# **Appendix A – Supplementary information on the data collection and measurement for control variables included in the regression models**

In this section, we report information on the measurement strategy and data sources for the control variables included in our regression models. To recall, they include classic second-order elections elements (such as the national electoral cycle, the horizontal simultaneity, and municipal powers) alongside the type of electoral system, political culture, and a time variable capturing the passage of time within our period of observation (January 1991- December 2019).

As standard practice in the second-order elections literature, for each observation in our dataset, the national cycle is measured as the fraction of an entire cycle elapsed at the moment of that particular municipal election (Jeffery and Hough 2003; Schakel and Dandoy 2014), and it is included in the regression models with both the linear and a quadratic term to account for the expected parabolic effect (Marsh 1998; Hix and Marsh 2007).[[1]](#footnote-1)

The horizontal simultaneity captures the placement of each municipal election relatively to the rest of the municipal elections within a given country. Holding subnational elections simultaneously may provide them with a nationwide resonance, thus increasing participation (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 249). It is measured as the fraction of the overall national municipalities voting in a given municipal electoral wave along with the particular observation in our dataset.

Municipal powers are operationalized through the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) scores (Ladner et al. 2019)[[2]](#footnote-2). This is a quantitative measure especially designed to comparatively assess municipal autonomy across countries, combining multiple indicators capturing various aspects of decentralization.

For the features of the electoral system applied in the municipal elections, we include two dummy indicators. One measures its general nature, with proportional representation (PR) coded as 1, and everything else coded with a 0. The second dichotomous electoral-system predictor looks at whether the mayor is directly elected, and it is coded with a 1 if she is and with 0 if she is not.

To control for national political culture in our municipalities, we have constructed a national-level indicator aimed at measuring the extent of subject political culture (Verba and Almond 1963) within each polity. This was calculated by measuring the portion of national respondents showing both acceptance for the political system and lack of confidence in their personal ability to affect it in the ESS (Wave 9 – Wave 2 for Luxembourg and Wave 6 for Albania, which are missing in Wave 9). Alternatively, as a measurement robustness test, we have replaced the subject-political-culture variable with an indicator measuring the portion of national respondents adhering to the “conformity” value of the Schwartz (1994) conceptualization. As a further robustness test, we have also used a behavioural indicator for this dimension – namely, the average turnout at national legislative elections for each country in the (1991-2019) period of observation. Regardless of which of these three measures is employed, the pattern does not change. No measure yields a significant effect, nor its inclusion affects the significant effects emerging for the other predictors (Appendix B: Table B13, Appendix B: Table B14).

# **References in the Appendix A**

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# **Appendix B – Additional tables and figures**

Figure B1 – Expected effects of cross-unit population polarization on municipal turnout after amalgamation, in the case of amalgamation between two units.



Table B1 – Post-amalgamation municipal elections included in the dataset.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Albania | Austria | Denmark | Finland | Germany | Iceland | Italy | Luxembourg | Netherlands | Norway |
| 1991 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 8-sep |
| 1992 |  |  |  | 18-oct |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3-feb |  |
| 1995 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 10-sep |
| 1996 |  |  |  | 20-oct |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1998 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4-mar |  |
| 1999 |  |  |  |  | 13-jun |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2000 |  |  |  | 22-oct |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6-mar |  |
| 2003 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 15-sep |
| 2004 |  |  |  | 24-oct | 13,27-jun21-dec |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2005 |  |  | 15-nov |  | 18-sep |  |  | 9-oct |  |  |
| 2006 |  |  |  |  |  | 27-may |  |  | 7-mar |  |
| 2007 |  |  |  |  | 22-apr |  |  |  |  | 10-sep |
| 2008 |  |  |  | 26-oct | 28-sep |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2009 |  |  |  |  | 7-jun |  |  |  | 22-nov |  |
| 2010 |  |  |  |  |  | 29-may |  |  | 3-mar24-nov |  |
| 2011 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 15-may | 9-oct | 23-nov | 12-sep |
| 2012 |  |  |  | 28-oct |  |  |  |  | 21-nov |  |
| 2013 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 13-nov |  |
| 2014 |  |  |  |  | 25-may | 31-may | 25-may |  | 19-mar19-nov |  |
| 2015 | 21-jun | 22-mar |  |  |  |  | 10,31-may |  | 18-nov | 14-sep |
| 2016 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 8-may5-jun6-nov |  | 23-nov |  |
| 2017 |  |  |  | 9-apr |  |  | 11-jun | 8-oct | 22-nov |  |
| 2018 |  |  |  |  |  | 26-may | 29-apr27-may10-jun29-jul |  | 21-sep |  |
| 2019 |  |  |  |  | 26-may |  | 26-may |  |  | 9-sep |

