

Online Appendix for

Franchino, Fabio, and Camilla Mariotto. "Bargaining Outcomes and Success in EU

Economic Governance Reforms." *Political Science Research and Methods*

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1. Data Collection: Sources and Cross-validation Strategies

Since we cover a timespan of almost twenty years, we had to rely on several different sources and strategies to identify and cross-validate issues and positions. Although measurement errors cannot be ruled out, we adopt an increasingly wider array of cross-validation techniques over time.

For institutional positions, we use Commission proposals, parliamentary readings, and Council opinions. We tracked and hand-coded all the amendments proposed throughout the legislative procedures and determined contested issues and institutional positions. For the governments, we followed a variety of approaches. First, the state of play issued by the Council Presidency during the negotiations is particularly informative and detailed since it highlights the key issues of disagreement. Unfortunately, this document offers mostly alternatives for compromise and rarely includes initial positions of ministers. Second, we examined 22 press releases, more than 90 transcribed speeches, given mostly during plenary debates, of parliamentarians, commissioners, and Council presidents, and more than 350 articles and reports of *Agence Europe* and other prominent European newspapers. Third, we used Council public legislative records, internal documents, and videos of Council legislative deliberations that were also made public. For our purposes, we have videos of economic and financial affairs (Ecofin) ministers debating the two-pack only. We hand-coded the transcripts of these deliberations. Finally, we conducted interviews with expert witnesses affiliated with EU and national institutions: three representatives of the Parliament, three Commission officials from

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the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, and five officials affiliated with the permanent representations and the national finance ministries. We asked these key informants to identify the issues of disagreement and to locate the initial positions of the actors involved. Interviews provided useful information only for the 2005 and 2011-3 reforms.

Divisive issues and positions have also been cross-checked against the data of Wasserfallen *et al.* (2019), and the analytical narratives of Artis and Buti (2000), Segers and van Esch (2007), Schure and Verdun (2008), Heipertz and Verdun (2010), and Schimmelfennig (2015).

Table A1 lists the measures, Table A2 the divisive issues, and Table A3 provides summary statistics of the country and institutional positions.

Table A1: Measures and adoption procedures

Excessive deficit procedure (EDP)	Adoption procedure
Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community	Consultation procedure with qualified majority voting
Council Regulation (EC) No 475/2000 of 28 February 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community	Consultation procedure with qualified majority voting
Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005 of 12 December 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 as regards the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure	Consultation procedure with qualified majority voting
Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (Codified version)	Consultation procedure with qualified majority voting. No changes.
Council Regulation (EC) No 679/2010 of 26 July 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 as regards the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure	Special procedure with qualified majority voting
Preventive arm of the stability and growth pact (SGP)	Adoption procedure
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies	Cooperation procedure
Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending	Cooperation procedure

Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies

Council Regulation (EC) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (also a six-pack measure)	Ordinary procedure	legislative
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Corrective arm of the stability and growth pact (SGP)	Adoption procedure	
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Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure	Consultation procedure with unanimity	
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Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure	Consultation procedure with unanimity	
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Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (also a six-pack measure)	Special procedure	with unanimity
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Enforcement of the stability and growth pact (six-pack)	Adoption procedure	
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Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area	Ordinary procedure	legislative
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Macroeconomic imbalances procedure (six-pack)	Adoption procedure	
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Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances	Ordinary procedure	legislative
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Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area	Ordinary procedure	legislative
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Budgetary frameworks (six-pack)	Adoption procedure	
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Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States	Special procedure	with qualified majority voting
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Two-pack regulations	Adoption procedure	
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Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability	Ordinary procedure	legislative
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Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area	Ordinary procedure	legislative
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Table A2: Divisive issues

