

7 Online appendix

7.1 Used statistical software

I used the statistical software *R* for all analyses (R Core Team 2020) except for the alternative model that uses clustered standard errors, which was calculated with *Stata*. The multinomial logistic regression models were generated with the package *nnet* (Venables and Ripley 2002). The charts with the predicted probabilities from these models were created with the package *sjPlot* (Lüdtke 2018).

7.2 Descriptive statistics

Due to various data limitations and restrictions, the number of observations varies considerably between the different models presented in this paper. The following descriptive statistics describe the full sample including legislators from countries with just one type of rebel and legislators from national constituencies.

| Variable | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Vote: Yes | 13694 | 0.81 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Vote: Abstain | 13694 | 0.05 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Vote: No | 13694 | 0.14 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Loyal legislator | 13087 | 0.92 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Contra rebel | 13087 | 0.05 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Pro rebel | 13087 | 0.03 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Logged GDP ratio | 13694 | 0.34 | 1.11 | -2.78 | 2.83 |
| Agreement depth | 13694 | 6.17 | 1.36 | 1.00 | 7.00 |
| GNI per capita (GNIC) | 13626 | 1.00 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 2.10 |
| Mean years of school (MSCH) | 13626 | 0.99 | 0.09 | 0.62 | 1.55 |
| Subnational trade competitiveness | 10313 | 0.01 | 0.16 | -0.47 | 0.79 |
| Female | 13694 | 0.24 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Party left-right position | 13299 | 5.82 | 2.33 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| Years to election | 13694 | 1.75 | 1.28 | -0.42 | 7.42 |
| Majoritarian system | 13694 | 0.40 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Proportional system | 13694 | 0.60 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Closed-list PR | 13694 | 0.19 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Open-list PR | 13694 | 0.40 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Government | 13694 | 0.55 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Age | 12613 | 53.55 | 10.89 | 20.00 | 93.00 |
| Constitutency seats | 13694 | 12.46 | 23.32 | 1.00 | 150.00 |
| Upper chamber | 13694 | 0.14 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Lower chamber | 13694 | 0.46 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Unicameral | 13694 | 0.39 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Share of "Yes" votes | 13694 | 0.81 | 0.14 | 0.48 | 1.00 |
| Votes per legislator | 13694 | 4.65 | 3.27 | 1.00 | 14.00 |
| Beneficial factor endowment (GNIC) | 11205 | 0.50 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Beneficial factor endowment (MSCH) | 11072 | 0.52 | | 0.00 | 1.00 |

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of variables

Figure A1: Most trade agreements are ratified with overwhelming majorities




Figure A2: Mean value of variables by legislator type




Figure A3: Countries




Figure A4: Depth of trade agreements




Figure A5: GDP ratio




Figure A6: Mean years of school (relative to country mean)




Figure A7: GNI per capita (relative to country mean)





Figure A8: Subnational trade competitiveness (standardized within country)



7.3 Country overview

Due to various data limitations and restrictions, the number of observations varies considerably between the different models presented in this paper. Below, I outline coding decisions for the electoral systems, the subnational level for which the measures of constituency economic interests are available (Mean years of schooling and GNI per capita from the SHDI database; subnational trade competitiveness from the STC database) as well as the limitations that restrict the inclusion of this country in the various model specifications.

- Argentina (ARG): The lower chamber uses closed-list proportional representation. Electoral districts are the 24 provinces. STC data is available for all provinces; SHDI data is available for 11 province groups. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in Argentina, the country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.
- Switzerland (CHE): The chamber house uses open-list proportional representation except for 6 cantons that have just one representative and thus use majoritarian representation. The upper chamber uses majoritarian representation. Electoral districts of both chambers are the 26 cantons and half-cantons. STC data is available for all cantons; SHDI data is available for 7 regions.
- Chile (CHL): Both chambers use open-list proportional representation. Most of the 16 regions are one single electoral district but some regions are split in more than one electoral district. STC data and SHDI data is available for all regions.
- Colombia (COL): Both chambers use open-list proportional representation. The upper chamber is elected nationally; the electoral districts for the lower chamber are the 33 departments. STC data and SHDI data is available for all departments. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in the lower chamber and the upper chamber (which has “Pro Rebels”) is elected nationally, the country is not included in the main model.
- Czechia (CZE): The lower chamber uses open-list proportional representation; the electoral districts are the 14 regions. The upper chamber uses majoritarian representation. STC data is not available; SHDI data is available for 8 region groups.
- Ecuador (ECU): The unicameral parliament uses closed-list proportional representation. Electoral districts are the 24 provinces. STC data is available for all provinces; SHDI data is available for 3 regions. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in Ecuador, the country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.
- Estonia (EST): The unicameral parliament uses open-list proportional representation. Electoral districts are largely identical to the counties. STC and SHDI data is available for 5 areas. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in Ecuador, the country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.
- France (FRA): The lower chamber uses majoritarian representation. Electoral districts are nested in the departments. STC data is available for all departments; SHDI data is available for 20 regions.
- Guatemala (GTM): The unicameral parliament uses closed-list proportional representation. Electoral districts are the 23 departments; some legislators are elected in a national

constituency. STC data is available for all departments; SHDI data is available for 8 regions.

- Iceland (ISL): The unicameral parliament uses open-list proportional representation. STC data is not available; SHDI data is available only on the national level. Thus the country is only included in the model including national districts.
- Republic of Korea (KOR): The unicameral parliament uses majoritarian representation for most legislators and closed-list proportional representation for some nationally elected legislators. Electoral districts are nested in 17 provinces and metropolitan cities. STC data is available for all provinces; SHDI data is available for 7 regions.
- Latvia (LVA): The unicameral parliament uses open-list proportional representation. Electoral districts are largely identical to the regions. STC data and SHDI data is available for all regions. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in Latvia, the country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.
- Mexico (MEX): The upper chamber uses majoritarian representation for most legislators and closed-list proportional representation for some nationally elected legislators. Electoral districts are the 32 states. STC data and SHDI data is available for all states.
- New Zealand (NZL): The unicameral parliament uses majoritarian representation for most legislators and closed-list proportional representation for some nationally elected legislators. Electoral districts are mostly nested within the 15 regions. STC data is not available; SHDI data is available for all regions. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in New Zealand, the country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.
- Peru (PER): The unicameral parliament uses open-list proportional representation. Electoral districts are the 26 regions. STC data is available for all regions; SHDI data is available for 6 region groups. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in Peru, the country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.
- Portugal (PRT): The unicameral parliament uses closed-list proportional representation. Electoral districts are nested in 7 regions. STC data and SHDI data is available for all regions. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in Portugal, the country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.
- El Salvador (SLV): The unicameral parliament uses open-list proportional representation. Electoral districts are the 14 departments. STC data is available for all departments, SHDI data is available for 4 regions. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in El Salvador, the country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.
- Slovakia (SVK): The unicameral parliament uses open-list proportional representation. All legislators are elected nationally. Thus the country is only included in the model including national districts.
- Sweden (SWE): The unicameral parliament uses open-list proportional representation. The electoral district are mostly identical to the 21 counties. STC data is not available; SHDI data is available for 8 areas. Because there are no “Pro Rebels” in Sweden, the

