1 Online Appendix: No Calm After the Storm – Diaspora Influence on Bilateral Emergency Aid Flows

Table 1: Summary Statistics OECD-Sample

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Emergency Aid (Logged)	1.366	4.094	0	21.273	136111
Emergency Aid (Dummy)	0.103	0.303	0	1	136111
Emergency Aid/GDP Donor*1000	0.001	0.007	0	0.791	132849
Emergency Aid/GDP Recipient*1000	0.092	1.34	0	130.888	125218
Total Emergency Aid	8.782	7.338	0	21.689	136111
Diaspora (WB, Logged)	4.463	3.375	0	16.27	136111
Diaspora (IAB, Logged)	4.155	3.254	0	15.248	83934
Logged Refugee Stock	0.852	1.924	0	12.41	136111
(Diaspora/Host Pop.)*1000 (Logged)	0.108	0.336	0	5.05	131582
Deaths (Logged)	3.14	2.44	0	12.612	72696
Affected (Logged)	8.911	4.568	0	19.65	72696
Former Colony	0.036	0.187	0	1	131769
Common Language	0.124	0.33	0	1	131769
Alliance	0.027	0.162	0	1	136111
Distance (Logged)	8.725	0.712	4.127	9.881	134734
Exports Donor to Recipient (Logged)	2.747	2.349	0	12.371	128859
Population Donor (Logged)	16.281	1.68	10.266	19.558	136111
GDP p.c. Donor (Logged)	9.852	0.830	6.471	11.965	132849
Population Recipient (Logged)	15.404	2.022	9.15	21.019	133226
GDP p.c. Recipient (Logged)	7.34	1.388	4.171	11.386	124213
Democracy Recipient	0.316	7.056	-10	10	116805

Table 2: Summary Statistics UN-Sample

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Emergency Aid (Logged)	2.457	5.068	0	20.891	14506
Emergency Aid (Dummy)	0.195	0.396	0	1	14506
Emergency Aid/GDP Donor*1000	0.001	0.007	0	0.287	14377
Emergency Aid/GDP Recipient*1000	0.051	1.582	0	178.629	13882
Total Emergency Aid (Logged)	14.593	2.056	10.187	21.411	14506
Diaspora (Logged)	4.706	3.717	0	16.209	11654
(Diaspora/Host Pop.)*1000 (Logged)	1.626	1.994	0	10.414	11406
Refugees (Logged)	1.559	2.391	0	12.621	13012
Deaths (Logged)	4.028	2.375	0	12.313	14506
Affected (Logged)	12.037	2.893	0	18.865	14506
Former Colony	0.022	0.148	0	1	13762
Common Language	0.081	0.273	0	1	13762
Alliance	0.03	0.17	0	1	13409
Distance (Logged)	8.853	0.628	5.209	9.895	14458
Exports Donor to Recipient (Logged)	3.215	2.638	0	12.285	13180
Democracy Donor	7.039	5.724	-10	10	13206
Democracy Recipient	3.702	5.772	-10	10	13066
Population Donor (Logged)	16.325	2.127	10.376	21.039	14109
GDP p.c. Donor (Logged)	9.851	1.12	6.115	12.174	14083
Population Recipient (Logged)	16.808	1.948	11.194	21.014	14218
GDP p.c. Recipient (Logged)	7.185	1.118	4.787	10.856	13738



Figure 1: Interaction of Bilateral Distance and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, OECD-Sample (M3)



Figure 2: Interaction of People Affected by a Disaster and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, UN-Sample (M4)



Figure 3: Interaction of Donor Regime Type and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, UN-Sample (M5)



Figure 4: Interaction of People Killed by a Disaster and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, UN-Sample



Figure 5: Interaction of Bilateral Distance and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, UN-Sample



Figure 6: Interaction of People Affected by a Disaster and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, OECD-Sample



Figure 7: Interaction of People Killed by a Disaster and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, OECD-Sample

Figure 1, 2 and 3 show the interactions of the main analysis with frequencies plotted in bar charts at the right hand side. In Figure 4 I substitute the number of people affected with the number of people killed, finding robust support for H2: the diaspora effect increases with less deadly disasters. In Figure 5 I interact the migrant stock measure with bilateral distance in the UN-sample, finding again the diaspora effect to be highest for the most distant disasters. In Figure 6 and 7 I interact the migrant stock measure with the number of people affected and killed by a disaster in the OECD-sample: due to aggregation to the dyad-year, the link between a disaster and aid flows is less direct than in the UN-sample, nut both graphs indicate that more severe disasters experience less of a diaspora effect.[1]

[1] As interaction terms cannot be interpreted directly in nonlinear models, I do show the corresponding regression tables.