Act	Year	Issue and Provisions
Preventive SGP	1997	Should references to growth be included? Article 3.1 and other provisions
Corrective SGP	1997	Under which exceptional circumstances is a deficit not excessive? Articles 2.2 and 2.3. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Corrective SGP	1997	In case of an excessive deficit, how much should the fixed component of the first deposit be? Article 12.1
Corrective SGP	1997	How automatic should the procedure for imposing sanctions be? Articles 2, 11, and 13. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
EDP	2005	How regular should methodological visits be? Changes to Article 8d of Regulation 3605/93
EDP	2005	How many days prior to publication should Eurostat communicate a reservation on data quality? Changes to Article 8h of Regulation 3605/93. <i>Interinstitutional compromise outcome</i>
Preventive SGP	2005	Should medium-term objectives be cyclically-adjusted and country-specific? Changes to Article 2a of Regulation 1466/97
Corrective SGP	2005	How numerous and specific mitigating factors for determining an excessive deficit? Changes to Article 2.3. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Preventive SGP	2011	In which articles should the Council decide by reverse QMV? Changes to Articles 6.2 and 10.2 (but no changes to Article 5.2) of Regulation 1466/97. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Preventive SGP	2011	How should the adjustment path towards the MTO be differentiated for highly indebted member states? Changes to Article 5.1 of Regulation 1466/97. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Preventive SGP	2011	How should deviations from the adjustment path towards the MTO be evaluated? Changes to Articles 5.1 and 6.2 second subparagraph of Regulation 1466/97. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Corrective SGP	2011	In which articles should the Council decide by reverse QMV? Article 1.1 (no changes)
Corrective SGP	2011	How should the debt criterion be operationalized? Article 2.1a first paragraph of Regulation 1467/97. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Corrective SGP	2011	How long should the transitional period be for member states being subject to an EDP? Article 2.1a second paragraph of Regulation 1467/97
Corrective SGP	2011	How numerous and specific mitigating factors for determining an excessive deficit? Articles 2.3-2.7 of Regulation 1467/97. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Enforcement SGP	2011	Should the Commission adopt emergency measures, including Eurobonds? Article 13.4. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Enforcement SGP	2011	In which articles should the Council decide by reverse QMV? Articles 4.2, 5.2, and 6.2
Enforcement SGP	2011	How severe sanctions should be? Articles 4.1, 5.1 and 6.1
Enforcement SGP	2011	Which sanctions do member states incur for manipulating statistics?

Enforcement SGP	2011	Article 8 How should interests and fines be distributed? Article 10
MIP	2011	In which articles should the Council decide by reverse QMV? Article 10.4 (but no changes to Articles 4.3, 6.1, 7, 8.2,10.1,10.5)
MIP	2011	Should macroeconomic imbalances be assessed symmetrically? Article 3.2. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
MIP	2011	Should the scoreboard be different among member states? Article 4.4. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
MIP	2011	Should the EP be involved in the design of the scoreboard? Recital 12
MIP Enforcement	2011	In which articles should the Council decide by reverse QMV? Article 3.3
MIP Enforcement	2011	How severe sanctions should be? Article 3.5
MIP Enforcement	2011	How should the sanctions be distributed? Article 4
Budgetary Frameworks	2011	Which instrument should be used? No relevant provisions
Budgetary Frameworks	2011	How frequent should fiscal data reporting be? Article 3.2a. <i>Interinstitutional compromise outcome</i>
Budgetary Frameworks	2011	Who should be in charge of monitoring and analysis? Articles 2,3,4, and 6
Surveillance	2013	How should the Council approve the macroeconomic adjustment programme? Article 7.2
Budgetary Plans	2013	Should the Commission adopt emergency measures, including Eurobonds? No relevant provisions, but see the review clause. <i>Compromise outcome</i>
Budgetary Plans	2013	Which member states should make budgetary plans public? Article 4
Budgetary Plans	2013	When should member states present their budgetary plans? Article 4.2. <i>Interinstitutional compromise outcome</i>
Budgetary Plans	2013	Who should monitor compliance with fiscal rules? Articles 2 and 5

Note: SGP: Stability and growth pact, EDP: Excessive deficit procedure, MIB: Macroeconomic imbalances procedure. We disregard conflicts that are resolved before the tabling of legislative proposals, such as those over the terms ‘close-to-balance’ and ‘surplus’ in the 1997 preventive GSP regulation (Artis and Buti 2000: 564-5).


