**Supporting Information**

**A Changing Economic Vote in Western Europe?**

**Appendix 1. Elections included in the analyses (micro-level)**

This appendix includes an overview of elections and datasets used for the individual-level analyses, including information on the question wording of the economic evaluation item and information on the parties in government.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Election** | **Data source** | **Question wording economic evaluation** | **Incumbent parties[[1]](#footnote-1)** |
| Denmark | 1987 | Provided by Rune Stubager [DDA87\_88 file] | How do you think Denmark´s economic situation is today compared to 3 years ago? (Better; No change; Worse) | KF, V, CD, KRF |
| Denmark | 1990 | Provided by Rune Stubager [DDA90 file] | How do you think Denmark´s economic situation is today compared to 3 years ago? (Much better; Somewhat better; No change; Somewhat worse; Much worse) | KF, V, RV |
| Denmark | 1994 | Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data (<http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk>) | How do you think Denmark’s economic situation is today compared to a year ago?  (Much better; Somewhat better; No change; Somewhat worse; Much worse) | SD, CD, RV, KRF |
| Denmark | 1998 | Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data (<http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk>) | Would you say the country’s economy situation has become better, stayed the same, or has become worse during the last 12 months? (If better or worse: Is that much or somewhat?) | SD, RV |
| Denmark | 2001 | Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data (<http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk>) | How is Denmark’s economic situation today compared to 3-4 years ago? (Much better; Somewhat better; No change; Somewhat worse; Much worse) | SD, RV |
| Denmark | 2005 | Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data (<http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk>) | How is Denmark’s economic situation today compared to 3-4 years ago? (Much better; Somewhat better; No change; Somewhat worse; Much worse) | V, KF |
| Denmark | 2007 | Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data (<http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk>) | How do you think Denmark’s economic situation is today compared to 3 years ago? (Much better; Somewhat better; No change; Somewhat worse; Much worse) | V, KF |
| Denmark | 2011 | Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data (<http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk>) | How do you think Denmark’s economic situation is today compared to 3 years ago? (Much better; Somewhat better; No change; Somewhat worse; Much worse) | V, KF |
| Germany | 1976 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | What is your general assessment of the current economic situation in Germany?  (Very good; Good; Neither good, neither bad; Bad; Very bad) | SPD, FDP |
| Germany | 1983 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | What is your general assessment of the current economic situation in Germany?  (Very good; Good; Neither good, neither bad; Bad; Very bad) | CDU, CSU, FDP |
| Germany | 1987 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | What is your general assessment of the current economic situation in Germany?  (Very good; Good; Neither good, neither bad; Bad; Very bad) | CDU, CSU, FDP |
| Germany | 1990 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | What is your general assessment of the current economic situation in Germany?  (Very good; Good; Neither good, neither bad; Bad; Very bad) | CDU, CSU, FDP |
| Germany | 1994 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | What is your general assessment of the current economic situation in Germany?  (Very good; Good; Neither good, neither bad; Bad; Very bad) | CDU, CSU, FDP |
| Germany | 1998 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | What is your general assessment of the current economic situation in Germany?  (Very good; Good; Neither good, neither bad; Bad; Very bad) | CDU, CSU, FDP |
| Germany | 2002 | GLES 2009 Langfrist-Panel 2002-2005-2009 (Gesis Study Number ZA5320 v 2.0.0). | How would you generally rate the current economic situation?  (Very good; Good; Partly good/partly bad; Bad; Very bad) | SPD, B90/Grünen |
| Germany | 2009 | GLES 2009 Post-election Cross Section  (Gesis Study Number ZA5301 v 4.0.1). | How in general terms would you rate the current economic situation in Germany?  (Very good; Good; Neither good nor bad; Bad; Very bad) | CDU, CSU, SPD |
| Germany | 2013 | German Longitudinal Election Study 2013 (Gesis Study Number ZA5700, v 1.0.0). | What is your general assessment of the current economic situation in Germany?  (Very good; Good; Neither good, neither bad; Bad; Very bad) | CDU, CSU, FDP |
| Germany | 2017 |  |  |  |
| Great Britain | 1974 october | British Election Study 1974 october (UK Data Archive) | Looking back over the last 6 months, would you say that the state of Britain’s econmy has stayed about the same, got better, or got worse? | LAB |
| Great Britain | 1987 | British Election Study 1987 (UK Data Archive) | [National economy last 12 months]  (Got a lot better; Got a little better; Stayed the same; Got a little worse; Got a lot worse) | CON |
| Great Britian | 1992 | British Election Study 1992 (UK Data Archive) | Looking back over the last year or so, would you say that Britain’s economy has…  (Got stronger; Got weaker; Or, stayed about the same) | CON |
| Great Britain | 1997 | British Election Study 1997 (UK Data Archive) | And how do you think the general economic situation in Britain has changed over the last 12 months? Has it  (Got a lot better; Got a little better; Stayed the same; Got a little worse; Got a lot worse) | CON |
| Great Britain | 2001 | British Election Study 2001 (UK Data Archive) | How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months. Has it…  (Got a lot worse; Got a little worse; Stayed the same; Got a little better; Got a lot better) | LAB |
| Great Britain | 2005 | British Election Study 2005 (UK Data Archive) | How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months.  (Got a lot worse; Got a little worse; Stayed the same; Got a little better; Got a lot better) | LAB |
| Great Britain | 2010 | British Election Study 2010 (UK Data Archive) | How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months. Has it:  (Got a lot worse; Got a little worse; Stayed the same; Got a little better; Got a lot better) | LAB |
| Great Britain | 2015 | British Election Study 2015 v 3.0 (<http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/cross-sectional-data/>) | How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?  (A lot worse; a little worse; the same; a little better; a lot better) | CON, LibDem |
| Italy | 1992 | ITANES 1992  (<http://www.itanes.org/dati/)> | In your opinion, is our country’s current situation better, more or less the same or worse than five years ago?  (Better; The same; Worse) | DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI |
| Italy | 1996 | ITANES 1996  (<http://www.itanes.org/dati/)> | We would like to know your opinion on the economic situation in Italy. Has the economic situation in Italy in the last 12 months improved, worsened or remained the same? | Ulivo-coalition (centre-left)[[2]](#footnote-2) |
| Italy | 2001 | ITANES 2001  (<http://www.itanes.org/dati/)> | We would like to know your opinion on the economic situation in Italy. In your opinion, over the last year, has the economic situation in Italy, much improved, fairly improved, remained the same, quite worsened, or much worsened? | DS, PpP, RiI, PdCI, FdV, PC, UDEUR, ID, SDI |
| Italy | 2006 | ITANES 2006  (<http://www.itanes.org/dati/)> | We would like to know your opinion on the economic situation in Italy. In your opinion, over the last year, has the economic situation in Italy, much improved, fairly improved, remained the same, quite worsened, or much worsened? | FI, AN, UDC, LN, NPSI, PRI |
| Italy | 2008 | ITANES 2008  (<http://www.itanes.org/dati/)> | According to you, over the last year the economic situation in Italy has improved very much, fairly improved, remained the same, become worse or much worse? | PD, IdV, Alliance of Radical Left Parties |
| Italy | 2013 | ITANES 2013  (<http://www.itanes.org/dati/)> | In your opinion, over the last year the economic situation in Italy has…  (Gotten much worse; Gotten somewhat worse; Remained the same; Improved somewhat; Improved a lot) | PdL, PD[[3]](#footnote-3) |
| The Netherlands | 1986 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | I would now like to ask you a few questions about what you think of the policies the government has conducted during the past four years (…). Do you think that the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies? | CDA, VVD |
| The Netherlands | 1989 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | I would now like to ask you a few questions about what you think of the policies the government has conducted during the past four years (…). Do you think that the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies? | CDA, VVD |
| The Netherlands | 1994 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | I would now like to ask you a few questions about what you think of the policies the government has conducted during the past four years (…). Do you think that the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies? | CDA, PVDA |
| The Netherlands | 1998 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | I would now like to ask you a few questions about what you think of the policies the government has conducted during the past four years (…). Do you think that the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies? | PVDA, VVD, D66 |
| The Netherlands | 2002 | Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2002/2003 ([www.dpes.nl](http://www.dpes.nl)) | I would now like to ask you a few questions about what you think of the policies the government has conducted during the past four years (…). Do you think that the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies? | PVDA, VVD, D66 |
| The Netherlands | 2006 | Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2006 ([www.dpes.nl](http://www.dpes.nl)) | I would now like to ask you a few questions about what you think of the policies the government has conducted during the past four years (…). Do you think that the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies? | CDA, VVD, D66 |
| The Netherlands | 2010 | Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010 ([www.dpes.nl](http://www.dpes.nl)) | I would now like to ask you a few questions about what you think of the policies the government has conducted during the past four years (…). Do you think that the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies? | CDA, PVDA, CU |
| The Netherlands | 2012 | Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2012 (<https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:57353/tab/2>) | Would you say that over the past twelve months, the Dutch economy’s condition has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse?  -- Much better or slightly better?  -- Much worse or somewhat worse? | VVD, CDA |
| Norway | 1985 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | Would you say that the economic situation in the country has improved the last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or is it worse today?  -- Would you say much better or a bit better  -- Would you say much worse or a bit worse | H, KRF, SP |
| Norway | 1989 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | Would you say that the economic situation in the country has improved the last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or is it worse today?  -- Would you say much better or a bit better  -- Would you say much worse or a bit worse | DNA |
| Norway | 1993 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | Would you say that the economic situation in the country has improved the last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or is it worse today?  -- Would you say much better or a bit better  -- Would you say much worse or a bit worse | DNA |
| Norway | 1997 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | Would you say that the economic situation in the country has improved the last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or is it worse today?  -- Would you say much better or a bit better  -- Would you say much worse or a bit worse | DNA |
| Norway | 2001 | Norwegian Election survey 2001 (Norwegian Socal Science Data Service – NSD) | Would you say that the economic situation in the country has improved the last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or is it worse today?  -- Would you say much better or a bit better  -- Would you say much worse or a bit worse | DNA |
| Norway | 2005 | Norwegian Election survey 2005 (Norwegian Socal Science Data Service – NSD) | Would you say that the economic situation in the country has improved the last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or is it worse today?  -- Would you say much better or a bit better  -- Would you say much worse or a bit worse | KRF, H, V |
| Norway | 2009 | Norwegian Election survey 2009 (Norwegian Socal Science Data Service – NSD) | Would you say that the economic situation in the country has improved the last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or is it worse today?  -- Would you say much better or a bit better  -- Would you say much worse or a bit worse | DNA, SV, SP |
| Norway | 2013 | Comparative Study of Electoral Studies, Module 4, Third Advance Release | Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in Norway has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?  -- Would you say much better or somewhat better?  -- Would you say much worse or somewhat worse? | DNA, SV, SP |
| Sweden | 1985 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | How has, in your opinion, the Swedish economy changed in the last two or three years? Has it improved, remained about the same or has it got worse? | SAP |
| Sweden | 1988 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | How has, in your opinion, the Swedish economy changed in the last two or three years? Has it improved, remained about the same or has it got worse? | SAP |
| Sweden | 1991 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | How has, in your opinion, the Swedish economy changed in the last two or three years? Has it improved, remained about the same or has it got worse? | SAP |
| Sweden | 1994 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | How has, in your opinion, the Swedish economy changed in the last two or three years? Has it improved, remained about the same or has it got worse? | MSP, FP, C, KS |
| Sweden | 1998 | The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Number ZA3911) | How has, in your opinion, the Swedish economy changed in the last 12 months? Has it improved, remained about the same or has it got worse? | SAP |
| Sweden | 2002 | Swedish Election Study 2002 (SND 0812) | Would you say that the economic situation in Sweden has improved, remained the same or gone worse during the last 12 months? | SAP |
| Sweden | 2006 | Swedish Election Study 2006 (SND 0861) | Would you say that the economic situation in Sweden has improved, remained the same or gone worse during the last 12 months? | SAP |
| Sweden | 2014 | Comparative Study of Electoral Studies, Module 4, Third Advance Release | Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in Norway has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?  -- Would you say much better or somewhat better?  -- Would you say much worse or somewhat worse? | MSP, FP, C, KD |

