How Corruption Investigations Undermine Regime Support
Evidence from China

Online Appendix

Political Science Research and Methods

Yuhua Wang and Bruce Dickson

April 26, 2021

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Section I. Basic Information of the Surveys

The two surveys were designed by one of the authors of this article, in collaboration with survey experts at the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University. Both surveys were implemented by RCCC. The 2010 baseline survey, implemented during October—December 2010, drew a sample of 6,293 Chinese adult citizens from 49 prefecture-level cities, provincial capitals, and districts of provincial-level municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). Provinces not surveyed include Inner Mongolia, Hainan, Guizhou, and Ningxia. These provinces were not included in the sample because the surveys used the probability proportionate to size method, meaning that localities with large populations had a higher probability of being selected than smaller localities, and these provinces have relatively small populations. Tibet and Xinjiang were also not part of the survey because of recent political tensions.

The 2010 survey interviewed 3,874 respondents with a complete rate of 61.6%. The 2014 follow-up survey, implemented during July—November 2014, drew a sample of 6,503 Chinese adult citizens from the same 49 counties, and interviewed 4,128 respondents with a completion rate of 63.5%.

Both surveys were based on a stratified multi-stage probability sample of all Chinese adults, which was drawn using GPS/GIS Assistant Area Sampling (see Landry and Shen 2005). To adjust for survey design effects, each primary sampling unit is treated as a cluster. Data are weighted in terms of strata, age and gender, based on the 2010 Census data.

Table A1.1: Corruption Investigations by Province (January 2011 – July 2014)

Province	Population (million)	N. of Corruption Investigations	N. of Corruption Investigations (Weighted)	N. of Tigers	N. of Flies	N. of Corruption Investigations Per Million
Beijing	20.693	39	5.235	0	39	1.885
Tianjin	14.132	9	1.355	1	8	0.637
Hebei Province	72.875	81	9.686	0	81	1.111
Shanxi Province	36.108	181	23.584	4	177	5.013
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	24.899	70	8.901	1	69	2.811
Liaoning Province	43.890	103	12.890	1	102	2.347
Jilin Province	27.504	55	6.817	0	55	2.000
Heilongjiang Province	38.340	78	9.779	1	77	2.034
Shanghai	23.804	62	8.286	0	62	2.605
Jiangsu Province	79.200	366	43.216	1	365	4.621
Zhejiang Province	54.770	295	34.928	0	295	5.386
Anhui Province	59.880	256	31.492	1	255	4.275
Fujian Province	37.480	149	18.497	0	149	3.975
Jiangxi Province	45.039	130	16.818	3	127	2.886
Shandong Province	96.849	329	39.245	0	329	3.397
Henan Province	94.062	286	35.163	0	286	3.041
Hubei Province	57.790	222	28.053	2	220	3.841
Hunan Province	66.389	228	28.530	1	227	3.434
Guangdong Province	105.940	366	47.529	2	364	3.455
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	46.820	167	19.979	1	166	3.567
Hainan Province	8.866	32	4.473	2	30	3.609
Chongqing	29.450	41	6.401	1	40	1.392
Sichuan Province	80.762	323	40.614	4	319	3.999
Guizhou Province	34.841	133	15.925	1	132	3.817
Yunnan Province	46.590	93	12.038	2	91	1.996

Tibet Autonomous Region	3.076	3	0.454	0	3	0.975
Shaanxi Province	37.530	65	8.545	0	65	1.732
Gansu Province	25.776	90	10.887	0	90	3.492
Qinghai Province	5.732	26	3.609	1	25	4.536
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	6.472	22	2.857	0	22	3.399
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	22.328	52	6.576	0	52	2.329

Table A1.2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Measure	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Trust Central Government	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you trust the central government	7821	7.77	1.944	0	10
Trust Central Party	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you trust the central party organization	7718	7.802	1.943	0	10
Support Central Government	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you support the central government	7853	7.996	1.818	0	10
Support Central Party	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you support the central party organization	7773	8.006	1.833	0	10
Trust Central Government_Dummy	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you trust the central government	7821	0.775	0.417	0	1
Trust Central Party_Dummy	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you trust the central party organization	7718	0.776	0.417	0	1
Support Central Government_Dummy	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you support the central government	7853	0.813	0.39	0	1
Support Central Party_Dummy	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you support the central party organization	7773	0.81	0.392	0	1
Trust Prefectural Government	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you trust the prefectural government	7728	6.676	2.245	0	10
Trust Prefectural Party	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you trust the prefectural party organization	7497	6.661	2.248	0	10
Support Prefectural Government	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you support the prefectural government	7778	7.047	2.158	0	10
Support Prefectural Party	Please use 0-10 to indicate how much you support the prefectural party organization	7631	6.988	2.167	0	10
Regime Support Index	Regime support scale	7907	7.886	1.764	0	10
N of Corrupt Central Officials (Work)	Total number of corrupt central officials who worked in this province	8002	0.691	0.899	0	4

