# Supplementary Information for:

# Three Strategies to Track Configurations over Time with Qualitative Comparative Analysis

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**Supplementary Information A: Recalibrated Data**

As we mentioned in the main text, Vis’ (2011) original dataset contained seven cases that were calibrated as 0.5. This means that in the original study, these cases were excluded from the truth table analysis. To repair this situation, let us discuss per condition how we recalibrated these cases to either 0.49 or 0.51, hereby staying as close as possible to Vis’ (2011) original calibration.

For the condition “CORP”, we recalibrated the three Danish governments (Schlüter 4; Rasmussen 1; Rasmussen 2 & 3) into 0.51. Our argument is that, despite the decline of corporatism in Denmark (see e.g., Rommetvedt et al. 2013), the Danish system can still be seen as more corporatist than not (Varone, Christiansen, and Mach 2017). For the same reason, we also recalibrated one Swedish government (Persson 1 & 2) into 0.51. For the condition “OPEN”, we recalibrated Thatcher 3 & Major 1 into 0.51. Our argument is that the other two British governments (i.e., Thatcher 2; Blair 1) were also a little bit more in than out of the set of openness, and a country’s degree of openness is a condition that tends to vary relatively little. For the condition “GROWTH”, we recalibrated Carlsson 2 & 1 into 0.49. The reasoning here is that in this period (1986-1990), Sweden’s yearly GDP growth lagged behind the EU-14 and the OECD average (Fölster 2014). For the condition “UNEM”, finally, we recalibrated Stoltenberg 1 into 0.49. We refer here to the general notion that the level of unemployment stayed well under the Stoltenberg cabinets (see <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jens-Stoltenberg)>.

Table S.A1 displays the descriptive information as well as the recalibrated data matrix.

