**Annex to**

**Citizens’ Preferences for Liberal Democracy and its Deformations.   
Evidence from Germany**

**Contents**

[Annex A1: Items for measuring conceptions of democracy 2](#_Toc99536146)

[Annex A2: External efficacy 3](#_Toc99536147)

[Annex A3: Economic policy preference 4](#_Toc99536148)

[Annex A4: Immigration policy preference 5](#_Toc99536149)

[Annex A5: Sample composition and comparison to election survey data 6](#_Toc99536150)

[Annex A6: Exploratory factor analysis without liberal democracy items 7](#_Toc99536151)

[Annex A7: Exploratory factor analysis with liberal democracy items 8](#_Toc99536152)

[Annex A8: Confirmatory factor analysis 9](#_Toc99536153)

[Annex A9: OLS regressions – main models 10](#_Toc99536154)

[Annex A10: Alternative models with vote intention as a predictor 11](#_Toc99536155)

[Annex A11: Alternative models with only left-right position for ideology 12](#_Toc99536156)

[Annex References 13](#_Toc99536157)

# Annex A1: Items for measuring conceptions of democracy

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Item | Construct | Item text |
| 1 | Liberal democratic:  ongoing contestation 1 | It is important that governments always justify and explain their decisions to voters. (Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta, 2016) |
| 2 | Liberal democratic:  ongoing contestation 2 | It is important that social interests can continuously contest and influence political plans and decisions also between election dates. |
| 3 | Liberal democratic:  ongoing contestation 3 | The government should develop its positions and politics in ongoing dialogue with political interests and affected groups. |
| 4 | Liberal democratic:  ongoing contestation 4 | The quality of politics is measured by the extent to which the government subjects itself to continuing societal critique. |
| 5 | Liberal democratic:  pluralist 1 | Openness to the views of others and readiness to compromise are important in politics. |
| 6 | Liberal democratic:  pluralist 2 | It is important that elected politicians debate important questions among themselves before they take decisions. (Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, and Sokhey, 2010) |
| 7 | Liberal democratic:  pluralist 3 | In politics, it is important to understand why other people have different opinions. (Landwehr and Steiner, 2017) |
| 8 | Liberal democratic:  pluralist 4 | The political will of a society can only emerge if different perspectives have a voice in ongoing public debates. |
| 9 | Populist 1 | The primary task of politics is to recognize the true will of the people and to translate it into decisions as directly as possible. |
| 10 | Populist 2 | The quality of political decisions is defined by how strong and how directly the true will of the people is expressed in them. |
| 11 | Populist 3 | Ideally, a democracy realizes the uniform will of the people in a society. |
| 12 | Post-democratic 1 | In politics, it should be left solely to professional politicians to negotiate politically feasible decisions. |
| 13 | Post-democratic 2 | Political matters should be left to elected politicians who are motivated by political success to take satisfactory decisions. |
| 14 | Post-democratic 3 | Politics should be the preserve of professional politicians who negotiate the right policies for the country among themselves as well as with social interests. |
| 15 | Technocratic 1 | The quality of politics is measured by the extent to which it is informed by the knowledge of independent experts regarding the best political decisions. |
| 16 | Technocratic 2 | To serve the interests of society, political decisions should be based on facts and knowledge as much as possible. |
| 17 | Technocratic 3 | Ideally, political decisions reflect what experts, not what elected politicians deem the best for society. (Bertsou and Pastorella, 2017) |
| 18 | Majoritarian-relativist 1 | Although there is no true will of the people, a clear majority for a position in the population means that it is the correct decision. (Landwehr and Steiner, 2017) |
| 19 | Majoritarian-relativist 2 | Politics should follow the current majoritarian mood in the society as closely as possible, regardless of which mood or opinion this is. |
| 20 | Majoritarian-relativist 3 | Politics should primarily follow what people think and feel about political matters as directly as possible, rather than party lines or data and facts. |

*Notes:* English translation of German items.

# Annex A2: External efficacy

English translation of German items.

*What is your opinion on the following general statements about politics? Please state for each question how much you agree or disagree with them.*

* Politicians talk too much and don’t act enough.
* Most politicians are not interested in citizens’ opinions.
* Most politicians are trustworthy. (negative item)
* Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful.
* Politicians care about what ordinary people think. (negative item)

1 Do not agree at all

to

5 Agree completely

# Annex A3: Economic policy preference

English translation of German items.

*How is your position on the question of taxes and social benefits? Please use the following scale.*

1 Lower taxes even if that means lower social benefits.

to

7 More social benefits even if that means higher taxes.

# Annex A4: Immigration policy preference

English translation of German items.

