

Online Appendix

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Part A: GLES panel data description

Table A.1 Data collection period of the GLES panel

Wave	Date of Collection
1	2016-10-06 to 2016-11-10
2	2017-02-16 to 2017-03-03
3	2017-05-11 to 2017-05-23
4	2017-07-06 to 2017-07-17
5	2017-08-17 to 2017-08-28
6	2017-09-04 to 2017-09-13
7	2017-09-18 to 2017-09-23

Table A.2 Number of waves in which respondents participated in the GLES panel

	Freq.	Percent
0	27	0.26
1	2227	21.15
2	1044	9.91
3	636	6.04
4	595	5.65
5	582	5.53
6	1092	10.37
7	4327	41.09
Total	10530	100.00

Table A.3 Descriptive overview

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Pr(AfD entering Bundestag)	0.59	0.31	0.00	1.00
Vote preference: AfD	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
Exposure to AfD's campaign	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Knowing AfD's immigration position	0.87	0.34	0.00	1.00
Rating of AfD	2.90	3.02	1.00	11.00
AfD partisan	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Socio-econ (ego)	4.11	1.46	1.00	7.00
Immigration (ego)	5.04	1.73	1.00	7.00
Political interest	2.58	1.05	1.00	5.00

Note: Descriptive statistics of the variables are calculated using the full dataset of the baseline analysis

Table A.4 Variable Description

Variable	Question Wording and Coding	GLEs Variables
Probability of AfD entering Bundestag (pr_AfD_)	<p>Question: How likely do you think it is for the following parties to be represented in the Bundestag after the federal election?</p> <p>(I) AfD</p> <p>Original Coding: (1) definitely not (2) probably not (3) maybe (4) probably (5) definitely</p> <p>----- (-93) not asked, terminated (-95) not participated (-99) no answer</p> <p>The variable is recoded as 1 for definitely and 0 for definitely not. Not asked, Not participated, No answer, and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.</p>	<p>kp5_3010i kp6_3010i kp7_3010i</p>
Vote preference for AfD (AfD_votepref_)	<p>Question: You have two votes in the federal election. The first vote is for a candidate in your local constituency, the second vote is for a party. How will you mark your ballot?</p> <p>(B) Second vote:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union / Christlich-Soziale Union) - SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) - FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) - Bündnis 90/Die Grünen - Die Linke 	<p>kp1_190b kp3_190b kp4_190b kp5_190b kp6_190b kp7_190b</p>

-
- AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)
 - Other party
 - Don't know yet

Original Coding:

- (1) CDU/CSU
- (4) SPD
- (5) FDP
- (6) GRÜNE
- (7) DIE LINKE
- (322) AfD
- (801) other party
- (-98) don't know

-
- (-93) not asked, terminated
 - (-95) not participated
 - (-97) not applicable
 - (-99) no answer
-

If respondents answered “not likely to vote” or “certain not to vote” in the vote intention question, they were asked the following hypothetical vote choice question: Which parties would you consider for your second vote?

(A) CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union) kp1_211i
kp3_211i
kp4_211i
kp5_211i
kp6_211i
kp7_211i

(C) SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)

(D) FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei)

(E) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen [labelled in dataset as "GRÜNE"]

(F) Die Linke [labelled in dataset as "DIE LINKE"]

(I) AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)

(G) other party

Coding wave 1,3-7:

- (1) would consider
-

-
- (2) would probably consider
 - (3) would probably not consider
 - (4) would not consider

-
- (-93) not asked, terminated
 - (-95) not participated
 - (-97) not applicable
 - (-99) no answer

This variable is coded as 1 if respondents answer they intend to vote for AfD in their party-list vote and coded as 0 if respondents answer (a) other parties or (b) not intend to vote and not provide any party preference. Don't know, Not asked (terminated), Not participated, Not applicable, No answer, and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.

