# Online Appendix

# Survey

### Treatment condition: female mayor

Q1. Imagine that your city has decided to close down the school your child attends. The purpose is to balance the city budget. The classes will be split up and your child has been assigned a place in a low performing school. Your child is worried about this disruption and losing their classmates.

If you would contact a politician in your city to try to change the situation, who would you be most likely to approach?

* **Mayor** Susan Nelson (D) 371 559 42 31 susan.nelson@citygov.com
* **Chair of the School Board** Mark Gallagher (D) 372 559 42 57 mark.gallagher@citygov.com

Q2. After learning about the policy, a parent sends the following email to the mayor Susan Nelson:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 **From:**       a.smith@gmail.com  
 **Sent:**         September 8, 2018 11:34 p.m.  
 **To:**            Susan Nelson  
 **Subject:**  
 I demand to appeal my son’s school placement! How can you treat our children as lab rats!!? I know where you live and I know your kids' names and where they go to school. You stink and mark my words you and your family will PAY FOR THIS!

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

**To what extent do you think that the way the parent acted is acceptable?** By *acceptable*, we mean that you could justify a person doing something like this in this situation.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) |  |
| Completely acceptable |  |  |  |  |  | Compeletely unacceptable |

**To what extent do you think that the way the parent acted is understandable?**   
By *understandable*, we mean that you could see how a person in this situation would do something like this.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) |  |
| Completely understandable |  |  |  |  |  | Completely not understandable |

Q3. In your opinion, how appropriate would it be for the mayor to respond to the parent's email in the following ways?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Very appropriate (30) | Somewhat appropriate (31) | Neither appropriate nor inappropriate (32) | Somewhat inappropriate (33) | Very inappropriate (34) |
| Reply, apologize for the policy, and describe the appeal process for school allotments |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reply describing the appeal process for school allotments in a constructive tone |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reply describing the appeal process for school allotments and emphasize that the comments are unacceptable |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ignore the email |  |  |  |  |  |
| Report the email to Human Resources |  |  |  |  |  |
| Report the email to the police |  |  |  |  |  |

Q4. How acceptable do you think that this type of email is to other people in your community?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) |  |
| Completely acceptable |  |  |  |  |  | Completely unacceptable |

How common do you think that this type of email to politicians is in your community?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) |  |
| Very common |  |  |  |  |  | Very rare |

### Control condition: male mayor

Q1. Imagine that your city has decided to close down the school your child attends. The purpose is to balance the city budget. The classes will be split up and your child has been assigned a place in a low performing school. Your child is worried about this disruption and losing their classmates.   
  If you would contact a politician in your city to try to change the situation, who would you be most likely to approach?

* **Mayor** Mark Nelson (D) 371 559 42 31 mark.nelson@citygov.com
* **Chair of the School Board** Susan Gallagher (D) 372 559 42 57 susan.gallagher@citygov.com

Q2. After learning about the policy, a parent sends the following email to the mayor Mark Nelson:   
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 **From:**        a.smith@gmail.com  
 **Sent:**         September 8, 2018 11:34 p.m.  
 **To:**            Mark Nelson  
 **Subject:**  
 I demand to appeal my son’s school placement! How can you treat our children as lab rats!!? I know where you live and I know your kids' names and where they go to school. You stink and mark my words you and your family will PAY FOR THIS!  
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 **To what extent do you think that the way the parent acted is acceptable?**  
 By *acceptable*, we mean that you could justify a person doing something like this in this situation.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) |  |
| Completely acceptable |  |  |  |  |  | Compeletely unacceptable |

**To what extent do you think that the way the parent acted is understandable?**   
By *understandable*, we mean that you could see how a person in this situation would do something like this.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) |  |
| Completely understandable |  |  |  |  |  | Completely not understandable |

Q3. In your opinion, how appropriate would it be for the mayor to respond to the parent's email in the following ways?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Very appropriate (30) | Somewhat appropriate (31) | Neither appropriate nor inappropriate (32) | Somewhat inappropriate (33) | Very inappropriate (34) |
| Reply, apologize for the policy, and describe the appeal process for school allotments |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reply describing the appeal process for school allotments in a constructive tone |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reply describing the appeal process for school allotments and emphasize that the comments are unacceptable |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ignore the email |  |  |  |  |  |
| Report the email to Human Resources |  |  |  |  |  |
| Report the email to the police |  |  |  |  |  |

Q4. How acceptable do you think that this type of email is to other people in your community?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) |  |
| Completely acceptable |  |  |  |  |  | Completely unacceptable |

How common do you think that this type of email to politicians is in your community?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) |  |
| Very common |  |  |  |  |  | Very rare |

### Hostility levels in Study 2 (In Swedish):

High hostility email (replication of US survey, same text as in the US survey translated into Swedish):

*Jag kräver att få överklaga min sons skolplacering! Hur kan du behandla våra barn som labbråttor!? Jag vet var du bor och jag vet vad dina barn heter och vilken skola de går i. Du stinker och var så säker du och din familj kommer få BETALA FÖR DET HÄR!*

Low hostility email (in Swedish):

*Hur kan du leva med dig själv när du är så totalt inkompetent! Nu har du förstört kommunen så att barnen straffas. Skäms du inte? Sover du bra på nätterna? Litar dina barn ens på dig? Har nog aldrig hört och sett en sån falsk människa som dig. Räkna med att du kommer få betala för det här!*

Low hostility email translated into English:

*How can you live with yourself when you are so totally incompetent! Now you have ruined the municipality so that the children are punished. Are you not ashamed? Do you sleep well at night? Do your children even trust you? Have probably never heard about such a false person as you. You can count on that you will have to pay for this!*

### Building policy condition in Study 2

Under the building policy condition in Study 2, the first two questions are phrased as follows (translated into English):

Q1. Imagine that your city has decided to build a high-rise apartment building in a green area near your residence. Car traffic is expected to increase and your own residence can become less attractive.

