

Supplementary Online Appendix

Article

Christmann, Pablo and Mariano Torcal. 2017. "The Effects of Government System Fractionalization on Satisfaction with Democracy". *Political Science Research and Methods*.

Database and Replication Files

Christmann, Pablo and Mariano Torcal. 2017. "Replication Data for: The Effects of Government System Fractionalization on Satisfaction with Democracy", Harvard Dataverse, V1, doi:10.7910/DVN/EU541C.

1. Figures and Tables

Figure A: Evolution of Electoral Disproportionality



Figure B: Evolution of Government Fractionalization



Table A: SWD-Sources of the TSCS Panel Dataset

Source	Data Access and Documentation
American National Election Studies	http://www.electionstudies.org/
Americas Barometer (LAPOP)	http://datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/
Asian Barometer	http://asianbarometer.org/data
Australian Election Study	http://aes.anu.edu.au/
Canadian Election Study	http://ces-eec.arts.ubc.ca/
Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB)	http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb2_en.htm
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB)	http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb_en.htm
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)	http://www.cses.org/datacenter/download.htm
Eurobarometer (EB)	http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/data-access/
European Value Study (EVS)	http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/
Latinobarómetro	http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp
New Democracies Barometer	http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog4_0.html
New Zealand Election Study	http://www.nzes.org

Notes: Last accessed on the 8th of December 2016.

Table B: Summary of Aggregate-Level Variables

Type of Variable	Indicator	Measurement	Longitudinal Variation	Cross-Sectional Variation	Sources
<i>Cultural and social indicators</i>	Ethnic fractionalization	Numerical	No	Yes	Alesina et. al. (2003)
	Income inequality (GINI Index)	Numerical	Yes	Yes	Solt (2016)
<i>Economic indicators</i>	GDP per capita (current US\$)	Numerical	Corresponds to GDP growth rate	Yes	Worldbank (2016), for Taiwan: IMF (2016)
	GDP growth rate	Numerical	Yes	Yes	Worldbank (2016), for Taiwan: IMF (2016)
<i>Quality of governance</i>	Quality of Government Index (International Country Risk Guide)	Numerical	Little	Yes	Quality of Governance Standard Dataset (Teorell et. al. 2015)
<i>Structure of the state</i>	Federalism	Yes, No	No	Yes	Democracy Barometer (2016), Norris (2009)
	Type of executive	Parliamentary, Semi-Presidential, Presidential	No	Yes	Bohrmann and Golder (2013)
<i>Electoral variables</i>	Temporal distance to last election	Years	Yes	Not meaningful	Own calculations
	Gallagher Index of electoral disproportionality	Numerical	Little	Yes	Gallagher (2015), Carey and Hix (2011), Democracy Barometer (2016)
	Effective number of electoral parties (ENEP)	Numerical	Yes	Yes	Bohrmann and Golder (2013), Gallagher (2015), Democracy Barometer (2016)
	Government fractionalization	Numerical	Yes	Yes	Database of Political Institutions (2016)

Table C: Summary of Individual-Level Variables

Indicator	Measurement	Sources
Age	Numerical	CSES
Gender	Female , Male (Ref.)	CSES
Education	Primary, Secondary, Tertiary (Ref.)	CSES
Household Income	Numerical	CSES
Political Efficacy	Numerical	CSES
Left-Right Ideology	Numerical: Low =Left, High=Right	CSES
Left-Right Congruence	Numerical	Own calculations: CSES, Parlgov
Party ID	Not close to a party, close to party (Ref.)	CSES
Voted	Voted, not voted (Ref.)	CSES
Electoral Winner	Electoral winner PM/ President, electoral winner minor coalition party, electoral loser (Ref.)	Own calculations: CSES, Parlgov, Parline
Representational Deficit	Numerical	Own calculations: CSES, Parlgov, Parline

Table D: Electoral System and Average District Magnitude (TSCS Dataset)