Year 2014*N of Corrupt Central Officials (Work)	Interaction term	8002	0.376	0.771	0	4
N of Corrupt Central Officials (Work) (Weighted)	Total number of corrupt central officials who worked in this province weighted by officials' bureaucratic rank	8002	0.329	0.475	0	2.083
Year 2014*N of Corrupt Central Officials (Work) (Weighted)	Interaction term	8002	0.18	0.4	0	2.083
N of Corrupt Central Officials (Hometown)	Total number of corrupt central officials whose hometown is in this province	8002	0.374	0.718	0	2
Year 2014*N of Corrupt Central Officials (Hometown)	Interaction term	8002	0.205	0.568	0	2
N of Corrupt Central Officials (Hometown) (Weighted)	Total number of corrupt central officials whose hometown is in this province weighted by officials' bureaucratic rank	8002	0.135	0.266	0	1
Year 2014*N of Corrupt Central Officials (Hometown) (Weighted)	Interaction term	8002	0.073	0.206	0	1
Year 2014	Dummy for the year of 2014	8002	0.516	0.5	0	1
N of Corruption Investigations	Total number of corruption investigations in a province between 2011 and 2014	8002	189.739	119.205	9	366
N of Corruption Investigations (Weighted)	Total number of corruption investigations weighted by officials' bureaucratic rank in a province between 2011 and 2014	8002	23.787	14.725	1.355	47.529
N of Tigers	Total number of corruption investigations of provincial or deputy provincial level officials in a province between 2011 and 2014	8002	1.154	1.261	0	4
N of Flies	Total number of corruption investigations of below-deputy provincial level officials in a province between 2011 and 2014	8002	188.585	118.769	8	365
N of Corruption Investigations Per Million	Total number of corruption investigations per million population in a province between 2011 and 2014	8002	3.146	1.147	0.637	5.386

Corruption Investigations (Above Mean)	Dichotomous measure of corruption investigations (1=above mean number of investigations)	8002	0.581	0.493	0	1
N of Corruption Investigations (Time Discount)	Total number of corruption investigations with time discount	8002	181.732	114.031	8.5	350.72
N of Corruption Investigations_Prefecture	Total number of corruption investigations in a prefecture between 2011 and 2014	8002	12.255	15.508	0	89
N of Corruption Investigations_County	Total number of corruption investigations in a county/city between 2011 and 2014	8002	0.753	1.339	0	6
Male	Male dummy	8002	0.483	0.5	0	1
Age	Age	8002	45.47	16.619	18	80
Year of Education	Year of education	7500	10.693	4.201	0	25
Urban	Urban hukou dummy	7994	0.781	0.413	0	1
Han	Ethnic Han dummy	7989	0.962	0.191	0	1
Party Member	Party member dummy	7996	0.158	0.365	0	1
Political Fear	Do you have concerns when you criticize the central government in private conversations?	4829	1.548	0.762	1	4
Response to Political Fear	Whether the respondent responded to the political fear question	8002	0.603	0.489	0	1
Per Capita Family Income (log)	Total family yearly income/Total number of individuals in the household	5338	9.6	0.926	4.723	13.122
Beliefs in Officials' Integrity	In general, government officials are honest	7204	2.347	0.818	1	4
Prior Beliefs in Officials' Integrity (Provincial Mean)	Provincial mean of Beliefs in Officiails' Integrity based on the 2010 survey	8002	2.366	0.208	1.758	2.855
Social Media News Consumption	Do you regularly use social media (such as WeChat) to read political news? (only in the 2014 survey)	4128	0.225	0.417	0	1

Social Media News Consumption (Provincial Mean)	Provincial mean of Social Media News Consumption based on the 2014 survey	8002	0.227	0.084	0.065	0.040

Table A1.3: Comparing the 2010 and 2014 Samples (*t*-Tests)

We first check whether there are compositional changes in the sample between the two periods and present the *t*-tests of key demographic variables in Appendix Table A1.3. While most demographic variables are balanced between the two periods in most provinces, there are significant differences in several covariates, such as ***Years of Education***, ***Urban***, and ***Per Capita Family Income (log)*** in provinces like Heilongjiang, Shandong, Hubei, Guangdong, and Guangxi. We hence control for these demographics in our analyses and conduct *conditional* DID estimators.

