

# Appendix to Lalanne & Seabright: “The Old Boy Network: Are the Professional Networks of Female Executives Less Effective than Men’s for Advancing their Careers?”

Table A1: Number of firms from our sample and their representativeness in the main indexes

Year	S&P 500	NASDAQ 100	FTSE 100	EUROTOP 100	CAC 40	DAX
2000	312 (62.4%)	49 (49%)	67 (67%)	34 (34%)	10 (25%)	1 (3%)
2001	363 (72.6%)	57 (57%)	70 (70%)	46 (46%)	25 (62.5%)	1 (3%)
2002	374 (74.8%)	66 (66%)	72 (72%)	50 (50%)	27 (67.5%)	5 (16.7%)
2003	357 (71.4%)	71 (71%)	70 (70%)	58 (58%)	31 (77.5%)	8 (26.7%)
2004	361 (72.2%)	69 (69%)	74 (74%)	60 (60%)	31 (77.5%)	13 (43.3%)
2005	369 (73.8%)	81 (81%)	77 (77%)	63 (63%)	29 (72.5%)	16 (53.3%)
2006	363 (72.6%)	82 (82%)	73 (73%)	65 (65%)	28 (70%)	26 (86.7%)
2007	338 (67.6%)	80 (80%)	75 (75%)	62 (62%)	32 (80%)	24 (80%)
2008	337 (67.4%)	72 (72%)	82 (82%)	69 (69%)	32 (80%)	25 (83.3%)
2009	317 (63.4%)	73 (73%)	82 (82%)	70 (70%)	30 (75%)	21 (70%)
2010	334 (66.8%)	81 (81%)	84 (84%)	68 (68%)	27 (67.5%)	23 (76.7%)
2011	330 (66%)	77 (77%)	83 (83%)	66 (66%)	31 (77.5%)	26 (86.7%)
2012	285 (57%)	51 (51%)	72 (72%)	36 (36%)	12 (30%)	3 (10%)

Companies can belong to several indexes at the same time. Percentages indicate the percentage of firms in the index in the given year that are included in our dataset.

Table A2: Main Dependent and Independent Variables

Variables	Description
Annual Compensation	Sum of salary, bonus, value of shares awarded, value of Long Term Incentive Programs awarded and estimated value of options awarded for the main job held in a year
Connections	Total number of individuals in the main database who worked in the same firm in the same year
Net Connections	Total number of individuals in the main database who worked in the same firm in the same year minus current colleagues
Net Female (Male) Connections	Total number of women (men) in the main database who worked in the same firm in the same year minus current female (male) colleagues
Recent Net Connections	Total number of individuals in the main database who worked in the same firm in the same year in the last 5 years minus current colleagues
Weighted Connections	Connections weighted by the number of years of overlap and the number of years since the overlapping ended
Weighted Net Connections	Net Connections weighted by the number of years of overlap and the number of years since the overlapping ended
Placebo Connections	Total number of individuals in the main database who worked in the same firm but not in the same year

Table A3: Impact of Net Connections on Annual Compensation - Controlling for CEO status

	Dependent variable: Log of Annual Compensation				
	I	II	III	IV	V
Log of Net Connections	0.206*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.006)	0.024*** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.007+ (0.003)
Log of Net Connections*Female Dummy	0.001 (0.006)	-0.047* (0.022)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.043* (0.020)	-0.008 (0.012)
CEO Dummy	0.433*** (0.006)	0.306*** (0.016)	0.641*** (0.009)	0.327*** (0.016)	0.635*** (0.009)
Log of Placebo Connections					0.023*** (0.003)
Log of Placebo Connections*Female Dummy					0.014 (0.010)
Female Dummy	-0.143*** (0.020)		-0.137*** (0.026)		-0.151*** (0.028)
Individual FE	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Match FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nb of observations	137567	137567	137567	137567	137567
Nb of FE units		26607	5409	27941	5409
R <sup>2</sup>	0.300	0.067	0.170	0.063	0.171

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log of age, log of age squared, education (BA, MA, PHD, Business, Finance, Social Science and Science), country, sector and year dummies. Definitions of network-related variables are provided in Table A2. Statistical significance levels: +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A4: Impact of Net Connections on Annual Compensation - Controlling for executive status