Table A3: Summary statistics of country and institutional positions

Country /Institution	Mean Position	St.dev. of Positions	N
Spain	38.6	42.59	35
France	42.1	42.78	35
United Kingdom	43.2	43.77	22
Latvia	44.4	39.81	18
Bulgaria	44.6	40.64	14
Italy	46.4	47.02	35
Greece	47.1	42.34	35
Sweden	47.7	40.76	22
European Commission	47.9	45.52	35
Germany	48.6	44.94	35
Lithuania	48.6	39.73	18
Poland	48.6	41.54	18
Slovenia	49.2	41.58	31
Czech Republic	50	39.3	18
Austria	50.7	42.22	35
Denmark	51.1	42.59	22
Romania	51.8	40.98	14
Estonia	52.4	39.45	31
Ireland	54.3	43.08	35
Slovakia	55.6	42.18	31
Finland	57.1	42.69	35
Cyprus	58.1	41.53	31
Hungary	58.3	36.38	18
Outcome	59.3	37.91	35
Portugal	59.3	41.16	35
Malta	59.7	40.14	31
Belgium	60.7	41.25	35
Netherlands	61.4	41.72	35
European Parliament	67.9	37.17	35

2. Illustration of a Controversial Issue

Figure A1. A controversial issue in the negotiations on the 1997 corrective SGP regulation

Under which exceptional circumstances is a deficit not excessive?



Note: OUT: Outcome, RP: Reference point, NBS: Nash bargaining solution, PROC: Procedural, COMP: Compromise, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, EC: European Commission proposal, EP1: parliamentary position at first reading, FR: France, IT: Italy, NL: Netherland. Other countries' positions are represented by the Ecofin (Economic and Financial Affairs) Council agreement. Procedure: Consultation with unanimity.

3. Predictive Accuracy of Models: Additional Results

Table A4. Mean absolute errors of models by legislative procedure

	Consultation with unanimity	Consultation with qualified majority voting	Ordinary legislative procedure
PROC	34.38 (29.69)	7.14 (18.90)	38.75 (44.04)
PROC \neg RP	21.88 (31.16)	14.29 (24.40)	21.25 (32.72)
NBS	12.25 (14.45)	65.43 (37.41)	55.95 (38.57)
NBS \neg RP	16.88 (17.05)	15.29 (20.06)	24.10 (24.58)
COMP	16.63 (17.62)	14.86 (18.53)	20.45 (17.68)
Mean	16.75 (17.93)	15.43 (20.29)	23.35 (25.29)
Minimax	22.25 (25.28)	36.57 (23.06)	32.05 (22.42)
COMP (big 5/6)	19.13 (12.32)	16.14 (16.99)	21.65 (17.35)
COMP (derived power)	16.63 (17.28)	19.00 (14.12)	25.70 (23.76)
No. of issues	8	7	20

Note: OUT: Outcome. RP: Reference point. NBS: Nash bargaining solution. PROC: Procedural. COMP: Compromise. Standard deviation in parenthesis. In the bargaining models, the Parliament is accounted for only in the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) (for compromise model variants see note to Table A6)

Patterns of model accuracy across *issue types* are less meaningful since more than 71% of issues are ranked, 3% are dichotomous and 7% are scale. Nevertheless, the most accurate models tend to be the best performers across issue types as well (Thomson (2011: 182-3) has similar results), except for the procedural model which performs well in dichotomous and scale issues but poorly in ranked issues.

Table A5. Mean Euclidean errors per proposal and pseudo R²

	Mean Euclidean error	Pseudo R ²
PROC	42.21	-0.64
PROC \rightarrow RP	27.56	0.13
NBS	55.46	-1.54
NBS \rightarrow RP	23.50	0.39
COMP	20.36	0.57
Mean	23.14	0.39
Minimax	37.95	0.02
COMP (big 5/6)	21.69	0.56
COMP (derived power)	27.07	0.38

Note: For acronyms see Table A4. In the bargaining models, the Parliament is accounted for only in the OLP (for compromise model variants see note to Table A6).