Province Name	Beijing	Tianjn	Hebei	Shanxi	Liaoning	Jilin	Heilongjiang	Shanghai	Jiangsu	Zhejiang	Anhui	Fujian
							Difference (2010 minus 2014)					
Male	0.088	-0.078	-0.084	-0.021	0.042	0.106	0.052	0.010	-0.055	0.043	0.100	-0.258**
Age	-4.010	-2.088	1.846	-0.900	2.736	0.717	-4.821**	2.478	3.221	0.288	-12.190**	2.657
Year of Education	0.994	-0.260	-1.556**	2.269**	-0.126	-0.663	0.905*	-0.536	-1.915**	-0.938*	2.840**	-0.457
Urban	0.079	-0.046	0.206**	0.427**	0.043	0.229**	-0.127**	-0.001	0.239**	0.0771*	0.022	0.188**
Han	0.017	0.000	-0.006	0.000	0.064*	-0.067*	-0.023	0.016	-0.007	-0.014	0.053	0.014
Party Member	-0.015	-0.136*	0.057	0.018	-0.113**	0.067	0.056	0.016	0.015	-0.113**	-0.088	-0.033
Per Capita Family Income (log)	-0.505**	-0.469*	-0.411**	-0.365**	-0.183*	-0.018	-0.437**	-0.070	-0.285*	-0.332*	-0.713**	-0.048
Trust Central Government (Missingness)	-0.036	-0.009	0.000	-0.028	-0.016	0.000	0.042*	-0.024*	-0.014	0.035**	0.000	-0.030
Trust Central Party (Missingness)	-0.036	0.007	0.000	-0.055	-0.016	0.000	0.063**	-0.024	-0.014	0.050**	-0.012	-0.044
Support Central Party (Missingness)	-0.010	0.014	0.000	-0.011	-0.011	0.000	0.000	-0.017	0.000	0.018	-0.012	-0.018
Support Central Government (Missingness)	-0.010	0.014	0.000	-0.039	-0.011	0.000	0.007	-0.008	0.010	0.0334*	-0.012	-0.032
N	265	152	182	238	293	121	313	504	172	444	167	156

Province Name	Shandong	Henan	Hubei	Hunan	Guangdong	Guangxi	Chongqing	Sichuan	Guizhou	Shaanxi	Gansu	Qinghai
						Difference (2010 minus 2014)						
Male	0.051	-0.010	0.009	0.075	0.063	0.055	0.016	-0.032	0.093	-0.047	0.055	0.150*
Age	-3.333	-1.917	-5.336**	-1.331	-3.854**	-3.595*	-1.204	0.734	-7.927**	-7.252**	-13.18**	-2.330
Year of Education	-1.209*	-0.476	-1.262**	-0.225	1.101**	1.650**	-0.189	-0.658	4.840**	-0.120	3.865**	0.531
Urban	0.118*	0.098**	0.007	0.244**	0.064	0.304**	-0.026	-0.021	-0.063	-0.150**	0.031	-0.019
Han	-0.092	-0.005	-0.001	0.009	-0.021*	-0.159**	-0.013	-0.004	-0.021	-0.007	0.025	-0.031
Party Member	-0.061	-0.016	-0.118**	-0.007	0.065**	0.085*	-0.039	-0.033	0.133*	0.007	0.113	0.135*
Per Capita Family Income (log)	-0.687**	-0.659**	-0.829**	-0.402**	-0.502**	-0.231	-0.736**	-0.726**	0.343	-0.887**	-0.268	-0.156
Trust Central Government (Missingness)	-0.033*	-0.010	-0.007	-0.038*	0.017	0.053*	0.019	0.003	0.018	0.009	0.014	0.000
Trust Central Party (Missingness)	-0.052*	-0.014	-0.051**	-0.080**	0.021	0.085**	0.057**	0.026	-0.002	0.014	0.020	0.031
Support Central Party (Missingness)	-0.020	-0.019	-0.011	-0.009	0.016	0.076**	-0.001	-0.004	0.076*	0.009	-0.017	0.000
Support Central Government (Missingness)	-0.026	-0.033*	-0.018	-0.052**	0.016	0.071**	0.008	0.000	0.067	0.005	-0.051	0.021
N	314	587	521	356	755	311	504	625	157	366	160	186

