**APPENDIX**

This online appendix provides three bodies of supplementary information to support the arguments made in the main text. The first part introduces the sampling and data collection strategies of the national survey. The second part elaborates the rationales of the 11 control variables included in all statistical models in the main text and this appendix. The last part further demonstrates the theories, hypotheses, models, and tests in regard to the two alternative explanations for the heterogeneous relationship between religious groups and collective contention.

**PART 1: SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY**

Considering the significant cultural, economic, and socio-political heterogeneity in contemporary rural China, my colleagues and I adopted a stratified random sampling strategy to secure the representativeness of our sample. We first followed the practical convention of dividing the country up into six regions (i.e., East China, North China, Northeast China, Northwest China, South China, and Southwest China). Within each region, one sample province was randomly selected, and the six sample provinces turned out to be Fujian, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jilin, Shaanxi, and Sichuan. Five sample counties were then randomly selected in each sample province, with two sample townships in each sample county, and two sample villages in each sample township. After dropping one sample village with too much missing information due to the severe damage caused by a catastrophic earthquake that occurred three months earlier, the final dataset covers 119 villages in 59 townships, 30 counties, and six provinces.

To collect data on religious groups, collective contention, and important background information from the sample villages, my colleagues and I organised a survey team that consists of university students majoring in the social sciences from a number of universities. Each team member was trained by experienced survey researchers before going into the field. In each sample village, working with our survey team, my colleagues and I obtained the necessary information on local demographic, geographic, economic, and government capabilities through interviewing village cadres and verifying official statistics. We also collected data on the scales, structures, and activities of religious groups by inviting leaders and active members of these organizations to fill out specific questionnaires. In addition, about 14 villagers were randomly selected in each sample village to provide their understanding of village situations, especially those issues which local cadres were reluctant to divulge. These issues included (but were not limited to) the cause, frequency, format, and scale of collective contention. Finally, we cross-checked the information we had gathered from various sources and then integrated it into a relatively comprehensive database of religious groups and collective contention in contemporary rural China. All information in the database has been carefully checked to guarantee quality. To avoid potential problems caused by less accurate long-term memories, this research was limited to only concern collective contention that occurred between 2000 and 2008.

**PART 2: RATIONALES OF INCLUDING THE 11 CONTROL VARIABLES**

The frequency of religious groups is certainly not the only factor that may have an impact on protests in rural China. The existing research shows that many other factors also matter. A set of township-level dummy variables, therefore, was also created and included in some of my models to ensure that my comparisons are actually conducted within each pair of sample villages locating in the same township. This approach allows me to compare the relationship between religious groups and collective contention in each of the two sample villages that are the most similar in terms of cultural traditions and the political impacts of upper-level governments. Upper-level governments may have significant effects on the likelihood and scale of protests (O'Brien and Li 1995, 776–779, [Jing 2010, 211](#_ENREF_18)) but cannot otherwise be controlled for.

To clarify the pure impact of the frequency of religious groups on protests in the sampled villages, a group of 10 control variables are included in all my models. As further elaborated later in this part of the appendix, these control variables measure the financial capacity of local authorities, the incentive of village cadres to maintain local stability, the quality of village elections, the extent and frequency of land requisition, as well as the geographic, demographic, and economic backgrounds of each village. The set of control variables remains the same in different models. The rationale for controlling these variables is explained below.

**Village Population**

There are at least two reasons why the *village population* variable should be controlled in the models. First, and straightforwardly, the size of village population has a direct impact on the likelihood of protests, especially collective protests. The behavior of crowds has long been a fascinating topic for social psychologists, many of whom believe that individuals are likely to become emotional and radical when they gather in large numbers, either because crowds foster anonymity and enable mental unity ([Le Bon 1896](#_ENREF_20); Festinger et al. 1952; [Zimbardo 1969](#_ENREF_59)) or because a large population provides more opportunities for people with similar background or demands to instigate collective action (Turner and Killian 1957; [Smelser 1963](#_ENREF_42)). Furthermore, as elaborated in the subsequent paragraphs, many variables in my models are aggregate indicators. Therefore, it is necessary to control the village population so that these aggregate indicators can be transformed into per capitameasures that are normally more suitable for cross-village comparison.

**Number of Settlements**

An administrative village in rural China may contain one or more settlements. The *number of settlements* within a village ranges from 1 to 60 in my sample, and this may have a mixed impact on the likelihood and scale of protests.

