

Supporting Information for:
"Partisan Selective Exposure in Online News
Consumption: Evidence from the 2016
Presidential Campaign"

Appendix A: Wakoopa Toolbar Uptake and Compliance


Initial Toolbar Uptake

Figure A1 compares the sample of individuals who installed the toolbar ($n=1,076$) to the overall survey sample ($n=7,704$). In each case we use survey weights provided by YouGov when making these comparisons. This mirrors the approach we use in our analysis when assessing partisan isolation throughout the paper.

The differences between these groups are small across a variety of indicators. The primary exception is that the toolbar sample has a higher degree of political interest than the initial survey sample. Based on this imbalance, we conduct additional robustness checks that re-weight the toolbar sample to reduce this imbalance at the end of this appendix section.

Figure A1: Demographic Differences by Toolbar Installation

Differences in Toolbar Sample Relative to YouGov Sample




Toolbar Use Over Time

While individuals who installed the toolbar were incentivized to continue using it throughout the study time period, we observed a modest degree of attrition in use of the Wakoopa toolbar over the study. During the first week of data collection, 94% of the individuals we analyze in the toolbar dataset registered at least one site visit. By the final week of

data collection 76% of these respondents visited at least one website during the week.

Figure A2 below displays the percentage of active users by day (based on a 7-day rolling average) over the period of data collection.


Figure A2: Toolbar Use Over Time



In Figure A3 (see below), we examine differences in the demographic profile of individuals who remained active on Wakoopa upto the last week of data collection (i.e., they have at least one website visit per week during this time period) relative to those who became inactive at this point (i.e., who visit zero sites during this week).

Figure A3: Demographic Differences by Wakoopa Activity

Over-Time Differences in Active Toolbar Sample



Attrition in toolbar use does not appear systematically linked to these covariates.

Comparison To Other Surveys

We also benchmark the final sample of web panelists we consider to a set of other political surveys that took place during the 2016 election. The next three plots display differences

in the sample composition of our toolbar sample after incorporating the sample weights relative to three other studies: 1) the 2016 American National Election Study Face to Face Interviews, 2) the 2016 American National Election Study Online Interviews and 3) the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (an online-only sample). This enables comparisons across a variety of different demographic and attitudinal characteristics. Because there are differences in the survey items and question format in each of these other surveys, not every toolbar item can be compared to all three other surveys.

These comparisons reveal a high degree of similarity between our sample and these other data sources on important dimensions like partisanship and Presidential vote choice. That being said, even after including these weights two departures stand out. First, self-reported political interest is substantially higher in our sample, even after including the weights, than it is for the 2016 CCES where a comparable 4-pt political interest measure is available (3.55 to 3.25). Second, self-reported turnout in the 2016 Presidential primaries and caucuses is substantially higher among the toolbar sample (76% among our panelists relative to: 40% for ANES Face to Face, 44% for ANES Online, 61% for CCES). Based on this differences, we conclude this section by presenting results which show that our overall findings are not altered by reweighting our data to reduce this discrepancy in political interest.

Figure A4: Trait differences between ANES 2016 Face to Face and Toolbar Sample

Differences in Sample Composition Relative to NES Sample




Figure A5: Trait differences between ANES 2016 Online and Toolbar Sample





Figure A6: Trait differences between CCES 2016 and Toolbar Sample

Differences in Sample Composition Relative to CCES Sample



Comparison To Other Web Traffic Sources

To compare the web traffic data from Wakoopa panelists to other sources, the table below pairs this traffic data for Wakoopa panelists during October 2016 to estimates of website traffic obtained from individual-level data from Comscore’s web panel over the same period of time.

We paired aggregate traffic data from our set of Wakoopa panelists to Comscore traffic data for two sets of websites a) the top 500 websites of any type in the Wakoopa dataset and b) the 255 political websites that are the primary focus of this study. We compared web traffic patterns for three different measures including a) the share of active panelists with at least one visit to a domain on a given day (closest to the approach used in Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011), b) the share of all web traffic to different web domains (closest to the approach used in Flaxman et al 2016) and c) the overall volume of traffic to various web domains. This approach allows us to benchmark our traffic sample to these other data sources.

