

Hazards or Hassles: the Effect of Sanctions on Leader Survival

Online Appendix

10/17/2014


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1. Leader Failure Coding

This paper utilizes a new variable for measuring leaders' exits as "failures" indicative of losing political support rather than simply events which lead to a leader stepping down. The coding scheme acknowledges that leaders may lose office in a variety of ways, including legal, extralegal, and illegal/violent means. Cases of irregular or violent exits will always be coded as "failures", but there are much less dramatic ways to lose political support. Therefore, with research assistance, I investigated further all those cases of exit considered to be "regular" or legal in nature. To distinguish between regular exits which indicate failure and those which do not, I evaluated the political relationship between the outgoing and incoming elites. I categorized these relationships as three types: heir/successor, challenger or neutral. The breakdown of these types across the categories of legal means which I identified can be found in Figure A1 below. Determinations of this relationship were made by drawing on notes in the Archigos codebook (usually referencing either Keasing's or major news publications), rulers.org, national government websites, elections repositories (e.g. Parties and Election in Europe), and LexisNexis news searches of major world newspapers. For more specific information on coding and sourcing, please see the dataset's Codebook available on the author's website.

An exit means is coded as "election" only if the leader actually ran for office. Term limits are assessed using information from national government websites, news and historical accounts, as well as occasionally the CIA World Factbook. "Other constitutional" means include impeachments and coalition dissolution. Resignations were determined by news and historical accounts. Caretaker/interim exits are those in which a temporary regime was set up with a mandate to create a new constitutional order during regime change. The majority of these exits feature a neutral incoming leader; when these interim regimes peacefully hand over power it is



usually because they were headed by either a highly technocratic or a hierarchical military administration, both of which are not readily identifiable with a political party. The unclear category is reserved for unusually chaotic regime changes about which there are conflicting historical accounts.

A turnover is characterized as an heir relationship under the following conditions: the incoming leader is of the same political party (and/or faction within the same political party) as the outgoing leader and no antagonistic statements were located in the contemporaneous media accounts; the incoming leader is described frequently as the “protégé” or groomed “successor” of the outgoing leader in media and historical accounts; the incoming leader is a blood relative of the outgoing leader and no accounts of a rift can be located in the contemporaneous media accounts. Using my criteria, 24% of targeted democratic leader exits and 18% of targeted autocratic leader exits are of the heir/successor type, and thus may not indicate that external punishments broke down the political support base of the administration. All leaders with political heir type exits are listed in Table A3 below.

A turnover is characterized as challenger under the following conditions: the incoming leader is of a different political party (and/or a different faction within the same political party);

contemporaneous media accounts highlight a deep rift between the incoming and outgoing leaders; the incoming leader is expressly not the designated “protégé” or groomed successor of the outgoing leader as described in media and historical accounts; the incoming leader and/or some actors connected to the incoming leader forcibly remove the outgoing leader through extralegal means.

To accommodate occurrences where a leader resigns power to a political protégé in order to avoid being ousted in a less pleasant fashion, an additional variable, called “Severe Political Pressure” (SPP) was also coded. For any case originally coded as a resignation under the Means variable, news accounts were checked for evidence of: popular unrest, coalition/junta/government dissatisfaction, and fear of coups. If evidence was found, the turnover is coded as a failure, even if a political heir takes over. Table A1 below shows the distribution of Successor types by SPP.

Table A1. Types of Successors by Severe Political Pressure

Successor	Severe Political Pressure		Total
	No	Yes	
No Turnover	5,019	0	5,019
Challenger	343	40	383
Heir	202	20	222
Irregular	176	0	176
Technocrat In	3	0	3
Caretaker In	3	0	3
Unity In	1	0	1
Technocrat Out	2	0	2
Technocrat Out	16	0	16
Unity Out	24	2	26
Rotating Executive	35	0	35
No News	4	0	4
Short Term	46	0	46
Total	5,875	61	5,936

Winning coalition failure, then is coded under the following circumstances: irregular turnover, severe political pressure, or regular challenger takeover. In all other cases, failure is right-censored. Table A2 compares exits listed in the Archigos data to the winning coalition failure variable.

Table A2. Comparing Exits to Failures

		Winning Coalition Failure		
		No	Yes	Total
Archigos Exit Codings	Regular	231	441	672
	Natural Death	45	7	52
	Retired Due to Ill Health	10	3	13
	Suicide	1	0	1
	Irregular	0	182	182
	Foreign Intervention	0	8	8
	Total	287	641	928

The cases where wfail2 differs from Marinov’s “fail” variable are listed in Table A4.

The TIES column indicates whether a sanction or threat exists in my sample for this leader year, while HSE indicates whether Marinov’s analysis considered the leader to be under sanction. For ease of access, the leader years discussed in the text – HSE targeted leader years coded as failures which do not meet the criteria of a winning coalition failure – are listed separately in Table A5.

In a larger-scale data collection process, Leeds and Mattes have produced a similar dataset of leader turnovers, “Change in Source of Leader Support” (CHISOLS). The coding procedures used for CHISOLS, however, differ significantly from mine. Specifically, my data procedure always uses the relationship between the incoming and outgoing leaders as the key to determining whether a turnover indicates failure or merely exit. CHISOLS uses a tiered procedure, where the regime type of the state is first considered, and then the turnover is coded using different rules based on the regime type. This difference in coding stems from different motivations for the data collection project. CHISOLS is concerned first and foremost with

whether a turnover indicates that a new social group has gained power, rather than with whether a leader's exit indicates a loss of political support. While using Archigos *exit* as the dependent variable in an assessment of foreign policy tools' ability to destabilize leaders risks over-stating an effect, CHISOLS may risk under-stating it. This is because, for autocratic regimes, CHISOLS requires a change in *regime type* in order to code positively. For example, if coding a turnover in a military autocracy, CHISOLS looks to determine whether the junta remains in place, while my project looks to determine whether the outgoing leader was replaced with a rival or an heir within the military clique and whether the resignation was preceded by political pressure.

Table A3. Instances of Political Heir Turnovers in Full Sample

	Country	Leader	Year	Successor Name	Sanction	Threat	Means	SPP	wfail2
1	United States	Nixon	1974	Ford	1	1	Resignation	1	1
2	United States	Reagan	1989	Bush	1	1	Term Limit	0	0
3	Canada	Trudeau	1984	Turner	1	1	Resignation	0	0
4	Canada	Mulroney	1993	Kim Campbell	1	0	Resignation	1	1
5	Haiti	Duvalier, Francois	1971	Duvalier, Jean-	0	0	Death	0	0
6	Haiti	Aristide	1996	Preval	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
7	Haiti	Preval	2001	Aristide	1	1	Term Limit	0	0
8	Jamaica	Manley	1992	Patterson	0	0	Resignation	0	0
9	Trinidad	Williams	1981	Chambers	0	0	Death	0	0
10	Mexico	Diaz Ordaz	1970	Echeverria Alvarez	0	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
11	Mexico	Echeverria Alvarez	1976	Lopez Portillo	0	0	Election	0	0
12	Mexico	Lopez Portillo	1982	de La Madrid	1	0	Election	0	0
13	Mexico	de La Madrid	1988	Salinas	1	0	Election	0	0
14	Mexico	Salinas	1994	Zedillo	1	1	Election	0	0
15	Guatemala	Arana Osorio	1974	Laugerud Garcia	0	0	Election	0	0
16	Guatemala	Laugerud Garcia	1978	Lucas Garcia	1	1	Election	0	0
17	Honduras	Lopez Arellano	1971	Cruz	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
18	Honduras	Reina	1998	Flores Facusse	1	1	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
19	El Salvador	Sanchez Hernandez	1972	Molina	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
20	El Salvador	Molina	1977	Romero Mena	1	0	Term Limit	0	0
21	El Salvador	Cristiani	1994	Calderon Sol	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
22	El Salvador	Calderon Sol	1999	Flores	1	0	Term Limit	0	0
23	El Salvador	Flores	2004	Saca González	1	0	Term Limit	0	0
24	Costa Rica	Trejos	1970	Figueres Ferrer	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
25	Costa Rica	Figueres Ferrer	1974	Quiros, Daniel	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
26	Costa Rica	Monge Alvarez	1986	Arias	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
27	Panama	Torrijos Herrera	1981	Florez Aguilar	0	0	Death	0	0
28	Panama	Dario Paredes	1983	Noriega	0	0	Resignation	0	0

Table A3 Continued			Year	Successor Name	Sanction	Threat	Means	SPP	wfail2
29	Colombia	Lopez Michelsen	1978	Turbay	0	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
30	Colombia	Vargas	1990	Trujillo	0	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
31	Colombia	Trujillo	1994	Pizano	1	1	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
32	Colombia	Arango	2002	Alvaro Uribe Velez	1	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
33	Venezuela	Lusinchi	1989	Andres Perez	1	0	Term Limit	0	0
34	Guyana	Burnham	1985	Hoyte	0	0	Death	0	0
35	Guyana	Jagan Cheddi	1997	Samuel Hinds	0	0	Death	0	0
36	Guyana	Janet Jagan	1999	Bharrat Jagdeo	0	0	Death	0	0
37	Ecuador	Gustavo Noboa	2003	Lucio Gutierrez	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
38	Peru	Belaunde	1985	Garcia Perez	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
39	Brazil	Medici	1974	Geisel	0	0	Resignation	0	0
40	Brazil	Geisel	1979	Figueiredo	1	1	Resignation	0	0
41	Brazil	Mello	1992	Franco, Itamar	1	1	Other Constitutional	0	0
42	Bolivia	Ovando Candia	1970	Torres	0	0	Resignation	1	1
43	Bolivia	Siles Zuazo	1985	Paz Estenssoro	0	0	Resignation	1	1
44	Bolivia	Banzer Suarez	2001	Jorge Quiroga Ramirez	0	0	Resignation	0	0
45	Paraguay	Wasmosy Monti	1998	Cubas Grau	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
46	Chile	Aylwin	1994	Frei Ruiz-Tagle	1	0	Term Limit	0	0
47	Argentina	Lanusse	1970	Levingston	0	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
48	Argentina	Campora	1973	Lastiri	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
49	Argentina	Peron	1974	Peron, Isabel	0	0	Death	0	0
50	Argentina	Videla	1981	Viola	1	1	Resignation	0	0
51	Uruguay	Pacheco Areco	1972	Bordaberry	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
52	United Kingdom	Wilson	1976	Callaghan	0	0	Resignation	0	0
53	United Kingdom	Thatcher	1990	Major	1	0	Resignation	1	1
54	Ireland	Lynch	1979	Haughey	0	0	Resignation	0	0
55	Netherlands	van Agt	1982	Lubbers	0	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
56	Belgium	Tindemans	1978	Vanden Boeynants	0	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
57	Belgium	Vanden Boeynants	1979	Martens	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
58	Belgium	Martens	1981	Eyskens, M.	0	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0

Table A3 Continued			Year	Successor Name	Sanction	Threat	Means	SPP	wfail2
59	Belgium	Eyskens, M.	1981	Martens	0	0	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
60	Belgium	Martens	1992	Dehaene	1	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
61	Spain	Franco	1975	Juan Carlos	0	0	Death	0	0
62	Portugal	Soares	1996	Sampaio	1	0	Term Limit	0	0
63	Germany West	Brandt	1974	Schmidt	0	0	Resignation	0	0
64	Poland	Gomulka	1970	Gierek	0	0	Resignation	1	1
65	Austria	Kreisky	1983	Sinowatz	0	0	Resignation	0	0
66	Austria	Sinowatz	1986	Vranitzky	0	0	Resignation	0	0
67	Austria	Vranitzky	1997	Klima	1	1	Resignation	0	0
68	Hungary	Kadar	1988	Grosz	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
69	Hungary	Peter Medgyessy	2004	Ferenc Gyurcsany	0	0	Resignation	1	1
70	Czechoslovakia	Husak	1989	Calfa	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
71	Czech Republic	Zeman	2002	Spidla	0	0	Resignation	0	0
72	Italy	Rumor	1970	Colombo	0	0	Resignation	1	1
73	Italy	Colombo	1972	Andreotti	0	0	Resignation	0	0
74	Italy	Andreotti	1973	Rumor	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
75	Italy	Rumor	1974	Moro	0	0	Resignation	1	1
76	Italy	Moro	1976	Andreotti	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
77	Italy	Andreotti	1979	Cossiga	0	0	Election	0	0
78	Italy	Cossiga	1980	Forlani	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
79	Italy	Fanfani	1987	Goria	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
80	Italy	Goria	1988	Mita	0	0	Resignation	1	1
81	Italy	Mita	1989	Andreotti	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
82	Italy	Dini	1996	Prodi	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
83	Albania	Hoxha	1985	Alia	0	0	Death	0	0
84	Albania	Fatos Nano	1998	Majko	0	0	Resignation	1	1
85	Albania	Majko	1999	Meta	0	0	Resignation	0	0
86	Albania	Meta	2002	Majko	0	0	Resignation	0	0
87	Albania	Majko	2002	Fatos Nano	0	0	Resignation	0	0
88	Macedonia	Crvenkovski	2004	Radmila Sekerinska	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0