Exposure to AfD's campaign (campaign_AfD_)	Question: During the election campaign, there are different ways of acquiring information about politics in Germany. From which parties did you receive information during the past week? I... (K) visited websites of a party or a candidate (G) saw campaign posters (D) saw party political broadcasts on TV (E) listened to party political broadcasts on the radio (H) had conversations at an election campaign booth (B) received campaign flyers, e-mails, text messages (I) received information material via a social network like for example Facebook or others. (Y) none of the above applies Coding parties: (I) AfD	kp4_421ki kp4_421gi kp4_421di kp4_421ei kp4_421hi kp4_421bi kp4_421ii kp5_421ki kp5_421gi kp5_421di kp5_421ei kp5_421hi kp5_421bi kp5_421ii kp6_421ki kp6_421gi kp6_421di
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	kp6_421ei
Original Coding checkboxes wave:	kp6_421hi
(0) not mentioned	kp6_421bi
(1) mentioned	kp6_421ii

(-93) not asked, terminated	kp7_421ki
(-95) not participated	kp7_421gi
(-99) no answer	kp7_421di
	kp7_421ei
The variable is coded as 1 if respondents mention any	kp7_421hi
one of the items and 0 if they mentioned none of them.	kp7_421bi
Not asked (terminated), Not participated, No answer,	kp7_421ii
and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.	

Knowing	AfD's	Question: Let's turn to the issue of immigration. Should	kp2_1110i
immigration position		it be easier or more difficult for foreigners to immigrate?	kp4_1110i
(know_AfD_immig_)		What do you think are the positions of the political	kp7_1110i
		parties on this issue?	
		(I) AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)	

Original Coding:

- (1) 1 immigration for foreigners should be easier
- (2) 2
- (3) 3
- (4) 4
- (5) 5
- (6) 6
- (7) 7 immigration for foreigners should be more difficult
- (-98) don't know
-
- (-93) not asked, terminated
- (-95) not participated
- (-99) no answer

The variable is coded as 1 if respondents answer AfD's immigration position and 0 if they answer "don't know".

Not asked (terminated), Not participated, No answer,
and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.

Party rating	Question: What do you think of the different parties in	kp1_430a,c-f,i
(rate_CDU_	general?	kp2_430a,c-f,i
rate_SPD_	(A) CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union)	kp3_430a, c-f,i
rate_FDP_	(C) SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)	kp4_430a,c-f,i
rate_Gr_	(D) FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei)	kp5_430a,c-f,i
rate_LP_	(E) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen [labelled in dataset as	kp6_430a,c-f,i
rate_AfD_)	"GRÜNE"]	kp7_430a,c-f,i
	(F) Die Linke [labelled in dataset as "DIE LINKE"]	
	(I) AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)	

Coding:

- (1) -5 I do not think much of the party at all
- (2) -4
- (3) -3
- (4) -2
- (5) -1
- (6) 0
- (7) +1
- (8) +2
- (9) +3
- (10) +4
- (11) +5 I think a great deal of the party
- (-71) haven't heard of [labelled in dataset as "subject unknown"]
-
- (-93) not asked, terminated
- (-95) not participated
- (-99) no answer

Haven't heard of, Not asked (terminated), Not participated, No answer, and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.

AfD partisanship (Afd_pi_)	Question: In Germany, many people lean towards a particular party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. How about you, do you in general lean towards a particular party? If so, which one?	kp1_2090 kp2_2090 kp3_2090 kp4_2090 kp5_2090 kp6_2090 kp7_2090
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- Coding:
- (1) CDU/CSU
 - (2) CDU
 - (3) CSU
 - (4) SPD
 - (5) FDP
 - (6) GRÜNE
 - (7) DIE LINKE
 - (322) AfD
 - (801) other party
 - (808) no party

-
- (-93) not asked, terminated
 - (-95) not participated
 - (-99) no answer

The variable is coded as 1 if respondents lean towards AfD and 0 if they lean towards other parties or answer “no party”. Not asked (terminated), Not participated, No answer, and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.

Economic attitude (tax_ego_)	Question: Some people prefer lower taxes, although this results in less social services. Others prefer more social services, although this results in raising taxes. What is your personal view on this issue?	kp1_1090 kp2_1090 kp3_1090 kp4_1090 kp6_1090 kp7_1090
---------------------------------	--	--

Coding:

- (1) 1 lower taxes, although this results in less social

services
(2) 2
(3) 3
(4) 4
(5) 5
(6) 6
(7) 7 more social services, although this results in raising taxes

(-93) not asked, terminated
(-95) not participated
(-99) no answer

The value of this variable at wave 5 is imputed by using the variable's average of wave 4 and wave 6. Not asked (terminated), Not participated, No answer, and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.