Table 3: List of Autocratic Donor Countries in the UN Sample

Host/Donor Country	**Aid Recipients With Large Diaspora**
Russia	Moldova (277,527)
	Ukraine (3,559,975)
	Azerbaijan (846,104)
	Tajikistan (383,057)
Belarus	Ukraine (187,293)
Saudi Arabia	Somalia (22,999)
	Morocco (17,371)
	Sudan (255,252)
	Syria (110,464)
	Yemen (784,899)
	Afghanistan (14,987)
	India (1,185,760)
	Pakistan (1,005,873)
	Bangladesh (422,740)
	Sri Lanka (223,070)
	Thailand (19,872)
	Philippines (539,921)
	Indonesia (286,600)
United Arab Emirates	Sudan (33,934)
	Syria (8,515)
	Yemen (59,511)
	India (1,325,053)
	Pakistan (569,556)
	Bangladesh (96,763)
	Sri Lanka (66,257)
	Philippines (120,801)
Kazakhstan	Tajikistan (14,590)
China	Thailand (8,897)
Thailand	India (15,399)
	Myanmar (265,141)
	Sri Lanka (20,456)
	Vietnam (21,260)
Malaysia	India (83,373)
	Pakistan (16,477)
	Myanmar (15,785)
	Indonesia (1,243,977)
Singapore	China (468,020)
	India (110,380)
	Pakistan (22,932)
	Bangladesh (17,969)
	Philippines (11,275)
	Indonesia (70,008)

Size of migrant communities in parentheses.

Table 4: Pooled Regression Models, Impact of Migrant Stocks on Aid Flows (OECD-Data)

	M6 (Logit)	M7 (Tobit)	M8 (Tobit)	M9 (Tobit)	M10 (Tobit)	M11 (Tobit)
Diaspora	0.004		0.037		0.054	0.465
	(0.001)***		(0.014)***		(0.014)***	(0.029)***
Diaspora (IAB)		0.192				
		(0.020)***				
(Diaspora/Host Pop.)*1000				0.273		
				(0.067)***		
Post Disaster						1.163
						(0.174)***
Post Disaster*Diaspora						-0.249
						(0.028)***
Refugees			0.103			
			(0.014)***			
Total Emergency Aid					0.638	
					(0.016)***	
Deaths	0.013	0.190	0.167	0.173	0.099	0.020
	(0.001)***	(0.015)***	(0.012)***	(0.013)***	(0.012)***	(0.014)
Affected	0.005	0.078	0.066	0.066	0.027	0.010
	(0.001)***	(0.009)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)
Former Colony	0.053	0.495	0.652	0.685	0.763	0.224
	(0.011)***	(0.144)***	(0.121)***	(0.125)***	(0.117)***	(0.138)
Common Language	0.042	0.495	0.574	0.604	0.586	2.009
	(0.008)***	(0.103)***	(0.084)***	(0.085)***	(0.081)***	(0.092)***
Alliance	-0.038	-1.029	-0.597	-0.649	-0.566	-0.942
	(0.017)**	(0.185)***	(0.152)***	(0.156)***	(0.151)***	(0.161)***
Distance	-0.053	-1.026	-0.714	-0.775	-0.762	-0.834
	(0.009)***	(0.105)***	(0.076)***	(0.076)***	(0.075)***	(0.072)***
Exports Donor to Recipient	0.015	0.211	0.202	0.223	0.215	0.676
	(0.003)***	(0.033)***	(0.026)***	(0.026)***	(0.025)***	(0.027)***
Population Donor	0.593	15.587	7.392	7.756	7.230	12.248
	(0.106)***	(1.347)***	(0.984)***	(1.047)***	(0.955)***	(0.985)***
GDP p.c. Donor	0.064	1.387	1.378	1.488	1.280	5.610
	(0.022)***	(0.301)***	(0.195)***	(0.202)***	(0.190)***	(0.212)***
Population Recipient	0.072	1.910	1.072	1.128	0.051	2.859
	(0.046)	(0.518)***	(0.397)***	(0.420)***	(0.401)	(0.376)***
GDP p.c. Recipient	-0.056	-0.745	-0.787	-0.759	-0.129	-0.504
	(0.010)***	(0.121)***	(0.096)***	(0.099)***	(0.095)	(0.098)***
Democracy Recipient	-0.001	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	0.007
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
N	43643	31955	45489	43360	45489	61871
Donors	26	19	26	26	26	26
Recipients	122	130	131	130	131	131
Dyads	3143	2450	3373	3347	3373	3373

