A Online Appendix

A.1 Correlations between time and respondent characteristics

In Tables A1 and A2 we show that respondents with specific characteristics self-select into doing the VAA at a particular moment of the day and a particular number of days from the election, as discussed in more detail in the paper. The robustness and placebo checks presented in the paper in the rest of the Online Appendix successfully deal with this issue.

Table A1: Predicting hour of the day

	Dependent variable:
	Hour of the day (0-24)
Age	0.010**
	(0.002)
Education	−0.132**
	(0.024)
Female	0.035
	(0.059)
Constant	13.609**
	(0.141)
Observations	30,803
Adjusted R^2	0.012

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

note: Linear model predicting the hour of the day (0-24). Not all dummies shown.

Table A2: Predicting days from the election

	Dependent variable:
	Days from election
Age	0.014**
	(0.001)
Education	−0.019
	(0.011)
Female	−0.023
	(0.026)
Constant	0.487**
	(0.065)
Observations	15,570
Adjusted R^2	0.043

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

note: Linear model predicting days from the election (0-5). Not all dummies shown.

A.2   No controls, indexed outcomes, and matching

In Table A3 we present the main model without control variables. As we would expect with a balanced sample, the estimates do not change substantially. Moreover, in Table A4, we present the main results using the 14-hr treatment window used in the paper with two outcomes that create an index from the voting variables from the Radical Right parties (PVV and FvD). We take the highest scoring populist party. The results are similar to those presented in the paper in Table 2.

Furthermore, in Table A5, we present out main results using matching to control for the covariates. To reiterate, we only control for covariates that can be considered pre-treatment. Even without controlling, there is balance on these covariates. We use matching to control for: age, gender, education, and the province someone is from. The only post-treatment variable we control for is where we have some remaining significant differences between treatment and control groups, which is the 'amounts visited' variable. The matching procedure gives us the same results as the main models presented in the paper.

Table A3: likelihood to vote – 14hr window, without controls

	DV: Party likelihood to vote					
	PVV	FVD	CU	VVD	CDA	D66
Treatment	0.032	0.189	−0.182	0.519**	0.038	0.411**
	(0.108)	(0.134)	(0.122)	(0.136)	(0.118)	(0.120)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	2,119	2,121	2,399	2,020	2,475	2,285

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: linear models predicting voters self-reported likelihood that they would vote for a party on a 10 point Likert scale. The treatment uses the 14-hour window. The model does not include the control variables

Table A4: Probability to vote with indexed outcome for populists

	Dependent variable:
	Highest out of FvD and PVV
Treatment	0.193
	(0.144)
Controls	✓
Observations	1,696

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: likelihood to vote – 14hr window using matching

|	DV: Party likelihood to vote					
	PVV	FVD	CU	VVD	CDA	D66
Treatment	0.175	0.340*	−0.244	0.716**	0.089	0.219
	(0.121)	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.156)	(0.139)	(0.130)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,632	1,620	1,818	1,569	1,870	1,747

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: linear models predicting voters self-reported likelihood that they would vote for a party on a 10 point Likert scale based on Nearest Neighbor matching using the Propensity Score. Respondents were matched using the R-package Matchit. The treatment uses the 14-hour window. Controls include: provincial fixed effects, education, age, gender, and amounts visited.

A.3   Changing the end-time of the treatment window

Furthermore, we show the results when increasing the size of the treatment windows for all different parties in Figure A1. The figure indicates that the overall results are consistent with what we have reported before.

Figure A1: Increasing size of treatment windows: all parties

A.4 Sensitivity Analysis

In Table A6 and Figure A2, we report the results from the sensitivity analysis tools from (Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020). We run the analysis on 'age', which is a continuous covariate that captures a respondent's age. The balance test presented in Table 1 indicated that people in the treatment group were slightly younger, which may indicate a violation of the temporal ignorability assumption if the treatment caused younger people to participate in the survey. In addition, the two tests (Tables A1 and A2) that check whether specific types of people self-select into doing the survey at a given day or moment of the day—which would be another type of violation of the temporal ignorability assumption—also indicate that age is an important covariate. This makes age a good covariate for sensitivity analysis because it is the strongest potential confounder in the main model.