Immigration attitude (mig_ego_)	Question: Should it be easier or more difficult for foreigners to immigrate? What is your personal view on immigration of foreigners?	kp1_1130 kp2_1130 kp3_1130 kp4_1130 kp6_1130 kp7_1130
	Coding:	
	(1) 1 immigration for foreigners should be easier	
	(2) 2	
	(3) 3	
	(4) 4	
	(5) 5	
	(6) 6	
	(7) 7 immigration for foreigners should be more difficult	

(-93) not asked, terminated
(-95) not participated
(-99) no answer

The value of this variable at wave 5 is imputed by using the variable's average of wave 4 and wave 6. Not asked

(terminated), Not participated, No answer, and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.

Political interest (polint_)	Question: Quite generally, how interested are you in politics?	kp1_010 kp2_010 kp3_010 kp4_010 kp5_010 kp6_010 kp7_010
	Coding:	
	(1) very interested	
	(2) somewhat interested	
	(3) in between	
	(4) not very interested	
	(5) not at all interested	

(-93) not asked, terminated

(-95) not participated

(-99) no answer

Not asked (terminated), Not participated, No answer, and Item nonresponse, were treated as missing.

Part B: Aggregate-level analysis

Table B.1. Bottom-up spillover effect for radical right parties (Conventional Estimate).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$D_{i,s,t}$	2.96*	3.92*	4.29*	4.15 ⁺	4.25 ⁺
	(1.23)	(1.66)	(1.96)	(2.19)	(2.29)
Bandwidth	Full sample	±5%	±4%	±3%	±2.69%
Left of c (N)	166	166	87	41	36
Right of c (N)	28	18	14	13	12

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.2. Bottom-up spillover effect for radical right parties (Biased-corrected estimate).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$D_{i,s,t}$	1.83	5.33**	4.51*	5.59*	5.75*
	(1.23)	(1.66)	(1.96)	(2.19)	(2.29)
Bandwidth	Full sample	$\pm 5\%$	$\pm 4\%$	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 2.69\%$
Left of c (N)	166	166	87	41	36
Right of c (N)	28	18	14	13	12

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure B.1. Regression discontinuity estimates of the bottom-up spillover effect for radical right parties (Bias-corrected Estimate).

Table B.3. Bottom-up spillover effect that exclude one radical right party in each model.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	without	without	without	without	without
	AfD	DVU	NPD	REP	Schill and Offensive D
$D_{i,s,t}$	2.08***	2.62*	6.72***	3.07*	2.96*
	(0.49)	(1.30)	(1.99)	(1.44)	(1.23)
Bandwidth	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample
left of c (N)	165	161	71	101	166
right of c (N)	15	27	17	26	28

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure B.2. Regression discontinuity estimates of the bottom-up spillover effect (dropping one radical right party at a time).

Note: Thick and thin error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Table B.4. Placebo test: vote share in previous federal election as outcome.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$D_{i,s,t}$	-0.01 (0.81)	1.23 (1.01)	1.48 (1.09)	1.61 (1.05)	1.43 (1.02)
Bandwidth	Full sample	$\pm 5\%$	$\pm 4\%$	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 2.69\%$
left of c (N)	172	172	86	40	35
right of c (N)	32	21	17	16	15

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in previous federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table B.5. Placebo test: pseudo-threshold at 3%.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$D_{i,s,t}$	0.54 (0.64)	-0.23 (0.53)	-0.35 (0.49)	-0.11 (0.41)	-0.00 (0.38)
Bandwidth	Full sample	$\pm 5\%$	$\pm 4\%$	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 2.69\%$
left of c (N)	144	144	144	144	117
right of c (N)	49	35	31	27	24

