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# **Appendix A**

## ***Table A.1:*** List of cabinets and their party composition

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **CDU/CSU** | **SPD** | **FDP** | **Greens** | **Others** |
| Adenauer I | X |  | X |  | X |
| Adenauer II | X |  | X |  | X |
| Adenauer III | X |  | X |  | X |
| Adenauer IV | X |  |  |  | X |
| Adenauer V | X |  |  |  | X |
| Adenauer VI | X |  | X |  |  |
| Adenauer VII | X |  | X |  |  |
| Erhard I |  | X | X |  |  |
| Erhard II | X |  | X |  |  |
| Kiesinger | X | X |  |  |  |
| Brandt I |  | X | X |  |  |
| Brandt II |  | X | X |  |  |
| Schmidt I |  | X | X |  |  |
| Schmidt II |  | X | X |  |  |
| Schmidt III |  | X | X |  |  |
| Kohl I | X |  | X |  |  |
| Kohl II | X |  | X |  |  |
| Kohl III | X |  | X |  |  |
| Kohl IV | X |  | X |  |  |
| Kohl V | X |  | X |  |  |
| Kohl VI | X |  | X |  |  |
| Schroeder I |  | X |  | X |  |
| Schroeder II |  | X |  | X |  |
| Merkel I | X | X |  |  |  |
| Merkel II | X |  | X |  |  |

## ***Table A.2:*** *Summary statistics for all variables*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| Questions | Δt-1 to t0 | 8,649 | -0.617 | 37.628 | -1119 | 972 |
|  | t-1 | 8,649 | 16.096 | 35.571 | 0 | 1212 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 16.108 | 35.016 | 0 | 1212 |
| Minor  | Δt-1 to t0 | 8,649 | -0.666 | 11.738 | -137 | 105 |
| requests | t-1 | 8,649 | 4.629 | 11.568 | 0 | 142 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 3.991 | 10.590 | 0 | 142 |
| Proposals | Δt-1 to t0 | 8,649 | -0.525 | 5.952 | -108 | 86 |
|  | t-1 | 8,649 | 3.470 | 5.702 | 0 | 108 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 3.319 | 6.282 | 0 | 152 |
| Government status | Δt-1 to t0 | 8,649 | 0 = 819 (9.47%); 1 = 6,987 (80.78%); 2 = 843 (9.75%) |  |  |  |
|  | Δt-1 to t0 (Rob. Check 4) | 12,760 | 0 = 4,111 (32.22%); 1 = 4,118 (32.27%); 2 = 843 (6.61%); 3 = 819 (6.42%); 4 = 2,869 (22.48%) |  |  |  |
|  | t-1 | 8,649 | 0.571 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 0.561 | 0.496 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex |  | 12,760 | 0 = 1,981 (15.53%); 1 = 10,779 (84.47%) |  |  |  |
| Experience |  | 12,760 | 3.315 | 2.345 | 1 | 18 |
| Whip | Δt-1 to t0 | 12,760 | 0 = 4,111 (32.22%); 1 = 129 (1.01%); 2 = 99 (0.78%); 3 = 52 (0.41%); 4 = 8,369 (65.59%) | 1.868 | 0 | 4 |
|  | t-1 | 8,649 | 0.021 | 0.143 | 0 | 1 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 0.022 | 0.146 | 0 | 1 |
| Committee (vice-)chair | Δt-1 to t0 | 12,760 | 0 = 4,111 (32.22%); 1 = 565 (4.43%); 2 = 366 (2.87%); 3 = 196 (1.54%); 4 = 7,522 (58.95%) | 1.858 | 0 | 4 |
|  | t-1 | 8,649 | 0.088 | 0.283 | 0 | 1 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 0.086 | 0.281 | 0 | 1 |
| PPG chair | Δt-1 to t0 | 12,760 | 0 = 4,111 (32.22%); 1 = 249 (1.95%); 2 = 187 (1.47%); 3 = 92 (0.72%); 4 = 8,121 (63.64%) | 1.866 | 0 | 4 |
|  | t-1 | 8,649 | 0.039 | 0.195 | 0 | 1 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 0.043 | 0.203 | 0 | 1 |
| Mandate | Δt-1 to t0 | 12,760 | 0 = 4,111 (32.22%); 1 = 3,793 (29.73%); 2 = 373 (2.92%); 3 = 306 (2.40%); 4 = 4,177 (32.74%) |  |  |  |
|  | t-1 | 8,649 | 0.474 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 0.454 | 0.498 | 0 | 1 |
| Electoral  | Δt-1 to t0 | 6,854 | 0.027 | 0.168 | -0.912 | 1.000 |
| safety | t-1 | 6,856 | 0.883 | 0.213 | >0.0001 | 1 |
|  | t0 | 10,341 | 0.864 | 0.235 | >0.0001 | 1 |
| Government  | Δt-1 to t0 | 8,649 | 6.814 | 552.247 | -1296 | 1335 |
| duration | t-1 | 8,649 | 869.220 | 454.337 | 33 | 1452 |
|  | t0 | 12,760 | 953.675 | 448.316 | 33 | 1452 |
| Left-wing party | 12,714 | 0 = 5,039 (39.63%); 1 = 7,675 (60.37%) | 0.489 | 0 | 1 |
| Questions feminine portfolio (%) | 12,760 | 7.624 | 19.169 | 0 | 100 |

## ***Table A.3:*** Overview over oversight mechanisms and eligibility, limitations, type of response and purpose.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Questions** | **Minor requests** | **Proposals** |
| **Eligibility** | Individual MPs | One or multiple fractions or at least 5% of the MPs | One or multiple fractions or at least 5% of the MPs |
| **Limitations** | 4 written questions per month per MP; 2 oral questions per session week for each MP | --- | --- |
| **Type of response** | Written or oral response by government | Written response by government | --- |
| **Purpose** | Controlling government/individual ministers | Retrieving information from the government | Ask government to act on certain issues or revisions of current legislative drafts |

## ***Table A.4:*** *Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in their government and opposition status (Full main models).*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Dependent variable | Questions | Minor requests | Proposals |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 27.555\*\*\* | 1.946\*\* | 1.532\*\*\* |
|  | (4.119) | (0.742) | (0.285) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | -27.204\*\*\* | -4.620\*\*\* | -1.542\*\*\* |
|  | (2.716) | (0.748) | (0.300) |
| Man MP | 0.321 | -1.664\*\*\* | -0.258 |
|  | (1.447) | (0.438) | (0.159) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -8.317\* | 4.143\*\*\* | -0.911\*\* |
|  X Man MP | (4.166) | (0.857) | (0.284) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 10.300\*\*\* | 2.788\*\*\* | 0.530+ |
|  X Man MP | (2.618) | (0.796) | (0.288) |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Experience (t0) | -0.235 | -0.132\*\* | -0.019 |
|  | (0.173) | (0.045) | (0.031) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -1.926 | -3.359\*\* | 0.114 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.670) | (1.232) | (0.311) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -11.806\* | 0.398 | 0.156 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.801) | (1.261) | (0.353) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | 1.726 | -0.658 | 0.280 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.525) | (1.105) | (0.200) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | -0.391 | -0.871+ | -1.310\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.712) | (0.516) | (0.565) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 2.797 | -0.384 | -1.933\*\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.459) | (0.826) | (0.676) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 2.516\*\* | -0.175 | -1.549\*\* |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.903) | (0.286) | (0.536) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | 10.163 | 0.062 | -0.262 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.526) | (0.728) | (0.708) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 2.338 | 2.202\* | -0.653 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.924) | (0.988) | (0.751) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 3.882\* | 1.202\*\*\* | -0.165 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.749) | (0.338) | (0.717) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -1.821 | -1.350\*\*\* | -0.199 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.831) | (0.348) | (0.181) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | 5.849\* | -0.014 | -0.102 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.496) | (0.521) | (0.158) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | 1.775 | 0.516\* | 0.084 |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.175) | (0.211) | (0.109) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 8.112\*\*\* | 0.129 | -0.028 |
|  | (2.324) | (0.722) | (0.248) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.013\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | -2.604 | 3.199\* | 4.000\*\*\* |
|  | (3.569) | (1.373) | (0.879) |
| Observations | 6854 | 6854 | 6854 |
| *R*2 | 0.521 | 0.662 | 0.487 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.518 | 0.660 | 0.484 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, +p<0.1.