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| **Table S.A1. *Descriptive information and recalibrated data matrix*** | | | | | | | | | |
| **Descriptive Information** | | | | **Recalibrated Data Matrix** | | | | | |
| **Conditions** | | | | | **Outcome** |
| **Case ID** | **Government** | **Time in Office** | **Period** | **UNEM** | **GROWTH** | **RIGHT** | **OPEN** | **CORP** | **ACT** |
| AUS\_1990s | Keating 2 & 3 | 12/91-03/96 | 1990s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0 | 0.37 | 0.25 | 0.59 |
| AUS\_1995s | Howard 1 | 03/96-10/96 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.39 | 0.25 | 0.43 |
| AU\_1995s | Klima 1 | 01/97-02/00 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 0.63 |
| BEL\_1990s | Dehaene 1 | 03/92-06/95 | 1990s | 0.83 | 0.67 | 0.33 | 1 | 0.83 | 0.41 |
| BEL\_1995s | Dehaene 2 | 06/95-07/99 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.33 | 1 | 1 | 0.47 |
| BEL\_2000s | Verhofstadt 1 | 07/99-07/03 | 2000s | 0.67 | 0.17 | 0.33 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.46 |
| CND\_1990s | Mulroney 2 | 12/88-11/93 | 1990s | 0.83 | 0.33 | 1 | 0.54 | 0 | 0.45 |
| DK\_1980s | Schlüter 4 | 06/88-01/90 | 1980s | 0.67 | 0.33 | 1 | 0.69 | 0.51 | 0.39 |
| DK\_1990s | Rasmussen 1 | 01/93-09/94 | 1990s | 0.33 | 1 | 0.33 | 0.69 | 0.51 | 0.65 |
| DK\_1995s\_1 | Rasmussen 2 & 3 | 09/94-03/98 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.17 | 0.72 | 0.51 | 0.62 |
| DK\_1995s\_2 | Rasmussen 4 | 03/98-11/01 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.17 | 0.81 | 0.83 | 0.73 |
| FI\_1980s | Holkeri 1 | 04/87-04/91 | 1980s | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.67 | 0.49 | 0.63 | 0.88 |
| FI\_1990s | Aho 1 | 04/91-04/95 | 1990s | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.55 | 0.63 | 0.14 |
| FI\_1995s | Lipponen 1 | 04/95-04/99 | 1995s | 0.17 | 0.67 | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.75 | 0.57 |
| FI\_2000s | Lipponen 2 | 04/99-04/03 | 2000s | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.45 | 0.71 | 0.56 | 0.41 |
| FR\_1980s | Rocard 1 et al. | 05/88-05/91 | 1980s | 0.67 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.44 | 0.25 | 0.57 |
| FR\_1995s | Jospin 1 | 06/97-05/02 | 1995s | 0.17 | 0.67 | 0 | 0.52 | 0.25 | 0.61 |
| DE\_1980s | Kohl 2 | 01/87-11/90 | 1980s | 0.33 | 0.83 | 1 | 0.47 | 0.75 | 0.69 |
| DE\_1990s | Kohl 3 | 12/90-10/94 | 1990s | 0.83 | 0.17 | 1 | 0.48 | 0.75 | 0 |
| DE\_1995s | Kohl 4 | 11/94-09/98 | 1995s | 0.67 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.52 | 0.75 | 0.42 |
| IE\_1990s | Haughey 4 & Reynolds 1 | 07/89-01/93 | 1990s | 0.67 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.45 |
| NL\_1980s | Lubbers 2 | 05/86-11/89 | 1980s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.59 |
| NL\_1990s | Lubbers 3 | 11/89-08/94 | 1990s | 0.67 | 0.17 | 0.55 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.6 |
| NL\_1995s | Kok 1 | 08/94-08/98 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.68 |
| NL\_2000s | Kok 2 | 08/98-05/02 | 2000s | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.63 |
| NZ\_1980s | Lange 2 | 08/87-11/90 | 1980s | 0.83 | 0.33 | 0 | 0.52 | 0.25 | 0.11 |
| NZ\_1990s | Bolger 2 | 11/93-12/96 | 1990s | 0.17 | 0.17 | 1 | 0.58 | 0 | 0.63 |
| NZ\_1995s | Bolger 3 & Shipley 1 | 12/96-08/98 | 1995s | 0.67 | 0.17 | 1 | 0.57 | 0 | 0.42 |
| NO\_1980s | Harlem Brundtland 2 | 05/86-10/89 | 1980s | 0.83 | 0.17 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.92 | 0.27 |
| NO\_1990s | Harlem Brundtland 4 et al. | 11/90-10/96 | 1990s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0 | 0.71 | 0.93 | 0.72 |
| NO\_1995s | Bondevik 1 | 10/97-03/00 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.33 | 1 | 0.72 | 0.92 | 0.43 |
| NO\_2000s | Stoltenberg 1 | 03/00-10/01 | 2000s | 0.49 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.54 |
| PT\_1980s | Cavaco e Silva 1 | 11/85-08/87 | 1980s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.63 | 0.25 | 0.54 |
| PT\_1990s | Cavaco e Silva 3 | 10/91-10/95 | 1990s | 0.83 | 0.83 | 1 | 0.63 | 0.38 | 0.21 |
| PT\_1995s | Guterres 1 | 10/95-10/99 | 1995s | 0.17 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.69 | 0.63 | 0.7 |
| PT\_2000s\_1 | Guterres 2 | 10/99-04/02 | 2000s | 0.67 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.73 | 0.58 | 0.57 |
| PT\_2000s\_2 | Barroso 1 | 04/02-07/04 | 2000s | 0.67 | 0.33 | 1 | 0.67 | 0.25 | 0.47 |
| ES\_1980s | González Márquez 2 | 07/86-12/89 | 1980s | 0.17 | 0.33 | 0 | 0.37 | 0.25 | 0.56 |
| ES\_1990s | González Márquez 3 | 12/89-07/93 | 1990s | 1 | 0.17 | 0 | 0.36 | 0.25 | 0.41 |
| ES\_1995s | Aznar 1 | 04/96-04/00 | 1995s | 0 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.52 | 0.63 | 0.6 |
| SE\_1980s | Carlsson 2 & 1 | 03/86-02/90 | 1980s | 0.33 | 0.49 | 0 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 1 |
| SE\_1990s\_1 | Carlsson 3 | 02/90-10/91 | 1990s | 0.67 | 0.33 | 0 | 0.57 | 0.75 | 0 |
| SE\_1990s\_2 | Bildt 1 | 10/91-10/94 | 1990s | 0.83 | 1 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.75 | 0 |
| SE\_1995s | Persson 1 & 2 | 03/96-09/02 | 1995s | 0 | 0.67 | 0 | 0.79 | 0.51 | 0.76 |
| CH\_1980s | Stich | 12/87-12/91 | 1980s | 0.67 | 0.17 | 0.87 | 0.7 | 0.75 | 0 |
| CH\_1990s | Felber | 12/91-12/95 | 1990s | 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.87 | 0.66 | 0.75 | 0.64 |
| CH\_1995s | Delamuraz | 12/95-12/99 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.87 | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.8 |
| CH\_2000s | Ogi | 12/99-12/03 | 2000s | 0.67 | 0.17 | 0.87 | 0.83 | 0.75 | 0.61 |
| UK\_1980s\_1 | Thatcher 2 | 06/83-06/87 | 1980s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.54 | 0 | 0.56 |
| UK\_1980s\_2 | Thatcher 3 & Major 1 | 06/87-04/92 | 1980s | 0.67 | 0 | 1 | 0.51 | 0 | 0.42 |
| UK\_1995s | Blair 1 | 05/97-06/01 | 1995s | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0 | 0.56 | 0 | 0.69 |
| US\_1980s | Reagan 2 | 01/85-01/89 | 1980s | 0.33 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.18 | 0 | 0.59 |
| US\_2000s | G.H.W. Bush | 01/01-01/05 | 2000 | 0.67 | 0.33 | 1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.45 |