  If you would contact a politician in your city to try to change the situation, who would you be most likely to approach?

* **Karin Bergström Mayor** Phone number: 0755-37821 Email: karin.bergstrom@kommun.se
* **Niklas Molin** **Chair of the Committee on Planning and Building** Phone number: 0755-37827 Email: niklas.molin@kommun.se

Q2. Anders Persson is a resident in the area who is upset. He sends the following email:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 **From:**        anders\_o\_persson@hotmail.com   
 **Sent:**         September 8, 2018 11:34 p.m.  
 **To:**            Karin Bergström  
 **Subject:**  
How can you live with yourself when you are so totally incompetent! Now you have ruined the municipality so that the citizens are punished. Are you not ashamed? Do you sleep well at night? Do your children even trust you? Have probably never heard about such a false person as you. You can count on that you will have to pay for this!

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 **To what extent do you think that the way the resident acted is acceptable?**

# Supplementary Tables

## Descriptive statistics

#### Table A1: Descriptive statistics Lucid Survey

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All | Control condition | Treatment condition |
| N (share) | 3765 | 1882 (0.50) | 1883 (0.50) |
| Age |  |  |  |
| 18-20 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| 20-29 | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.21 |
| 30-39 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.21 |
| 40-49 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.16 |
| 50-59 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| 60-69 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| 70-79 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| 80 and above | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Gender |  |  |  |
| Male | 0.48 | 0.47 | 0.49 |
| Female | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.51 |
| Ethnicity |  |  |  |
| White | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.70 |
| Non-white | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| Education |  |  |  |
| Low | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.35 |
| Middle | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.27 |
| High | 0.38 | 0.37 | 0.38 |
| Income (in $ 1 000 per year) | |  |  |
| Under 20 | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.21 |
| Between 20--40 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.29 |
| Between 40--60 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.20 |
| Between 60--80 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.13 |
| Between 80--120 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| Over 120 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| Party affiliation |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.43 |
| Republican | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.32 |
| Independent | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.26 |

#### Table A2: Descriptive statistics LORE Survey

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All | Control condition | Treatment condition |
| N (share) | 3761 | 1845 (0.50) | 1851 (0.50) |
| Age |  |  |  |
| Below 30 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.09 |
| 30-39 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.17 |
| 40-49 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 |
| 50-59 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.21 |
| 60-69 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.20 |
| 70 and above | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.16 |
| Gender |  |  |  |
| Male | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.51 |
| Female | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.49 |
| Education |  |  |  |
| Low | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| Middle | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.47 |
| High | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.50 |
| Income (in 1000 SEK per year) | |  |  |
| Less than 4 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Between 4--9 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Between 9--13 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 |
| Between 13--16 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Between 16--19 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| Between 19--23 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Between 23--26 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 |
| Between 26--30 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.09 |
| Between 30--37 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| Between 37--45 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.15 |
| Between 45--55 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| Between 55--65 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| More than 65 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| Other/NA | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |

#### Table A3: Survey versions

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Context | Policy area | Level of hostility in email | N |
| 1 | US | School | High | 3 765 |
| 2A | Sweden | School | High | 634 |
| 2B | Sweden | School | Low | 1 855 |
| 2C | Sweden | Building | Low | 626 |

Notes: Within each survey version, 50% of the respondents were randomised to treatment (female mayor) and 50% to control (male mayor).

## Tables on main hypotheses

### Hostility lenience

The size and statistical significance of differences in attitudes toward hostility are analysed by regressing each dimension of attitudes toward hostility, here denoted *k (understandable, acceptable,* and *sanctions)*, on a dummy variable for the treatment condition (female mayor), using the model

= α + + γ+ (1)

where I also control for the same respondent characteristics as in Table A4/A6 below. Positive estimates in the first two dimensions and negative estimates in the third indicate more lenient attitudes toward hostility.

#### Table A4. Hostility lenience, USA

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions |
| Female mayor | 0.018 | -0.077\* | 0.035\* | 0.022 | -0.078\* | 0.033 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.043) | (0.020) | (0.043) | (0.045) | (0.022) |
| Respondent female |  |  |  | -0.388\*\*\* | -0.222\*\*\* | -0.027 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.045) | (0.046) | (0.022) |
| FE for children. Reference category: Does not have children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Have children living at home |  |  |  | -0.188\*\*\* | -0.033 | 0.004 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.069) | (0.072) | (0.035) |
| Have children who have moved out |  |  |  | -0.115\*\* | -0.074 | -0.019 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.056) | (0.058) | (0.028) |
| FE for marital status. Reference category: Single |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Married |  |  |  | 0.003 | -0.018 | -0.004 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.055) | (0.057) | (0.028) |
| Divorced |  |  |  | 0.101 | 0.008 | -0.098\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.074) | (0.077) | (0.037) |
| FE for age groups |  |  |  | YES | YES | YES |
| FE for education |  |  |  | YES | YES | YES |
| FE for income |  |  |  | YES | YES | YES |
| Democrat |  |  |  | 0.034 | -0.028 | 0.026 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.045) | (0.047) | (0.023) |
| Voter |  |  |  | -0.051 | -0.011 | -0.027 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.051) | (0.053) | (0.026) |
| Degree of ideological identification |  |  |  | 0.057\*\*\* | 0.040\* | 0.004 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.010) |
| Constant | 1.875\*\*\* | 2.655\*\*\* | 2.875\*\*\* | 2.440\*\*\* | 3.039\*\*\* | 2.918\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.015) | (0.127) | (0.131) | (0.064) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,748 | 3,748 | 3,735 | 3,352 | 3,352 | 3,352 |
| R-squared | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.074 | 0.031 | 0.017 |

