**Appendix A**Timeline and invitation mechanism of the PB cases

**Table 5**

*Timeline of the PB cases*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |   | Round 1: choosing themes |  |  | Round 2a: dividing budget |  |  | Round 2b:proposing projects |  |  | Round 3: choosing projects |  |
| Duiven | ○ | 18/02/19  | ○ |  | 28/02/19 |  |  | 20/02/19 | ○ |  | 28/02/19 | ○ |
| Amsterdam Old-East | ○ | 01/03/20 (3 hours) |  |  | 05/03/20 (3 hours) | ○ |  | 13/03/20 – 06/04/20\* |  |  | 28/05/20 – 22/06/20\* |  |
| Amsterdam IJburg | ○ | 07/03/20 (3 hours) |  |  | 19/04/20 – 30/04/20\* | ○ |  | 01/05/20 – 09/06/20\* |  |  | 11/09/20 – 05/10/20\* |  |
| Maastricht | ○ | In 4 locations: 27/09/21, 04/10/21, 07/01/22, 10/01/22 (2 hours) |  | ○ | In 2 locations: 16/04/22, 21/04/22 (2,5 hours) | ○ |  | 22/04/22 – 06/06/22\* |  | ○ | 23/10/22 (4 hours) | ○ |

*Note.* \*Took place online, ○ survey.

**Table 6**

*Invitation mechanisms of the PB cases*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Case | Invitation mechanism |
| Duiven | Citizens self-selected and were invited through local media and civil servants asking around at public spaces.  |
| Amsterdam Old-East | Citizens self-selected and were invited through local media. |
| Amsterdam IJburg | Citizens self-selected and were invited through local media. |
| Maastricht | Citizens self-selected and were invited through random invitations and local media. |

**Appendix B**

Survey responses

**Table 7**

*Overview of survey responses for all samples and per case*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Duiven | Amsterdam Old-East | Amsterdam IJburg | Maastricht | All samples |
| *Meeting*  | *1st* | *Last* | *1st* | *Last* | *1st* | *Last* | *1st* | *Last* | *1st* | *Last* |
| N participants | 82 | 40 | 63 | 44 | 63 | 210\* | 127 | 63 | 335 | 357 |
| N responses | 59 | 31 | 45 | 36 | 48 | 43 | 108 | 59 | 260 | 169 |
| Response rate (in %) | 72 | 77.5 | 71.4 | 81.8 | 76.2 | 20.5\* | 85 | 93.7 | 77.6 | 47.3 |

\* This meeting was held online due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in more participants.

**Appendix C**

Descriptive statistics

**Table 8**

*Descriptive statistics for participants who filled out at least one survey and participants who filled out both surveys*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Filled out at least 1 survey | Filled out both surveys |
| Average populist attitudes pre-survey | 3.23 (.75) | 3.10 (.69) |
| Average populist attitudes post-survey | 3.14 (.82) | 3.07 (.79) |
| High populists: average populist attitudes pre-survey | 4.00 (.38) | 3.92 (.45) |
| High populists: average populist attitudes post-survey | 3.58 (.81) | 3.58 (.81) |
| Low populists: average populist attitudes pre-survey | 2.77 (.48) | 2.78 (.47) |
| Low populists: average populist attitudes post-survey | 2.87 (.70) | 2.87 (.70) |
| N minimum | 163 | 71 |

*Note.* Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. Differences between the samples were tested with independent samples *t*-tests. None of the differences were statistically significant.

**Table 9**

*Demographics and political attitudes for all participants and for citizens with high and citizens with low populist attitudes*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All sample | *High populist* | *Low populist* |
| N | 71 | 20 | 51 |
| Average age | 56.93 (13.51) | 58.35 (11.11) | 57.16 (14.56) |
| Percentage female | 46.00 (.50) | 55.00 (.51)  | 43.14 (.50) |
| Average level of education (1=primary education – 6=university education) | 5.21 (.88) | 5.00 (.86) | 5.33 (.91) |
| Average level of political interest (1= not at all interested – 4= very interested) | 3.17 (.70) | 3.23 (.90) | 3.15 (.61) |
| Average level of satisfaction with local democracy (0=not at all satisfied – 10=very satisfied)  | 5.76 (1.79) | 5.58 (1.71) | 5.83 (1.85) |

*Note.* Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. Differences between the groups were tested with one-tailed independent samples *t*-tests. None of the differences were statistically significant.

**Appendix D**

Assumption testing

**D.1 *T*-test of change in populist attitudes for all participants**

Before conducting a paired-samples t-test estimating the effect of participation in a PB on all participants, we checked whether the normality assumption holds by conducting a Shapiro-Wilk Test. The null hypothesis of Shapiro’s test is that the population is distributed normally. The *p*-value of the test is 0.073, which means that our data do not differ significantly from a normal distribution.