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table B.6. Placebo test: top-down spillover effect.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$D_{i,s,t}$	0.01 (2.31)	-0.40 (2.82)	-1.94 (3.11)	-1.95 (3.24)	-2.11 (3.28)
Bandwidth	Full sample	$\pm 5\%$	$\pm 4\%$	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 2.69\%$
left of c (N)	201	201	110	52	45
right of c (N)	16	12	11	11	11

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent regional election; treatment is passing through the 5% threshold in a federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$




Figure B.3. Coefficient plot of covariate balance tests

Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table B.7. Covariate balance test (Full Sample).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Post-1989	Baden-Württemberg	Bavaria	Berlin	Brandenburg	Bremen	Hamburg	Hesse	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	Lower Saxony	North Rhine-Westphalia	Rhineland-Palatinate	Saarland	Saxony	Saxony-Anhalt	Schleswig-Holstein	Thuringia
$D_{i,s,t}$	-0.15	0.03	-0.04	-0.08	0.01	-0.06	-0.05	0.18	-0.01	-0.04	0.00	0.05	-0.25	-0.15	0.03	-0.04	-0.08
	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.06)
left of c (N)	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
right of c (N)	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.8. Covariate balance test (5% bandwidth).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Post-1989	Baden-Württemberg	Bavaria	Berlin	Brandenburg	Bremen	Hamburg	Hesse	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	Lower Saxony	North Rhine-Westphalia	Rhineland-Palatinate	Saarland	Saxony	Saxony-Anhalt	Schleswig-Holstein	Thuringia
$D_{i,s,t}$	-0.34	0.09	0.01	-0.08	0.02	-0.08	-0.14	0.26	0.04	-0.10	-0.05	0.09	0.26	-0.11	-0.07	-0.12	-0.02
	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)
left of c (N)	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
right of c (N)	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.9. Covariate balance test (4% bandwidth).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Post-1989	Baden-Württemberg	Bavaria	Berlin	Brandenburg	Bremen	Hamburg	Hesse	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	Lower Saxony	North Rhine-Westphalia	Rhineland-Palatinate	Saarland	Saxony	Saxony-Anhalt	Schleswig-Holstein	Thuringia
$D_{i,s,t}$	-0.35 (0.24)	0.10 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.06 (0.09)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.09)	0.30 (0.19)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.10 (0.18)	0.27 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.05)
left of c (N)	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126
right of c (N)	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.10. Covariate balance test (3% bandwidth).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Post-1989	Baden-Württemberg	Bavaria	Berlin	Brandenburg	Bremen	Hamburg	Hesse	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	Lower Saxony	North Rhine-Westphalia	Rhineland-Palatinate	Saarland	Saxony	Saxony-Anhalt	Schleswig-Holstein	Thuringia
$D_{i,s,t}$	-0.48 (0.28)	0.16 (0.20)	-0.00 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.13)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.09)	0.34 (0.23)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.09 (0.22)	0.26 (0.21)	-0.25 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.06)
left of c (N)	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
right of c (N)	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.11. Covariate balance test (Optimal bandwidth = 2.69%).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Post-1989	Baden-Württemberg	Bavaria	Berlin	Brandenburg	Bremen	Hamburg	Hesse	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	Lower Saxony	North Rhine-Westphalia	Rhineland-Palatinate	Saarland	Saxony	Saxony-Anhalt	Schleswig-Holstein	Thuringia
$D_{i,s,t}$	-0.50	0.19	-0.01	-0.14	0.00	-0.08	-0.10	0.34	0.09	-0.10	-0.02	0.08	0.26	-0.26	-0.04	-0.16	-0.05
	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.09)
left of c (N)	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
right of c (N)	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.12. Manipulation Testing using Local Polynomial Density Estimation.

	$\pm 5\%$	$\pm 4\%$	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 1.11\%$
Effective Number of observations (left of c)	205	100	50	44
Effective Number of observations (right of c)	24	20	19	18
<i>p</i> -value	0.0924	0.5113	0.5255	0.1132

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The kernel being used is triangular. Local polynomial density estimators are estimated using jackknife standard errors. A *p*-value below the significance threshold (0.05) indicates that one can reject the null hypothesis of no sorting.