country is only included in the model that includes even countries with just one type of rebel as well as in the vote choice model.

- United States of America (USA): Both chambers use majoritarian representation. Some states elect just one at-large legislator to the lower chamber; the electoral districts of states with more than one legislator are nested within their state. The legislators in the upper house are elected in the states. STC and SHDI data is available for all states.

Table A2 summarizes the number of observations by country, parliamentary chamber, and electoral system used in the baseline model (M1) of each set of models presented in this paper. Thus, column “Main model” reflects the observations used in the baseline model (M1) presented in Table 1. To illustrate this table, the votes from the Colombian Senate and Slovakia were only used in the robustness check that included nationally elected legislators because these chambers have no electoral districts at all and legislators cannot be attributed to a specific geographic constituency. The observations used in the alternative model specifications with clustered standard errors and no country fixed effects are the same as in the main model.

| Country | Chamber | Electoral system | Votes | Main model | All countries | Incl. national | Add. controls | No abst. | 10 seats | Majoritarian |
|---------|------------|------------------|-------|------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------|----------|--------------|
| ARG | Lower | PR: Closed-lists | 537 | | 454 | 454 | | | | |
| CHE | Lower | PR: Open-lists | 1263 | 1214 | 1214 | 1214 | 1214 | 1029 | 485 | |
| CHE | Lower | Majoritarian | 34 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| CHE | Upper | Majoritarian | 212 | 196 | 196 | 196 | 196 | 179 | 196 | 196 |
| CHL | Lower | PR: Open-lists | 1554 | 1485 | 1485 | 1485 | 1485 | 1417 | 1485 | |
| CHL | Upper | PR: Open-lists | 257 | 239 | 239 | 239 | 239 | 236 | 239 | |
| COL | Lower | PR: Open-lists | 564 | | 534 | 540 | | | | |
| COL | Upper | PR: Open-lists | 360 | | | 356 | | | | |
| CZE | Lower | PR: Open-lists | 132 | 122 | 122 | 122 | 122 | 116 | 22 | |
| CZE | Upper | Majoritarian | 71 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 38 | 61 | 61 |
| ECU | Unicameral | PR: Closed-lists | 488 | | 393 | 468 | | | | |
| EST | Unicameral | PR: Open-lists | 67 | | 66 | 66 | | | | |
| FRA | Lower | Majoritarian | 553 | 520 | 512 | 520 | 520 | 447 | 520 | 520 |
| GTM | Unicameral | PR: Closed-lists | 690 | 518 | 518 | 625 | 361 | 518 | 397 | |
| ISL | Unicameral | PR: Open-lists | 639 | | | 621 | | | | |
| KOR | Unicameral | PR: Closed-lists | 379 | | | 338 | | | | |
| KOR | Unicameral | Majoritarian | 1756 | 1474 | 1474 | 1474 | 1474 | 1422 | 1474 | 1474 |
| LVA | Unicameral | PR: Open-lists | 77 | | 76 | 76 | | | | |
| MEX | Upper | PR: Closed-lists | 153 | | | 147 | | | | |
| MEX | Upper | Majoritarian | 516 | 506 | 506 | 506 | 478 | 501 | 506 | 506 |
| NZL | Unicameral | PR: Closed-lists | 203 | | | 203 | | | | |
| NZL | Unicameral | Majoritarian | 280 | | 275 | 275 | | | | |
| PER | Unicameral | PR: Open-lists | 116 | | 113 | 113 | | | | |
| PRT | Unicameral | PR: Closed-lists | 206 | | 202 | 206 | | | | |
| SLV | Unicameral | PR: Open-lists | 83 | | 77 | 77 | | | | |
| SVK | Unicameral | PR: Open-lists | 124 | | | 100 | | | | |
| SWE | Unicameral | PR: Open-lists | 272 | | 268 | 268 | | | | |
| USA | Lower | Majoritarian | 1713 | 1712 | 1712 | 1712 | 1712 | 1712 | 1712 | 1712 |
| USA | Upper | Majoritarian | 395 | 395 | 395 | 395 | 395 | 395 | 395 | 395 |
| Overall | | | 13694 | 8470 | 10920 | 12885 | 8285 | 8038 | 7520 | 4892 |