*P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A1.4: Testing Differential Composition Effect on Demographics (OLS Regression)

We conduct an additional test, using these demographic variables as outcomes, and show that there is no differential composition effect of corruption investigations—an assumption for identification.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Outcome Variable	Male	Age	Year of Education	Urban	Han	Party Member	Per Capita Family Income (log)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	0.000	-0.001	0.002	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Year 2014	-0.022	2.498*	-0.485	-0.014	0.003	-0.010	0.311**
	(0.024)	(1.403)	(0.440)	(0.033)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.138)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.483	45.470	10.693	0.781	0.962	0.158	9.600
Outcome S.D.	0.500	16.619	4.201	0.413	0.191	0.365	0.926
Observations	8002	8002	7500	7994	7989	7996	5338
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
R2	0.007	0.041	0.041	0.073	0.035	0.015	0.154

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A1.5: The Effect of Central Corruption Investigations on Public Support (OLS Regressions)

Outcome Variable	(1) Trust Central Gov	(2) Trust Central Party	(3) Support Central Gov	(4) Support Central Party
Panel I	Coeff. (B.C.S.E.)	Coeff. (B.C.S.E.)	Coeff. (B.C.S.E.)	Coeff. (B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corrupt Central Officials (Work)	0.005	-0.023	-0.061	-0.090
	(0.161)	(0.188)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Year 2014	0.236	0.197	0.243	0.235
	(0.171)	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.160)
Province F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7821	7718	7853	7773
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.080	0.080	0.099	0.093
Panel II				
Year 2014*N of Corrupt Central Officials (Work) (Weighted)	-0.179	-0.196	-0.301	-0.335
	(0.367)	(0.398)	(0.326)	(0.219)
Year 2014	0.299*	0.246*	0.300*	0.283*
	(0.167)	(0.141)	(0.175)	(0.148)
Province F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7821	7718	7853	7773
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.081	0.081	0.100	0.094

Panel III				
Year 2014*N of Corrupt Central Officials (Hometown)	0.171	0.140	0.098	0.031
	(0.134)	(0.189)	(0.132)	(0.164)
Year 2014	0.175	0.128	0.163	0.160
	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.151)	(0.163)
Province F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7821	7718	7853	7773
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.081	0.081	0.099	0.092
Panel IV				
Year 2014*N of Corrupt Central Officials (Hometown) (Weighted)	0.338	0.157	0.193	-0.065
	(0.325)	(0.568)	(0.321)	(0.490)
Year 2014	0.193	0.160	0.174	0.181
	(0.151)	(0.159)	(0.151)	(0.166)
Province F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7821	7718	7853	7773
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.081	0.080	0.099	0.092

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A1.6: Placebo Tests Using Two Pre-Treatment Surveys and One Post-Treatment Survey (OLS Regressions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	**Trust Central Government (z-score)**		**Trust Central Party (z-score)**	
	Coefficient	**Coefficient**	**Coefficient**	**Coefficient**
	(Bootstrap C.S.E.)	**(Bootstrap C.S.E.)**	**(Bootstrap C.S.E.)**	**(Bootstrap C.S.E.)**
Year 2010*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year 2010	1.629***	1.673***	1.656***	1.700***
	(0.103)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.161)
Year 2014	1.963***	1.983***	1.978***	1.991***
	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.055)	(0.071)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0	0	0	0
Outcome S.D.	1	1	1	1
Observations	9723	8319	9599	8213
N of Clusters	20	20	20	20
R^2	0.613	0.583	0.621	0.590