Table A3 Continued			Year	Successor Name	Sanction	Threat	Means	SPP	wfail2
89	Macedonia	Radmila Sekerinska	2004	Hari Kostov	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
90	Macedonia	Hari Kostov	2004	Radmila Sekerinska	0	0	Resignation	0	0
91	Macedonia	Radmila Sekerinska	2004	Vlado Buckovski	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
92	Croatia	Tudjman	1999	Pavletic	0	0	Death	0	0
93	Croatia	Pavletic	2000	Tomcic	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
94	Yugoslavia	Kolisevski	1980	Mijatovic	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
95	Slovenia	Drnovsek	2002	Anton Rop	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
96	Greece	Karamanlis	1980	Rallis	0	0	Resignation	0	0
97	Cyprus	Clerides	1974	Makarios	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
98	Cyprus	Makarios	1977	Kyprianou	0	0	Death	0	0
99	Bulgaria	Zhivkov	1989	Mladenov	0	0	Resignation	1	1
100	Bulgaria	Mladenov	1990	Lukanov	0	0	Resignation	1	1
101	Estonia	Vahi	1997	Siimann	1	1	Resignation	0	0
102	Latvia	Birkavs	1994	Gailis	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
103	Georgia	Ioseliani	1992	Shevardnadze	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
104	Azerbaijan	H. Aliyev	2003	Ilhma Aliyev	0	0	Resignation	0	0
105	Finland	Koivisto	1994	Marthi Ahtisaari	1	1	Unclear/Chaotic	0	0
106	Finland	Marthi Ahtisaari	2000	Halonen	1	1	Resignation	0	0
107	Sweden	Carlsson	1996	Persson	1	1	Resignation	0	0
108	Norway	Borten	1971	Bratteli	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
109	Norway	Bratteli	1976	Nordli	0	0	Resignation	0	0
110	Norway	Nordli	1981	Brundtland	0	0	Resignation	0	0
111	Norway	Willoch	1986	Brundtland	0	0	Resignation	0	0
112	Norway	Brundtland	1996	Jagland	1	1	Resignation	0	0
113	Norway	Bondevik	1998	Lahnstein	1	1	Resignation	0	0
114	Norway	Lahnstein	1998	Bondevik	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
115	Denmark	Krag	1972	Jorgensen	0	0	Resignation	0	0
116	Guinea-Bissau	Correia Seabra	2003	Henrique Pereira Rosa	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
117	Mali	Konare	2002	Amadou Toure	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
118	Senegal	Senghor	1980	Diouf	0	0	Resignation	0	0

Table A3 Continued			Year	Successor Name	Sanction	Threat	Means	SPP	wfail2
119	Mauritania	Ould Bouceif	1979	Ould Sidi	0	0	Death	0	0
120	Niger	Kountche	1987	Seibou	0	0	Death	0	0
121	Ivory Coast	Houphouet-Boigny	1993	Konan Bedie	0	0	Death	0	0
122	Guinea	Toure	1984	Beavogui	0	0	Death	0	0
123	Liberia	Tubman	1971	Tolbert	0	0	Death	0	0
124	Liberia	Taylor	2003	Moses Zeh Blah	1	1	Resignation	1	1
125	Sierra Leone	Stevens	1985	Momoh	0	0	Resignation	0	0
126	Nigeria	Abacha	1998	Abubakar	1	1	Death	0	0
127	Uganda	Paulo Muwanga	1980	Obote	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
128	Kenya	Kenyatta	1978	Moi	0	0	Death	0	0
129	Tanzania	Nyerere	1985	Mwinyi	0	0	Resignation	0	0
130	Tanzania	Mwinyi	1995	Mkapa	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
131	Burundi	Kinigi	1994	Ntarymira	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
132	Burundi	Buyoya	2003	Ndayizeye	0	0	Resignation	0	0
133	Djibouti	Gouled Aptidon	1999	Guelleh	0	0	Resignation	0	0
134	Angola	Neto	1979	Dos Santos	0	0	Death	0	0
135	Mozambique	Machel	1986	Chissano	0	0	Death	0	0
136	Zambia	Chiluba	2002	Levy Mwanawasa	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
137	Malawi	Muluzi	2004	Bingu wa Mutharika	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
138	South Africa	Vorster	1978	Botha	1	0	Resignation	0	0
139	South Africa	Heunis	1989	Botha	1	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
140	South Africa	Mandela	1999	Mbeki	1	0	Resignation	0	0
141	Lesotho	Mokhehle	1998	Mosisili	0	0	Resignation	0	0
142	Botswana	Khama	1980	Masire	0	0	Death	0	0
143	Botswana	Masire	1998	Mogae	0	0	Resignation	0	0
144	Swaziland	Subhuza II	1982	Dzeliwe Shongwe	0	0	Death	0	0
145	Swaziland	Ntombe Thwala	1986	Mswati	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
146	Madagascar	Gilles Andriamahazo	1975	Ratsiraka	0	0	Resignation	0	0
147	Mauritius	Anerood Jugnauth	2003	Paul Berenger	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
148	Morocco	Hassan II	1999	Muhammad VI	0	0	Death	0	0

Table A3 Continued			Year	Successor Name	Sanction	Threat	Means	SPP	wfail2
149	Algeria	Boumedienne	1978	Bitat	0	0	Death	0	0
150	Algeria	Bitat	1979	Benjedid	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
151	Algeria	Zeroual	1999	Bouteflika	0	0	Resignation	0	0
152	Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1989	Khamenei	1	1	Death	0	0
153	Iran	Khamenei	1989	Rafsanjani	1	1	Resignation	0	0
154	Iran	Rafsanjani	1997	Khatami	1	1	Resignation	0	0
155	Turkey	Ozal	1989	Akbulut	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
156	Turkey	Demirel	1993	Erdal Inonu	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
157	Turkey	Abdullah Gul	2003	Erdogan	1	1	Other Constitutional	0	0
158	Iraq	Hassan Al-Bakr	1979	Saddam Hussein	0	0	Resignation	0	0
159	Egypt	Nasser	1970	Sadat	0	0	Death	0	0
160	Syria	Al-Khatib	1971	Al-Assad H.	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
161	Syria	Al-Assad H.	2000	Bashar al-Assad	1	1	Death	0	0
162	Lebanon	Sarkis	1982	Gemayel, Amin	0	0	Resignation	0	0
163	Israel	Meir	1974	Rabin	0	0	Resignation	0	0
164	Israel	Begin	1983	Shamir	1	1	Resignation	0	0
165	Saudi Arabia	Khalid	1982	Fahd	1	0	Death	0	0
166	Saudi Arabia	Fahd	1996	Abdullah	1	1	Death	0	0
167	Yemen South	Ali Nassir Hassani	1978	Ismail	1	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
168	Yemen South	Attas	1990		0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
169	Kuwait	Sabah As-Sabah	1977	Jabir As-Sabah	0	0	Death	0	0
170	Bahrain	Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah	1999	Hamad Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah	0	0	Death	0	0
171	Afghanistan	Mojadidi	1992	Burhanuddin Rabbani	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
172	China	Mao Tse-Tung	1976	Hua Guofeng	0	0	Death	0	0
173	China	Hua Guofeng	1980	Deng Xiaoping	0	0	Resignation	0	0
174	China	Deng Xiaoping	1997	Jiang Zemin	1	1	Death	0	0
175	China	Jiang Zemin	2003	Hu Jintao	1	1	Resignation	0	0
176	Taiwan	Chiang Kai-shek	1975	Yen Chia-Kan	0	0	Death	0	0
177	Taiwan	Yen Chia-Kan	1978	Chiang Ching-Kuo	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
178	Taiwan	Chiang Ching-Kuo	1988	Lee Teng-Hui	0	0	Death	0	0

Table A3 Continued			Year	Successor Name	Sanction	Threat	Means	SPP	wfail2
179	Korea North	Kim Il-Sung	1994	Kim Jong-Il	1	0	Death	0	0
180	Korea South	Park Choong Hoon	1980	Chun Doo Hwan	0	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0
181	Korea South	Chun Doo Hwan	1988	Roh Tae Woo	1	1	Term Limit	0	0
182	Korea South	Roh Tae Woo	1993	Kim Young Sam	1	1	Term Limit	0	0
183	Korea South	Kim Dae Jung	2003	Roh Moo Hyun	1	1	Term Limit	0	0
184	Japan	Miki	1976	Fukuda	0	0	Resignation	0	0
185	Japan	Nakasone	1987	Takeshita	1	0	Term Limit	0	0
186	Japan	Hosokawa	1994	Hata	1	1	Resignation	1	1
187	Japan	Obuchi	2000	Mikio Aoki	1	1	Death	0	0
188	Bhutan	Wangchuk, Jigme Dorji	1972	Wangchuck, Jigme Singye	0	0	Death	0	0
189	Bhutan	Lyonpo Jigme Thinley	1999	Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
190	Bhutan	Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup	2000	Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
191	Bhutan	Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba	2001	Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
192	Bhutan	Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk	2002	Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
193	Bhutan	Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji	2003	Lyonpo Jigme Thinley	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
194	Bhutan	Lyonpo Jigme Thinley	2004	Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
195	Myanmar (Burma)	Ne Win	1988	Sein Lwin	1	0	Resignation	1	1
196	Myanmar (Burma)	Sein Lwin	1988	Maung Maung	1	0	Resignation	1	1
197	Myanmar (Burma)	Saw Maung	1992	Than Shwe	1	1	Resignation	0	0
198	Sri Lanka	Jayewardene	1989	Premadasa	0	0	Resignation	0	0
199	Nepal	Mahendra	1972	Birendra	0	0	Death	0	0
200	Nepal	Birendra	1990	Krishna Prasad Bhattraai	1	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
201	Nepal	Krishna Prasad Bhattraai	1991	Girija Prasad Koirala	0	0	Election	0	0
202	Nepal	Girija Prasad Koirala	1999	Krishna Prasad Bhattraai	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
203	Nepal	Lokendra Bahadur Chand	2003	Surya Bahadur Thapa	0	0	Resignation	1	1
204	Thailand	Sangad	1977	Kriangsak	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
205	Thailand	Panyarachun	1992	Kraprayoon	1	1	Other Constitutional	0	0
206	Laos	Phomivan	1992	Phounsavanh	1	1	Death	0	0
207	Laos	Phounsavanh	1998	Siphandon	0	0	Resignation	0	0
208	Malaysia	Rahman	1970	Razak	0	0	Resignation	1	1

Table A3 Continued			Year	Successor Name	Sanction	Threat	Means	SPP	wfail2
209	Malaysia	Razak	1976	Hussein Bin Onn	0	0	Death	0	0
210	Malaysia	Hussein Bin Onn	1981	Mahatir Bin Mohammad	0	0	Resignation	0	0
211	Malaysia	Mahatir Bin Mohammad	2003	Ahmad Badawi	1	1	Resignation	0	0
212	Singapore	Lee Kuan Yew	1990	Goh Chok Tong	1	1	Resignation	0	0
213	Singapore	Goh Chok Tong	2004	Lee Hsien Loong	1	1	Resignation	0	0
214	Philippines	Aquino	1992	Ramos	0	0	Term Limit	0	0
215	Indonesia	Suharto	1998	Habibie	0	0	Resignation	1	1
216	Indonesia	Wahid	2001	Megawati Sukarnoputri	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
217	Australia	Gorton	1971	McMahon	0	0	Other Constitutional	0	0
218	Australia	Hawke	1991	Keating	0	0	Resignation	0	0
219	New Zealand	Holyoake	1972	Marshall	0	0	Resignation	0	0
220	New Zealand	Kirk	1974	Rowling	0	0	Death	0	0
221	New Zealand	Lange	1989	Palmer	1	1	Resignation	0	0
222	Fiji	Ratu Josefa Iloilo	2000	Bainimarama	1	0	Caretaker/Interim	0	0