Table B2 – Descriptive evidence on our dependent variable and the predictors.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Turnout variation | 1,174 | -3.0 | 8.6 | -29.6 | 30.3 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Post-amalgamation municipal size | 1,174 | 18,156 | 33,438 | 165 | 608,886 |
| Time (days since January 1, 1991) | 1,174 | 7,537.136 | 2,422.257 | 252 | 10,478 |
| National electoral cycle | 1,174 | -0.1 | 0.3 | -0.8 | 1.0 |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 1,174 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Municipal powers  | 1,174 | 25.2 | 2.9 | 18.2 | 29.7 |
| Proportional electoral system | 1,174 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Direct major election | 1,174 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Subject political culture | 1,174 | 38.7 | 12.0 | 19.8 | 65.5 |
| Forced amalgamation | 1,174 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Amalgamation wave overall scope | 1,174 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Number of constituent units | 1,174 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 30.0 |
| Amalgamation type | 1,174 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 3.0 |

 Figure B2 – Marginal plot for the effect of the national electoral cycle on voter turnout in municipal elections, from Model 1 in Table 2.



Figure B3 – Marginal plot for the effect of the national electoral cycle on voter turnout in municipal elections, from Model 2 in Table 2.



Figure B4 – Marginal plot for the effect of the national electoral cycle on voter turnout in municipal elections, from Model 3 in Table 2