The dependent variable is the log of (1 plus) aid commitments from the donor to the recipient. Reported are marginal effects calculated as the effect on the latent variable multiplied by the probability of being uncensored (except for M6). All models include donor, recipient and year dummies; standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$



Figure 8: Interaction of Pre-/Post-Disaster Indicator and Migrant Stock, OECD-Sample (M11)

Table 4, OECD-sample: In M6 I replace the logged amount of emergency aid with a binary indicator for whether aid was granted or not as the dependent variable. The results of the Logit model confirm the results of the Tobit model, indicating that migrants positively affect both the decision whether to grant aid as well as how much. In M7 I replace the World Bank diaspora measure with the 'brain drain' data of the German "Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung" (IAB),[2] which provides information on the number of bilateral migrants who are older than 25 for 20 OECD countries. The stock number is available for the period 1980-2010 in 5-year intervals. The effect of the IAB migration measure on aid is positive and statistically significant. In M8 I add a measure of bilateral refugee stocks,[3] which are measured separately by the UNHCR. When adding this variable to the basic regression model, the magnitude of the diaspora effect is somewhat reduced, and the number of refugees has a positive effect on bilateral emergency aid. This is at least some evidence that donor countries 'target' emergency aid when they have reason to expect that a disaster will cause (further) substantive refugee flows to their country. Like regular migrants, though, refugees might as well serve as an information channel

[2] `https://www.iab.de/de/daten/iab-brain-drain-data.aspx`
[3] World Refugee Dataset by Marbach, 1989-2015. Version 1.1.0, `https://github.com/sumtxt/wrd`

to the donor country.

In M9 I substitute the migrant stock measure with a measure of the share of the diaspora community in the host country population. Diaspora populations, however, are usually extremely small in relation to the host country population. In order to normalize the distribution of the variable, I multiply the share measure by 1000 and then take the log (after adding +1; cf. Leblang 2017). The transformed share measure has a positive and statistically significant effect on emergency aid. In M10 I introduce a control for the absolute amount of emergency aid a country receives in a given year in order to capture the overall level of help a disaster attracts. The variable exerts a positive and significant effect on bilateral aid, but the diaspora effect proves to be robust. In M11 I compare the effect of migrants on disaster aid to their effect on development aid more general by comparing the influence on foreign aid flows before and after a natural disaster. In other words, the magnitude of the diaspora effect on aid in times of disaster is compared to the times when there is no disaster. This approach has the additional benefit of controlling for cross-sector reallocation, which occurs when donors relabel aid they would have given anyway to a country as emergency aid after a disaster. Figure 8 plots the interaction effect of the migrant stock measure with an indicator coded 1 for years when a country is hit by a disaster and the year after, and 0 for the two years before a disaster. As evident from the differing slopes in Figure 8, the diaspora effect on bilateral development aid is stronger in 'normal' times than after a disaster. Still, aid commitments increase with the size of a diaspora group, only at a lesser magnitude when compared to pre-disaster times. I interpret this as evidence that while diasporas affect aid flows to their home country stronger when there is no emergency, they are a still a relevant factor in the dire circumstances of a natural disaster, though additional mobilization effects appear to be offset by donors' stronger responsiveness to humanitarian need.

Table 5, UN-sample: In M12 I replace the logged amount of emergency aid with a binary indicator for whether a country received aid by a specific donor or not. The Logit model finds the size of the diaspora community to be a positive and significant predictor of the decision to grant aid. In M13 I add a control for the number of refugees from the disaster-affected country residing in the donor country (data by Marbach, see above): other than in the OECD-sample, there is no evidence that donor countries send more aid to the source countries of their refugee

Table 5: Pooled Regression Models, Impact of Migrant Stocks on Aid Flows (UN-Data)