**Appendix 2. Elections included in the analysis (macro-level)**

This appendix lists an overview of countries, time period and number of elections included in the aggregate-level analysis.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Time frame | Number of elections |
| Austria | 1953-2017 | 20 |
| Belgium | 1954-2014 | 19 |
| Denmark | 1953-2015 | 24 |
| Finland | 1954-2015 | 17 |
| France | 1956-2017 | 16 |
| Iceland | 1953-2017 | 21 |
| Ireland | 1954-2016 | 18 |
| Luxembourg | 1954-2013 | 13 |
| The Netherlands | 1956-2017 | 19 |
| Norway | 1953-2017 | 17 |
| Sweden | 1952-2014 | 20 |
| Switzerland | 1955-2015 | 16 |
| United Kingdom | 1955-2017 | 17 |
| (West) Germany | 1953-2017 | 18 |
| TOTAL |  | 271 |

**Appendix 3. Explaining voting for the incumbent in Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (full results)**

This appendix reports the results of logistic regression models for explaining voting for the incumbent party. Separate models are estimated for each election-survey.

TABLE 1. Voting for the incumbent in Denmark (1987-2011)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1987 | 1990 | 1994 | 1998 | 2001 | 2005 | 2007 | 2011 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Female | 0.449\*  (0.188) | 0.357  (0.222) | 0.187  (0.123) | -0.094  (0.128) | 0.277\*  (0.121) | 0.267\*  (0.132) | -0.076  (0.089) | 0.036  (0.138) |
| Age | 0.021\*\*  (0.006) | 0.105\*\* a  (0.034) | 0.006  (0.004) | -0.002  (0.005) | 0.004  (0.004) | 0.004  (0.004) | 0.008\*\*  (0.003) | 0.003  (0.004) |
| Education (0-1) | 0.282  (0.315) | 1.495\*\*\*  (0.361) | -0.892\*\*\*  (0.205) | -1.103\*\*\*  (0.206) | -0.701\*\*\*  (0.203) | 0.298  (0.214) | 0.187  (0.126) | 0.334  (0.224) |
| Income (0-1) |  | 0.646  (0.503) | -0.799\*  (0.344) | -0.016  (0.394) | -0.066  (0.284) | 1.818\*\*\*  (0.308) | 1.425\*\*\*  (0.197) | 0.580  (0.309) |
| Urbanization (0-1) |  | 0.663  (0.357) | -0.188  (0.198) | -0.022  (0.075) | 0.051  (0.179) | -0.208  (0.184) | -0.529\*\*\*  (0.130) | -0.474\*  (0.213) |
| Left right (0-1) | 0.859\*\*\*  (0.078) | 7.431\*\*\*  (0.645) | -3.240\*\*\*  (0.296) | -3.799\*\*\*  (0.308) | -4.113\*\*\*  (0.296) | 6.725\*\*\*  (0.363) | 4.830\*\*\*  (0.198) | 5.572\*\*\*  (0.340) |
| **Economy (0-1)** | **2.294\*\*\***  **(0.366)** | **2.542\*\*\***  **(0.565)** | **2.643\*\*\***  **(0.324)** | **2.404\*\*\***  **(0.346)** | **1.370\*\*\***  **(0.311)** | **2.511\*\*\***  **(0.355)** | **2.072\*\*\***  **(0.231)** | **0.973\*\*\***  **(0.337)** |
| Constant | -7.091\*\*\*  (0.597) | -9.055\*\*\*  (0.808) | 0.472  (0.387) | 0.917\*  (0.405) | 0.709  (0.382) | -7.061\*\*\*  (0.459) | -5.492\*\*\*  (0.298) | -4.878\*\*\*  (0.397) |
| *N* | 787 | 668 | 1,466 | 1,481 | 1,648 | 1,774 | 3,435 | 1,589 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.305 | 0.372 | 0.157 | 0.154 | 0.143 | 0.314 | 0.266 | 0.235 |
| Correctly classified | 79.67% | 83.23% | 69.58% | 67.93% | 67.84% | 78.69% | 77.90% | 75.90% |
| Area under the ROC curve | 0.869 | 0.890 | 0.759 | 0.767 | 0.769 | 0.861 | 0.835 | 0.825 |

*Source:* Danish election surveys 1994-2011, obtained from [www.surveybank.dk](http://www.surveybank.dk). 1987 and 1990 election surveys obtained from Rune Stubager. Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. a Age measured in age categories.