	Model 8		Model 9	
	β	(se)	β	(se)
<i>Longitudinal</i>				
Years since last election	-1.64***	(0.29)	-1.64***	(0.29)
GPD growth rate	1.94***	(0.32)	1.96***	(0.32)
Gini Index	-2.20***	(0.39)	-2.24***	(0.39)
Quality of Government Index	0.47	(0.44)	0.51	(0.44)
Linear Time Trend	2.48***	(0.52)	2.47***	(0.52)
<i>Cross-Sectional</i>				
Mixed electoral system	-4.61	(4.69)		
PR electoral system	-2.28	(4.49)		
Average district magnitude			-1.73	(1.18)
GPD per capita	7.78**	(2.50)	7.87**	(2.48)
GPD growth rate	2.68	(1.42)	3.13*	(1.44)
Gini Index	0.39	(2.76)	0.19	(2.70)
Quality of Government Index	8.49**	(2.93)	8.90**	(2.86)
Semi-Presidential	-4.59	(3.10)	-4.67	(3.07)
Presidential	5.53	(4.50)	5.08	(4.44)
Federal	0.52	(3.64)	0.32	(3.43)
Ethnic fractionalization	-2.29	(1.41)	-2.26	(1.40)
<i>Constant</i>	51.23***	(4.62)	48.84***	(2.13)
<i>Variance components</i>				
Country intercept	57.36***	(13.21)	56.40***	(12.98)
Election intercept	34.74***	(5.71)	34.76***	(5.71)
Residuals	58.31***	(3.59)	58.33***	(3.59)
Log Likelihood	-3066.32		-3066.09	
AIC	6170.64		6168.18	
ICC Country years	0.39		0.39	
ICC Election	0.23		0.23	
ICC Country	0.38		0.38	
Number of country years	833		833	
Number of elections	300		300	
Number of countries	58		58	

Notes: Multilevel regression with ML-Integration; standardized β for continuous variables; standard errors in parentheses; significance (two-tailed) *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. AIC: Akaike's Information Criterion, ICC: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.

Table E: Electoral System and Average District Magnitude (CSES Dataset)

	Model 10		Model 11	
	β	(se)	β	(se)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)
Female	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)
Primary education	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)
Secondary education	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)
Household income	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)
Political efficacy	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)
Left-right ideology	0.05***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.00)
Left-right congruence	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)
Party ID	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)
Winner: minor coalition party	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)
Winner: party PM/president	0.16***	(0.01)	0.16***	(0.01)
Representation Deficit	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)
<i>Country Level (Cross-Sectional)</i>				
Mixed electoral system	-0.24	(0.13)		
PR electoral system	-0.07	(0.10)		
Average district magnitude			-0.04	(0.04)
Quality of Government Index	0.16**	(0.05)	0.14**	(0.05)
Semi-Presidential	-0.08	(0.08)	-0.07	(0.08)
Presidential	0.18	(0.09)	0.14	(0.10)
GPD per capita	0.08	(0.06)	0.14*	(0.05)
GPD growth rate	0.03	(0.04)	0.07*	(0.03)
<i>Constant</i>	2.73***	(0.09)	2.64***	(0.05)
<i>Variance components</i>				
Country intercept	0.03***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)
Election intercept	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)
Residuals	0.48***	(0.00)	0.48***	(0.00)
Log Likelihood	-88633.74		-88634.92	
AIC	177313.5		177313.8	
ICC respondent level	0.91		0.90	
ICC election level	0.05		0.05	
ICC country level	0.05		0.05	
Number of respondents	83.968		83.968	
Number of elections	96		96	
Number of countries	38		38	
Notes: Multilevel regression with ML-Integration; standardized β for all continuous variables; standard errors in parentheses; significance (two-tailed) *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. AIC: Akaike's Information Criterion, ICC: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.				

Table F: Party/Government System Fractionalization and Electoral Disproportionality (TSCS Dataset)