Table A4. List of Leader Turnovers in Marinov (2004) Coded Differently by Wining Coalition Failure

Country	Year	Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail2
United States	2001	Clinton	G.W. Bush	1	1	0	Term Limit	Challenger	0	1
Canada	1984	Trudeau	Turner		1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Haiti	1971	Duvalier, Francois	Duvalier, Jean-		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Haiti	1996	Aristide	Preval	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Haiti	2001	Preval	Aristide	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Dominican Rep	1982	Guzman Fernandez	Majluta Azar		0	1	Death	Unity Out	0	0
Dominican Rep	1996	Balaguer	Fernandez Reyna	0	1	1	Election	Unity Out	0	0
Jamaica	1992	Manley	Patterson	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Trinidad	1981	Williams	Chambers		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Mexico	1970	Diaz Ordaz	Echeverria Alvarez	0	0	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Mexico	1976	Echeverria Alvarez	Lopez Portillo	0	0	1	Election	Heir	0	0

Table A4. Continued		Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail
Mexico	1982	Lopez Portillo	de La Madrid	0	1	1	Election	Heir	0	0
Mexico	1988	de La Madrid	Salinas	0	1	1	Election	Heir	0	0
Mexico	1994	Salinas	Zedillo	0	1	1	Election	Heir	0	0
Guatemala	1970	Mendez Montenegro	Arana Osorio	0	0	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Unity Out	0	0
Guatemala	1974	Arana Osorio	Laugerud Garcia	0	0	1	Election	Heir	0	0
Guatemala	1978	Laugerud Garcia	Lucas Garcia	1	1	1	Election	Heir	0	0
Guatemala	1996	Leon Carpio	Arzu Yrigoyen	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity Out	0	0
Honduras	1971	Lopez Arellano	Cruz	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Honduras	1982	Paz Garcia	Suazo Cordova	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity Out	0	0
Honduras	1998	Reina	Flores Facusse	0	1	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
El Salvador	1972	Sanchez Hernandez	Molina	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
El Salvador	1977	Molina	Romero Mena	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
El Salvador	1984	Magana Borjo	Duarte	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
El Salvador	1994	Cristiani	Calderon Sol	1	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
El Salvador	1999	Calderon Sol	Flores	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
El Salvador	2004	Flores	Saca González		1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Nicaragua	1972	Anastasio Somoza Debayle		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Costa Rica	1970	Trejos	Figueres Ferrer	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Costa Rica	1974	Figueres Ferrer	Quiros, Daniel	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Costa Rica	1986	Monge Alvarez	Arias	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Panama	1981	Torrijos Herrera	Florez Aguilar		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Panama	1983	Dario Paredes	Noriega	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Colombia	1978	Lopez Michelsen	Turbay	0	0	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Colombia	1990	Vargas	Trujillo	0	1	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Colombia	1994	Trujillo	Pizano	0	1	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Colombia	2002	Arango	Alvaro Uribe Velez		1	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Venezuela	1989	Lusinchi	Andres Perez	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Guyana	1985	Burnham	Hoyte		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Guyana	1997	Jagan Cheddi	Samuel Hinds		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Guyana	1999	Janet Jagan	Bharrat Jagdeo	0	0	1	Death	Heir	0	0

Table A4. Continued		Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail
Ecuador	1979	Poveda Burbano	Roldos Aquilers	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Ecuador	2003	Gustavo Noboa	Lucio Gutierrez		0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Peru	1980	Morales Bermudez	Belaunde	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity Out	0	0
Peru	1985	Belaunde	Garcia Perez	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Brazil	1974	Medici	Geisel	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Brazil	1979	Geisel	Figueiredo	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Brazil	1985	Figueiredo	Sarnay		1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Brazil	1992	Mello	Franco, Itamar	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Bolivia	1989	Paz Estenssoro	Paz Zamora	0	0	1	Resignation	Unity Out	0	0
Bolivia	2001	Banzer Suarez	Jorge Quiroga Ramirez	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Paraguay	1993	Rodriguez Pedotti	Wasmosy Monti	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity Out	0	0
Paraguay	1998	Wasmosy Monti	Cubas Grau	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Chile	1994	Aylwin	Frei Ruiz-Tagle	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Argentina	1970	Lanusse	Levingston		0	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Argentina	1973	Campora	Lastiri		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Argentina	1974	Peron	Peron, Isabel		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Argentina	1981	Videla	Viola	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Uruguay	1972	Pacheco Areco	Bordaberry	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Uruguay	1981	Mendez Manfredini	Alvarez Armalino	1	1	1	Term Limit	Unity Out	0	0
Uruguay	1985	Alvarez Armalino	Sanguinetti	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
United Kingdom	1976	Wilson	Callaghan	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Ireland	1979	Lynch	Haughey	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Ireland	1982	Fitzgerald		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Netherlands	1982	van Agt	Lubbers	0	0	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Belgium	1972	Eyskens, G.		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Belgium	1978	Tindemans	Vanden Boeynants	0	0	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Belgium	1979	Vanden Boeynants	Martens	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Belgium	1981	Martens	Eyskens, M.	0	0	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Belgium	1981	Eyskens, M.	Martens		0	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Belgium	1981	Martens		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0

Table A4. Continued	Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail	
Belgium	1992	Martens	Dehaene	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Switzerland	1970	Tschudi	Gnagi	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1971	Gnagi	Celio	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1972	Celio	Bonvin	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1973	Bonvin	Brugger	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1974	Brugger	Graber	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1975	Graber	Gnagi	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1976	Gnagi	Furgler	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1977	Furgler	Ritschard	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1978	Ritschard	Hurlimann	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1979	Hurlimann	Chevallaz	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1980	Chevallaz	Furgler	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1981	Furgler	Honegger	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1982	Honegger	Aubert	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1983	Aubert	Schlumpf	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1984	Schlumpf	Furgler	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1985	Furgler	Egli	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1986	Egli	Aubert	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1987	Aubert	Stich	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1988	Stich	Delamuraz	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1989	Delamuraz	Koller	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1990	Koller	Cotti	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1991	Cotti	Felber	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1992	Felber	Ogi	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1993	Ogi	Stich	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1994	Stich	Villiger	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1995	Villiger	Delamuraz	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1996	Delamuraz	Koller	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1997	Koller	Cotti	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	1998	Cotti	Dreifuss	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0

Table A4. Continued	Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail	
Switzerland	1999	Dreifuss	Ogi	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	2000	Ogi	Leuenberger	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	2001	Leuenberger	Villiger		1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	2002	Villiger	Pascal Couchepin		1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Switzerland	2003	Pascal Couchepin	Joseph Deiss		1	1	Other Constitutional	Rotating Executive	0	0
Spain	1975	Franco	Juan Carlos		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Spain	1976	Arias Navarro	Suarez Gonzalez	0	0	1	Resignation	Unity Out	0	0
Portugal	1976	Costa Gomes	Eanes	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity Out	0	0
Portugal	1986	Eanes	Soares	0	1	1	Term Limit	Unity Out	0	0
Portugal	1996	Soares	Sampaio	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Germany, West	1974	Brandt	Schmidt	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Austria	1983	Kreisky	Sinowatz	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Austria	1986	Sinowatz	Vranitzky	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Austria	1997	Vranitzky	Klima	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Hungary	1988	Kadar	Grosz	1	1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Hungary	1994	Boross	Horn	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Czechoslovakia	1989	Husak	Calfa	1	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Czech Republic	1998	Tosovsky	Zeman	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Czech Republic	2002	Zeman	Spidla		0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Slovakia	1994	Meciar		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Italy	1972	Colombo	Andreotti	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Italy	1973	Andreotti	Rumor	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Italy	1976	Moro	Andreotti	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Italy	1979	Andreotti	Cossiga	0	0	1	Election	Heir	0	0
Italy	1980	Cossiga	Forlani	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Italy	1987	Fanfani	Goria		1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Italy	1989	Mita	Andreotti	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Italy	1993	Amato	Ciampi	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Unity Out	0	0
Italy	1995	Berlusconi	Dini	0	1	1	Resignation	Technocrat In	0	0
Italy	1996	Dini	Prodi	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0

Table A4. Continued		Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail
Albania	1999	Majko	Meta	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Albania	2002	Meta	Majko		0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Albania	2002	Majko	Fatos Nano		0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Macedonia	2004	Crvenkovski	Radmila Sekerinska		0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Macedonia	2004	Radmila Sekerinska	Hari Kostov		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Macedonia	2004	Hari Kostov	Radmila Sekerinska		0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Macedonia	2004	Radmila Sekerinska	Vlado Buckovski		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Croatia	1999	Tudjman	Pavletic		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Croatia	2000	Pavletic	Tomcic		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Yugoslavia	1980	Tito	Kolisevski		0	1	Death	Unity Out	0	0
Yugoslavia	1980	Kolisevski	Mijatovic	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Slovenia	2000	Drnovsek		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Slovenia	2002	Drnovsek	Anton Rop		0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Greece	1980	Karamanlis	Rallis	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Greece	1989	Grivas	Zolotas	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Cyprus	1974	Clerides	Makarios	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Cyprus	1977	Makarios	Kyprianou		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Bulgaria	1994	Berov	Indzhova	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Technocrat Out	0	0
Romania	1991	Roman	Stolojan	1	1	1	Other Constitutional	Caretaker In	0	0
Romania	1992	Stolojan	Vacariou	1	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Romania	1999	Vasile	Athanasiu		1	1	Other Constitutional	Technocrat In	0	0
USSR	1982	Brezhnev	Andropov	1	1	0	Death	Challenger	0	1
USSR	1985	Chernenko	Gorbachev	1	1	0	Death	Challenger	0	1
Estonia	1997	Vahi	Siimann	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Latvia	1994	Birkavs	Gailis	1	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Georgia	1992	Ioseliani	Shevardnadze		0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Azerbaijan	2003	H. Aliyev	Ilhma Aliyev		0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Finland	1994	Koivisto	Marthi Ahtisaari	0	1	1	Unclear/Chaotic	Heir	0	0
Finland	2000	Marthi Ahtisaari	Halonen	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Sweden	1996	Carlsson	Persson	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0

Table A4. Continued		Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail
Norway	1971	Borten	Bratteli	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Norway	1976	Bratteli	Nordli	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Norway	1981	Nordli	Brundtland	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Norway	1986	Willoch	Brundtland	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Norway	1996	Brundtland	Jagland	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Norway	1998	Bondevik	Lahnstein	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Norway	1998	Lahnstein	Bondevik		1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Norway	1998	Bondevik		0	1	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Denmark	1972	Krag	Jorgensen	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	2003	Correia Seabra	Henrique Pereira Rosa		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Mali	1992	Amadou Toure	Konare		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity Out	0	0
Mali	2002	Konare	Amadou Toure		0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Senegal	1980	Senghor	Diouf	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Mauritania	1979	Ould Bouceif	Ould Sidi		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Mauritania	1979	Ould Sidi	Ould Ahmed Louly		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	3	0	0
Niger	1987	Kountche	Seibou		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Niger	1993	Seibou	Ousmane	0	0	1	Resignation	Unity Out	0	0
Ivory Coast	1993	Houphouet-Boigny	Konan Bedie		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Guinea	1984	Toure	Beavogui		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Burkina Faso	1970	Lamizana		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Liberia	1994	Sawyer	Kpormapkor	1	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Liberia	1995	Kpormapkor	Sankawulo	1	0	1	Other Constitutional	Unity Out	0	0
Liberia	1996	Sankawulo	Perry	1	0	1	Other Constitutional	Unity Out	0	0
Sierra Leone	1985	Stevens	Momoh	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Nigeria	1979	Obasanjo	Shagari	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity Out	0	0
Uganda	1980	Paulo Muwanga	Obote	1	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Tanzania	1985	Nyerere	Mwinyi	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Tanzania	1995	Mwinyi	Mkapa	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Burundi	1994	Kinigi	Ntarymira	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Burundi	2003	Buyoya	Ndayizeye		0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0