*How is your position on the question of the possibilities of foreigners to enter the country? Please use the following scale.*

1 Foreigners‘ possibilities to enter and live in Germany should be extended.

to

7 Foreigners‘ possibilities to enter and live in Germany should be restricted.

# Annex A5: Sample composition and comparison to election survey data

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Own sample | | German Longitudinal Election Study 2017 | |
| Education | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| No degree | 3 | 0% | 24 | 1% |
| Secondary level lower tier | 140 | 13% | 518 | 24% |
| Secondary level mid-tier | 386 | 35% | 713 | 33% |
| Secondary level upper tier I | 135 | 12% | 189 | 9% |
| Secondary level upper tier II or tertiary education | 430 | 39% | 676 | 31% |
| Other degree | 21 | 2% | 11 | 1% |
| Still in school | 1 | 0% | 45 | 2% |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Gender | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| Female | 563 | 50% | 1094 | 50% |
| Male | 550 | 49% | 1085 | 50% |
| Diverse | 4 | 0% |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age category | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| <30 | 213 | 19% | 379 | 17% |
| 30-39 | 188 | 17% | 272 | 12% |
| 40-49 | 192 | 17% | 294 | 13% |
| 50-59 | 253 | 23% | 454 | 21% |
| 60-69 | 137 | 12% | 374 | 17% |
| 70+ | 133 | 12% | 406 | 19% |

*Notes:* German Longitudinal Election Study 2017 based on:Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schoen, Harald, Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Bieber, Ina; Stövsand, Lars-Christopher; Dietz, Melanie; Scherer, Philipp; Wagner, Aiko (2017): Vor- und Nachwahl-Querschnitt (Kumulation) (GLES 2017). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln: ZA680.

# Annex A6: Exploratory factor analysis without liberal democracy items

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Factor1 | Factor2 | Factor3 | Factor4 |
| Populist 1 | 0.032 | **0.716** | 0.165 | -0.074 |
| Populist 2 | 0.009 | **0.785** | 0.137 | -0.038 |
| Populist 3 | 0.011 | **0.653** | -0.046 | 0.095 |
| Postdemocratic 1 | **0.769** | 0.049 | -0.007 | -0.020 |
| Postdemocratic 2 | **0.712** | 0.012 | -0.078 | 0.065 |
| Postdemocratic 3 | **0.807** | -0.008 | 0.020 | -0.003 |
| Technocratic 1 | 0.106 | -0.197 | 0.063 | **0.714** |
| Technocratic 2 | -0.093 | 0.273 | -0.182 | **0.576** |
| Technocratic 3 | -0.045 | -0.043 | 0.088 | **0.568** |
| Majoritarian-relativist 1 | 0.034 | 0.054 | **0.589** | 0.110 |
| Majoritarian-relativist 2 | -0.044 | 0.008 | **0.864** | 0.000 |
| Majoritarian-relativist 3 | 0.006 | 0.154 | **0.678** | -0.059 |
| Eigenvalue | 1.78 | 1.70 | 1.65 | 1.20 |
| Cumulative explained variance | 0.15 | 0.29 | 0.43 | 0.53 |

*Notes:* Values are the loadings from amaximum-likelihood factor analysis. Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin criterion = 0.80.