The results ($RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$) indicate that unobserved confounders that explain 4.7% of the residual variance of both the outcome and the treatment are strong enough to bring the estimate to a value where it is statistically insignificant from zero at the 95% level. It follows from this that any unobserved confounders that do *not* explain more than 4.7% of the residual variance in both treatment and outcome are not strong enough to explain the presented results. Age, the covariate on which there is the most imbalance, explains 2.8% of the variation in the outcome and 1% of the variation in the treatment. As shown in Figure A2, this implies that even if any unobserved covariates are confounding three times as much as Age, they would still not render the results insignificant. It seems relatively unlikely that there are any such confounders because education, gender, and age are some of the most salient political lines of division in the Netherlands, and among those age correlated most strongly with self-selection into the VAA (see Tables A1 and A2). The most important alternative variable that we are missing is income, yet income generally does not have effects larger than age or education on voting (Kriesi et al., 2008), nor are there reasons to expect why people with a particular income are substantially more likely to do the survey at a given moment of the day. In all, the sensitivity analyses shows that our results seem robust to unobserved confounders, which indicates that our design likely addresses the issue of self-selection into taking the VAA.

Table A6: Sensitivity analysis for the VVD result

Outcome: *VVD*						
Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D|\mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$
Treatment	0.573	0.145	3.941	0.9%	9.1%	4.7%
df = 1692			*Bound (1x age)*: $R^2_{Y \sim Z|\mathbf{X},D} = 2.8\%$, $R^2_{D \sim Z|\mathbf{X}} = 1\%$			

Figure A2: Sensitivity analysis for the VVD result

A.5   Binary vote-choice outcome

A reader familiar with VAAs might wonder why we do not use a question on the exact party a respondent indicates she will vote for as an outcome alongside the 'Likelihood to vote' 0-10 scales that we use in the main paper. Such questions are common in VAAs, including ours, and might serve as a robustness check. However, since the question asks for voting on a specific party—as opposed to feelings about a party—it is much less sensitive to smaller changes in attitudes, meaning that the design will have less power when using these questions. That being said, in Table A7 and Figure A3 we show the results for these question. Overall, the main result holds: there is a positive effect for the VVD, albeit at a lower level of confidence. All in all, we believe these additional results also provide evidence for our argument because the signs are all in the expected direction. Generally, the results are less significant for four reasons, none which we believe are reasons for concern. First, the sample is smaller as the question is later in the VAA. Second, there is less variation because these are binary outcomes as opposed to 10-step Likert scales. Third, direct changes in vote behavior are a more extreme outcome than liking a party more, thus the effect is bound to be smaller (and therefore less significant). Fourth, these questions come after the voting advice and are thus influenced by the voting advice.

Table A7: Which party will you vote for – 14hr treatment window

	DV: Party likelihood to vote					
	PVV	FVD	CU	VVD	CDA	D66
Treatment	0.011	−0.017	−0.003	0.020	−0.007	−0.005
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,682	1,682	1,682	1,682	1,682	1,682

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: linear probability models predicting the party voters self-report they will vote for. The treatment treatment uses the 14-hour window. Controls include: provincial fixed effects, education, age, gender, and amounts visited.

Figure A3: Increasing size of treatment windows: all parties, which party question

A.6 Alternative treatment windows

In Tables A8, A9, and A10, we present the results using the other windows around the event that are discussed in the paper. To reiterate, these are the windows that are presented in the balance table in the main paper (Table 1). The two models that also have decent balance alongside the 14-hr window used in the paper (the 8-hr and 24-hr window) show similar results.

Table A8: Probability to vote - Same-day Window

| | DV: Party likelihood to vote | | | | | |
	PVV	FVD	CU	VVD	CDA	D66
Treatment	−0.169	−0.098	0.191	0.178	0.105	0.521***
	(0.170)	(0.196)	(0.198)	(0.213)	(0.192)	(0.174)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	857	856	962	820	1,001	927
Note:						*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A9: Probability to vote - 8-Hour Window

| | DV: Party likelihood to vote | | | | | |
	PVV	FVD	CU	VVD	CDA	D66
Treatment	0.131	0.152	−0.224	0.770***	0.076	0.401**
	(0.142)	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.191)	(0.171)	(0.158)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,006	1,010	1,143	968	1,179	1,089
Note:						*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A10: Probability to vote - 24-Hour Window

| | DV: Party likelihood to vote | | | | | |
	PVV	FVD	CU	VVD	CDA	D66
Treatment	0.116	−0.083	−0.271***	0.263***	−0.0005	0.119
	(0.072)	(0.087)	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.077)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	5,706	5,731	6,338	5,480	6,520	6,073
Note:						*p<0.05; **p<0.01

A.7 Heterogeneous effects by ideology

In Table A11, we interact the main treatment effect reported in Table 2 with respondent left-right ideology. Ideology is captured using the policy questions in the VAA, which are aggregated to form a single left-right score for each respondent. In the application, this score is used to place respondents on the election compass and calculate respondent distance to a particular party. The results indicate that there may be a triple interaction effect between ideology and being in Utrecht for the FvD. To further investigate this effect, we model the triple interaction term as shown in Table A12. To facilitate interpretation, we visualize the predicted outcome on the FvD scale in Figure A4. The results indicate that the treatment had a positive effect for right wing voters who are not from Utrecht, while a negative effect for right wing voters who are from Utrecht. Note that in the sample as a whole, we do not find a significant interaction effect with Ideology.