# **Appendix B: Additional information**

## ***Operationalization of electoral safety***

Stoffel and Sieberer (2018) suggest a two-step procedure to estimate predicted re-election probabilities: First, the researcher should estimate the effects of key electoral system and election features such as list positions, district magnitude, and previous margin of victory on the chance to be elected in previous elections using logistic regression. Afterwards, the resulting estimates allow to predict the re-election chances of any legislator in the subsequent election. In case of the German mixed member proportional electoral system, the variables included into the regression equation vary depending on the tier on which MPs are running: For MPs running in the first (single member district) tier, the margin of victory is the main predictor. For MPs running in the second (closed-list proportional) tier, district magnitude and list positions are used to predict electoral safety. And for MPs running on both tiers, these two measures are combined to provide the shared overall re-election probability (poverall = pFPTP + pPR − pFPTP\*pPR; see also Stoffel (2014) for more details). The main advantages of this approach include its sensitivity to variation in the degree of the closeness of race by rejecting the idea of a linear relationship between closeness of race and electoral safety and its ability to capture regional differences in context conditions such as district magnitude.

## ***Table B1: Comparison of Germany to other industrial democracies.***

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Share women (last) | Share women (mean) | ENPP (last) | ENPP (mean) | Gallagher Index (last) | Gallagher Index (mean) | Polarization (last) | Polarization (mean) |
| **Germany** | 34.8 | 18.5 | 5.5 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| **Australia** | 38.4 | 10.0 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 16.7 | 9.7 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| **France** | 37.3 | 9.9 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 12.8 | 13.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| **Italy** | 35.7 | 11.5 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| **Japan** | 9.7 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 2.9 | 5.5 | 9.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| **New Zealand** | 50.4 | 16.9 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 8.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| **Norway** | 45.6 | 24.9 | 5.6 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| **United Kingdom** | 34.0 | 11.1 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 11.8 | 11.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 |

*Annotations*: Source of share of women in parliament: parliamentary websites and other online sources. All other variables originate from the ParlGov database (Döring et al. 2022). The effective number of parliamentary parties is based on the seats in the parliament (Laakso/Taagepera 1979). The Gallagher Index displays the proportionality of the election results, i.e. how votes are translated into seats (Gallagher 1991). The Polarization Index measures how polarized the parliament is and is based on Dalton (2008).

# **Appendix C: Robustness checks**

We ran a series of additional model specifications as robustness checks. By and large, these robustness checks demonstrate that sex differences in parliamentary oversight activities persist even after controlling for a large number of potential confounders and modelling alternatives.

## ***Table A.4:*** Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (General ECMs following De Boef and Keele 2008; Robustness Check 1).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
| Dependent variable | Questions | Minor requests | Proposals |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 31.993\*\*\* | 2.304\*\* | 1.496\*\*\* |
|  | (4.004) | (0.714) | (0.299) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | -30.158\*\*\* | -6.252\*\*\* | -1.414\*\*\* |
|  | (2.723) | (0.783) | (0.294) |
| Man MP | -0.419 | -1.720\*\*\* | -0.251 |
|  | (1.445) | (0.437) | (0.160) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -6.911+ | 3.874\*\*\* | -0.905\*\* |
|  X Man MP | (4.072) | (0.843) | (0.284) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 10.410\*\*\* | 2.591\*\*\* | 0.522+ |
|  X Man MP | (2.599) | (0.775) | (0.287) |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Government MP (t0) | -8.821\*\*\* | -2.128\*\*\* | 0.162 |
|  | (0.909) | (0.199) | (0.189) |
| Experience (t0) | -0.303 | -0.133\*\* | -0.007 |
|  | (0.187) | (0.046) | (0.033) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -2.868 | -3.056\* | 0.064 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.560) | (1.244) | (0.310) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -12.033\* | 0.572 | 0.093 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.680) | (1.265) | (0.348) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | 2.382 | -0.548 | 0.211 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.498) | (1.103) | (0.194) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | -2.272 | -0.660 | -1.315\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.683) | (0.518) | (0.554) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 1.223 | -0.229 | -1.949\*\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.441) | (0.828) | (0.670) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 2.378\* | -0.144 | -1.582\*\* |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.951) | (0.293) | (0.537) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | 9.699 | 0.219 | -0.282 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.543) | (0.733) | (0.706) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 1.012 | 2.190\* | -0.696 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.967) | (0.976) | (0.745) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 5.224\*\* | 1.256\*\*\* | -0.234 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.839) | (0.347) | (0.726) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -3.545\* | -1.304\*\*\* | -0.210 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.783) | (0.351) | (0.183) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | 3.499 | -0.070 | -0.142 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.499) | (0.526) | (0.166) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | 0.419 | 0.184 | 0.104 |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.123) | (0.207) | (0.117) |
| Electoral safety (t-1) | 0.675 | -1.127+ | -0.850\*\* |
|  | (1.762) | (0.577) | (0.283) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 7.924\*\* | -0.546 | -0.649+ |
|  | (2.569) | (0.845) | (0.353) |
| Government duration (t-10) | 0.027\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.024\*\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | -11.712\*\* | 6.864\*\*\* | 4.701\*\*\* |
|  | (4.023) | (1.487) | (0.981) |
| Observations | 6854 | 6854 | 6854 |
| *R*2 | 0.537 | 0.667 | 0.487 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.534 | 0.665 | 0.484 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, +p<0.1.

Robustness check 1 in Table A.4 reports results of General ECMs following De Boef and Keele (2008), which disentangle long- and short-term effects on oversight activities for all confounding variables. Therefore, the models include additional lagged variables for electoral safety, government duration, and government status. The effects of the key explanatory variables do not differ substantially from the main model.

## ***Table A.5:*** T-tests comparing the amount of oversight activities of MPs serving their last term and those re-elected for women in government, men in government, women in opposition and men in opposition.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Obs. | Mean | Dif. | p |
|   |  | Not last term | Last term | Not last term | Last term |  |  |
| Questions | Women in gov. | 337 | 237 | 57.336 | 61.199 | -3.863 | 0.516 |
|  | Men in gov. | 689 | 437 | 49.258 | 49.643 | -0.385 | 0.901 |
|  | Women in opp. | 328 | 227 | 5.299 | 5.929 | -0.631 | 0.619 |
|  | Men in opp. | 806 | 671 | 10.792 | 7.143 | 3.648 | 0.001 |
| Minor  | Women in gov. | 337 | 237 | 15.956 | 2.017 | 13.938 | 0.000 |
| requests | Men in gov. | 689 | 437 | 10.281 | 4.49 | 5.792 | 0.000 |
|  | Women in opp. | 328 | 227 | 0.110 | 0.075 | 0.035 | 0.540 |
|  | Men in opp. | 806 | 671 | 0.466 | 0.356 | 0.109 | 0.293 |
| Proposals | Women in gov. | 337 | 237 | 4.659 | 3.177 | 1.482 | 0.000 |
|  | Men in gov. | 689 | 437 | 3.588 | 2.620 | 0.968 | 0.000 |
|  | Women in opp. | 328 | 227 | 2.116 | 1.639 | 0.477 | 0.002 |
|  | Men in opp. | 806 | 671 | 1.561 | 1.342 | 0.22 | 0.073 |

*Annotations:* T-tests with unequal variance, sample excludes MPs younger than 63 in the election year and all observations before 1990.

