

Appendix for *Mass Support for Populism in Power: Evidence from Turkey*

Contents

1	Information about the surveys	1
2	Exploratory factor analysis of populist statements	3
3	Populist Attitudes Index – Robustness Checks	5
4	Partisanship and satisfaction with democracy and economy	9
5	Support for different dimensions of populism and satisfaction with democracy and economy	10
6	Regression analysis of experimental results	13

1 Information about the surveys

The sampling procedures for the surveys are identical and starts with the use of Turkish Statistical Institute’s (TUIK) NUTS -2 regions. The target sample was distributed according to each region’s share of urban and rural population in accordance with current records of the Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS). Next, TUIK’s block data were used with block size set at 400 residents. Twenty voters were targeted from each block and no substitution was used. Probability-proportionate-to-size (PPS) principle was used in distributing the blocks to NUTS-2 regions. Selection of individuals in households is done on the basis of reported target population of 18 years or older in each household according to a lottery method. If for any reason that individual could not respond to our questions in our first visit, then the same household is visited up to three times until a successful interview is conducted and no substitution was applied. The interviews were conducted face-to-face in respondents’ households by Frekans Research (www.frekans.com.tr) between 17 February and 2 April 2017 for the first survey and between 7 May and 14 June 2018 for the second survey. The Open Society Foundation - Turkey and Koç University provided funding for the first survey, and the second survey was funded by Koç University and Sabancı University.

Descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the analyses related to the first and second surveys are presented in Table A1 and Table A2, respectively.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis of the first survey.

Variables	N	Mean	Min	Max
Index of populist attitudes	1,856	0.36	-2	2
Female	1,954	0.50	0	1
Age	1,940	42.6	18	89
Education	1,952	3.2	1	5
(Log) Income	1,724	7.5	0	10.3
Religiosity	1,954	0.36	0	1
Kurdish	1,954	0.14	0	1
Democratic satisfaction	1,852	5.1	0	10
Economic satisfaction	1,898	4.1	0	10
Fair treatment	1,790	2.4	1	4
Trust in parties	1,873	4.7	1	10
AKP Partisan	1,954	0.37	0	1
CHP Partisan	1,954	0.12	0	1
MHP Partisan	1,954	0.05	0	1
HDP Partisan	1,954	0.03	0	1

Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis of the second survey.

Variables	N	Mean	Min	Max
Index of populist attitudes	1,555	0.53	-2	2
Female	1,648	0.54	0	1
Age	1,639	43.5	18	96
Education	1,644	3.0	1	5
(Log) Income	1,421	7.6	0	11
Religiosity	1,648	0.40	0	1
Kurdish	1,648	0.18	0	1
Democratic satisfaction	1,626	5.1	0	10
Economic satisfaction	1,629	4.6	0	10
AKP Partisan	1,648	0.26	0	1
CHP Partisan	1,648	0.08	0	1
Other Opposition Partisan	1,648	0.07	0	1

2 Exploratory factor analysis of populist statements

Given the continuing debates in the literature about the different dimensions of populism and attitudinal items to be used in measurements, we decided to run exploratory factor analysis (EFA) instead of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) since the CFA assumes correct a priori model specification. Moreover, it has been observed that in practice CFA models often do not fit the data well due to overly restrictive assumptions.¹

We submit the twelve populist statement items used in the survey to EFA using oblique (promax) rotation. The results are presented in Table A3. This analysis results in four factors with an eigenvalue equal or larger than one, and together they explain about 53% of the total variance. All statements except one load highly (factor loading above +0.4) on a single factor (reported in the appendix). Only statement 4, “most politicians do not care about the people,” loads on two factors and negatively on one of them; therefore we decide to remove this statement from the analyses in the paper. The factor loadings of the remaining 11 items are presented in Table A4.

Table A3: Results of exploratory factor analysis of populist statement items.

Statement items	Factor 1 <i>Eigenvalue</i>	Factor 2 <i>Eigenvalue</i>	Factor 3 <i>Eigenvalue</i>	Factor 4 <i>Eigenvalue</i>
	2.48	1.82	1.07	1.03
Item 1			.632	
Item 2			.708	
Item 3			.504	
Item 4		-0.554	.429	
Item 5				.723
Item 6				.683
Item 7		.765		
Item 8		.627		
Item 9		.732		
Item 10	.509			
Item 11	.758			
Item 12	.600			

Only entries with an absolute factor loading above 0.40 are shown.