Notes: Data from Study 1. Survey items as follows. *Acceptable*: ”To what extent do you think that the way the parent acted is acceptable?” , measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Completely unacceptable” and 5 is “Completely acceptable”. *Understandable*: ”To what extent do you think that the way the parent acted is understandable?” , measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Completely not understandable” and 5 is “Completely understandable”. *Democrat* refers to being a democrat rather than a republican or independent. *Voter* refer to having voted in 2016 or not. *Degree of ideological identification* goes from 0—3 where 0 is “middle of the road” and 3 is either “extremely liberal” or “extremely conservative”. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

#### Table A5. Hostility lenience: level of sanction considered appropriate, USA

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Apologize | Constructive tone | Ignore | Emphasize hostile comments unacceptable | Report to HR | Report to police | Sanctions compiled |
| Female mayor | -0.060 | -0.006 | -0.008 | 0.060 | 0.066 | 0.025 | 0.035\* |
|  | (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.043) | (0.039) | (0.042) | (0.044) | (0.020) |
| Constant | 3.764\*\*\* | 3.851\*\*\* | 2.445\*\*\* | 3.555\*\*\* | 3.376\*\*\* | 3.488\*\*\* | 2.875\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.031) | (0.027) | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.015) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,735 | 3,735 | 3,735 | 3,735 | 3,735 | 3,735 | 3,735 |
| R-squared | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 |

Notes: Data from Study 1. Survey item: “In your opinion, how appropriate would it be for the mayor to respond to the parent’s email in the following ways?” , measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Very inappropriate” and 5 is “Very appropriate”. *Apologize:* “Reply, apologize for the policy, and describe the appeal process for school allotments”. *Constructive tone:* “Reply describing the appeal process for school allotments in a constructive tone”. *Ignore the email:* “Ignore the email”. *Emphasize hostile comments unacceptable:* “Reply describing the appeal process for school allotments and emphasize that the comments are unacceptable.” *Report to HR:* “Report the email to Human Resources.” *Report to police:* “Report the email to the police”. *Sanctions compiled:* All dimensions of sanctions are added up into one scale, where items without sanctions (*Apologize* and *Constructive*) give negative values and the rest give positive values. The variable has been rescaled so that it ranges from 1—5.

#### Table A6: Hostility lenience, Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions |
| Female mayor | -0.096\*\*\* | -0.145\*\*\* | 0.156\*\*\* | -0.110\*\* | -0.086 | 0.121\*\*\* |
|  | (0.034) | (0.046) | (0.029) | (0.050) | (0.065) | (0.041) |
| Respondent female |  |  |  | -0.298\*\*\* | -0.337\*\*\* | -0.042 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.052) | (0.068) | (0.042) |
| Does not have children |  |  |  | 0.029 | 0.092 | 0.003 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.072) | (0.093) | (0.057) |
| FE for marital status. Reference category: Single |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Married |  |  |  | -0.061 | -0.054 | 0.056 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.070) | (0.091) | (0.057) |
| Divorced |  |  |  | -0.035 | 0.312\*\* | 0.039 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.105) | (0.137) | (0.089) |
| FE for age groups |  |  |  | YES | YES | YES |
| FE for education |  |  |  | YES | YES | YES |
| FE for income |  |  |  | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 1.540\*\*\* | 2.625\*\*\* | 2.828\*\*\* | 2.064\*\*\* | 3.181\*\*\* | 2.791\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.033) | (0.021) | (0.180) | (0.235) | (0.153) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,115 | 3,109 | 2,789 | 1,517 | 1,512 | 1,366 |
| R-squared | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.010 | 0.039 | 0.049 | 0.057 |

Note. Data from study 2. Outcome variables defined in Table A4 and A5. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

#### Table A7: Attitudes toward hostility against women and men across survey versions, Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Acceptable | Acceptable | Acceptable | Understandable | Understandable | Understandable | Sanctions | Sanctions | Sanctions |
|  | 2A | 2B | 2C | 2A | 2B | 2C | 2A | 2B | 2C |
| Female mayor | -0.096 | -0.146\*\* | 0.057 | -0.125 | -0.088 | -0.046 | 0.011 | 0.110\*\* | 0.178\*\* |
|  | (0.087) | (0.069) | (0.109) | (0.130) | (0.086) | (0.145) | (0.087) | (0.052) | (0.084) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 1.333\*\*\* | 2.431\*\*\* | 1.752\*\*\* | 1.753\*\*\* | 3.693\*\*\* | 3.293\*\*\* | 3.599\*\*\* | 2.538\*\*\* | 2.534\*\*\* |
|  | (0.335) | (0.252) | (0.355) | (0.499) | (0.316) | (0.472) | (0.320) | (0.205) | (0.270) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 317 | 898 | 302 | 315 | 895 | 302 | 290 | 812 | 264 |
| R-squared | 0.057 | 0.059 | 0.078 | 0.092 | 0.049 | 0.101 | 0.058 | 0.076 | 0.137 |

Notes: Data from Study 2. Controls included as in Table A4. See Table A3 for an overview of survey versions 2A-2C. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

#### Table A8: Attitudes toward hostility across survey versions, Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions |
| School policy | 0.018 | 0.117\*\* | -0.029 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.043) | (0.058) | (0.036) |  |  |  |
| High hostility email |  |  |  | -0.364\*\*\* | -0.442\*\*\* | 0.500\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.042) | (0.057) | (0.035) |
| Constant | 1.476\*\*\* | 2.457\*\*\* | 2.933\*\*\* | 1.565\*\*\* | 2.640\*\*\* | 2.808\*\*\* |
|  | (0.038) | (0.052) | (0.032) | (0.019) | (0.026) | (0.016) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,115 | 3,109 | 2,789 | 3,115 | 3,109 | 2,789 |
| R-squared | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.023 | 0.019 | 0.069 |