Notes: Here we use two pre-treatment surveys (conducted in 2008 and 2010) to conduct a placebo test to support the common trends assumption. *N of Corruption Investigations* is the total number of corruption investigations in a province during the anti-corruption campaign between 2011 and 2014. All specifications include provincial fixed effects. Demographic controls include male, age, years of education, urban, Han, and Party member. Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. *p*-values are based on a two-tailed test*: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.5$, *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table A1.6 shows the DID results with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates using the 2008, 2010, and 2014 data. The outcome variables are ***Trust Central Government*** and ***Trust Central Party***, which are measured using the same questions in the 2008, 2010, and 2014 surveys. The 2008 survey, however, used a 1–4 scale to measure respondents' responses, while the 2010 and 2014 surveys used a 0–10 scale. We thus standardize the variables by taking their *z*-scores to assure comparability between the two surveys.[1] ***Year 2010*** is an indicator for the 2010 survey (2008 as the reference group), ***Year2014*** is an indicator for the 2014 survey, ***Number of Corruption Investigations*** is the total number of corruption investigations in a province during 2011–2014, and ***Year 2010 × Number of Corruption Investigations*** and ***Year 2014 × Number of Corruption Investigations*** are the interaction terms. The models control for provincial fixed effects, capturing any time-invariant historical, institutional, and cultural covariates at the provincial level. In Columns (2) and (4), we also control for demographic variables, including ***Male***, ***Age***, ***Years of Education***, ***Urban***, ***Han***, and ***Party Member***, to account for demographic differences between respondents in the two surveys. We use clustered bootstrap standard errors at the treatment level (provincial level) to deal with the potential downward bias caused by the small number (20) of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008, 414).

[1] The *z*-score is a measure of how many standard deviations below or above the population mean a raw score is, so the transformed variable has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.



Figure A1.1: Correlates of Corruption Investigations

Notes: These graphs plot the bivariate correlations between the level of regime support (2010), economic development (2010), and measures of corruption (2003-2007) and the number of corruption investigations during 2011–2014. The dots indicate Chinese provinces.

Section II. Benchmark Results

Table A2.1: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effects of Corruption Investigations on Regime Support (Full OLS Results)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome Variable		**Support Central Party**	
	Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.574**	0.557**	0.499**
	(0.293)	(0.218)	(0.252)
N of Corruption Investigations	0.000		
	(0.001)		
Male			-0.137***
			(0.040)
Age			0.013***
			(0.002)
Year of Education			-0.014*
			(0.008)
Urban			0.013
			(0.091)
Han			0.114
			(0.140)
Party Member			0.220***
			(0.062)
Province FE	No	Yes	Yes

Outcome Mean	8.006	8.006	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.833	1.833	1.830
Observations	7773	7773	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25
R2	0.010	0.097	0.121

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A2.2: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effects of Corruption Investigations at the Prefectural or County Level on Public Support (OLS Regressions)

Outcome Variable	(1) Trust Central Gov	(2) Trust Central Party	(3) Support Central Gov	(4) Support Central Party	(5) Trust Central Gov	(6) Trust Central Party	(7) Support Central Gov	(8) Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations_Prefecture	-0.003	-0.006	0.002	-0.001				
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)				
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations_County					-0.013	-0.004	-0.026	-0.025
					(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Year 2014	0.258*	0.235*	0.162	0.169	0.234*	0.169	0.212	0.175
	(0.141)	(0.132)	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.137)	(0.128)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
County FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.775	7.807	8.001	8.011	7.775	7.807	8.001	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.938	1.938	1.813	1.830	1.938	1.938	1.813	1.830
Observations	7318	7224	7343	7274	7318	7224	7343	7274
N of Clusters	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
R2	0.125	0.125	0.143	0.137	0.125	0.124	0.143	0.137

*Clustered standard errors at the prefectural or county level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A2.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effects of Corruption Investigations at the Prefectural Level on Public Support for Prefectural Organizations (OLS Regressions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Trust Prefectural Government	Trust Prefectural Party	Support Prefectural Government	Support Prefectural Party
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)	(C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations Prefecture	-0.011	-0.012*	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Year 2014	0.117	0.182	0.044	0.193
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.188)	(0.186)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	6.667	6.656	7.041	6.984
Outcome S.D.	2.245	2.247	2.155	2.164
Observations	7227	7021	7273	7148
N of Clusters	50	50	50	50
R2	0.132	0.135	0.124	0.131

*Clustered standard errors at the prefectural level in parentheses P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Section III. Robustness Checks