It is possible that parties could resist the re-nomination of MPs whose action is in discrepancy with institutional roles. This would mean that our method to study change in oversight activities (which requires re-election) systematically excludes the most relevant group. To take this potential bias into account, Table A.5 presents results of a t-test for unpaired data comparing MPs who were re-elected to those who served their last term in parliament. To take heterogeneity between MPs into account, we present separate tests for men and women in government and in opposition. We limit the sample to MPs who are younger than 63 in the election year to exclude those most likely to leave parliament voluntarily and only look at the time after 1990, since most women were elected afterwards. For questions, we find that women in government, men in government and women in opposition who are not re-elected indeed submitted slightly more questions than their colleagues who were re-elected. However, the differences are marginal and do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. For the number of questions submitted by men in opposition, as well as for minor requests and proposals per se, the tests actually indicate the opposite pattern: Those who leave parliament tend to be less active than those who aim for re-election. Overall, there is no reason to believe that the decreased sample on which we base our main model drives our findings.

## ***Table A.6:*** Multi-level Poisson regression of the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (Robustness Check 2).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
| Dependent variable | Questions | Minor requests | Proposals |
| Government (ref: Opposition) (t0)  | -1.445\*\*\* | -1.654\*\*\* | -0.732\*\*\* |
|  | (0.191) | (0.229) | (0.057) |
| Man MP (ref: Woman) | -0.224\* | -0.704\*\*\* | -0.404\*\*\* |
|  | (0.101) | (0.138) | (0.048) |
| Government (ref: Opposition) (t0)  | 0.494\* | 0.945\*\*\* | 0.317\*\*\* |
|  X Man MP | (0.194) | (0.237) | (0.065) |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Whip (t0) | 0.250\* | -0.229 | -0.140+ |
|  | (0.118) | (0.164) | (0.084) |
| Committee (vice-)chair (t0) | -0.067 | -0.045 | 0.103\* |
|  | (0.075) | (0.065) | (0.050) |
| PPG chair (t0) | -0.422\*\*\* | -0.438\*\*\* | -0.126+ |
|  | (0.121) | (0.112) | (0.071) |
| Experience (t0) | -0.116\*\*\* | 0.010 | -0.020\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.006) |
| District mandate (ref: List mandate)  | -0.370\*\*\* | -0.215\*\*\* | -0.019 |
|  (t0) | (0.055) | (0.056) | (0.031) |
| Electoral safety (t0) | 0.364\*\*\* | 0.303\*\* | 0.186\*\*\* |
|  | (0.095) | (0.097) | (0.055) |
| Government duration (t0) | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* | 0.003\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | -1.076\*\*\* | -6.945\*\*\* | -3.152\*\*\* |
|  | (0.162) | (0.454) | (0.128) |
| Observations | 10,341 | 10,341 | 10,341 |

*Annotations:* MPs nested in electoral periods, standard errors clustered at the MP level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, + p<0.1.

Even though there is little reason to believe that our results are driven by a bias in the data, table A.6 shows the results of models predicting the overall level of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs. Taking all MPs (N=10341) into account, the test allows us to see whether men in government (opposition) display higher (lower) overall levels of engagement – all else being equal. Given that the dependent variables are count variables, we estimated Poisson regressions. In order to account for autocorrelation, we nest MPs in electoral periods. However, we cannot include a lagged dependent variable, since this would again limit the sample to MPs who were re-elected. The models show the expected patterns with a negative effect of governing status, a negative effect for men MPs, and a positive effect for men in government for all three indicators of legislative oversight. Table A.7 shows the predicted number of activities for women and men in opposition and in government. In government, the model predicts that men submit more questions and minor requests than women (but these coefficients lack statistical significance), while there is no sex difference in proposal activities. In opposition, women tend to submit higher numbers of questions, minor requests and proposals than men, even though the coefficient for questions does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Interestingly, while the models for changes consistently predict that men moving from government to opposition increase their activities on minor requests more strongly than women, it appears as if this does not play out in an overall higher level of usage of this oversight instrument. Overall, this test confirms that even when using the full sample of MPs and applying a more fragile modelling strategy, sex differences in legislative oversight activities persist and indicate higher levels of institutional role conformity by women MPs.

## ***Table A.7:*** Predicted number of legislative oversight activities based on models in Table A.6 with 95%-confidence intervals.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Women in opposition | Men in opposition | Women in government | Men in government |
| Questions | 45.59[37.78-53.40] | 36.45[33.70-39.20] | 10.75[7.71-13.79] | 14.08[12.55-16.61] |
| Minor requests | 13.30[9.98-16.62] | 6.58[5.96-7.19] | 2.55[1.72-3.37] | 3.24[2.86-3.62] |
| Proposals | 4.32[3.94-4.70] | 2.89[2.74-3.03] | 2.08[1.90-2.25] | 1.91[1.82-1.99] |

## ***Table A.8***: Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (Excluding outliers on the dependent variable, 5%-95% percentile; Robustness Check 3).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 |
| Dependent variable | Questions | Minor requests | Proposals |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 12.898\*\*\* | 0.234 | 1.998\*\*\* |
|  | (1.728) | (0.152) | (0.192) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | -14.738\*\*\* | -0.419\* | -0.643\*\*\* |
|  | (1.565) | (0.199) | (0.167) |
| Man MP | 0.170 | -0.167 | -0.125+ |
|  | (0.525) | (0.102) | (0.070) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -5.294\*\* | 0.557\*\* | -0.860\*\*\* |
|  X Man MP | (1.811) | (0.177) | (0.207) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 6.325\*\*\* | -0.050 | 0.282+ |
|  X Man MP | (1.539) | (0.216) | (0.169) |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Experience (t0) | -0.203\*\* | 0.004 | -0.019+ |
|  | (0.069) | (0.017) | (0.010) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -0.092 | -0.011 | -0.021 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.155) | (0.379) | (0.260) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -2.263 | 0.329 | 0.059 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.880) | (0.334) | (0.347) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | -1.194 | 0.251 | 0.108 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.434) | (0.209) | (0.193) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | 0.355 | -0.229 | -0.053 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.867) | (0.223) | (0.157) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 1.030 | -0.422+ | -0.248 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.155) | (0.246) | (0.202) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 0.825+ | -0.129 | -0.113 |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.487) | (0.168) | (0.130) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | -0.215 | 0.117 | 0.421\* |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.394) | (0.196) | (0.190) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 0.835 | 0.812\*\* | 0.284 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.907) | (0.257) | (0.211) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 0.861 | 0.642\*\*\* | 0.526\*\*\* |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.811) | (0.127) | (0.137) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | 0.337 | -0.334\* | -0.125 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.859) | (0.147) | (0.093) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | 1.633+ | 0.261+ | 0.030 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.986) | (0.140) | (0.120) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | 1.129\*\*\* | 0.201\*\* | 0.115\* |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.337) | (0.074) | (0.051) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 1.427 | 0.224 | 0.096 |
|  | (1.091) | (0.199) | (0.143) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | 2.673 | 0.479 | 1.389\*\*\* |
|  | (1.851) | (0.357) | (0.301) |
| Observations | 5994 | 5986 | 6241 |
| *R*2 | 0.453 | 0.313 | 0.562 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.450 | 0.308 | 0.559 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, +p<0.1.