Table A4. Continued		Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail
Djibouti	1999	Gouled Aptidon	Guelleh	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Mozambique	1986	Machel	Chissano		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Zambia	2002	Chiluba	Levy Mwanawasa		0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Malawi	2004	Muluzi	Bingu wa Mutharika		0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
South Africa	1978	Vorster	Botha	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
South Africa	1989	Botha	Heunis	1	1	1	Resignation	Caretaker In	0	0
South Africa	1989	Heunis	Botha		1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
South Africa	1999	Mandela	Mbeki	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Lesotho	1993	Ramaema	Mokhehle	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity In	0	0
Lesotho	1994	Mokhehle		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Lesotho	1998	Mokhehle	Mosisili		0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Botswana	1998	Masire	Mogae	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Swaziland	1982	Subhuza II	Dzeliwe Shongwe		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Swaziland	1986	Ntombe Thwala	Mswati		0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Madagascar	1975	Gilles Andriamahazo	Ratsiraka		0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Comoros	2002	Azali Assoumani	Hamada Madi		0	1	Resignation	Technocrat Out	0	0
Mauritius	2003	Anerood Jugnauth	Paul Berenger		0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Morocco	1999	Hassan II	Muhammad VI		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Algeria	1978	Boumedienne	Bitat		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Algeria	1979	Bitat	Benjedid	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Algeria	1994	Kafi	Zeroual	1	0	1	Resignation	Caretaker In	0	0
Algeria	1999	Zeroual	Bouteflika	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Sudan	1971	Nimeiri	Osman	0	0	0	Irregular/Violent	Irregular	0	1
Sudan	1986	Abdul Rahman Swaredahab	Al-Mirghani	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Unity Out	0	0
Iran	1989	Ayatollah Khomeini	Khamenei		1	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Iran	1989	Khamenei	Rafsanjani	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Iran	1997	Rafsanjani	Khatami	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Turkey	1972	Erim	Melen	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Turkey	1973	Melen	Talu	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Turkey	1974	Talu	Ecevit	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0

Table A4. Continued		Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail
Turkey	1975	Irmak	Demirel	1	1	1	Other Constitutional	Technocrat Out	0	0
Turkey	1989	Ozal	Akbulut	1	1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Turkey	1993	Demirel	Erdal Inonu	1	1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Turkey	2003	Abdullah Gul	Erdogan		1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Iraq	1979	Hassan Al-Bakr	Saddam Hussein	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Syria	1971	Al-Khatib	Al-Assad H.	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Lebanon	1982	Sarkis	Gemayel, Amin	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Israel	1974	Meir	Rabin	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Israel	1983	Begin	Shamir	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Yemen South	1978	Ali Nassir Hassani	Ismail		1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Yemen, South	1990	Attas		0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Afghanistan	1992	Mojadidi	Burhanuddin Rabbani	0	0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
China	1976	Mao Tse-Tung	Hua Guofeng		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
China	1980	Hua Guofeng	Deng Xiaoping	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
China	2003	Jiang Zemin	Hu Jintao		1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Taiwan	1978	Yen Chia-Kan	Chiang Ching-Kuo		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Taiwan	1988	Chiang Ching-Kuo	Lee Teng-Hui	0	1	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Korea North	1994	Kim Il-Sung	Kim Jong-Il		1	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Korea South	1980	Park Choong Hoon	Chun Doo Hwan		1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0
Korea, South	1988	Chun Doo Hwan	Roh Tae Woo	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Korea, South	1993	Roh Tae Woo	Kim Young Sam	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Korea South	2003	Kim Dae Jung	Roh Moo Hyun		1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Japan	1976	Miki	Fukuda	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Japan	1980	Ohira	Ito		1	1	Death	Unity Out	0	0
Japan	1987	Nakasone	Takeshita	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Japan	2000	Obuchi	Mikio Aoki		1	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Bhutan	1972	Wangchuk, Jigme Dorji	Wangchuck, Jigme Singye		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Bhutan	1999	Lyonpo Jigme Thinley	Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup		0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Bhutan	2000	Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup	Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Bhutan	2001	Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba	Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk	0	0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0

Table A4. Continued		Leader	Successor Name	HSE	TIES	Fail	Means	Successor	SPP	Wfail
Bhutan	2002	Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk	Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji		0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Bhutan	2003	Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji	Lyonpo Jigme Thinley		0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Bhutan	2004	Lyonpo Jigme Thinley	Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba		0	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Pakistan	1997	Khalid	Sharif	1	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Myanmar	1981	Ne Win		0	0	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Myanmar	1992	Saw Maung	Than Shwe	1	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Sri Lanka	1989	Jayewardene	Premadasa	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Nepal	1991	Krishna Prasad Bhattra	Girija Prasad Koirala		0	1	Election	Heir	0	0
Nepal	1999	Girija Prasad Koirala	Krishna Prasad Bhattra		0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Thailand	1975	Sanya	Seni Pramroj		0	1	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	0	0
Thailand	1977	Sangad	Kriangsak	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Thailand	1992	Panyarachun	Kraprayoon	1	1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Laos	1992	Phomivan	Phounsavanh	0	1	1	Death	Heir	0	0
Laos	1998	Phounsavanh	Siphandon	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Malaysia	1981	Hussein Bin Onn	Mahatir Bin Mohammad	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Malaysia	2003	Mahatir Bin Mohammad	Ahmad Badawi		1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Singapore	1990	Lee Kuan Yew	Goh Chok Tong	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Singapore	2004	Goh Chok Tong	Lee Hsien Loong		1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Philippines	1992	Aquino	Ramos	0	1	1	Term Limit	Heir	0	0
Indonesia	2001	Wahid	Megawati Sukarnoputri	0	1	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Australia	1971	Gorton	McMahon	0	0	1	Other Constitutional	Heir	0	0
Australia	1991	Hawke	Keating	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
New Zealand	1972	Holyoake	Marshall	0	0	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
New Zealand	1974	Kirk	Rowling		0	1	Death	Heir	0	0
New Zealand	1989	Lange	Palmer	0	1	1	Resignation	Heir	0	0
Fiji	1987	Mara		0	1	1	Case Ongoing	Case Ongoing	0	0
Fiji	2000	Ratu Josefa Iloilo	Bainimarama	0	1	1	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	0	0

Table A5. Cases of Sanctions coded by Marinov as Failures which are not Coded as Wfail2

Country	Year	Leader	Successor Name	Means	Successor	HSE	Fail	Target	wfail2
Algeria	1994	Kafi	Zeroual	Resignation	Caretaker In	1	1	0	0
Argentina	1981	Videla	Viola	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Brazil	1979	Geisel	Figueiredo	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Czechoslovakia	1989	Husak	Calfa	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	1	1	0	0
El Salvador	1994	Cristiani	Calderon Sol	Term Limit	Heir	1	1	0	0
Estonia	1997	Vahi	Siimann	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Guatemala	1978	Laugerud Garcia	Lucas Garcia	Election	Heir	1	1	1	0
Hungary	1988	Kadar	Grosz	Other Constitutional	Heir	1	1	1	0
Iran	1989	Khamenei	Rafsanjani	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Iran	1997	Rafsanjani	Khatami	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Israel	1974	Meir	Rabin	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Israel	1983	Begin	Shamir	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Latvia	1994	Birkavs	Gailis	Other Constitutional	Heir	1	1	0	0
Liberia	1994	Sawyer	Kpormapkor	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	1	1	0	0
Liberia	1995	Kpormapkor	Sankawulo	Other Constitutional	Unity Out	1	1	0	0
Liberia	1996	Sankawulo	Perry	Other Constitutional	Unity Out	1	1	0	0
Myanmar (Burma)	1992	Saw Maung	Than Shwe	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Pakistan	1997	Khalid	Sharif	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	1	1	1	0
Romania	1991	Roman	Stolojan	Other Constitutional	Caretaker In	1	1	1	0
Romania	1992	Stolojan	Vacariou	Caretaker/Interim	Technocrat Out	1	1	1	0
South Africa	1978	Vorster	Botha	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
South Africa	1989	Botha	Heunis	Resignation	Caretaker In	1	1	1	0
Thailand	1992	Panyarachun	Kraprayoon	Other Constitutional	Heir	1	1	1	0
Turkey	1975	Irmak	Demirel	Other Constitutional	Technocrat Out	1	1	1	0
Turkey	1989	Ozal	Akbulut	Other Constitutional	Heir	1	1	1	0
Turkey	1993	Demirel	Erdal Inonu	Other Constitutional	Heir	1	1	1	0
Uganda	1980	Paulo Muwanga	Obote	Caretaker/Interim	Heir	1	1	0	0
United Kingdom	1976	Wilson	Callaghan	Resignation	Heir	1	1	1	0
Uruguay	1981	Mendez Manfredini	Alvarez Armalino	Term Limit	Unity Out	1	1	1	0

2. Matching Procedure and Estimation of *Ex Ante* Risks

A central contention of this project is that in order to estimate the effect of economic sanctions on leader survival accurately, we must first account for any potential differences in *ex ante* risks of losing office. To achieve this end, I employed matching to sort observations into subclasses of targeted and untargeted leaders facing similar risks of losing office. This procedure required a reasonable estimate of these prior hazards. I modeled leader failure within democratic, autocratic, and anocratic regimes using logistic regression, calculated the linear indices from this regression, lagged them one year, and utilized them as the key factor in nearest neighbor matching using MatchIt (Ho et al. 2011). Below I discuss the specifications in more detail.

Estimating Ex Ante Risks


To obtain estimates of leaders' risks, I separated the samples by regime type, and used a slate of variables which measure institutional facets of leader replacement, major economic and social determinants of leader turnover, regional dummy variables, and duration dependence parameters. Logistic regression fit can be assessed using the Expected Percent Correctly Predicted (EPCP), and I set a bar of 80% as a target for each regression. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to split the democratic population into presidential and parliamentary systems and to separate the fully autocratic leaders from those of middling Polity2 scores. All models now reach the desired threshold of proportional reduction in error, but the parliamentary model just misses the target EPCP.

Most institutional measures came from the Quality of Governance dataset (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg, & Rothstein, 2011). Specifically, the Database of Political Institutions provides the data on opposition size, term limits, executive election years, length of executive

party in office, and democratic type (presidential vs. parliamentary) (Beck, Clarke, Groff, & Walsh, 2001). Authoritarian regime type variables draw from the new Autocratic Regime Data (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, New Data on Autocratic Regimes, 2012) and Wright's (2008) coding of authoritarian legislatures. General consistency of regime type is tapped by lagged Polity2 score (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013). Economic and population data came from (Gleditsch, 2002). Counts of protests and strikes, as well as party and ethnic fractionalization were drawn from the Cross-National Time Series dataset (Banks, 2011). For attempted and past successful coups, the Powell and Thyne (2011) coup dataset was utilized. Natural resource reserves and production information comes from Humphreys (2005).

Tables A6-A9 display the final models, and Figure A2 summarizes the predicted probabilities of failure. The strategy of modeling each regime type separately ensures that a large range of probabilities of failure can be estimated for each. Pooling may result in all democratic leaders receiving a relatively high probability of failure, as they typically face risks greater than those of autocrats. The left hand panel of Figure A2 shows that a large portion of autocratic leaders are very safe in office. As the other panel demonstrates, however, a full range from

Figure A2. Variation in Predicted Probability of Failure in Sample



basically no to very high risk was estimated for each regime type. This is highly desirable, as leaders *ex ante* risks are likely to be evaluated within the context of their regime type, rather than across different types of governments.