Notes: Data from Study 2. Columns 1—3 compare the degree of lenient attitudes toward hostility between the sample exposed to a school policy and the sample exposed to a building policy. *School policy* indicates a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for the respondents exposed to a school policy and the value 0 for those exposed to a building policy. Columns 4—6 compare the degree of lenient attitudes toward hostility between the sample exposed to a more hostile email and the sample exposed to an email with a lower degree of hostility. The email versions are described in detail in Appendix I. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

### Contact preferences

The analysis presented in the main manuscript uses respondents as the unit of analysis and estimates the likelihood that the respondent will contact the mayor rather than the chair if she is female rather than male. As a complement, I here use politician profiles as the unit of analysis. Each person sees one vignette containing two possible contacts – the mayor and the chair. I let these politician profiles be the units of analysis, and the outcome variable be a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent chooses to contact that politician and 0 otherwise. The setup of this analysis is similar to a conjoint survey experiment with a forced binary choice between two options with two traits: the politicians’ formal role (mayor or chair) and their sex (woman or man).[[1]](#footnote-2) Following Hainmueller et al. (2014), I estimate Average Marginal Component Effects by controlling for each trait with dummies. This amounts to one dummy for the politician being a woman – the treatment variable of interest – and one dummy for the politician’s official role, for which I choose to include a dummy for the politician being the mayor.[[2]](#footnote-3) Just like Table 2 in the main manuscript demonstrates, Table A9 shows that the likelihood that a politician will be contacted is about 6 percentage points higher for women than men.

#### Table A9: Contact preferences

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Contact choice | Contact choice |
| Woman | 0.059\*\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.017) |
| Mayor | -0.251\*\*\* | -0.437\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.017) |
| Constant | 0.788\*\*\* | 1.071\*\*\* |
|  | (0.034) | (0.037) |
|  |  |  |
| *Sample* | *USA* | *Sweden* |
| Observations | 7,516 | 5,462 |
| R-squared | 0.066 | 0.192 |

Notes: DV: “If you would contact a politician in your city to try to change the situation, who would you be most likely to approach?”. Respondents select a politician that they would contact, a forced choice between mayor and chair. The outcome variable takes the value 1 if a certain politician was selected and 0 otherwise. Politician profiles (two per respondent), rather than respondents, are the unit of analysis in these analyses. Standard errors clustered at the level of the respondent in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

#### Table A10: Contact preferences across policy areas, Sweden

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Preference for contacting mayor | Preference for contacting mayor |
|  | School policy | Building policy |
| Female mayor | 0.055\*\*\* | 0.058 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.036) |
| Constant | 0.266\*\*\* | 0.207\*\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.025) |
| *Sample* | *USA* | *Sweden* |
| Observations | 2,172 | 559 |
| R-squared | 0.004 | 0.005 |

Notes: Data from Study 2. Column 1 reports estimates from running equation 2 on the respondents assigned to survey versions 2A and 2B, and column 2 respondents assigned to survey version 2C. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

## Robustness checks

#### Table A11: Hypotheses tests across Democrats and Republicans

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | Contact mayor | Contact mayor | Acceptable | Acceptable | Understandable | Understandable | Sanctions | Sanctions |
| Female mayor | 0.074\*\*\* | 0.050\* | 0.054 | -0.102 | -0.109 | -0.116 | 0.088\*\*\* | -0.009 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.030) | (0.065) | (0.083) | (0.067) | (0.084) | (0.033) | (0.040) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 0.617\*\*\* | 0.483\*\*\* | 2.547\*\*\* | 2.308\*\*\* | 3.005\*\*\* | 3.156\*\*\* | 2.830\*\*\* | 3.075\*\*\* |
|  | (0.093) | (0.092) | (0.238) | (0.254) | (0.247) | (0.258) | (0.121) | (0.124) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sample | Democrats | Republicans | Democrats | Republicans | Democrats | Republicans | Democrats | Republicans |
| Observations | 1,429 | 1,028 | 1,429 | 1,028 | 1,429 | 1,028 | 1,429 | 1,028 |
| R-squared | 0.042 | 0.047 | 0.107 | 0.082 | 0.048 | 0.047 | 0.031 | 0.031 |

Notes: Data from Study 1. Columns 1—2 replicate column 1 in Table A9, looking at the sub-samples of Democrats and Republicans separately. Columns 3—8 replicate columns 4—6 in Table A4 looking at the sub-samples of Democrats and Republicans separately. Controls as defined in Table A4.

#### Table A12: Gendered hostility lenience among women and men respondents

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Acceptable | Acceptable | Understandable | Understandable | Sanctions | Sanctions |
| Female mayor | 0.013 | 0.044 | -0.086 | -0.070 | 0.023 | 0.045 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.066) | (0.061) | (0.066) | (0.030) | (0.032) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 2.000\*\*\* | 2.505\*\*\* | 2.712\*\*\* | 3.216\*\*\* | 2.911\*\*\* | 2.894\*\*\* |
|  | (0.148) | (0.209) | (0.160) | (0.209) | (0.078) | (0.100) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sample | Women respondents | Men respondents | Women respondents | Men respondents | Women respondents | Men respondents |
| Observations | 1,743 | 1,609 | 1,743 | 1,609 | 1,743 | 1,609 |
| R-squared | 0.038 | 0.093 | 0.025 | 0.037 | 0.023 | 0.017 |

Notes: Data from Study 1. Analyses replicate columns 4–6 in Table A4, looking at the sub-samples of women and men respondents separately. Controls as defined in Table A4.