¹See, e.g., Asparouhov, Tihomir, and Bengt Muthen, (2009), “Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling,” *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, 16(3), 397-438; Marsh, Herbert W., Jiesi Guo, Theresa Dicke, Philip D. Parker, and Rhonda G. Craven, (2020), “Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling (ESEM), and Set-ESEM: Optimal Balance Between Goodness of Fit and Parsimony,” *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 55(1), 102-119.

Table A4: Results of exploratory factor analysis of statement items included in the analyses.

Statement items	Factor 1 <i>Eigenvalue</i>	Factor 2 <i>Eigenvalue</i>	Factor 3 <i>Eigenvalue</i>	Factor 4 <i>Eigenvalue</i>
	2.46	1.75	1.06	1.00
Item 1			.679	
Item 2			.699	
Item 3			.626	
Item 5				.743
Item 6				.647
Item 7		.772		
Item 8		.594		
Item 9		.733		
Item 10	.774			
Item 11	.686			
Item 12	.723			

Only entries with an absolute factor loading above 0.40 are shown.
Statement item 4 is excluded from the analyses because it loads to two factors, as reported in the appendix.

It is straightforward to interpret the substantive constructs that these four factors represent, as the statements load perfectly to the proposed theoretical dimensions earlier. Statements 1 to 3 that correspond to the dimension of Manichean view of politics load strongly on the third factor. We had included statements 5 and 6 to capture the anti-elitist sentiments in populism, and together they load to the fourth factor. And we see that the six items (statements 7 through 12) that pertain to the centrality of people’s will load to separate factors, in line with the conceptualization of Mudde (2004) and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). Statements 7 to 9 that emphasize people-centrism load strongly on the second factor, and statements 10 to 12 tapping to the supremacy of popular sovereignty load on the first factor.

3 Populist Attitudes Index – Robustness Checks

First, in Table A5 below we repeat the analysis when items 10, 11, and 12 are removed from the populist attitudes index. We see that there are no changes in substantive results: AKP partisanship and democratic/economic satisfaction have positive and statistically significant effects on populist attitudes.

Next, we use a more conventional populist attitude scale, that of Hawkins et al. (2012). This scale has just four items:

- Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil
- The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people
- The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress
- The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions

In Table A6 we present the results of our main analysis when we use this four-item scale as the dependent variable. Again there are no substantives change in results, though the statistical significance of AKP partisanship is a little weaker compared to the original scale.

Finally, we implemented the procedure outlined in Wuttke et al. (2020) by using the Goertzian subdimension construction. Specifically, we used the minimum function, which “ensures that two individuals with identical values on the lowest concept components do not differ in the derived aggregate score, regardless of the values on the remaining concept components” (Wuttke et al., Supplement 2, p. X). By doing so, “higher values on one subdimension do not compensate for lower values on another subdimension. Moreover, individuals with low scores on one concept subdimension are not assigned high populism scores” (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 7).

To do this, we first conducted an exploratory factor analysis by using our 11 items. Next, we gathered predicted factor scores for each dimension, which in turn have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Finally, we took the minimum values of each dimension for each respondent for constructing the populism index. In other words, we used the “rowmin” command of Stata, as Wuttke et al. (2020) suggested for generating the final populism index.

Table A7 presents the results from this procedure. Our original results are robust to the approach suggested by Wuttke et al. (2020): AKP partisanship as well as satisfaction with democracy and economy still have positive and statistically significant relationship with populist attitudes.