**Supplementary Information B: Consistency Cut-Off, Replication of Vis (2011)**

*Consistency cut-off point*

In her analysis, Vis (2011) adopted a relatively high consistency cut-off point of 0.911. We observed in the truth table (see Table S.B1 below) that the 23 empirically present truth table rows all have rather high consistency scores, ranging from 0.831 to 0.954. There was also no obvious gap in the consistency scores marking a clear cut-off point. Therefore, we also inspected the truth table for the negated outcome but again found high consistency scores throughout the table, ranging from 0.752 to 0.989. This signals that we are dealing here with the problem of simultaneous subset relations (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). So-called PRI-scores, which measure the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency, can be used to detect and deal with simultaneous subset relationships. While there is no strict criterion, the lower is a PRI-score the more likely it is that a simultaneous subset relation is present. The PRI-scores for the rows in the truth table for the outcome (“ACT”) demonstrate a drop in PRI at the consistency score of 0.911 (see Table S.B1), which could support Vis’ (2011) original choice for the consistency cut-off point. However, closer inspection of the truth table revealed that multiple truth table rows above the 0.911 consistency cut-off point have a PRI-score below 0.5. This indicates that these rows could in fact be more consistent with the statement that they are sufficient for the negated outcome (“act”). It concerns configurations #27, #12, #4, and #20. To see if these rows are indeed sufficient for the negated outcome rather than the outcome, we also inspected the PRI-scores for the negated outcome, which we included in Table S.B1 as well. There are three truth table rows which Vis (2011) coded as having the outcome, but where the PRI for the negated outcome is actually higher than the PRI for the outcome (i.e., configurations #27, #12, and #4 as highlighted in grey in Table 2 in the main text). For these truth table rows, it may be considered problematic that they are coded as sufficient for the outcome (“ACT”). However, going back to the calibrated data matrix (Table 1 in the main text), we found that the four cases covered by the three problematic truth table rows (i.e., PT\_1980s, UK\_1980s\_1, DE\_1980s, and FI\_1980s) all have outcome scores higher than 0.50. Moreover, we observed that none of the solution terms from the results (see Table 1 in the main text) is covered by (one of) those cases only.[[1]](#endnote-1) Therefore, we conclude that Vis’ (2011) original consistency cut-off point is justified.