Table A2: Countries, electoral systems, and observations by models

7.4 Summary of ratification votes

| Country | Chamber | Agreement | Year | Share yes | Pro rebels | Contra rebels | Share rebels |
|----------------|---------|-------------------------------|------|--------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Argentina | Lower | Argentina Chile | 2018 | 0.69 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Argentina | Lower | Egypt MERCOSUR | 2017 | 0.92 | 0 | 3 | 0.01 |
| Argentina | Lower | Israel MERCOSUR | 2011 | 0.90 | 0 | 2 | 0.01 |
| Chile | Upper | Brazil Chile | 2020 | 0.77 | 1 | 1 | 0.07 |
| Chile | Lower | Brazil Chile | 2020 | 0.63 | 3 | 3 | 0.04 |
| Chile | Upper | Argentina Chile | 2019 | 0.97 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Upper | Chile UK | 2019 | 0.97 | 1 | 0 | 0.03 |
| Chile | Lower | CPTPP | 2019 | 0.52 | 6 | 0 | 0.04 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile UK | 2019 | 0.75 | 1 | 9 | 0.09 |
| Chile | Upper | Chile China | 2018 | 0.96 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Lower | Argentina Chile | 2018 | 0.66 | 1 | 14 | 0.14 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile Uruguay | 2018 | 0.94 | 0 | 5 | 0.06 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile China | 2018 | 0.78 | 0 | 6 | 0.05 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile Indonesia | 2018 | 0.87 | 0 | 2 | 0.02 |
| Chile | Lower | Canada Chile | 2018 | 0.92 | 0 | 5 | 0.04 |
| Chile | Upper | Chile Thailand | 2015 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile Thailand | 2015 | 0.98 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Upper | Chile Hong Kong | 2014 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile Hong Kong | 2014 | 0.94 | 0 | 3 | 0.03 |
| Chile | Lower | Pacific Alliance | 2013 | 0.80 | 0 | 10 | 0.12 |
| Chile | Upper | Chile Vietnam | 2012 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile Vietnam | 2012 | 0.91 | 0 | 8 | 0.07 |
| Chile | Upper | Chile Malaysia | 2011 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile Malaysia | 2011 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Upper | Chile Turkey | 2010 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Chile | Lower | Chile Turkey | 2010 | 0.97 | 0 | 3 | 0.03 |
| Colombia | Lower | Colombia Israel | 2017 | 0.77 | 0 | 14 | 0.15 |
| Colombia | Upper | Colombia Israel | 2016 | 1.00 | 3 | 0 | 0.05 |
| Colombia | Lower | Colombia Costa Rica | 2015 | 0.89 | 0 | 5 | 0.05 |
| Colombia | Upper | Colombia Costa Rica | 2014 | 0.97 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Colombia | Upper | Colombia Korea | 2014 | 0.82 | 0 | 4 | 0.05 |
| Colombia | Lower | Colombia Korea | 2014 | 0.88 | 0 | 4 | 0.04 |
| Colombia | Upper | Pacific Alliance | 2013 | 0.87 | 1 | 0 | 0.02 |
| Colombia | Lower | Pacific Alliance | 2013 | 0.82 | 0 | 12 | 0.14 |
| Colombia | Lower | Colombia EC Peru | 2013 | 0.79 | 0 | 17 | 0.17 |
| Colombia | Upper | Colombia US | 2012 | 0.94 | 0 | 2 | 0.04 |
| Colombia | Upper | Colombia EC Peru | 2012 | 0.82 | 0 | 4 | 0.07 |
| Colombia | Lower | Colombia US | 2012 | 0.94 | 0 | 1 | 0.01 |
| Czech Republic | Upper | Canada EC (CETA) | 2017 | 0.62 | 0 | 24 | 0.34 |
| Czech Republic | Lower | Canada EC (CETA) | 2017 | 0.64 | 1 | 12 | 0.10 |
| Ecuador | Unicam. | Andean Countries UK | 2020 | 0.78 | 0 | 1 | 0.01 |
| Ecuador | Unicam. | Ecuador EFTA | 2020 | 0.99 | 0 | 1 | 0.01 |
| Ecuador | Unicam. | Ecuador El Salvador | 2017 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Ecuador | Unicam. | Colombia EC Peru Ecuador acc. | 2016 | 0.95 | 0 | 3 | 0.03 |
| El Salvador | Unicam. | Central America EC | 2013 | 0.99 | 0 | 1 | 0.01 |
| Estonia | Unicam. | Canada EC (CETA) | 2017 | 0.99 | 0 | 1 | 0.01 |
| France | Lower | Canada EC (CETA) | 2019 | 0.48 | 20 | 69 | 0.16 |
| Guatemala | Unicam. | Centr. Am. EFTA Guatemala | 2020 | 0.91 | 0 | 10 | 0.08 |
| Guatemala | Unicam. | Central America UK | 2019 | 0.84 | 0 | 11 | 0.11 |
| Guatemala | Unicam. | Guatemala Trinidad and Tobago | 2017 | 0.91 | 1 | 7 | 0.07 |
| Guatemala | Unicam. | Central America Mexico | 2013 | 0.92 | 0 | 1 | 0.01 |
| Guatemala | Unicam. | Central America EC | 2013 | 0.87 | 0 | 13 | 0.10 |
| Guatemala | Unicam. | Guatemala Peru | 2013 | 0.89 | 0 | 14 | 0.11 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | EFTA Indonesia | 2019 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | EFTA Philippines | 2019 | 0.79 | 1 | 5 | 0.10 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | Ecuador EFTA | 2019 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---------|-----------------------------|------|------|----|----|------|
| Iceland | Unicam. | EFTA Georgia | 2017 | 0.96 | 0 | 2 | 0.04 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | Centr. Am. EFTA Guatemala | 2016 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | Central America EFTA | 2014 | 0.98 | 0 | 1 | 0.02 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | EFTA Colombia | 2014 | 0.98 | 0 | 1 | 0.02 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | Bosnia and Herzegovina EFTA | 2014 | 0.98 | 0 | 1 | 0.02 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | China Iceland | 2014 | 0.92 | 1 | 2 | 0.05 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | Albania EFTA | 2011 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | EFTA Peru | 2011 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | EFTA Serbia | 2011 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Iceland | Unicam. | EFTA Ukraine | 2011 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Latvia | Unicam. | Canada EC (CETA) | 2017 | 0.92 | 0 | 2 | 0.03 |
| Mexico | Upper | USMCA | 2019 | 0.94 | 0 | 6 | 0.05 |
| Mexico | Upper | CPTPP | 2018 | 0.72 | 0 | 7 | 0.07 |
| Mexico | Upper | Mexico Panama | 2015 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Mexico | Upper | Pacific Alliance | 2012 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Mexico | Upper | Mexico Peru | 2011 | 0.54 | 1 | 0 | 0.01 |
| Mexico | Upper | Colombia Mexico Venezuela | 2011 | 0.76 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Mexico | Upper | Central America Mexico | 2011 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| New Zealand | Unicam. | CPTPP | 2018 | 0.93 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| New Zealand | Unicam. | Korea New Zealand | 2015 | 0.79 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| New Zealand | Unicam. | Hong Kong New Zealand | 2010 | 0.92 | 0 | 2 | 0.02 |
| New Zealand | Unicam. | Malaysia New Zealand | 2010 | 0.91 | 0 | 2 | 0.02 |
| Peru | Unicam. | Andean Countries UK | 2020 | 0.91 | 0 | 4 | 0.03 |
| Portugal | Unicam. | Canada EC (CETA) | 2017 | 0.82 | 0 | 1 | 0.00 |
| Slovakia | Unicam. | Canada EC (CETA) | 2019 | 0.73 | 2 | 4 | 0.05 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | China Korea | 2015 | 0.74 | 5 | 1 | 0.02 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | Korea New Zealand | 2015 | 0.89 | 0 | 30 | 0.11 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | Korea Vietnam | 2015 | 0.89 | 0 | 29 | 0.11 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | Colombia Korea | 2014 | 0.89 | 0 | 17 | 0.09 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | Canada Korea | 2014 | 0.76 | 5 | 0 | 0.02 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | Australia Korea | 2014 | 0.76 | 5 | 1 | 0.02 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | Korea Turkey | 2012 | 0.94 | 2 | 3 | 0.03 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | Korea Peru | 2011 | 0.79 | 0 | 33 | 0.19 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | Korea US | 2011 | 0.89 | 5 | 12 | 0.10 |
| South Korea | Unicam. | EC Korea | 2011 | 0.96 | 0 | 6 | 0.04 |
| Sweden | Unicam. | Canada EC (CETA) | 2018 | 0.91 | 0 | 5 | 0.02 |
| Switzerland | Upper | EFTA Turkey | 2019 | 0.86 | 12 | 4 | 0.36 |
| Switzerland | Upper | Ecuador EFTA | 2019 | 1.00 | 12 | 0 | 0.27 |
| Switzerland | Lower | EFTA Turkey | 2019 | 0.69 | 0 | 4 | 0.02 |
| Switzerland | Lower | Ecuador EFTA | 2019 | 0.75 | 0 | 4 | 0.02 |
| Switzerland | Upper | EFTA Georgia | 2017 | 1.00 | 12 | 0 | 0.27 |
| Switzerland | Lower | EFTA Georgia | 2017 | 0.80 | 5 | 2 | 0.04 |
| Switzerland | Upper | China Switzerland | 2014 | 0.64 | 9 | 4 | 0.33 |
| Switzerland | Upper | Central America EFTA | 2014 | 1.00 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Switzerland | Lower | Central America EFTA | 2014 | 0.83 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Switzerland | Lower | China Switzerland | 2013 | 0.66 | 14 | 8 | 0.12 |
| Switzerland | Lower | EFTA Hong Kong | 2012 | 0.70 | 3 | 0 | 0.02 |
| Switzerland | Lower | EFTA Peru | 2011 | 0.67 | 23 | 2 | 0.15 |
| United States | Upper | USMCA | 2020 | 0.90 | 0 | 10 | 0.10 |
| United States | Lower | USMCA | 2019 | 0.90 | 0 | 40 | 0.09 |
| United States | Upper | Colombia US | 2011 | 0.67 | 22 | 2 | 0.24 |
| United States | Upper | Panama US | 2011 | 0.78 | 31 | 0 | 0.31 |
| United States | Upper | Korea US | 2011 | 0.85 | 38 | 1 | 0.40 |
| United States | Lower | Colombia US | 2011 | 0.61 | 31 | 9 | 0.09 |
| United States | Lower | Korea US | 2011 | 0.65 | 59 | 21 | 0.19 |
| United States | Lower | Panama US | 2011 | 0.70 | 66 | 6 | 0.17 |