Table B3 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2) excluding Albania.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.002\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.127\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.963\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.810\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -6.058\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.361\*\* | (0.001) | -4.529\*\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.558\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.444\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.510\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.657\*\* | (0.003) | 0.633\*\* | (0.005) | 0.580\* | (0.010) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -2.354 | (0.544) | -2.670 | (0.510) | -2.182 | (0.587) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 4.242 | (0.454) | 3.797 | (0.630) | 3.935 | (0.610) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.083 | (0.708) | -0.105 | (0.714) | -0.116 | (0.681) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.480\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.476\*\*\* | (0.000) | -8.071\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.517\*\*\* | (0.000) | 11.820\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.951\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.084) | -0.000 | (0.510) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.615 | (0.204) | 1.240\* | (0.036) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.658\*\* | (0.004) | 2.041\*\* | (0.004) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.190\*\* | (0.009) | 0.211\* | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -52.654\*\*\* | (0.000) | -37.449\*\* | (0.002) | -37.690\*\* | (0.002) | -4.824\* | (0.025) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.457\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.808\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.786\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.770\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.758\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.713\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.705\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.911\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1114 | 1114 | 1114 | 1114 |
| *AIC* | 7133.029 | 7043.638 | 7034.798 | 7472.7357517.876-3727.367 |
| *BIC* | 7188.202 | 7108.842 | 7120.065 |
| *Log likelihood* | -3555.515 | -3508.819 | -3500.399 |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table B4 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2) with robust standard errors.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.002\* | (0.019) | 0.001 | (0.111) | 0.001 | (0.105) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.122 | (0.116) | 6.944\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.819\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -6.060 | (0.184) | -4.347\* | (0.033) | -4.487\* | (0.016) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.552\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.428 | (0.063) | 4.506 | (0.061) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.659 | (0.051) | 0.668\*\* | (0.007) | 0.615\* | (0.013) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -2.393 | (0.098) | -3.586\*\* | (0.005) | -3.125\* | (0.015) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 4.202 | (0.215) | 3.190 | (0.443) | 3.332 | (0.408) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.085 | (0.664) | -0.161 | (0.504) | -0.166 | (0.484) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process  |  |  | -4.541\* | (0.011) | -4.525\* | (0.012) | -8.087\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.373\*\*\* | (0.000) | 11.800\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.861\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.215) | -0.000 | (0.200) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.683 | (0.280) | 1.250\* | (0.039) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.727\*\*\* | (0.000) | 2.038\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.171\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.185\*\* | (0.002) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -52.580\*\* | (0.010) | -35.750 | (0.057) | -36.172 | (0.054) | -5.551\*\* | (0.003) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.404\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.776\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.758\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.798\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.754\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.711\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.705\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.901\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1174 | 1174 | 1174 | 1114 |
| *AIC* | 7504.376 | 7411.671 | 7396.888 | 7855.4117901.024-3918.705 |
| *BIC* | 7549.989 | 7457.285 | 7442.501 |
| *Log likelihood* | -3743.188 | -3696.836 | -3689.444 |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table B5 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2) with clustered by country standard errors.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.002\* | (0.019) | 0.001 | (0.111) | 0.001 | (0.105) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.122 | (0.116) | 6.944\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.819\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -6.060 | (0.184) | -4.347\* | (0.033) | -4.487\* | (0.016) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.552\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.428 | (0.063) | 4.506 | (0.061) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.659 | (0.051) | 0.668\*\* | (0.007) | 0.615\* | (0.013) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -2.393 | (0.098) | -3.586\*\* | (0.005) | -3.125\* | (0.015) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 4.202 | (0.215) | 3.190 | (0.443) | 3.332 | (0.408) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.085 | (0.664) | -0.161 | (0.504) | -0.166 | (0.484) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.541\* | (0.011) | -4.525\* | (0.012) | -8.087\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.373\*\*\* | (0.000) | 11.800\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.861\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.215) | -0.000 | (0.200) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.683 | (0.280) | 1.250\* | (0.039) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.727\*\*\* | (0.000) | 2.038\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.171\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.185\*\* | (0.002) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -52.580\*\* | (0.010) | -35.750 | (0.057) | -36.172 | (0.054) | -5.551\*\* | (0.003) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.404\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.776\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.758\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.798\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.754\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.711\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.705\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.901\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1174 | 1174 | 1174 | 11747855.4117901.024-3918.705 |
| *AIC* | 7504.376 | 7411.671 | 7396.888 |
| *BIC* | 7549.989 | 7457.285 | 7442.501 |
| *Log likelihood* | -3743.188 | -3696.836 | -3689.444 |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table B6 – Replication of the multi-level models from Table 2 with country fixed effects in place of random intercepts.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.002\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.217\*\*\* | (0.000) | 7.183\*\*\* | (0.000) | 7.062\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -5.979\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.203\*\* | (0.002) | -4.340\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.554\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.327\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.409\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers | 0.674\*\* | (0.004) | 0.660\*\* | (0.005) | 0.605\* | (0.011) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -3.283 | (0.477) | -2.897 | (0.512) | -2.437 | (0.580) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 0.473 | (0.893) | -9.135\*\* | (0.009) | -7.813\* | (0.025) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.082 | (0.546) | -0.094 | (0.480) | -0.129 | (0.330) |  |  |
| Country= Austria | -5.507\*\* | (0.001) | -9.744\*\*\* | (0.000) | -9.249\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.120\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Denmark | -14.576\*\*\* | (0.000) | -22.074\*\*\* | (0.000) | -21.739\*\*\* | (0.000) | -5.591\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Finland | -0.356 | (0.859) | -4.915\* | (0.039) | -4.361 | (0.067) | 9.672\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Germany | 1.215 | (0.507) | 6.828\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.111\*\* | (0.001) | 10.470\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Iceland | -1.188 | (0.572) | -4.239 | (0.080) | -4.160 | (0.086) | 10.164\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Italy | -1.758 | (0.741) | 4.807 | (0.380) | 5.057 | (0.354) | 7.093\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Luxembourg | -3.889 | (0.366) | -6.250 | (0.139) | -5.862 | (0.165) | 9.307\*\*\* | (0.001) |
| Netherlands | 0.000 | (.) | 0.000 | (.) | 0.000 | (.) | 9.318\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Norway | 0.000 | (.) | 0.000 | (.) | 0.000 | (.) | 18.611\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.482\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.457\*\*\* | (0.000) | -7.959\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.947\*\*\* | (0.000) | 12.394\*\*\* | (0.000) | 15.256\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.222) | -0.000 | (0.619) |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.659 | (0.151) | 1.207\* | (0.030) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.717\*\* | (0.002) | 2.014\*\* | (0.003) |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.167\* | (0.016) | 0.181\* | (0.031) |
| Constant | -48.508\*\*\* | (0.000) | -31.085\*\*\* | (0.001) | -30.832\*\*\* | (0.001) | -13.227\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e \_cons | 1.750\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.707\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.700\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.897\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 11747473.9987560.157-3719.999 | 11747376.9847473.280-3669.492 | 11747370.4337487.001-3662.217 | 11747820.1047906.263-3893.052 |
| *AIC* |
| *BIC* |
| ll |
|  *p*-values in parentheses \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001 |  |  |  |  |