Table A1: Wakoopa and Comscore Web Traffic Comparison

	Daily Visitor Share (1 or More Visits)	Traffic Share	Visits per Panelist
Top 50 (All Sites)	0.82	0.95	0.95
Top 500 (All Sites)	0.82	0.95	0.95
Top 50 (Political Site List)	0.74	0.55	0.54
Full Political Site List	0.84	0.67	0.67

Across these comparisons the correlation between the share of users visiting a domain at least once on a given day exceeds .8 for the entire website list and .7 when focusing just on political websites. In terms of traffic share there are stronger relationships between the two sources of data for the entire website list (above .9) than when just focusing on the political website list (above .5).

Robustness: Weighting To Account For High Levels of Political Interest

One potential concern raised by these benchmarking exercises is that the evidence of greater levels of partisan isolation in our sample relative to previous research is attributable to the higher levels of political interest in this sample relative to other election surveys. Adding to this concern, when we reestimate partisan isolation separately for

respondents with high and low levels of political interest based on either their survey responses to a political interest question (those who pay attention to politics “A great deal” relative to other panelists) or their amount of browsing on these political news domains (above or below median number of visits to these news domains), panelists with low levels of political interest exhibit lower levels of partisan isolation.

Table A2: Partisan Isolation Index By Political Interest

Trait	Adjusted Isolation Index
2016 (Low Interest-Survey Based)	0.04
2016 (Low Interest-Traffic Based)	0.09
2016 (High Interest-Survey Based)	0.25
2016 (High Interest-Traffic Based)	0.23

We address this concern by reestimating our key comparison with a new set of respondent weights obtained by raking the set of Wakoopa panelists to the population marginal distributions of age, education, gender, partisan identification, race, region and self-reported political interest from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Applying these alternative weights lowers the average political interest of the Toolbar sample from 3.6 when using the YouGov weights to 3.3, matching the distribution of political interest in the CCES sample.

Applying these alternative weights when assessing partisan isolation does not substantially alter partisan isolation index or the substantial increase in partisan isolation relative to prior research. The partisan isolation index is 0.21 when using the YouGov weights – the results presented in the main text – and 0.22 when using these alternative raking weights to downweight the overall level of political interest among the panel. In both cases, we continue to observe substantially higher levels of partisan isolation than prior research.

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Appendix B: Crowd-Sourced News Article Labels

After identifying news articles that mentioned “Clinton” or “Trump” within the first 150 words of the article, we used crowd-sourced classifications of article content from workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to provide further information about the articles.

Coders were provided with the instructions below when rating the articles.

Figure B1: Rating Instructions

Please categorize the below news article from the 2016 Presidential Campaign based on its **Topic**.

If multiple categories are appropriate, use the topic that **most prominently** appears in the text excerpt.

See the **Definition** below for more details on each category and **Examples**

Topic	Definition	Examples
Clinton Scandal	Alleged moral/legal/financial wrongdoing by Hillary Clinton or Democratic Party. This includes critiques of Clinton's character or personal behavior .	Coverage/Discussion of Hillary Clinton's health after fainting at campaign event. FBI investigation of Clinton's email server. <i>(Press Clinton Scandal button for additional examples)</i>
Trump Scandal	Alleged moral/legal/financial wrongdoing by Donald Trump or Republican Party. This includes critiques of Trumps's character or personal behavior .	Coverage/Discussion of Trump's comments about women on leaked "Access Hollywood" tape. Lawsuit brought against Trump University. <i>(Press Trump Scandal button for additional examples)</i>
Candidate Policy	Policy positions of either candidate.	Trump proposal to increase military spending. Clinton position on Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.
Campaign Strategy	Overall state of the campaign. Includes candidate targeting/outreach efforts, predictions about election outcomes or discussions of polls.	Discussion of Clinton purchasing TV advertising in Florida. News report about a public opinion poll.
Campaign Event	Focus on specific campaign event (e.g., a speech, coverage of a presidential debate, an endorsement for one of the candidates).	Coverage of specific Trump campaign speech. Story about one of the presidential debates. News about an endorsement received by one of the candidates.
Other	Coverage that does not fall into the above categories.	

They then rated the articles using the following interface.