TABLE 2. Voting for the incumbent in Germany (1976-2013)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1976 | 1983 | 1987 | 1990 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2009 | 2013 | 2017 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Female | 0.203 | -0.281 | 0.098 | -0.103 | -0.092 | 0.316\* | 0.183 | 0.152 | 0.281\* | 0.163 |
|  | (0.197) | (0.169) | (0.167) | (0.184) | (0.182) | (0.152) | (0.101) | (0.120) | (0.135) | (0.116) |
| Age | -0.004 | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.006 | 0.010 | 0.012\* | -0.007\* | 0.019\*\*\* | 0.009\* | 0.011\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| Education (0-1) | -0.901\*\* | 0.379 | 0.773\*\* | 0.424 | -0.054 | 0.342 | -0.320 | -1.431\*\*\* | -0.061 | -0.574\* |
|  | (0.309) | (0.271) | (0.263) | (0.248) | (0.273) | (0.198) | (0.226) | (0.276) | (0.292) | (0.224) |
| Religious attendance | -2.124\*\*\* | 1.209\*\*\* | 1.438\*\*\* | 1.648\*\*\* | 1.036\*\* | 1.534\*\*\* | -0.905\*\*\* | -0.040\*\* | 1.520\*\*\* | 1.898\*\*\* |
| (0-1) | (0.321) | (0.272) | (0.281) | (0.286) | (0.320) | (0.253) | (0.199) | (0.012) | (0.304) | (0.347) |
| Professional status | -0.112 | 0.265 | 0.807\*\* | 0.214 | -0.245 | 0.571 |  |  |  |  |
| (0-1) | (0.352) | (0.283) | (0.289) | (0.283) | (0.319) | (0.295) |  |  |  |  |
| Social class (0-1) | 0.393 | -0.362 | -0.234 | 0.176 | -0.368 | -0.265 | -0.022 | 0.960\* | 0.562 | 0.460 |
|  | (0.276) | (0.275) | (0.261) | (0.278) | (0.281) | (0.243) | (0.276) | (0.381) | (0.422) | (0.331) |
| Urbanization (0-1) | 0.203 | -0.281 | 0.098 | -0.103 | -0.092 | 0.316\* | 0.397\*\* | 0.223 | -0.070 | -0.312\* |
|  | (0.197) | (0.169) | (0.167) | (0.184) | (0.182) | (0.152) | (0.135) | (0.173) | (0.192) | (0.159) |
| East-Germany |  |  |  |  | 1.234\*\*\* | -0.011 | -0.547\*\*\* | 0.345\* | 0.856\*\*\* | -0.297\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.215) | (0.172) | (0.124) | (0.140) | (0.163) | (0.130) |
| Left right (0-1) | -9.708\*\*\* | 6.479\*\*\* | 7.181\*\*\* | 5.805\*\*\* | 8.598\*\*\* | 3.920\*\*\* | -5.243\*\*\* | 3.092\*\*\* | 7.057\*\*\* | 0.935\*\* |
|  | (0.747) | (0.515) | (0.496) | (0.535) | (0.669) | (0.404) | (0.300) | (0.345) | (0.474) | (0.303) |
| **Economy (0-1)** | **6.211\*\*\*** | **1.599\*\*** | **4.600\*\*\*** | **0.429** | **2.501\*\*\*** | **1.456\*\*\*** | **1.248\*\*\*** | **0.896\*** | **1.873\*\*\*** | **0.746\*** |
|  | **(0.696)** | **(0.498)** | **(0.558)** | **(0.389)** | **(0.579)** | **(0.371)** | **(0.248)** | **(0.361)** | **(0.403)** | **(0.320)** |
| Constant | 2.680\*\*\* | -4.647\*\*\* | -8.090\*\*\* | -4.357\*\*\* | -6.051\*\*\* | -4.820\*\*\* | 2.421\*\*\* | -2.256\*\*\* | -6.249\*\*\* | -1.311\*\*\* |
|  | (0.613) | (0.502) | (0.576) | (0.543) | (0.598) | (0.470) | (0.281) | (0.339) | (0.505) | (0.369) |
| *N* | 956 | 882 | 1,113 | 743 | 853 | 976 | 2,151 | 1,376 | 1,325 | 1,472 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.494 | 0.278 | 0.399 | 0.237 | 0.338 | 0.160 | 0.190 | 0.117 | 0.241 | 0.066 |
| Correctly classified | 85.15% | 77.55% | 81.58% | 75.24% | 79.13% | 71.82% | 73.13% | 68.90% | 76.15% | 65.01% |
| Area under the ROC curve | 0.925 | 0.839 | 0.893 | 0.821 | 0.869 | 0.763 | 0.793 | 0.731 | 0.826 | 0.671 |

*Source:* 1976-1998: The European Voter Dataset; 2013: GLES 2013. Standard errors in parentheses \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

TABLE 3. Voting for the incumbent in Great Britain (1983-2010) – Vote for incumbent

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1974 oct | 1987 | 1992 | 1997 | 2001 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Female | -0.110 | 0.152 | 0.277 | 0.553\*\* | 0.040 | 0.229\* | 0.031 | 0.435\* |
|  | (0.188) | (0.147) | (0.162) | (0.201) | (0.127) | (0.097) | (0.166) | (0.198) |
| Age | -0.018\*\* | 0.085\*\*\* a | 0.016\*\* | 0.012 | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.019\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.020) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Religious denomination |  |  |  |  | 0.042 | 0.140 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.133) | (0.102) |  |  |
| Religious attendance (0-1) |  |  | -0.356 | 0.008 |  |  | 1.168\*\* | -0.253 |
|  |  |  | (0.212) | (0.267) |  |  | (0.370) | (0.268) |
| Religiosity (0-1) | -0.279 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.284) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Social class (0-1) |  | 0.785\*\* | 0.865\*\*\* | -0.013 | -0.260 | -0.340\*\* | -0.325 | 0.198 |
|  |  | (0.294) | (0.189) | (0.243) | (0.142) | (0.109) | (0.185) | (0.241) |
| Income (0-1) | -0.988\* |  | 1.402\*\*\* | 0.505 | 0.364 | -0.024 |  | 1.357\*\*\* |
|  | (0.390) |  | (0.296) | (0.360) | (0.233) | (0.178) | (0.185) | (0.394) |
| Incumbent party ID | 4.790\*\*\* | 3.188\*\*\* | 4.770\*\*\* | 5.253\*\*\* | 3.242\*\*\* | 1.567\*\*\* | 3.217\*\*\* | 3.121\*\*\* |
|  | (0.192) | (0.145) | (0.162) | (0.215) | (0.146) | (0.117) | (0.178) | (0.197) |
| **Economy (0-1)** | **1.103\*\*\*** | **4.069\*\*\*** | **1.202\*\*\*** | **2.051\*\*\*** | **1.550\*\*\*** | **1.814\*\*\*** | **-0.046** | **1.894\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.289)** | **(0.339)** | **(0.229)** | **(0.438)** | **(0.287)** | **(0.213)** | **(0.310)** | **(0.415)** |
| Constant | -1.209\*\* | -5.631\*\*\* | -4.951\*\*\* | -5.969\*\*\* | -4.563\*\*\* | -2.114\*\*\* | -2.666\*\*\* | -4.256\*\*\* |
|  | (0.381) | (0.330) | (0.375) | (0.534) | (0.356) | (0.236) | (0.372) | (0.566) |
| *N* | 1,605 | 2,084 | 2,379 | 2,103 | 1,981 | 2,476 | 1,279 | 887 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.599 | 0.515 | 0.635 | 0.662 | 0.373 | 0.107 | 0.341 | 0.416 |
| Correctly classified | 91.78% | 87.43% | 92.43% | 93.91% | 81.63% | 74.64% | 83.42% | 84.55% |
| Area under the ROC curve | 0.935 | 0.932 | 0.952 | 0.956 | 0.876 | 0.712 | 0.859 | 0.891 |

*Source:* British election studies, UK Data archive (1974-2010), <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/version-3-0-2015-face-to-face-post-election-survey/> (2015). Standard errors in parentheses \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. a Age categories.