Table A6. Logit of Presidential Democracy Winning Coalition Failure

	wfail2
Lagged Polity2	-0.1052** (0.0478)
Checks	-0.0744 (0.1286)
Length of Executive Party's Time in Office	0.1872 (0.1580)
Executive Election This Year	1.2146*** (0.3682)
Number of Other Government Parties	0.2086* (0.1257)
Party Fractionalization	0.0004*** (0.0001)
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/Capita	-6.5724*** (2.4595)
Lagged Logged Real GDP/Capita	0.3561 (0.2379)
Lagged Count of Anti-Government Demonstrations	0.0646 (0.0832)
Lagged Count of General Strikes	0.2140* (0.1268)
Fractionalization	0.8114 (0.7019)
South America	0.5087 (0.3966)
Central America	1.0144** (0.4194)
Cubic Splines of Time in Office	-0.1326*** (0.0442)
	1.1880*** (0.3936)
	-1.8441*** (0.6165)
	-2.1962** (0.9109)
Constant	-8.5133*** (2.2569)
Observations	688
EPCP	81.67%
EPRE	17.83%

Note: Observations are leader years. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table A7. Logit of Parliamentary Democracy Winning Coalition Failure

	wfail2
Lagged Polity2	0.1545 (0.2034)
Executive Party's Length of Time in Office	0.1662** (0.0836)
No Term Limit	3.1006 (1.9441)
Number of Other Government Parties	0.0374 (0.0616)
Difference in Seat Share between Largest Government and Opposition Parties	-1.0972** (0.4885)
Left Government	0.6936** (0.3459)
Party Fractionalization	0.0002 (0.0001)
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/Capita	-2.4534 (3.2349)
Lagged Logged Real GDP/Capita	-1.0306*** (0.2412)
Lagged Population Growth	-18.9042 (21.2439)
Lagged Anti-Government Demonstrations	0.0969* (0.0526)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.0797 (0.9101)
Lagged Oil Production	0.2548** (0.1154)
East Asia	1.6577*** (0.2344)
Middle East	0.9759*** (0.3408)
North America	1.0355*** (0.2863)
Cubic Polynomial of Time Left in Current Term	2.7743*** (0.4396)
	-1.7917*** (0.3277)
	0.2737*** (0.0571)
Constant	4.7265** (1.8545)
Observations	770
EPCP	76.86%
EPRE	10.82%

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table A8. Logit of Autocratic Winning Coalition Failure

	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Lagged Polity2	-0.1850* (0.1023)
Ln(time)× Lagged Polity2	0.0647*** (0.0169)
geddes_monarch	0.4671 (0.6692)
Personalist Regime	-0.2147 (0.3048)
Military Regime	0.6671*** (0.2242)
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/capita	-1.0398 (0.8918)
Lagged Logged Real GDP/capita	-0.0778 (0.1505)
Lagged Count of General Strikes	0.2578 (0.1666)
Lagged Count of Anti-Government Demonstrations	0.0626** (0.0298)
Lagged Count of Failed Coups	0.0500 (0.3246)
Lagged Oil Reserves	-0.0112 (0.0134)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.0749 (0.2541)
Eastern Europe	0.6306* (0.3786)
Cubic Splines of Time in Office	-0.0000 (0.0009)
	0.0013 (0.0065)
	-0.0040 (0.0142)
	-0.0679 (0.1913)
Constant	-0.6086 (1.2282)
Observations	1,978
EPCP	90.12%
EPRE	14.6%

NOTE: Observations are leader years. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table A9. Logit of Anocratic Winning Coalition Failure

VARIABLES	Coefficient (standard error)
Lagged Polity2	0.4091*** (0.1466)
Ln(time)× Lagged Polity2	-0.0532** (0.0243)
Personalist Regime	0.2657 (0.5258)
Military Regime	1.4375** (0.6649)
Party Fractionalization	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Length of Executive Party's Time in Office	0.0316*** (0.0118)
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/capita	-2.8210* (1.5932)
Lagged Logged Real GDP/capita	-0.7288** (0.3029)
Lagged Count of General Strikes	-0.0095 (0.2535)
Lagged Count of Anti-Government Demonstrations	0.0398 (0.0549)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.5667 (1.1197)
Successful Coup in the Past Three Years	-0.1631 (0.3649)
Lagged Oil Reserves	-1.3817* (0.7487)
Lagged Diamond Production	-0.0556 (0.0404)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.7840** (0.8204)
Cubic Splines of Time in Office	0.0016 (0.0016)
	-0.0133 (0.0117)
	0.0294 (0.0263)
	0.3181 (0.3544)
Constant	3.9002 (2.5999)
Observations	481
EPCP	82.11%
EPRE	11.69%

Note: Observations are leader years. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Matching Procedure

Having obtained the estimates of *ex ante* risks described above, I next coded a dummy variable to tap whether a state had ever been involved in a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) with a state that has a high probability of using economic sanctions. I defined likely sanctioners as the top ten most frequent primary sending states in the TIES dataset: US, Canada, India, Mexico, Germany, UK, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Including Israel in this group did not significantly change results. To tap the other side of relations with likely sender states, I also created an index of defense ties by multiplying defense pacts by the frequency of primary sending state status in an episode year format of the TIES dataset. For this measure, I utilized Gibler's (2005) Correlates of War military alliances data. I then used Ho et al.'s (2011) MatchIt software in R to use the linear index of the logistic regressions for leader failure lagged by one year, history of conflict or security ties, and their interaction as the variables in a nearest neighbor matching scheme to classify targets and nontargets with similar risks.

Using a sparse model to perform propensity score matching is nontraditional. However, my primary concern is to guard against confounding of the duration model via variation in *ex ante* risks. Including additional terms in the matching procedure dilutes the match on risks, producing a set of matched cases which are similar in other respects, but less similar in their baseline probability of failure. Concern over the sparseness of the matching model should be tempered by recognition that the linear index from the leader failure logits actually summarizes a large amount of information about each leader and his/her country in the current time period.

Subclassification, rather than exact matching or one of its variants, was utilized due to the structure of the theoretical model employed here (see manuscript page 14). In each sub-regime type, I tested three schemes: one with just the lagged linear index of winning coalition failure,

and one with interactions between *ex ante* risks and each measure of relations with likely sanctioning states. As detailed in the manuscript, balance was maximized in the democratic sample using the MID interaction scheme; in the autocratic, with the defense ties scheme; in the mixed, with just risks included. Figures A3-A5 display the histograms of pre- and post-matching similarity in propensity score between the matched and control samples. Figures A6-A8 contain QQ plots for the best fitting schemes. Tables A10-A12 provide the size of each subclass.

Table A10. Sample Sizes by Democratic Subclass, Matched on Ex Ante Risks and History of Conflict

	<i>Subclass 1</i>	<i>Subclass 2</i>	<i>Subclass 3</i>
Treated	9	229	230
Control	288	150	30
Total	297	379	260

Table 11. Sample Sizes by Autocratic Subclass, Matched on Ex Ante Risks and Alliance Ties

	<i>Subclass 1</i>	<i>Subclass 2</i>	<i>Subclass 3</i>	<i>Subclass 4</i>	<i>Subclass 5</i>	<i>Subclass 6</i>
Treated	67	67	67	67	67	68
Control	315	277	270	294	108	56
Total	382	344	337	361	175	124

Table A12. Sample Sizes by Anocratic Subclass, Matched on Ex Ante Risks

	<i>Subclass 1</i>	<i>Subclass 2</i>	<i>Subclass 3</i>	<i>Subclass 4</i>	<i>Subclass 5</i>	<i>Subclass 6</i>
Treated	30	30	30	30	30	30
Control	42	70	59	52	45	8
Total	72	100	89	82	75	38

For the subsequent analysis, it is very important to assess whether there are sufficient failures of targeted leaders across subclasses to model cross-strata variation in the effect of economic coercion. Put more simply, it is possible that sanctions work differently against leaders who are very likely to be sanctioned than against those who are very unlikely to be. Such heterogeneity in effect can, in principle, be modeled by interactions between subclass indicators and targeting, to allow a slope shift for sanctions against leaders in a certain subclass. However,

initial tests revealed extremely large coefficients for significant sanction-strata interactions in the autocratic and anocratic models. This raises a concern of near or complete separation in the data. If there are not sufficient failures of targeted leaders across the subclasses, the data do not contain enough information to model cross-strata differences. Unfortunately, this appears to be the case. Tables A11-A13 list the number of winning coalition failures in each subclass by targeting.

Table A11. Count of Democratic Winning Coalition Failures by Sanction Type and Subclass

Subclass	All Democratic Leaders Sanctions				Parliamentary Leaders Sanctions			
	No	Threats	Sanctions	Both	No	Threats	Sanctions	Both
1	28	0	0	2	12	0	0	0
2	44	0	17	23	19	0	6	10
3	14	0	8	34	9	0	8	26

Table A12. Count of Autocratic Winning Coalition Failures by Sanction Type and Subclass

Subclass	All Autocratic Leaders Sanctions				Personalist Leaders Sanctions			
	No	Threats	Sanctions	Both	No	Threats	Sanctions	Both
1	9	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
2	14	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
3	33	0	6	2	5	0	0	0
4	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
5	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
6	3	0	3	2	6	0	0	0

Table A13. Count of Anocratic Winning Coalition Failures by Sanction Type and Subclass

Subclass	All Anocratic Leaders Sanctions			
	No	Threats	Sanctions	Both
1	15	1	1	0
2	6	0	1	3
3	11	0	1	4
4	6	0	1	0
5	1	0	2	1

Figure A3. Histogram of Matched Democratic Cases




Figure A4. Histogram of Matched Autocratic Cases




Figure A5. Histogram of Matched Anocratic Cases




Figure A6. QQ Plots of Democratic Subsamples




Figure A7. QQ Plots of Autocratic Sample





Figure A8. QQ Plots for Anocratic Sample



3. Control Variables in Main Analysis

Table A14. Summary of Variable Coding and Sources

Variable	Measurement	Source
Winning Coalition Failure	= 1 if leader left office through irregular/violent means, severe political pressure, or successor is a challenger	Author
Sanction	=1 if an imposed economic sanction against the leader's state within the leader's tenure in that year	TIES (Morgan et al. 2009)
Threat	=1 if a threat of economic sanction exists against the leader's state within the leader's tenure in that year	TIES
Parliamentary Democracy	= 1 if Database of Political Institutions' (DPI) variable <i>system</i> =2, "parliamentary"	DPI (Beck et al. 2001)
Economic Growth	Change in per capita GDP, lagged one year	(Gleditsch 2002)
Party Fractionalization	Divided by 1000 to prevent numerical instability	(Banks 2011)
Imports	Log of value of imports, lagged one year	Gleditsch (2002)
Exports	Log of value of exports, lagged one year	Gleditsch (2002)
Lagged Coup Success	= 1 if successful coup took place in the prior three years	Powell and Thyne (2011)
Lagged Coup Attempt	Count of coups attempted (but failed) in the prior year	Powell and Thyne (2011)
Anti-Government Demonstrations	Count of demonstrations in prior year	Banks (2011)
Strikes	Count of strikes in priorHa year	Banks (2011)
Personalist Regime	= 1 if Geddes regime type = personalist	(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2012)
Monarchy	= 1 if Geddes regime type = monarchy	Geddes et al. (2012)
Military	= 1 if Geddes regime type = military	Geddes et al. (2012)
Legislature	= 1 if a legislature exists in an authoritarian state	(Wright 2008)
MID Target	= 1 if the state was targeted in a MID in the prior year	(Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004)
Lagged Oil Production	Barrels of oil produced per day	Humphreys (2005)
Diamond Production	Diamonds produced per day	Humphreys (2005)

4. Robustness Checks

To assess the robustness of findings to alternative specification, I performed a number of additional tests. I looked into the difference between trade and “security” sanctions, the role of sanctions costs, and the potentially different effects of sanctions sent by the U.S. as opposed to less powerful countries. Each of these issues is discussed in turn below. All major findings proved robust to these alternatives.

Trade Disputes vs. High Politics

As discussed in the manuscript text, analysts often claim that economic restrictions imposed over trade disputes differ fundamentally from those over the “high politics” of political and military influence (e.g. Pape 1997, 1998). This distinction is more difficult to pinpoint when targeted leader years are the unit of analysis, but the TIES issue variable, which codes the stated causes of the dispute, allows it to be addressed. TIES codes each sanctions episode using the typology summarized in Table A15.


Table A15. Issue Coding Scheme in TIES Dataset

Code	Description	Count in Matched Samples*
1	Contain Political Influence	37
2	Contain Military Behavior	1
3	Destabilize Regime	21
4	Release Citizens, Property, Material	2
5	Solve Territorial Dispute	27
6	Deny Strategic Materials	26
7	Retaliate for Alliance or Alignment Choice	139
8	Improve Human Rights	183
9	End Weapons/Materials Proliferation	18
10	Terminate Support of Non-State Actors	49
11	Deter or Punish Drug Trafficking Practices	17
12	Improve Environmental Policies	16
13	Trade Practices	507
14	Implement Economic Reform	1
15	Other	7

*Includes only the *issue1* coding for the first (i.e. the oldest) ongoing episode for each matched leader year. Full analysis loops over all ongoing issues to generate the trade ratio variable.

To separate trade disputes from other sanctions episodes, I first coded a variable *traderatio* which is defined as: $\frac{\text{(number of disputes with issue1 coding 12,13,or 14)}}{\text{(total number of ongoing disputes)}}$. This variable equals zero under two conditions: there are no trade-based disputes ongoing, or there are no disputes of any kind ongoing. The distribution of this variable varies predictably across regime types. Most sanctioned democrats experience threats and punishments exclusively on issues of trade; most autocrats, on more traditional “high politics” issues. Figure A9 displays the distribution of *traderatio* in the matched autocratic and democratic samples.