Continuing our search for selection bias, Robustness Check 3 in Table A.8 excludes outliers with extreme values at the dependent variable. We therefore limit the sample to those observations lying between the 5th and 95th percentile. The effects of nearly all key variables remain the same, with the notable exemption that the positive effect of man MP moving from opposition into government on change in the number of requests submitted turns null. If we exclude extreme cases, women and men becoming members of the governing majority do not differ substantially in the way they adapt their engagement into minor requests without their party. With the positive effect persisting across all other robustness checks, this leads us to conclude that sex differences between men’s and women’s submission rates of minor requests when moving from opposition to government do exist at the aggregate level, but are consequence of the actions of a few.

## ***Table A.9:*** Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (Alternative operationalization of change in government status; Robustness Check 4).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 13 | Model 14 | Model 15 |
| Dependent variable | Questions | Minor requests | Proposals |
| Opp. to gov. (ref: Gov.) (Δt-1 to t0) | -21.524\*\*\* | -2.548\*\*\* | -1.303\*\*\* |
|  | (2.322) | (0.546) | (0.350) |
| Gov. to opp (ref: Gov.) (Δt-1 to t0) | 32.092\*\*\* | 3.816\*\*\* | 1.774\*\*\* |
|  | (4.266) | (0.638) | (0.337) |
| Opp. (ref: Gov.) (Δt-1 to t0) | 14.941\*\*\* | 5.017\*\*\* | 0.507 |
|  | (2.304) | (0.884) | (0.322) |
| Man MP | 2.794\*\* | -0.334 | 0.078 |
|  | (0.926) | (0.269) | (0.239) |
| Opp. to gov. (ref: Gov.) (Δt-1 to t0) | 7.052\*\* | 1.165\* | 0.199 |
|  X Man MP | (2.194) | (0.567) | (0.336) |
| Gov. to opp (ref: Gov.) (Δt-1 to t0) | -11.412\*\* | 2.611\*\*\* | -1.234\*\*\* |
|  X Man MP | (4.177) | (0.750) | (0.341) |
| Opp. (ref: Gov.) (Δt-1 to t0) | -6.287\* | -3.370\*\*\* | -0.762\* |
|  X Man MP | (2.834) | (0.922) | (0.307) |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Experience (t0) | -0.294 | -0.137\*\* | -0.016 |
|  | (0.183) | (0.045) | (0.032) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -1.218 | -3.204\*\* | 0.098 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.617) | (1.232) | (0.309) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -10.828\* | 0.590 | 0.163 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.641) | (1.285) | (0.352) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | 2.360 | -0.530 | 0.257 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.504) | (1.103) | (0.198) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | -0.434 | -0.846+ | -1.310\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.707) | (0.513) | (0.563) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 2.582 | -0.385 | -1.941\*\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.423) | (0.817) | (0.674) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 2.612\*\* | -0.156 | -1.556\*\* |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.924) | (0.296) | (0.535) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | 10.667 | 0.195 | -0.256 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.551) | (0.732) | (0.711) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 2.089 | 2.106\* | -0.651 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.944) | (0.977) | (0.747) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 4.925\*\* | 1.461\*\*\* | -0.158 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.857) | (0.354) | (0.726) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -2.242 | -1.409\*\*\* | -0.192 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.815) | (0.343) | (0.181) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | 5.344\* | -0.177 | -0.083 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.492) | (0.517) | (0.160) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | 0.422 | 0.200 | 0.112 |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.116) | (0.209) | (0.117) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 8.445\*\*\* | 0.222 | -0.020 |
|  | (2.288) | (0.719) | (0.246) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | -9.637\* | 0.998 | 3.767\*\*\* |
|  | (3.752) | (1.330) | (0.956) |
| Observations | 6854 | 6854 | 6854 |
| *R*2 | 0.529 | 0.667 | 0.487 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, +p<0.1.

In Robustness Check 4 in Table A.9, we disentangle MPs who did not change their governing status by those who remained in government and those who remained in opposition. These substantially different groups are treated as a single one in the operationalization used in the main models, building on the assumption that in the absence of change in governing status, different patterns of change in the oversight activities are unlikely. Possibly, the heterogeneity of these two groups might be substantial and using such a diverse group as reference category for our main effects might bias the results. In fact, the results show that, compared to MPs who remain in government, those who remain in opposition tend to decrease their oversight activities over time. However, the test also shows no substantial differences in the way sex shapes the way MPs adapt to change in government and opposition status, with the exemption that the positive effect of being a man moving from opposition into government on change in the number of proposals submitted by an MP turns null – meaning that this person cannot be distinguished from a woman (ceteris paribus).

## ***Table A.10:*** Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (Additional confounder for status as member of the junior/senior governing party, Robustness Check 5).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Dependent variable | Questions | Minor requests | Proposals |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 20.300\*\*\* | 0.382 | 1.660\*\*\* |
|  | (4.253) | (0.759) | (0.310) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | -23.058\*\*\* | -4.082\*\*\* | -1.513\*\*\* |
|  | (2.662) | (0.700) | (0.337) |
| Man MP | -0.070 | -1.722\*\*\* | -0.268+ |
|  | (1.454) | (0.439) | (0.155) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -8.175\* | 3.898\*\*\* | -0.852\*\* |
|  X Man MP | (4.146) | (0.834) | (0.277) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 10.100\*\*\* | 2.545\*\*\* | 0.565\* |
|  X Man MP | (2.591) | (0.758) | (0.288) |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Experience (t0) | -0.298 | -0.149\*\* | -0.016 |
|  | (0.183) | (0.046) | (0.032) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -0.945 | -3.280\*\* | 0.127 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.554) | (1.224) | (0.309) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -10.841\* | 0.450 | 0.159 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.648) | (1.257) | (0.349) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | 2.558 | -0.524 | 0.279 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.497) | (1.102) | (0.197) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | -0.582 | -0.787 | -1.325\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.705) | (0.515) | (0.563) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 2.515 | -0.310 | -1.946\*\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.412) | (0.822) | (0.674) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 2.613\*\* | -0.113 | -1.556\*\* |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.938) | (0.294) | (0.535) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | 10.502 | 0.187 | -0.277 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.520) | (0.727) | (0.708) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 2.128 | 2.122\* | -0.648 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.943) | (0.965) | (0.747) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 4.792\*\* | 1.384\*\*\* | -0.177 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.842) | (0.347) | (0.724) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -2.570 | -1.295\*\*\* | -0.225 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.830) | (0.342) | (0.180) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | 5.297\* | -0.211 | -0.089 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.490) | (0.519) | (0.160) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | 0.449 | 0.178 | 0.113 |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.122) | (0.209) | (0.117) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 8.167\*\*\* | 0.248 | -0.051 |
|  | (2.250) | (0.718) | (0.243) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Government status (junior=1, ref.= not governing) | -12.266\*\*\* | -1.173\*\*\* | -0.119 |
|  | (1.235) | (0.236) | (0.228) |
| Government status (senior=1, ref.= not governing) | -5.536\*\* | -3.445\*\*\* | 0.560+ |
|  | (1.713) | (0.330) | (0.288) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | 2.230 | 4.425\*\* | 3.906\*\*\* |
|  | (3.713) | (1.363) | (0.838) |
| Observations | 6854 | 6854 | 6854 |
| *R*2 | 0.529 | 0.666 | 0.487 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.526 | 0.664 | 0.484 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, +p<0.1.