On the one hand, this control variable may correlate negatively with the dependent variables. A higher frequency of settlements usually indicates a lower residential density. Contentious collective action is more likely to occur in more densely inhabited districts (Zhao 2004, 239–266). In other words, due to the relatively high costs of organizing and mobilizing, the likelihood and scale of protest in villages with more settlements is lower. In addition, according to Zhao ([2011](#_ENREF_58)), it is very uncommon for different settlements within an administrative village to have efficient mechanisms for communication and cooperation in rural China. This limits the villagers’ capability of launching collective action, including protests. Furthermore, O’Brien and Li ([1995](#_ENREF_32)) find that some protests in rural China start from ordinary villagers’ observations of wrongdoing by their neighboring local officials. Given that high residential density may lead to more observations of this kind by villagers, protests are more likely to occur in villages with more settlements.

On the other hand, this control variable could also correlate positively with the dependent variables. A higher frequency of settlements may also lead to the split and conflict of interests between different settlements, and hence more protests. In contrast, a low frequency of settlements is usually associated with high residential density, which often results in more communication and interaction between local cadres and their fellow villagers. As communication and interaction could increase mutual trust and understanding ([Etgar 1979](#_ENREF_11); Anderson and Weitz 1989; Anderson and Narus 1990), they may thus reduce hostility between villagers and cadres and consequently reduce protests.

**Village Government Revenue**

*Village government revenue* refers to the total income that the village government receives in the forms of rents, fees, donations, or subventions from upper-level governments. This indicator measures the financial capability of the village government, and it has a mixed impact on the likelihood and scale of protests.

Two mechanisms could result in a negative correlation between village government revenue and the likelihood of protests.

First, in villages where government revenue is high, village cadres are usually more capable of providing more public goods and better public services to fellow villagers (Oi 1999, 79–80). Accordingly, they also start from a stronger bargaining position when dealing with protesters. For example, according to Guo (2001, 432–433), protest leaders in rural China are usually economically independent from local cadres, whereas "the majority of villagers were bystanders who were generally sympathetic with the cause of resistance, but reluctant to take action," due to the fact that these villagers lack "alternative means of living other than farming" and thus are "totally at the mercy of the village cadres who controlled the vital resources that the households depended on for livelihood, and therefore could not afford to challenge the authorities." Likewise, Whiting ([2006, 4](#_ENREF_56)) finds that owners of private enterprise usually have "larger bargaining power confronting local officials," especially in "communities where private ownership dominated." In addition, according to my own field observations, cadres in villages with higher governmental revenue can use public funding to pay for the unpopular policies or projects required by higher-level governments; by doing so, they do not need to collect money directly from fellow villagers for these initiatives and thus can avoid many protests that would otherwise occur. This appears to be consistent with Bernstein and Lü’s (2003, 209) observation that "in the richest, coastal areas, TVE profits largely relieved ordinary farmers from having to shoulder heavy burdens."

Second, according to Tsai (2002; [2007b](#_ENREF_51)), cadres in villages where public funding is limited have to "rely on community institutions such as temple and clan groups to fund and manage public services." This limits the actual power and authority of the village government in the local community, and thus may undermine the village government’s capacity to deal with protests, especially those supported by temple or lineage groups. Therefore, protests are more likely to happen in villages with less government revenue.

Villages with high government revenue, however, may also witness fierce protests, since the cadres in these villages are more likely to become corrupt or be accused of corruption. Existing literature has shown that a large proportion of protests in contemporary China start from people’s anger toward corrupt cadres. Perry (1999; [2002](#_ENREF_38)), for example, suggests that the resentment toward official privilege and bureaucratic corruption has a long history in Chinese society, dating back to the imperial era. Sun (2004, 205) finds that corrupt activities are fostering distributional inequities and posing "serious threats to social and political stability" in today’s China. Likewise, Chen ([2000](#_ENREF_9)) finds that citizens’ motivations for protesting increase and their militancy intensifies if they believe that their economic plight is being exacerbated by corrupt officials. Therefore, as Bernstein and Lü (2003) have shown in their book, when depressed villagers are fed-up with the burdens caused or exacerbated by corrupt cadres, collective protests become a powerful way for villagers to voice their dissent and offer resistance that corruption.