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| **Table S.B1. *Truth table, also with PRI-scores for the negated outcome*** | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Conditions** | | | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **OPEN** | **GROWTH** | **UNEM** | **RIGHT** | **CORP** | **ACT** | **n** | **Incl.** | **PRI for Y** | **PRI for ~Y** | **Cases** |
| 19 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.954 | 0.531 | 0.469 | NZ\_1990s |
| 25 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.941 | 0.714 | 0.286 | FR\_1995s |
| 28 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 0.939 | 0.722 | 0.225 | AU\_1995s, NL\_1980s, NL\_1995s, NO\_2000s, ES\_1995s, CH\_1995s |
| 17 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.936 | 0.678 | 0.322 | UK\_1995s |
| 27 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0.935 | 0.318 | 0.580 | PT\_1980s, UK\_1980s\_1 |
| 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.923 | 0.446 | 0.554 | DE\_1980s |
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.923 | 0.489 | 0.511 | FI\_1980s |
| 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0.921 | 0.656 | 0.344 | FI\_2000s, PT\_1995s, SE\_1980s |
| 20 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.918 | 0.484 | 0.428 | NL\_2000s, NO\_1995s |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.918 | 0.600 | 0.367 | AUS\_1990s |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.912 | 0.622 | 0.326 | ES\_1980s |
| 26 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0.912 | 0.716 | 0.201 | BEL\_1995s, DK\_1990s, DK\_1995s\_1, DK\_1995s\_2, FI\_1995s, NO\_1990s, SE\_1995s |
| 11 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.907 | 0.280 | 0.607 | AUS\_1995s, US\_1980s |
| 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.901 | 0.243 | 0.645 | US\_2000s |
| 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0.890 | 0.187 | 0.712 | CND\_1990s, NZ\_1995s, PT\_2000s\_2, UK\_1980s\_2 |
| 21 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.886 | 0.419 | 0.581 | NZ\_1980s |
| 30 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.880 | 0.368 | 0.574 | BEL\_1990s |
| 31 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.867 | 0.075 | 0.925 | PT\_1990s |
| 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.858 | 0.248 | 0.752 | DE\_1990s |
| 24 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0.852 | 0.317 | 0.604 | DK\_1980s, IE\_1990s, NL\_1990s, CH\_1980s, CH\_2000s |
| 32 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0.835 | 0.241 | 0.750 | FI\_1990s, DE\_1995s, SE\_1990s\_2, CH\_1990s |
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.831 | 0.413 | 0.557 | FR\_1980s, ES\_1990s |
| 22 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0.831 | 0.363 | 0.577 | BEL\_2000s, NO\_1980s, PT\_2000s\_1, SE\_1990s\_1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

*Notes. “Incl.” is the consistency score of the truth table rows and “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency. Configurations with simultaneous subset relations are highlighted in grey. The numbers in the first column refer to a specific configuration.*

*Replication of Vis (2011)*

Despite the slight recalibrations we implemented, and using the same consistency cut-off point, we were able to exactly replicate Vis’s (2011) findings (see Table 1 in the main text for the conservative solution and Table S.B2 below for the parsimonious solution).

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| **Table S.B2. *Multiple Time Periods, Single QCA (Strategy A), extension of Vis (2011), parsimonious solution*** | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | **InclS** | **PRI** | **CovS** | **CovU** | **1980s** | **1990s** | **1995s** | **2000s** |
| #1 | OPEN\*unem | 0.904 | 0.731 | 0.775 | 0.106 | SE\_1980s,  PT\_1980s,  UK\_1980s\_1,  NL\_1980s | NZ\_1990s, DK\_1990s, NO\_1990s | UK\_1995s, PT\_1995s, NO\_1995s, FR\_1995s, BEL\_1995s, DK\_1995s\_1, DK\_1995s\_2, FI\_1995s, SE\_1995s, AU\_1995s, NL\_1995s, ES\_1995s, CH\_1995s | FI\_2000s, NL\_2000s, NO\_2000s |
| #2 | unem\*right | 0.860 | 0.679 | 0.452 | 0.025 | ES\_1980s,  SE\_1980s | AUS\_1990s, DK\_1990s, NO\_1990s | UK\_1995s, PT\_1995s, FR\_1995s, BEL\_1995s, DK\_1995s\_1, DK\_1995s\_2, FI\_1995s, SE\_1995s | FI\_2000s |
| #3 | unem \*CORP | 0.892 | 0.716 | 0.621 | 0.016 | FI\_1980s,  DE\_1980s,  SE\_1980s,  NL\_1980s | DK\_1990s, NO\_1990s | PT\_1995s, NO\_1995s, BEL\_1995s, DK\_1995s\_1, DK\_1995s, FI\_1995s, SE\_1995s, AU\_1995s, NL\_1995s, ES\_1995s, CH\_1995s | FI\_2000s, NL\_2000, NO\_2000 |
|  |  | 0.871 | 0.683 | 0.815 |  |  |  |  |  |

*Notes. “InclS” is the consistency score of the solution terms, “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency, “CovS” is the raw coverage score of the solution terms, and “CovU” is the unique coverage score of the solution terms.*