Figure B2: Rating Interface

\$(header)

\$(body)

1) Choose a category:

Clinton Scandal
Trump Scandal
Candidate Policy
Campaign Strategy
Campaign Event
Other
<input type="radio"/> Unreadable/Garbled Text

2) What type of article is this?

<input type="radio"/> Descriptive Reporting
Something Else

3) Is this article generally more positive towards the Democratic Party, more positive towards the Republican Party, or is it neutral?

1 More Positive towards the Democratic Party
2
3 Neutral
4
5 More Positive towards the Republican Party

After selecting a high-level category, they were then presented with several sub-category labels for each article. For instance, “scandal” articles could be labeled as discussing allegations of wrongdoing by the Clinton Foundation or Hillary Clinton’s earnings from speaking engagements among other sub-categories. Similarly, “issue” articles could be labeled as focusing on national security or the economy among other options.

We took several steps to ensure coding reliability. Raters were required to complete a 3-item political knowledge quiz prior to rating any articles and needed to have 95% of their prior HITS approved and more than 500 successful prior HITS. We also limited the amount of work that could be done by an individual rater to 200 total articles so that no individual rater could influence the final results. Finally, we removed ratings from workers who “sped” through assessments in the first round of coding (coders who took an average of less than 20 seconds per article to complete their ratings). These reports were re-labeled in a second round of coding.

Assessing Label Quality

We developed this coding scheme after extensive pilot testing of the labeling process involving iterative labeling from multiple workers. After finalizing our coding scheme we conducted a final pilot test with 1,000 articles assigned to two different workers to assess the inter-coder reliability in article labeling.

In the section below, we present measures of inter-coder reliability from this final pilot for the classification of articles according to both topic and slant.

Article Topics

Our analysis focuses on “Event”, “Issue”, “Strategy”, “Scandal” and “Other” coverage categories. Across all categories, the two coders labeled articles consistently in 55% of the cases. This level of agreement is no different from results reported in prior work that employs crowd-sourced labeling to identify article topics (e.g. Budak et al. 2016 report agreement in 53% of articles).

As a second check we asked 100 coders to classify two news reports that clearly focused on prominent political controversies — the Trump Access Hollywood Tape and Hillary Clinton’s fainting scare. Coding agreement on these “exemplar” cases was high; the correct scandal label was assigned in 88 percent of the cases and the appropriate sub-label (Clinton Health or Trump Tape scandal) in 81 percent of all cases.

Article Slant

For the article-level slant ratings, inter-coder reliability assessments were relatively modest. There was a correlation of .23 between the Rater 1 and Rater 2 assessments. The Cohen’s Kappa of these ratings was 0.07.

While these measures of exact agreement are relatively modest, coders disagreed on the partisan direction of the slant (cases in which one rater coding the article as Pro-

Republican and the other as Pro-Democratic) in only 5% of cases (the comparable figure is 3% in Budak et al. 2016). In cases where both raters categorized an article as non-neutral (20% of the pilot articles) they were rated in the same direction 77% of the time.

Whatever issues there were in rating articles, they appear unrelated to the coder’s personal political view. When asked about their 2016 Presidential Vote choice 50% said they supported Clinton, 29% said they supported Trump and 21% said they did not vote or supported a 3rd party candidate.

The table below shows that average article ratings were similar across these different groups, with all of them evaluating coverage as, on average, slightly favorable towards the Democratic party.

Table B1: Article Rating by Political Views


	Presidential Vote in 2016	Average Article Rating
1	Voted Democratic	2.73
2	Voted 3rd Party/Did not vote	2.77
3	Voted Republican	2.72

Of course, these modest measures of inter-coder agreement on article ideology raise questions about any findings that rely exclusively on individually-coded articles. However, as the next section indicates, the aggregate measures of content-based website partisanship based on averaging all the article ratings for a given domains exhibit strong convergent validity with the audience-based measures. And, to the extent individual coders disagreed about article placement, it appears to produce a tendency towards rating articles as neutral rather than substantial disagreement over the ideological direction of an article.

Appendix C: Comparing Measures of News Domain Partisanship

We follow previous research in using both audience-based and content-based indicators of news slant. Our audience-based measure characterizes the partisanship of different political news domains based on the partisanship of their audience. Our content-based measure is based on assessments of article-level slant made by coders on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.

Figure C1: Domain Partisanship Ratings



The two measures of slant are strongly correlated, suggesting some degree of convergent validity. Figure C1 displays the relationship between the audience-based indicator of website partisan slant (the share of Republican pageviews) and the content-based rating (the average coder rating of slant for articles on that site). This analysis includes all websites visited by at least 50 panelists (217 domains in our data).

Both measures also correlate well with alternative indicators of news sources’ ideological or partisan leanings. The table below focuses on the 42 most visited websites in our data. These are sources visited by at least 300 panelists and represent the top 20% of websites by traffic in our sample. There are generally strong correlations between our two operationalizations of website slant and these alternative measures used in prior studies.

Particularly strong overlap occurs between the audience measure used in this study and one produced by studying patterns of content sharing on Facebook (Bakshy et al. 2015) and the content measure used in this study with the audience-based measure constructed from users of a web toolbar (Flaxman et al., 2016).

Table C1: Correlation Between Site Partisanship/Ideology Measures

Measure	Audience	Content
Audience(This Study)	-	0.67
Content (This Study)	0.67	-
Audience (Flaxman et al., 2016)	0.59	0.67
Audience (Bakshy et al., 2015)	0.78	0.82

Appendix D: Partisan Isolation - Robustness and Alternative Measures

Formula for Adjusted Isolation Index

To introduce the isolation index measure in the main text, we present the relatively concise formula for the unadjusted isolation index. However, to follow Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) we employ an “adjusted” isolation index throughout our primary analysis. We do so to avoid inflating partisan isolation due to a small-sample bias that occurs when web domains receive relatively few visitors.

The formula for the adjusted isolation index is presented below.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adjusted Isolation Index} &= \sum_{j \in J} \left(\frac{\widehat{rep}_j}{\widehat{rep}_m} \right) \left(\sum_{i \in I_{rep}} w_{ij} \frac{\widehat{rep}_j - x_{ij}}{\widehat{visits}_j - x_{ij}} \right) \\ &\quad - \sum_{j \in J} \left(\frac{\widehat{dem}_j}{\widehat{dem}_m} \right) \left(\sum_{i \in I_{dem}} w_{ij} \frac{\widehat{rep}_j}{\widehat{visits}_j - x_{ij}} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Here \widehat{rep}_j refers to the number of republican daily visitors to outlet j , divided by the share of all daily visitors to outlet j with non-missing partisanship. \widehat{dem}_j is defined the same way for Democratic visits to a domain. The total number of domain visits is defined as $\widehat{visits}_j = \widehat{rep}_j + \widehat{dem}_j$, while the total number of visits made by a partisan group is \widehat{rep}_m for Republicans and \widehat{dem}_m for Democrats.

In this equation x_{ij} refers to a respondent’s YouGov sampling weight times the number of daily visits made by the respondent to outlet j . $w_{ij} = \frac{x_{ij}}{\sum_{k \in I_{rep}} x_{kj}}$ for Republicans and $\frac{x_{ij}}{\sum_{k \in I_{dem}} x_{kj}}$ for Democrats.

Comparing Results Using Adjusted/Unadjusted Isolation Index

The table below displays the partisan isolation index across a variety of sets of websites using both the adjusted isolation index and the unadjusted isolation index measure (the results of which were not presented in the main text). Across a variety of different sets of web domains/content types, these two measures produce similar depictions of partisan isolation. They differ primarily when considering visit patterns to the large number of non-political domains in the data set (“All Web Traffic” and “All Non-Political Domains.”). Because many web domains used in that analysis receive only a small number of visits from the panelists in our data, the unadjusted isolation index is much higher than the adjusted measures.

This table also helps to demonstrate the robustness of the partisan isolation index to a variety of changes. This includes using all traffic to the set of three large political news aggregators (aol.com,msn.com,yahoo.com) instead of focusing just on news-based visits as in the primary analysis (“Political Domains - Include All AOL/MSN/Yahoo Traffic”) or removing all visits of any type to these three sites (“Political Domains - Exclude All AOL/MSN/Yahoo Traffic”).