**Total Villagers’ Income**

When the variable of village population is controlled, the aggregate variable *total income of villagers* is transformed into *per capita* income, an individual-level indicator that is usually applied to measure the level of economic development. Unlike the indictor of village government revenue, which indicates the wealth of the local authority, the variable *per capita* income measures the average financial situation of the villagers. Previous research shows that villagers’ average level of income has a complex relationship with the likelihood and scale of protests. On the one hand, to villagers in rural China, higher income normally means more autonomy from local cadres (Guo 2001; Whiting 2006), and hence a greater ability to stand up against the wrongdoings of local cadres. On the other hand, higher income may also mean a higher "opportunity cost" of taking part in protests (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), and could thus reduce the likelihood and scale of protests.

**Party Members**

When the variable of village population is controlled, the *frequency of Party members* indicates the Party membership density, which is equivalent to the proportion or percentage of Party members in the total village population. Party members play political roles in contemporary Chinese villages (Chen 2006), and they are significantly less likely to lead popular protests than other villagers (Li and O'Brien 2008). In addition, despite the decentralization process and the grassroots democratic self-governing movement in China, the Party successfully maintains efficient control on its members and Chinese society (Landry 2008; McGregor 2010). Therefore, in villages where the party membership density is high, the capability of local authorities is usually high, and the likelihood and scale of protests are likely to be relatively low.

**Village Cadres**

Village cadres play essential roles in governing rural China, and whether they can be controlled by upper-level governments is directly relevant to the likelihood and scale of protests in Chinese villages. Although their power vis-à-vis ordinary villagers has been "sharply curtailed" as a result of de-collectivization of the People’s Communes (Nee 1989, 667) and their autonomy vis-à-vis upper-level governments has been weakened in the economic reform (Shue 1988), village cadres still occupy the strategically powerful position between the villagers and the state. Cai (2000, 784), for example, finds that village cadres in contemporary China still "enjoy considerable autonomy in pursuing their personal goals if supervision by higher-level government is absent." Also, according to O’Brien and Li (1999, 167), it is "hardly news" that village cadres can choose to "carry out some policies but not others."

Therefore, when the level of control exerted by upper-level governments over village cadres is low, village cadres no longer "serve as loyal party-state tools," and therefore the party-state’s organizational control in the countryside becomes less efficient (Chen 2007, 147). This leaves considerable room for protests to be organized and carried out. Moreover, according to Liu (2000) and Li (2002), elected village cadres may ally with their constituents to resist the unlawful local policies from the township or county government through launching collective protests. Wang (2012) also finds that the policy of "reducing local government revenues and recentralising fiscal autonomy to the county level" has resulted in "the rising alliances between village cadres and peasants in forming collective petitions and expressing grievances."

Of course, protests are not uncommon in villages where the control of upper-level government over grassroots cadres is extremely high, either. Under such circumstances, "the township-village cadre relations were those of obedience and subordination" and the village government would be required to "execute township orders even when they are unreasonable" (Bernstein and Lü 2000, 664). And given that "there is no guarantee that village cadres who are the representatives of the collective are able or willing to defend the interests of villagers … self-serving village cadres may pursue their interests at the expense of the collective" and protests are thus likely to be triggered (Cai 2003, 664).

Two indicators are included in my models to control the complex impact of the relationship between village cadres and upper-level governments on the likelihood and scale of protests. The first indicator measures the *average percentage of subsidies in the salary of the village head and the village Party secretary*. It is designed to assess the state’s fiscal control over village cadres. The second indicator is *the possibility for village cadres to be prompted to a position in upper-level governments*. This is a binary variable, aiming to measure the state’s political control over village cadres.

**Village Elections**

Village elections have become some of the most important political events in rural China (O'Brien and Li 2000; Tan 2004). While many scholars suggest that the introduction of village elections greatly improves on the democracy and good governance in rural China (e.g., Shi 1999; Manion 2006; Tan 2006; He 2007), O’Brien and Li (1995, 765) insightfully observe that "electoral reforms, in some localities, play a significant role in encouraging popular action." I believe that the quality of village elections may influence the likelihood and scale of protests in contemporary rural Chinese villages. Existing literature has shown that villagers are likely to take contentious action when elections are unlawfully intervened in by upper-level government officials (Perry 1999), or manipulated by corrupt cadres (O'Brien 2002b, 55; Schubert and Chen 2007, 25). Following the traditions in research on village elections in China (e.g., Pastor and Tan 2000; Tan 2004), my survey data includes 10 indicators to measure the fairness of the most recent village election prior to 2008.