**Supplementary Information C: Truth Tables and Full Results for Strategy B “Multiple QCAs, Different Time Periods”**

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| **Table S.C1. *Truth table for the 1980s*** | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Conditions** | | | | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **OPEN** | **GROWTH** | **UNEM** | **RIGHT** | **CORP** | **ACT** | **n** | **Incl.** | **PRI for Y** | **Cases** |
| 27 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0.903 | 0.469 | PT\_1980s, UK\_1980s\_1 |
| 11 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.903 | 0.500 | US\_1980s |
| 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.895 | 0.791 | SE\_1980s |
| 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.894 | 0.641 | DE\_1980s |
| 28 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.888 | 0.609 | NL\_1980s |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.873 | 0.729 | ES\_1980s |
| 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.854 | 0.323 | UK\_1980s\_2 |
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.825 | 0.565 | FI\_1980s |
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.760 | 0.573 | FR\_1980s |
| 21 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.730 | 0.505 | NZ\_1980s |
| 22 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.676 | 0.435 | NO\_1980s |
| 24 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0.675 | 0.210 | DK\_1980s, CH\_1980s |

*Notes. “Incl.” is the consistency score of the truth table rows and “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency. The numbers in the first column refer to a specific configuration.*

*Based on the substantial drop in consistency between 0.825 and 0.760, we placed the cut-off point at 0.825*.

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| **Table S.C2 *Truth table for the 1990s*** | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Conditions** | | | | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **OPEN** | **GROWTH** | **UNEM** | **RIGHT** | **CORP** | **ACT** | **n** | **Incl.** | **PRI for Y** | **Cases** |
| 19 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.915 | 0.553 | NZ\_1990s |
| 26 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.852 | 0.625 | DK\_1990s, NO\_1990s |
| 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.834 | 0.000 | CND\_1990s |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.791 | 0.383 | AUS\_1990s |
| 22 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.753 | 0.149 | SE\_1990s\_1 |
| 30 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.752 | 0.078 | BEL\_1990s |
| 24 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0.723 | 0.176 | IE\_1990s, NL\_1990s |
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.662 | 0.000 | ES\_1990s |
| 31 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.625 | 0.000 | PT\_1990s |
| 32 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0.571 | 0.170 | FI\_1990s, SE\_1990s\_2, CH\_1990s |
| 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.490 | 0.000 | DE\_1990s |

*Notes. “Incl.” is the consistency score of the truth table rows and “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency. The numbers in the first column refer to a specific configuration.*

*Based on the substantial drop in consistency between 0.834 and 0.791, we placed the cut-off point at 0.834*.

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| **Table S.C3. *Truth table for 1995s*** | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Conditions** | | | | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **OPEN** | **GROWTH** | **UNEM** | **RIGHT** | **CORP** | **ACT** | **n** | **Incl.** | **PRI for Y** | **Cases** |
| 17 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | UK\_1955s |
| 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | PT\_1995s |
| 25 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | FR\_1995s |
| 28 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0.991 | 0.968 | AU\_1995s, NL\_1995s, ES\_1995s, CH\_1995s |
| 32 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.968 | 0.583 | DE\_1995 |
| 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.944 | 0.250 | NZ\_1995 |
| 20 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.936 | 0.368 | NO\_1995s |
| 11 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.933 | 0.217 | AUS\_1995s |
| 26 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0.932 | 0.766 | BEL\_1995s, DK\_1995s\_1, DK\_1995s\_2, SE\_1995s, FI\_1995s |

*Notes. “Incl.” is the consistency score of the truth table rows and “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency. The numbers in the first column refer to a specific configuration.*

*Based on the substantial drop in PRI-consistency between 0.968 and 0.944, we placed the cut-off point at 0.968*.

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| **Table S.C4. *Truth table for the 2000s*** | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Conditions** | | | | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **OPEN** | **GROWTH** | **UNEM** | **RIGHT** | **CORP** | **ACT** | **n** | **Incl.** | **PRI for Y** | **Cases** |
| 28 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | NO\_2000s |
| 24 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.977 | 0.786 | CH\_2000s |
| 20 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.970 | 0.765 | NL\_2000s |
| 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.921 | 0.000 | PT\_2000s\_2 |
| 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.916 | 0.000 | FI\_2000s |
| 22 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0.892 | 0.389 | BEL\_2000s, PT\_2000s\_1 |
| 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.889 | 0.000 | US\_2000s |

*Notes. “Incl.” is the consistency score of the truth table rows and “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency. The numbers in the first column refer to a specific configuration.*

*Based on the substantial drop in consistency between 0.916 and 0.892, we placed the cut-off point at 0.916*.