We moreover investigate whether MPs’ status as member of the junior or senior coalition partner may bias the results. Coalition governments tend to harm the electoral outcomes of junior partners (Klüver and Spoon 2020), so that MPs’ belonging to the numerically weaker member of the coalition might try to strengthen their party’s reputation by engaging in highly visible legislative oversight mechanisms. At the same time, smaller parties tend to have fewer women (Reynolds 1999), so that, possibly, low levels of oversight activities might be biased by large numbers of comparably inactive women belonging to the senior partner of the coalition. In Robustness Test 5 in Table A10, we therefore include a categorical confounding variable that takes the value 0 for MPs who do not govern, 1 for MPs who belong to the junior partner, and 2 for MPs who belong to the senior partner. Contrary to our anticipation, MPs who belong to the junior partner become even less active than MPs who belong to the senior partner over time when it comes to submitting questions and minor requests. The main effects do not change as a consequence of this modification.

## ***Table A.11:*** Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (only electoral periods after 1994, Robustness Check 6).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Dependent variable | Questions | Minor requests | Proposals |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 37.307\*\*\* | -4.157\*\*\* | 2.278\*\*\* |
|  | (4.902) | (0.518) | (0.279) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | -38.826\*\*\* | -11.780\*\*\* | -1.395\*\*\* |
|  | (4.004) | (1.288) | (0.376) |
| Man MP | -2.683 | -1.042+ | -0.199 |
|  | (3.147) | (0.542) | (0.137) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 3.488 | 1.864\*\*\* | -0.652\* |
|  X Man MP | (5.771) | (0.544) | (0.254) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 8.224\* | 3.966\*\* | 0.386 |
|  X Man MP | (3.770) | (1.265) | (0.332) |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Experience (t0) | 0.257 | -0.045 | -0.068\*\* |
|  | (0.369) | (0.075) | (0.021) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -7.884 | -1.109 | -0.288 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.861) | (1.131) | (0.393) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -18.096\* | 2.435\*\* | -0.438 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.856) | (0.833) | (0.477) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | 0.365 | 0.673+ | -0.302 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.167) | (0.389) | (0.245) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | -0.668 | -0.139 | 0.053 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.001) | (1.082) | (0.226) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 5.049 | 1.128 | 0.041 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.675) | (1.355) | (0.255) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 6.813\* | 0.346 | 0.068 |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.299) | (0.720) | (0.176) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | 18.837 | -0.013 | -0.233 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (14.964) | (0.742) | (0.448) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 10.964+ | 2.284\*\* | -0.895+ |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (6.636) | (0.799) | (0.459) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 9.654\* | 0.898\* | -0.561 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.202) | (0.410) | (0.362) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -3.633 | -3.262\*\*\* | 0.396 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.863) | (0.704) | (0.308) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | -4.843 | 0.349 | -0.352+ |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.369) | (0.291) | (0.190) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | -0.936 | 1.847\*\*\* | 0.591\*\*\* |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.133) | (0.422) | (0.086) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 13.947\* | 0.733 | -0.049 |
|  | (5.417) | (0.780) | (0.282) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.017\*\*\* | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.035\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.006) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | X | X | X |
| Constant | -8.926 | 1.004 | 0.281 |
|  | (10.078) | (1.120) | (0.533) |
| Observations | 2013 | 2013 | 2013 |
| *R*2 | 0.535 | 0.683 | 0.584 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.529 | 0.678 | 0.579 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, +p<0.1.

Possibly, changes in the share of women present in parliament might also change the behavior of women (Dahlerup 1988). To ensure that women’s numerical strength does not cause changes in the behavior of women MPs over time, we limit our observation period to 1994 and later. We chose this cut-off point, as it indicates the end of a sharp increase and the beginning of a period of stagnation in women’s representation. Moreover, the German party system remain mostly constant afterwards. The test hence provides evidence to what extent the patterns presented in the main analysis do still apply today. Robustness Test 7 in Table A11 displays the results of this test. Note that the models do not include legislative period fixed effects due to the lower variation at that level. There is one noteworthy change in the findings: There is no statistically significant sex gap in the degree to which MPs change the number of questions to the government which they submit when moving from government into opposition. This finding indicates that the questioning activities of men and women in opposition became more similar in the recent legislative periods than in the early years of the German democracy. Nevertheless, all remaining differences in the way men and women adapt to change in their status as government and opposition member persist.

## ***Table A.12:*** Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (Split sample for electorally safe and electorally vulnerable MPs; Robustness Check 7).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 16 | Model 17 | Model 18 | Model 19 | Model 20 | Model 21 |
|  | Questions | Questions | Minor requests | Minor requests | Proposals | Proposals |
| Dependent variable | Elec. vuln. MPs | Elec. safe MPs | Elec. vuln. MPs | Elec. safe MPs | Elec. vuln. MPs | Elec. safe MPs |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 24.729\*\*\* | 34.705\* | 2.262\*\* | -0.839 | 1.514\*\*\* | 1.349+ |
|  | (4.682) | (13.973) | (0.817) | (1.252) | (0.330) | (0.796) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1  | -24.010\*\*\* | -30.087\*\*\* | -5.776\*\*\* | -5.986\*\* | -1.821\*\*\* | -1.936 |
|  to t0) | (2.763) | (8.236) | (0.883) | (2.303) | (0.356) | (1.219) |
| Man MP | 1.443 | -1.540 | -1.436\*\* | -1.827\* | -0.244 | -0.361 |
|  | (1.224) | (3.455) | (0.474) | (0.891) | (0.220) | (0.359) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1  | -9.416+ | -19.276 | 3.706\*\*\* | 3.078\*\* | -0.881\* | -1.683\* |
|  to t0) X Man MP | (4.839) | (14.782) | (0.984) | (1.162) | (0.355) | (0.740) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 8.668\*\* | 12.796+ | 3.934\*\*\* | 3.247+ | 0.863\* | 0.232 |
|  X Man MP | (2.732) | (7.424) | (0.947) | (1.951) | (0.362) | (0.911) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience (t0) | -0.460\*\* | 0.258 | -0.127\* | -0.244\* | -0.017 | -0.031 |
|  | (0.175) | (0.326) | (0.050) | (0.115) | (0.035) | (0.049) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying | -2.402 | 5.133 | -4.104\* | -2.066 | 0.162 | -0.977 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.744) | (12.764) | (1.609) | (1.968) | (0.393) | (0.880) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying  | -8.430 | -11.918 | -0.674 | 1.273 | -0.107 | -0.582 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (5.217) | (14.269) | (1.463) | (1.631) | (0.393) | (1.580) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref:  | -0.265 | 12.739 | -1.242 | 0.992 | 0.154 | 0.442 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.553) | (9.154) | (1.306) | (0.761) | (0.217) | (0.516) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | -0.584 | 13.112 | -1.184\* | 0.398 | -1.319\*\* | -0.213 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.870) | (10.068) | (0.564) | (2.593) | (0.490) | (0.906) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 3.993 | 7.481 | -0.370 | -3.575+ | -1.619\*\* | -0.738 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.882) | (9.433) | (0.961) | (1.833) | (0.534) | (1.009) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 1.770\* | 5.991 | -0.412 | 0.014 | -1.405\*\* | 0.167 |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.878) | (3.869) | (0.311) | (1.072) | (0.464) | (0.697) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | -0.008 | 25.467 | 0.877 | -3.009+ | -0.357 | 1.010 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.765) | (24.345) | (0.825) | (1.770) | (0.797) | (1.572) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 1.287 | 33.670 | 2.823\* | -2.208 | -0.745 | 0.609 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.887) | (23.686) | (1.165) | (1.525) | (0.830) | (1.035) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 2.421 | 20.753\*\* | 1.245\*\*\* | 0.468 | -0.410 | 0.633 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.604) | (7.474) | (0.348) | (0.998) | (0.811) | (0.425) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -3.184 | 1.449 | -1.184\*\* | -5.092\*\*\* | -0.054 | -0.972\*\* |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.009) | (7.476) | (0.448) | (1.440) | (0.266) | (0.370) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | 4.240 | 17.755\* | 0.116 | -3.622\*\* | -0.014 | -0.756 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.009) | (8.974) | (0.679) | (1.305) | (0.201) | (0.660) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | 3.495\*\*\* | -0.433 | 0.734\*\* | -1.586\* | 0.204 | -0.291 |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.765) | (2.161) | (0.227) | (0.744) | (0.125) | (0.237) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | -23.444 | 10.948+ | -3.340 | -1.768 | -0.274 | -0.638 |
|  | (16.291) | (6.304) | (4.434) | (1.357) | (1.312) | (0.519) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.016\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | 0.684 | -35.485\* | 3.305\* | 3.290+ | 3.693\*\*\* | 2.447\* |
|  | (3.597) | (13.802) | (1.599) | (1.978) | (0.945) | (1.211) |
| Observations | 4887 | 1055 | 4887 | 1055 | 4887 | 1055 |
| *R*2 | 0.603 | 0.567 | 0.683 | 0.504 | 0.508 | 0.554 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.600 | 0.550 | 0.681 | 0.484 | 0.504 | 0.536 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, + p<0.1.