All indicators are binary variables, of which value = 0 refers to the absence of the situation and value = 1 refers to the presence of the situation. The 10 indicators are: (1) whether each of the villagers could directly vote to elect the village head; (2) whether the list of qualified voters was posted for public attention; (3) whether the electoral certificate was handed to each voter before the election; (4) whether the electoral proceeding was agreed to by the villagers’ assembly; (5) whether the electoral commission was formed before the election; (6) whether the voters could mark their ballots in specially-designated rooms which guaranteed their privacy; (7) whether the voters were required to mark their ballots secretly; (8) whether proxy vote was banned; (9) whether candidates were allowed to make public speeches; and (10) whether ballots were counted and announced openly.

Given that the values of the 10 indicators are highly correlated with one another, to overcome the problem of multi-collinearity, they are all combined into a new variable: the *village election fairness index* (Bryman and Hardy 2004, 179). The higher a village’s score on the index, the fairer was the election there, and the less likely it was that related protests occurred.

**Land Requisition**

Land requisition is arguably the most common trigger of protest in contemporary rural China (Guo 2001; Ho 2010), especially in richer and suburban villages (O'Brien 2002a; Tong and Lei 2010). Moreover, land requisition distinguishes the interests of ordinary villagers and grassroots cadres; as a result, it increases the vulnerability of villagers to the unreasonable or unfair policies from high above (Cai 2003; Warner and Yang 2012). To control the impact of land requisition on the likelihood and scale of protests, I include two variables that are relevant to land disputes. First, *total households whose land was expropriated during 2004 and 2008* measures the magnitude of land requisition. The higher value this variable takes, the more likely it is that a protest will occur. Second, *the frequency of land requisition during 2004 and 2008* also matters. Frequent land requisitions are more likely to result in protests.

**Conclusion**

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control all possible effects on the likelihood and scale of protest other than those effects from religious groups. However, based on the relevant literature, the eight most important factors of this kind are identified and operationalized into 10 indicators. Including and controlling these variables in my models allows me to distinguish the pure impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable.

**PART 3: TESTING AND REJECTING THE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS**

Social scientists are split over the roles of religious groups in contentions politics, and their debates have been waged on three fronts. The first front concerns the faith and beliefs associated with religious groups, the second has to do with the competitions and clashes among different religions and cultures, and the third is regarding the social capital possessed by religious groups. My framework is mainly deployed on the third front. It explains the diversity of the relationship between religious groups and collective contention through the varieties of social capital. However, two alternative frameworks explain the heterogeneity in the association between religious groups and collective contention from other perspectives: one suggests that religious groups of different faiths may play different roles in contentious politics, and the other argues that the level of competition that a religious group faces in the local community may explain its roles in contentious politics. In this part of the online appendix, both alternative explanations are examined against the same set of data that I use to test the existing theories and my framework in the main text.

**Does Religious Belief Really Matter?**

In the existing literature that focuses on the social impact of religious groups in contemporary rural China, many scholars have demonstrated that there appears to be a substantial difference in Chinese villages between temples (of Buddhist, Daoist, and popular religious groups) and churches (of Catholic, Protestant, and other institutional religious groups). It should be noted that "popular religion" often refers to the Chinese communal polytheist religions. These religions do not always have well-developed theologies and many of their rituals and practices are similar to those adopted by more established religions such as Buddhism or Taoism.

First and most obviously, the organizational structure of church groups seems "formal," whereas that of temple groups is often described as "causal" (Li 2008a). The boundary of a church group is often clear, and members of a church group rarely belong to any other similar groups. The boundary of a temple group, however, is usually blurred. The core members of a temple group are sometimes, albeit not always, also de facto arbitrators, event organizers, and clan leaders in Chinese villages (Wang 2005; Li 2008b). It is not rare for a member of one temple group to simultaneously also belong to another temple group (He 2011).

In addition, based on the data from the World Value Survey, Li (2011) finds significantly higher average levels of general social trust are placed in members of temple groups than in members of church groups. Furthermore, according to Jenkins (2002), throughout modern Chinese history, while church groups have been more likely to associate with elites and function as sources of moral values, temple groups have been more likely to associate with ordinary villagers and "tend to support values already present in society and its institutions." Su et al. (2011) find that temple groups (especially those that overlap with certain kinds of clans) are very much capable of mobilizing their members to vote in village elections, whereas churches and mosques are barely able to do so.