Table A3.1: Using Alternative Dependent Variables (OLS Regressions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Outcome Variable	Trust Central Gov		Trust Central Party		Support Central Gov		Regime Support Index	
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.577***	0.544**	0.530**	0.483**	0.563**	0.519**	0.565**	0.519**
	(0.212)	(0.231)	(0.244)	(0.234)	(0.226)	(0.255)	(0.253)	(0.224)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.770	7.775	7.802	7.807	7.996	8.001	7.886	7.891
Outcome S.D.	1.944	1.938	1.943	1.938	1.818	1.813	1.764	1.761
Observations	7821	7318	7718	7224	7853	7343	7907	7393
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
R2	0.083	0.113	0.083	0.112	0.103	0.128	0.103	0.134

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.2: Using Weighted Number of Corruption Investigations (OLS Regressions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Trust Central Gov	Trust Central Party	Support Central Gov	Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations (Weighted)	-0.015**	-0.015**	-0.015*	-0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Year 2014	0.553**	0.490**	0.530*	0.511**
	(0.217)	(0.215)	(0.274)	(0.248)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.775	7.807	8.001	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.938	1.938	1.813	1.830
Observations	7318	7224	7343	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.113	0.112	0.128	0.122

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.3: Using Number of Tigers (OLS Regressions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Trust Central Gov	Trust Central Party	Support Central Gov	Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Tigers	-0.132	-0.110	-0.147	-0.154*
	(0.089)	(0.116)	(0.098)	(0.091)
Year 2014	0.354**	0.271	0.336*	0.310*
	(0.177)	(0.181)	(0.189)	(0.160)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.775	7.807	8.001	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.938	1.938	1.813	1.830
Observations	7318	7224	7343	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.112	0.111	0.126	0.120

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.4: Using Number of Flies (OLS Regressions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Trust Central Gov	Trust Central Party	Support Central Gov	Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Flies	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.541**	0.481**	0.516*	0.497**
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.272)	(0.243)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.775	7.807	8.001	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.938	1.938	1.813	1.830
Observations	7318	7224	7343	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.113	0.112	0.128	0.121

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.5: Using Number of Corruption Investigations Per Million (OLS Regressions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Trust Central Gov	Trust Central Party	Support Central Gov	Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations Per Million	-0.198*	-0.180*	-0.160	-0.154*
	(0.102)	(0.093)	(0.107)	(0.092)
Year 2014	0.823**	0.708**	0.669	0.614*
	(0.402)	(0.346)	(0.413)	(0.328)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.775	7.807	8.001	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.938	1.938	1.813	1.830
Observations	7318	7224	7343	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.113	0.112	0.126	0.120

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.6: Using Dichotomous Dependent Variables (OLS Regressions)

Outcome Variable	(1) Trust Central Government_Dummy	(2) Trust Central Party_Dummy	(3) Support Central Government_Dummy	(4) Support Central Party_Dummy
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.0003*	-0.0003**	-0.0002	-0.0004***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Year 2014	0.0928**	0.1058***	0.0867**	0.1054**
	(0.0414)	(0.0409)	(0.0430)	(0.0417)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.778	0.778	0.814	0.812
Outcome S.D.	0.416	0.416	0.389	0.391
Observations	7318	7224	7343	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.068	0.065	0.067	0.068

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.7: Did Corruption Investigations Change Political Fear (OLS Regressions)?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Political Fear	Political Fear	Response to Political Fear	Response to Political Fear
	Coeff. (B.C.S.E.)	Coeff. (B.C.S.E.)	Coeff. (B.C.S.E.)	Coeff. (B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year 2014	0.033	0.054	-0.067	-0.063
	(0.144)	(0.107)	(0.051)	(0.043)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	1.548	1.550	0.603	0.606
Outcome S.D.	0.762	0.762	0.489	0.489
Observations	4829	4528	8002	7478
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.052	0.059	0.050	0.091

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.8: Controlling for Political Fear (OLS Regressions)

