**Online Appendix**

Lobbying Strategies and Success: Inside and Outside Lobbying in European Union Legislative Politics

**INTEREURO sample**

To produce the sample, all European Commission (EC) proposals between 01/01/2008 and 31/12/2010 (111 directives and 427 regulations) were first archived. All media coverage in five media outlets (*European Voice*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Agence Europe*, *Le Monde*, and *Financial Times*) that was related to these proposals was subsequently identified and archived with electronic keyword searches. A set of 48 directives and 38 regulations that gained media coverage in at least two media outlets was ultimately selected. Using non English-language media sources was important to avoid a bias in the sample towards proposals of specific interest to certain countries (Beyers *et al*. 2014a). In addition, 20 proposals for which the EC organized online consultations with interest organizations were included. Therefore, in order to control for the presence of legislative proposals that were publicly debated, 19 proposals that gained little or no media coverage and where no EC consultation took place were randomly added. The sample of 125 proposals is thus stratified in that it is weighted towards cases that gained media attention or for which public consultations were held by the EC.

Although for some research objectives the stratification according to media salience may be a source of bias, it is not problematic for the specific research purposes of this paper. On the contrary, when no media coverage is available, it means that interest groups could not have received approval in media debates, and consequently there are no observations on one of the main independent variables. A pure random sample would have therefore produced fewer observations of salient cases and media endorsement, and thus by design led to less variance on the dependent variable that could have been caused by media salience and endorsement.

**Selection and quality control of media data**

The relevant media coverage related to the sample set of cases was manually assembled by PhD students and postdoctoral researchers involved in the INTEREURO project. To increase the quality of the media searches, the design focused on media outlets from their respective countries. The search within media archives was conducted using keywords that were carefully selected based on the name of the legislative proposal and extensive desk research (for each proposal, a separate memo with background information was created and shared among project members). All keywords were stored in a database and are published on the INTEREURO website ([www.intereuro.eu](http://www.intereuro.eu)).

Not all articles that resulted from keyword searches were kept in the sample. Each article was screened by coders for relevance. Articles that were directly related to the sampled legislative cases were kept, while articles that only vaguely or indirectly related to the legislative proposal were withheld. Keyword searches were concluded only when an information saturation point was met, that is, when the addition of new keyword searches did not result in additional articles. The results were centralized and stored by one research team, which conducted an additional consistency check.

Furthermore, an extensive precision test was conducted by hand coding all collected articles and their constituting statements. Each article was coded for its relevance to the sampled legislative case. This resulted in a precision of 88%. Non-relevant articles were excluded from further analyses. In addition, each separate statement made in the assembled articles was coded for its relevance to the legislative proposal in question. From all assembled statements, 22% were not directly connected to the legislative proposals and were therefore also excluded from further analyses. For the variables used in this study, inter-coder reliabilities were satisfactory, with Krippendorff’s Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from 0.7 to 0.9 (based on the double coding of a randomly selected set of 100 media statements).

**Validity of outside lobbying scale**

In order to test the validity of the scale measuring the relative use of outside lobbying compared to inside lobbying (0-100), we tested how concrete lobbying tactics correlate with this variable. Table 1A presents two types of tactics: (1) tactics that are by nature indirectly oriented at policymakers and publicly visible and (2) tactics that are not visible to the broader public and address policymakers directly (and involve direct contacts such as mailing, telephone conversations, face-to-face meetings, workshops, et cetera). The results indicated higher levels of investment in outside lobbying for organizations that used specific outside lobbying tactics. A lower level of outside lobbying (compared to inside lobbying) was observed for groups that intensively contacted various types of policymakers directly. This correlation can never be perfect, however, because of the inherent theoretical discrepancy between the absolute use and relative use of inside and outside lobbying tactics. For example, interest groups that intensively used many different outside lobbying tactics may still have focused relatively more on inside lobbying, or vice versa. Nonetheless, these results support the validity of the relative measure and are consistent with previous studies on lobbying strategies (Binderkrantz 2005; Beyers 2004; Kollman 1998).

**Table A1. Correlation between lobbying scales and lobbying tactics (Spearman Rho)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Scale1=never; 2=rarely; 3=sometimes; 4=frequently; 5=very frequently | relative use of outside lobbying | p |
| outside tactics |  |  |  |
| participation in media debates | one item | .54 | .0001 |
| press conferences & releases | one item | .51 | .0001 |
| stage protest activities | one item | .31 | .0002 |
| inside tactics; taking contact with |  |  |  |
| member-state government officials | one item | .21 | .0151 |
| cabinets of EC | additive index of intensity contact with five cabinets | .21 | .0147 |
| directorates of the EC | additive index of intensity contact with five DGs | .18 | .0286 |
| Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) | additive index of 4 items; contacting 1) rapporteur, 2) shadow rapporteur, 3) member and 4) chair of responsible committee.  | .23 | .0059 |