Table A6. Means of absolute differences between reference points, outcomes, and compromise model predictions

	OUT	RP	COMP	COMP (big 5/6)
COMP	18.46 (17.47)	55.51** (28.34)		
COMP (big 5/6)	19.97 (15.99)	54.97** (29.00)	9.06 (8.64)	
COMP (derived power)	22.29 (20.70)	51.91** (27.01)	8.06 (7.54)	14.83 (12.40)

Note: OUT: Outcome. RP: Reference point. COMP: Compromise. Standard deviation in parenthesis. COMP (big 5/6) model accounts for the voting power of only the largest five or six member states (the sixth country being Poland after the 2004 EU enlargement). COMP (derived power) model employs the voting power of supranational institutions calculated by Thomson (2011: 204-9), assuming unequal distribution of Council power. Specifically, for the Commission: in unanimity zero voting power before 2004 and 4% of Council total power after 2004; in qmv-consultation, 30% before 2004 and 18% after; in OLP, 15% before 2004 and 3% after. For the Parliament: in OLP, 20% of Council total before 2004 and 11% after. † p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01: two-sided sign test that the median of the differences is different from zero.

Table A7. Model performance comparison between row compromise model predictions and column model predictions

		COMP	COMP (big 5/6)
COMP (big 5/6)	Better	13	
	Worse	17	
	Equal	5	
COMP (derived power)	Better	9	15
	Worse	21*	19
	Equal	5	1

Note: See Table A4. COMP: Compromise. † p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01: one-sided sign test.


4. Bargaining Success: Additional Information and Results

Table A8. Descriptive statistics

Variable		Mean	St. deviation	Min	Max
<i>Dependent variable</i>					
Success	Opposite of absolute difference between country position and outcome	-25.13	32.94	-100	0
<i>Independent variables</i>					
Distance to reference point	Absolute difference between country position and reference point/status quo	52.11	41.68	0	100
Distance to Commission position	Absolute difference between country position and Commission position	36.79	38.90	0	100
Distance to Council President position	Absolute difference between country position and finalizing presidency country position	17.95	33.04	0	100
Distance to Parliament position	Absolute difference between country position and Parliament position	38.18	41.42	0	100
Extremeness of position	Absolute difference between country position and the mean of country positions	16.30	20.91	0	96.30
Voting power	Penrose–Banzhaf voting power index x 100 [†]	6.92	5.06	0.94	14.32
Issue Saliency	Absolute difference between country saliency and the mean of country saliency x 100	7.66	6.09	0	24.07
Population	Population (million)	19.28	24.01	0.4	82.47
GDP p.c.	Real GDP per capita (thousand)	26.70	15.46	5.3	79.3

Note: N= 759. [†]In qmv, we employ the voting weights to calculate this index. In unanimity, the index is simply $1/n$, where n is the number of member states. This value correctly equalizes voting power *across* states in a given procedure, but it underestimates power *across* procedures. A country could easily (and implausibly) enjoy more power under qmv than under unanimity (this is not a relevant issue in the earlier analysis because accuracy metrics are measured on an issue basis). To avoid this measurement error, we set the power index in unanimity as ten percent higher than the maximum power index value under qmv.

Figure A2. Bargaining success of member states, institutions, and groups




Note: Means and 95% confidence intervals of success (= 100 - |position – outcome|). The dashed vertical line is the overall mean value. Old member states are the member countries prior to the 2004 enlargement. Large states: Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Poland. Medium states: Sweden, Portugal, Czech Republic, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Romania. The others are small states. Northern states: Germany, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland. Southern states: Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Cyprus. The others are eastern states.

Table A9. Significance of the difference in bargaining success

	Germany	Ireland	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Austria	Finland	Sweden	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Latvia	Malta	Slovakia	Commission	Parliament
Belgium					■									■	
France	■										■				
Germany		■	■	■		■									
Netherlands										■					
Denmark		■													
Ireland					■		■	■					■	■	
Greece					■									■	
Portugal					■									■	
Spain						■			■			■			■
Austria							■	■						■	
Cyprus														■	
Estonia												■			
Malta														■	
Commission															■

Note: Grey cells indicate that the difference between the means of bargaining success is significantly different from zero at $p < 0.05$ in both the t-tests assuming equal and unequal variance. Light grey cells indicate that the difference is only significant in one of the two t-tests. Cells with insignificant differences are not reported. For the t-test results of the groupings see the replication material.