	M12 (Logit)	M13 (Tobit)	M14 (Tobit)	M15 (Tobit)
Diaspora	0.008	0.115		0.122
	(0.002)***	(0.026)***		(0.025)***
(Diaspora/Host Pop)*1000			0.115	
			(0.038)***	
Refugees		-0.004		
		(0.030)		
Total Emergency Aid				0.907
				(0.032)***
Deaths	0.044	0.563	0.564	0.083
	(0.003)***	(0.034)***	(0.034)***	(0.034)**
Affected	0.001	0.010	0.009	-0.031
	(0.003)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Former Colony	0.060	0.843	0.849	0.823
	(0.023)**	(0.289)***	(0.295)***	(0.276)***
Common Language	0.056	0.734	0.781	0.677
	(0.015)***	(0.182)***	(0.184)***	(0.179)***
Alliance	-0.010	-0.536	-0.547	-0.461
	(0.031)	(0.321)*	(0.334)	(0.303)
Distance	-0.050	-0.681	-0.767	-0.586
	(0.011)***	(0.139)***	(0.134)***	(0.131)***
Exports Donor to Recipient	0.018	0.244	0.264	0.252
	(0.004)***	(0.048)***	(0.049)***	(0.046)***
Democracy Donor	0.006	0.071	0.072	0.043
	(0.009)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.107)
Democracy Recipient	0.011	0.151	0.151	0.005
	(0.002)***	(0.023)***	(0.023)***	(0.022)
Population Donor	0.352	4.850	4.688	4.933
	(0.062)***	(0.789)***	(0.781)***	(0.854)***
GDP p.c. Donor	0.122	1.770	1.661	1.675
	(0.029)***	(0.356)***	(0.353)***	(0.340)***
Population Recipient	-0.223	-3.034	-3.104	-0.776
	(0.187)	(2.383)	(2.376)	(2.313)
GDP p.c. Recipient	0.013	0.252	0.261	0.434
	(0.029)	(0.372)	(0.372)	(0.356)
N	9214	9214	9214	9214
Donors	44	44	44	44
Recipients	78	78	78	78
Dyads	3351	3351	3351	3351

The dependent variable is the log of (1 plus) emergency aid commitments from the donor to the recipient. Reported are marginal effects calculated as the effect on the latent variable multiplied by the probability of being uncensored (except for M12). All models include donor, recipient, year and disaster-type dummies; robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

populations. In M14, I substitute the diaspora stock measure with the share of the diaspora community in the donor country (see above), finding a positive and statistically significant effect on emergency aid. In M15 I add a control for the absolute amount of aid a specific disaster generates: the measure is positively correlated with the amount of bilateral emergency aid, but leaves the diaspora effect unaffected.

Table 6: Pooled Regression Models, Impact of Migrant Stocks on Aid Flows (OECD-Data)

	M16 (Tobit)	M17 (Tobit)	M18 (ReLogit)	M19 (PPML)
Diaspora	0.000	0.009	0.128	123790.981
	(0.000)***	(0.002)***	(0.014)***	(29432.828)***
Deaths	0.000	0.021	0.094	93812.733
	(0.000)***	(0.002)***	(0.008)***	(27192.333)***
Affected	0.000	0.007	0.063	-8456.073
	(0.000)***	(0.001)***	(0.005)***	(11129.675)
Former Colony	0.000	0.070	0.376	229296.684
	(0.000)***	(0.017)***	(0.129)***	(145454.098)
Common Language	0.000	0.059	-0.111	149945.692
	(0.000)***	(0.012)***	(0.082)	(100881.699)
Alliance	-0.000	-0.092	-0.223	-226101.401
	(0.000)***	(0.021)***	(0.130)*	(279142.397)
Distance	-0.001	-0.095	-0.084	-154552.158
	(0.000)***	(0.011)***	(0.050)*	(145269.272)
Exports Donor to Recipient	0.000	0.023	0.088	87426.311
	(0.000)***	(0.004)***	(0.022)***	(31567.992)***
Population Donor	0.005	0.844	0.168	9021916.254
	(0.001)***	(0.139)***	(0.026)***	(2867564.923)***
GDP p.c. Donor	0.001	0.116	1.613	-1233429.893
	(0.000)***	(0.027)***	(0.049)***	(342423.774)***
Population Recipient	-0.000	-0.195	-0.114	-372420.210
	(0.000)	(0.056)***	(0.027)***	(680176.300)
GDP p.c. Recipient	-0.001	-0.149	-0.606	-393663.537
	(0.000)***	(0.013)***	(0.031)***	(180025.843)**
Democracy Recipient	-0.000	-0.003	-0.011	7926.368
	(0.000)	(0.001)**	(0.005)**	(13137.384)
N	45489	45489	45489	43643
Donors	26	26	26	26
Recipients	131	131	131	122
Dyads	3373	3373	3373	3143

