (0.04)
Reform#1998.electionyear	-0.14*** (0.04)
Reform#1994.electionyear	-0.24*** (0.05)
PC#1995.electionyear	-0.05

	(0.05)
PC#1996.electionyear	-0.16***
	(0.05)
PC#1997.electionyear	-0.04
	(0.04)
PC#1998.electionyear	-0.09*
	(0.05)
Constant	-1.04***
	(0.02)
Observations	245,643

Logistic regression. 1994-1998 donations only. n=245,643
*Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Amount of Donations by Party

Another question is whether the size of donations varies systematically by party, and party donors also by gender. For example, women might disproportionately donate to the NDP, and NDP donations also tend to be smaller. To examine differences in size, we model the difference in donation size between men and women for each party. All parties have negative point estimates, showing that women donate less than men. The BQ confidence interval crosses zero, although since we are using population administrative data, we don't really think this should be considered a null. However, it is notable that the gender gap in the size of donations to the NDP is considerably smaller than the Conservatives or Liberals. That is, there is a smaller difference in the size of donations by men and women to the NDP. This may be because the NDP gets considerably fewer large donations, and it is among large donations that we see the largest gender gap.

VARIABLES	Amount of Donation
WomanDonor	-46.10***
	(1.45)
NDP	-129.97***
	(1.26)
BQ	53.85***
	(3.87)
Conservatives	-18.60***
	(1.12)
WomanDonor#NDP	23.44***
	(2.02)
WomanDonor#BQ	36.46***
	(7.14)

WomanDonor#Conservatives	8.74*** (1.97)
Constant	260.88*** (0.86)
Observations	4,424,085
R-squared	0.01

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Potential Multiple Donations

Since we do not have exact addresses, we cannot identify unique individuals as donors. One concern might be that if there is a gender difference between those who give multiple times and those who give just once, then this might produce different results when analyzing donations rather than unique donors. To gain some leverage on this issue, we use a name/postalcode/year variable, which identifies donors with the same name in the same postal code. After 2003, reliable postal code data are provided for each donation, so the analysis only includes the years from 2004-2018. We allow individuals to recur in multiple years since our analysis is over time and because constraining the analysis to a single year would bias the data to a person’s first donation. Essentially this creates a dataset of (probable) individuals in each year. This is not a perfect method, since there may well be people with the same name in the same postal code, or those who have moved and hence have different postal codes. However, it is the best method for eliminating a large number of multiple donations by the same person, and so it is a useful way to check the effect of the analysis.

Our main concern was that the gender balance is different among donors who give once versus many times. To test this, we replicate some key analyses from the paper, but include an interaction with a dichotomous first/subsequent donations variable. Figure 4b duplicates the analysis in Figure 1 and Figure 2 but shows gender of first donation per year and subsequent donations. The multiple donations line is somewhat higher, showing that donors who give multiple times are more likely to be women. However, the difference is modest – about 5% – and still much smaller than the ~30% difference between men and women. The right panel of Figure 4b shows similar analysis for the size of donations. Not surprisingly, initial donations are larger; this is because, among other reasons, a large initial donation leaves less room for subsequent donations relative to the donation limit. Importantly, the relationship to gender is the same: for both initial and subsequent donations, men make larger donations than women.

Since the gender relationships and trend over time of these analyses are quite similar, it doesn’t seem likely that multiple donations are responsible for our primary results. On the other hand, the postalcode/name combination is certainly not a perfect unique identifier, so we don’t include these results in the main paper

Figure 4b: Initial vs Subsequent Donations by Gender

Note: Panel on left shows gender of donor, panel on right shows mean size of donations. n=4,086,435

Gender of Donors by Initial and Subsequent Donations

VARIABLES	Woman Donor
2005.electionyear	-0.08*** (0.03)
2006.electionyear	-0.05** (0.02)
2007.electionyear	-0.04 (0.03)
2008.electionyear	0.01 (0.02)
2009.electionyear	-0.04 (0.03)
2010.electionyear	0.05* (0.03)
2011.electionyear	0.03 (0.02)
2012.electionyear	0.08*** (0.03)
2013.electionyear	0.11*** (0.03)
2014.electionyear	0.06** (0.03)
2015.electionyear	0.11*** (0.02)
2016.electionyear	0.08*** (0.03)
2017.electionyear	0.03 (0.03)
2018.electionyear	0.10*** (0.02)
2019.electionyear	-0.00 (0.03)
Multiple donations	0.50*** (0.03)
2005.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.22*** (0.04)
2006.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.24***