TABLE 4. Voting for the incumbent in Italy (1992-2013) – Vote for incumbent

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1992 | 1996 | 2001 | 2006 | 2008 | 2013 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Female | 0.132 | -0.381\*\* | 0.205 | 0.003 | -0.008 | -0.122 |
|  | (0.174) | (0.142) | (0.155) | (0.235) | (0.186) | (0.145) |
| Age | 0.012\* | 0.008 | 0.010 | 0.013 | 0.011 | 0.026\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.009) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| Education (0-1) | 0.335 | 1.146\*\* | -0.438 | 0.342 | 0.179 | 0.056 |
|  | (0.461) | (0.394) | (0.313) | (0.496) | (0.288) | (0.310) |
| Urbanization (0-1) | -0.918\*\*\* | -0.043 | -0.162 | -0.714 | 0.468 | -0.439 |
|  | (0.215) | (0.202) | (0.254) | (0.401) | (0.275) | (0.242) |
| Social class (0-1) | 0.599\* | 0.151 | 0.404 | -0.722\* | -0.098 | -0.521\* |
|  | (0.262) | (0.216) | (0.243) | (0.351) | (0.267) | (0.228) |
| Religious attendance (0-1) | 1.214\*\*\* | 0.131 |  | 0.647 |  |  |
|  | (0.227) | (0.180) |  | (0.339) |  |  |
| Religious importance (0-1) |  |  | 0.505 |  | -1.021\*\* | -0.331 |
|  |  |  | (0.266) |  | (0.322) | (0.243) |
| Left right (0-1) |  | -1.371\*\*\* | -0.677\*\*\* | 2.061\*\*\* | -1.245\*\*\* | -0.002 |
|  |  | (0.069) | (0.041) | (0.131) | (0.074) | (0.030) |
| **Economy (0-1)** | **0.773\*\*** | **1.081\*\*\*** | **2.109\*\*\*** | **2.023\*\*\*** | **2.441\*\*\*** | **0.359** |
|  | **(0.272)** | **(0.198)** | **(0.378)** | **(0.534)** | **(0.480)** | **(0.479)** |
| Constant | -1.710\*\*\* | 1.363\*\* | 0.863\* | -7.003\*\*\* | 6.042\*\*\* | -0.516 |
|  | (0.460) | (0.415) | (0.427) | (0.732) | (0.522) | (0.395) |
| *N* | 663 | 1,584 | 1,339 | 886 | 1,407 | 848 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.089 | 0.366 | 0.342 | 0.580 | 0.581 | 0.041 |
| Correctly classified | 67.42% | 81.25% | 80.58% | 89.62% | 89.27% | 58.61% |
| Area under the ROC curve | 0.698 | 0.864 | 0.875 | 0.945 | 0.952 | 0.638 |

*Source:* ITANES 1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2013 Election Studies. Standard errors in parentheses \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

TABLE 5. Voting for the incumbent in The Netherlands (1986-2010) – Vote for incumbent

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1986 | 1989 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2006 | 2010 | 2012 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Female | 0.093 | 0.295\* | -0.064 | 0.256\* | 0.126 | -0.029 | 0.033 | 0.005 |
|  | (0.170) | (0.147) | (0.129) | (0.124) | (0.121) | (0.118) | (0.116) | (0.136) |
| Age | 0.003 |  | 0.030\*\*\* | -0.006 | 0.008 | 0.012\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* |
|  | (0.005) |  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Education (0-1) | -0.642\* | -0.215 | 0.448\*\* | 0.310 | 0.598\* | 0.353 | -0.490\* | 0.486 |
|  | (0.252) | (0.192) | (0.165) | (0.176) | (0.250) | (0.237) | (0.228) | (0.269) |
| Religious attendance (0-1) | 0.375 | 0.178 | 0.835\*\*\* | -2.726\*\*\* | -2.168\*\*\* | -0.584\*\* | 2.378\*\*\* | -0.126 |
|  | (0.227) | (0.194) | (0.190) | (0.186) | (0.220) | (0.185) | (0.196) | (0.208) |
| Social class (0-1) | 1.475\*\*\* | 1.642\*\*\* | -1.129\*\*\* | 0.088 | 0.431 | 1.402\*\*\* | -0.359 | 1.526\*\*\* |
|  | (0.342) | (0.305) | (0.263) | (0.273) | (0.287) | (0.274) | (0.263) | (0.322) |
| Urbanization (0-1) | 0.129 | -0.229 | -0.558\*\* | -0.270 | -0.250 | -0.571\*\* | -0.180 | -0.494\* |
|  | (0.249) | (0.210) | (0.191) | (0.191) | (0.185) | (0.191) | (0.179) | (0.219) |
| Left right (0-1) | 5.754\*\*\* | 5.552\*\*\* | -1.519\*\*\* | 0.890\*\* | -0.584\* | 6.728\*\*\* | -2.331\*\*\* | 5.683\*\*\* |
|  | (0.441) | (0.373) | (0.289) | (0.293) | (0.292) | (0.363) | (0.257) | (0.391) |
| **Economy (0-1)** | **2.000\*\*\*** | **1.501\*\*\*** | **1.401\*\*\*** | **1.348\*\*\*** | **1.149\*\*\*** | **1.780\*\*\*** | **0.964\*\*\*** | **0.265** |
|  | **(0.275)** | **(0.251)** | **(0.195)** | **(0.202)** | **(0.188)** | **(0.171)** | **(0.157)** | **(0.305)** |
| Constant | -5.122\*\*\* | -4.803\*\*\* | -1.094\*\*\* | 0.049 | -1.443\*\*\* | -6.205\*\*\* | -0.266 | -5.277\*\*\* |
|  | (0.445) | (0.345) | (0.300) | (0.321) | (0.363) | (0.384) | (0.327) | (0.451) |
| *N* | 1,071 | 1,294 | 1190 | 1,490 | 1,425 | 1,930 | 1,696 | 1,304 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.407 | 0.340 | 0.126 | 0.172 | 0.117 | 0.330 | 0.151 | 0.222 |
| Correctly classified | 83.85% | 81.30% | 66.89% | 74.63% | 67.72% | 78.65% | 72.52% | 74.77% |
| Area under the ROC curve | 0.892 | 0.868 | 0.732 | 0.761 | 0.722 | 0.862 | 0.750 | 0.810 |

*Source:* 1986-1998: The European Voter Dataset. 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2012: Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey (DPES) 2002-2003, 2006, 2010 and 2012. Standard errors in parentheses \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