In another series of tests, we investigate heterogeneous effects and whether within the highly diverse group of MPs, a certain one drives the observed patterns. We begin by investigating the role of electoral safety as a confounder (Table A.12). Previous literature indicates substantial differences in the level of electoral safety of men and women running for elected office (Kellermann 2013; Giger et al. 2020). Higher levels of actual electoral threat for women MPs could potentially be an alternative explanation to the causal mechanism we propose, which builds on gender differences in threat perception. To investigate whether the observed patterns hold within the group of electorally comparably safe and more vulnerable MPs, we split our sample into two groups using the mean level of electoral safety as a cut-off point. The sex differences in change of oversight activities persists for most key variables in both samples, meaning that the overall dynamics hold even for the most electorally safe MPs. However, for the group of electorally safe MPs, two of the interaction terms between sex and change in governing status fall short of statistical significance in test: Firstly, the observed sex difference in questioning activity of MPs moving from government to opposition do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, but are actually even more substantial than in the remaining models (-19.3 with p=0.193). Secondly, when moving from opposition to government, electorally safe men are still more likely to submit proposals, but the coefficient falls short of statistical significance (0.23). Still, the overall evidence suggests that men’s and women’s oversight activities differ with women conforming more strongly with the institutional norms even within the group of electorally safe MPs.

## ***Table A.13:*** Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (Split sample for district and party list MPs; Robustness Check 8).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 22 | Model 23 | Model 24 | Model 25 | Model 26 | Model 27 |
|  | Questions | Questions | Minor requests | Minor requests | Proposals | Proposals |
| Dependent variable | District MPs | Party list MPs | District MPs | Party list MPs | District MPs | Party list MPs |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 38.919\*\*\* | 20.766\*\*\* | 4.327\*\* | 1.520+ | 2.398\*\*\* | 1.309\*\*\* |
|  | (8.422) | (4.495) | (1.439) | (0.871) | (0.386) | (0.372) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | -22.793\*\*\* | -32.642\*\*\* | -6.096\*\*\* | -3.570\*\*\* | -1.171\*\* | -1.654\*\*\* |
|  | (4.747) | (3.626) | (0.986) | (0.903) | (0.450) | (0.385) |
| Man MP | -1.485 | 1.439 | -1.466\* | -1.478\*\* | 0.003 | -0.292 |
|  | (2.609) | (1.422) | (0.610) | (0.559) | (0.145) | (0.235) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -15.843+ | -6.380 | 4.388\*\* | 2.677\*\* | -1.344\*\*\* | -1.023\*\* |
|  X Man MP | (8.905) | (4.704) | (1.593) | (1.004) | (0.393) | (0.373) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 6.763+ | 13.749\*\*\* | 4.325\*\*\* | 1.901+ | 0.422 | 0.561 |
|  X Man MP | (3.921) | (3.597) | (1.022) | (0.987) | (0.425) | (0.378) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience (t0) | -0.231 | -0.299 | -0.148\* | -0.132+ | 0.008 | -0.055 |
|  | (0.217) | (0.246) | (0.058) | (0.068) | (0.053) | (0.034) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -2.686 | -1.330 | -5.318\* | -3.174\* | -0.188 | 0.210 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (5.304) | (5.286) | (2.553) | (1.240) | (0.369) | (0.449) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -12.259 | -10.724 | -2.011 | 1.526 | 0.185 | -0.052 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (8.601) | (7.010) | (2.634) | (1.116) | (0.494) | (0.489) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | 3.445 | 0.472 | -2.886 | 0.536 | 0.353 | 0.116 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.708) | (3.621) | (2.533) | (0.502) | (0.342) | (0.244) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | 0.936 | -1.786 | -0.093 | -1.699\* | -1.180+ | -1.407 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.155) | (2.866) | (0.709) | (0.687) | (0.666) | (0.882) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 0.537 | 4.836 | -1.647\* | 0.943 | -1.704\* | -1.744\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.197) | (4.509) | (0.671) | (1.398) | (0.715) | (0.879) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 3.119\*\* | 1.271 | 0.042 | -0.555 | -1.204+ | -1.871\* |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.177) | (1.546) | (0.349) | (0.448) | (0.670) | (0.795) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | 15.742 | 4.199 | -0.014 | -0.312 | 0.271 | -0.766 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (14.357) | (4.301) | (1.023) | (0.924) | (0.555) | (1.277) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 5.826 | 2.440 | 2.955\* | 1.861 | 0.386 | -1.509 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (6.323) | (5.750) | (1.420) | (1.261) | (0.570) | (1.347) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 5.283 | 5.843\*\* | 1.018+ | 1.367\*\* | 0.650 | -1.001 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (5.442) | (2.084) | (0.543) | (0.423) | (0.538) | (1.305) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -2.404 |  | -0.697\* |  | -0.051 |  |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.751) |  | (0.349) |  | (0.182) |  |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: district  |  | -2.209 |  | 0.280 |  | 0.141 |
|  to list) (Δt-1 to t0) |  | (2.565) |  | (0.560) |  | (0.173) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 7.634 | 9.202\*\* | -0.192 | 0.400 | -0.538 | 0.151 |
|  | (5.621) | (2.811) | (0.820) | (1.002) | (0.632) | (0.240) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.011\*\*\* | 0.015\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | -5.147 | 1.440 | 4.921+ | 2.350+ | 2.306\*\* | 5.575\*\* |
|  | (7.170) | (5.522) | (2.793) | (1.234) | (0.798) | (1.717) |
| Observations | 3385 | 3469 | 3385 | 3469 | 3385 | 3469 |
| *R*2 | 0.548 | 0.527 | 0.746 | 0.592 | 0.454 | 0.528 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.543 | 0.521 | 0.743 | 0.588 | 0.448 | 0.523 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, + p<0.1.