	(0.03)
2007.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.17***
	(0.04)
2008.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.21***
	(0.03)
2009.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.15***
	(0.04)
2010.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.21***
	(0.04)
2011.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.18***
	(0.03)
2012.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.18***
	(0.04)
2013.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.20***
	(0.04)
2014.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.14***
	(0.04)
2015.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.17***
	(0.03)
2016.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.19***
	(0.04)
2017.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.18***
	(0.04)
2018.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.30***
	(0.03)
2019.electionyear#Multipledonations	-0.19***
	(0.04)
Constant	-0.93***
	(0.02)
Observations	4,086,435

Logistic Regression. Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Amount of Donation and Gender of Donors, by Initial and Subsequent Donations

VARIABLES	Amount of Donation
WomanDonor	-14.30
	(14.36)
2005.electionyear	127.09***
	(11.64)

2006.electionyear	104.85***
	(9.55)
2007.electionyear	-0.43
	(11.34)
2008.electionyear	35.74***
	(9.41)
2009.electionyear	14.46
	(11.32)
2010.electionyear	32.68***
	(11.22)
2011.electionyear	47.53***
	(9.61)
2012.electionyear	-7.94
	(12.29)
2013.electionyear	-30.39**
	(11.93)
2014.electionyear	77.03***
	(11.28)
2015.electionyear	126.64***
	(9.04)
2016.electionyear	116.60***
	(12.73)
2017.electionyear	-23.38*
	(11.94)
2018.electionyear	131.98***
	(9.86)
2019.electionyear	183.95***
	(13.74)
WomanDonor#2005.electionyear	-32.70
	(22.24)
WomanDonor#2006.electionyear	-0.84
	(18.08)
WomanDonor#2007.electionyear	3.67
	(21.48)
WomanDonor#2008.electionyear	16.11
	(17.67)
WomanDonor#2009.electionyear	26.98
	(21.44)
WomanDonor#2010.electionyear	5.14
	(20.91)
WomanDonor#2011.electionyear	40.25**
	(18.00)
WomanDonor#2012.electionyear	10.16

	(22.73)
WomanDonor#2013.electionyear	-18.26
	(21.91)
WomanDonor#2014.electionyear	7.73
	(20.97)
WomanDonor#2015.electionyear	14.57
	(16.80)
WomanDonor#2016.electionyear	15.79
	(23.49)
WomanDonor#2017.electionyear	19.37
	(22.28)
WomanDonor#2018.electionyear	-11.27
	(18.29)
WomanDonor#2019.electionyear	-20.19
	(25.84)
MultipleDonations	-51.74***
	(13.95)
WomanDonor#MultipleDonations	-1.99
	(23.46)
2005.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-308.79***
	(16.67)
2006.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-226.12***
	(15.26)
2007.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-239.57***
	(16.47)
2008.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-254.21***
	(15.14)
2009.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-226.63***
	(16.42)
2010.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-269.36***
	(16.36)
2011.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-267.97***
	(15.24)
2012.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-230.60***
	(17.06)
2013.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-205.07***
	(16.79)
2014.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-308.86***
	(16.32)
2015.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-380.83***
	(14.81)
2016.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-380.88***
	(17.34)

2017.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-251.31***
	(16.76)
2018.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-397.18***
	(15.68)
2019.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-465.54***
	(19.28)
WomanDonor#2005.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-9.76
	(29.29)
WomanDonor#2006.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-34.56
	(26.24)
WomanDonor#2007.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-26.03
	(28.72)
WomanDonor#2008.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-40.95
	(25.88)
WomanDonor#2009.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-54.34*
	(28.62)
WomanDonor#2010.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-19.75
	(28.24)
WomanDonor#2011.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-63.43**
	(26.05)
WomanDonor#2012.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-31.30
	(29.53)
WomanDonor#2013.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-11.78
	(28.87)
WomanDonor#2014.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-40.73
	(28.15)
WomanDonor#2015.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-32.94
	(25.11)
WomanDonor#2016.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-29.56
	(30.05)
WomanDonor#2017.electionyear#MultipleDonations	-33.19
	(29.10)
WomanDonor#2018.electionyear#MultipleDonations	11.99
	(26.73)
WomanDonor#2019.electionyear#MultipleDonations	25.25
	(33.87)
Constant	466.01***
	(7.65)
Observations	4,086,210
R-squared	0.02

OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Partner Donations

Another possible effect of donation limits is they might contribute to a change in the gender gap because men might start to donate “in the name of” their women partners. If this were the case, then we would expect a jump in women donors at certain points, such as when the donation limit was changed from \$5000 to \$1000 in 2007. Although we do not have precise household data, we can look at people with the same last name in the same postal code. Again, this is not perfect, since many people of the same last name might live in the same postal code, and not all partners have the same last name, but we would not expect a sharp change in the gender composition of this group over a short time period.