	Model 12		Model 13		Model 14		Model 15		Model 16		Model 17		Model 18	
	β	(se)	β	(se)	β	(se)	β	(se)	β	(se)	β	(se)	β	(se)
<i>Longitudinal</i>														
Gallagher Index	0.35	(0.46)	0.33	(0.46)					0.57	(0.46)			0.35	(0.46)
Government Fractionalization											-0.27	(0.43)	-0.26	(0.43)
ENEP					-0.83	(0.44)	-0.84	(0.44)	-0.96*	(0.45)				
Years since last election	-1.64***	(0.29)	-1.64***	(0.29)	-1.64***	(0.29)	-1.64***	(0.29)	-1.65***	(0.29)	-1.64***	(0.29)	-1.65***	(0.29)
GPD growth rate	1.96***	(0.32)	1.96***	(0.32)	1.97***	(0.32)	1.97***	(0.32)	1.99***	(0.32)	1.94***	(0.32)	1.95***	(0.32)
Gini Index	-2.25***	(0.39)	-2.25***	(0.39)	-2.21***	(0.39)	-2.21***	(0.39)	-2.23***	(0.39)	-2.21***	(0.39)	-2.23***	(0.39)
Quality of Government Index	0.48	(0.44)	0.46	(0.44)	0.57	(0.44)	0.57	(0.44)	0.54	(0.44)	0.51	(0.44)	0.48	(0.44)
Linear Time Trend	2.47***	(0.52)	2.41***	(0.52)	2.42***	(0.51)	2.42***	(0.51)	2.45***	(0.51)	2.47***	(0.52)	2.48***	(0.52)
<i>Cross-Sectional</i>														
Gallagher Index	-2.54*	(1.17)	-12.46**	(4.04)					-2.85	(3.26)			-4.33*	(1.81)
Gallagher Index Squared			10.37*	(4.05)										
ENEP					-3.95***	(1.12)	-11.52*	(5.55)	-4.13*	(1.76)				
ENEP Squared							8.01	(5.75)						
Gallagher Index*ENEP									0.17	(3.67)				
Government Fractionalization											-1.29	(1.26)	-3.80	(2.30)
Gallagher Index*Gov.Frac.													0.97	(2.30)
GPD per capita	7.67**	(2.43)	6.66**	(2.34)	7.06**	(2.30)	7.44**	(2.28)	6.59**	(2.19)	8.22**	(2.50)	7.87***	(2.34)
GPD growth rate	3.07*	(1.39)	3.43**	(1.33)	3.77**	(1.34)	3.64**	(1.32)	4.20**	(1.30)	2.91*	(1.44)	3.76**	(1.38)
Gini Index	1.45	(2.64)	1.14	(2.50)	-0.49	(2.49)	-0.81	(2.46)	0.16	(2.39)	-0.15	(2.86)	-0.39	(2.68)
Quality of Government Index	8.62**	(2.81)	8.55**	(2.66)	9.24***	(2.64)	9.39***	(2.60)	9.09***	(2.52)	8.64**	(2.89)	8.39**	(2.74)
Semi-Presidential	-3.66	(3.02)	-3.59	(2.86)	-3.90	(2.83)	-4.13	(2.79)	-3.11	(2.71)	-4.25	(3.10)	-3.29	(2.99)
Presidential	3.04	(4.49)	2.68	(4.27)	4.62	(4.11)	5.33	(4.08)	2.14	(4.04)	5.68	(4.49)	2.79	(4.33)
Federal	1.74	(3.39)	3.56	(3.29)	2.00	(3.18)	0.00	(3.43)	3.19	(3.13)	0.66	(3.45)	2.07	(3.27)
Ethnic fractionalization	-2.46	(1.37)	-2.11	(1.31)	-1.02	(1.34)	-0.77	(1.33)	-1.14	(1.27)	-1.91	(1.47)	-1.55	(1.38)
<i>Constant</i>	49.15***	(2.10)	48.99***	(1.99)	48.31***	(1.96)	48.45***	(1.93)	48.84***	(1.88)	48.45***	(2.15)	48.99***	(2.02)
<i>Variance components</i>														
Country intercept	53.84***	(12.45)	46.93***	(11.20)	46.36***	(11.02)	44.42***	(10.66)	40.70***	(9.86)	57.66***	(13.24)	48.60***	(11.40)
Election intercept	34.40***	(5.69)	34.44***	(5.69)	34.10***	(5.63)	34.17***	(5.63)	33.33***	(5.57)	35.00***	(5.74)	34.57***	(5.70)
Residuals	58.40***	(3.60)	58.40***	(3.60)	58.26***	(3.58)	58.24***	(3.58)	58.39***	(3.59)	58.21***	(3.58)	58.26***	(3.59)
Log Likelihood	-3064.60		-3061.51		-3059.71		-3058.75		-3055.79		-3066.43		-3061.80	
AIC	6167.19		6163.01		6157.42		6157.51		6155.58		6170.87		6167.60	
ICC Country years	0.40		0.42		0.42		0.43		0.44		0.39		0.41	
ICC Election	0.23		0.25		0.25		0.25		0.25		0.23		0.24	
ICC Country	0.37		0.34		0.33		0.32		0.31		0.38		0.34	
Number of country years	833		833		833		833		833		833		833	
Number of elections	300		300		300		300		300		300		300	
Number of countries	58		58		58		58		58		58		58	

Notes: Multilevel regression with ML-Integration; standardized β for continuous variables; standard errors in parentheses; significance (two-tailed) *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. AIC: Akaike's Information Criterion, ICC: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.