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| **Table S.C5. *Full results for the 1980s*** | | | | | | |
|  |  | **InclS** | **PRI** | **CovS** | **CovU** | **Cases** |
| #1 | unem | 0.852 | 0.681 | 0.854 | 0.381 | ES\_1980; FI\_1980; US\_1980; DE\_1980; SE\_1980; PT\_1980, UK\_1980\_1; NL\_1980 |
| #2 | RIGHT\*corp | 0.640 | 0.240 | 0.494 | 0.021 | US\_1980; UK\_1980\_2; PT\_1980, UK\_1980\_1 |
|  |  | 0.717 | 0.477 | 0.874 |  |  |

*Notes*: *Parsimonious solution.* *InclS” is the consistency score of the solution terms, “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency, “CovS” is the raw coverage score of the solution terms, and “CovU” is the unique coverage score of the solution terms.*

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table S.C6. *Full results for the 1990s*** | | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | **InclS** | **PRI** | **CovS** | **CovU** | **M1** | **M2** | **M3** | **M4** | **Cases** |
| #1 | OPEN\*unem | 0.845 | 0.566 | 0.639 | 0.031 | 0.259 | 0.327 |  |  | NZ\_1990; DK\_1990, NO\_1990 |
| #2 | unem\*CORP | 0.805 | 0.451 | 0.468 | 0.000 |  |  | 0.229 | 0.283 | DK\_1990, NO\_1990 |
| #3 | OPEN\*growth\*corp | 0.830 | 0.263 | 0.488 | 0.061 | 0.108 |  | 0.249 |  | NZ\_1990; CND\_1990 |
| #4 | growth\*RIGHT\*corp | 0.764 | 0.280 | 0.368 | 0.008 |  | 0.056 |  | 0.183 | NZ\_1990; CND\_1990 |
|  | M1  M2  M3  M4 | 0.837  0.775  0.834  0.766 | 0.511  0.444  0.475  0.409 | 0.747  0.695  0.717  0.651 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

*Notes: Parsimonious solution. InclS” is the consistency score of the solution terms, “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency, “CovS” is the raw coverage score of the solution terms, and “CovU” is the unique coverage score of the solution terms. M1 to M4 are the different models from this same truth table. In the main text, we have selected M1 for our illustration, because this is the model with the highest InclS-, PRI-, and CovS-scores.*

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| **Table S.C7. *Full results for the 1995s*** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | **InclS** | **PRI** | **CovS** | **CovU** | **M1** | **M2** | **M3** | **M4** | **M5** | **M6** | **Cases** |
| #1 | growth\*right | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.430 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.088 | 0.060 | 0.088 | 0.060 | UK\_1995; PT\_1995 |
| #2 | right\*corp | 0.892 | 0.696 | 0.387 | 0.012 | 0.065 | 0.065 |  |  |  |  | UK\_1995; FR\_1995 |
| #3 | OPEN\*GROWTH\*RIGHT | 0.973 | 0.896 | 0.520 | 0.000 | 0.315 |  | 0.171 | 0.171 |  |  | AU\_1995, NL\_1995, ES\_1995, CH\_1995; DE\_1995 |
| #4 | OPEN\*GROWTH\*corp | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.480 | 0.000 |  |  | 0.053 |  | 0.086 |  | FR\_1995 |
| #5 | OPEN\*unem\*corp | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.525 | 0.017 |  |  |  | 0.070 |  | 0.103 | UK\_1995; FR\_1995 |
| #6 | GROWTH\*RIGHT\*CORP | 0.937 | 0.800 | 0.496 | 0.008 |  | 0.291 |  |  | 0.179 | 0.179 | AU\_1995, NL\_1995, ES\_1995, CH\_1995; DE\_1995 |
|  | M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6 | 0.929  0.907  0.982  0.982  0.960  0.961 | 0.814  0.776  0.947  0.947  0.889  0.889 | 0.810  0.786  0.798  0.815  0.806  0.823 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

*Notes*: *Parsimonious solution.* *InclS” is the consistency score of the solution terms, “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency, “CovS” is the raw coverage score of the solution terms, and “CovU” is the unique coverage score of the solution terms. M1 to M6 are the different models from this same truth table. In the main text, we have selected M4 for our illustration, because this is the model with the highest InclS- and PRI-scores and with the second most CovS-score.*