# Mechanisms

## Theory on mechanisms behind lenient attitudes for hostility against women representatives

In order to further expand understanding for what might put women politicians at risk of violence, I consider possible mechanisms that could foment lenient attitudes to hostility directed at women politicians. A potential mechanism behind gendered hostility lenience is that such attitudes are related to and explained by gendered contact preferences. Hostile sexism is waged on women that “fail” to live up to their caring and good female nature as stipulated under benevolent sexism (Glick and Raberg 2018; Manne 2017). Consequently, acceptance for hostile treatment of women politicians can arise in situations when women are perceived to deviate from their expected social role. Expecting better representation from women based on benevolent sexism can hence explain a later acceptance of hostile treatment of them if the constituent perceives that the woman representative deviates from her prescribed nurturing leadership style.

**H3:** Constituents’ preferences for contacting female over male politicians can explain their more lenient attitudes toward hostility against female than male politicians.

Another possible mechanism behind individuals’ attitudes toward hostility is that social norms assign permissibility to hostility against women politicians. Research on aggression such as sexual harassment (Fitzgerald and Cortina 2018; Hulin, Fitzgerald, and Drasgow 1996) and ethnic violence (McDoom 2013; Scacco 2010) has concluded that a social climate where aggression is tolerated encourages potential perpetrators to act on their impulses. Psychological research on violence perpetration specifies that people who believe violence to be common and acceptable among their peers also are more prone to use violence themselves (Mulla et al. 2018; Neighbors et al. 2010; Taylor et al. 2011; Witte and Mulla 2012). I hence explore whether social norms are more permissive of hostility against women:

**H4**: Constituents perceive hostility as more common and acceptable *to others* when directed at female politicians,

and whether this works as a mechanism explaining a difference in attitudes to hostility against women and men politicians:

**H5**: A gap in lenient attitudes toward hostility against female and male politicians can be explained by perceived social norms of tolerating hostility.

## Measures of mechanisms

H3-H5 concern mechanisms behind H1. H3 is supported if there is a gendered leniency towards hostility (i.e. H1 is supported), and the gendered hostility lenience can be explained by a preference for contacting women. To support H3, the gendered leniency toward hostility should be moderated by gendered contact preferences, and be smaller once controlling for whether the respondent prefers to contact women. In the survey, respondents rate how common and acceptable to others they believe this type of email to be in their community. To offer support for H4, there should be a higher mean in respondents’ perceptions about how common and acceptable to others hostility is against women than men. For H5 to be supported, H1 should first be supported, and the gendered leniency toward hostility should be moderated by – i.e. smaller when controlling for – gendered social norms on hostility.

## Results for mechanism hypotheses

### Contact preferences and attitudes to hostility

Compared to Table A4 and A9 reporting the relationship between attitudes to hostility and assignment to treatment compared to control, the relationship looks the same in Table A13 below. In other words, controlling for gendered contact preferences does not alter the relationship between attitudes to hostility and the gender of the mayor that hostility is directed at.

#### Table A13: Contact preferences and attitudes to hostility

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions |
|  | USA | USA | USA | Sweden | Sweden | Sweden |
| Female mayor | 0.014 | -0.086\* | 0.036 | -0.199\*\*\* | -0.103 | 0.147\*\*\* |
|  | (0.045) | (0.046) | (0.022) | (0.059) | (0.078) | (0.049) |
| Contact choice: woman | -0.024 | -0.023 | 0.014 | -0.182\*\*\* | -0.028 | 0.053 |
|  | (0.045) | (0.046) | (0.022) | (0.059) | (0.078) | (0.049) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 2.505\*\*\* | 3.108\*\*\* | 2.920\*\*\* | 2.298\*\*\* | 3.278\*\*\* | 2.700\*\*\* |
|  | (0.083) | (0.086) | (0.041) | (0.194) | (0.256) | (0.165) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,359 | 3,359 | 3,359 | 1,341 | 1,338 | 1,223 |
| R-squared | 0.069 | 0.028 | 0.016 | 0.049 | 0.055 | 0.055 |

Note: Data from Study 1 in columns 1—3, and from Study 2 in columns 4—6. I re-estimate the full model of equation 1 (control variables specified in Tables A4 and A6) and also include a dummy variable for the gender of the representative respondents chose as the one they would be most likely to contact. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

### Social norms and attitudes to hostility

H4 and H5 stem from theory on social norms shaping individually held gendered attitudes toward hostility against politicians. In order to explore whether social norms are more permissive of hostility against women, I compare the perceived social norms to hostility against politicians under the treatment and control condition, estimating the following equation:

Norm perceptionsCommon, Acceptable to others = α + βFemale + γ**X´** + e (3)

where beta captures the difference in the average norm perception when the mayor is female compared to when the mayor is male. I run this regression and present the results from both country samples in Table A17. No substantial difference is detected in either the descriptive or injunctive norms on hostility between the treatment and the control group in either of the contexts. This suggests that constituents do not perceive social norms as more permissive of hostility against women than men.

The Swedish questionnaire contains a direct question on who respondents believe hostility most commonly targets (i.e. a direct question on the descriptive norm). As a contrast to comparing social norms between the treatment and control group, this direct question reveals that a majority of respondents believe that hostility is more frequently directed at women than men politicians (see Table A18). While not providing causal evidence, these results nevertheless render some support for H4. Furthermore, this suggests that when the target of hostility was not made explicit in questions on social norms, responses were not based on the gender of the target of hostility that they had been exposed to.

H5 is investigated by adding control variables for social norms to equation 3. Controlling for social norms does not alter the relationship between attitudes to hostility and the gender of the mayor that hostility is directed at (see Tables A13 and A14). In addition, I investigate whether social norms have a differential impact on personal attitudes to hostility depending on the target of hostility. I estimate the impact of each of the social norms on attitudes to hostility separately for those assigned to treatment and control in Tables A15 and A16. As can be seen in these tables, social norms impact attitudes to hostility equally when the target of hostility is a woman and a man.