TABLE 6. Voting for the incumbent in Norway (1985-2009)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1985 | 1989 | 1993 | 1997 | 2001 | 2005 | 2009 | 2013 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Female | 0.278 | 0.023 | 0.012 | -0.153 | 0.048 | 0.133 | -0.007 | 0.190 |
|  | (0.156) | (0.125) | (0.122) | (0.116) | (0.147) | (0.143) | (0.156) | (0.145) |
| Age | 0.014\*\* | 0.012\*\* | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.012\* | 0.013\*\* | 0.004 | 0.010\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Education (0-1) | 1.336\*\*\* | -1.827\*\*\* | -1.033\*\*\* | -1.319\*\*\* | -1.461\*\*\* | 1.460\*\*\* | -0.452 | -0.527 |
|  | (0.247) | (0.208) | (0.189) | (0.192) | (0.365) | (0.236) | (0.384) | (0.315) |
| Religious attendance (0-1) | 3.314\*\*\* | -2.223\*\* | -3.313\*\*\* | -2.091\*\*\* | 0.211 | 3.897\*\*\* | -1.908 |  |
|  | (0.714) | (0.719) | (0.675) | (0.583) | (0.824) | (0.759) | (0.982) |  |
| Religious denomination |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.166 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.207) |
| Income (0-1) | 0.216 | 0.141 | 0.124 | 0.482\*\* | 7.648\*\*\* | 6.286\*\*\* | -1.496 | 0.129 |
|  | (0.221) | (0.192) | (0.155) | (0.155) | (2.195) | (1.253) | (1.239) | (0.225) |
| Urbanization (0-1) | -0.795\*\*\* | 0.296\* | 0.540\*\*\* | 0.765\*\*\* | 0.612\*\* | 1.532\*\*\* | -0.158 | 0.225 |
|  | (0.182) | (0.149) | (0.149) | (0.194) | (0.196) | (0.338) | (0.166) | (0.163) |
| Left right (0-1) | 11.540\*\*\* | -4.634\*\*\* | -3.468\*\*\* | -3.274\*\*\* | -4.162\*\*\* | 5.618\*\*\* | -10.088\*\*\* | -7.618\*\*\* |
|  | (0.578) | (0.345) | (0.333) | (0.282) | (0.379) | (0.384) | (0.548) | (0.449) |
| Economy (0-1) | **1.912\*\*\*** | **0.962\*\*\*** | **1.716\*\*\*** | **0.122** | **0.552** | **0.998\*\*** | **0.686** | **0.250** |
|  | **(0.383)** | **(0.222)** | **(0.263)** | **(0.296)** | **(0.388)** | **(0.346)** | **(0.432)** | **(0.506)** |
| Constant | -8.844\*\*\* | 1.325\*\*\* | 0.452 | 0.756\* | -0.272 | -7.968\*\*\* | 5.694\*\*\* | 3.133\*\*\* |
|  | (0.525) | (0.329) | (0.336) | (0.358) | (0.434) | (0.502) | (0.545) | (0.500) |
| *N* | 1,628 | 1,682 | 1,472 | 1,606 | 1,329 | 1,575 | 1,317 | 1,255 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.475 | 0.206 | 0.135 | 0.107 | 0.124 | 0.289 | 0.411 | 0.298 |
| Correctly classified | 86.98% | 73.72% | 69.23% | 66.31% | 77.95% | 80.44% | 83.83% | 80.08% |
| Area under the ROC curve | 0.921 | 0.802 | 0.744 | 0.722 | 0.750 | 0.857 | 0.901 | 0.862 |

*Source:* 1985-1997: The True European Voter Dataset; 2001, 2005 and 2009: Norwegian National Election Studies (Statistics Norway); 2013: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 4. Standard errors in parentheses \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

TABLE 7. Voting for the incumbent in Sweden (1985-2006)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1985 | 1988 | 1991 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2006 | 2014 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Female | 0.273\* | 0.089 | 0.004 | 0.148 | -0.224 | -0.215 | -0.144 | 0.178 |
|  | (0.121) | (0.124) | (0.126) | (0.152) | (0.199) | (0.179) | (0.219) | (0.168) |
| Age | -0.005 | -0.001 | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.055 a | 0.132 a | -0.001 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.032) | (0.074) | (0.005) |
| Education (0-1) | -1.361\*\*\* | -1.360\*\*\* | -0.821\*\*\* | 0.742\*\*\* | -0.228 | -0.645\* | -0.765\* | 0.660 |
|  | (0.168) | (0.161) | (0.189) | (0.214) | (0.289) | (0.299) | (0.362) | (0.393) |
| Religious attendance (0-1) | 0.335 | 0.628\*\* | 0.476\* | -1.196\*\*\* | -0.130 | -0.942\* | -0.486 | 0.825\* |
|  | (0.201) | (0.200) | (0.209) | (0.256) | (0.435) | (0.415) | (0.494) | (0.393) |
| Social class (0-1) | -1.234\*\*\* | -1.540\*\*\* | -2.017\*\*\* | 2.357\*\*\* | -2.512\*\*\* | -1.074\*\* | -1.961\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.233) | (0.244) | (0.276) | (0.269) | (0.471) | (0.327) | (0.474) |  |
| Income (0-1) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1.072\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.245) |
| Urbanization (0-1) | 0.298 | 0.490\* | 0.603\*\* | -0.730\*\* | 0.296 | 0.292 | -0.343 | 0.135 |
|  | (0.199) | (0.200) | (0.204) | (0.249) | (0.329) | (0.242) | (0.347) | (0.218) |
| Left right (0-1) | -6.434\*\*\* | -5.633\*\*\* | -6.922\*\*\* | 11.020\*\*\* | -4.179\*\*\* | -4.524\*\*\* | -5.246\*\*\* | 0.309\*\* |
|  | (0.363) | (0.355) | (0.399) | (0.585) | (0.510) | (0.482) | (0.567) | (0.105) |
| **Economy (0-1)** | **1.301\*\*\*** | **0.743\*\*\*** | **0.597\*\*** | **0.603** | **1.607\*\*\*** | **0.804\*\*\*** | **0.671** | **2.784\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.150)** | **(0.180)** | **(0.216)** | **(0.324)** | **(0.324)** | **(0.228)** | **(0.347)** | **(0.429)** |
| Constant | 2.855\*\*\* | 2.241\*\*\* | 2.815\*\*\* | -6.119\*\*\* | -0.088 | 1.706\*\*\* | 2.296\*\*\* | -3.176\*\*\* |
|  | (0.362) | (0.383) | (0.382) | (0.453) | (0.640) | (0.423) | (0.544) | (0.454) |
| *N* | 2,102 | 1,861 | 1,902 | 1,819 | 686 | 759 | 588 | 711 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.369 | 0.301 | 0.341 | 0.512 | 0.265 | 0.212 | 0.298 | 0.115 |
| Correctly classified | 80.97% | 76.89% | 79.60% | 85.98% | 76.97% | 73.12% | 77.55% | 66.67% |
| Area under the ROC curve | 0.884 | 0.851 | 0.876 | 0.934 | 0.834 | 0.805 | 0.852 | 0.736 |

*Source:* 1985-1998: The European Voter Dataset; 2002, 2006: Swedish National Election Studies; 2014: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 4. Standard errors in parentheses \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. a Age measured in age categories.

**Appendix 4. Individual-level analyses, controlling for ENEP**

This appendix reports the results of logistic regression models explaining voting for the incumbent. Models are estimated on the pooled individual-level dataset.

TABLE 1. Explaining the incumbent vote – individual-level binomial logit estimations (since 1974)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Economic evaluation (0-1) | 1.010\*\*\* | 1.244\*\* |
|  | (0.141) | (0.471) |
| Time | -0.001 | 0.003 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Economic evaluation × Time |  | -0.010 |
|  |  | (0.013) |
| Sociodemographics yhat | 0.650\*\*\* | 0.652\*\*\* |
|  | (0.044) | (0.041) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat | 0.918\*\*\* | 0.918\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.025) |
| ENEPe-1 | 0.041 | 0.052 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.034) |
| Constant | -0.428\*\* | -0.587\* |
|  | (0.150) | (0.233) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes |
| N | 79,524 | 79,524 |
| pseudo-R2 | 0.295 | 0.295 |
| Correctly classified | 75.82% | 76.78% |
| Area under the ROC-curve | 0.849 | 0.849 |

*Note:* Standard errors are robust for 7 country-clusters. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. Information on the effective number of parties (in votes) as reported by Gallagher (<https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf>). The ENEP-indicator is lagged one election.

**Appendix 5. Restricting the macro-analyses**

This appendix lists the results of aggregate-level OLS models explaining the incumbent vote share. The macro-dataset is limited to elections since 1974.

TABLE 1. Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1974)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Incumbent vote sharee-1 |  |  | 0.723\*\*\* | 0.723\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| GDP growth rate | 0.625\* | 1.054 | 0.508\* | 0.543 |
|  | (0.282) | (1.072) | (0.218) | (0.759) |
| Time | -0.147\*\*\* | -0.125\* | -0.153\*\*\* | -0.151\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) | (0.061) | (0.029) | (0.042) |
| GDP growth × Time |  | -0.009 |  | -0.001 |
|  |  | (0.021) |  | (0.016) |
| Constant | 60.762\*\*\* | 59.698\*\*\* | 18.803\*\*\* | 18.723\*\*\* |
|  | (3.221) | (3.983) | (3.652) | (3.899) |
| Country dummies? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *N* elections | 179 | 179 | 179 | 179 |
| *N* countries | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| *R*2 | 0.640 | 0.640 | 0.809 | 0.809 |

*Note:* OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election.