Figure A9. Proportion of Ongoing Disputes Centered on Trade in Samples



NOTE: Trade defined as issue1= Trade Dispute, Economic Reform, or Environment.

I interacted *traderatio* with the indicator for *threat*, which equals 0 when there is no threat against the leader in the current year, and 1 when there is. By including this interaction and both constitutive terms, I was able to model the conditional effect both of threats (coefficient for

traderatio×*threat*) and sanctions (coefficient for *traderatio*). When interacted with a dummy, the constitutive term for a continuous variable can be interpreted as the effect of that variable when the dummy equals zero. In this case, any time that threat equals zero and *traderatio* does not, then the proportion of trade disputes refers to those in imposed economic sanctions. The results of this specification are displayed in Table A16 contains the results. Across samples, the constitutive and the interaction terms fail to reach statistical significance. Combined effects ($T \times \beta_{traderatio \times threat} + \beta_{threat}$), and ($T \times \beta_{traderatio} + \beta_{sanction}$), where T takes on values from 0 to 1 in .10 increments, reach significance only in the democratic sample. As displayed in Figure A10 below, hazard rates of democratic leaders targeted with threats about security issues are significantly higher than those faced with threats about trade. The increase is substantively significant: risks more than double.



While intriguing, this formulation restricts the effect when trade disputes constitute the entirety of a state’s ongoing sanctions to differ only in *size* from the effect when high security

Table A16. Stratified Cox Models of Winning Coalition Failure with Trade Ratio Interactions

	Democratic	Autocratic	Mixed
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(Std.Err)	(Std.Err)	(Std.Err)
Sanction	-0.0440 (0.2815)	0.6836 (2.8947)	-0.1603 (0.6120)
Threat	1.2442*** (0.3568)	-0.5375 (0.6628)	0.9968 (0.6672)
Trade Ratio	0.1788 (0.2859)	0.9296 (0.6010)	0.1583 (0.8429)
Trade Ratio×threat	-1.3444*** (0.4165)	-1.1685 (1.5371)	-0.5102 (1.1713)
Ln(time) ×sanction		-0.0842 (0.3606)	
Lagged Oil Production×Sanction		2.8694*** (0.9689)	
Oil Production ² ×Sanction		-1.2729*** (0.3767)	
Personalist Regime		-0.1440 (0.4432)	
Target of a MID Last Year	-0.0085 (0.5246)	0.2945 (0.5836)	-0.4693 (0.4826)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0000** (0.0000)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita×Oil		0.0001 (0.0001)	
Lagged Logged Total Imports	0.1686** (0.0770)	-0.9936** (0.4371)	
Lagged Logged Total Imports ²		0.0803** (0.0322)	
Anti-Government Demonstration Indicator		0.2177 (0.2181)	-0.3959 (0.3406)
Successful Coup in Last Three Years		-0.0659 (0.2551)	
Lagged Oil Production		-0.7286 (0.4529)	-0.0967 (0.2051)
Oil Production ²		0.1892*** (0.0610)	
Lagged Diamond Production		-1.2629* (0.6628)	
Parliamentary Democracy	0.2948 (0.2146)		
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/Capita	-5.3645*** (2.0252)		-0.7024 (2.0598)
Count of Anti-Government Demonstrations	-0.0066 (0.0582)		
Count of General Strikes	0.2251** (0.0935)		
Party Fractionalization	0.1482** (0.0628)		
No Term Limit	0.9379* (0.5528)		

Table A16. Continued

General Strike Indicator			0.0285 (0.3556)
Observations	909	1,645	335

NOTE: Unit of analysis is leader year. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

constitutes the whole of a state's problems. If high and low politics really differ substantively, then this restriction will be inappropriate. Accordingly, I also specified a test where dummy variables allow separate effects to be estimated for cases with no trade disputes, all trade disputes, and a mix of trade and security. These models are reported below in Table A17.

Here, the sanction and threat constitutive terms represent the effect of these foreign policy tools when ongoing disputes contain a mix of trade and security issues. The interactions between threat and "No Trade" and "All Trade" give the effects when threats are leveled when trade ratio equals zero and one, respectively. The dummies for No Trade and All Trade are interactions with the sanction indicator to avoid muddying the reference categories; nontargeted leaders are not tapped by these indicators. To interpret the effects, I calculated the combined coefficients: $\beta_{threat} + \beta_{alltrade \times threat}$, $\beta_{threat} + \beta_{notrade \times threat}$, $\beta_{sanction} + \beta_{alltrade}$, $\beta_{sanction} + \beta_{notrade}$. In the autocratic sample, the interaction between threat and all trade is omitted, due to lack of failures in this category. Including it produces a very large, negative coefficient.

Again, threats against democratic leaders involved in security vs. trade disputes differ. While a mix of threats does not significantly differ from a completely security-based slate of disputes, both conditions feature risks of failure higher than not being targeted at all. Threats in

Table A17. Stratified Cox of Winning Coalition Failure with Trade Disputes and Security Disputes Separated by Dummy Variables

	Democratic	Autocratic	Anocratic
	Coef. (St.Err.)	Coef. (St.Err.)	Coef. (St.Err.)
Sanction	-0.0196 (0.2864)	1.5706 (2.5708)	0.6074 (0.6844)
Threat	0.6412** (0.3262)	0.1791 (0.9611)	3.4567** (1.3670)
All Trade	0.3099 (0.2765)	0.9547 (0.6401)	0.8385* (0.4986)
All Trade×Threat	-0.9513** (0.3872)		-4.4636*** (1.4606)
No Trade	-0.0432 (0.3240)	0.7269 (0.7473)	-1.0763 (0.6962)
No Trade×threat	0.6037 (0.4753)	-1.2820 (1.1511)	-2.2362 (1.8044)
Ln(time)×sanction		-0.2493 (0.3354)	
Lagged Oil Production×Sanction		2.3865** (0.9989)	
Oil Production ² ×Sanction		-1.1419*** (0.3569)	
Personalist Regime		-0.1307 (0.4348)	
Target of a MID Last Year	-0.0270 (0.4971)	0.1844 (0.5430)	-0.8532 (0.5423)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0000** (0.0000)	-0.0001** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita×Oil		0.0001 (0.0001)	
Lagged Logged Total Imports	0.1342 (0.0882)	-1.0838** (0.4305)	-0.1580 (0.1513)
Lagged Logged Total Imports ²		0.0862*** (0.0312)	
Anti-Government Demonstration Indicator		0.1707 (0.2064)	-0.4432 (0.3674)
Successful Coup in Last Three Years		-0.0271 (0.2525)	
Lagged Oil Production		-0.6734 (0.4493)	0.1436 (0.1569)
Oil Production ²		0.1767*** (0.0590)	
Lagged Diamond Production		-1.2149* (0.6442)	
Parliamentary Democracy	0.3282 (0.2124)		
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/Capita	-5.4626*** (2.0333)		0.2441 (2.1561)
Count of Anti-Government Demonstrations	0.0027 (0.0587)		
Count of General Strikes	0.2202** (0.0937)		

Table A17 Continued.


Party Fractionalization	0.1633**		
	(0.0655)		
No Term Limit	0.9811*		
	(0.5745)		
General Strike Indicator		0.2692	
		(0.3341)	
Observations	909	1,645	334

NOTE: Unit of analysis is leader year. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

completely trade-related disputes (recall that the significant, negative coefficient on All Trade×Threat is a slope shift, not a full effect on its own) produce no significant difference between targeted and untargeted leaders. See Figure A11 for the comparisons between targeted and non-targeted leaders by the nature of underlying disputes. The anocratic model also indicates that dispute type matters. The poor results of the matching schemes in this set of leaders, though, leave me unwilling to emphasize these findings. They are not likely to be robust if *ex ante* risks matter.

Figure A11. Risks Compared to Nontargeted Leaders by Type of Dispute



NOTE: Figures plotted are hazard ratios from stratified Cox models including trade ratio and its interaction with threats. Bars give 95% confidence bounds calculated using the Delta method via Stata's lincom utility.

As indicated in Figure A9, the bulk of sanctioned democratic leaders are involved, not in politico-military disputes with senders, but with arguments over trade practices. It is not, however, a completely unheard of occurrence for democratic leaders to be the targets of economic coercion over broadly security-based issues. Table A18 lists the 120 leader years in the matched sample of democratic leaders whose slate of ongoing sanctions episodes feature at least an even split between military and security concerns.

Table A18. List of Matched Democratic Leaders Involved in Security Disputes

count	country	Year	Leader	Sanction	Threat	Subclass	wfail2	Trade Ratio
1	Argentina	1983	Bignone	1	1	3	1	0.333333
2	Australia	1981	Fraser	0	0	2	0	0
3	Austria	1984	Sinowatz	0	0	2	0	0
4	Bangladesh	1991	Ahmed	0	0	3	1	0
5	Bolivia	1982	Torrelío Villa	1	0	2	1	0
6	Canada	1979	Trudeau	1	0	3	1	0
7	Chile	1994	Aylwin	1	0	2	0	0
8	Chile	1995	Frei Ruiz-Tagle	1	0	2	0	0
9	Chile	1996	Frei Ruiz-Tagle	1	0	2	0	0
10	Chile	2000	Frei Ruiz-Tagle	1	0	2	1	0
11	Chile	2004	Ricardo Lagos Escobar	1	0	2	0	0
12	Colombia	1980	Turbay	0	0	2	0	0
13	Czech Republic	1997	Klaus	0	0	2	1	0
14	Ecuador	1979	Poveda Burbano	0	0	2	0	0
15	France	1977	Giscard D'Estaing	0	0	2	0	0
16	France	1978	Giscard D'Estaing	0	0	3	0	0
17	France	1983	Mitterand	1	0	2	0	0.333333
18	France	1984	Mitterand	1	0	3	0	0.333333
19	France	1985	Mitterand	1	0	3	0	0.333333
20	France	1986	Mitterand	1	0	3	0	0.5
21	France	1987	Mitterand	1	1	3	0	0.5
22	France	1988	Mitterand	1	0	2	0	0.333333
23	France	1989	Mitterand	1	0	3	0	0.333333
24	France	1990	Mitterand	1	0	3	0	0.333333
25	France	1991	Mitterand	1	0	2	0	0.333333
26	Germany West	1980	Schmidt	0	0	3	0	0
27	Germany West	1981	Schmidt	0	0	2	0	0
28	Germany West	1982	Schmidt	1	0	2	1	0
29	Germany West	1984	Kohl	0	0	3	0	0

Table A18. Continued		Year	Leader	Sanction	Threat	Subclass	wfail2	Trade Ratio
30	Germany West	1985	Kohl	0	0	3	0	0
31	Germany West	1986	Kohl	1	0	3	0	0.333333
32	Germany West	1987	Kohl	1	1	3	0	0.333333
33	Germany West	1988	Kohl	0	0	3	0	0
34	Haiti	1994	Cedras	1	1	2	1	0
35	India	1978	Desai	1	0	2	0	0
36	India	1979	Desai	1	1	3	1	0
37	India	1980	Charan Singh	1	1	3	1	0
38	India	1981	Gandhi, I.	1	1	3	0	0
39	India	1982	Gandhi, I.	1	1	3	0	0.5
40	Indonesia	1999	Habibie	0	0	2	1	0.5
41	Indonesia	2000	Wahid	0	0	2	0	0.333333
42	Israel	1977	Rabin	0	0	3	1	0
43	Israel	1978	Begin	0	0	3	0	0
44	Israel	1979	Begin	0	0	3	0	0
45	Israel	1980	Begin	0	0	3	0	0
46	Israel	1981	Begin	1	0	3	0	0
47	Israel	1982	Begin	1	0	3	0	0
48	Israel	1983	Begin	1	1	3	0	0
49	Israel	1984	Shamir	1	1	3	1	0
50	Israel	1985	Peres	1	1	3	0	0
51	Israel	1986	Peres	1	1	3	1	0
52	Israel	1987	Shamir	1	1	3	0	0
53	Israel	1988	Shamir	1	1	2	0	0
54	Israel	1989	Shamir	1	1	3	0	0
55	Israel	1990	Shamir	1	1	3	0	0
56	Israel	1991	Shamir	1	1	3	0	0
57	Israel	1992	Shamir	1	1	2	1	0
58	Israel	1993	Rabin	1	1	3	0	0
59	Israel	1994	Rabin	1	1	3	0	0