Further exploring the role of social norms, I test whether these are related to personally held attitudes toward hostility. Table A19 shows results from regressing the three dimensions of attitudes toward hostility on each of the two variables for social norms. The descriptive norm denotes perceiving hostility to be common, and the injunctive norm denotes perceiving hostility to be acceptable to others. Similar to findings in previous research regarding the impact of social norms on other attitudes, the more people believe politician-directed hostility to be common and acceptable to others in one’s community, the more lenient attitudes they have themselves. The incjunctive norm has a consistent and fairly strong association with attitudes toward hostility in both contexts. The descriptive norm goes in the expected direction in the US although its impact is weaker than the injunctive norm’s, and it has almost no impact in Sweden. This suggests that believing hostility to be acceptable to others matters more for personally tolerating hostility than beliefs about how common hostility is. However, the relationship between social norms and personal attitudes toward hostility is equally strong when the target of hostility is a woman and a man as discussed above.

#### Table A14: Social norms and gendered attitudes to hostility, USA

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions |
| Female mayor | 0.039 | -0.067 | 0.031 | 0.014 | -0.087\*\* | 0.034 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.041) | (0.021) | (0.043) | (0.044) | (0.021) |
| Others acceptable | 0.650\*\*\* | 0.432\*\*\* | -0.063\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.014) | (0.017) | (0.009) |  |  |  |
| Common |  |  |  | 0.160\*\*\* | 0.198\*\*\* | -0.032\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.009) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.826\*\*\* | 1.986\*\*\* | 3.091\*\*\* | 1.997\*\*\* | 2.484\*\*\* | 3.027\*\*\* |
|  | (0.071) | (0.086) | (0.045) | (0.094) | (0.096) | (0.047) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,359 | 3,359 | 3,359 | 3,359 | 3,359 | 3,359 |
| R-squared | 0.431 | 0.184 | 0.031 | 0.093 | 0.063 | 0.020 |

Note: Data from Study 1. Survey items: “How acceptable do you think that this type of email is to other people in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Completely unacceptable” and 5 is “Completely acceptable”, and “How common do you think that this type of email to politicians is in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Very rare” and 5 is “Very common”. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

#### Table A15: Social norms and gendered attitudes to hostility, Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions | Acceptable | Understandable | Sanctions |
| Female mayor | -0.077 | -0.053 | 0.101\*\* | -0.110\*\* | -0.085 | 0.122\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) | (0.063) | (0.040) | (0.050) | (0.065) | (0.041) |
| Others acceptable | 0.325\*\*\* | 0.358\*\*\* | -0.187\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.025) | (0.034) | (0.021) |  |  |  |
| Common |  |  |  | 0.026 | 0.091\*\*\* | -0.020 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.023) | (0.030) | (0.019) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 1.178\*\*\* | 2.200\*\*\* | 3.285\*\*\* | 1.971\*\*\* | 2.858\*\*\* | 2.860\*\*\* |
|  | (0.185) | (0.244) | (0.159) | (0.198) | (0.257) | (0.167) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,514 | 1,510 | 1,365 | 1,516 | 1,511 | 1,366 |
| R-squared | 0.135 | 0.116 | 0.107 | 0.040 | 0.055 | 0.058 |

Note: Data from Study 2. Survey items as defined in Table A14. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

#### Table A16: Social norms of lenience toward hostility against women and men, USA

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | | (7) | | (8) | | (9) | | | (10) | | (11) | | (12) | |
|  | Acceptable | | Understan-dable | | Sanctions | | Acceptable | | Understan-dable | | Sanctions | | Acceptable | | Understan-dable | | Sanctions | | | Acceptable | | Understan-dable | | Sanctions | |
| Acceptable to others | 0.665\*\*\* | | 0.474\*\*\* | | -0.496\*\*\* | |  | |  | |  | | 0.632\*\*\* | | 0.385\*\*\* | | -0.255\*\*\* | | |  | |  | |  | |
|  | (0.020) | | (0.024) | | (0.075) | |  | |  | |  | | (0.020) | | (0.025) | | (0.077) | | |  | |  | |  | |
| Common |  | |  | |  | | 0.152\*\*\* | | 0.176\*\*\* | | -0.170\*\* | |  | |  | |  | | | 0.166\*\*\* | | 0.218\*\*\* | | -0.202\*\*\* | |
|  |  | |  | |  | | (0.025) | | (0.025) | | (0.074) | |  | |  | |  | | | (0.024) | | (0.025) | | (0.074) | |
| Controls | y | | y | | y | | Y | | y | | y | | y | | y | | y | | | y | | y | | y | |
| Constant | 0.655\*\*\* | | 1.862\*\*\* | | 13.321\*\*\* | | 1.974\*\*\* | | 2.606\*\*\* | | 12.504\*\*\* | | 0.854\*\*\* | | 1.894\*\*\* | | 11.866\*\*\* | | | 1.995\*\*\* | | 2.239\*\*\* | | 11.811\*\*\* | |
|  | (0.152) | | (0.179) | | (0.567) | | (0.195) | | (0.198) | | (0.578) | | (0.145) | | (0.181) | | (0.561) | | | (0.184) | | (0.192) | | (0.569) | |
|  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | |  | |  | |  | |
| *Sample* | | *Treatment* | | *Treatment* | | *Treatment* | | *Treatment* | | *Treatment* | | *Treatment* | | *Control* | | *Control* | | *Control* | *Control* | | *Control* | | *Control* | |
| Observations | 1,674 | | 1,674 | | 1,674 | | 1,674 | | 1,674 | | 1,674 | | 1,678 | | 1,678 | | 1,678 | | | 1,678 | | 1,678 | | 1,678 | |
| R-squared | 0.450 | | 0.222 | | 0.047 | | 0.106 | | 0.061 | | 0.025 | | 0.423 | | 0.157 | | 0.031 | | | 0.100 | | 0.078 | | 0.029 | |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Survey items: “How acceptable do you think that this type of email is to other people in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Completely unacceptable” and 5 is “Completely acceptable”, and “How common do you think that this type of email to politicians is in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Very rare” and 5 is “Very common”. Treatment (T) = Female mayor condition, and control (C) = male mayor condition. Data from Study 1.