Table A3: Summary of ratification votes

7.5 Regression tables

Table A4: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, with clustered standard errors

| | Model 1a | | Model 2a | | Model 3a | | Model 4a | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.26*** (0.09) | -0.04 (0.06) | -0.27*** (0.09) | -0.05 (0.06) | -0.27*** (0.09) | -0.05 (0.06) | -0.33*** (0.09) | -0.06 (0.06) |
| Agreement depth | 0.19*** (0.06) | -0.10* (0.05) | 0.20*** (0.06) | -0.09* (0.05) | 0.19*** (0.06) | -0.09* (0.05) | 0.25*** (0.06) | -0.07 (0.05) |
| Mean school years | | | -2.12*** (0.54) | 4.45** (1.99) | | | | |
| GNI per capita | | | | | -0.62** (0.25) | 0.88 (0.48) | | |
| Subn. trade comp. | | | | | | | -1.70*** (0.56) | 0.16 (0.64) |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.38*** (0.13) | -0.13 (0.18) | 0.41*** (0.13) | -0.14 (0.18) | 0.41*** (0.13) | -0.17 (0.18) | 0.37*** (0.14) | -0.16 (0.18) |
| Party left-right | -0.14*** (0.02) | -0.86*** (0.07) | -0.15*** (0.02) | -0.88*** (0.08) | -0.14*** (0.02) | -0.89*** (0.08) | -0.15*** (0.03) | -0.91*** (0.08) |
| Years to election | -0.25*** (0.05) | 0.13** (0.07) | -0.25*** (0.05) | 0.12* (0.06) | -0.25*** (0.05) | 0.13** (0.07) | -0.23*** (0.06) | 0.13** (0.07) |
| Majoritarian | 2.09*** (0.29) | 2.55*** (0.33) | 2.10*** (0.29) | 2.60*** (0.33) | 2.08*** (0.29) | 2.61*** (0.33) | 2.01*** (0.29) | 2.60*** (0.33) |
| Government | -0.77*** (0.12) | 1.49*** (0.22) | -0.79*** (0.12) | 1.58*** (0.23) | -0.77*** (0.12) | 1.56*** (0.23) | -0.80*** (0.12) | 1.58*** (0.23) |
| (Intercept) | -3.90*** (0.49) | -0.89* (0.46) | -1.78*** (0.70) | -5.34*** (1.96) | -3.28*** (0.54) | -1.72** (0.63) | -4.16*** (0.53) | -0.97 (0.46) |
| AIC | 5104.91 | | 5037.66 | | 5050.53 | | 4665.95 | |
| BIC | 5316.24 | | 5263.01 | | 5275.88 | | 4875.27 | |
| Log Likelihood | -2522.46 | | -2486.83 | | -2493.26 | | -2302.97 | |
| Deviance | 10207.70 | | 9264.53 | | 9455.36 | | 10227.29 | |
| Num. obs. | 8470 | | 8453 | | 8453 | | 7922 | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. Country fixed effects omitted.