Figure A4: Predicted outcome for the triple interaction for the FvD

Table A11: Main effects interacted with ideology

	PVV	FvD	VVD	CDA	CU	D66	PVV	FvD	VVD	CDA	CU	D66
Treatment	0.178	0.125	0.590**	0.014	−0.139	0.283*	0.018	−0.016	0.604*	0.113	−0.125	0.480*
	(0.130)	(0.156)	(0.163)	(0.149)	(0.157)	(0.141)	(0.190)	(0.227)	(0.238)	(0.214)	(0.224)	(0.209)
right wing	1.363**	1.598**	2.163**	1.073**	−0.010	−0.484*	1.314**	1.292**	2.037**	1.114**	0.037	−0.362
	(0.191)	(0.231)	(0.235)	(0.219)	(0.233)	(0.209)	(0.241)	(0.293)	(0.297)	(0.277)	(0.292)	(0.272)
Treatment X right wing	−0.272	0.233	−0.125	−0.044	−0.228	0.097	0.018	1.014**	−0.212	−0.008	−0.119	0.021
	(0.244)	(0.296)	(0.302)	(0.283)	(0.300)	(0.269)	(0.316)	(0.383)	(0.390)	(0.364)	(0.382)	(0.356)
Intercept	0.369	1.794**	4.416**	4.561**	2.670**	7.518**	0.125	1.688**	4.663**	4.741**	2.803**	7.345**
	(0.308)	(0.369)	(0.384)	(0.350)	(0.369)	(0.334)	(0.387)	(0.467)	(0.481)	(0.439)	(0.458)	(0.430)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
With Utrecht	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓						
R^2	0.150	0.181	0.166	0.058	0.016	0.161	0.185	0.223	0.171	0.078	0.022	0.162
Adj. R^2	0.138	0.170	0.154	0.047	0.005	0.151	0.166	0.205	0.151	0.061	0.003	0.145
Num. obs.	1789	1785	1715	2073	2011	1926	948	961	918	1154	1110	1043

$**\,p < 0.01$; $*\,p < 0.05$. Left and Right ideology is determined based on someone's position on the VAA election compass. The baseline for right wing is being Left-wing. Controls include age, education, gender, province and amounts visited.

Table A12: Main effects interacted with ideology and being in Utrecht

	PVV	FvD	VVD	CDA	CU	D66
Treatment	0.328	0.253	0.550*	−0.097	−0.178	0.118
	(0.180)	(0.218)	(0.228)	(0.213)	(0.223)	(0.198)
right wing	1.424**	2.307**	2.362**	1.193**	0.031	−0.652
	(0.327)	(0.398)	(0.404)	(0.390)	(0.405)	(0.362)
Not in Utrecht	−0.105	−0.056	−0.540*	−0.132	0.120	−0.651**
	(0.200)	(0.239)	(0.253)	(0.229)	(0.240)	(0.215)
Treatment X right wing	−0.660	−1.218*	−0.006	−0.345	−0.598	0.212
	(0.408)	(0.499)	(0.509)	(0.493)	(0.512)	(0.455)
Treatment X Not in Utrecht	−0.307	−0.264	0.029	0.167	0.062	0.318
	(0.260)	(0.311)	(0.328)	(0.299)	(0.314)	(0.281)
right wing X Not in Utrecht	−0.113	−0.986*	−0.342	−0.202	−0.133	0.326
	(0.402)	(0.487)	(0.496)	(0.472)	(0.493)	(0.442)
Treatment X Right wing X Not in Utrecht	0.665	2.209**	−0.235	0.407	0.575	−0.267
	(0.514)	(0.623)	(0.640)	(0.609)	(0.636)	(0.568)
Intercept	0.896**	2.010**	5.337**	4.721**	2.875**	8.165**
	(0.230)	(0.275)	(0.291)	(0.267)	(0.281)	(0.253)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.148	0.187	0.158	0.044	0.013	0.159
Adj. R^2	0.137	0.177	0.147	0.034	0.002	0.149
Num. obs.	1789	1785	1715	2073	2011	1926

**$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$. Left and Right ideology is determined based on someone's position on the VAA election compass. The baseline for right wing is being Left-wing. The baseline for Utrecht is being in Utrecht. Controls include age, education, gender and amounts visited.