**Appendix 6. Controlling for clarity of responsibility**

This appendix lists the results of aggregate-level OLS models explaining the incumbent vote share.

TABLE 1. Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1950) – main effects of institutional variables

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Incumbent vote sharee-1 | 0.860\*\*\* | 0.859\*\*\* |
|  | (0.049) | (0.048) |
| GDP growth rate | 0.341 | 0.177 |
|  | (0.181) | (0.332) |
| Time | -0.112\*\*\* | -0.132\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.039) |
| GDP growth × Time |  | 0.006 |
|  |  | (0.010) |
| ENEPe-1 | 0.898 | 0.960 |
|  | (0.616) | (0.626) |
| Coalition government | -0.670 | -0.662 |
|  | (1.425) | (1.428) |
| Minority government | 1.793 | 1.726 |
|  | (1.240) | (1.257) |
| Number of parties in government | 1.091 | 1.112 |
|  | (0.698) | (0.698) |
| RAI index | -0.092 | -0.102 |
|  | (0.139) | (0.141) |
| Country dummies? | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 6.893 | 7.680 |
|  | (3.987) | (4.200) |
| *N* | 216 | 216 |
| *R*2 | 0.875 | 0.876 |

*Note:* OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election.

TABLE 2. Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1950) – interactions with institutional variables

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Incumbent vote sharee-1 | 0.860\*\*\* | 0.854\*\*\* | 0.859\*\*\* | 0.860\*\*\* | 0.859\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) |
| Time | -0.131\*\* | -0.125\*\* | -0.131\*\*\* | -0.134\*\* | -0.131\*\*\* |
|  | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.041) | (0.039) |
| GDP growth | 0.123 | -0.188 | 0.189 | 0.259 | 0.068 |
|  | (0.590) | (0.404) | (0.349) | (0.422) | (0.435) |
| GDP growth × Time | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| ENEPe-1 | 0.925 | 0.892 | 0.957 | 0.969 | 0.945 |
|  | (0.707) | (0.631) | (0.628) | (0.629) | (0.628) |
| Coalition government | -0.655 | -2.415 | -0.682 | -0.666 | -0.704 |
|  | (1.425) | (1.819) | (1.437) | (1.426) | (1.435) |
| Minority government | 1.733 | 1.944 | 1.875 | 1.700 | 1.749 |
|  | (1.257) | (1.284) | (1.911) | (1.265) | (1.262) |
| Number of parties in | 1.101 | 1.166 | 1.114 | 1.221 | 1.128 |
| government | (0.707) | (0.694) | (0.698) | (0.779) | (0.701) |
| RAI index | -0.100 | -0.071 | -0.101 | -0.106 | -0.119 |
|  | (0.143) | (0.145) | (0.144) | (0.142) | (0.141) |
| GDP × ENEPe-1 | 0.014 |  | -0.090 |  |  |
|  | (0.124) |  | (0.126) |  |  |
| GDP × Coalition |  | 0.526 |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.340) |  |  |  |
| GDP × Minority government |  |  | -0.043 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.358) |  |  |
| GDP × Parties in government |  |  |  | -0.038 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.128) |  |
| GDP × RAI index |  |  |  |  | 0.007 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.014) |
| Country dummies? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 7.755 | 8.560\* | 7.630 | 7.462 | 7.934 |
|  | (4.299) | (4.174) | (4.293) | (4.240) | (4.194) |
| *N* | 216 | 216 | 216 | 216 | 216 |
| *R*2 | 0.876 | 0.877 | 0.876 | 0.876 | 0.876 |

*Note:* OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election. Information on the Effective Number of Parties is obtained from Gallagher. Information on governments (coalition and minority) comes from ParlGov (Döringer and Manow, 2018) and the RAI index comes from Hooghe et al. (2016).

**Appendix 7. Examining economic voting with a focus on the lead party only**

Given the multiparty settings looked at in our paper, it might be argued that analyzing a vote for any party in the governing coalition is a poor approximation of the reality of economic voting in these countries. More specifically, a number of recent studies have argued that in a context of coalition governments, the blame and reward for the economy is directed at the party of the Prime Minister mostly (Debus, Stegmaier & Tosun, 2014; Larsen, 2016).

As an additional robustness test, therefore, we also verify whether the basic conclusion of a stability in the economic vote holds when assessing a vote for the lead party. We define as the lead party, the party of the prime minister. Compared to the main analyses presented in our paper, Switzerland is excluded from the aggregate-level analyses, because the Council is the collective head of government. A lead party can thus not be identified.

In Table 1 and Table 2 we report those analyses for the individual-level (pooled dataset) and the aggregate-level analysis respectively. While there are obviously differences between both approaches, the conclusion that there is no significant over-time change in the economic vote holds regardless of whether we focus on a vote for the coalition or a vote for the PM party only.

TABLE 1. Explaining the lead party vote – individual-level binomial logit estimations (since 1974)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Economic evaluation (0-1) | 0.957\*\*\* | 1.131\* |
|  | (0.181) | (0.506) |
| Time | -0.005 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.009) |
| Economic evaluation × Time |  | -0.007 |
|  |  | (0.014) |
| Sociodemographics yhat | 0.549\*\*\* | 0.550\*\*\* |
|  | (0.077) | (0.076) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat | 0.887\*\*\* | 0.886\*\*\* |
|  | (0.037) | (0.037) |
| Constant | 0.048 | -0.043 |
|  | (0.214) | (0.237) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes |
| N | 75,547 | 75,547 |
| pseudo-R2 | 0.275 | 0.275 |
| Correctly classified | 77.60% | 77.62% |
| Area under the ROC-curve | 0.840 | 0.840 |

*Note:* Standard errors are robust for country-clusters. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001.

TABLE 2. Explaining the lead party vote share in Western Europe (since 1950)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Lead party vote sharee-1 |  |  | 0.759\*\*\* | 0.756\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.044) | (0.044) |
| GDP growth rate | 0.419 | -0.121 | 0.397\*\* | 0.155 |
|  | (0.225) | (0.384) | (0.149) | (0.256) |
| Time | -0.169\*\*\* | -0.220\*\*\* | -0.073\*\*\* | -0.096\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.038) | (0.020) | (0.024) |
| GDP growth × Time |  | 0.016 |  | 0.007 |
|  |  | (0.010) |  | (0.006) |
| Constant | 45.274\*\*\* | 47.530\*\*\* | 10.299\*\*\* | 11.451\*\*\* |
|  | (1.900) | (2.226) | (2.476) | (2.574) |
| Country dummies? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *N* elections | 253 | 253 | 253 | 253 |
| *N* countries | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| *R*2 | 0.492 | 0.497 | 0.797 | 0.798 |

*Note:* OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election. Switzerland is excluded from the lead party vote share analyses.

**Appendix 8. Multinomial logit estimates – voting for the lead party**

The results presented in Figure 1 are average marginal effects of economic evaluations (the effect of moving from the most negative to the most positive evaluation of the state of the economy) on voting for the party of the prime minister. Estimates were obtained after estimating a series of multinomial logit models, with the exact same independent variables as the variables reported in the binary logit analyses in Appendix 3. However, we analyzed all (major) parties as vote choice options, in a multinomial logit specification. The coefficients reported here are those for the party of the prime minister only. Visually, the trends are largely the same as those obtained from the logit analyses and there are no indications of a clear time trend.

FIGURE 1. Effect of the economy on a vote for the lead party



*Note:* Average effect (and 95% confidence intervals) on probability of voting for the lead party as economic evaluation moves from least to most positive. Based on estimates of 55 election-specific multinomial logit models (full results available from the authors). The Italian 2013 election is included, as the Prime Minister (Monti) was considered non-partisan.

**Appendix 9. Non-linear time effects**

This appendix lists the results of individual (Table 1) and aggregate-level (Table 2) models explaining respectively voting for the incumbent and the incumbent vote share. The models reported in this appendix include dummies to distinguish between decades and interactions between the economic variables and the decade-dummies.