Table A18. Continued		Year	Leader	Sanction	Threat	Subclass	wfail2	Trade Ratio
60	Israel	1995	Rabin	1	1	2	1	0
61	Israel	1996	Peres	1	1	2	1	0
62	Israel	1997	Netanyahu	1	1	3	0	0
63	Israel	1998	Netanyahu	1	1	3	0	0
64	Israel	1999	Netanyahu	1	1	3	1	0
65	Israel	2000	Barak	1	1	3	0	0
66	Japan	1979	Ohira	0	0	2	0	0
67	Japan	1980	Ohira	1	0	2	0	0
68	Japan	1981	Suzuki	1	1	2	0	0
69	Japan	1982	Suzuki	1	0	3	1	0.5
70	Japan	1984	Nakasone	0	0	3	0	0
71	Japan	1985	Nakasone	0	0	2	0	0.5
72	Japan	1986	Nakasone	1	0	2	0	0.5
73	Netherlands	1977	den Uyl	0	0	2	1	0
74	Netherlands	1980	van Agt	0	0	2	0	0
75	New Zealand	1985	Lange	1	0	2	0	0.5
76	New Zealand	1988	Lange	1	1	2	0	0.5
77	Norway	1984	Willoch	0	0	3	0	0
78	Norway	1985	Willoch	0	0	2	0	0
79	Norway	1986	Willoch	0	0	2	0	0.5
80	Norway	1987	Brundtland	0	0	3	0	0
81	Norway	1990	Syse	1	0	2	1	0.5
82	Norway	1994	Brundtland	1	0	2	0	0.5
83	Norway	1998	Bondevik	1	1	3	0	0.5
84	Norway	1999	Bondevik	1	1	3	0	0.333333
85	Norway	2000	Bondevik	1	1	3	1	0.333333
86	Paraguay	1997	Wasmosy Monti	0	0	2	0	0
87	Paraguay	1998	Wasmosy Monti	0	0	2	0	0
88	Paraguay	2000	Gonzalez Macchi	0	0	2	0	0
89	Paraguay	2003	Gonzalez Macchi	0	0	2	1	0

Table A18. Continued		Year	Leader	Sanction	Threat	Subclass	wfail2	Trade Ratio
90	Paraguay	2004	Nicanor Duarte Frutos	0	0	2	0	0
91	Portugal	1985	Eanes	1	0	2	0	0.5
92	Portugal	1988	Soares	1	0	2	0	0.5
93	Portugal	1991	Soares	1	0	2	0	0.5
94	Portugal	1992	Soares	1	0	3	0	0.5
95	Portugal	1995	Soares	1	0	2	0	0.5
96	Portugal	1996	Soares	1	0	2	0	0.5
97	South Africa	1993	deKlerk	1	0	2	0	0
98	South Africa	1994	deKlerk	1	0	2	1	0
99	Sri Lanka	2002	Kumaratunga	0	0	2	0	0.5
100	Turkey	1991	Akbulut	1	0	3	1	0.5
101	Turkey	1992	Demirel	1	0	3	0	0.5
102	Turkey	1994	Ciller	0	0	3	0	0.5
103	United Kingdom	1977	Callaghan	0	0	3	0	0
104	United Kingdom	1979	Callaghan	1	0	2	1	0
105	United Kingdom	1980	Thatcher	1	0	3	0	0.25
106	United Kingdom	1982	Thatcher	1	0	3	0	0.2
107	United Kingdom	1983	Thatcher	1	0	3	0	0.25
108	United Kingdom	1984	Thatcher	1	0	3	0	0.25
109	United Kingdom	1985	Thatcher	1	0	3	0	0.25
110	United Kingdom	1986	Thatcher	1	0	3	0	0.25
111	United Kingdom	1988	Thatcher	1	0	3	0	0.333333
112	United Kingdom	1990	Thatcher	1	0	3	1	0.333333
113	United Kingdom	1991	Major	1	0	3	0	0.333333
114	United Kingdom	1992	Major	1	0	3	0	0.5
115	United States	1979	Carter	1	0	2	0	0.166667
116	United States	1980	Carter	1	1	2	0	0.428571
117	United States	1981	Carter	1	1	2	1	0.454546
118	United States	1982	Reagan	1	1	3	0	0.5
119	United States	1990	Bush	1	1	3	0	0.5

Table A18. continued		Year	Leader	Sanction	Threat	Subclass	wfail2	Trade Ratio
120	Venezuela	1980	Campins	0	0	2	0	0

Costs of Sanctions

A reasonable objection to the strategy pursued in the manuscript is that it treats sanctions which will never cause significant economic dislocation exactly the same as those which may be very costly in real terms. In part, this is again a function of changing focus to leaders rather than sanctions episodes in particular. Determining the costs of sanctions, though, is generally a difficult task. To assess the possible importance of costly sanctions I used to strategies.

First, I included the average value of TIES sendercosts and targetcosts variables, which take on three values: 1 “minor”, 2 “major”, 3 “severe”. The missingness rate on these variables is quite high, around 30%. Averaging across cases, skipping over those with missing data, is partially a strategy to avoid throwing out data. It is also important to acknowledge that for many leaders, there is more than one set of costs to be evaluated. Even so, the averages on these variables is very close to “1”, minor. This is also the modal category for both variables, so using the mode would generally produce the same results. Neither variable comes anywhere close to statistical significance, in the democratic and anocratic models. Table A19 contains the full results. In the autocratic model, sender costs is significant and positive: Higher average sender costs heighten the risk of targeted autocratic leaders. However, it is important to note that the addition of these variables is not supported by Bayesian Information Criterion Tests: this model does not perform as well as one omitting a measure of costliness.

Table A19. Stratified Cox Model of Winning Coalition Failure Controlling for Average Cost of Sanctions to Sender and Target

	Democratic	Autocratic	Anocratic
Sanction	0.2132 (0.3114)	2.0110 (2.3400)	-0.3079 (0.4888)
Sanction×ln(time)		-0.4067 (0.3004)	
Sanction×Oil Production		2.6618** (1.0794)	
Sanction×Oil Production ²		-1.1276*** (0.4338)	

Table A19. Continued			
Threat	0.1322 (0.2440)	-0.8750* (0.5073)	0.8603 (0.5994)
Personalist Regime		-0.1711 (0.4348)	
Target of MID last year	0.1067 (0.5562)	0.2061 (0.5699)	-0.4630 (0.4676)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001* (0.0000)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita for Oil Producing States		0.0001 (0.0001)	
Average Target Costs	0.0917 (0.2594)	-0.0785 (0.1527)	0.0059 (0.3315)
Average Sender Costs	-0.1516 (0.3211)	1.5198*** (0.5531)	0.2125 (0.4219)
Anti-Government Demonstrations (Indicator)		0.3277 (0.2185)	-0.3456 (0.3298)
Successful Coup in Last Three Years		-0.0883 (0.2556)	
Lagged Oil Production		-0.5894 (0.5309)	-0.0646 (0.1451)
Lagged Oil Production ²		0.1570** (0.0694)	
Lagged Diamond Production		-1.1849* (0.6548)	
Parliamentary Democracy	0.3536 (0.2362)		
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/Capita	-5.2862*** (1.9897)		-0.4663 (2.0374)
Count of Demonstrations	0.0387 (0.0581)		
Count of General Strikes	0.2151** (0.0853)		
Party Fractionalization	0.1671*** (0.0631)		
No Term Limits	0.8750 (0.5712)		
General Strike (Indicator)			0.0006 (0.3665)
Observations	930	1,693	335
BIC	1318.29	619	289.07

NOTE: Unit of analysis is leader year. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

The second strategy for measuring costs averages the trade flows between the target state and its sending states, both imports from and exports to the primary sender (if there is one). I logged and lagged these variables. These variables do not produce a consistent pattern of

significance across regime types. In the democratic model, they fail significance tests. In the autocratic model, imports insulate leaders while exports destabilize. The reverse holds in anocratic systems. Generally, BIC tests support the qualitative operationalization of costs in Table A19 to those in A20. But, the original models, omitting a measure of the costliness of sanctions are strongly supported by the BIC test over either measurement strategy.

Table A20. Stratified Cox Model of Winning Coalition Failure Controlling for Average Volume of Trade between Sender and Target

	Democratic Coef. (Std.Err.)	Autocratic Coef. (Std.Err.)	Anocratic Coef. (Std.Err.)
Sanction	0.1248 (0.3093)	1.0329 (2.5194)	-0.1388 (0.4367)
Sanction×ln(time)		-0.1136 (0.3128)	
Sanction×Oil Production		2.5622*** (0.8710)	
Sanction×Oil Production ²		-1.0237*** (0.3227)	
Threat	0.1284 (0.2474)	-0.9672** (0.4606)	1.2464** (0.5337)
Personalist Regime		-0.2921 (0.4662)	
Target of MID last year	0.0966 (0.5686)	0.2848 (0.5838)	-0.3003 (0.5166)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0001** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0000)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita for Oil Producing States		0.0001 (0.0001)	
Lagged Logged Average of Imports from Senders to Target	0.0165 (0.1588)	-0.4882** (0.2091)	0.4553* (0.2337)
Lagged Logged Average of Exports to Senders from Target	-0.0085 (0.1547)	0.5432*** (0.1829)	-0.5448* (0.2810)
Anti-Government Demonstrations (Indicator)		0.4467 (0.2870)	-0.3899 (0.3221)
Successful Coup in Last Three Years		-0.1442 (0.2891)	
Lagged Oil Production		-0.5490 (0.4928)	-0.0560 (0.1813)
Lagged Oil Production ²		0.1468** (0.0598)	
Lagged Diamond Production		-1.3138* (0.7041)	
Parliamentary Democracy	0.3678 (0.2385)		
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/Capita	-5.2609*** (2.0062)		-0.2491 (1.9355)

Table A20. Continued

Count of Demonstrations	0.0350 (0.0565)		
Count of General Strikes	0.2190** (0.0890)		
Party Fractionalization	0.1666*** (0.0618)		
No Term Limits	0.8840 (0.5691)		
General Strike (Indicator)			-0.1045 (0.3647)
Observations	930	1,693	335
BIC	1318.47	628.40	286.36

NOTE: Unit of analysis is leader year. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

U.S. Sanctions

The United States has the largest economy in the world and is also the most frequent user of economic sanctions. It is possible that being denied access to this economy is more damaging than restrictions in trade with other states. I test this by determining whether any of the ongoing sanctions disputes for a country feature the United States as a primary sender and interacting this variable with threats, as in the analyses above. The results is displayed in Table A21 below.

In the model of democratic leader failure, sanctions from the United States have no different effect than those from other countries. Against autocrats, threatened economic sanctions from the United States do differ: autocratic leaders threatened by states other than the U.S. are saver than those under threat from America. This appears to support the argument that American economic clout matters. Yet, these results should not be overstated for several reasons. First, compared to unthreatened leaders, those hit with U.S. threats are no more nor less likely to fail. Second, imposed sanctions from the U.S. appear to be no different than punishments inflicted by other states. Lastly, BIC tests do not support the inclusion of these additional interactions. The difference in BIC's is 13.