To conduct this analysis, we generate a partner donor variable: those who have another donor with the same last name in the same postal code. This is accomplished by dropping all duplicates of fullname/postalcode/year, as was done above. Then we create a variable that is lastname/postalcode/year, and use this to generate a duplicate variable (if there is a person of the same last name in the same postal code), which is used in the partner donor analysis. The key question is if partner donors show an especially large increase in the proportion of women around the 2004/2006 time period.

The model has this partner variable as the dependent variable, and election year, gender, and an interaction as independent variables. Figure 5b shows the predicted probabilities that a donor has a partner (same lastname/postalcode), by gender. Of course, the total number of multiple donation donors depends on the total number of donations, but this doesn't determine the ratio of men/women. If there were an increase in men donating in the name of their woman partner, we would expect that multiple donation donors would be more likely to be women after 2004/2006 period. In fact, this is not the case. Of course, this method is not perfect: not all domestic partners are married, not all women change their names, not all partnerships are between men and women, and so on. Nonetheless, this analysis shows no evidence that the decrease in donation limits was associated with an increase in donations by the female partners of male donors.

These results suggest that any effect of regulations with respect to donor gender is small and does not change the results of the main analysis. This is perhaps not surprising, given that the bulk of donations, and donors, are below the donation limit.

Figure 5b: Partner Donations

Note: Donations by people of the same last name (but different first names) residing in the same postal code. Left panel shows donations by men and women, right panel shows difference, with higher values indicating more men. N=349,772

Partner Donations by Gender

VARIABLES	Woman Donor
2001	0.60*** (0.03)
2002	1.23*** (0.03)
2003	1.03*** (0.03)
2004	0.44*** (0.02)
2005	0.67*** (0.03)
2006	0.62*** (0.03)
2007	1.00*** (0.03)
2008	0.72*** (0.02)
2009	0.92*** (0.03)
2010	1.03*** (0.03)
2011	0.78*** (0.02)
2012	1.05*** (0.03)
2013	0.99*** (0.03)
2014	0.87*** (0.03)
2015	0.11*** (0.02)
2016	1.00*** (0.03)

2017	0.30***
	(0.03)
2018	0.11***
	(0.03)
2019	0.66***
	(0.04)
WomanDonor	0.09**
	(0.04)
2001 #WomanDonor	0.15***
	(0.05)
2002 #WomanDonor	0.15***
	(0.05)
2003 #WomanDonor	-0.07
	(0.05)
2004 #WomanDonor	-0.03
	(0.05)
2005 #WomanDonor	0.04
	(0.06)
2006 #WomanDonor	-0.07
	(0.05)
2007 #WomanDonor	-0.06
	(0.06)
2008 #WomanDonor	-0.08*
	(0.05)
2009 #WomanDonor	-0.10*
	(0.06)
2010 #WomanDonor	-0.10*
	(0.05)
2011 #WomanDonor	-0.09*
	(0.05)
2012 #WomanDonor	-0.08
	(0.06)
2013 #WomanDonor	-0.17***
	(0.06)
2014 #WomanDonor	-0.16***
	(0.05)
2015 #WomanDonor	-0.06
	(0.04)
2016 #WomanDonor	-0.16***
	(0.06)
2017 #WomanDonor	0.03
	(0.06)
2018 #WomanDonor	-0.08*

	(0.05)
2019 #WomanDonor	-0.05
	(0.07)
Constant	-0.41 ***
	(0.02)
Observations	349,772
R-squared	

*Note: OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Donations of Different Sizes, including Under \$100

There is some inconsistency in reporting donations under \$100: for example, these donations are reported for candidates in 1993, but not for parties. This seems to be an administrative decision by Elections Canada, rather than a legislative requirement, and the reasons are not clear. The absence of donations under \$100 seems to be greater in earlier years, with some years missing them entirely, although there were also probably fewer small donations prior to the emergence of online transactions. The main question is whether these discrepancies are a major issue for the over-time analysis, since the gender of small versus large donations is different.

To examine this, we repeat the analysis in Figure 1 of the main text for four different categories of donation amounts: <\$100, \$100-\$500, \$501-\$1000, \$1000. The results are in Figure 6b below. For the <\$100 model we only estimate 2004 and after because in earlier years the number of donations vary widely, and we do not think the estimates are very informative (partly because we think these variations are due to changes in reporting decisions not regulations). Importantly, the over-time pattern for the \$100-\$500 donations is essentially the same as in Figure 1: rise over time, and a post 2015 decline. This suggests that those results are not driven by missing <\$100 donations. However, the two larger categories show a quite different pattern: no increase at all in the \$500-\$1000 category, and some increase in \$1000+ but still much smaller increase than in the small donations category.