TABLE 1. Explaining the incumbent vote – individual-level binomial logit estimations (since 1974)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Economic evaluation (0-1) | 1.046\*\*\* | 1.924\*\* |
|  | (0.132) | (0.421) |
| 1980s (ref: 1970s) | -0.195\* | 0.141 |
|  | (0.077) | (0.421) |
| 1990s | -0.078 | 0.401 |
|  | (0.109) | (0.389) |
| 2000s | -0.154 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.164) | (0.228) |
| 2010s | -0.008 | 0.564 |
|  | (0.167) | (0.336) |
| Economic evaluation × 1980s |  | -0.818 |
|  |  | (0.806) |
| Economic evaluation × 1990s |  | -1.078 |
|  |  | (0.758) |
| Economic evaluation × 2000s |  | -0.499 |
|  |  | (0.643) |
| Economic evaluation × 2010s |  | -1.319 |
|  |  | (0.772) |
| Sociodemographics yhat | 0.648\*\*\* | 0.656\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) | (0.043) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat | 0.918\*\*\* | 0.919\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.022) |
| Constant | -0.161 | -0.556 |
|  | (0.139) | (0.295) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes |
| N | 79,524 | 79,524 |
| pseudo-R2 | 0.296 | 0.230 |
| Correctly classified | 76.98% | 77.01% |
| Area under the ROC-curve | 0.849 | 0.850 |

*Note:* Standard errors are robust for country-clusters. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001.

TABLE 2. Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1950)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Incumbent vote sharee-1 |  |  | 0.852\*\*\* | 0.842\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.039) | (0.038) |
| GDP growth rate | 0.736\* | 2.332\*\*\* | 0.369\* | 1.096\*\*\* |
|  | (0.321) | (0.642) | (0.175) | (0.307) |
| 1960s | 1.082 | 15.503\*\* | -1.242 | 3.108 |
|  | (2.017) | (5.515) | (0.960) | (2.579) |
| 1970s | -3.552\* | 5.595 | -1.746 | 3.976\* |
|  | (1.746) | (3.790) | (0.907) | (1.978) |
| 1980s | -3.510 | 2.130 | -2.169\* | 0.901 |
|  | (1.845) | (3.733) | (0.970) | (1.930) |
| 1990s | -4.956\*\* | 0.528 | -4.986\*\*\* | -3.368 |
|  | (1.838) | (3.639) | (1.034) | (1.871) |
| 2000s | -5.905\*\* | 1.956 | -3.831\*\*\* | -0.605 |
|  | (1.908) | (4.296) | (1.055) | (2.319) |
| 2010s | -9.004\*\*\* | -1.540 | -7.754\*\*\* | -4.268\*\* |
|  | (2.287) | (3.214) | (1.263) | (1.617) |
| GDP growth × 1960s |  | -3.204\*\* |  | -0.984 |
|  |  | (1.103) |  | (0.548) |
| GDP growth × 1970s |  | -2.239\* |  | -1.438\*\* |
|  |  | (0.899) |  | (0.460) |
| GDP growth × 1980s |  | -1.142 |  | -0.725 |
|  |  | (1.074) |  | (0.549) |
| GDP growth × 1990s |  | -1.069 |  | -0.126 |
|  |  | (0.967) |  | (0.554) |
| GDP growth × 2000s |  | -1.985 |  | -0.781 |
|  |  | (1.199) |  | (0.732) |
| GDP growth × 2010s |  | -2.441\* |  | -1.237\* |
|  |  | (0.970) |  | (0.521) |
| Constant | 63.875\*\*\* | 56.684\*\*\* | 9.393\*\* | 6.780\* |
|  | (3.605) | (4.274) | (3.081) | (3.078) |
| Country dummies? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *N* elections | 271 | 271 | 271 | 271 |
| *N* countries | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| *R*2 | 0.545 | 0.566 | 0.855 | 0.861 |

*Note:* OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election.

**Appendix 10. The effect of GDP growth on reported voting behaviour**

This appendix lists the results of individual-level logistic regression models explaining voting for an incumbent party. As an indicator of economic conditions, the GDP growth rate is included in the models.

TABLE 1. Explaining the incumbent vote – individual-level binomial logit estimations (since 1974)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| GDP growth | -0.042\* | -0.062\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.025) |
| Time | -0.001 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| GDP growth × Time |  | 0.001 |
|  |  | (0.001) |
| Sociodemographics yhat | 0.658\*\*\* | 0.658\*\*\* |
|  | (0.051) | (0.051) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat | 0.939\*\*\* | 0.939\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Constant | 0.441\*\* | 0.477\*\* |
|  | (0.145) | (0.147) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes |
| *N* | 86,341 | 86,341 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.284 | 0.284 |

*Note:* Standard errors are robust for country-clusters. Significance levels: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001.

**Appendix 11. Assessing the validity of opposing theoretical mechanisms of change**

The literature that argues the economic vote is likely to strengthen over time expects so because of an alleged process of profound change in electoral behavior, that results from the fact that long-term factors such as socio-demographics, partisanship, and even left-right seem to be eroding. These long-term factors traditionally served as an anchor for the vote choice, and their erosion begs the question what has replaced for their impact. The economy is only one of the factors for which scholars expect it to gain weight as long-term factors weaken.

At an individual-level, long-term factors effectively weaken the economic vote. A large literature, for example, has shown that partisanship functions as a perceptual screen and hence limits the extent to which voters are holding incumbents accountable (for a clear example, see Kayser and Wlezien, 2011). The data used in our paper allow confirming the presence of this basic pattern in the set of seven countries included. In Table 1 we present the results of a series of additional individual-level models, in which we replace the interaction with time for an interaction between the left-right/partisanship yhat and economic evaluations. As such, we can test whether a stronger anchorage to a particular party effectively weakens the economic vote. As evident from the results in Table 1, this interaction term is indeed negative and statistically significant, confirming that voters who are tied more closely to a particular party, economic considerations affect their vote choice to a lesser extent.

As strong linkages reduce the impact of the economic vote, why are we not observing the economic vote to become stronger over time? Perhaps – over time – the impact of those stabilizing factors on the vote has not waned considerably, in contrast to what theorists of dealignment claim. To investigate this possibility, we proceed in the same way and add an interaction term between the left-right/partisanship yhat and time in Table 2. As the results in Table 2 illustrate, there are no indications of the anchorage variables becoming weaker predictors of the vote over time – at least not in our dataset of countries and for the time frame covered by our data. On the contrary, the interaction term is positive and significant, indicating a somewhat strengthened impact of the anchorage variables. As a result, we could conclude that unlike what is assumed in a context of dealignment, there is no ‘room’ opening up for other factors of the vote to become increasingly important.

TABLE 1. Explaining the incumbent vote – individual-level binomial logit estimations (since 1974)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat | 0.918\*\*\* | 0.995\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.040) |
| Economic evaluation (0-1) | 1.012\*\*\* | 0.978\*\*\* |
|  | (0.144) | (0.143) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat × Economic evaluation (0-1) |  | -0.152\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.046) |
| Sociodemographics yhat | 0.646\*\*\* | 0.648\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.043) |
| Time | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Constant | -0.267 | -0.242 |
|  | (0.154) | (0.144) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes |
| N | 79,524 | 79,524 |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.295 | 0.296 |

Note: Standard errors are robust for country-clusters. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001.

TABLE 2. Explaining the incumbent vote – individual-level binomial logit estimations (since 1974)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat | 0.918\*\*\* | 0.924\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.038) |
| Time | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat × Time |  | -0.000 |
|  |  | (0.002) |
| Economic evaluation (0-1) | 1.012\*\*\* | 1.012\*\*\* |
|  | (0.144) | (0.144) |
| Sociodemographics yhat | 0.646\*\*\* | 0.647\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.041) |
| Constant | -0.267 | -0.266 |
|  | (0.154) | (0.159) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes |
| Election dummies included? | No | No |
| N | 79,524 | 79,524 |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.295 | 0.295 |

Note: Standard errors are robust for country-clusters. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001.