Outcome Variable	(1) Trust Central Gov	(2) Trust Central Party	(3) Support Central Gov	(4) Support Central Party	(5) Trust Central Gov	(6) Trust Central Party	(7) Support Central Gov	(8) Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.003**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.773***	0.673**	0.674*	0.680**	0.514**	0.451**	0.494*	0.475**
	(0.284)	(0.287)	(0.379)	(0.303)	(0.204)	(0.208)	(0.272)	(0.235)
Political Fear	-0.161**	-0.127**	-0.175**	-0.106*				
	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.061)				
Response to Political Fear					-0.463***	-0.457***	-0.383***	-0.357***
					(0.067)	(0.089)	(0.078)	(0.068)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.534	7.571	7.787	7.811	7.775	7.807	8.001	8.011
Outcome S.D.	2.019	2.016	1.878	1.900	1.938	1.938	1.813	1.830
Observations	4458	4416	4469	4445	7318	7224	7343	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
R2	0.099	0.097	0.112	0.104	0.125	0.124	0.137	0.130

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.9: Controlling for Per Capita Family Income (OLS Regressions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Trust Central Gov	Trust Central Party	Support Central Gov	Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.676***	0.590**	0.575*	0.514*
	(0.258)	(0.281)	(0.319)	(0.291)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Per Capita Family Income (log)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.820	7.855	8.041	8.045
Outcome S.D.	1.911	1.906	1.773	1.791
Observations	4947	4881	4961	4917
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.113	0.113	0.134	0.123

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.10: Dropping New Migrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Trust Central Gov	Trust Central Party	Support Central Gov	Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.569***	0.498**	0.531**	0.509**
	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.264)	(0.238)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.787	7.820	8.012	8.021
Outcome S.D.	1.936	1.935	1.810	1.827
Observations	6986	6898	7007	6946
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.112	0.111	0.128	0.121

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.11: Considering Survey Design Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	Trust Central Gov	Trust Central Party	Support Central Gov	Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.515***	0.489***	0.525***	0.506***
	(0.171)	(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.164)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.771	7.804	8.015	8.024
Outcome S.D.	1.946	1.942	1.814	1.834
Observations	7318	7224	7343	7274
Population Size	239510930	236841535	240082630	237946794
R2	0.106	0.103	0.120	0.112

*P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.12: Using Multiple Imputation to Deal with Missing Data in the Dependent Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Variable	**Trust Central Gov**	**Trust Central Party**	**Support Central Gov**	**Support Central Party**
	Coeff.	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**
	(C.S.E.)	**(C.S.E.)**	**(C.S.E.)**	**(C.S.E.)**
Year 2014 * N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.529**	0.473*	0.514*	0.483*
	(0.253)	(0.240)	(0.264)	(0.250)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7142	7142	7142	7142
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25

*P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.13: Controlling for Spatial Lag

Outcome Variable	(1) Trust Central Government	(2) Trust Central Party	(3) Support Central Government	(4) Support Central Party
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations (Spatial Lag)	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Year 2014	0.334	0.055	0.073	-0.075
	(1.349)	(1.236)	(1.293)	(1.134)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.775	7.807	8.001	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.938	1.938	1.813	1.830
Observations	7318	7224	7343	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25	25
R2	0.113	0.113	0.128	0.122

*The spatial lag is calculated using Stata's spgen command, which calculates the (weighted) number of corruption investigations from other provinces—weighted by distance. Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.14: Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables

Restricted Model	Full Model	Trust Central Gov	Trust Central Party	Support Central Gov	Support Central Party
None	Provincial FE	9.685	10.220	10.191	12.441
Provincial FE	Provincial FE + Demographic Controls	-61.051	44.230	37.401	21.501

Notes: Here we conduct a formal sensitivity analysis to estimate how strong the influence of unobservables would have to be, *relative to the influence of observables*, in order to overturn our results (Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005). We find that unobservables need to be at least nine times stronger than existing observables to invalidate our results. Each cell in the table reports the "Altonji ratio" based on the coefficient for Year 2014 * N. of Corruption Investigations from two regressions. In one, the covariates include the "restricted set" of control variables. Call this coefficient $beta^R$. In the other, the covariates include the "full set" of controls. Call this coefficient $beta^F$. The reported "Altonji ratio" is calculated as: $beta^F / (beta^R - beta^F)$.

Table A3.15: Using Wild Bootstrap Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome Variable		**Support Central Party**	
	Coefficient (Wild Bootstrap 95% C.I.)	**Coefficient (Wild Bootstrap 95% C.I.)**	**Coefficient (Wild Bootstrap 95% C.I.)**
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	[-0.0029, -0.0015]	[-0.0027, -0.0014]	[-0.0026, -0.0012]
Year 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes
N of Corruption Investigations	Yes	No	No
Demographic Controls	No	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	8.006	8.006	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.833	1.833	1.830
Observations	7773	7773	7274
R2	0.010	0.097	0.121

Notes: Here we follow Cameron and Miller (2015) to provide wild bootstrap standard errors (implemented by Stata's boottest) for the benchmark model.