In an additional test, we take into account the particularities of the German mixed member proportional electoral system, in which women are considerably more likely to win party list than single member district mandates (Eder et al. 2016). Given that MPs elected through the two tiers are known to display substantial variation in their legislative behaviour (Stratmann 2006; Sieberer 2010), systematic differences in the mandate type that men and women tend to win could cause differences in their oversight activities. The results of Robustness Check 8 in table A.13 largely mirror those of the previous ones, indicating only some differences between the groups of district and list MPs for single coefficients (in the model predicting questions, the interaction term for men compared to women list MPs moving from government to opposition does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance with -6.4 and p=0.175; in the model predicting proposals, the interaction terms for both district and list MPs moving from opposition to government is still substantial but not statistically significantly different from zero with 0.4 and 0.6). The vast majority of effects, however, remains comparable to the main model, suggesting that both men and women differ with regard to the way they adapt their oversight activities when moving between government and opposition independent of their electoral mandate.

## ***Table A.14:*** Linear regression of change in the number of questions, minor requests, and proposals submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (Three-way interaction of party ideology, change in government status, and sex, Robustness Check 9).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 28 | Model 29 | Model 30 |
| Dependent variable | Questions | Minor requests | Proposals |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 40.581\*\*\* | 3.098\* | -0.278 |
|  | (7.031) | (1.202) | (0.715) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | -29.497\*\*\* | 1.587\*\*\* | -1.739\*\*\* |
|  | (4.674) | (0.350) | (0.411) |
| Man MP | 3.077\* | -0.668\* | -0.419 |
|  | (1.216) | (0.267) | (0.338) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -3.152 | -0.105 | 0.135 |
|  X Man MP | (6.164) | (0.574) | (0.510) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 5.705 | 0.654\* | 0.734+ |
|  X Man MP | (4.161) | (0.304) | (0.393) |
| Left-wing party MP | 7.190\*\* | 5.573\*\*\* | 0.693 |
|  | (2.274) | (0.737) | (0.476) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -15.562+ | -3.269\* | 2.350\*\* |
|  X Left-wing party MP | (8.528) | (1.516) | (0.810) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 15.063\* | -13.024\*\*\* | -0.026 |
|  X Left-wing party MP | (6.438) | (1.559) | (0.581) |
| Man MP X Left-wing party MP | -4.767\* | -2.202\*\* | 0.235 |
|  | (2.275) | (0.803) | (0.437) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -8.195 | 6.960\*\*\* | -1.300+ |
|  X Man MP X Left-wing party MP | (8.327) | (1.307) | (0.664) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 4.654 | 4.877\*\*\* | -0.001 |
|  X Man MP X Left-wing party MP | (5.155) | (1.395) | (0.580) |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Experience (t0) | -0.256 | -0.135\*\* | -0.020 |
|  | (0.172) | (0.043) | (0.032) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -1.984 | -3.514\*\* | 0.102 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.636) | (1.212) | (0.306) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -10.775\* | -0.073 | 0.176 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.604) | (1.217) | (0.350) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | 1.809 | -0.780 | 0.257 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.557) | (1.076) | (0.203) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | -0.354 | -0.794 | -1.326\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.693) | (0.506) | (0.566) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 2.686 | -0.406 | -1.967\*\* |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.433) | (0.821) | (0.676) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 2.598\*\* | -0.217 | -1.572\*\* |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.906) | (0.267) | (0.538) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | 10.222 | 0.095 | -0.301 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.511) | (0.718) | (0.713) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 2.097 | 1.992\* | -0.651 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.887) | (1.007) | (0.761) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 4.091\* | 1.076\*\* | -0.182 |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.787) | (0.341) | (0.722) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -1.830 | -1.220\*\*\* | -0.235 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.833) | (0.339) | (0.180) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | 5.466\* | -0.123 | -0.050 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.501) | (0.530) | (0.156) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | 1.741 | 0.429\* | 0.094 |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.153) | (0.203) | (0.109) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 8.721\*\*\* | 0.010 | -0.023 |
|  | (2.324) | (0.713) | (0.251) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Constant | -8.763\* | -0.240 | 3.314\*\* |
|  | (3.934) | (1.293) | (1.066) |
| Observations | 6854 | 6854 | 6854 |
| *R*2 | 0.526 | 0.675 | 0.490 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.523 | 0.673 | 0.487 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, +p<0.1.

## ***Table A.15:*** Predicted number of legislative oversight activities based on models in Table A.12 with 95%-confidence intervals.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Left | Right |
|  | Women, gov. to opp. | Men, gov. to opp. | Women, opp. to gov | Men, opp. to gov | Women, gov. to opp. | Men, gov. to opp. | Women, opp. to gov | Men, opp. to gov |
| Questions | 26.35 | 13.31 | -13.11 | -4.44 | 34.72 | 34.64 | -35.11 | -26.58 |
| Minor requests | 2.91 | 6.89 | -8.36 | -5.70 | 0.60 | -0.17 | -0.91 | -0.92 |
| Proposals | 2.60 | 1.25 | -1.23 | -0.68 | -0.44 | -0.72 | -1.90 | -1.59 |

Lastly, like in most developed democracies, the sex of MPs strongly covaries with party ideology in the German case. Leftist parties do not only send the most women into parliament but also promote gender quality more broadly in their manifestos and policies they initiate (McDonald and Mendes 2003; Caul 2001; Lühiste and Kenny 2016). This could potentially also have consequences for our main analysis. On the one hand, sex differences in the degree to which women conform with institutional norms could be more pronounced in right-wing than left-wing parties. Women MPs belonging to right-wing parties might be under more pressure to conform to norms than women in left-wing parties for two reasons: Because their party is generally more sceptical of women’s involvement in politics and because smaller numbers of women make their individual behaviour more visible. In left-wing parties, women MPs hence have to strive less for their re-nomination than in an environment that is more hostile to women’s inclusion into politics, i.e. right-wing parties. Beyond ideological differences between right- and left-wing parties, the lower numbers of women MPs belonging to the former might shape risk perception. Blalock (1967) points out that dominant groups are likely to react harshest to out-group members as long as they are small in numbers, so that discrimination and harassment are most pronounced in organization with very few out-group members (see also Yoder 1991). On the other hand, sex differences could also be less pronounced in right-wing compared to left-wing parties. Right-wing parties are masculine domains and all MPs belonging to such parties have incentives to follow the behavioural patterns displayed by men MPs within these parties. Kanter (1977) proposes that, in strongly skewed groups, i.e. with many members from one group and extremely few from another, those who form a minority within the group are likely to adapt to the norms of the majority. If that is true, then we should not be able to see any (substantial) differences in the legislative oversight activities between men and women MPs in right-wing parties, while they should occur in parties with larger shares of women. Moreover, right-wing parties are more concerned with the protection of traditional values and state authority than left-wing parties (Lye and Waldron 1997; McDonald and Mendes 2003). Accordingly, deviation from norms about the behaviour of proper legislators in parliament and government should be more frequent in left-wing than right-wing parties. To investigate the way sex shapes legislative oversight in left-wing and right-wing parties, we introduced a three-way interaction between change in governing status, MP’s sex, and a party ideology dummy that takes the value 0 for right-wing parties and 1 for left-wing parties (see Robustness Check 9 in Table A.14). We identify party ideology based on data from the MARPOR Project (Volkens et al. 2021). Despite ample reason to expect differences between the way gender shapes legislative oversight in left- and right-wing parties, the predicted change in the oversight activities conditional on ideology mostly mirrors the unconditional effects of sex and change in governing status (see Table A.15). However, within the group of right-wing party MPs, sex differences appear to be generally less pronounced and even approach zero for those of them moving from government to opposition. Yet, even men and women belonging to right-wing parties, who move from opposition into government display substantial differences in the way they adapt their questioning and proposal activities and the gap points into the expected direction. This test hence suggests that our main proposition that women tend to behave in a manner more consistent with institutional roles might be moderated to some degree by party ideology. MPs in left-wing parties appear to be more likely to display the expected patterns than MPs in right-wing parties. The reasons for this variation certainly deserve additional scholarly attention. However, what matters for the present research is that we observe significant differences in the way men and women MPs react to change in their governing status in both, left-wing and right-wing parties.