Table A5: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, without country fixed effects

| | Model 1b | | Model 2b | | Model 3b | | Model 4b | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.29*** (0.05) | 0.29*** (0.06) | -0.27*** (0.05) | 0.28*** (0.06) | -0.29*** (0.05) | 0.26*** (0.06) | -0.23*** (0.06) | 0.27*** (0.06) |
| Agreement depth | 0.29*** (0.06) | -0.07 (0.07) | 0.30*** (0.06) | -0.08 (0.07) | 0.29*** (0.06) | -0.08 (0.07) | 0.37*** (0.07) | -0.05 (0.07) |
| Mean school years | | | -2.72*** (0.56) | 1.93* (1.05) | | | | |
| GNI pc | | | | | -0.87*** (0.28) | 0.92*** (0.30) | | |
| Subn. trade comp. | | | | | | | -1.76*** (0.39) | 0.50 (0.55) |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.37*** (0.11) | -0.10 (0.13) | 0.42*** (0.11) | -0.13 (0.14) | 0.39*** (0.11) | -0.16 (0.14) | 0.39*** (0.12) | -0.14 (0.14) |
| Party left-right | -0.13*** (0.02) | -0.87*** (0.05) | -0.14*** (0.02) | -0.90*** (0.05) | -0.13*** (0.02) | -0.91*** (0.05) | -0.16*** (0.02) | -0.92*** (0.05) |
| Years to election | -0.10*** (0.04) | -0.06 (0.05) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.07 (0.05) | -0.11*** (0.04) | -0.07 (0.05) | -0.05 (0.04) | -0.07 (0.05) |
| Majoritarian | 0.58*** (0.13) | 1.79*** (0.18) | 0.70*** (0.13) | 1.79*** (0.18) | 0.57*** (0.13) | 1.83*** (0.18) | 0.75 (0.14) | 1.86*** (0.18) |
| Government | -0.75*** (0.11) | 1.95*** (0.16) | -0.74*** (0.11) | 2.06*** (0.17) | -0.75*** (0.11) | 2.05*** (0.17) | -0.68*** (0.11) | 2.04*** (0.17) |
| (Intercept) | -3.72*** (0.38) | -1.41*** (0.46) | -1.13* (0.64) | -3.28*** (1.17) | -2.83*** (0.48) | -2.20*** (0.55) | -4.43*** (0.45) | -1.42*** (0.48) |
| AIC | 5384.44 | | 5317.35 | 5325.86 | 4917.10 | | | |
| BIC | 5497.15 | | 5444.11 | 5452.62 | 5042.69 | | | |
| Log Likelihood | -2676.22 | | -2640.67 | -2644.93 | -2440.55 | | | |
| Deviance | 5352.44 | | 5281.35 | 5289.86 | 4881.10 | | | |
| Num. obs. | 8470 | | 8453 | 8453 | 7922 | | | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | 3 | 3 | | | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. No country fixed effects included.

Table A6: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, including countries with only one type of rebel

| | Model 1c | | Model 2c | | Model 3c | | Model 4c | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.17** (0.07) | -0.04 (0.08) | -0.17** (0.07) | -0.05 (0.08) | -0.17** (0.07) | -0.05 (0.08) | -0.24*** (0.08) | -0.06 (0.08) |
| Agreement depth | 0.13*** (0.05) | -0.10 (0.08) | 0.13*** (0.05) | -0.09 (0.08) | 0.13*** (0.05) | -0.10 (0.08) | 0.16*** (0.06) | -0.07 (0.08) |
| Mean school years | | | -1.77*** (0.45) | 4.46*** (1.70) | | | | |
| GNI per capita | | | | | -0.44** (0.20) | 0.89** (0.36) | | |
| Subn. trade comp. | | | | | | | -1.35*** (0.36) | 0.17 (0.57) |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.34*** (0.11) | -0.12 (0.14) | 0.37*** (0.11) | -0.14 (0.14) | 0.36*** (0.11) | -0.17 (0.14) | 0.34*** (0.12) | -0.16 (0.14) |
| Party left-right | -0.17*** (0.02) | -0.87*** (0.05) | -0.17*** (0.02) | -0.89*** (0.05) | -0.17*** (0.02) | -0.89*** (0.06) | -0.17*** (0.02) | -0.91*** (0.06) |
| Years to election | -0.30*** (0.05) | 0.13** (0.06) | -0.31*** (0.05) | 0.12** (0.06) | -0.31*** (0.05) | 0.13** (0.06) | -0.28*** (0.06) | 0.13** (0.06) |
| Majoritarian | 1.20*** (0.45) | 9.38*** (0.29) | 1.40*** (0.45) | 10.80*** (0.36) | 1.30*** (0.45) | 11.26*** (0.30) | 0.79* (0.43) | 9.79*** (0.22) |
| Open-list PR | -0.94** (0.44) | 6.81*** (0.31) | -0.75* (0.44) | 8.18*** (0.38) | -0.83* (0.44) | 8.63*** (0.32) | -1.29*** (0.42) | 7.18*** (0.23) |
| Government | -0.54*** (0.10) | 1.53*** (0.19) | -0.56*** (0.10) | 1.59*** (0.19) | -0.55*** (0.10) | 1.57*** (0.19) | -0.62*** (0.11) | 1.60*** (0.19) |
| (Intercept) | -3.53*** (0.53) | -19.39*** (0.47) | -1.76** (0.70) | -24.61*** (1.52) | -3.08*** (0.57) | -23.04*** (0.56) | -3.58*** (0.55) | -18.21*** (0.35) |
| AIC | 5748.34 | | 5697.46 | | 5710.89 | | 5148.09 | |
| BIC | 6113.25 | | 6076.91 | | 6090.34 | | 5463.98 | |
| Log Likelihood | -2824.17 | | -2796.73 | | -2803.45 | | -2530.05 | |
| Deviance | 5648.34 | | 5593.46 | | 5606.89 | | 5060.09 | |
| Num. obs. | 10920 | | 10905 | | 10905 | | 9695 | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. Country fixed effects omitted.