**D.2 Difference-in-differences analysis: difference in change in populist attitudes between citizens with high and citizens with low populist attitudes**

To test whether the assumptions for our difference-in-differences (DID) analysis hold, we checked for the normality of all variables used in the paired and unpaired *t*-tests with a Shapiro-Wilk Test, as well as the homogeneity of variances for all variables used in the unpaired *t*-tests with a Bartlett Test.

**Table 10**

*p-values of the Shapiro-Wilk and Bartlett Test for all variables included in the DID analysis*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variable  | *p*-value Shapiro-Wilk Test | *p*-value Bartlett Test |
| Change in populist attitudes: high populist attitudes group | .690 | NA |
| Change in populist attitudes: low populist attitudes group | .015\*\* | NA |
| Difference between groups before PB | .622 | .836 |
| Difference between groups after PB | .073 | .435 |
| Difference in change between groups | .104 | .886 |

As we can see from Table 7, the normality assumption does not hold for the variable ‘change in populist attitudes’ for the low populist attitudes group. We therefore opted to conduct both classic as well as bootstrapped *t*-tests for our DID analysis (Zhu, 1997). Both yield highly similar results but we chose to report the bootstrapped results as this method relaxes the normality assumption.

 The null hypothesis of the Bartlett Test is that the variances are equal for both samples. The null hypothesis could not be rejected and therefore we can assume that our sample does not significantly suffer from heterogeneity of variances.

**D.3 Regression models of change in populist attitudes including demographic and case variables**

We also ensured that all assumptions for the regression analysis hold. First, we verified whether our sample was linear with a residuals versus fitted plot of the dependent variable. This plot displayed no clear pattern and which means we can assume a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Second, we looked at the normality of the residuals with a Shapiro-Wilk Test of residuals. This test showed that our residuals are normally distributed. Third, we checked for heteroscedasticity with both a Non-constant Variance Score Test and a Breusch-Pagan Test. Both tests indicated that the residuals in our model are distributed with equal variance. Fourth, we checked whether our observations were independent with a Durbin Watson Test. The results of this test suggest that our model does not suffer from autocorrelation. Last, we checked for multicollinearity with the aid of a correlation matrix and the Variance Inflation Factor. We found no correlation between the different predictors in the model.

**Appendix E**

Robustness checks

**E.1 Different cut-off points**

We conducted the same analysis as in Table 3 with different cut-off points in order to ensure that our findings are not an artefact of our chosen cut-off point.

**Table 11**

*Difference-in-differences analysis: difference in change in populist attitudes between citizens with high and citizens with low populist attitudes (cut-off point 3.67)*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Before PB | After PB | Change | N |
| High populist | 4.13 | 3.89 | -0.26 (.13)\* | 13 |
| Low populist | 2.86 | 2.88 | 0.02 (.08) | 58 |
| Difference | -1.28 (.13)\*\*\* | -1.00 (.21)\*\*\* | 0.28 (.15) | 71 |

*Note.* Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. High populist (average populist attitudes pre >= 3.67); low populist (average populist attitudes pre < 3.67). Bootstrapped paired samples two-tailed *t*-tests were conducted to assess changes over time. Bootstrapped unpaired samples two-tailed *t*-tests were conducted to assess differences between the groups. The difference between these statistics is the bootstrapped difference-in-differences estimator.

\**p* < 0.1, \*\**p* < 0.05, \*\*\**p* < 0.01.

**Table 12**

*Difference-in-differences analysis: difference in change in populist attitudes between citizens with high and citizens with low populist attitudes (cut-off point 4.00)*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Before PB | After PB | Change | N |
| High populist | 4.28 | 4.05 | -0.23 (.14) | 10 |
| Low populist | 2.90 | 2.91 | 0.01 (.08) | 61 |
| Difference | -1.38 (.13)\*\*\* | -1.14 (.22)\*\*\* | 0.24 (.16) | 71 |

*Note*. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. High populist (average populist attitudes pre >= 4); low populist (average populist attitudes pre < 4). Bootstrapped paired samples two-tailed *t*-tests were conducted to assess changes over time. Bootstrapped unpaired samples two-tailed *t*-tests were conducted to assess differences between the groups. The difference between these statistics is the bootstrapped difference-in-differences estimator.

\**p* < 0.1, \*\**p* < 0.05, \*\*\**p* < 0.01.

**E.2 Regression to the mean**

We tested whether our observed effect could be explained by regression to the mean. For doing so, we conducted the same regression analysis but replaced the variable of interest with a continuous variable.