## ***Table A.16:*** Linear regression of change in the number of questions submitted by MPs on their sex and change in government and opposition status (control variable for the number of questions submitted to a ministry responsible for a “feminine” portfolio, Robustness Check 10).

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Model 31 |
| Dependent variable | Questions |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | 27.165\*\*\* |
|  | (4.095) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0) | -26.926\*\*\* |
|  | (2.720) |
| Man MP | 0.754 |
|  | (1.494) |
| Gov. to opp. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | -8.149\* |
|  X Man MP | (4.129) |
| Opp. to gov. (Ref: No change) (Δt-1 to t0)  | 9.975\*\*\* |
|  X Man MP | (2.625) |
|  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |
| Experience (t0) | -0.223 |
|  | (0.174) |
| Whip (gaining office) (ref: staying in  | -2.083 |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.677) |
| Whip (leaving office) (ref: staying in  | -11.395\* |
|  office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (4.801) |
| Whip (staying out of office) (ref: staying | 1.663 |
|  In office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.531) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (gaining office)  | -0.363 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.717) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (leaving office)  | 2.932 |
|  (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.462) |
| Committee (vice-) chair (staying out of  | 2.478\*\* |
|  office) (ref: staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (0.907) |
| PPG chair (gaining office) (ref: staying  | 10.045 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (7.546) |
| PPG chair (leaving office) (ref: staying  | 2.310 |
|  in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (3.927) |
| PPG chair (staying out of office) (ref:  | 3.800\* |
|  staying in office) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.752) |
| Mandate (list to district) (ref: both times  | -1.737 |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.831) |
| Mandate (district to list) (ref: both times  | 5.962\* |
|  district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (2.489) |
| Mandate (both times list) (ref: both  | 1.798 |
|  times district mandate) (Δt-1 to t0) | (1.179) |
| Electoral safety (Δt-1-t0) | 8.062\*\*\* |
|  | (2.321) |
| Share of questions to ministry with  | 0.059\*\*\* |
|  feminine portfolio (t0) | (0.017) |
| Government duration (Δt-1 to t0) | 0.013\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-1, ln) | 🗸 |
| Party dummies | 🗸 |
| LP dummies | 🗸 |
| Constant | -3.113 |
|  | (3.570) |
| Observations | 6854 |
| *R*2 | 0.522 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.519 |

*Annotations:* Standard errors clustered at the MP-level.

With \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5, + p<0.1.

In a last test, we take sex differences in the substantial priorities of men and women MPs into account (Höhmann 2020; Celis 2006). One could argue that engagement in the legislative oversight in some policy areas could be more volatile than others, so that sex differences in policy priorities could correlate with sex differences in change in legislative oversight activities. To test this rationale, we draw on the advantage that questions are directed to a specific ministry, which allows us to identify the policy area they address. We add a control variable to the main model for questions that identifies the share of questions that an MP submitted to a ministry that covers policy-making responsibilities in a portfolio that is assigned with stereotypically feminine responsibilities (Robustness Check 10 in table A.16). To identify such ministries, we follow the coding of Kroeber and Hüffelmann (2021) and code the following ministries as feminine: Work and social affairs (Arbeit und Sozialordnung/Arbeit und Soziales), education and research (Bildung und Forschung/Bildung und Wissenschaft/Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie), family (Familie und Jugend/Familie und Jugendfragen/Familie und Senioren/Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Gesundheit/Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit/Jugend, Familie, Frauen und Gesundheit), health (Gesundheit), and women (Frauen und Jugend). We find no change in the key effects for questions due to this modification. Since minor requests and proposals are not explicitly linked to a specific ministry, we cannot run a similar test for these variables.

## ***Table A.17:*** Comparison of coefficients of robustness tests

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **Questions** | **Minor requests** | **Proposals** |
|  |  | Sex diff. in opp (gov to opp/opp) | Sex diff. in gov (opp to gov/gov) | Sex diff. in opp (gov to opp/opp) | Sex diff. in gov (opp to gov/gov) | Sex diff. in opp (gov to opp/opp) | Sex diff. in gov (opp to gov/gov) |
|  | Main Model | -8.317\* | 10.300\*\*\* | 4.143\*\*\* | 2.788\*\*\* | -0.911\*\* | 0.530+ |
| RC1 | General ECM | -6.911+ | 10.410\*\*\* | 3.874\*\*\* | 2.591\*\*\* | -0.905\*\* | 0.522+ |
| RC2 | Poisson model for DV at t0 |  | 0.494\* |  | 0.945\*\*\* |  | 0.317\*\*\* |
| RC3 | Excluding outliers | -5.294\*\* | 6.325\*\*\* | 0.557\*\* | -0.050 | -0.860\*\*\* | 0.282+ |
| RC4 | Alternative operationalization of change in government status (reference category gov.) | -11.412\*\* | 7.052\*\* | 2.611\*\*\* | 1.165\* | -1.234\*\*\* | 0.199 |
| RC5 | Control for junior/senior coalition partner | -8.175\* | 10.100\*\*\* | 3.898\*\*\* | 2.545\*\*\* | -0.852\*\* | 0.565\* |
| RC6 | Years 1994-2013 only | 3.488 | 8.224\* | 1.864\*\*\* | 3.966\*\* | -0.652\* | 0.386 |
| RC7a | Elec vuln MP | -9.416+ | 8.668\*\* | 3.706\*\*\* | 3.934\*\*\* | -0.881\* | 0.863\* |
| RC7b | Elec safe MP | -19.276 | 12.796+ | 3.078\*\* | 3.247+ | -1.683\* | 0.232 |
| RC8a | District MP | -15.843+ | 6.763+ | 4.388\*\* | 4.325\*\*\* | -1.344\*\*\* | 0.422 |
| RC8b | List MP | -6.380 | 13.749\*\*\* | 2.677\*\* | 1.901+ | -1.023\*\* | 0.561 |
| RC9 | Leftist MP | -8.195 | 4.654 | 6.960\*\*\* | 4.877\*\*\* | -1.300+ | -0.001 |
| RC10 | CV Feminine portfolio | -8.149\* | 9.975\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |

Table A.17 provides an overview over all robustness tests and the strength and level of statistical significance of key coefficients in these tests. Overall, these additional model specifications show that the findings presented in the main model are robust to a broad variety of modifications in the modelling strategy, sample, operationalization of the independent variables, and consideration of additional confounders and persist for highly diverse MPs.

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