Table G: Party/Government System Fractionalization and Electoral Disproportionality (CSES Dataset)

	Model 19		Model 20		Model 21		Model 22		Model 23		Model 24		Model 25		Model 26	
	β	(se)														
<i>Individual Level</i>																
Age	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)
Female	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)
Primary education	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)
Secondary education	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)
Household income	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)
Political efficacy	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)
Left-right ideology	0.05***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.00)
Left-right congruence	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)
Party ID	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)
Winner: minor coalition party	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)
Winner: party PM/president	0.16***	(0.01)	0.16***	(0.01)	0.16***	(0.01)	0.16***	(0.01)	0.16***	(0.01)	0.16***	(0.01)	0.16***	(0.01)	0.16***	(0.01)
Representation Deficit	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)
<i>Country Level (Cross-Sectional)</i>																
Gallagher Index	-0.05	(0.03)	-0.27*	(0.13)					-0.07*	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.10)			-0.10*	(0.04)
Gallagher Index Squared			0.22	(0.12)												
ENEP					-0.05	(0.03)	-0.26	(0.14)	-0.07*	(0.03)	-0.06	(0.04)				
ENEP Squared							0.20	(0.14)								
Gallagher Index * ENEP											-0.02	(0.10)				
Government Fractionalization													-0.06	(0.03)	-0.10	(0.06)
Gallagher Index * Gov .Frac.															-0.01	(0.05)
GPD per capita	0.12*	(0.05)	0.11*	(0.05)	0.15**	(0.05)	0.16**	(0.05)	0.13*	(0.05)	0.13*	(0.05)	0.16**	(0.06)	0.16**	(0.05)
GPD growth rate	0.07*	(0.03)	0.07*	(0.03)	0.08**	(0.03)	0.08**	(0.03)	0.09**	(0.03)	0.09**	(0.03)	0.08**	(0.03)	0.09***	(0.03)
Quality of Government Index	0.14**	(0.05)	0.12*	(0.05)	0.13**	(0.05)	0.13**	(0.05)	0.13**	(0.05)	0.13**	(0.05)	0.13**	(0.05)	0.12**	(0.05)
Semi-Presidential	-0.07	(0.08)	-0.05	(0.08)	-0.08	(0.08)	-0.08	(0.07)	-0.09	(0.07)	-0.09	(0.07)	-0.07	(0.08)	-0.07	(0.07)
Presidential	0.16	(0.09)	0.14	(0.09)	0.16	(0.09)	0.11	(0.10)	0.16	(0.09)	0.16	(0.09)	0.12	(0.09)	0.08	(0.09)
Constant	2.64***	(0.05)	2.63***	(0.05)	2.64***	(0.05)	2.65***	(0.05)	2.65***	(0.04)	2.65***	(0.04)	2.64***	(0.05)	2.65***	(0.04)
<i>Variance components</i>																
Country intercept	0.03***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)
Election intercept	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)
Residuals	0.48***	(0.00)	0.48***	(0.00)	0.48***	(0.00)	0.48***	(0.00)	0.48***	(0.00)	0.48***	(0.00)	0.48***	(0.00)	0.48***	(0.00)
Log Likelihood	-88634.65		-88633.15		-88633.88		-88632.82		-88631.86		-88631.83		-88634.04		-88629.89	
AIC	177313.3		177312.3		177311.8		177311.6		177309.7		177311.7		177312.1		177307.8	
ICC respondent level	0.90		0.91		0.91		0.91		0.91		0.91		0.91		0.92	
ICC election level	0.05		0.05		0.05		0.05		0.05		0.05		0.05		0.05	
ICC country level	0.05		0.05		0.05		0.04		0.04		0.04		0.05		0.04	
Number of respondents	83.968		83.968		83.968		83.968		83.968		83.968		83.968		83.968	
Number of elections	96		96		96		96		96		96		96		96	
Number of countries	38		38		38		38		38		38		38		38	

Notes: Multilevel regression with ML-Integration; standardized β for all continuous variables; standard errors in parentheses; significance (two-tailed) *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. AIC: Akaike's Information Criterion, ICC: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.

Table H: Government System Fractionalization (TSCS Dataset, Parliamentary Systems Only)

	Model 27	
	β	(se)
<i>Longitudinal</i>		
Gallagher Index	0.88	(0.73)
Government Fractionalization	-0.21	(0.73)
Years since last election	-1.52***	(0.36)
GPD growth rate	2.24***	(0.41)
Gini Index	-1.81*	(0.70)
Quality of Government Index	-0.61	(0.60)
Linear Time Trend	2.55***	(0.70)
<i>Cross-Sectional</i>		
Gallagher Index	-3.05+	(1.63)
Government Fractionalization	-5.00**	(1.70)
GPD per capita	1.99	(2.64)
GPD growth rate	7.91***	(2.15)
Gini Index	-7.14+	(3.95)
Quality of Government Index	17.01***	(3.40)
Federal	0.85	(3.81)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.13	(1.58)
<i>Constant</i>	44.84***	(2.12)
<i>Variance components</i>		
Country intercept	23.61***	(9.89)
Election intercept	36.11***	(7.43)
Residuals	32.41***	(3.13)
Log Likelihood	-1184.41	
AIC	2406.81	
ICC Country years	0.35	
ICC Election	0.39	
ICC Country	0.26	
Number of country years	344	
Number of elections	125	
Number of countries	23	
Notes: Multilevel regression with ML-Integration; standardized β for continuous variables; standard errors in parentheses; significance (two-tailed) *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. AIC: Akaike's Information Criterion, ICC: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.		