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| **Table S.C8. *Full results for the 2000s*** | | | | | | |
|  |  | **InclS** | **PRI** | **CovS** | **CovU** | **Cases** |
| #1 | unem | 0.914 | 0.508 | 0.773 | 0.031 | FI\_2000; NL\_2000; NO\_2000 |
| #2 | OPEN\*RIGHT | 0.832 | 0.441 | 0.850 | 0.109 | NL\_2000; PT\_2000\_2; CH\_2000; NO\_2000 |
|  |  | 0.797 | 0.376 | 0.882 |  |  |

*Notes*: *Parsimonious solution.* *InclS” is the consistency score of the solution terms, “PRI” is the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency, “CovS” is the raw coverage score of the solution terms, and “CovU” is the unique coverage score of the solution terms.*

**Supplementary Information D: Calibrated Data Matrix and Ideal Type Membership Scores**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table S.D1. *Calibrated data matrix and ideal type memberships (Strategy C)*** | | | | | | | | |
| **Case ID** | **Calibrated Data Matrix** | | | | **Ideal Type Membership Scores** | | | |
| **GEN** | **gen** | **ACT** | **act** | **AG** | **Ag** | **aG** | **ag** |
| AUS\_1990s | 0.16 | 0.84 | 0.59 | 0.41 | 0.16 | ***0.59*** | 0.16 | 0.41 |
| AUS\_1995s | 0.16 | 0.84 | 0.43 | 0.57 | 0.16 | 0.43 | 0.16 | ***0.57*** |
| AU\_1995s | 0.56 | 0.44 | 0.63 | 0.37 | ***0.56*** | 0.44 | 0.37 | 0.37 |
| BEL\_1990s | 0.68 | 0.32 | 0.41 | 0.59 | 0.41 | 0.32 | ***0.59*** | 0.32 |
| BEL\_1995s | 0.68 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0.53 | 0.47 | 0.32 | ***0.53*** | 0.32 |
| BEL\_2000s | 0.68 | 0.32 | 0.46 | 0.54 | 0.46 | 0.32 | ***0.54*** | 0.32 |
| CND\_1990s | 0.57 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.55 | 0.45 | 0.43 | ***0.55*** | 0.43 |
| DK\_1980s | 0.66 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.61 | 0.39 | 0.34 | ***0.61*** | 0.34 |
| DK\_1990s | 0.67 | 0.33 | 0.65 | 0.35 | ***0.65*** | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.33 |
| DK\_1995s\_1 | 0.63 | 0.37 | 0.62 | 0.38 | ***0.62*** | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.37 |
| DK\_1995s\_2 | 0.59 | 0.41 | 0.73 | 0.27 | ***0.59*** | 0.41 | 0.27 | 0.27 |
| FI\_1980s | 0.63 | 0.37 | 0.88 | 0.12 | ***0.63*** | 0.37 | 0.12 | 0.12 |
| FI\_1990s | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.14 | 0.86 | 0.14 | 0.14 | ***0.7*** | 0.3 |
| FI\_1995s | 0.64 | 0.36 | 0.57 | 0.43 | ***0.57*** | 0.36 | 0.43 | 0.36 |
| FI\_2000s | 0.59 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.59 | 0.41 | 0.41 | ***0.59*** | 0.41 |
| FR\_1980s | 0.74 | 0.27 | 0.57 | 0.43 | ***0.57*** | 0.27 | 0.43 | 0.27 |
| FR\_1995s | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.61 | 0.39 | ***0.61*** | 0.3 | 0.39 | 0.3 |
| DE\_1980s | 0.7 | 0.31 | 0.69 | 0.31 | ***0.69*** | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.31 |
| DE\_1990s | 0.67 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ***0.67*** | 0.34 |
| DE\_1995s | 0.65 | 0.35 | 0.42 | 0.58 | 0.42 | 0.35 | ***0.58*** | 0.35 |
| IE\_1990s | 0.24 | 0.76 | 0.45 | 0.55 | 0.24 | 0.45 | 0.24 | ***0.55*** |
| NL\_1980s | 0.81 | 0.19 | 0.59 | 0.41 | ***0.59*** | 0.19 | 0.41 | 0.19 |