	Dependent variable: Log of Annual Compensation				
	I	II	III	IV	V
(Log of) Net Connections	0.205*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.006)	0.022*** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.007+ (0.003)
(Log of) Net Connections*Female Dummy	0.001 (0.006)	-0.046* (0.022)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.041* (0.020)	-0.008 (0.011)
(Log of) Placebo Connections					0.021*** (0.003)
(Log of) Placebo Connections*Female Dummy					0.013 (0.010)
CEO Dummy	0.448*** (0.013)	0.376*** (0.028)	0.613*** (0.024)	0.378*** (0.028)	0.610*** (0.024)
CFO, COO Dummy	0.112*** (0.014)	0.192*** (0.030)	0.064** (0.024)	0.184*** (0.031)	0.066** (0.024)
President, Vice President, Chief Officer Dummy	0.005 (0.014)	0.082** (0.030)	-0.081*** (0.024)	0.055+ (0.030)	-0.075** (0.024)
Director, Head, Officer Dummy	-0.067*** (0.014)	-0.015 (0.031)	-0.089*** (0.026)	-0.072* (0.031)	-0.087*** (0.026)
Female Dummy	-0.145*** (0.020)		-0.137*** (0.026)		-0.151*** (0.027)
Indiv FE	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Match FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nb of obs	137567	137567	137567	137567	137567
Nb of FE units		26607	5409	27941	5409
R2	0.302	0.070	0.176	0.066	0.177

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log of age, log of age squared, education (BA, MA, PHD, Business, Finance, Social Science and Science), country, sector and year dummies. Definitions of network-related variables are provided in Table A2. Statistical significance levels: +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A5: Impact of Net Connections on Annual Compensation - Controlling for firm characteristics

	Dependent variable: Log of Annual Compensation				
	I	II	III	IV	V
(Log of) Net Connections	0.089*** (0.003)	0.005 (0.009)	0.052*** (0.006)	0.005 (0.009)	0.024*** (0.007)
(Log of) Net Connections*Female Dummy	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.023)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.031)
(Log of) Placebo Connections					0.037*** (0.007)
(Log of) Placebo Connections*Female Dummy					-0.007 (0.026)
(Log of) Total Assets	0.227*** (0.002)	0.139*** (0.009)	0.143*** (0.012)	0.138*** (0.009)	0.143*** (0.012)
Nb of Indep. Non-Executives	0.037*** (0.002)	0.010* (0.004)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.030*** (0.006)
Executive Chairman Dummy	-0.028*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.022)	0.004 (0.020)	-0.013 (0.022)
Prop. of Women on Board	0.169*** (0.044)	0.034 (0.074)	0.054 (0.097)	0.047 (0.074)	0.065 (0.097)
Female Dummy	-0.213*** (0.035)		-0.182** (0.060)		-0.184** (0.067)
Indiv FE	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Match FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nb of obs	63034	63034	63034	63034	63034
Nb of FE units		11486	4045	11917	4045
R2	0.481	0.112	0.098	0.103	0.100

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log of age, log of age squared, education (BA, MA, PHD, Business, Finance, Social Science and Science), country, sector and year dummies. Nb of Indep. Non-Executives is the number of independent non executive directors on the board. Executive Chairman Dummy is 1 if the Chairman of the board is an executive and 0 otherwise. Definitions of network-related variables are provided in Table A2. Statistical significance levels: +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A6: Impact of Net Connections on Annual Compensation - Controlling for executive status and firm characteristics

	Dependent variable: Log of Annual Compensation				
	I	II	III	IV	V
(Log of) Net Connections	0.075*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.009)	0.030*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.009)	0.019** (0.006)
(Log of) Net Connections*Female Dummy	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.029)
(Log of) Placebo Connections					0.015* (0.006)
(Log of) Placebo Connections*Female Dummy					-0.014 (0.023)
CEO Dummy	0.546*** (0.015)	0.404*** (0.033)	0.546*** (0.029)	0.404*** (0.033)	0.544*** (0.029)
CFO, COO Dummy	0.163*** (0.016)	0.227*** (0.040)	0.100** (0.030)	0.255*** (0.041)	0.100** (0.030)
President, Vice President, Chief Officer Dummy	0.072*** (0.018)	0.207*** (0.048)	0.068+ (0.036)	0.232*** (0.048)	0.072* (0.036)
Director, Head, Officer Dummy	-0.103*** (0.015)	-0.038 (0.037)	-0.103*** (0.029)	-0.059 (0.038)	-0.101*** (0.029)
(Log of) Total Assets	0.247*** (0.002)	0.151*** (0.009)	0.159*** (0.012)	0.143*** (0.009)	0.159*** (0.012)
Nb of Indep. Non-Executives	0.032*** (0.002)	0.010** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.008+ (0.004)	0.022*** (0.006)
Executive Chairman Dummy	0.038*** (0.008)	0.027 (0.018)	0.036+ (0.021)	0.027 (0.019)	0.036+ (0.021)
Prop. of Women on Board	0.102* (0.041)	0.012 (0.072)	-0.018 (0.093)	0.027 (0.072)	-0.012 (0.093)
Female Dummy	-0.115*** (0.033)		-0.077 (0.050)		-0.068 (0.055)
Indiv FE	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Match FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nb of obs	63034	63034	63034	63034	63034
Nb of FE units		11486	4045	11917	4045
R2	0.529	0.131	0.201	0.123	0.201