Table A21. Stratified Cox Model of Winning Coalition Failure Controlling for Sanctions from the United States

	Democratic	Autocratic	Anocratic
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(Std.Err.)	(Std.Err.)	(Std.Err.)
Sanction	0.2452 (0.3257)	0.5096 (2.9236)	-0.2974 (0.5794)
Threat	-0.1672 (0.4511)	-1.5611** (0.6850)	0.4034 (0.8225)
USever	-0.4102 (0.3047)	0.2386 (0.4531)	0.1224 (0.4207)
USever×threat	0.4558 (0.4805)	0.8598 (0.8367)	0.9379 (0.9736)
Sanction×ln(time)		-0.0659 (0.3620)	
Sanction×Oil Production		3.3527*** (0.9915)	
Sanction×Oil Production ²		-1.5497*** (0.4121)	
Personalist Regime		-0.1718 (0.4534)	
Target of MID last year	0.0453 (0.5952)	0.2154 (0.5520)	-0.6582 (0.4936)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0000* (0.0000)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita for Oil Producing States		0.0001 (0.0001)	
Lagged Logged Total Imports	0.1326 (0.0895)	-1.2321*** (0.4499)	-0.0997 (0.1402)
Lagged Logged Total Imports ²		0.1012*** (0.0335)	
Anti-Government Demonstrations (Indicator)		0.2025 (0.2329)	-0.2276 (0.3610)
Successful Coup in Last Three Years		-0.0593 (0.2479)	
Lagged Oil Production		-0.8276* (0.4897)	-0.0250 (0.1558)
Lagged Oil Production ²		0.1962*** (0.0623)	
Lagged Diamond Production		-1.2199* (0.6608)	
Parliamentary Democracy	0.3315 (0.2356)		
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/Capita	-6.0125*** (2.1273)		-0.9857 (2.2924)
Count of Demonstrations	0.0147 (0.0564)		
Count of General Strikes	0.2394*** (0.0916)		
Party Fractionalization	0.1503** (0.0656)		
No Term Limits	0.9061 (0.5561)		
General Strike (Indicator)			0.0254 (0.3694)

BIC	1310.364	631.5433	292.9047
Observations	909	1,645	334

NOTE: Unit of analysis is leader year. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Alternative Matching Schemes

As described in the manuscript and the Matching Procedure section above, three alternative schemes for generating propensity scores were tested for each regime type. In this section, I replicate the main models across these alternative schemes to assess the importance of maximized balance on *ex ante* risks and to provide robustness against the other variables included in the propensity scores. The results are displayed in models A22-A24. In each, the first column gives the preferred model.

Table A22. Stratified Cox Model of Democratic Leader Failure across Matching Schemes

	Preferred Model MID and L(x β)	Alternative 1 Just L(x β)	Alternative 2 Ally and L(x β)
Sanction	0.0392 (0.2900)	0.2142 (0.2712)	0.1006 (0.3698)
Threat	0.1619 (0.2453)	0.0579 (0.2440)	0.1772 (0.3026)
Parliamentary	0.3343 (0.2260)	0.1676 (0.2288)	0.2899 (0.3068)
Target of MID in last year	0.0782 (0.5653)	0.0738 (0.5534)	0.1636 (0.4568)
Lagged Growth in RealGDP/Capita	-5.4400*** (1.9995)	-5.9946*** (1.9373)	-6.8038*** (2.0174)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0000* (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Lagged Logged Total Imports	0.1168 (0.0838)	0.0979 (0.0827)	0.1179 (0.1299)
Count of Demonstrations	0.0182 (0.0565)	0.0145 (0.0522)	0.0516 (0.0801)
Count of General Strikes	0.2390*** (0.0916)	0.2070** (0.0839)	0.2069* (0.1230)
Party Fractionalization	0.1537** (0.0644)	0.1096* (0.0575)	0.1378** (0.0681)
No Term Limits	0.8861 (0.5495)	1.1344*** (0.4060)	1.0208** (0.5151)
Observations	909	909	772

NOTE: Unit of analysis is leader year. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table A23. Stratified Cox Models of Autocratic Leader Failure across Matching Schemes

	Preferred Model	Alternative 1	Alternative 2
	Ally and L(x β)	MID and L(x β)	Just L(x β)
Sanction	0.9932 (2.8578)	2.1565 (2.6990)	0.2577 (2.9045)
Sanction \times ln(time)	-0.8483 (0.5285)	-0.9276 (0.5979)	-0.7685 (0.5902)
Sanction \times Oil Production	-0.1107 (0.3565)	-0.2448 (0.3546)	-0.0401 (0.3604)
Sanction \times Oil Production ²	2.7157*** (0.8765)	2.7381** (1.2075)	2.0550** (0.9487)
Threat	-1.2455*** (0.3314)	-1.3774*** (0.4942)	-0.9802*** (0.3716)
Personalist Regime	-0.1680 (0.4476)	-0.1407 (0.3995)	-0.2142 (0.4255)
Target of MID last year	0.2455 (0.5698)	0.3314 (0.6244)	0.1623 (0.6032)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0001* (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita for Oil Producing States	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Lagged Logged Total Imports	-1.2519*** (0.4483)	-1.3118*** (0.4578)	-1.1605*** (0.4342)
Lagged Logged Total Imports ²	0.1025*** (0.0332)	0.1112*** (0.0340)	0.0954*** (0.0309)
Anti-Government Demonstrations (Indicator)	0.2134 (0.2226)	0.1858 (0.2264)	0.1547 (0.2122)
Successful Coup in Last Three Years	-0.0454 (0.2508)	-0.0935 (0.2484)	-0.1397 (0.2567)
Lagged Oil Production	-0.8057* (0.4789)	-0.7593* (0.4105)	-0.6795* (0.3721)
Lagged Oil Production ²	0.1921*** (0.0602)	0.1813*** (0.0548)	0.1656*** (0.0485)
Lagged Diamond Production	-1.2315* (0.6641)	-1.3490* (0.6971)	-1.2186** (0.6077)
Observations	1,645	1,645	1,645

NOTE: Unit of analysis is leader year. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

In the democratic model, most controls remain close to the same in their magnitude, and patterns of significance are consistent for all variables except GDP/capita. The largest changes in parameter estimates across models, as might be expected, occur in the sanction and threat variables. The jumps in value in the imposed sanctions variable are especially large. The preferred model produces the smallest point estimate, but sanctions never reach significance

across specifications. The pattern in autocracies is similar: coefficients regarding sanctions jump in value across specifications while controls remain more consistent. In the anocratic models, results change more across specifications, reflecting the less reliable results of the matching procedure in this small sample. Overall, the pattern of results across matching schemes and regime types suggest that as long as analysis adequately takes *ex ante* risks into account, generally, estimates of the efficacy of sanctions will be similar.

Table A24. Stratified Cox Models of Anocratic Leader Failure across Matching Schemes

	Preferred Model	Alternative 1	Alternative 2
	Just L(x β)	MID and L(x β)	Ally and L(x β)
Sanction	-0.2270 (0.5021)	-0.0980 (0.4551)	0.0537 (0.4358)
Threat	0.9749 (0.6361)	0.7896 (0.5545)	0.6675 (0.5005)
Target of MID in last year	-0.5951 (0.4948)	-0.6511 (0.4730)	-1.2919** (0.5807)
Lagged Growth in RealGDP/Capita	-0.2678 (2.0307)	-0.4183 (1.8169)	-1.0453 (1.9202)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Lagged Logged Total Imports	-0.0943 (0.1436)	-0.0824 (0.1449)	-0.0723 (0.1489)
Anti-Government Demonstration (Indicator)	-0.2966 (0.3516)	-0.2309 (0.3563)	-0.2405 (0.3587)
General Strike (Indicator)	0.0214 (0.3663)	-0.0935 (0.3636)	-0.1957 (0.3203)
Lagged Oil Production	0.0188 (0.1387)	-0.1910 (0.1928)	-0.2013 (0.2982)
Observations	334	334	334

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Assassinations:

The last robustness check involves making sure that failures which do not reflect the loss of control/support of N>1 members of a winning coalition have little or no effect on the results.

To this end, I looked into each case of assassination left in sample after matching. I proceeded

first by merging the Iqbal and Zorn (2008) assassination into my data, and checking to make sure that only the actually assassinated leaders were tagged. This precaution is necessary, because the Iqbal and Zorn data is in country years rather than leader years, and it is not uncommon, under conditions conducive to assassination, for more than one leader turnover to occur during a single year (e.g. the removal of Selassie in Ethiopia, which was not an assassination, preceded the killing of General Aman Andom by just two months). The remaining assassinations in sample after this initial check include:

Table A25. Assassinations of Matched Leaders

Leader	Country	Year	Regime Type	Target	Context
Faisal	Saudi Arabia	1975	Autocratic	No	Killed by relative
Ramat Mohammed	Nigeria	1976	Autocratic	No	Failed Coup
Sadat	Egypt	1981	Autocratic	Yes	Killed by fundamentalist soldiers
Hee Park	South Korea	1979	Autocratic	No	Killed by intelligence chief
Habyarimana	Rwanda	1994	Autocratic	No	Plane crash, during rebellion of Tutsis
Tolbert	Liberia	1980	Autocratic	No	Coup
Banti	Ethiopia	1977	Autocratic	Yes	Fighting within Junta
Tombalbaye	Chad	1975	Autocratic	No	Coup
Ali Roubayyi	Yemen, South	1978	Autocratic	Yes	Fighting within Central Committee
Ngouabi	Congo, Brazzaville	1977	Autocratic	No	Failed Coup
Premadasa	Sri Lanka	1993	Anocratic	Yes	Suicide bombing, Tamil Tigers suspected
Doe	Liberia	1990	Anocratic	No	Rebellion
Ziaur Rahman	Bangladesh	1981	Anocratic	No	Failed Coup
Gandhi, I.	India	1984	Democratic	Yes	Killed by radicals
Palme	Sweden	1986	Democratic	No	Lone gunman, never solved
Rabin	Israel	1995	Democratic	Yes	Killed by radical student

NOTE: Names vary in presentation to match Archigos's use. Searching these names in the Archigos codebook will locate the leader's entry. Sources consulted include, Archigos codebook and rulers.org

As might be expected, there is a clear difference in the context of assassination across regime types. In democracies, lone radicals are the most frequent means of assassinating the executive. In autocracies and mixed regimes, though, leaders are most frequently killed during a

struggle for power. To be certain that the lone gunman-type assassinations have little or no influence on results, I recoded the failure variable to right-censor these exits and replicated the main models. The results are displayed in Table A26. Predictably, the only results that are affected in a very meaningful way are those for anocratic leaders. Right censoring the coup-type assassinations in the autocratic sample also shakes things up a bit, but this should be expected given that coups are a very common way for leaders to lose power in autocracies.

Table A26. Stratified Cox Models of Winning Coalition Failure with Assassinations Right Censored

	Democrats	Autocrats, coup assassinations right censored	Autocrats, coup assassinations included	Anocrats
	Coeff. (Std.Err.)	Coeff. (Std.Err.)	Coeff. (Std.Err.)	Coeff. (Std.Err.)
Sanction	-0.0040 (0.2899)	1.5259 (3.0278)	1.3803 (2.9475)	-0.9181* (0.5026)
Threat	0.1910 (0.2439)	-0.8171 (0.6132)	-0.8883 (0.5468)	1.2067** (0.6050)
Sanction×ln(time)		-0.2130 (0.3816)	-0.1512 (0.3645)	
Sanction×Oil Production		1.7204 (1.1499)	2.1007** (0.9665)	
Sanction×Oil Production ²		-0.7131* (0.4087)	-0.9616*** (0.3622)	
Personalist Regime		-0.0315 (0.4708)	-0.2027 (0.4586)	
Target of MID last year	-0.0256 (0.5654)	0.2968 (0.5627)	0.2016 (0.5856)	-33.4687*** (1.1059)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita	-0.0000* (0.0000)	-0.0001** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Lagged Real GDP/Capita for Oil Producing States		0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	
Lagged Logged Total Imports	0.0658 (0.0878)	-1.2382*** (0.4646)	-1.1016** (0.4604)	-0.1009 (0.1485)
Lagged Logged Total Imports ²		0.0997*** (0.0350)	0.0896*** (0.0345)	
Anti-Government Demonstrations (Indicator)		0.4448* (0.2333)	0.2203 (0.2380)	0.5142 (0.3934)
Successful Coup in Last Three Years		-0.1067 (0.2573)	-0.1127 (0.2599)	
Lagged Oil Production		-0.4961 (0.5805)	-0.2292 (0.6372)	0.4743** (0.2376)
Lagged Oil Production ²		-0.0049 (0.1559)	-0.0502 (0.1560)	
Lagged Diamond Production		-1.6012 (1.0095)	-1.2757* (0.6611)	
Parliamentary Democracy	0.1245 (0.2248)			

Table A 26. Continued				
Lagged Growth in Real GDP/Capita	-4.4349**			-0.3121
	(1.9044)			(2.2015)
Count of Demonstrations	0.0386			
	(0.0627)			
Count of General Strikes	0.1356			
	(0.1023)			
Party Fractionalization	0.1572**			
	(0.0630)			
No Term Limits	1.6890***			
	(0.3880)			
General Strike (Indicator)				0.0543
				(0.6246)
Observations	909	1,645	1,645	334

NOTE: Unit of analysis is leader years. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on country. "Coups assassinations" include killing of the executive during the course of a coup (failed or otherwise), as part of a rebellion, or during fighting within the government.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10