DV M16: Aid/Donor GDP*1000, M17: Aid/Recipient GDP*1000, M18: Binary, M19: Aid (untransformed). Reported are marginal effects. All models include donor, recipient and year dummies (except M18); standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6, OECD-sample: In M16 and M17 I replace the logged amount of emergency aid as the dependent variable with the amount relative to the donor (M16) and recipient GDP (M17), multiplied by 1000 to obtain interpretable coefficients: since emergency aid amounts are usually extremely small when compared to GDP, effect sizes are small as well, especially when aid is normalized by donor GDP (M16). In both cases, however, the coefficient signs and significance levels are very similar to the original model. In M18 I re-estimate the model with the Rare

Table 7: Pooled Regression Models, Impact of Migrant Stocks on Aid Flows (UN-Data)

	M20 (Tobit)	M21 (Tobit)	M22 (ReLogit)	M23 (PPML)
Diaspora	0.000	0.018	0.101	82893.633
	(0.000)***	(0.006)***	(0.015)***	(48567.924)*
Deaths	0.001	0.084	0.366	276176.218
	(0.000)***	(0.007)***	(0.019)***	(57814.294)***
Affected	0.000	0.005	0.055	154013.365
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.018)***	(83864.463)*
Former Colony	0.000	0.093	0.424	46320.311
	(0.000)*	(0.058)	(0.195)**	(239273.918)
Common Language	0.001	0.081	-0.003	706662.276
	(0.000)***	(0.038)**	(0.118)	(196861.179)***
Alliance	-0.001	0.010	0.463	330375.297
	(0.000)**	(0.060)	(0.188)**	(219497.983)
Distance	-0.000	-0.150	-0.246	-253292.967
	(0.000)***	(0.028)***	(0.069)***	(139938.114)*
Exports Donor to Recipient	0.000	0.034	0.064	105422.756
	(0.000)***	(0.011)***	(0.028)**	(63188.251)*
Democracy Donor	-0.000	0.012	-0.005	22474.223
	(0.000)	(0.021)	(0.008)	(68389.868)
Democracy Recipient	0.000	0.017	0.018	-61744.344
	(0.000)***	(0.005)***	(0.007)***	(38372.649)
Population Donor	0.006	0.703	0.354	1532045.624
	(0.002)***	(0.189)***	(0.035)***	(980300.520)
GDP p.c. Donor	0.001	0.197	1.106	1036463.034
	(0.000)***	(0.075)***	(0.056)***	(381611.241)***
Population Recipient	-0.000	-0.332	-0.371	-4525541.623
	(0.002)	(0.491)	(0.038)***	(4240680.978)
GDP p.c. Recipient	-0.001	-0.025	-0.344	-1282026.687
	(0.000)*	(0.079)	(0.042)***	(643459.848)**
N	9214	9214	9214	9214
Donors	44	44	44	44
Recipients	78	78	78	78
Dyads	3351	3351	3351	3351

DV M20: Aid/Donor GDP*1000, M21: Aid/Recipient GDP*1000, M22: Binary, M23: Aid (untransformed). Reported are marginal effects. All models include donor, recipient and year dummies (except M22); standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Events Logit model by Tomz, King and Zeng:[4] as only a small subset of dyads experiences aid flows, results of standard models may be biased. Unfortunately, the ReLogit Model does not allow to include donor, recipient, and year dummies. The positive and significant diaspora effect on emergency aid remains unaffected. Finally, in M19, I substitute the Tobit Model with the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) model by Santos Silva and Tenreyro,[5] which is designed for data structures with many zeros and large values. Unfortunately, the PPML-model does not allow to calculate interaction terms and their marginal effects. While regressing the explanatory variables on the untransformed dependent variable results in very large coefficients, the diaspora variables remains a robust predictor of bilateral emergency aid.

Table 7, UN-sample: In M20 to M23, I replicate the same steps for the UN-sample and find the main results regarding the diaspora effect again robust (though the effect is only significant at the 10%-level in the PPML model).



Figure 9: Interaction of Bilateral Distance and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, OECD-Sample (Logit)

[4] https://gking.harvard.edu/relogit
[5] https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458102.html



Figure 10: Interaction of People Affected by a Disaster and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, UN-Sample (Logit)



Figure 11: Interaction of Donor Regime Type and Migrant Stock with Frequencies, UN-Sample (Logit)

In Graph 9, 10 and 11 I plot the interactions of the original analysis with a Logit instead of a Tobit model: Even when only considering the decision whether to grant aid or not, less severe and more distant experience more of a diaspora effect than nearby and more severe disasters. There is only limited support for the finding that autocratic host countries are more responsive to their immigrant communities than democratic host countries: there are only few non-democratic donors in the sample, and there is considerably less variation when analyzing aid flows as a binary decision.[6]

[6] As interaction terms cannot be interpreted directly in nonlinear models, I do show the corresponding regression tables.