#### Table A17: Social norms and attitudes toward hostility against women and men, Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|  | Accep-table | Understan-dable | Sanctions | Accep-table | Understan-dable | Sanctions | Accep-table | Understan-dable | Sanctions | Accep-table | Understan-dable | Sanctions |
| Acceptable to others | 0.283\*\*\* | 0.333\*\*\* | -0.149\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.369\*\*\* | 0.389\*\*\* | -0.230\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.034) | (0.048) | (0.031) |  |  |  | (0.038) | (0.048) | (0.030) |  |  |  |
| Common |  |  |  | -0.020 | 0.017 | 0.006 |  |  |  | 0.069\*\* | 0.167\*\*\* | -0.049\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.031) | (0.043) | (0.027) |  |  |  | (0.035) | (0.043) | (0.028) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 1.227\*\*\* | 2.161\*\*\* | 3.475\*\*\* | 1.967\*\*\* | 2.883\*\*\* | 3.092\*\*\* | 1.036\*\*\* | 2.188\*\*\* | 3.227\*\*\* | 1.888\*\*\* | 2.776\*\*\* | 2.760\*\*\* |
|  | (0.258) | (0.360) | (0.240) | (0.279) | (0.385) | (0.253) | (0.266) | (0.336) | (0.214) | (0.282) | (0.347) | (0.224) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Sample* | *Treatment* | *Treatment* | *Treatment* | *Treatment* | *Treatment* | *Treatment* | *Control* | *Control* | *Control* | *Control* | *Control* | *Control* |
| Observations | 754 | 751 | 679 | 755 | 751 | 680 | 760 | 759 | 686 | 761 | 760 | 686 |
| R-squared | 0.115 | 0.090 | 0.077 | 0.033 | 0.031 | 0.043 | 0.160 | 0.153 | 0.144 | 0.055 | 0.096 | 0.075 |

Notes: Data from Study 2. Items: “How acceptable do you think that this type of email is to other people in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Completely unacceptable” and 5 is “Completely acceptable”, and “How common do you think that this type of email to politicians is in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Very rare” and 5 is “Very common”. Controls included as in Table A8. Treatment (T) = Female mayor condition, and control (C) = male mayor condition. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

#### Table A18: Gender and social norms on hostility, USA and Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | Acceptable to others | Common | Acceptable to others | Common | Acceptable to others | Common | Acceptable to others | Common |
| Female mayor | -0.044 | 0.013 | -0.024 | 0.035 | -0.064\* | 0.013 | -0.099\*\* | -0.009 |
|  | (0.040) | (0.041) | (0.042) | (0.043) | (0.034) | (0.040) | (0.047) | (0.054) |
| Controls |  |  | YES | YES |  |  | YES | YES |
| Constant | 2.039\*\*\* | 3.113\*\*\* | 2.813\*\*\* | 2.977\*\*\* | 2.483\*\*\* | 3.485\*\*\* | 2.754\*\*\* | 3.460\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.153) | (0.159) | (0.024) | (0.029) | (0.164) | (0.190) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,735 | 3,735 | 3,314 | 3,314 | 3,106 | 3,110 | 1,639 | 1,642 |
| R-squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.065 | 0.035 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.030 | 0.044 |

Notes: Data from Study 1 in Columns 1-4 and from Study 2 in columns 5-8. Survey items: “How acceptable do you think that this type of email is to other people in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Completely unacceptable” and 5 is “Completely acceptable”, and “How common do you think that this type of email to politicians is in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Very rare” and 5 is “Very common”. Control variables included as in Table A6 in columns 3 and 4, and as in Table A8 in columns 7 and 8. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

#### Table A19: Direct question on descriptive norm, Sweden

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Most common target of hostility |
| Men | 0.04 |
| Women | 0.61 |
| Equal | 0.35 |

Note: Survey question: “Do you believe that this type of email is more commonly sent to women or men?”. Data from Study 2.

#### Table A20: Social norms and personal lenient attitudes toward hostility

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|  | Accep-table | Understan-dable | Sanctions | Accep-table | Understan-dable | Sanctions | Accep-table | Understan-dable | Sanctions | Accep-table | Understan-dable | Sanctions |
|  | USA | USA | USA | USA | USA | USA | Sweden | Sweden | Sweden | Sweden | Sweden | Sweden |
| Acceptable to others | 0.649\*\*\* | 0.432\*\*\* | -0.063\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.327\*\*\* | 0.359\*\*\* | -0.189\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.014) | (0.017) | (0.009) |  |  |  | (0.025) | (0.033) | (0.021) |  |  |  |
| Common |  |  |  | 0.159\*\*\* | 0.196\*\*\* | -0.032\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.026 | 0.090\*\*\* | -0.019 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.009) |  |  |  | (0.023) | (0.030) | (0.019) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 0.760\*\*\* | 1.874\*\*\* | 3.100\*\*\* | 1.981\*\*\* | 2.423\*\*\* | 3.028\*\*\* | 1.140\*\*\* | 2.174\*\*\* | 3.336\*\*\* | 1.926\*\*\* | 2.823\*\*\* | 2.909\*\*\* |
|  | (0.105) | (0.127) | (0.066) | (0.134) | (0.138) | (0.068) | (0.183) | (0.242) | (0.158) | (0.197) | (0.256) | (0.166) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,352 | 3,352 | 3,352 | 3,352 | 3,352 | 3,352 | 1,514 | 1,510 | 1,365 | 1,516 | 1,511 | 1,366 |
| R-squared | 0.433 | 0.186 | 0.031 | 0.097 | 0.064 | 0.020 | 0.133 | 0.115 | 0.103 | 0.037 | 0.054 | 0.052 |

Notes: Survey items: “How acceptable do you think that this type of email is to other people in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Completely unacceptable” and 5 is “Completely acceptable”, and “How common do you think that this type of email to politicians is in your community?”, measured on a scale from 1—5 where 1 is “Very rare” and 5 is “Very common”. Data from the US in columns 1—4, from Sweden in columns 5—8. Controls specified in Table 2 and Table A4. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

# Vignette methodology

## Images and names of fictitious representatives

Images can signal other things than gender, e.g. age, competence, niceness. In order to avoid such violations of the excludability criterion images and names have been selected to signal same age, race and class. The names were selected from lists of common names in the age cohort born in the 1960s in the US. Google searches were used to ascertain that the names did not belong to any well-known celebrity, and Google image searches were carried out to ascertain that no specific person was strongly associated with any of the names that figure in the vignette, and that the majority of pictures that turned up displayed people similar to those presented in the experiment in terms of gender, age, and race. The images used in the survey have previously been used in Clayton, O’Brien and Piscopo (2019). They have been tested on Mturk to make sure they score equally on attractiveness, likeability, competence, and perceived age. More information can be found in their online appendix (Clayton, O’Brien, and Piscopo 2019).

Randomisation happens in two steps. First, the gender of the mayor in the vignette is randomised. In the next step, three pictures of female and male legislators are randomly varied to make sure that any gender difference in the outcomes do not entirely emanate from the pictures themselves. Averages for the three fictitious women mayors are compared to the same for the three fictitious men mayors.

The Swedish experiment does not include images. Names were selected and tested in a fashion similar to the US procedure, to make sure the chosen names are common across generations and not associated with a particular person.

## Vignette design of Study 1 and Study 2

After analysing the results from Study 1, some minor adjustments were made in Study 2. Instead of including images of the feigned representatives, a control question was asked at the end of the survey about the sex of the mayor in the vignette. The majority of respondents answered this question correctly, and the ones who answered the wrong sex or that they did not know are excluded from the analyses.

In the US context, women representatives are sometimes interpreted as being Democrat if no information on their partisanship is provided. Both representatives are presented as being Democrat in order to control for a bias incurred from perceived partisanship. There is no similar tendency to infer party from gender in the Swedish context, and hence no information on the partisanship of the representatives were included in the Swedish survey.

Study 1 contained two questions about contact choice: first about which representative they would be most likely to contact directly, and secondly which representative they thought ought to participate in a townhall. In the end, one question was enough to measure this outcome since they measured the same thing. Hence, Study 2 only asks which representative the respondent would be most likely to contact, and includes information about citizens trying to invite the representatives to a townhall (which they do not attend) in the vignette.

Definitions of the concepts of “acceptable” and “understandable” were included in Study 1: “ By *acceptable*, we mean that you could justify a person doing something like this in this situation”, and “By *understandable*, we mean that you could see how a person in this situation would do something like this.” Such formulations were not included in Study 2 based on the assessment that they did not add any valuable information but rather increased the length of the survey unnecessarily.

### Choice of policy areas

When choosing the policy areas to include in the vignettes, I had a couple of main consideration. First, it had to be a scenario perceived as realistic enough for respondents to take it seriously, and one that a majority of respondents would be able to relate to and understand as problematic. Second, it had to be a scenario that is not particularly tied to a certain political agenda, in order to avoid biasing the results based on respondents’ ideological orientations. Education is an area that is not considered specifically tied to a political party or ideology in either the American or Swedish context. School allotments was chosen as the primary policy context of the hostility due to how often politicians and security personnel mentioned this particular area in interviews as something that triggers aggression. Most respondents should be able to relate to a constituent being upset about their child being assigned to a low-performing school. Since it is a female coded policy area, I include a male coded policy area as a robustness check in one of the Swedish survey versions (see Table A3). It had to be a policy area that is handled at the local rather than national level (which hence excludes e.g. military or police), something that concerns citizens on a personal level just like school allotments, and something that concerns citizens regardless of which part of the country they live in. A lot of policy in Swedish municipalities is related to welfare and education – both typically female coded. Most Swedish municipalities have a committee on planning and building, however, which can be considered a male coded policy area due to its association with the economy (see Dolan 2010; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005) and its non-association with childcare and welfare. Furthermore, building a high-rise building in a green area is a type of decision that could be made by politicians from various parties in the Swedish context.

## Differences between pre-registered hypotheses for Study 1 and Study 2, and empirical analyses

The pre-analysis plan uses the concept “tolerance for hostility”, whereas the article uses the concept “lenient attitudes toward hostility”. This change of wording arose from comments that the concept of tolerance in the context of studies on political violence usually denotes attitudes relating to acceptance of differences and peaceful coexistence. To avoid confusion, I hence changed this wording in all aspects of the paper including in the hypotheses.

The hypotheses appear in a different order in the pre-analysis plan (PAP), and as the order of the hypotheses was altered in the paper the numbers of each hypothesis have changed. Furthermore, I present hypotheses in a more efficient manner in the paper compared to the PAPs. In the PAPs, I have separate hypotheses for the three dimensions of lenient attitudes toward hostility (or tolerance for hostility), whereas these are merged into the same hypothesis in the article. Furthermore, social norms are conceptualised as a component of lenient attitudes toward hostility in the pre-analysis plan for Study 1. Learning more about research on the topic, I instead conceptualised social norms as a possible explanation for lenient attitudes toward hostility in the pre-analysis plan for Study 2 as well as in the article.

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1. The “conjoint” is constrained to always present the mayor first and the chair second, and in terms of the structure of the options, where I require both the two offices and the two genders to be different from each other in each combination of politician profiles. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Using the politician profiles that respondents chose between as possible contacts as the units of analysis generates two observations per respondent in the dataset. Because these two observations are correlated with each other, I cluster the standard errors at the level of the respondent. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)