# Annex A7: Exploratory factor analysis with liberal democracy items

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Factor1 | Factor2 | Factor3 | Factor4 | Factor5 | Factor6 |
| Populist 1 | 0.130 | 0.273 | 0.041 | **0.585** | -0.016 | -0.124 |
| Populist 2 | -0.127 | 0.160 | -0.004 | **0.813** | 0.063 | -0.023 |
| Populist 3 | 0.026 | 0.025 | -0.004 | **0.596** | -0.007 | 0.089 |
| Postdemocratic 1 | 0.012 | 0.003 | **0.771** | 0.020 | 0.015 | -0.017 |
| Postdemocratic 2 | -0.019 | -0.078 | **0.696** | 0.043 | -0.055 | 0.083 |
| Postdemocratic 3 | -0.003 | 0.023 | **0.807** | -0.031 | 0.026 | -0.001 |
| Technocratic 1 | -0.002 | 0.030 | 0.128 | -0.146 | 0.025 | **0.668** |
| Technocratic 2 | 0.339 | -0.098 | -0.070 | 0.140 | -0.071 | **0.482** |
| Technocratic 3 | -0.135 | 0.044 | -0.070 | 0.052 | 0.009 | **0.630** |
| Majoritarian-relativist 1 | 0.069 | **0.635** | 0.022 | 0.006 | -0.099 | 0.133 |
| Majoritarian-relativist 2 | -0.063 | **0.904** | -0.046 | -0.038 | -0.006 | 0.039 |
| Majoritarian-relativist 3 | 0.004 | **0.716** | 0.026 | 0.077 | 0.034 | -0.065 |
| Ongoing contestation 1 | 0.359 | 0.124 | 0.009 | 0.003 | **0.384** | -0.050 |
| Ongoing contestation 2 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.021 | 0.043 | **0.766** | -0.038 |
| Ongoing contestation 3 | 0.214 | -0.035 | -0.031 | 0.014 | **0.635** | 0.053 |
| Ongoing contestation 4 | 0.087 | -0.027 | 0.007 | 0.013 | **0.431** | 0.142 |
| Pluralism 1 | **0.782** | -0.015 | 0.010 | -0.073 | 0.033 | -0.023 |
| Pluralism 2 | **0.821** | -0.029 | 0.003 | -0.092 | -0.051 | 0.048 |
| Pluralism 3 | **0.876** | -0.019 | 0.000 | 0.024 | -0.145 | -0.043 |
| Pluralism 4 | **0.579** | 0.009 | -0.003 | -0.013 | 0.214 | -0.032 |
| Eigenvalue | 2.75 | 1.87 | 1.76 | 1.43 | 1.42 | 1.16 |
| Cumulative explained variance | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.32 | 0.39 | 0.46 | 0.52 |
| *Notes:* Values are the loadings from amaximum-likelihood factor analysis. Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin criterion = 0.89. | | | | | | |

# Annex A8: Confirmatory factor analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Factor1 | Factor2 | Factor3 | Factor4 | Factor5 | Factor6 |
| Populist 1 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Populist 2 | 1.12 (0.04) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Populist 3 | 0.83 (0.04) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Postdemocratic 1 |  | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| Postdemocratic 2 |  | 0.90 (0.05) |  |  |  |  |
| Postdemocratic 3 |  | 1.02 (0.05) |  |  |  |  |
| Technocratic 1 |  |  | 1.00 |  |  |  |
| Technocratic 2 |  |  | 1.23  (0.10) |  |  |  |
| Technocratic 3 |  |  | 0.85 (0.09) |  |  |  |
| Majoritarian-relativist 1 |  |  |  | 1.00 |  |  |
| Majoritarian-relativist 2 |  |  |  | 1.43 (0.07) |  |  |
| Majoritarian-relativist 3 |  |  |  | 1.26 (0.07) |  |  |
| Ongoing contestation 1 |  |  |  |  | 1.00 |  |
| Ongoing contestation 2 |  |  |  |  | 1.18 (0.06) |  |
| Ongoing contestation 3 |  |  |  |  | 1.24 (0.06) |  |
| Ongoing contestation 4 |  |  |  |  | 1.03 (0.06) |  |
| Pluralism 1 |  |  |  |  |  | 1.00 |
| Pluralism 2 |  |  |  |  |  | 0.97 (0.05) |
| Pluralism 3 |  |  |  |  |  | 0.98 (0.05) |
| Pluralism 4 |  |  |  |  |  | 1.03 (0.05) |

*Notes:* Standard errors in parenthesis, all loadings are statistically significant under p < 0.01. Chi² = 552.763 (p < 0.01), Chi²/df = 3.57; Comparative Fit Index = 0.945; Tucker-Lewis Index = 0.933; RMSEA = 0.054, SRMR = 0.050.