Table I: Government System Fractionalization (CSES Dataset, Parliamentary Systems Only)

	Model 28		Model 29	
	β	(se)	β	(se)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)
Female	-0.02***	(0.01)	-0.02***	(0.01)
Primary education	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)
Secondary education	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Household income	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)
Political efficacy	0.07***	(0.00)	0.07***	(0.00)
Left-right ideology	0.04***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)
Left-right congruence	0.03***	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)
Party ID	0.06***	(0.01)	0.06***	(0.01)
Winner: minor coalition party	0.04***	(0.01)	0.03*	(0.01)
Winner: party PM/president	0.14***	(0.01)	0.14***	(0.01)
Representation Deficit	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.04***	(0.01)
<i>Country Level (Cross-Sectional)</i>				
Government Fractionalization (Gov. Frac.)	-0.13**	(0.05)	-0.12**	(0.05)
Gallagher Index	-0.07+	(0.04)	-0.08+	(0.04)
GPD per capita	0.23***	(0.06)	0.23***	(0.06)
GPD growth rate	0.12***	(0.03)	0.12***	(0.03)
Quality of Government Index	0.19***	(0.05)	0.20***	(0.05)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>				
Winner: minor coalition party * Gov. Frac.			0.03	(0.02)
Winner: party PM/president * Gov. Frac.			-0.04***	(0.01)
Representation Deficit * Gov. Frac.			-0.03***	(0.00)
<i>Constant</i>	2.68***	(0.04)	2.68***	(0.04)
<i>Variance components</i>				
Country intercept	0.01***	(0.01)	0.01***	(0.01)
Election intercept	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)
Residuals	0.45***	(0.00)	0.45***	(0.00)
Log Likelihood	-50478.34		-50449.25	
AIC	100998.7		100946.5	
ICC respondent level	0.93		0.93	
ICC election level	0.04		0.04	
ICC country level	0.03		0.03	
Number of respondents	49,455		49,455	
Number of elections	50		50	
Number of countries	18		18	
Notes: Multilevel regression with ML-Integration; standardized β for all continuous variables; standard errors in parentheses; significance (two-tailed) *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. AIC: Akaike's Information Criterion, ICC: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.				

2. Additional Robustness Checks

A number of robustness checks were performed after the estimation of each model. Given the extensive scope of the robustness checks and the usage of two entirely different datasets, we will not present our results here in detail. However, every step can be replicated by using the commented Stata Do-file accompanying this study. First, we identified and controlled for the effect of influential outlying cases at the country and election levels as suggested by Meer et al. (2010), mainly by analyzing the random effects at both levels but also by scrutinizing partial residual plots. Second, when observing the residuals at the lowest level we found them to be almost normally distributed. Deleting the few potentially problematic cases did not change the results. Third, following a suggestion by King and Roberts (2015), to understand differences in robust standard errors and normal standard errors as indications of model misspecification, we estimated all the models twice and compared their standard errors. We found only minor differences and no coefficient losses or gains of much statistical significance.

Fourth, we estimated the random part of all the models by treating ‘country-years’ as nested within ‘election cycles,’ which are cross-classified within ‘years’ and ‘countries.’ However, the variance that can be attributed to the ‘year’ level is so marginal that it did not change the estimates to a notable degree. Fifth, analyzing the correlation matrix of each model and the VIF scores, we found the degree of collinearity in the longitudinal part to be only a minor issue. Regarding the cross-sectional part, we found GDP per capita, the Quality of Government Index and the Gini Index to be moderately collinear but not the institutional variables. As a consequence, we increased the possibility of type II errors for the Gini Index and accepted $\beta_i = 0$, although in reality there is a relationship (Arceneaux and Huber 2007; Goldberger 1991).

Finally, we also added random slopes for the longitudinal estimators for ENEP and ‘years since election’ to further probe the robustness of the fixed effect of these ‘within’ estimators (Barr et al. 2013; Bates et al. 2015). We found that the fixed effect stays significant regardless of the inclusion of the random term.

3. Additional References

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