Table B7 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2) with OLS regression and country fixed effects, operationalized as country dummies.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Time | 0.002\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.217\*\*\* | (0.000) | 7.183\*\*\* | (0.000) | 7.062\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -5.979\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.203\*\* | (0.002) | -4.340\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.554\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.327\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.409\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.674\*\* | (0.004) | 0.660\*\* | (0.006) | 0.605\* | (0.011) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -3.283 | (0.480) | -2.897 | (0.516) | -2.437 | (0.583) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 0.473 | (0.893) | -9.135\*\* | (0.009) | -7.813\* | (0.027) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.082 | (0.548) | -0.094 | (0.483) | -0.129 | (0.334) |  |  |
| Country= Austria | -5.507\*\* | (0.002) | -9.744\*\*\* | (0.000) | -9.249\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.120\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Denmark | -14.576\*\*\* | (0.000) | -22.074\*\*\* | (0.000) | -21.739\*\*\* | (0.000) | -5.591\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Finland | -0.356 | (0.860) | -4.915\* | (0.041) | -4.361 | (0.070) | 9.672\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Germany | 1.215 | (0.510) | 6.828\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.111\*\* | (0.002) | 10.470\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Iceland | -1.188 | (0.575) | -4.239 | (0.083) | -4.160 | (0.089) | 10.164\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Italy | -1.758 | (0.743) | 4.807 | (0.383) | 5.057 | (0.359) | 7.093\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Luxembourg | -3.889 | (0.370) | -6.250 | (0.143) | -5.862 | (0.169) | 9.307\*\* | (0.001) |
| Netherlands | 0.000 | (.) | 0.000 | (.) | 0.000 | (.) | 9.318\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Norway | 0.000 | (.) | 0.000 | (.) | 0.000 | (.) | 18.611\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.482\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.457\*\*\* | (0.000) | -7.959\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.947\*\*\* | (0.000) | 12.394\*\*\* | (0.000) | 15.256\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.226) | -0.000 | (0.622) |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.659 | (0.155) | 1.207\* | (0.031) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.717\*\* | (0.002) | 2.014\*\* | (0.003) |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.167\* | (0.017) | 0.181\* | (0.032) |
| Constant | -48.508\*\*\* | (0.000) | -31.085\*\*\* | (0.001) | -30.832\*\*\* | (0.001) | -13.227\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1174 | 1174 | 1174 | 11740.402 |
| *R*2 | 0.555 | 0.591 | 0.596 |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