Table 8: Pooled Logit Models, Impact of Migrant Stocks on U.S. News Reports and Aid Flows

	M24 (DV: News Report)	M25 (DV: Aid Flow)	M26 (DV: Aid Flow)
Diaspora	0.070	0.006	0.004
	(0.022)***	(0.011)	(0.011)
News Reporting		0.085	-0.012
		(0.014)***	(0.058)
News*Diaspora			0.009
			(0.005)*
News Pressure	-0.016	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.006)***	(0.004)*	(0.004)*
Deaths	0.050	0.033	0.034
	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Affected	0.011	0.036	0.036
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Recipient GDP p.c.	0.065	-0.036	-0.037
	(0.019)***	(0.015)**	(0.015)**
N	3200	3962	3962
Recipients	67	115	115
Years	23	23	23

Coefficients show marginal effects, robust standard errors in parentheses.
All models include recipient country, month and disaster-type fixed effects,
as well as fixed effects for the interaction of missing values on Deaths and Affected
with disaster type. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$



Figure 12: Interaction of U.S. TV News Indicator and Migrant Stock (M26)

Table 8: I rely on the replication data of the study by Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) to shed

some light on the question whether the diaspora effect on emergency aid is linked to increased media attention to a disaster in the migrants' homeland. Eisensee and Strömberg analyzed the effect of a natural disaster abroad being covered in the television news on the likelihood of U.S. disaster aid. The dataset covers 5,212 natural disasters occurring in 143 countries from 1968 to 2002, with information on the number of people killed and affected, news pressure[7] and binary indicators of whether a disaster was covered in the TV news and whether the U.S. granted aid or not.

Models 24 to 26 in Table 8 are Logit models with recipient country, month and disaster type specific effects.[8] The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether a disaster was reported in the U.S. television news (M24) and whether the U.S. granted aid or not (M25 and M26). While the U.S. are the most important emergency aid donor in the world, the data shows that only 12% of disasters abroad make it to the U.S. TV news and only 19% receive U.S. emergency aid. If migrants affect aid because they increase the host country's attention to a disaster, the size of a diaspora should be positively correlated with the probability of a disaster in the homeland being reported in the U.S. news. The results of Model 24 suggest that, even after controlling for the number of people killed and affected as well as the recipient GDP p.c. and the news pressure at the time of a disaster, an affected country's diaspora stock in the U.S. significantly increases the chances that the disaster will make it into the news. Migrants may actively provide information on disasters to the media, but the media may also report more extensively on disasters due to the number of migrants in the audience.

Model 25 shows that while news reporting in turn increases the chances of an aid flow, there seems to be no independent effect of the size of a migrant community on aid.[9] When interacting the migrant stock measure with the news report indicator in Model 26, however, the plot of the marginal effects calculation in Figure 12 indicates a positive relation between the size of a diaspora and a news report on aid: While there is only a very small positive effect of the migrant stock when a disaster is not covered in the news, the size effect shows a clear positive

[7] Measured as the median (across broadcasts in a day) number of minutes a news broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day.

[8] As there are many missing values on Deaths and Affected, the authors imputed values and included additional fixed effects for the interaction between missing values and disaster type.

[9] Applying recipient country fixed effects to a single donor sample effectively means to rely on the within-dyad variation of the migrant stock over time. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the political voice of diaspora groups in the U.S. is mediated by their organizational power and the degree of concentration in certain areas.

slope in cases where there is a TV news report. Since this is not a 'true' interaction effect – as migrants affect news coverage, and both migrants and news coverage affect aid –, this result should be treated with caution. Still, the evidence suggests that if migrants fail to generate media attention to a disaster, their effect on U.S. aid is negligible, but quite substantive when a disaster makes it into the news. Together, I (cautiously) interpret this as evidence that increasing the level of public attention to a disaster is indeed an important channel of diaspora influence. By providing (and potentially framing) information, larger migrant communities in the U.S. increase the otherwise low chances of a news report on a disaster in the homeland. News coverage of the disaster, then, multiplies the diaspora influence on the probability of an U.S. aid flow by increasing the public pressure on decision-makers to help the disaster-affected people abroad.