Among others, Tsai’s distinctions between the roles played by village temples and the roles played by village churches are particular influential. Although her main objective is to examine the factors that affect the quality of local governance and public goods provision in rural China, her study does find that temples and churches differ in political status in Chinese villages (Tsai 2007a; 2007[b](#_ENREF_51)). She argues that in contrast to temples, which usually develop indigenously and hence are tolerated by the state, churches are not only associated with threats to the state’s "sovereignty" but also with "events like the Taiping Rebellion in which Christianity provided the basis for mobilising vast numbers of people across localities against the state" and hence have high subversive potential (Tsai 2007b, 359).

If the aforementioned arguments hold true, we should be able to observe that temples (mainly refers to groups of Buddhism, Daoism, and popular religions) and churches (mainly refers to groups of Catholicism and Protestantism) behave very differently in contentious politics in contemporary rural China. More specifically, compared with temple groups, church groups should be more likely to associate with contention, because they are usually independent from other players in local communities, their members have less general social trust, and they have higher subversive potential through the modern Chinese history. In other words, we should be able to find from our data that church groups are more likely to positively associate with collective contention. According to the structure of our survey data, this proposition is operationalized into the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4:** Other things being equal, the occurrence of collective contention should NOT significantly correlate to the frequency of temple groups, but it should significantly correlate with the frequency of church groups, and the direction of such correlation should be positive.

To test Hypothesis 4, we need the following model to simultaneously examine the impact of temple groups and church groups on collective contention:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *IfCPi =* α + *NTGi*β + *NCGi*λ *+ CVi*γ *+ TDi*θ + μ*i* | (C) |

In Model C, *IfCP* is the dependent variable referring to the occurrence of collective contention from 2000 and 2008; *NTG* is the first independent variable and it measures the frequency of temple groups in a sampled village; *NCG* is the other independent variable and it measures the frequency of temple groups in a sampled village; α is the intercept; β is the coefficient of *NTG*; δ is the coefficient of *NCG*; μ is the residual error of the model, and *i* is the village code. *TD* represents the township-level dummy variables, along with θ as the coefficient. *CV* refers to a vector of controls and its coefficient is marked as *γ*.

The testing results of Models C are reported in Table 5. According to these results, neither the coefficient of the frequency of temple groups nor that of the frequency of church groups is significant. That is to say, the likelihood of collective contention appears to be on the same level in villages with different numbers of either temple groups or church groups. In other words, neither temple groups nor church groups could significantly increase or decrease the likelihood of collective contention in sample villages. Hypothesis 4 fails to pass the test against empirical data from rural China. In fact, according to my experiences and observations in Chinese villages, religious groups with the same faith may behave differently in contentious politics on one hand, and religious groups with different faiths may behave similarly in contentious politics on the other.

**Does Religious Competition Really Matter?**

The second alternative explanation attributes the heterogeneity in the relationship between religious groups and collective contention to the different levels of religious competition in local communities. Based on his empirical study on the social and political roles played by Latin American Christian churches, Trejo (2009; 2012) argues that the relationship between religious groups and collective contention is not fixed; instead, it depends on the structure of local religious market. Absent religious competition, Catholic churches in Latin American generally stand with political regimes to discourage contentious collective action, ignoring popular pressure to improve social and political conditions. However, when confronted by the expansion of United States mainline Protestantism and fearing the loss of their followers, Catholic churches became more responsive to the local communities and now plays more active roles in voicing resistance against hostile authoritarian regimes. To summarize, in Trejo’s view, religious groups are likely to act as social tranquillizers if they face no religious competition in the community, but are social stimulants when competition with other religious groups is intense.

If Trejo’s argument also works in the context of contemporary China, one may expect to find that the association between religious groups and collective contention should be more likely to appear in villages where more than one religious group coexist so that the religious competition is likely to be more intensive. Such a proposition is operationalized into Hypothesis 5 in accordance with the structure of our survey data:

**Hypothesis 5:** Other things being equal, the occurrence of collective contention should be lower in villages with a single religious group than in other villages, and it should be higher in villages with multiple (i.e. two or more) religious groups than in other villages.