 Table B8 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2) with the alternative non-dichotomous measure for the forced/voluntary dimension of the amalgamation replacing the dichotomous indicator.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.002\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.122\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.934\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.810\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -6.060\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.378\*\* | (0.001) | -4.515\*\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.552\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.427\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.508\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.659\*\* | (0.002) | 0.657\*\* | (0.003) | 0.603\*\* | (0.005) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -2.393 | (0.487) | -3.135 | (0.402) | -2.667 | (0.472) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 4.202 | (0.434) | 3.865 | (0.587) | 3.998 | (0.567) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.085 | (0.669) | -0.144 | (0.570) | -0.149 | (0.551) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -7.707\*\*\* | (0.000) | -7.687\*\*\* | (0.000) | -13.637\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.415\*\*\* | (0.000) | 11.839\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.947\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.200) | -0.000 | (0.567) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.681 | (0.139) | 1.244\* | (0.026) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.723\*\* | (0.002) | 2.021\*\* | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.172\* | (0.013) | 0.186\* | (0.026) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -52.580\*\*\* | (0.000) | -36.301\*\* | (0.002) | -36.735\*\* | (0.001) | -4.981\*\* | (0.009) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.404\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.706\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.686\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.662\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.754\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.711\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.705\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.901\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1174 | 1174 | 1174 | 11747852.7347898.348-3917.367 |
| *AIC* | 7508.376 | 7418.274 | 7411.483 |
| *BIC* | 7564.126 | 7484.160 | 7497.642 |
| *Log likelihood* | -3743.188 | -3696.137 | -3688.741 |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