Gender of Donors in Different Amount Categories

Donations by Gender for Different Categories of Donation Amounts

VARIABLES	<\$100	\$100-\$500	\$501-\$1000	\$1000
1994.electionyear		0.10***	0.03	0.04
		(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.09)
1995.electionyear		0.17***	-0.03	0.07

		(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.09)
1996.electionyear		0.16***	-0.05	0.04
		(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.08)
1997.electionyear		0.03*	-0.03	0.09
		(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.07)
1998.electionyear		0.17***	0.08	-0.00
		(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.08)
1999.electionyear		0.16***	0.03	0.03
		(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.08)
2000.electionyear	0.57	0.15***	0.10**	0.05
	(0.39)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.07)
2001.electionyear	0.75**	0.10***	-0.07	0.06
	(0.38)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.09)
2002.electionyear	-0.36	0.09***	0.00	0.09
	(0.62)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.08)
2003.electionyear	0.73	0.15***	0.15***	0.19***
	(0.50)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)
2004.electionyear	0.73*	0.07***	-0.09	0.06
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.07)
2005.electionyear	0.75**	0.05***	-0.00	-0.09
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.07)
2006.electionyear	0.77**	0.05***	0.10**	0.09
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)
2007.electionyear	0.79**	0.09***	-0.18***	0.20***
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.07)
2008.electionyear	0.82**	0.10***	-0.03	0.13**
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)
2009.electionyear	0.78**	0.14***	0.02	0.13**
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)
2010.electionyear	0.79**	0.15***	-0.02	0.13**
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)
2011.electionyear	0.81**	0.18***	-0.01	0.09
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)
2012.electionyear	0.86**	0.24***	-0.00	0.15**
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)
2013.electionyear	0.87**	0.24***	-0.11**	0.16***
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)
2014.electionyear	0.90**	0.21***	0.02	0.19***
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)
2015.electionyear	0.88**	0.26***	0.07	0.23***
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)
2016.electionyear	0.81**	0.20***	0.07	0.22***
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)

2017.electionyear	0.76**	0.19***	-0.17***	0.14**
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)
2018.electionyear	0.72*	0.23***	0.05	0.10
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)
2019.electionyear	0.76**	0.20***	0.02	0.04
	(0.38)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Constant	-1.20***	-0.96***	-0.87***	-1.06***
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Observations	1,958,092	2,165,145	128,770	134,364

Logistic Regression. Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Donations to In and Out of District Candidates

Do gender affinity effects extend beyond the local district? Since people can donate to candidates outside their district, gender affinity effects might be larger among people who donate outside the district. To determine whether donors contributed to a local candidate or to one outside of their own electoral district, we link donors' postal codes to the applicable federal electoral district using Statistics Canada's postal code conversion files. We create a new variable for in- and out-of-district donations for all donations to candidates between 2004 and 2018 (data not available in all files for earlier years). We create this variable by comparing, for each donation, the electoral district of the donor and the candidate. There are some limitations to this approach, including errors in postal codes and postal codes that cross electoral district boundaries, but we successfully matched 58,531 or 73% of all donations to candidates to their respective electoral districts.

To examine gender affinity to candidates inside and outside the donor's district, we use a model similar to the one above: the gender of the donor is the dependent variable, and gender of the candidate is an independent variable. Here, we also include a variable for if the donation is to candidate is in a different district, and an interaction term between the two. Election year is not included, since it makes the cells too small for useful estimates. As before, there are controls for ministerial status, incumbency, percentage of votes received, if the candidate won the election, and party. The results show that gender affinity is stronger for donations to candidates outside the donor's district: 31% of donations to women candidates are from women, and 28% of donations to men candidates are from women: a difference of 3%. For donations to candidates outside the district, the gender affinity effect more than double the size, at 7%. This is the result of a smaller proportion of women (25%) supporting men candidates outside the district, while local men candidates received 28% of local donations from women ($p < .001$).

Gender Affinity for Candidates Inside and Outside Donor's District

VARIABLES	Woman Donor
WomanCandidate	0.14*** (0.03)
Out-of-District	-0.14*** (0.02)
WomanCandidate#Out-of-District	0.12*** (0.05)
Minister	-0.19*** (0.04)
Incumbent Candidate	0.02 (0.03)
Elected	0.01 (0.03)
Result	-0.00*** (0.00)
2006.electionyear	-0.02 (0.03)
2008.electionyear	0.09*** (0.03)
2011.electionyear	0.10*** (0.03)
NDP	0.46*** (0.03)
BQ	0.25*** (0.08)
Conservative	-0.21*** (0.02)
Constant	-0.86*** (0.04)
Observations	55,030

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$