Table B.13. Classification of radical left, green, liberal, and radical right parties

Party Family (total number of observations)	Parties that belong to the party family (Period)
Radical Left (n=70)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Die Linke (2006-2019) • PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) (1990-2005) • WASG (Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative)¹ (2005-2006)
Green (n=135)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (1978-2019)²
Liberal (n=167)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) (1966-2019) • FDP/DPS (Demokratische Partei Saar) (1975-1999) • FDP/DVP (Demokratische Volkspartei) (1976-2001)
Radical Right (n=194)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)³ (2013-2019) • DVU (Die Deutsche Volksunion) (1991-2009) • NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (1966-2019) • REP (Die Republikaner) (1986-2017) • Schill Partei (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive) & Offensive D (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive)⁴ (2001-2006)

¹ WASG formed an electoral alliance with PDS in 2005, and their electoral list was called Die Linke. Thus, the dataset uses the vote share of Die Linke for these two parties in 2005 federal election.

² In 1993, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen was formed through the merger of The Greens (Die Grünen) in West Germany and Alliance 90 (Bündnis 90) in East Germany.

³ Some may argue that AfD was not a RRP before the 2015 factional struggle (Arzheimer, 2015), and only after this intra-party split has its party program been nativist and anti-immigrant (Franzmann, 2019). However, this programmatic change of AfD should not concern the research design too much, for this paper is investigating the impact of crossing subnational electoral hurdle upon AfD's vote share in 2017 federal election. At that point, AfD was already clearly an RRP.

⁴ Because Offensive D is basically the continuation of Schill Partei after Ronald Schill was ousted, the dataset groups together the electoral performance of these two parties.

Table B.14. Bottom-up spillover effect for radical left parties (Conventional Estimate).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$D_{i,s,t}$	0.19 (0.77)	-0.69 (0.83)	-0.11 (0.77)	0.50 (0.64)	0.52 (0.62)
Bandwidth	Full sample	$\pm 5\%$	$\pm 4\%$	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 2.75\%$
Left of c (N)	23	23	18	16	15
Right of c (N)	47	14	11	9	9

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table B.15. Bottom-up spillover effect for green parties (Conventional Estimate).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$D_{i,s,t}$	-0.57 (0.80)	-1.52 ⁺ (0.89)	-1.60 ⁺ (0.96)	-1.82 ⁺ (1.04)	-2.75 [*] (1.35)
Bandwidth	Full sample	$\pm 5\%$	$\pm 4\%$	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 1.27\%$
Left of c (N)	34	34	34	29	12
Right of c (N)	101	70	61	52	28

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table B.16. Bottom-up spillover effect for liberal parties (Conventional Estimate).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$D_{i,s,t}$	-0.56 (0.78)	-0.59 (0.84)	-0.71 (0.90)	-0.81 (1.01)	-1.77 (1.29)
Bandwidth	Full sample	$\pm 5\%$	$\pm 4\%$	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 1.84\%$
Left of c (N)	60	60	59	50	34
Right of c (N)	107	90	81	70	44

Note: Outcome is party's vote share in subsequent federal election within a particular state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and they are clustered at state-election level. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Part C: Individual-level analysis

Table C.1. Viability mechanism, exposure mechanism and legitimation mechanism: fixed effect models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
wave 2					-0.09** (0.04)
wave 3		-0.04*** (0.01)			-0.19*** (0.04)
wave 4		-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)		-0.15*** (0.04)
wave 5		-0.03*** (0.01)		0.13*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.04)
wave 6	0.07*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)		0.26*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.04)
wave 7	0.15*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.35*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.04)
tr * wave 2					-0.06 (0.05)
tr * wave 3		-0.00 (0.01)			-0.03 (0.05)
tr * wave 4		-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		-0.03 (0.05)
tr * wave 5		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)
tr * wave 6	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.05)
tr * wave 7	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.05)
AfD * wave 2					-0.10 (0.10)
AfD * wave 3		-0.04** (0.01)			-0.07 (0.10)
AfD * wave 4		-0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)		-0.26* (0.10)
AfD * wave 5		0.00 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.03)	-0.17 (0.11)