 Table B9 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2 – models 3, 4) including an interactive term between cross-unit population polarization and post-amalgamation size.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 6.796\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -4.439\*\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 4.518\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.617\*\* | (0.005) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -3.118 | (0.409) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 3.269 | (0.662) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.165 | (0.535) |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process | -4.453\*\*\* | (0.000) | -7.995\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) | 11.752\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.868\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| H3. Number of constituent units | 0.174\* | (0.012) | 0.187\* | (0.026) |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |
| Type=One large (v. mixed) | 1.045 | (0.071) | 1.958\*\* | (0.005) |
| Type=Equal (v. mixed) | 2.327\*\* | (0.001) | 2.940\*\*\* | (0.001) |
| H5. Post-amalgamation municipal size | 0.000 | (0.504) | 0.000 | (0.146) |
| Type=One large (v. mixed) \* Size | -0.000 | (0.321) | -0.000 | (0.103) |
| Type=Equal (v. mixed) \* Size | -0.000 | (0.220) | -0.000 | (0.152) |
| Constant | -36.734\*\* | (0.002) | -6.370\*\* | (0.004) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.760\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.811\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.704\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.900\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 11747415.2227511.517-3688.611 | 11747856.3237912.073-3917.161 |
| *AIC* |
| *BIC* |
| ll |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table B10 – Replication of the regression models from Table 2 with post-amalgamation turnout level as DV and pre-amalgamation turnout at the municipal level as a control.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pre-amalgamation turnout in the municipality | 0.771\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.800\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.777\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.664\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Time | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.181\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.528\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.104\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -1.588 | (0.233) | -1.823 | (0.167) | -1.790 | (0.171) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 9.562\*\*\* | (0.000) | 7.472\*\*\* | (0.000) | 7.892\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers | 0.173 | (0.370) | 0.297 | (0.133) | 0.225 | (0.236) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -5.855 | (0.050) | -4.803 | (0.124) | -4.155 | (0.158) |  |  |
| Direct major election | -1.839 | (0.667) | -0.430 | (0.926) | -0.612 | (0.882) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.048 | (0.766) | -0.104 | (0.548) | -0.100 | (0.521) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.158\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.008\*\*\* | (0.000) | -6.975\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 4.949\*\*\* | (0.001) | 3.411\* | (0.017) | 4.989\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000\*\* | (0.001) | -0.000\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.034 | (0.940) | 0.127 | (0.798) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.586\*\* | (0.003) | 1.753\*\* | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of amalgamated units |  |  |  |  | 0.150\* | (0.025) | 0.101 | (0.174) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -15.744 | (0.088) | -12.495 | (0.189) | -10.741 | (0.232) | 22.224\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.153\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.244\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.113\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.456\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.692\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.677\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.666\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.781\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 11747360.8207421.638-3668.410 | 11747333.2157404.170-3652.608 | 11747311.8047403.031-3637.902 | 11747569.3737620.055-3774.687 |
| *AIC* |
| *BIC* |
| ll |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table B11 – Replication of the regression models from Table 2 with national post-amalgamation national average turnout level included as an additional control.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) |  | (2) |  | (3) |  | (4) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Post-amalgamation turnout at the national level | -0.187 | (0.233) | -0.201 | (0.352) | -0.204 | (0.335) | 0.008 | (0.960) |
| Time | 0.002\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.178\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.947\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.820\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -5.954\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.309\*\* | (0.001) | -4.450\*\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.596\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.453\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.531\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers | 0.690\*\*\* | (0.001) | 0.692\*\* | (0.002) | 0.639\*\* | (0.004) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -4.267 | (0.250) | -4.904 | (0.219) | -4.493 | (0.257) |  |  |
| Direct major election | -0.565 | (0.930) | -2.284 | (0.807) | -2.205 | (0.809) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.020 | (0.917) | -0.073 | (0.790) | -0.078 | (0.773) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.609\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.598\*\*\* | (0.000) | -8.082\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.287\*\*\* | (0.000) | 11.704\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.865\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.181) | -0.000 | (0.555) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.689 | (0.134) | 1.250\* | (0.025) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.722\*\* | (0.002) | 2.038\*\* | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of amalgamated units |  |  |  |  | 0.172\* | (0.013) | 0.185\* | (0.028) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -40.230\*\* | (0.005) | -23.265 | (0.188) | -23.455 | (0.177) | -6.096 | (0.579) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.328\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.720\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.697\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.799\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.754\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.711\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.705\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.901\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1174 | 11747420.8667491.821-3696.433 | 11747414.0307505.257-3689.015 | 11747857.4087908.090-3918.704 |
| *AIC* | 7509.0637569.881-3742.531 |
| *BIC* |
| ll |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table B12 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2) without the quadratic element for the national electoral cycle.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.002\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 5.062\*\*\* | (0.000) | 8.536\*\*\* | (0.000) | 8.459\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 9.237\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.707\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.818\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.857\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.797\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.746\*\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -2.195 | (0.531) | -3.758 | (0.329) | -3.308 | (0.387) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 3.079 | (0.578) | 2.227 | (0.777) | 2.334 | (0.763) |  |  |