**Combined success measure**

As this research offers a unique opportunity to rely on different measures of lobbying success, we also created a model with a combined success measure, utilizing both the EC interviews and the lobbyists’ self-perception. To do so, each success measure was recoded into a dichotomous variable and combined in an additive index. The recoding of the EC-based measure (0-100) was achieved by grouping all values lower or equal to (n=93), or higher than (n=42) the median value of 50. The ordinal self-perceived measure presented here was recoded by grouping the two higher and two lower categories of self-perceived success. Both dichotomized success measures were then combined in an additive index ranging from 0 to 2. This index served as the dependent variable in the subsequent multinomial logistic regression (Table A2). On this variable, the value “2” denotes that both success measures indicated high success scores, “1” denotes that the measures disagreed, and “0” signifies that both measures indicated low success scores. Although an ordered logit or OLS regression render similar results, we did not apply these modelling strategies, as, strictly speaking, it is unknown whether the intermediary value “1” represents *more* or *less* success. Rather, it may indicate an imprecise or unreliable estimation of success (it was potentially difficult for respondents to attribute success). As such, the categorical variable cannot be considered an ordinal or continuous variable. The results in Table A2 largely corroborate the main findings presented in this paper.

**Table A2. Multinomial logistic regression of additive success index**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Intercept | -0.19 (2.70) | *.94* |
| ***Main effects*** |  |  |
| Outside relative to inside lobbying | -0.16 (0.7) | *.26* |
| Public salience (ln) | 0.08 (0.08) | *.30* |
| Media alignment (no=ref) | -6.12 (2.47) | *.01\** |
| Coalition (0=no coalition=ref)* 1=homogenous coalition
* 2=heterogeneous coalition
 | -7.57 (2.14)-7.16 (3.19) | *.00\***.02\** |
| ***Interaction terms*** |  |  |
| Outside x public salience | -0.00 (0.00) | *.63* |
| Outside x coalition (0=no coalition=ref)* 1=homogenous coalition
* 2=heterogeneous coalition
 | 0.20 (0.07)0.23 (0.12) | *.01\***.05\** |
| Outside x media alignment | 0.31 (0.12) | *.01\** |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |
| Group type (0=business=reference) | 0.91 (0.94) | *.39* |
| Staff size (ln) | 0.94 (0.38) | *.01\** |
| Organizational salience (1=more=ref)* 2= equally
* 3= less
 | 0.69 (0.93)0.51 (1.29) | *.46**.69* |
| Position (1=support =ref)* 2=shape parts
* 3=block or change most
 | -3.03 (1.27)-4.50 (1.47) | *.02\***.00\** |
| * mobilization density: n interests seeking policy influence (ln)
 | 2.36 (0.76) | *.00\** |
| ***Fit statistics*** |  |  |
| N | 108 |  |
| Wald chi2 | 66.33 |  |
| p | .00 |  |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.25 |  |
| Clusters | 70 |  |

*Note*: Results of a multinomial logistic regression with “low success score” (value 0) as the baseline and with estimated coefficients for high success scores (value 2). Coefficients for intermediary values, where success measures disagreed (value 1), are not presented. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis, and two-sided *p*-values referring to *H0* that *β=0* in italics. Coefficients that are significant at the 0.05-level are indicated with one \*.

**Spurious relationships**

To assess whether the significant interactions are a result of underlying spurious relationships, we explored the correlations between the key dependent and independent variables. The correlations indicate that a relative investment in outside lobbying is not significantly related to popular endorsement in media debates nor to media salience or coalition formation (which can be considered as independent measures). It is therefore possible to conclude that none of these conditions spur a more intense investment in outside lobbying. Furthermore, none of the independent variables significantly relate to one of the success measures, with the exception of coalition formation, which has a negative correlation. Based on these observations, this research can conclude that the significant interaction effects presented in the regression models are unlikely to be caused by underlying spurious relationships. Moreover, these results suggest that outside lobbying is exogenous to the hypothesized conditions, not that it affects or is affected by these conditions.

**Table A3. Correlation matrix of dependent and explanatory variables (Spearman Rho)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Self-perceived success | Proximity to outcome | Outside lobbying % | Coalition membership | Media endorsement |
| Proximity to outcome | 0.27\* |  |  |  |  |
| Outside lobbying % | -0.10 | 0.08 |  |  |  |
| Coalition membership | -0.19\* | -0.29 | 0.05 |  |  |
| Media endorsement | -0.08 | 0.01 | 0.07 | -0.18 |  |
| Public salience | 0.09 | -0.09 | 0.05 | 0.23\* | 0.06 |

*Note*: Coefficients that are significant at the 0.05-level are