Table A7: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, including national districts

| | Model 1d | | Model 2d | | Model 3d | | Model 4d | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.14** (0.07) | -0.05 (0.08) | -0.14** (0.07) | -0.06 (0.08) | -0.14** (0.07) | -0.06 (0.08) | -0.24*** (0.08) | -0.06 (0.08) |
| Agreement depth | 0.16*** (0.05) | -0.12 (0.07) | 0.16*** (0.05) | -0.11 (0.07) | 0.16*** (0.05) | -0.12 (0.07) | 0.16*** (0.06) | -0.07 (0.08) |
| Mean school years | | | -2.05*** (0.47) | 3.81** (1.49) | | | | |
| GNI per capita | | | | | -0.47** (0.21) | 0.88** (0.35) | | |
| Subn. trade comp. | | | | | | | -1.35*** (0.36) | 0.17 (0.57) |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.29*** (0.10) | -0.14 (0.13) | 0.32*** (0.10) | -0.16 (0.14) | 0.31*** (0.10) | -0.18 (0.14) | 0.34*** (0.12) | -0.16 (0.14) |
| Party left-right | -0.20*** (0.02) | -0.80*** (0.05) | -0.20*** (0.02) | -0.83*** (0.05) | -0.20*** (0.02) | -0.83*** (0.05) | -0.17*** (0.02) | -0.91*** (0.06) |
| Years to election | -0.22*** (0.05) | 0.11** (0.06) | -0.22*** (0.05) | 0.11* (0.06) | -0.22*** (0.05) | 0.11** (0.06) | -0.28*** (0.06) | 0.13** (0.06) |
| Majoritarian | 0.60*** (0.20) | 2.26*** (0.26) | 0.62*** (0.20) | 2.29*** (0.27) | 0.60*** (0.20) | 2.31*** (0.27) | 2.07*** (0.29) | 2.61*** (0.28) |
| Government | -0.50*** (0.10) | 1.29*** (0.17) | -0.53*** (0.10) | 1.36*** (0.18) | -0.51*** (0.10) | 1.34*** (0.18) | -0.62*** (0.11) | 1.60*** (0.19) |
| (Intercept) | -3.62*** (0.52) | -14.34*** (0.50) | -1.57** (0.70) | -18.89*** (1.51) | -3.15*** (0.56) | -14.94*** (0.60) | -3.58*** (0.55) | -17.04*** (0.52) |
| AIC | 6489.54 | | 6419.90 | | 6436.03 | | 5148.09 | |
| BIC | 6892.59 | | 6837.61 | | 6853.74 | | 5463.98 | |
| Log Likelihood | -3190.77 | | -3153.95 | | -3162.02 | | -2530.05 | |
| Deviance | 6381.54 | | 6307.90 | | 6324.03 | | 5060.09 | |
| Num. obs. | 12885 | | 12824 | | 12824 | | 9695 | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. Country fixed effects omitted.

Table A8: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, with additional control variables

| | Model 1e | | Model 2e | | Model 3e | | Model 4e | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.28*** (0.08) | 0.11 (0.09) | -0.29*** (0.08) | 0.10 (0.09) | -0.29*** (0.08) | 0.10 (0.09) | -0.34*** (0.09) | 0.10 (0.09) |
| Agreement depth | 0.18*** (0.06) | -0.07 (0.08) | 0.19*** (0.06) | -0.07 (0.08) | 0.19*** (0.06) | -0.07 (0.08) | 0.26*** (0.07) | -0.05 (0.08) |
| Mean school years | | | -2.26*** (0.56) | 3.68** (1.68) | | | | |
| GNI per capita | | | | | -0.62** (0.24) | 1.00*** (0.37) | | |
| Subn. trade comp. | | | | | | | -1.74*** (0.41) | -0.17 (0.58) |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.40*** (0.12) | -0.09 (0.14) | 0.43*** (0.12) | -0.11 (0.14) | 0.42*** (0.12) | -0.14 (0.14) | 0.38*** (0.13) | -0.12 (0.14) |
| Party left-right | -0.14*** (0.02) | -0.80*** (0.05) | -0.15*** (0.02) | -0.83*** (0.05) | -0.14*** (0.02) | -0.84*** (0.05) | -0.15*** (0.03) | -0.86*** (0.05) |
| Years to election | -0.25*** (0.06) | -0.09 (0.07) | -0.26*** (0.06) | -0.09 (0.07) | -0.25*** (0.06) | -0.09 (0.07) | -0.23*** (0.06) | -0.09 (0.07) |
| Majoritarian | 2.14*** (0.37) | 1.54*** (0.35) | 2.15*** (0.37) | 1.59*** (0.35) | 2.14*** (0.37) | 1.55*** (0.35) | 1.99*** (0.37) | 1.54*** (0.36) |
| Government | -0.77*** (0.12) | 0.95*** (0.20) | -0.79*** (0.12) | 1.03*** (0.21) | -0.77*** (0.12) | 1.00*** (0.21) | -0.80*** (0.12) | 1.03*** (0.22) |
| Age in years | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Unicameral | 0.37** (0.18) | -0.20 (0.38) | 0.34* (0.19) | -0.60 (0.48) | 0.38** (0.18) | -0.27 (0.39) | -0.33* (0.18) | -0.28 (0.21) |
| Share of yes votes | 0.50 (0.53) | -5.08*** (0.79) | 0.48 (0.53) | -4.96*** (0.80) | 0.50 (0.53) | -5.00*** (0.80) | 0.64 (0.54) | -4.96*** (0.80) |
| (Intercept) | -4.25*** (0.70) | 2.86*** (0.87) | -1.87** (0.91) | -1.02 (1.96) | -3.61*** (0.74) | 1.80* (0.96) | -4.94*** (0.74) | 2.69*** (0.89) |
| AIC | 4930.80 | | 4868.29 | | 4877.56 | | 4592.20 | |
| BIC | 5183.60 | | 5135.05 | | 5144.32 | | 4843.26 | |
| Log Likelihood | -2429.40 | | -2396.14 | | -2400.78 | | -2260.10 | |
| Deviance | 4858.80 | | 4792.29 | | 4801.56 | | 4520.20 | |
| Num. obs. | 8285 | | 8268 | | 8268 | | 7894 | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. Country fixed effects omitted.