| Subject political culture | -0.023 | (0.912) | -0.121 | (0.664) | -0.125 | (0.648) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.436\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.454\*\*\* | (0.000) | -8.087\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 13.105\*\*\* | (0.000) | 12.523\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.861\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.255) | -0.000 | (0.554) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.614 | (0.184) | 1.250\* | (0.025) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.629\*\* | (0.004) | 2.038\*\* | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.180\*\* | (0.010) | 0.185\* | (0.028) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -61.103\*\*\* | (0.000) | -40.708\*\*\* | (0.001) | -41.228\*\*\* | (0.001) | -5.551\*\* | (0.009) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.436\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.814\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.798\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.798\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.762\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.715\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.709\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.901\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1174 | 1174 | 1174 | 11747855.4117901.024-3918.705 |
| *AIC* | 7525.785 | 7428.187 | 7422.133 |
| *BIC* | 7576.466 | 7489.005 | 7503.223 |
| *Log likelihood* | -3752.892 | -3702.094 | -3695.066 |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table B13 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2) with national percentage of adherents to conformism value replacing subject political culture as the political-culture indicator.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.002\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.099\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.947\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.827\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -6.122\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.369\*\* | (0.001) | -4.503\*\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.553\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.424\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.503\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.632\*\* | (0.002) | 0.645\*\* | (0.003) | 0.595\*\* | (0.006) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -2.456 | (0.412) | -3.595 | (0.303) | -3.062 | (0.378) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 2.536 | (0.373) | -0.028 | (0.995) | -0.024 | (0.995) |  |  |
| Conformism | -0.156 | (0.241) | -0.239 | (0.203) | -0.229 | (0.218) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.465\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.451\*\*\* | (0.000) | -8.087\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.420\*\*\* | (0.000) | 11.855\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.861\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.210) | -0.000 | (0.554) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.680 | (0.139) | 1.250\* | (0.025) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.728\*\* | (0.002) | 2.038\*\* | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.170\* | (0.014) | 0.185\* | (0.028) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -44.647\*\*\* | (0.000) | -25.007 | (0.087) | -26.330 | (0.069) | -5.551\*\* | (0.009) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.346\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.719\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.708\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.798\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.754\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.711\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.705\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.901\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1174 | 1174 | 1174 | 11747855.4117901.024-3918.705 |
| *AIC* | 7507.262 | 7418.513 | 7411.850 |
| *BIC* | 7563.012 | 7484.399 | 7498.009 |
| *Log likelihood* | -3742.631 | -3696.257 | -3688.925 |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table B14 – Replication of the main models (from Table 2) with nation-wide average turnout percentage in national elections replacing subject political culture as the political-culture indicator.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time | 0.002\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle | 3.199\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.968\*\*\* | (0.000) | 6.845\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| National electoral cycle2 | -5.910\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.293\*\* | (0.001) | -4.431\*\*\* | (0.001) |  |  |
| Horizontal simultaneity | 8.517\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.437\*\*\* | (0.000) | 4.514\*\*\* | (0.000) |  |  |
| Municipal powers  | 0.717\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.698\*\* | (0.001) | 0.646\*\* | (0.003) |  |  |
| Proportional electoral system | -3.438 | (0.299) | -3.195 | (0.398) | -2.739 | (0.465) |  |  |
| Direct major election | 0.100 | (0.977) | -1.526 | (0.762) | -1.566 | (0.752) |  |  |
| Voting participation tradition | -0.232 | (0.245) | -0.104 | (0.719) | -0.112 | (0.694) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H1. Forced (1) v. voluntary (0) amalgamation process |  |  | -4.538\*\*\* | (0.000) | -4.521\*\*\* | (0.000) | -8.087\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2. Amalgamation wave overall scope: Gradual (0) v. massive (1) |  |  | 12.340\*\*\* | (0.000) | 11.765\*\*\* | (0.000) | 14.861\*\*\* | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3. Post-amalgamation municipal size |  |  |  |  | -0.000 | (0.193) | -0.000 | (0.554) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H4. Cross- unit population polarization: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Type=‘One large’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 0.682 | (0.138) | 1.250\* | (0.025) |
| Type=‘Equal’ (v. ‘Mixed’, 0) |  |  |  |  | 1.727\*\* | (0.002) | 2.038\*\* | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H5. Number of constituent units |  |  |  |  | 0.170\* | (0.014) | 0.185\* | (0.028) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -36.657\* | (0.039) | -33.041 | (0.185) | -33.020 | (0.179) | -5.551\*\* | (0.009) |
| lns1\_1\_1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.346\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.788\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.769\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.798\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| lnsig\_e |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 1.754\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.711\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.705\*\*\* | (0.000) | 1.901\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| *N* | 1174 | 1174 | 1174 | 11747855.4117901.024-3918.705 |
| *AIC* | 7507.284 | 7419.893 | 7413.119 |
| *BIC* | 7563.034 | 7485.779 | 7499.277 |
| *Log likelihood* | -3742.642 | -3696.946 | -3689.559 |

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

1. Table B12 in the Appendix B reports our main models from Table 2 in the main text without the quadratic cyclical terms. No significant differences in the relevant effects emerge. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Incorporating the appropriate State/region-based integration proposed by Bolgherini et al. (2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)