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log of age, log of age squared, education (BA, MA, PHD, Business, Finance, Social Science and Science), country, sector and year dummies. Nb of Indep. Non-Executives is the number of independent non executive directors on the board. Executive Chairman Dummy is 1 if the Chairman of the board is an executive and 0 otherwise. Definitions of network-related variables are provided in Table A2. Statistical significance levels: +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A7: Impact of Net Connections on Annual Compensation - Controlling for average board size and number of companies

	Dependent variable: Log of Annual Compensation				
	I	II	III	IV	V
(Log of) Net Connections	0.231*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.006)	0.048*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.026*** (0.004)
(Log of) Net Connections*Female Dummy	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.055* (0.022)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.051* (0.020)	-0.006 (0.012)
(Log of) Avg board size	0.432*** (0.008)	0.162*** (0.045)	-0.059** (0.019)	0.130** (0.045)	-0.101*** (0.019)
(Log of) Nb of companies	-0.316*** (0.011)	0.024 (0.039)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.105* (0.042)	-0.135*** (0.024)
(Log of) Placebo Connections					0.057*** (0.004)
(Log of) Placebo Connections*Female Dummy					0.009 (0.011)
Female Dummy	-0.199*** (0.020)		-0.208*** (0.029)		-0.222*** (0.031)
Indiv FE	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Match FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nb of obs	137536	137536	137536	137536	137536
Nb of FE units		26607	5409	27941	5409
R2	0.295	0.057	0.046	0.052	0.052

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log of age, log of age squared, education (BA, MA, PHD, Business, Finance, Social Science and Science), country, sector and year dummies. Nb of companies is the total number of different companies in which individuals have worked since the beginning of their career. Avg board size is the average board size of the companies in which individuals have worked since the beginning of their career. Definitions of network-related variables are provided in Table A2. Statistical significance levels: +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A8: Impact of Weighted Net Connections on Annual Compensation

	Dependent variable: Log of Annual Compensation				
	I	II	III	IV	V
Log of Weighted Net Connections	0.228*** (0.002)	0.010* (0.004)	0.048*** (0.003)	0.007 (0.004)	0.026*** (0.003)
Log of Weighted Net Connections*Female Dummy	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.036* (0.017)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.033* (0.015)	-0.005 (0.011)
Log of Placebo Connections					0.044*** (0.003)
Log of Placebo Connections*Female Dummy					0.007 (0.010)
Female Dummy	-0.177*** (0.021)		-0.213*** (0.028)		-0.220*** (0.032)
Individual FE	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Match FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nb of observations	137567	137567	137567	137567	137567
Nb of FE units		26607	5409	27941	5409
R <sup>2</sup>	0.278	0.056	0.046	0.051	0.051

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log of age, log of age squared, education (BA, MA, PHD, Business, Finance, Social Science and Science), country, sector and year dummies. Definitions of network-related variables are provided in Table A2. Statistical significance levels: <sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A9: Impact of Recent Net Connections on Annual Compensation

	Dependent variable: Log of Annual Compensation				
	I	II	III	IV	V
(Log of) Recent Net Connections	0.249*** (0.002)	0.007* (0.003)	0.051*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.032*** (0.004)
(Log of) Recent Net Connections*Female Dummy	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.016)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.007 (0.012)
(Log of) Placebo Connections					0.045*** (0.003)
(Log of) Placebo Connections*Female Dummy					0.000 (0.009)
Female Dummy	-0.199*** (0.020)		-0.235*** (0.027)		-0.231*** (0.032)
Indiv FE	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Match FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nb of obs	137567	137567	137567	137567	137567
Nb of FE units		26607	5409	27941	5409
R2	0.273	0.056	0.045	0.051	0.052

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log of age, log of age squared, education (BA, MA, PHD, Business, Finance, Social Science and Science), country, sector and year dummies. Definitions of network-related variables are provided in Table A2. Statistical significance levels:  $^+ p < 0.10$ ,  $^* p < 0.05$ ,  $^{**} p < 0.01$ ,  $^{***} p < 0.001$ .