AfD * wave 6	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.01)		-0.09** (0.03)	-0.20+ (0.10)
AfD * wave 7	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.10 (0.11)
tr * AfD * wave 2					-0.04 (0.15)
tr * AfD * wave 3		0.01 (0.02)			0.22 (0.15)
tr * AfD * wave 4		0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)		0.42** (0.15)
tr * AfD * wave 5		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.04 (0.05)	0.30+ (0.16)
tr * AfD * wave 6	-0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)		-0.00 (0.05)	0.29+ (0.15)
tr * AfD * wave 7	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.44** (0.15)
AfD partisan	0.03+ (0.02)	0.26*** (0.01)	0.03+ (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	1.43*** (0.05)
Socio-econ (ego)	-0.01+ (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Immigration (ego)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	0.01+ (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Political interest	-0.01+ (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02+ (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)
Constant	0.60*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.01)	1.02*** (0.02)	0.08* (0.04)	2.79*** (0.08)
Observations	12895	26247	13494	17451	31364
Number of respondents	4770	5023	4956	4906	5020
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: DV of Model 1: Perceived probability of AfD entering federal parliament; DV of Model 2: Intend to vote for AfD (dummy); DV of Model 3: Knowing AfD's immigration position (dummy); DV of Model 4: Receiving campaign information from AfD (dummy); DV of Model 5: Rating of AfD. Entries are coefficients of fixed effect model. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure C.1. Viability mechanism among non-AfD voters

Note: The left panel shows the perceived probability of AfD entering federal parliament among non-AfD voters in the treated states and those in the control states; 95% confidence intervals are shown; the gray bar represents the period when AfD had broken into subnational parliament in the treated state. The right panel plots the coefficients of the parameters; thick and thin error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure C.2. Placebo test: Rating of other parties

Note: The dependent variable is respondent's rating of different parties; 95% confidence intervals are shown; the gray bar represents the period when AfD had broken into subnational parliament in the treated states.




Figure C.3 Coefficient plots of placebo test: Rating of other parties

Note: The dependent variable is respondent's rating of different parties. The panels plot the coefficient of the parameters; thick and thin error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure C.4. Check for contamination: using respondents in already treated states and treated states as regression sample

Note: The left panel shows the rating of AfD among AfD voters in the treated states and those in the already treated state; 95% confidence intervals are shown; the gray bar represents the period when AfD had broken into subnational parliament in the treated state. The right panel plot the coefficient of the parameters; thick and thin error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Table C.2. Check for contamination: using respondents in already treated states and treated states as regression sample

	Model 1
wave 2	-0.15*** (0.04)
wave 3	-0.22*** (0.04)
wave 4	-0.18*** (0.04)
wave 5	-0.20*** (0.04)
wave 6	-0.17*** (0.04)
wave 7	-0.23*** (0.04)
tr * wave 2	0.06 (0.05)
tr * wave 3	-0.00 (0.05)
tr * wave 4	-0.03 (0.05)
tr * wave 5	-0.06 (0.05)
tr * wave 6	-0.03 (0.05)
tr * wave 7	0.02 (0.05)
AfD * wave 2	-0.14 (0.11)
AfD * wave 3	0.15 (0.11)
AfD * wave 4	0.16 (0.11)
AfD * wave 5	0.13 (0.12)
AfD * wave 6	0.09 (0.11)

AfD * wave 7	0.33**
	(0.12)
tr * AfD * wave 2	-0.04
	(0.14)
tr * AfD * wave 3	-0.18
	(0.14)
tr * AfD * wave 4	-0.34*
	(0.14)
tr * AfD * wave 5	-0.21
	(0.14)
tr * AfD * wave 6	0.05
	(0.14)
tr * AfD * wave 7	-0.25
	(0.14)
AfD partisan	1.45***
	(0.05)
Socio-econ (ego)	-0.01
	(0.01)
Immigration (ego)	0.02*
	(0.01)
Political interest	0.02
	(0.02)
Constant	2.91***
	(0.07)
<hr/>	
Observations	38204
Number of respondents	6141
Individual FE	YES

Note: DV of Model 1: Rating of AfD. Entries are coefficients of fixed effect model.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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