Table A5: Correlates of support for populism in Turkey – statement items 10, 11, and 12 removed

Dep. Variable: Abbreviated Index of Populist Attitudes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.010 (0.035)	0.033 (0.035)	0.036 (0.035)	0.032 (0.035)	0.030 (0.035)	0.034 (0.035)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Primary education	0.071 (0.043)	0.013 (0.043)	0.013 (0.043)	0.014 (0.044)	0.012 (0.043)	0.013 (0.043)
College education	0.051 (0.051)	0.075 (0.051)	0.088 (0.052)	0.075 (0.052)	0.073 (0.051)	0.078 (0.051)
(Log) Income	0.008 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.016)
Religiosity	0.017 (0.037)	-0.087* (0.041)	-0.100* (0.041)	-0.086* (0.041)	-0.087* (0.041)	-0.084* (0.041)
Kurdish	-0.133* (0.055)	-0.091 (0.061)	-0.086 (0.061)	-0.089 (0.062)	-0.094 (0.061)	-0.122 (0.065)
Democratic satisfaction		0.022** (0.007)	0.017* (0.008)	0.022** (0.008)	0.022** (0.007)	0.022** (0.007)
Economic satisfaction		0.035*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.008)
Fair treatment		0.021 (0.021)	0.006 (0.021)	0.021 (0.021)	0.021 (0.021)	0.025 (0.021)
Trust in parties		0.007 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)
AKP partisan			0.127** (0.040)			
CHP partisan				0.012 (0.055)		
MHP partisan					-0.044 (0.078)	
HDP partisan						0.122 (0.121)
Constant	0.393** (0.126)	0.145 (0.142)	0.170 (0.138)	0.143 (0.143)	0.155 (0.141)	0.140 (0.141)
R^2	0.013	0.138	0.156	0.138	0.139	0.141
N	0.009	0.076	0.083	0.076	0.076	0.077

OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Post-stratification weights based on gender, age, education level, and region are applied. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A6: Correlates of support for populism in Turkey – index from Hawkins et al. (2012)

Dep. Variable: Index of Populist Attitudes of Hawkins et al. (2012)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.033 (0.045)	0.046 (0.048)	0.049 (0.048)	0.042 (0.047)	0.042 (0.048)	0.049 (0.047)
Age	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Primary education	-0.014 (0.052)	-0.051 (0.054)	-0.051 (0.054)	-0.047 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.050 (0.054)
College education	0.018 (0.066)	0.048 (0.069)	0.058 (0.070)	0.045 (0.069)	0.044 (0.069)	0.052 (0.069)
(Log) Income	0.005 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.018)
Religiosity	0.055 (0.048)	-0.042 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.036 (0.054)	-0.041 (0.055)	-0.038 (0.054)
Kurdish	-0.131 ⁺ (0.074)	-0.087 (0.082)	-0.083 (0.083)	-0.079 (0.083)	-0.092 (0.083)	-0.133 ⁺ (0.081)
Democratic satisfaction		0.027** (0.010)	0.023* (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)	0.027* (0.010)	0.027** (0.010)
Economic satisfaction		0.032** (0.011)	0.030** (0.011)	0.033** (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)
Fair treatment		0.028 (0.030)	0.016 (0.030)	0.030 (0.030)	0.028 (0.030)	0.034 (0.029)
Trust in parties		-0.015 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.011)
AKP partisan			0.098 ⁺ (0.055)			
CHP partisan				0.057 (0.078)		
MHP partisan					-0.077 (0.091)	
HDP partisan						0.183 (0.170)
Constant	0.675*** (0.146)	0.488** (0.172)	0.508** (0.170)	0.477** (0.174)	0.505** (0.170)	0.480** (0.171)
R^2	0.005	0.035	0.037	0.035	0.035	0.036
N	1,686	1,468	1,468	1,468	1,468	1,468

OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Post-stratification weights based on gender, age, education level, and region are applied. ⁺ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A7: Correlates of support for populism in Turkey – implementation of procedure suggested by Wuttke et al. 2020