Our results do not offer indications of a decline in the impact of the ideological/partisanship anchor on the vote. But what about socio-demographic variables? A rich literature has shown that the effect of cleavages on electoral behavior has decreased over time. Hasn’t this trend created ‘space’ for a stronger impact of economic evaluations on the vote? In Table 3 in this Appendix, we evaluate this expectation by means of two models that are estimated on the pooled individual-level dataset. In Model 1, we add an interaction between time and the socio-demographic yhat to test the expectation that the impact of cleavages has waned over time. In Model 2 in Table 3, we include to the main model that is presented in the manuscript an interaction between the sociodemographic yhat and economic evaluations. This model allows verifying whether sociodemographics impede an economic vote.

The results in Table 3 confirm the decline of cleavages (a significant and negative interaction between the sociodemographics yhat and time in Model 1). However, Model 2 clarifies why this decline has not translated into an increase in the effect of economic evaluations on the vote; sociodemographics do not appear to significantly weaken the economic vote (no significant interaction between the sociodemographic yhat and economic evaluations in Model 2). If sociodemographics never (strongly) inhibit the effect of economic evaluations on the vote, their decline will self-evidently not lead to a growing importance of economic evaluations for voters’ choices.

TABLE 3. Explaining the incumbent vote, individual-level binomial logit estimations

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Economic evaluation (0-1) | 1.019\*\*\* | 1.027\*\*\* |
|  | (0.147) | (0.147) |
| Time | -0.002 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Sociodemographics yhat | 0.922\*\*\* | 0.621\*\*\* |
|  | (0.097) | (0.051) |
| Time × Sociodemographics yhat | -0.011\* |  |
|  | (0.005) |  |
| Economic evaluation × Sociodemographics yhat |  | 0.047 |
|  |  | (0.053) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat | 0.923\*\*\* | 0.918\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.024) |
| Constant | -0.236 | -0.274 |
|  | (0.127) | (0.151) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes |
| *(N)* individuals | 79,524 | 79,524 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.296 | 0.295 |

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust for country-clusters. Significance levels: \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

Another stream of literature on economic voting offers reasons to expect an opposite trend: a pattern of the economic vote weakening over time. This work argues that the openness of the economy affects the strength of the economic vote. In more open economies, it is claimed, voters realize national incumbents are not to be blamed for the state of the national economy, hence weakening the economic vote at that level. A process of globalization, and a growing economic interdependence between countries – in particular in Western Europe – would then logically imply that the economic vote should weaken over time.

For the seven countries under scrutiny in our paper, there are effectively indications of economies becoming more open over time. Using an indicator of economic globalization as suggested by Dreher (2006)[[4]](#footnote-4), we find that over the time period covered by our individual-level analyses, economies in the seven countries under study have indeed become more open. Figure 1 graphically presents this over-time evolution. The trend is more pronounced in some countries than it is in others, but it is evident that overall, economies are becoming more open over time.

FIGURE 1. Evolution of openness of the economy over time



Why would that not lead to a weaker economic vote? In Table 4 we investigate whether – in general – economic evaluations are indeed having a weaker impact on the vote in more globalized economies. Therefore, we add the indicator economic globalization to our model and we interact this variable with respondents’ evaluation of the state of the economy. Our expectation would be that this interaction term has a negative sign, as the economic vote should be reduced in more open economies. The results however offer no indications of levels of openness in the economy to mediate the impact of economic evaluations on the vote: the coefficients of the interaction terms are close to zero and far from reaching a conventional level of statistical significance. Note that this is in line with the results of Fernandéz-Albertos (2006), as he did not find the impact of general economic considerations to be affected by the openness of the economy either. Furthermore, these results are robust to including another indicator of economic openness: the sum of imports and experts (as a percentage of a country’s GDP) in a country (see Fernandéz-Albertos, 2006).

TABLE 4. Explaining the incumbent vote – individual-level binomial logit estimations (since 1974)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Economic evaluation (0-1) | 1.056\*\*\* | 1.724 |
|  | (0.165) | (1.600) |
| Economic globalization | -0.033 | -0.027 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.032) |
| Economic globalization × Economic evaluation (0-1) |  | -0.008 |
|  |  | (0.019) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat | 0.657\*\*\* | 0.658\*\*\* |
|  | (0.039) | (0.038) |
| Sociodemographics yhat | 0.923\*\*\* | 0.923\*\*\* |
|  | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Time | 0.017 | 0.017 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Constant | 2.042 | 1.628 |
|  | (1.811) | (2.474) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes |
| N | 78,052 | 78,052 |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.300 | 0.300 |

Note: Standard errors are robust for country-clusters. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001.

To complement these individual-level analyses, we investigate the impact of economic openness on the economic vote in our aggregate-level dataset, covering a larger number of West-European democracies as well. The results are displayed in Table 5 and basically lead to the same conclusion. The extent to which an economy is globalized (Dreher, 2006) does not seem to mediate the impact of the state of the economy (measured as GDP growth rate) on the incumbent vote share. In sum, as the extent to which the economy of a country is open does not significantly affect the economic vote at an individual nor at an aggregate level, an increased economic openness cannot be expected to cause the economic vote to weaken over time.

TABLE 5. Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1970)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|  | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) | b  (s.e.) |
| Incumbent vote share *e-1* |  |  | 0.708\*\*\* | 0.709\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.058) | (0.058) |
| GDP growth rate | 0.701\* | -0.268 | 0.596\*\* | -0.521 |
|  | (0.278) | (3.145) | (0.213) | (2.333) |
| Economic globalization | -0.161\* | -0.198 | -0.150\* | -0.194 |
|  | (0.078) | (0.151) | (0.059) | (0.104) |
| GDP × Economic globalization |  | 0.012 |  | 0.014 |
|  |  | (0.040) |  | (0.029) |
| Constant | 64.664\*\*\* | 67.669\*\*\* | 23.156\*\*\* | 26.611\*\* |
|  | (7.011) | (12.525) | (5.680) | (9.162) |
| Country dummies included? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N elections | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 |
| N countries | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| R2 | 0.647 | 0.648 | 0.820 | 0.820 |

Note: OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001.

**Appendix 12. Over-time change in the effect of economic evaluations on voting for the incumbent, control variables omitted**

It might be objected that our models, that include controls for socio-demographics, and an ideology or partisanship anchor, prevent seeing a change in the economic voting coefficient. As an additional robustness test, we have therefore estimated the pooled individual-level model without controlling for the socio-demographic and ideology/partisanship yhat-varibles. The results of this test are reported in Table 1 in this appendix.

As evident from the results, even when not including any control variables (which might imply an omitted variable bias and entails a risk of a biased economic voting coefficient), we still find no indications of a significant over-time change in the effect of economic evaluations on the vote (Model 1). The estimate of the interaction effect is largely unaltered when subsequently adding the control variables (Model 2 and Model 3).

TABLE 1. Explaining the incumbent vote, no control variables

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Time | -0.002 | 0.005 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.013) | (0.006) | (0.007) |
| Economic evaluation (0-1) | 1.559\*\*\* | 1.668\*\*\* | 1.184\* |
|  | (0.417) | (0.344) | (0.470) |
| Time × Economic evaluation | -0.006 | -0.013 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.010) | (0.013) |
| Socio-demographic yhat |  | 0.976\*\*\* | 0.647\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.023) | (0.041) |
| Left-right/partisanship yhat |  |  | 0.918\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.025) |
| Constant | -1.277\*\*\* | -0.870\*\*\* | -0.353 |
|  | (0.300) | (0.190) | (0.250) |
| Country dummies included | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *(N)* individuals | 94644 | 83006 | 79524 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.040 | 0.109 | 0.295 |

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust for country-clusters. Significance levels: \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

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1. Information on what parties are to be considered incumbents comes from the ParlGov Database (Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2012. Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies. Version 12/10 – 15 October 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For the 1996 election, we follow Bellucci (2010) and code the Centre-left parties as the incumbent. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For the 2013 election, we follow Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo (2017: 620), who state: “For Italy in 2013, a plausible government parties coding could include Party of Freedom plus the Democratic Party. This would essentially pit the grand coalition (which, after all, installed Premier Monte) against the opposition parties. Given that both these major parties suffered historic losses, this coding has a lot to say for it.” [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The data are published by Dreher and his colleagues (<http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>) and are available for the period 1970-2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)