Table A9: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, with partner variables

| | Model 2f | | Model 3f | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.26*** (0.08) | -0.04 (0.08) | -0.26*** (0.08) | -0.04 (0.08) |
| Agreement depth | 0.20*** (0.06) | -0.06 (0.08) | 0.20*** (0.06) | -0.06 (0.08) |
| Mean school years (MSCH) | -2.14*** (0.53) | 3.73** (1.85) | | |
| GNI per capita (GNIC) | | | -0.67*** (0.23) | -0.13 (0.47) |
| Control variables | | | | |
| Beneficial factor endowment (MSCH) | 0.05 (0.11) | 0.05 (0.14) | | |
| Beneficial factor endowment (GNIC) | | | -0.04 (0.11) | 0.62*** (0.16) |
| Female | 0.42*** (0.12) | -0.13 (0.14) | 0.41*** (0.12) | -0.19 (0.14) |
| Party left-right | -0.14*** (0.02) | -0.90*** (0.06) | -0.14*** (0.02) | -0.90*** (0.06) |
| Years to election | -0.24*** (0.05) | 0.20*** (0.06) | -0.24*** (0.05) | 0.21*** (0.06) |
| Majoritarian | 2.03*** (0.29) | 2.41*** (0.28) | 2.01*** (0.29) | 2.49*** (0.29) |
| Government | -0.80*** (0.12) | 1.76*** (0.20) | -0.78*** (0.12) | 1.75*** (0.20) |
| (Intercept) | -1.74** (0.69) | -4.87** (1.91) | -3.18*** (0.51) | -1.15 (0.71) |
| AIC | 4959.98 | | 4956.93 | |
| BIC | 5198.14 | | 5195.09 | |
| Log Likelihood | -2445.99 | | -2444.46 | |
| Deviance | 4891.98 | | 4888.93 | |
| Num. obs. | 8141 | | 8141 | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. Country fixed effects omitted.

Table A10: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, excluding legislators who abstained from voting

| | Model 1g | | Model 2g | | Model 3g | | Model 4g | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.20* (0.11) | 0.06 (0.10) | -0.21* (0.11) | 0.06 (0.10) | -0.21* (0.11) | 0.06 (0.10) | -0.29** (0.13) | 0.06 (0.10) |
| Agreement depth | 0.19** (0.08) | -0.04 (0.10) | 0.20** (0.08) | -0.03 (0.10) | 0.19** (0.08) | -0.03 (0.10) | 0.30*** (0.11) | 0.01 (0.10) |
| Mean school years | | | -2.43*** (0.61) | 4.52** (2.02) | | | | |
| GNI per capita | | | | | -0.83*** (0.32) | 1.10** (0.43) | | |
| Subn. trade comp. | | | | | | | -2.93*** (0.64) | -0.15 (0.75) |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.11 (0.17) | -0.25 (0.16) | 0.12 (0.17) | -0.23 (0.16) | 0.12 (0.17) | -0.27* (0.16) | 0.01 (0.20) | -0.26 (0.16) |
| Party left-right | -0.13*** (0.03) | -1.27*** (0.10) | -0.14*** (0.03) | -1.31*** (0.11) | -0.14*** (0.03) | -1.34*** (0.11) | -0.15*** (0.04) | -1.45*** (0.13) |
| Years to election | -0.28*** (0.07) | 0.26*** (0.06) | -0.29*** (0.07) | 0.26*** (0.07) | -0.29*** (0.07) | 0.27*** (0.07) | -0.23** (0.09) | 0.28*** (0.07) |
| Majoritarian | 0.16 (1.08) | 3.02*** (0.41) | 0.16 (1.08) | 3.09*** (0.42) | 0.11 (1.08) | 3.13*** (0.42) | 0.11 (1.08) | 3.15*** (0.43) |
| Government | -1.45*** (0.18) | 2.24*** (0.27) | -1.48*** (0.18) | 2.30*** (0.28) | -1.44*** (0.18) | 2.29*** (0.27) | -1.73*** (0.21) | 2.31*** (0.28) |
| (Intercept) | -4.96*** (0.80) | -1.40** (0.68) | -2.51** (1.00) | -5.90*** (2.19) | -4.08*** (0.87) | -2.37*** (0.83) | -5.39*** (0.95) | -1.28* (0.73) |
| AIC | 3344.00 | | 3299.46 | | 3310.64 | | 2900.62 | |
| BIC | 3553.76 | | 3523.14 | | 3534.32 | | 3108.27 | |
| Log Likelihood | -1642.00 | | -1617.73 | | -1623.32 | | -1420.31 | |
| Deviance | 3284.00 | | 3235.46 | | 3246.64 | | 2840.62 | |
| Num. obs. | 8038 | | 8023 | | 8023 | | 7492 | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. Country fixed effects omitted.

Table A11: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, limited to constituencies with at most 10 seats