The following model is created to test Hypothesis 5:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *IfCPi=α+IfSRGiβ +IfMRGiδ*+*CViγ+TDiθ +μi* | (D) |

In Model D, *IfCP* is the dependent variable, which refers to the occurrence of collective contention from 2000 and 2008. *IfSRG* and *IfMRG* are two dummy independent variables which together indicate whether a village has no religious groups, one religious group, or multiple (i.e., more than one) religious groups. More specificity, we assign 0 for *IfSRG* and 0 for *IfMRG* in case a sampled village has no religious group, we assign 1 for *IfSRG* and 0 for *IfMRG* to the sampled villages that have a single religious group, and we assign 0 for *IfSRG* and 1 for *IfMRG* to villages with multiple (i.e., more than one) religious groups. α is the intercept; β is the coefficient of *IfSRG*; δ is the coefficient of *IfMRG*; μ is the residual error of the model; and *i* is the village code. *TD* represents the township-level dummy variables, along with θ as the coefficient. *CV* refers to a vector of controls and its coefficient is marked as *γ*.

Model D allows us to compare the likelihood of collective contention among villages with different frequencies of religious groups. This model is tested against the same survey data previously used in this paper, and the results are reported in Table 6. According to these results, neither of the coefficients of the two independent variables is significant, implying that the likelihood of collective contention has no significant difference among villages with a single religious group, those with multiple religious groups, and those with no religious group at all. That is to say, there is no sufficient evidence to support that the occurrence of collective contention is lower in villages with a single religious group than in other villages and that it is higher in villages with multiple religious groups than in other villages. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 fails to pass the statistical test. At least in contemporary rural China, it seems that the level of religious competition cannot explain the roles that religious groups choose to play in contentious politics. The second alternative framework is thus also rejected.

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**Table 5.** Statistical Results for Model C

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Variables | Model [C]The Occurrence of Collective Contention |
| Independent variable |  |
| Frequency of temple groups | 0.0322 |
| (0.81) |
| Frequency of church groups | -0.1460 |
|  | (-1.56) |
| Control variables |  |
| Village population | -0.0002 |
|  | (-1.66) |
| Frequency of Settlements | 0.0142 |
|  | (1.30) |
| Village government revenue (*1000 yuan*) | 0..5540 |
| (1.56) |
| Total villagers’ income (*1000 yuan*) | 0.0000 |
| (0.53) |
| Frequency of Party members | 0.0048 |
|  | (0.82) |
| Subsidy percentage in cadres’ salary | 0.0079\*\* |
| (2.39) |
| Possibility of promotion | 0.0637 |
|  | (0.50) |
| Score on the Election Fairness Index | -0.0286 |
| (-1.06) |
|  Households influenced by land requisition | 0.0006 |
| (1.21) |
| Frequency of land requisition | 0.1050 |
|  | (1.88) |
| Township-level dummies | **controlled** |
| Constant | -0.364 |
|  | (-1.06) |
| *R2* | 0.7211 |

*N = 119.* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by \*, at the 5% level by \*\*, and at the 1% level by \*\*\*.

**Table 6.** Statistical Results for Model D

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Variables | Model [D]The Occurrence of Collective Contention |
| Independent variable |  |
| Village with a single religious group*1 = yes; 0 = no* | 0.2260 |
| (1.18) |
| Village with multiple religious groups*1 = yes; 0 = no* | 0.1070 |
| (0.73) |
| Control variables |  |
| Village population | -0.0002 |
|  | (-1.72) |
| Frequency of Settlements | 0.0126 |
|  | (1.32) |
| Village government revenue (*1000 yuan*) | 0.5650 |
| (1.60) |
| Total villagers’ income (*1000 yuan*) | 0.0000 |
| (0.03) |
| Frequency of Party members | 0.0057 |
|  | (1.01) |
| Subsidy percentage in cadres’ salary | 0.0087\*\* |
| (2.62) |
| Possibility of promotion | 0.0724 |
|  | (0.53) |
| Score on the Election Fairness Index | -0.0431 |
| (-1.42) |
|  Households influenced by land requisition | 0.0008 |
| (1.52) |
| Frequency of land requisition | 0.0986 |
|  | (1.67) |
| Township-level dummies | controlled |
| Constant | -0.5380 |
|  | (-1.48) |
| *R2* | 0.7156 |

*N = 119.* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by \*, at the 5% level by \*\*, and at the 1% level by \*\*\*. The reference group for the independent variable is villages with no religious group at all.