Table A10: Human capital and network characteristics by female friendly type

	FFF=1		FFF=0		Diff.	Std. Error
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.		
Age	51.322	7.989	50.778	8.242	-0.544***	0.044
Degree level: Bachelor (prop.)	0.272	-	0.281	-	0.009***	0.002
Degree level: Master (prop.)	0.393	-	0.328	-	-0.065***	0.003
Degree level: PhD (prop.)	0.195	-	0.204	-	0.009***	0.002
Degree major: Business (prop.)	0.297	-	0.228	-	-0.068***	0.002
Degree major: Finance (prop.)	0.103	-	0.142	-	0.038***	0.002
Degree major: Social Sciences (prop.)	0.105	-	0.064	-	-0.040***	0.002
Degree major: Science (prop.)	0.017	-	0.027	-	0.010***	0.001
Connections	106.295	155.841	73.840	116.269	-32.455***	0.762
Current colleagues	35.973	36.092	26.835	28.099	-9.137***	0.179
Net connections	70.322	139.966	47.004	105.568	-23.318***	0.687
Placebo connections	98.845	191.816	69.053	149.219	-29.793***	0.950
Weighted connections	248.001	285.219	175.188	209.062	-72.813***	1.388
Weighted net connections	63.861	126.385	42.541	96.471	-21.320***	0.649
Nb of observations	77950		59617			

Statistics first averaged over years (within individuals) and then over individuals. Definitions of network-related variables are provided in Table A2. Statistical significance levels: <sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A11: Job and firm characteristics by female friendly type

	FFF=1		FFF=0		Diff.	Std. Error
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.		
Annual compensation (\$000)	1054.952	1043.600	752.190	853.187	-302.763***	5.254
CEO (prop.)	0.224	-	0.250	-	0.026***	0.002
CFO, COO (prop.)	0.283	-	0.226	-	-0.057***	0.002
President, Vice President, Chief Officer (prop.)	0.299	-	0.212	-	-0.087***	0.002
Director, Head, Officer (prop.)	0.135	-	0.242	-	0.107***	0.002
Other Executives (prop.)	0.004	-	0.005	-	0.001*	0.000
Chairman (prop.)	0.122	-	0.122	-	0.000	0.002
Nb of companies	2.150	1.609	2.058	1.554	-0.093***	0.009
Avg board size	8.616	3.576	7.544	3.310	-1.072***	0.019
Firm country: Canada (prop.)	0.002	-	0.004	-	0.003***	0.000
Firm country: France (prop.)	0.020	-	0.029	-	0.009***	0.001
Firm country: Germany (prop.)	0.022	-	0.020	-	-0.002**	0.001
Firm country: Italy (prop.)	0.003	-	0.015	-	0.012***	0.000
Firm country: Ireland (prop.)	0.012	-	0.018	-	0.006***	0.001
Firm country: Netherlands (prop.)	0.009	-	0.022	-	0.013***	0.001
Firm country: Norway (prop.)	0.017	-	0.002	-	-0.015***	0.001
Firm country: Sweden (prop.)	0.011	-	0.005	-	-0.006***	0.000
Firm country: Switzerland (prop.)	0.005	-	0.009	-	0.005***	0.000
Firm country: UK (prop.)	0.148	-	0.347	-	0.199***	0.002
Firm country: US (prop.)	0.735	-	0.497	-	-0.238***	0.003
Sector: Finance (prop.)	0.153	-	0.112	-	-0.042***	0.002
Sector: Information (prop.)	0.037	-	0.029	-	-0.008***	0.001
Sector: Manufacturing (prop.)	0.142	-	0.127	-	-0.015***	0.002
Sector: Mining (prop.)	0.278	-	0.295	-	0.017***	0.002
Sector: Services (prop.)	0.033	-	0.045	-	0.012***	0.001
Sector: Technical (prop.)	0.080	-	0.087	-	0.007***	0.002
Nb of observations	77950		59617			

Statistics first averaged over years (within individuals) and then over individuals. Nb of companies is the total number of different companies in which individuals have worked since the beginning of their career. Avg board size is the average board size of the companies in which individuals have worked since the beginning of their career. Statistical significance levels: +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .