Supplementary Information

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How Transnational Party Alliances Influence National Parties' Policies

A - Group Models: Spatial Weight Matrices and Regression Tables

To estimate the group models presented in Figure 1 (right panel) we consider disaggregated links between individual transnational party alliances. The first one (W Foreign Incumbent: same group PES) is defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country, $party_i$ and $party_k$ belong to the Social Democratic transnational party alliance (PES) and $party_k$ was in government (or part of the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t. Second, (W Foreign Incumbent: same group EPP) is defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country, $party_i$ and $party_k$ belong to the center-right European People's Party transnational party alliance and $party_k$ was in government (or part of the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t. Third, (W Foreign Incumbent: same group ALDE) is defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country, $party_i$ and $party_k$ belong to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and $party_k$ was in government (or part of the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t. Finally, (W Foreign Incumbent: same group UEN) is defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country, $party_i$ and $party_k$ belong to the Union for Europe of the Nations and $party_k$ was in government (or part of the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t. The average number of neighbors for each of the four spatial weights matrices is shown in Table S2.

Table S 1: Average number of neighbors for disaggregated spatial weights matrices

Spatial lag variable	neighbors
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group PES	6.2
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group EPP	4.1
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group ALDE	3.3
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group UEN	0.4

Table S 2: Single 'disaggregated' Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS)

	Dependent variable: RILE Party Position			
	Model D1	Model D2	Model D3	Model D4
Lagged RILE Party Position	0.746***	0.752***	0.752***	0.750***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Lagged Median Voter	0.454***	0.438***	0.437***	0.410***
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.029**	0.028**	0.027**	0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Lagged Median Voter * Lagged Economic Globalization	−0.006***	−0.006***	−0.006***	−0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group PES	0.003***			
	(0.001)			
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group EPP		0.001		
		(0.001)		
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group ALDE			−0.0003	
			(0.002)	
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group UEN				0.054**
				(0.023)
Constant	−1.074	−1.021	−1.016	−0.856
	(0.818)	(0.820)	(0.820)	(0.822)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718	2,718
R^2	0.888	0.888	0.888	0.888
Adjusted R^2	0.877	0.876	0.876	0.877
F Statistic (df = 252; 2465)	77.802***	77.402***	77.403***	77.597***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S 3: Single Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS)

|	*Dependent variable:*	
	RILE Party Position	
	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged RILE Party Position	0.751***	0.751***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Lagged Median Voter	0.438***	0.434***
	(0.158)	(0.158)
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.028**	0.027**
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Lagged Median Voter *		
Lagged Economic Globalization	−0.006***	−0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
ρ Foreign: Same party family Social Democrats	0.00001	
	(0.0002)	
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same party family Social Democrats		−0.0003
		(0.0004)
Constant	−1.021	−1.007
	(0.820)	(0.820)
Observations	2,718	2,718
R^2	0.888	0.888
Adjusted R^2	0.876	0.876
Residual Std. Error (df = 2465)	0.325	0.325
F Statistic	77.402***	77.418***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

To compare the results of the disaggregated model for the Social Democratic transnational group in the EP with the Social Democratic party family, we created to additional weight matrices. The first one (*W* Foreign: Same party family Social Democrats) is defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country and $party_i$ and $party_k$ belong to the Social Democratic party family (as coded according to the MARPOR data). Second, (*W* Foreign Incumbent: Same party family Social Democrats) is defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country and $party_i$ and $party_k$ belong to the Social Democratic party family (as coded according to the MARPOR data) and $party_k$ was in government (or part of the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t.

B - Simulations

We estimate the parameters of Model 4 and Model 5 (Table 1) and draw 1000 sets of simulated coefficients from their posterior distribution. Next, we fix the spatial lag variables (ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group and ρ Foreign Incumbent: Different group) at the fifth (0.00 and 0.00) and ninety-fifth percentile (47.39 and 129.97) holding all other variables at their means, and then 1000 expected values of the RILE Party Position are calculated. Figure S2 shows the distributions of simulated expected values. In the left panel, we observe differences in expected values of the RILE Party Position depending on whether the values of the spatial lag variable (ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same group) are low or high. The means of the two distributions are different from each other at conventional levels of statistical significance. In contrast, we observe no differences in expected values of the RILE Party Position depending on whether the values of the spatial lag variable (ρ Foreign Incumbent: Different group) are low or high. The two distributions are not different from each other at conventional levels of statistical significance. This indicates that the positions of incumbent parties within the same group will influence a focal party, while the positions of incumbent parties in other

groups do not. In addition, we calculated first differences between the two expected values and it shows that in 894 out of 1000 simulations the expected value based on the parties from the same party group is larger than the expected value based on the different party group. Thus the effect of (on average) two incumbent parties within the same party group is larger than the effect of (on average) nearly eight parties in other party groups.

Figure S 1: Simulated expected values of RILE Party Position

Note: The plot shows the distribution of a focal party's expected RILE position on the x-axis, based on simulations fixing the spatial lag variables at the fifth (dark gray) and ninety-fifth percentile (light gray). The y-axis indicates the number of simulations. Left panel: Same group. Right panel: Different group. The left panel (for same party group) shows that left-right positions of a focal party are more strongly influenced, i.e., pulled further to the left or right, by foreign incumbents in the same transnational group, when compared to the effects simulated in the right panel for foreign incumbents that are not in the same transnational group.

C- Equilibrium Effects

In the global model but also in the disaggregated group models, party policy diffusion is indicated by the spatial parameter ρ. It reflects changes in the left-right position of parties based on changes in the time-lagged left-right position of foreign incumbents belonging to the same transnational party group. Crucially, it does not provide information about specific diffusion patterns of individual parties (**?**). To provide such insights, we re-analyze the impact of changes in the time-lagged left-right position of Social Democratic incumbent parties on individual parties using equilibrium impacts (Ward and Skrede Gleditsch 2008). In particular, we estimate differences in predicted values of parties' left-right position between Model 4 (global model) in Table 1 and a model in which the value of the time-lagged left-right position of Social Democratic incumbent parties is increased by 1. Figure S3 shows the changes in predicted values for the five parties with the largest positive differences in predicted values between the two models in the short term. In addition, it indicates whether the top five parties belong to the Social Democratic transnational party alliance or not. The figure shows that it was not always the case that Social Democratic parties learn and emulate the position of Social Democratic foreign incumbents the most. Only from the 1990's onwards, we observe that parties within the same transnational party alliance are learning and emulating the position of Social Democratic foreign incumbents the most. This suggests that within-group party policy diffusion in the Social Democratic transnational party alliance was particularly pronounced during the implementation of 'third way' policies. Interestingly, in the period from 2004-2006 we observe that radical-right parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party learn and emulate the policy positions of Social Democratic foreign incumbent parties most strongly.

Figure S 2: Differences in predicted RILE values (top five parties)

D - Additional Spatial Weights Matrices

The two matrices (*W* Foreign Incumbent: Same Party Group and *W* Foreign Incumbent: Different Party Group) described in the main part of the manuscript connect parties that are represented at the EU level and affiliated with a transnational party group. However, there are further links between parties to explore where either $party_i$ or the foreign incumbent $party_k$ is not affiliated/represented at the European level. As previously mentioned, each focal party has on average 22.29 neighbors. Leaving aside, the 1.97 neighbors in the same transnational group and 7.82 neighbors in different groups there are around 12 neighbors left representing situations where either $party_i$ or the foreign incumbent $party_k$ is not affiliated/represented at the European level. To consider links between parties that are represented and affiliated at the EU level and parties that are not represented and affiliated at the EU level, we construct the following additional connectivity matrices. The first one (*W* Foreign Incumbent: $party_i$ & $party_k$ not affiliated/represented) is

defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country, $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not affiliated to a group or not represented at the EU level and $party_k$ was in government (or part of the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t. Second, (W Foreign Incumbent: $party_i$ not affiliated/represented) is defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country, only $party_i$ is not affiliated to a group or not represented at the EU level and $party_k$ was in government (or part of the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t. Third, (W Foreign Incumbent: $party_k$ not affiliated/represented) is defined so that each element $W_{i,k,t}$ receives a value of 1 if $party_i$ and $party_k$ are not based in the same country, only $party_k$ is not affiliated to a group or not represented at the EU level and $party_k$ was in government (or part of the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t. The average number of neighbors for each of the three spatial weights matrices is shown in table S3.

Table S 4: Average number of neighbors for additional spatial weights matrices

Spatial lag variable	neighbors
ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_i$ & $party_k$ not affiliated/represented	2.72
ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_i$ not affiliated/represented	6.85
ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_k$ not affiliated/represented	2.93

E - Additional Empirical Results

The coefficients of spatial lag variables considering non-affiliated and non-represented parties further substantiate the important role of being represented at the EU level in order to learn from and emulate foreign incumbent parties (Table S4). The coefficient ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_i$ & $party_k$ not affiliated/represented is negatively signed and statistically significant at conventional levels which indicates that parties that are not represented at the EU level or affiliated to a party group do not learn from and emulate each other but instead move further apart in their RILE position. Similarly, the coefficient ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_i$ not affiliated/represented indicates that parties that are not represented at the EU level or affiliated to a party group do not learn from and emulate foreign incumbents that are represented at the EU level and affiliated to a party group. Finally, the coefficient ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_k$ not affiliated/represented, statistically significant at conventional levels, indicates that parties represented at the EU level and affiliated to a group observe and respond to foreign incumbent parties that are not represented at the EU level or not affiliated to a party group. This suggests that parties that are represented and affiliated at the EU level consider additional channels. However, considering the short-term and long-term effect of the spatial lag based on shifts in left-right positions of (on average) three foreign incumbents we see that learning from foreign incumbents that belong to the same transnational party group outweighs learning from foreign incumbents that are not represented at the EU level.

Table S 5: Single Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS)

	Dependent variable: RILE Party Position		
	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3
Lagged RILE Party Position	0.751***	0.752***	0.751***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Lagged Median Voter	0.440***	0.432***	0.448***
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.028**	0.027**	0.029**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Lagged Median Voter * Lagged Economic Globalization	−0.006***	−0.006***	−0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_i$ & $party_k$ not affiliated/represented	−0.001*		
	(0.001)		
ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_i$ not affiliated/represented		−0.0002	
		(0.0002)	
ρ Foreign Incumbent: $party_k$ not affiliated/represented			0.001*
			(0.001)
Constant	−0.992	−1.001	−1.083
	(0.820)	(0.820)	(0.820)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Adjusted R^2	0.876	0.876	0.876
F Statistic	77.507***	77.438***	77.519***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S 6: Single Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS)

	Dependent variable: RILE Party Position			
	Model LI1	Model LI2	Model LI3	Model LI4
Lagged RILE Party Position		0.827***		0.828***
		(0.010)		(0.010)
Lagged Median Voter		0.389***		0.326***
		(0.114)		(0.114)
Lagged Economic Globalization		0.024***		0.019**
		(0.008)		(0.008)
Lagged Median Voter * Lagged Economic Globalization		−0.005***		−0.004***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
ρ Foreign Incumbent	0.006***	0.004***		
	(0.002)	(0.001)		
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same party group			0.004***	0.001**
			(0.001)	(0.0005)
Constant	5.724***	−1.109*	6.118***	−0.555
	(0.213)	(0.603)	(0.197)	(0.593)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718	2,718
Adjusted R^2	0.746	0.932	0.747	0.931
F Statistic	33.208***	147.932***	33.289***	146.717***

Note: Party position between elections are interpolated using linear interpolation. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S 7: Single Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS)

|	*Dependent variable:* RILE Party Position			
	Model SI1	Model SI2	Model SI3	Model SI4
Lagged RILE Party Position		0.822***		0.822***
		(0.012)		(0.012)
Lagged Median Voter		0.275*		0.209
		(0.146)		(0.145)
Lagged Economic Globalization		0.017*		0.012
		(0.010)		(0.010)
Lagged Median Voter * Lagged Economic Globalization		−0.003*		−0.002
		(0.002)		(0.002)
ρ Foreign Incumbent	0.007***	0.005***		
	(0.002)	(0.001)		
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same party group			0.005***	0.001**
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	5.497***	−0.757	5.950***	−0.169
	(0.242)	(0.770)	(0.225)	(0.756)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718	2,718
Adjusted R^2	0.685	0.894	0.687	0.893
F Statistic	24.879***	91.808***	25.001***	91.338***

Note: Party position between elections are interpolated using spline interpolation. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Interrupted Time Series Analysis

To further examine our proposed mechanism of transnational party policy diffusion through EP party groups, we present results from an interrupted time series analysis in which we leverage the accession of Austria and Sweden to the EU (see Figure S4). Before the accession the Social Democratic Parties of the two countries were part of the Social Democratic Europarty but not the Social Democratic EP party group. Using the differences between the RILE position of the two Social Democratic parties and the lagged RILE position of the average foreign incumbent in the Social Democratic EP party group as dependent variable, we find negative slope and level changes in the post-accession period indicating that the two parties adjusted their position towards the foreign incumbents in the Social Democratic EP party group after becoming members of the EP party group.[1] This provides evidence that learning and emulation of foreign incumbents is channeled through the EP party group.

Figure S 3: Regression Coefficients - Interrupted Time Series Model

An ITS analysis uses data collected at equally spaced intervals before and after the occurrence of an event (i.e., becoming a member of a EP party group). The basic strategy of an ITS analysis is to use the observed trajectory of the outcome variable prior to the event to forecast the future trajectory of the outcome variable in the absent of the event. This assumed counterfactual is then used to estimate the causal effect of the event by comparing the assumed counterfactual with the observed outcome variable in the time period after the occurrence of the event.

A minimum of three variables is required for ITS analysis. First, the time (T) elapsed since the start of the study. We use annual data for the 15 years before and after the Swedish and Austrian Social Democratic parties joined the Social Democratic party group in the EP. Second, a dummy variable indicating the pre-event period (coded 0) and the post-event period (coded 1). Third, the outcome variable at time t. Our outcome variable is the absolute distance between the RILE position of the two national Social Democratic parties and the average lagged RILE position of foreign incumbent in the Social Democratic EP group. We use a standard unadjusted ITS model considering both level and slope changes:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 X_t + \beta_3 T X_t$$

where β_0 represent the baseline at $T = 0$, β_1 is interpreted as the change in outcome associated with a time unit increase representing the underlying pre-event trend. β_2 is the level change following the event ($X = 1$) and β_3 indicates the slope change following the event (using the interaction between time and event: TX). To make the model with interactions easier to interpret, we center the running variable (T) by subtracting the cutoff point.

Globalization and Political Parties

In this section, we consider context-conditional responses to globalization (i.e., unit responses to exogenous-external conditions may depend on unit characteristics). As suggested by **?**, the effects of globalization should

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[1]Please consult the Section 'Interrupted Time Series Analysis' in the appendix for more information.

be stronger for Left parties than for Right parties. Below, we present model results that take such a context-conditional explanation into account. Our result on party policy diffusion within the same EP party group is robust to this alternative approach.

Table S 8: Single Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Dependent variable: RILE Party Position			
Lagged RILE Party Position	1.021***	1.007***	1.008***	1.006***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Lagged Median Voter	0.017	0.019	0.017	0.019
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.017***	0.016***	0.015***	0.016***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Lagged RILE Party Position * Lagged Economic Globalization	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ρ Foreign Incumbent	0.004***			
	(0.001)			
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same party group		0.002**		0.002**
		(0.001)		(0.001)
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Different party group			0.0001	0.0001
			(0.0003)	(0.0003)
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	−0.547	−0.290	−0.265	−0.284
	(0.460)	(0.451)	(0.452)	(0.452)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718	2,718
Adjusted R^2	0.877	0.877	0.877	0.877
F Statistic	77.937***	77.852***	77.636***	77.515***

Note: $^*p<0.1;\ ^{**}p<0.05;\ ^{***}p<0.01$

EU, Migration, and RILE Disaggregation

In the main section, we study party policy diffusion based on the RILE dimension. We focus on RILE because it constitutes the main cleavage between political parties across European democracies. However, one might be interested in the precise topics and strategies that are learned and emulated. For this reason, we present results based on individual manifesto categories. The first model shows that parties do not seem to learn from and emulate foreign incumbents Anti-EU position (per110 minus per108). We believe that the non-finding makes good sense. The EU is not important in national elections and parties do not win national elections because of their EU position. Second, we find no clear evidence that parties adjust their multiculturalism attitudes (per608 minus per607) towards the position of foreign incumbents from the same transnational party group. The category is used as a proxy for parties' migration attitudes. The coefficient is positive but small and not statistically significant at conventional levels. Given that migration has become increasingly important in national election campaigns, it seems reasonable that parties learn and emulate foreign incumbents' strategies. The sign of the coefficient points in this direction; however, it is difficult to capture parties' migration attitudes with manifesto data because the category includes migration-related multiculturalism but also concerns over national minorities.

Finally, we disaggregate the RILE dimension and find evidence that issues from the economic domain tend to be subject to party policy diffusion while issues from the political system domain are not. This

suggests that political parties learn from and emulate cues about foreign incumbents' economic policies most strongly. We illustrate the findings by presenting results for the issues Political Authority, Free Market Economy, and Market Regulation which all three are part of the RILE measure (Model 3-5).

Table S 9: Single Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS)

	Dependent variables:				
	Anti-EU	Anti-Multiculturalism	Political Authority	Free Market Economy	Market Regulation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Lagged Party Position	0.711***	0.683***	0.707***	0.667***	0.652***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Lagged Median Voter	0.020	−0.053**	0.137	0.057	0.104**
	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.137)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.001	−0.003**	0.0001	0.006	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Lagged Median Voter * Lagged Economic Globalization	−0.0003	0.001***	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001**
	(0.0005)	(0.0003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same party group	−0.0002	0.0001	0.0001	0.002	0.002**
	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	1.507***	1.981***	−0.508	0.061	−0.060
	(0.208)	(0.138)	(0.718)	(0.282)	(0.258)
Observations	2,599	2,599	2,599	2,599	2,599
Adjusted R^2	0.756	0.754	0.771	0.780	0.705
Residual Std. Error	0.075	0.043	0.281	0.111	0.101
F Statistic	42.166***	41.563***	45.646***	47.877***	32.725***

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Testing for remaining temporal correlation in residuals

As described in the main text of the manuscript our choice to use a time-lagged spatial-lag model rests on the theoretical expectation that manifesto drafting processes are time-consuming and thus justify non-instantaneous interdependence. Moreover, we account for temporal dynamics (common trends) by adding a lagged dependent variable. When using such model specification, it is suggested to test whether the lagged dependent variable causes the remaining errors to be independent (**??**). Below, we present tests for remaining temporal correlation of residuals for various model specifications (Models 1-4 from the main text). Model 1 (Foreign Incumbent) and Model 3 (Foreign Incumbent: Same EP party group) do not feature a lagged dependent variable. Model 2 (Foreign Incumbent) and Model 4 (Foreign Incumbent: Same EP party group) include a lagged dependent variable. While the residuals in Model 2 and Model 4 still exhibit some autocorrelation, it is clearly shown that our consideration of temporal dynamics mitigates the temporal correlation in residuals.

Table S 10: Breusch-Godfrey Test

Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
1307	10.938	1293.7	11.525
$p < 0.01$	$p < 0.01$	$p < 0.01$	$p < 0.01$

Figure S 4: Autocorrelation function (ACF)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

The remaining serial correlation in the residuals of our dynamic model indicate that the dynamic function has not been completely specified. One option is to consider additional lag terms (see Wooldridge 2002). Below, we present such an approach (by adding $t - 2$) and show that serial correlation in the residuals is further reduced (Table S12) while our main conclusion is robust to this alternative specification (Table S13).

Table S 11: Breusch-Godfrey Test

Model 2 (add. lag)	Model 4 (add. lag)
6.4555	6.0906
$p > 0.01$	$p > 0.01$

Table S 12: Single Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS) with additional lag term

	Dependent variable:	
	RILE Party Position	
	Model 2 (add. lag)	Model 4 (add. lag)
Lagged RILE Party Position (t-1)	0.816***	0.816***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Lagged RILE Party Position (t-2)	−0.087***	−0.088***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Lagged Median Voter	0.533***	0.487***
	(0.158)	(0.157)
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.035***	0.031***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Lagged Median Voter * Lagged Economic Globalization	−0.007***	−0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
ρ Foreign Incumbent	0.004***	
	(0.001)	
ρ Foreign Incumbent: Same party group		0.002**
		(0.001)
Constant	−1.615*	−1.177
	(0.833)	(0.816)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	2,718	2,718
R^2	0.889	0.889
Adjusted R^2	0.878	0.878
Residual Std. Error (df = 2464)	0.323	0.323
F Statistic (df = 253; 2464)	78.135***	78.048***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Learning from and Emulating Opposition Parties

Parties might not only respond to foreign incumbents (from the same EP party group) but also to foreign opposition parties that gained votes at the most recent election. To test the hypothesis, we use the spatial lag labelled ρ Foreign Opposition (by vote gain). The connectivity matrix of this spatial lag is defined as follows: in the row corresponding to party i, entries are 0, unless in column k the corresponding party was recently in opposition in another country, in which case the entry is party k's absolute vote gain. The results do not provide evidence that a focal party is responsive to opposition parties when they gain votes in the previous election. This suggests that incumbency is the important cue that parties respond to.

Table S 13: Single Spatial Lag Regression Models (S-OLS)

	Dependent variable:	
	RILE Party Position	
	Model OP1	Model OP2
Lagged RILE Party Position	0.751***	0.752***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Lagged Median Voter	0.416***	0.440***
	(0.160)	(0.158)
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.026**	0.028**
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Lagged Median Voter * Lagged Economic Globalization	−0.006***	−0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
ρ Foreign Opposition (by vote gain)	0.0002	
	(0.0002)	
ρ Foreign Opposition (by vote gain): Same party group		−0.0001
		(0.0001)
Constant	−0.878	−1.030
	(0.832)	(0.820)
Observations	2,718	2,718
R^2	0.888	0.888
Adjusted R^2	0.876	0.876
Residual Std. Error	0.325	0.325
F Statistic	77.437***	77.418***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F - Information about Political Parties

Table S 14: National Parties and Political Groups at the EU level

EP	MS	MS	Party Groups	Party Groups	No. of national parties
EP I (79')	9	9	7	7	49
EP II (84')	10	10	8	7	56
EP III (89')	12	12	10	10	68
EP IV (94')	12	12	9	9	77
EP V (99')	15	15	8	8	90
EP VI (04')	25	21	7	7	97
EP VII (09')	27	21	7	7	113

Note: Numbers in plain font represent information from the European Parliamentary Research Service. Numbers in bold represent our data set. The number of parties gives the absolute number of parties that are included in our data per EP term.

G - National parties included in empirical analysis

∗ = foreign incumbent

EP = member of EP party group

() = name of the EP party group

Austria
BZÖ Alliance for the Future of Austria (2007-2010)
FPÖ Austrian Freedom Party (1996-2010) ∗
GRÜNE The Greens (1996-2010) *EP* (Greens/EFA)
KPÖ Austrian Communist Party (2003-2010)
LIF Liberal Forum (1996-1998)
SPÖ Austrian Social Democratic Party (1996-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
ÖVP Austrian People's Party (1996-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)

Belgium
AGALEV Live Differently (1982-2010) ∗ *EP* (Greens/EFA)
CVP Christian People's Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
ECOLO Ecologists (1982-2010) ∗ *EP* (Greens/EFA)
LDD List Dedecker (2008-2010) *EP* (ECR)
MR Reform Movement (2004-2010) *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
PLDP Liberal Democratic and Pluralist Party (1977-1980)
PRL Liberal Reformation Party (1977-1994) ∗
PRL-FDF Liberal Reformation Party - Francophone Democratic Front (1996-1998)
PRL-FDF-MCC Liberal Reformation Party - Francophone Democratic Front - Citizens' Movement for Change (2000-2002)
PS Francophone Socialist Party (1979-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)

PSC Christian Social Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
PVV Party of Liberty and Progress (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
SP Flemish Socialist Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
SPIRIT Social, Progressive, International, Regionalist, Integrally Democratic and Forward-Looking (2008-2009) *EP* (PES/S&D)
SPIRIT Socialist Party Different (2004-2009)

Bulgaria
ATAKA National Union Attack (2006-2008)
BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party (2006-2008)
DSB Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (2006-2008) *EP* (EPP)
KzB Coalition for Bulgaria (2005-2008) *EP* (PES/S&D)
NDSV National Movement Simeon the Second (2005-2008) ∗ *EP* (ALDE)
ODS United Democratic Forces (2005-2008)

Cyprus
AKEL Progressive Party of the Working People (2005) *EP* (GUE)
DIKO Democratic Party (2005) ∗
DISY Democratic Coalition (2005) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
KISOS Social Democrats' Movement (2005) ∗

Czech Republic
CSSD Czech Soc. Democratic Party (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
KDU-CSL Christian and Democratic Union - Czech People's Party (2007-2010)
KDU-CSL-US-DEU Christian and Democratic Union - Czech People's Party - Freedom Union - Democratic Union (2005) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
KSCM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (2005-2010) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
ODS Civic Democratic Party (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (ECR)
SPR-RSC Association for the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (2005)
SZ Green Party (2007-2010)

Denmark
CD Centre Democrats (1977-2006) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
DF Danish People's Party (1999-2010) *EP* (UEN, European for Freedom and Democracy)
DKP Danish Communist Party (1977-1987)
EL Red-Green Unity List (1995-2010)
KF Conservative People's Party (1977-2006) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
KrF Christian People's Party (1977-2006) ∗
NY New Alliance (2008-2010)
RV Radical Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
SD Social Democratic Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
SF Socialist People's Party (1977-2010) *EP* (GUE/NGL, Greens/EFA, Communist Group,)
V Liberals (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
VS Left Socialist Party (1977-1986)

Estonia

SDE Social Democratic Party *EP* (PES/S&D)
EER Estonian Greens (2008-2010)
ER Estonian Reform Party (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
IL Pro Patria Union (2005-2006) *EP* (EPP)
K Estonian Center Party (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
M People's Party Moderates (2005-2010)
RP Union for the Republic (2005-2010)

Finland

KK National Coalition (1994-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
LKP Liberal People's Party (1994)
NSP Progressive Finnish Party, also known as Young Finns (1996-1998)
SKL Finnish Christian Union (1994-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
SSDP Finnish Social Democrats (1994-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
VAS Left Wing Alliance (1994-2010) ∗ *EP* (GUE/NGL)
VL Green Union (1994-2010) ∗ *EP* (Greens/EFA)

France

CDP Centre, Democracy and Progress (1977)
CNIP National Centre of Independents and Peasants - Conservatives (1977-1992)
FN National Front (1987-2010) *EP* (European Right)
GE Ecology Generation (1977-2010)
Les Verts The Greens (1994-2010) ∗ *EP* (Greens/EFA)
MR Reformers' Movement (1977)
PCF French Communist Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (GUE/NGL, Communist Group)
PS Socialist Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
RPR Rally for the Republic - Gaullists (1977-2001) ∗
UDF Union for French Democracy (1979-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP, ALDE)
UMP Union for the Presidential Majority (2003-2010) *EPP* (EPP)

Germany

90/Greens Alliance'90/Greens (1984-2010) ∗ *EP* (Green/EFA)
CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
FDP Free Democratic Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
L-PDS The Left. Party of Democratic Socialism (2006-2008)
LINKE The Left (2010)
PDS Party of Democratic Socialism (1991-2004) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)

Great Britain

Conservative Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (EDG, EPP, ECR)
Labour Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&S)
Liberal Party (1977-2010) *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
SDP Social Democratic Party (1984-1991)
SF Ourselves Alone (1998-2004) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
UUP Ulster Unionist Party (1993-2004) *EP* (EPP)

Greece

DIKKI Democratic Social Movement (1997-1999) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
KKE Communist Party of Greece (1981-2006) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
ND New Democracy (1981-2007) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
PASOK Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (1981-2007) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
Pola Political Spring (1994-1999)
SYP Progressive Left Coalition (1990-2003)
SYRIZA Coalition of the Left, Movements and Ecology (2005-2006)

Hungary

FiDeSz-MPSz Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People's Party (2007-2010)
MDF Hungarian Democratic Forum (2005-2009) *EP* (EPP)
MSzDP Hungarian Social Democratic Party (2007-2010)
MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
SzDSz Alliance of Free Democrats (2005-2009) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)

Ireland

DLP Democratic Left Party (1993-2001)
Family of the Irish (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
Green Party (1990-2010) *EP* (Greens/EFA)
Labour Party (1997-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
PD Progressive Democrats (1988-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
Soldiers of Destiny (1977-2010) ∗ *EPP* (EDA, UEN, ELDR/ALDE)
WP Workers' Party (1982-1992)

Italy

AD Democratic Alliance (1995-2000)
AN National Alliance (1994-2007) ∗ *EP* (UEN)
CCD Christian Democratic Centre (1997-2000) ∗
DC Christian Democrats (1977-2000) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
DP Proletarian Democracy (1984-1991)
FI Go Italy (1995-2007) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
FdV Green Federation (1988-2007)
House of Freedom (2002-2005)
IdV List Di Pietro - Italy of Values (2002-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
LN Northern League (1993-2010) *EP* (Democracy Group, EFD)
M-DL Daisy Democracy is Freedom (2002-2005)
MSI-DN Italian Social Movement-National Right (1977-2007)
NPSI New Italian Socialist Party (2002-2007)
Olive Tree (2002-2007) *EP* (PES/S&D)
PCI Italian Communist Party (1977-2005) ∗ *EP* (GUE/NGL, PES/S&D)
PD Democratic Party (2009-2010) *EP* (PES/S&D)
PI Pact for Italy (1995)
PLI Italian Liberal Party (1977-1993) ∗

PR Radical Party (1977-2000)
PRC Communist Refoundation Party (1993-2007) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
PRI Italian Republican Party (1977-1993) ∗
PSDI Italian Democratic Socialist Party (1977-1993) ∗
PSI Italian Socialist Party (1977-1995) ∗
PdCI Party of Italian Communists (2002-2007) ∗ *EP* (GUE/NGL)
PdL People of Freedom (2009-2010)
PdUP Proletarian Unity Party for Communism (The Manifesto/Proletarian Unity Party) (1977-1986)
RI Italian Renewal (1977-2000)
RnP Rose in the Fist (2007)
The Girasole (Sunflower) (2002-2005)
UdC Union of the Center (2007-2010) *EP* (EPP)
White Flower (2002-2005)

Latvia
JL New Era (2005)
LC Latvian Way Union (2005) ∗
LPP Latvia's First Party (2005)
PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia (2005)
TB-LNNK For Fatherland and Freedom - Latvian National Independence Movement (2005) ∗
TP People's Party (2005) ∗

Luxembourg
CSV/PCS Christian Social People's Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
DP/PD Democratic Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
GAP Green Alternative (1985-1993)
GLEI Green Left Ecological Initiative (1990-1993)
GLEI-GAP Green Left Ecological Initiative - Green Alternative (1995-2003) *EP* (Greens/EFA)
KPL/PCL Communist Party (1977- 1993)
LSAP/POSL Socialist Workers' Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
The Greens (2005-2010)
The Left (2010)

Netherlands
CDA Christian Democratic Appeal (1978-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
CU Christian Union (2003-2010)
DS'70 Democratic Socialists'70 (1977- 1980)
D'66 Democrats'66 (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
GL Green Left (1990-2010) *EP* (Greens/EFA)
LN Livable Netherlands (2003-2005)
LPF List Pim Fortuyn (2003-2005)
PPR Radical Political Party (1977-1988) ∗
PVV Party of Freedom (2007-2010)
PvdA Labour Party (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
SP Socialist Party (1995-2010) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
VVD People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (1977-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR(ALDE)

Norway
DnA Norwegian Labour Party (1991-2006) ∗
H Conservative Party (1991-2006) ∗
KrF Christian People's Party (1991-2006) ∗
SV Socialist Left Party (1991-2006)
V Liberal Party (1991-2006) ∗

Poland
LPR League of Polish Families (2005-2006)
PO Civic Platform (2005-2010) *EP* (EPP)
PiS Law and Justice (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (ECR)
SLD Democratic Left Alliance (2006) ∗

Portugal
BE Left Bloc (2000-2010) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
CDS Social Democratic Center Party (1986-2010) *EP* (EPP, UEN)
CDU Unified Democratic Coalition (1992-2008) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
ID Democratic Intervention (1988-1990)
MDP Popular Democratic Movement (1986)
PCP Portuguese Communist Party (1986-2010) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
PEV Ecologist Party 'The Greens' (1986-2010)
PRD Democratic Renewal Party (1986-1990)
PS Socialist Party (1986-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
PSD Social Democratic Party (1986-2010) ∗ *EP* (ALDE, EPP)
UDP Popular Democratic Union (1986-1990)

Romania
PDL Democratic Liberal Party (2009-2010) *EP* (EPP)
PNL National Liberal Party (2009-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)

Slovakia
ANO Alliance of the New Citizen (2005)
HZDS Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (2005-2010) ∗
KDH Christian Democratic Movement (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
KSS Communist Party of Slovakia (2005)
SDKÚ-DS Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
SDL' Party of the Democratic Left (2005) ∗
SNS Slovak National Party (2007-2010) ∗ *EP* (EFD)
Smer Direction-Social Democracy (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)

Slovenia
For Real (2009-2010) *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
LDS Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (2005-2010) *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
Nsi New Slovenian Christian People's Party (2005-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
SD Social Democratic Party (2005-2010) *EP* (PES/S&D)

SDS Slovenian Democratic Party (2005-2010) *EP* (EPP)
SLS Slovenian People's Party (2005-2010) ∗
SNS Slovenian National Party (2005-2010)

Spain
CDS Centre Democrats (1986-1995)
CiU Convergence and Union (1986-2010) *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
IU United Left (1986-2010) *EP* (GUE/NGL)
PDP Popular Democratic Party (1986-1988)
PL Liberal Party (1987-1988)
PP Popular Party (1986-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (1986-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)

Sweden
FP People's Party (1996-2010) ∗ *EP* (ELDR/ALDE)
Kd Christian Democrats (1996-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
MP Green Ecology Party (1996-2010) *EP* (Greens/EFA)
MSP Moderate Coalition Party (1996-2010) ∗ *EP* (EPP)
SAP Social Democratic Labor Party (1996-2010) ∗ *EP* (PES/S&D)
VPK Left Communists Party (1996-2010) *EP* (GUE/NGL)