# Annex A9: OLS regressions – main models

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Populism* | | *Technocracy* | | *Post-democracy* | | *Majoritarian relativism* | | *Liberal democracy* | |
|  | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* |
| Constant | 2.93 \*\*\* | -0.24 | 3.30 \*\*\* | 0.23 | 3.95 \*\*\* | 1.04 \* | 1.79 \*\*\* | -1.66 \*\*\* | 3.62 \*\*\* | 0.63 |
| (0.40) | (0.34) | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.48) | (0.52) | (0.45) | (0.41) | (0.29) | (0.32) |
| Political disaffection | 0.42 \*\*\* | 0.28 \*\*\* | 0.15 \* | -0.06 | -0.28 \*\*\* | -0.59 \*\*\* | 0.40 \*\*\* | 0.26 \*\*\* | 0.27 \*\*\* | 0.10 \* |
| (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Institutional trust | 0.03 | -0.11 \*\* | 0.16 \*\*\* | 0.05 | 0.27 \*\*\* | 0.19 \*\*\* | 0.07 | -0.07 | 0.07 \* | -0.06 |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Satisfaction w. democracy | -0.02 | -0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 \* | 0.10 \* | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.00 | -0.01 |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Left-right position | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.05 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.05 | -0.02 | -0.03 |
| (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Left-right position squared | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.01 |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Pro-state vs. market liberal position | -0.01 | 0.03 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.08 \* | -0.05 | -0.06 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 \*\* |
| (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Anti- vs. pro-immigr. position | 0.06 \*\* | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.08 \*\*\* | 0.11 \*\*\* | 0.07 \* | 0.16 \*\*\* | 0.13 \*\*\* | -0.05 \*\* | -0.13 \*\*\* |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Pol. interest | 0.10 \*\* | 0.10 \*\* | 0.06 | 0.05 | -0.23 \*\*\* | -0.31 \*\*\* | -0.04 | -0.07 | 0.20 \*\*\* | 0.22 \*\*\* |
| (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age | 0.01 \*\* | 0.00 | 0.01 \*\*\* | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.01 \*\*\* | 0.02 \*\*\* | 0.01 \*\*\* | 0.00 \* | -0.00 |
| (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | 0.02 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.09 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.04 |
| (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| High formal education | -0.20 \* | -0.19 \*\* | 0.22 \*\* | 0.34 \*\*\* | -0.20 \* | -0.20 | -0.20 \* | -0.19 \* | 0.15 \* | 0.24 \*\*\* |
| (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| R² | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.13 | 0.17 |
| Adj. R² | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.12 | 0.16 |
| Num. obs. | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 |

*Notes:* Standard errors in parenthesis. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05.

# Annex A10: Alternative models with vote intention as a predictor

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Populism* | | *Technocracy* | | *Post-democracy* | | *Majoritarian relativism* | | *Liberal democracy* | |
|  | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* |
| Constant | 3.28 \*\*\* | 0.08 | 3.30 \*\*\* | 0.09 | 4.00 \*\*\* | 0.97 | 1.90 \*\*\* | -1.65 \*\*\* | 3.63 \*\*\* | 0.51 |
| (0.45) | (0.38) | (0.41) | (0.41) | (0.54) | (0.58) | (0.51) | (0.47) | (0.33) | (0.36) |
| Political disaffection | 0.39 \*\*\* | 0.26 \*\*\* | 0.12 \* | -0.07 | -0.24 \*\* | -0.53 \*\*\* | 0.38 \*\*\* | 0.24 \*\*\* | 0.26 \*\*\* | 0.09 |
| (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Institutional trust | 0.02 | -0.14 \*\*\* | 0.16 \*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.31 \*\*\* | 0.22 \*\*\* | 0.12 \* | -0.02 | 0.07 | -0.09 \* |
| (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Satisfaction w. democracy | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.06 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
| (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Left-right position | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.05 | 0.07 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.00 | 0.01 |
| (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Left-right position squared | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.02 | -0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01 |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Pro-state vs. market liberal position | -0.02 | 0.04 | -0.05 | 0.01 | -0.10 \*\* | -0.06 | -0.09 \*\* | -0.06 | 0.01 | 0.07 \*\* |
| (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Anti- vs. pro-immigr. position | 0.05 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.07 \*\* | 0.10 \*\* | 0.07 | 0.14 \*\*\* | 0.12 \*\*\* | -0.04 \* | -0.12 \*\*\* |
| (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Vote intention SPD | -0.10 | -0.11 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.10 |
| (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.10) | (0.11) |
| Vote intention Green Party | -0.18 | -0.25 \* | 0.22 | 0.24 | -0.05 | -0.09 | -0.05 | -0.09 | 0.16 | 0.18 |
| (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.11) | (0.12) |
| Vote intention FDP | -0.13 | -0.02 | -0.08 | 0.04 | -0.42 \* | -0.40 | 0.01 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.24 |
| (0.16) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.11) | (0.13) |
| Vote intention Left Party | -0.23 | -0.14 | 0.04 | 0.19 | -0.37 | -0.32 | -0.18 | -0.08 | 0.16 | 0.35 \* |
| (0.19) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.20) | (0.14) | (0.15) |
| Vote intention AfD | 0.22 | 0.09 | 0.13 | -0.02 | -0.31 | -0.58 \* | 0.61 \*\* | 0.57 \*\* | 0.11 | -0.05 |
| (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.21) | (0.19) | (0.13) | (0.15) |
| Vote intention Other | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.23 | 0.17 | -0.39 | -0.61 \* | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.17 | 0.10 |
| (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.21) | (0.14) | (0.16) |
| Vote intention would not vote | -0.27 | -0.23 | -0.15 | -0.08 | 0.08 | 0.21 | -0.06 | 0.04 | -0.03 | 0.07 |
| (0.19) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.22) | (0.24) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.14) | (0.15) |
| Pol. interest | 0.06 | 0.07 \* | 0.04 | 0.05 | -0.19 \*\*\* | -0.25 \*\*\* | -0.08 | -0.10 \* | 0.18 \*\*\* | 0.22 \*\*\* |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age | 0.01 \*\* | 0.00 | 0.01 \*\*\* | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.02 \*\*\* | 0.02 \*\*\* | 0.01 \*\*\* | 0.01 \*\* | -0.00 |
| (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | 0.01 | -0.06 | 0.02 | -0.06 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.04 | -0.04 | 0.11 | 0.06 |
| (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| High formal education | -0.19 \* | -0.18 \* | 0.19 \* | 0.30 \*\*\* | -0.21 \* | -0.20 | -0.18 | -0.16 | 0.14 \* | 0.24 \*\*\* |
| (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| R² | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.13 | 0.19 |
| Adj. R² | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.11 | 0.17 |
| Num. obs. | 769 | 769 | 769 | 769 | 769 | 769 | 769 | 769 | 769 | 769 |