Table D1: Partisan Isolation Index

Data	Unadjusted Isolation	Adjusted Isolation
All Web Traffic	0.28	0.06
All Non-Political Domains	0.28	0.05
Political Domains - Include All AOL/MSN/Yahoo Traffic	0.22	0.18
Political Domains - Exclude All AOL/MSN/Yahoo Traffic	0.28	0.24
Political Domains - Baseline	0.25	0.21
Political Domains - Top Ten (2016 List)	0.22	0.21
Political Domains - Top Ten (2009 List)	0.24	0.22
All Election Articles	0.36	0.33
Election Articles - Strategy	0.36	0.29
Election Articles - Trump Scandal	0.39	0.34
Election Articles - Clinton Scandal	0.44	0.40
Election Articles - Issue	0.53	0.45
Election Articles - Neutral Slant	0.38	0.33
Election Articles - Moderate Slant	0.43	0.39
Election Articles - High Slant	0.47	0.42

We also present estimates of partisan isolation by various levels of geography using the

full YouGov survey and just those respondents who were also included in the Wakoopa sample where web traffic is available. Like previous research that employs this metric (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011, Table IV), we observe limited partisan isolation at these levels of geography using the adjusted isolation index.

Table D2: Partisan Isolation Index by Geography

Sample/Geography	Unadjusted Isolation	Adjusted Isolation
Full Yougov - County	0.63	0.05
Full Yougov - Zip Code	0.89	0.06
Wakoopa Panel - County	0.79	-0.03
Wakoopa Panel - Zip Code	0.96	0.04

We also present both the unadjusted and adjusted isolation index for the other traits which was discussed as a robustness check in the main text.

Table D3: Isolation by Other Traits

Trait	Unadjusted Isolation	Adjusted Isolation
Ideology	0.28	0.24
Education	0.07	0.03
Gender	0.07	0.03
Race	0.05	-0.00

Using both the adjusted and unadjusted isolation index, there is substantially more isolation by ideology than these other variables.

Appendix E: Relationship Between Web Browsing Behavior and Candidate Preference

In the main text we present a simple bivariate examination of the relationship between partisan news exposure and candidate preferences across the two survey waves. This section estimates a series of regression models that include additional covariates and do not coarsen the measure of partisan media exposure as we do in the main text. These alternative estimation approaches produce the same finding of a minimal relationship between partisan media diet and candidate preferences over the course of the general election campaign.

Model Specifications

We examine the consequences of partisan news consumption using two types of regression models. The first “change score” model regresses the change in the outcome variables on partisan media exposure and other controls.

$$Y_2 - Y_1 = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \textit{Partisan News Exposure} + \textit{Controls} + \epsilon.$$

In addition to this difference specification, we also estimate a second model using a lagged dependent variable specification. This alternative approach has the potential to produce more precise estimates of the effect of media exposure on candidate evaluation, but does so at the added cost of less confidence in the estimates of causal effects (i.e., this approach no longer accounts for unobservable, time-invariant confounders). This model takes the following form:

$$Y_2 = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \textit{Partisan News Exposure} + \beta_2 \times Y_1 + \textit{Controls} + \epsilon$$

Dependent and Independent Variables

Across both specifications the outcome variables are an individual's attitudes toward the candidates as measured in the surveys. We examine three indicators of candidate affect. These consist of feeling thermometer ratings of Clinton and Trump, a battery of trait ratings for each candidate (intelligence, trustworthiness, "tells it like it is", compassion, morality, stability and willingness to compromise), and items measuring emotional reactions to the two candidates (these emotions were: anger, hopefulness, fear, disgust, pride and inspiration). Across these sets of indicators we compute the relative ratings of the two candidates (e.g., the difference in a respondent's feeling thermometer placement of Trump relative to Clinton). In combination, these variables allow us to observe the effect of media exposure on both overall candidate assessments and less crystallized elements of candidate evaluation (e.g., ratings of candidate competence) that may be more amenable to media influence.

The *Partisan News Exposure* variable is operationalized in two different ways. First, we use the audience-based measure of exposure to partisan content from the previous section. Second, we construct a content-based measure of partisan news exposure by averaging the coder-rated slant of all election-related articles that a respondent encountered.

Finally, the *Controls* included in the model are a variety of respondent attributes measured in the first wave of the survey—level of education, income, partisanship, gender, and age among other variables. Their inclusion means we examine the influence of media exposure that is not otherwise explained by an individual's demographic characteristics.

In presenting both sets of these results we orient the outcome measures so that higher values indicate favorable shifts in assessments of Donald Trump relative to Hillary Clinton between the two waves of the panel. Similarly, we construct both media exposure measures so that higher values indicate a more Republican news diet. Finally, we rescale both sets of measures to have mean zero and standard deviation one to facilitate comparisons

across different operationalizations of media exposure and candidate outcomes.

We find limited evidence that news consumption contributed to attitude change over the course of the campaign. Figure E1 displays point estimates of the effect of partisan news exposure on candidate evaluations from “change score” approach (black points) and lagged dependent variable models(gray points).

The left panel of Figure E1 trace changes in our indicators of candidate evaluation to our audience-based measure of individuals’ exposure to partisan news (the average Republican audience share of their news visits). The top point focuses on the difference in the candidate feeling thermometers, the middle point repeats the analysis for net trait ratings of the two candidates, and the bottom point examines shifts in a measure of net candidate affect. Higher values on all three measures indicate shifts in a more Republican direction (i.e., a shift towards more favorable evaluations of Donald Trump relative to Hillary Clinton). The right hand panels of Figure E1 repeat the analyses, this time substituting the content-based measure of slant as the measure of exposure to partisan news.

Figure E1: Effects of Partisan Media Exposure on Candidate Evaluations (Change Score and Lagged DV Models)




Figure E1 displays the coefficients on Republican media exposure from these regres-

sions. Across the different change score model specifications, differences in exposure to partisan news sources exerted no detectable influence on changes in candidate evaluations. A one standard deviation increase in Republican media exposure resulted in a change of -0.04 standard deviations in the net thermometer rating, a change of 0.01 standard deviations in the net trait rating, and -0.02 in the affect score. In all cases these shifts are not statistically significant, with 95% confidence intervals that contain zero.

We observe similar results when employing our measure of election-related article slant. Here there are shifts of -0.04, 0.02 and 0.01 standard deviations on the thermometer, trait and emotional evaluations in response to a one standard deviation increase in exposure to articles with a favorable slant toward Donald Trump. As in the audience-based measure of exposure to partisan information, these relationships are not statistically significant. In general, we observe little, if any, attitude change due to partisan media exposure between August and November of 2016.

Turning to the lagged dependent variable, in several cases, estimates on the effect of partisan media exposure reach conventional levels of statistical significance in predicting shifts in supportive views of Donald Trump over the course of the panel, but effects are substantively small and are consistent with the interpretation of the findings included in the main text.

Appendix F: Correlates of Overall Online Browsing Activity

As we note in the main text, Democrats were more active consumers of online news than Republicans. The table below regresses an individual’s number of pageviews on any of the political domains we consider on a variety of demographic characteristics and their party ID. Consistent with the discussion in the main text, Democrats are more active in this regard than Republicans. This persists even when conditioning on a variety of demographic covariates that may differ between the two parties, suggesting partisanship is a distinctive factor in its own right and that these differences are not simply due to demographics correlated with party ID. Age has a strong negative relationship with an individual’s amount of political news consumption online.

Table F1: Correlates of News Website Pageviews

	News Website Pageviews	Log(News Website Pageviews)
(Intercept)	39674.45*	9.76*
	(4376.04)	(0.23)
Democrat	4835.66*	0.38*
	(1985.89)	(0.10)
Independent	5687.44*	0.13
	(2823.69)	(0.15)
Age	-320.66*	-0.01*
	(60.75)	(0.00)
Female	2646.47	0.17
	(1769.30)	(0.09)
Black	-2213.86	-0.45*
	(3586.23)	(0.19)
Hispanic	-146.97	0.12
	(4311.01)	(0.22)
College/Graduate Degree	913.51	0.18
	(2393.38)	(0.12)
Some College	2331.58	0.24
	(2420.99)	(0.13)
<i>N</i>	1073	1073

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

While this indicates an absolute difference in browsing activity, it does not explain the partisan divides in web browsing we find throughout the paper. As our measures

of partisan isolation focus on relative differences in the media diets of the two groups of partisans, rather than the absolute level of news exposure by any group, a partisan difference in news consumption volume cannot explain the pattern we find. To the extent Democrats visit more websites, this pushes the average Republican audience visit share of all websites lower. If Democrats and Republicans visit the same websites, but Democrats visit them more frequently, it would lead both groups to encounter websites with a similar Republican audience share. If this occurred our measures of selectivity would reveal low levels of partisan division (e.g., the two terms in the isolation index would be similar and lead to a low score). In our case partisan divides in exposure emerge because, in addition to Democrats visiting more websites in general, Democrats and Republicans arrive at different news domains.