| | Model 1h | | Model 2h | | Model 3h | | Model 4h | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.22** (0.09) | -0.07 (0.09) | -0.22** (0.09) | -0.08 (0.09) | -0.22** (0.09) | -0.09 (0.09) | -0.28*** (0.09) | -0.09 (0.09) |
| Agreement depth | 0.21*** (0.06) | -0.10 (0.09) | 0.22*** (0.06) | -0.10 (0.09) | 0.21*** (0.06) | -0.10 (0.09) | 0.27*** (0.07) | -0.10 (0.09) |
| Mean school years | | | -1.82*** (0.68) | 4.09** (1.83) | | | | |
| GNI per capita | | | | | -0.18 (0.27) | 0.84** (0.37) | | |
| Subn. trade comp. | | | | | | | -1.66*** (0.41) | 0.49 (0.65) |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.39*** (0.12) | -0.07 (0.15) | 0.42*** (0.12) | -0.09 (0.15) | 0.40*** (0.12) | -0.11 (0.15) | 0.38*** (0.13) | -0.10 (0.15) |
| Party left-right | -0.14*** (0.03) | -0.89*** (0.06) | -0.15*** (0.03) | -0.93*** (0.06) | -0.14*** (0.03) | -0.93*** (0.06) | -0.15*** (0.03) | -0.94*** (0.06) |
| Years to election | -0.28*** (0.06) | 0.17*** (0.06) | -0.28*** (0.06) | 0.16** (0.06) | -0.28*** (0.06) | 0.17*** (0.06) | -0.27*** (0.06) | 0.16*** (0.06) |
| Majoritarian | 1.83*** (0.41) | 2.92*** (0.36) | 1.84*** (0.41) | 2.95*** (0.37) | 1.84*** (0.41) | 2.96*** (0.37) | 1.81*** (0.42) | 2.95*** (0.37) |
| Government | -0.83*** (0.12) | 1.89*** (0.22) | -0.85*** (0.12) | 2.02*** (0.23) | -0.84*** (0.12) | 2.00*** (0.23) | -0.86*** (0.13) | 1.99*** (0.22) |
| (Intercept) | -3.99*** (0.55) | -1.53** (0.64) | -2.21** (0.86) | -5.60*** (1.94) | -3.84*** (0.60) | -2.31*** (0.74) | -4.38*** (0.60) | -1.50** (0.65) |
| AIC | 4628.70 | | 4574.23 | | 4581.32 | | 4256.23 | |
| BIC | 4836.46 | | 4795.77 | | 4802.86 | | 4462.23 | |
| Log Likelihood | -2284.35 | | -2255.12 | | -2258.66 | | -2098.11 | |
| Deviance | 4568.70 | | 4510.23 | | 4517.32 | | 4196.23 | |
| Num. obs. | 7520 | | 7503 | | 7503 | | 7093 | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. Country fixed effects omitted.

Table A12: Rebel behavior on trade ratification, limited to majoritarian electoral systems

| | Model 1i | | Model 2i | | Model 3i | | Model 4i | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro | Contra | Pro |
| Explanatory variables | | | | | | | | |
| Logged GDP ratio | -0.31*** (0.11) | -0.10 (0.10) | -0.31*** (0.11) | -0.12 (0.10) | -0.31*** (0.11) | -0.12 (0.10) | -0.42*** (0.11) | -0.12 (0.10) |
| Agreement depth | 0.53*** (0.15) | -0.30*** (0.11) | 0.52*** (0.15) | -0.31*** (0.11) | 0.53*** (0.15) | -0.31*** (0.11) | 0.50*** (0.15) | -0.32*** (0.11) |
| Mean school years | | | -3.33*** (0.99) | 6.57*** (2.29) | | | | |
| GNI per capita | | | | | -0.15 (0.30) | 0.92** (0.38) | | |
| Subn. trade comp. | | | | | | | -4.02*** (0.59) | 0.80 (0.86) |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.37** (0.15) | -0.08 (0.16) | 0.42*** (0.15) | -0.09 (0.16) | 0.38** (0.15) | -0.13 (0.16) | 0.44*** (0.15) | -0.12 (0.16) |
| Party left-right | -0.16*** (0.03) | -0.92*** (0.06) | -0.17*** (0.03) | -0.97*** (0.07) | -0.16*** (0.03) | -0.98*** (0.07) | -0.15*** (0.03) | -0.97*** (0.07) |
| Years to election | -0.27*** (0.08) | 0.22*** (0.07) | -0.26*** (0.08) | 0.21*** (0.07) | -0.27*** (0.08) | 0.23*** (0.07) | -0.26*** (0.08) | 0.22*** (0.07) |
| Government | -0.91*** (0.14) | 2.34*** (0.27) | -0.94*** (0.14) | 2.55*** (0.30) | -0.92*** (0.14) | 2.53*** (0.30) | -0.85*** (0.14) | 2.54*** (0.30) |
| (Intercept) | -4.25*** (1.07) | 2.21*** (0.77) | -0.85 (1.47) | -4.28* (2.41) | -4.10*** (1.11) | 1.40 (0.87) | -4.43*** (1.08) | 2.30*** (0.80) |
| AIC | 3435.94 | | 3371.68 | | 3386.14 | | 3327.92 | |
| BIC | 3591.83 | | 3540.47 | | 3554.93 | | 3496.64 | |
| Log Likelihood | -1693.97 | | -1659.84 | | -1667.07 | | -1637.96 | |
| Deviance | 3387.94 | | 3319.68 | | 3334.14 | | 3275.92 | |
| Num. obs. | 4892 | | 4875 | | 4875 | | 4862 | |
| K | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression model. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is likelihood of rebellion either in favor or against the agreement compared to the baseline of loyal legislators. Country fixed effects omitted.

7.6 Jackknifing

The following two charts show the coefficients of the explanatory variables from two series of regression analyses based on the main model specification but with one agreement or country dropped from the sample. This process is also known as Jackknifing. The legend indicates which agreement or country is dropped. The coefficient of the main model from Table 1 is provided as reference.

Figure A9: Jackknifing of the 15 agreements with the largest share of rebels





Figure A10: Jackknifing of countries



7.7 Interaction effects

The following charts summarize the interaction effects between the five control variables of the main model (Gender, party position, electoral cycle, electoral system, and government status) with the five explanatory variables (Agreement depth, gdp ratio, mean years of schooling, GNI per capita, and subnational trade competitiveness). These interaction effects are calculated separately (i.e. gender x depth in one model, party position x depth in the next). This results in a total of 25 regression models. Each set of charts shows the interaction effects with one of the explanatory variables. Each column represents one control variable. The upper row shows the predicted probability of a contra rebellion; the lower row shows the predicted probability of a pro rebellion. For example, the panel in the first chart, first column, upper row shows the interaction effect of gender on agreement depth for contra rebellions. The predicted probabilities are estimated for two levels of depth. The first set of estimates show the predicted probabilities from the main model in Table 1 as comparison. The two other sets of estimates show the predicted probabilities for both levels of depth for men and women respectively. We can see here that whilst the predicted probability of a contra rebellion is significantly different for both genders when we vary the depth of the agreement, the effect of agreement depth is larger for women than for men. This indicates an interaction effect between gender and agreement depth.

Figure A11: Interactions with depth of trade agreements




Figure A12: Interactions with GDP ratio




Figure A13: Interactions with mean years of school




Figure A14: Interactions with GNI per capita




Figure A15: Interactions with subnational trade competitiveness