Dep. Variable: Index of Populist Attitudes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.055 (0.048)	-0.014 (0.048)	-0.005 (0.047)	-0.012 (0.048)	-0.022 (0.048)	-0.014 (0.047)
Age	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Primary education	0.137* (0.059)	0.079 (0.061)	0.085 (0.061)	0.078 (0.062)	0.077 (0.061)	0.079 (0.061)
College education	0.050 (0.071)	0.070 (0.066)	0.098 (0.065)	0.071 (0.066)	0.064 (0.066)	0.070 (0.066)
(Log) Income	0.037+ (0.022)	0.025 (0.022)	0.024 (0.022)	0.025 (0.022)	0.023 (0.022)	0.025 (0.022)
Religiosity	0.027 (0.053)	-0.135* (0.056)	-0.160*** (0.055)	-0.138* (0.057)	-0.134* (0.056)	-0.135* (0.056)
Kurdish	-0.289*** (0.085)	-0.237* (0.093)	-0.224* (0.094)	-0.240*** (0.093)	-0.246*** (0.093)	-0.239* (0.099)
Democratic satisfaction		0.041*** (0.011)	0.032*** (0.011)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.011)
Economic satisfaction		0.075*** (0.012)	0.070*** (0.012)	0.075*** (0.012)	0.075*** (0.012)	0.075*** (0.012)
Fair treatment		0.002 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.031)	0.001 (0.030)	0.001 (0.030)	0.002 (0.031)
Trust in parties		-0.003 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)
AKP partisan			0.253*** (0.058)			
CHP partisan				-0.030 (0.072)		
MHP partisan					-0.132 (0.093)	
HDP partisan						0.008 (0.184)
Constant	-1.207*** (0.182)	-1.664*** (0.193)	-1.596*** (0.186)	-1.662*** (0.194)	-1.630*** (0.189)	-1.665*** (0.194)
<i>N</i>	1267	1162	1162	1162	1162	1162
<i>R</i> ²	0.020	0.128	0.144	0.128	0.130	0.128

OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Post-stratification weights based on gender, age, education level, and region are applied. + $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

4 Partisanship and satisfaction with democracy and economy

In Figure A1 we see that partisans of the AKP express significantly more satisfaction with the way democracy works in Turkey and their economic circumstances than partisans of other parties. This is in line with the findings in the literature that being a partisan of the winning party in elections and positive evaluations of the democratic system and economy are closely related (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Evans and Andersen 2006).

Figure A1: Partisanship and satisfaction with democracy and economy (on a 0-10 scale where higher values indicate more satisfaction)



5 Support for different dimensions of populism and satisfaction with democracy and economy

In the paper we show that AKP partisans differ from other voters especially with respect to their level of support to the populist principle of popular sovereignty that downplays the role of institutions and check-and-balances in democratic governance. In Table 3 we present the percentages of agreement with each of our populist statements among the AKP partisans and other individuals in our sample separately, ordered by the differences across these two groups. We saw that three of the five statements with the largest differences in agreement across AKP partisans and others were related to the popular sovereignty aspect of populism. This is an important finding given the positive correlation between AKP partisanship and support for populism (even after accounting for several relevant factors), and suggests that the popular sovereignty dimension of populism is especially salient among individuals with higher levels of populist attitudes in Turkey in general.

Our analysis had revealed that higher levels of democratic and economic satisfaction were also related to higher support for populist statements (Table 2). Do these respondents emphasize the popular sovereignty aspect of populism as well? The answer is yes. First recall that democratic and economic satisfaction questions were asked on a 0–10 scale; we denote individuals with values at or above seven on these scales as democratically and economically satisfied. In Table A8 we present the percentages of agreement with each of our populist statements among those satisfied with democracy and others in our sample separately, ordered by the differences across these two groups. We note two things. Those who are satisfied with the way democracy works in Turkey display higher levels of agreement with the populist statements in general than other respondents. Second, three of the five statements with the largest differences in agreement across the two groups of respondents are related to the popular sovereignty aspect of populism.

In Table A9 we replicate this analysis by dividing the sample among those who are satisfied economically and others. Again those who are satisfied economically display higher levels of agreement with populist statements in general, and three of the five statements with the largest differences in agreement across the two groups are popular sovereignty items.

Table A8: Levels of agreement with populist statements among those who are satisfied with the way democracy works in Turkey and others.