Appendix G: Political Website List

Table G1 on the next page contains the list of political websites we focus on in this study. These were determined by examining the top 100 websites offering news coverage by traffic among the Wakoopa panelists and an additional 255 U.S.-based websites included on Alexa's list of most popular news domains.

For three large websites – aol.com, msn.com, and yahoo.com – we focus on only traffic to their news content in our primary analysis to avoid non-news related web traffic (e.g., individuals checking their email at mail.aol.com, conducting a web search at yahoo.com or playing online video games at zone.msn.com) that would otherwise be included in the analysis if only traffic to the top-level domain was examined. Appendix D shows that alternative approaches to treating visits to these three pages produces largely similar estimates of partisan isolation.

Table G1: List of Political Websites

abcnews.go.com	denverpost.com	lacrossetribune.com	palmbeachpost.com	sun-sentinel.com
abqjournal.com	deseretnews.com	lancasteronline.com	pantagraph.com	suntimes.com
ajc.com	deseretsun.com	lansingstatejournal.com	patch.com	syracuse.com
al.com	desmoinesregister.com	lasvegassun.com	patriotledger.com	talkingpointsmemo.com
altnet.org	detroitnews.com	latimes.com	pbs.org	tallahassee.com
aol.com/news	disinfo.com	ledger-enquirer.com	pe.com	tampabay.com
ap.org	diversityinc.com	lehighvalleylive.com	people-press.org	tbo.com
argusleader.com	drudgereport.com	livemint.com	pewresearch.org	tcpalm.com
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bismarcktribune.com	firstknow.com	metrowestdailynews.com	pressdemocrat.com	theepochtimes.com
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bradenton.com	foxnews.com	mlive.com	qctimes.com	thenewtribune.com
breakingnews.com	freep.com	monroenews.com	rasmussenreports.com	thepoliticalinsider.com
breitbart.com	fresnobee.com	motherjones.com	rawstory.com	therealnews.com
buffalonews.com	frontpagemag.com	msn.com/en-us/news	realclearpolitics.com	theroot.com
burlingtonfreepress.com	gainesville.com	msnbc.com	redding.com	thestar.com
business-standard.com	gannett.com	mysanantonio.com	registerguard	thestate.com
businessinsider.com	gastongazette.com	naplesnews.com	reuters.com	thestranger.com
buzzfeed.com	gazette.com	nationalreport.net	reviewjournal.com	thetimesnews.com
c-span.org	globalissues.org	nationalreview.com	rgj.com	theweek.com
carbonated.tv	good.is	nbcsports.com	richmond.com	thinkprogress.org
cbn.com	governing.com	newbernsj.com	roanoke.com	time.com
cbslocal.com	grandforksherald.com	newrepublic.com	rollcall.com	timesunion.com
cbsnews.com	greeleytribune.com	news-gazette.com	rrstar.com	townhall.com
centredaily.com	greensboro.com	news-press.com	rt.com	trib.com
chicagoreader.com	greenvilleonline.com	news.com.au	sacbee.com	triblive.com
chicagotribune.com	gregpalast.com	news.yahoo.com	salon.com	truthdig.com
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cjonline.com	heavy.com	newsmax.com	sanluisobispo.com	unionleader.com
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clarionledger.com	heraldnews.com	newsok.com	saukvalley.com	usatoday.com
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cnm.com	houstonpress.com	newsweek.com	seattletimes.com	vanityfair.com
columbian.com	huffingtonpost.com	newyorker.com	sfchronicle.com	vcstar.com
commercialappeal.com	hutchnews.com	nhregister.com	sfgate.com	vice.com
commondreams.org	ibtimes.co.uk	niemanlab.org	sfweekly.com	villagevoice.com
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dailymail.co.uk	journalnow.com	ocregister.com	starnetnews.com	wn.com
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