*Notes:* The reference category for the vote intention variable is CDU/CSU. Standard errors in parenthesis. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05.

# Annex A11: Alternative models with only left-right position for ideology

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Populism* | | *Technocracy* | | *Post-democracy* | | *Majoritarian relativism* | | *Liberal democracy* | |
|  | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* | *absolute* | *relative* |
| Constant | 3.14 \*\*\* | -0.12 | 3.13 \*\*\* | -0.12 | 4.17 \*\*\* | 1.18 \* | 2.26 \*\*\* | -1.22 \*\* | 3.46 \*\*\* | 0.28 |
| (0.37) | (0.32) | (0.34) | (0.34) | (0.46) | (0.49) | (0.43) | (0.40) | (0.28) | (0.31) |
| Political disaffection | 0.45 \*\*\* | 0.28 \*\*\* | 0.15 \*\* | -0.09 | -0.22 \*\* | -0.56 \*\*\* | 0.48 \*\*\* | 0.32 \*\*\* | 0.26 \*\*\* | 0.04 |
| (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Institutional trust | 0.02 | -0.11 \*\* | 0.16 \*\*\* | 0.06 | 0.25 \*\*\* | 0.17 \*\* | 0.04 | -0.09 \* | 0.08 \*\* | -0.03 |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Satisfaction w. democracy | -0.04 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.09 \* | -0.06 | -0.07 \* | -0.00 | 0.01 |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Left-right position | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.09 \*\* | 0.11 \*\* | 0.10 \* | 0.14 \*\*\* | 0.13 \*\*\* | -0.06 \* | -0.12 \*\*\* |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Pol. interest | 0.11 \*\* | 0.11 \*\*\* | 0.06 | 0.05 | -0.23 \*\*\* | -0.31 \*\*\* | -0.03 | -0.07 | 0.20 \*\*\* | 0.23 \*\*\* |
| (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age | 0.01 \*\*\* | 0.00 | 0.01 \*\*\* | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.01 \*\*\* | 0.02 \*\*\* | 0.01 \*\*\* | 0.00 \* | -0.00 |
| (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | -0.00 | -0.06 | -0.02 | -0.08 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.09 | 0.06 |
| (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| High formal education | -0.22 \*\* | -0.19 \*\* | 0.22 \*\* | 0.37 \*\*\* | -0.26 \*\* | -0.24 \* | -0.28 \*\* | -0.25 \*\* | 0.17 \*\* | 0.30 \*\*\* |
| (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| R² | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.12 | 0.12 |
| Adj. R² | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.11 |
| Num. obs. | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 | 889 |

*Notes:* Standard errors in parenthesis. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05.

# Annex References

Bertsou, E. and Pastorella, G. (2017) ‘Technocratic attitudes: a citizens’ perspective of expert decision-making’, *West European Politics*, *40*(2), 430–58.

Kriesi, H., Saris, W. and Moncagatta, P. (2016) ‘The Structure of Europeans’ Views of Democracy’ [online], in M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi (eds.), *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 64–89. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766902.001.0001/acprof-9780198766902-chapter-4

Landwehr, C. and Steiner, N. D. (2017) ‘Where Democrats Disagree: Citizens’ Normative Conceptions of Democracy’, *Political Studies*, *65*(4), 786–804.

Neblo, M. A., Esterling, K. M., Kennedy, R. P., Lazer, D. M. J. and Sokhey, A. E. (2010) ‘Who Wants To Deliberate—And Why?’, *American Political Science Review*, *104*(3), 566–83.