Statement	Dimension	Agree (%)		Difference (percentage point)
		Satisfied with democracy	Others	
11. Having a strong leader in government is good for Turkey even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.	People's will - Popular sovereignty	59	35	24
12. Most of the time parliaments do nothing but preventing the governments to do their jobs.	People's will - Popular sovereignty	42	33	9
1. Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.	Manichean view	53	42	9
10. Political leaders do not need to be checked by institutions since people make their decision in the elections.	People's will - Popular sovereignty	49	42	7
8. Referendums are the ultimate measure of the will of the people.	People's will - People centrism	70	64	6
2. What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out one's principles.	Manichean view	35	29	6
3. I would stop talking to a friend who had unacceptable political opinions.	Manichean view	27	22	5
5. The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.	Anti-elitism	66	61	5
7. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	People's will - People centrism	63	62	1
9. Politicians in the parliament need to follow the will of the people.	People's will - People centrism	74	75	-1
6. The differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.	Anti-elitism	56	60	-4

Table A9: Levels of agreement with populist statements among those who are satisfied economically and others.

Statement	Dimension	Agree (%)		Difference (percentage point)
		Satisfied with economy	Others	
11. Having a strong leader in government is good for Turkey even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.	People's will - Popular sovereignty	67	39	28
2. What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out one's principles.	Manichean view	43	29	14
10. Political leaders do not need to be checked by institutions since people make their decision in the elections.	People's will - Popular sovereignty	53	42	11
1. Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.	Manichean view	54	44	10
12. Most of the time parliaments do nothing but preventing the governments to do their jobs.	People's will - Popular sovereignty	44	35	9
3. I would stop talking to a friend who had unacceptable political opinions.	Manichean view	31	23	8
8. Referendums are the ultimate measure of the will of the people.	People's will - People centrism	72	65	7
5. The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.	Anti-elitism	67	62	5
7. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	People's will - People centrism	67	62	5
9. Politicians in the parliament need to follow the will of the people.	People's will - People centrism	79	74	5
6. The differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.	Anti-elitism	57	58	-1

6 Regression analysis of experimental results

Table A10 presents our experimental results with and without the inclusion of demographic variables in the regressions.

Table A10: Regression analyses of average treatment effects

DV: Index of Populist Attitudes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Erdoğan, populist</i>	-0.026 (0.055)	-0.006 (0.055)	0.061 (0.049)	0.075 (0.048)	0.033 (0.050)	0.053 (0.049)
<i>Kılıçdaroğlu, anti-populist</i>	-0.100 ⁺ (0.055)	-0.104 ⁺ (0.055)	-0.013 (0.050)	-0.005 (0.050)	-0.031 (0.050)	-0.030 (0.050)
<i>Nonpartisan, populist</i>	-0.025 (0.053)	-0.028 (0.053)	-0.021 (0.048)	-0.026 (0.048)	-0.010 (0.047)	-0.016 (0.048)
AKP Partisan	0.190* (0.074)	0.101 (0.075)				
AKP Partisan* <i>Erdoğan</i>	0.236* (0.105)	0.207* (0.105)				
AKP Partisan* <i>Kılıçdaroğlu</i>	0.270* (0.109)	0.281* (0.109)				
AKP Partisan* <i>Nonpartisan</i>	0.038 (0.104)	0.058 (0.107)				
CHP Partisan			-0.142 (0.135)	0.014 (0.143)		
CHP Partisan* <i>Erdoğan</i>			-0.360 ⁺ (0.193)	-0.362 ⁺ (0.209)		
CHP Partisan* <i>Kılıçdaroğlu</i>			-0.306 ⁺ (0.182)	-0.361 ⁺ (0.198)		
CHP Partisan* <i>Nonpartisan</i>			-0.019 (0.178)	0.066 (0.187)		
Other Opposition Partisan					-0.144 (0.140)	-0.165 (0.138)
Other Opp. Part.* <i>Erdoğan</i>					-0.041 (0.199)	-0.048 (0.199)
Other Opp. Part.* <i>Kılıçdaroğlu</i>					-0.158 (0.222)	-0.039 (0.224)
Other Opp. Part.* <i>Nonpartisan</i>					-0.172 (0.194)	-0.022 (0.192)
Constant	0.481*** (0.039)	0.355** (0.125)	0.548*** (0.034)	0.340** (0.128)	0.547*** (0.034)	0.357** (0.127)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
<i>N</i>	1,555	1,448	1,555	1,448	1,626	1,582

OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include gender, age, education, religiosity and speaking Kurdish. ⁺ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ for two-tailed tests.