| NL\_1990s | 0.82 | 0.18 | 0.6 | 0.4 | ***0.6*** | 0.18 | 0.4 | 0.18 |
| NL\_1995s | 0.82 | 0.18 | 0.68 | 0.32 | ***0.68*** | 0.18 | 0.32 | 0.18 |
| NL\_2000s | 0.83 | 0.17 | 0.63 | 0.37 | ***0.63*** | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0.17 |
| NZ\_1980s | 0.23 | 0.77 | 0.11 | 0.89 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.23 | ***0.77*** |
| NZ\_1990s | 0.13 | 0.87 | 0.63 | 0.37 | 0.13 | ***0.63*** | 0.13 | 0.37 |
| NZ\_1995s | 0.11 | 0.89 | 0.42 | 0.58 | 0.11 | 0.42 | 0.11 | ***0.58*** |
| NO\_1980s | 0.75 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.73 | 0.27 | 0.25 | ***0.73*** | 0.25 |
| NO\_1990s | 0.75 | 0.25 | 0.72 | 0.28 | ***0.72*** | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 |
| NO\_1995s | 0.74 | 0.26 | 0.43 | 0.57 | 0.43 | 0.26 | ***0.57*** | 0.26 |
| NO\_2000s | 0.74 | 0.26 | 0.54 | 0.46 | ***0.54*** | 0.26 | 0.46 | 0.26 |
| PT\_1980s | 0.83 | 0.17 | 0.54 | 0.46 | ***0.54*** | 0.17 | 0.46 | 0.17 |
| PT\_1990s | 0.84 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.79 | 0.21 | 0.16 | ***0.79*** | 0.16 |
| PT\_1995s | 0.84 | 0.16 | 0.7 | 0.3 | ***0.7*** | 0.16 | 0.3 | 0.16 |
| PT\_2000s\_1 | 0.83 | 0.17 | 0.57 | 0.43 | ***0.57*** | 0.17 | 0.43 | 0.17 |
| PT\_2000s\_2 | 0.83 | 0.17 | 0.47 | 0.53 | 0.47 | 0.17 | ***0.53*** | 0.17 |
| ES\_1980s | 0.97 | 0.03 | 0.56 | 0.44 | ***0.56*** | 0.03 | 0.44 | 0.03 |
| ES\_1990s | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0.41 | 0.59 | 0.41 | 0.1 | ***0.59*** | 0.1 |
| ES\_1995s | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.4 | ***0.6*** | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| SE\_1980s | 0.93 | 0.07 | 1 | 0 | ***0.93*** | 0.07 | 0 | 0 |
| SE\_1990s\_1 | 0.96 | 0.04 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ***0.96*** | 0.04 |
| SE\_1990s\_2 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ***0.9*** | 0.1 |
| SE\_1995s | 0.78 | 0.22 | 0.76 | 0.24 | ***0.76*** | 0.22 | 0.24 | 0.22 |
| CH\_1980s | 0.79 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ***0.79*** | 0.21 |
| CH\_1990s | 0.86 | 0.14 | 0.64 | 0.36 | ***0.64*** | 0.14 | 0.36 | 0.14 |
| CH\_1995s | 0.82 | 0.18 | 0.8 | 0.2 | ***0.8*** | 0.18 | 0.2 | 0.18 |
| CH\_2000s | 0.81 | 0.19 | 0.61 | 0.39 | ***0.61*** | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.19 |
| UK\_1980s\_1 | 0.08 | 0.92 | 0.56 | 0.44 | 0.08 | ***0.56*** | 0.08 | 0.44 |
| UK\_1980s\_2 | 0.04 | 0.96 | 0.42 | 0.58 | 0.04 | 0.42 | 0.04 | ***0.58*** |
| UK\_1995s | 0 | 1 | 0.69 | 0.31 | 0 | **0.69** | 0 | 0.31 |
| US\_1980s | 0.46 | 0.54 | 0.59 | 0.41 | 0.46 | ***0.54*** | 0.41 | 0.41 |
| US\_2000s | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.45 | 0.55 | 0.4 | 0.45 | 0.4 | ***0.55*** |

*Notes. The italic-bold fuzzy-set scores indicate to which ideal type the case belongs.*

**References Supplementary Information** (not included in the main text)

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**Footnotes**

1. This means that the results will not change when the three inconsistent truth table rows #27, #12, and #4 would be excluded from the minimization. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)