Figure A3. Salience-weighted bargaining success of member states, institutions, and groups



Note: See Figure A2.

Table A10. Significance of the difference in salience-weighted bargaining success


	Germany	Ireland	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Austria	Finland	Sweden	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Latvia	Malta	Slovakia	Commission	Parliament
Belgium					■										
France	■	■									■				
Germany		■	■	■		■						■			
Italy		■													
Luxembourg		■										■			
Netherlands		■								■					
Denmark		■				■									
Ireland					■		■	■			■		■	■	
Greece					■									■	
Portugal					■									■	
Spain						■			■			■			■
Austria							■	■						■	
Cyprus									■					■	
Estonia												■			
Malta													■	■	

Note: See Table A9.

5. Re-categorization robustness tests

For the Neumayer and Plümer (2017: 127-8)'s re-categorization test, we have drawn a random sample of more than ten percent of issue positions, then shifted half of them upward to the next meaningful position on the 0-100 scale and the other half downward to the next lower ranked position. This practically means re-classifying four positions of any given actor on the thirty-five issues. A position is meaningful if at least one actor has taken it. We have then computed the mean absolute error per issue. The procedure is repeated for 1,000 samples. Figure A4 plots the distribution of this metric.

Figure A4. Density of mean absolute errors per issue




Note: Normal distribution overlaid. Test for unsystematic error. Results do not change if we assume that errors systematically originate from the measurement of

positions which are primarily derived from common internal documents issued at the beginning of negotiations. Mean errors increase with larger samples of modified positions, but relative model performance is unchanged.

Using the same procedure, we have rerun the bargaining success regression of Table 3 for the 1,000 samples. Figure A5 displays the distribution, central tendency and, 95% confidence intervals of selected coefficients.

Figure A5. Density of selected coefficients of bargaining success (recategorization test)



Note: Normal distribution overlaid. Test for unsystematic error.


6. Random noise robustness tests

For this test, we draw random variables from a normal distribution with mean equals to zero and standard deviation equals to 0.1. We add this so-called Gaussian noise to governmental and institutional positions, bounding the results to the 0-100 range, and compute for each model the mean absolute error per issue. After repeating this procedure 1,000 times, we compute the overall mean absolute errors and the 95% confidence intervals.

We then repeat this same procedure with random variables drawn from more dispersed distributions. Simulations are carried out for every integer increase in standard deviation, from 0.1 up to 42.1 (the latter being the standard deviation of the original positions in the dataset). Figure 2 in the main text maps the overall mean absolute errors as models are perturbed by increasingly dispersed Gaussian noise.

Similarly, we add randomly drawn Gaussian noise to governmental and institutional positions and re-run the regression of Table 3. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times for each integer increase in the standard deviation of the noise, from 0.1 up to 42.1. Figure A6 maps the means and confidence intervals of selected coefficients as the model is perturbed by increasingly dispersed Gaussian noise. The coefficients of the distance to the parliamentary position, under OLP, and of the extremeness of positions are the only ones to differ significantly from zero across the full spectrum of disturbance.

Figure A6. Selected coefficients of bargaining success, across levels of Gaussian noise




Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

7. Independent coders robustness test

We provided our material to two doctoral students of EU politics and asked them to independently code positions. This procedure is more appropriate for coding political documents that are addressed to the general public. Coding is not only much easier but the subjectivity that underlies coding disparities is also more justifiable. With these caveats in mind, we have nevertheless randomly replaced half of our observations with the new coded positions for 1,000 times and rerun the regression in Table 3 (sample sizes are smaller because between 16 and 23 percent of the original positions has not been coded). Figure A7 displays the distribution, central tendency, and 95% confidence intervals of selected coefficients.

Figure A7. Density of selected coefficients of bargaining success (independent coders test)



Note: Normal distribution overlaid.

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