**Table 13**

*Regression models including demographic and case variables*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Change in populist attitudes |
|  | I | II | III |
| Age | 0.001 (.005) | 0.001 (.006) | 0.002 (.005) |
| Female (ref: male) | -0.141 (.146) | -0.163 (.164) | -0.107 (.161) |
| Education | -0.084 (.082) | -0.077 (.090) | -0.109 (.088) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Duiven (ref: Maastricht) |  | 0.017 (.237) | -0.017 (.230) |
| Amsterdam Old-East (ref: Maastricht) |  | 0.155 (.204) | 0.143 (.197) |
| Amsterdam IJburg (ref: Maastricht) |  | -0.045 (.240) | -0.054 (.232) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Populist attitudes pre |  |  | -0.244 (.107)\*\* |

*Note.* Regression coefficients are unstandardised and shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models are linear regressions where the dependent variable is the change in average populist attitudes (-4; 4) from before to after the PB. Education (1=primary education; 2=lower secondary education; 3=higher secondary education; 4=vocational training; 5=university college education; 6=university education); Populist attitudes pre (1–5).

\**p* < 0.1, \*\**p* < 0.05, \*\*\**p* < 0.01.

**E.3 Outliers**

To detect potential outliers we subjected the minim and maximum levels of change in populist attitudes that were observed to the Grubbs Test. The highest value of 1.67 had a G statistic of 2.794, which is below the critical value of 3.095 and therefore not an outlier. The lowest value of -1.7 yielded a G statistic of 2.749, which is also below the critical value. Therefore, based on the Grubbs’ test, we could not find any outliers in our dataset.

**E.4 Ceiling effects**

In order to account for possible ceiling effects, we first assessed whether there were observations in our dataset that could be affected by ceiling effects. It turned out that two participants increased their populist attitudes to the maximum level of 5 which means that they could have been limited by the upper boundary of our dependent variable. Therefore, we allowed these two observations to increase by the average increase experienced across the other participants in the sample, which is 0.509. Then, we repeated the analysis for the effect of participation on the entire sample, which is depicted in Table 10. Our initial finding remains unchanged.

**Table 14**

*T-test of change in populist attitudes for all participants*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Before PB | After PB | Change | N |
| All participants | 3.10 | 3.08 | **-0.02 (.07)** | 71 |

*Note.* Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Paired *t*-test with two-tailed significance levels.

\**p* < 0.1, \*\**p* < 0.05, \*\*\**p* < 0.01

Subsequently, we repeated the analysis for the effect of participation on citizens with high and low populist attitudes. As can be seen in Table 11, the overall findings do not change after correcting for ceiling effects. The high populist attitudes group still significantly lowers their populist attitudes after participation, while the difference in change between the two groups is still, albeit slightly less, significant.

**Table 15**

*Difference-in-differences analysis: difference in change in populist attitudes between citizens with high and citizens with low populist attitudes*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Before PB | After PB | Change | N |
| High populist | 3.92 | 3.60 | -0.32 (.13)\*\* | 20 |
| Low populist | 2.78 | 2.87 | 0.09 (.08) | 51 |
| Difference | -1.14 (.12)\*\*\* | -0.73 (.22)\*\*\* | 0.41 (.16)\*\* | 71 |

*Note.* Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. High populist (average populist attitudes pre >= 3.5); low populist (average populist attitudes pre < 3.5). Bootstrapped paired samples two-tailed *t*-tests were conducted to assess changes over time. Bootstrapped unpaired samples two-tailed *t*-tests were conducted to assess differences between the groups. The difference between these statistics is the bootstrapped difference-in-differences estimator.

\**p* < 0.1, \*\**p* < 0.05, \*\*\**p* < 0.01

**E.5 Moderator analysis**

**Figure 3**

*Predicted values for change in populist attitudes for citizens with high and low populist attitudes at different levels of satisfaction with the PB*



**Table 16**

*Regression models including demographic and case variables and moderator effect*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Change in populist attitudes |
|  | I | II | III |
| Age | 0.001 (.005) | 0.001 (.006) | 0.004 (.006) |
| Female (ref: male) | -0.141 (.146) | -0.163 (.164) | -0.141 (.169) |
| Education | -0.084 (.082) | -0.077 (.090) | -0.119 (.093) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Duiven (ref: Maastricht) |  | 0.017 (.237) | 0.070 (.260) |
| Amsterdam Old-East (ref: Maastricht) |  | 0.155 (.204) | 0.205 (.213) |
| Amsterdam IJburg (ref: Maastricht) |  | -0.045 (.240) | -0.040 (.287) |
|  |  |  |  |
| High populist attitudes |  |  | 0.390 (.803) |
| Satisfaction with PB  |  |  | -0.006 (.087) |
| High populist attitudes\*satisfaction with PB |  |  | -0.118 (.111) |

*Note.* Regression coefficients are unstandardised and shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models are linear regressions where the dependent variable is the change in average populist attitudes (-4; 4) from before to after the PB. Education (1=primary education; 2=lower secondary education; 3=higher secondary education; 4=vocational training; 5=university college education; 6=university education); High populist attitudes (1=average populist attitudes pre >= 3.5; 0=average populist attitudes pre < 3.5); Satisfaction with PB (1-10).

\**p* < 0.1, \*\**p* < 0.05, \*\*\**p* < 0.01.