Table A3.16: Using a Dichotomous Independent Variable (Above Mean Number of Corruption Investigations)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome Variable		**Support Central Party**	
	Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**
Year 2014*Corruption Investigations (Above Mean)	-0.638**	-0.549**	-0.544*
	(0.261)	(0.220)	(0.278)
Year 2014	0.533**	0.490**	0.445*
	(0.245)	(0.201)	(0.228)
Corruption Investigations (Above Mean)	0.087		
	(0.341)		
Demographic Controls	No	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	8.006	8.006	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.833	1.833	1.830
Observations	7773	7773	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25
R2	0.013	0.098	0.123

*P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A3.17: Interacting with Provinces That Have Connections with Xi Jinping

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome Variable		**Support Central Party**	
	Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations*Xi Provinces	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.070)	(0.103)	(0.007)
Year 2014*Xi Provinces	0.136	0.243	0.313
	(4.649)	(6.673)	(0.539)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002***	-0.002**	-0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
N of Corruption Investigations*Xi Provinces	0.001	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.154)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Year 2014	0.497**	0.500*	0.419***
	(0.217)	(0.256)	(0.132)
N of Corruption Investigations	-0.000		
	(0.001)		
Provinces Connected with Xi	-0.432		
	(10.029)		
Demographic Controls	No	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	8.006	8.006	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.833	1.833	1.830
Observations	7773	7773	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25
R2	0.013	0.097	0.122

Notes: Provinces that have connection with Xi Jinping include Zhejiang, Fujian, Shanghai, and Shaanxi (Jiang, Shao, and Zhang Forthcoming). *P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.*

Table A3.18: Dropping Provinces That Have Connections with Xi Jinping

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome Variable		**Support Central Party**	
	Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.002**	-0.002	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.497**	0.500	0.415*
	(0.243)	(0.308)	(0.231)
N of Corruption Investigations	-0.000		
	(0.001)		
Demographic Controls	No	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	8.052	8.052	8.058
Outcome S.D.	1.815	1.815	1.812
Observations	6338	6338	5936
N of Clusters	21	21	21
R2	0.011	0.075	0.103

Notes: Here we drop provinces that have connections with Xi Jinping, including Zhejiang, Fujian, Shanghai, and Shaanxi, based on the argument that these provinces followed a different path of anti-corruption campaign (Jiang, Shao, and Zhang Forthcoming). *P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.*

Table A3.19: Using Number of Corruption Investigations (Weighted by Time)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome Variable		**Support Central Party**	
	Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations (Time Discount)	-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2014	0.577**	0.560**	0.503**
	(0.293)	(0.219)	(0.252)
N of Corruption Investigations (Time Discount)	0.000		
	(0.001)		
Demographic Controls	No	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	8.006	8.006	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.833	1.833	1.830
Observations	7773	7773	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25
R2	0.010	0.097	0.122

Notes: Here we give a discount to corruption investigations that happened earlier. The investigations that happened 1 year before the survey were discounted by 0.9. The investigations that happened 2 year before the survey were discounted by 0.9^2. The investigations that happened 3 year before the survey were discounted by 0.9^3. *P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.*

Table A3.20: Quadratic Term of Number of Corruption Investigations

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome Variable		**Support Central Party**	
	Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**	**Coefficient (Bootstrap C.S.E.)**
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations (Squared)	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year 2014*N of Corruption Investigations	-0.004	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
N of Corruption Investigations (Squared)	-0.000		
	(0.000)		
Year 2014	0.706*	0.540	0.568
	(0.380)	(0.420)	(0.394)
N of Corruption Investigations	0.002		
	(0.005)		
Demographic Controls	No	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	8.006	8.006	8.011
Outcome S.D.	1.833	1.833	1.830
Observations	7773	7773	7274
N of Clusters	25	25	25
R2	0.010	0.097	0.122



Figure A3.1: Placebo Tests with 100 Hypothetical Campaigns

Notes: The dots represent the point estimates, and lines 95% confidence intervals.



Figure A3.2: Dropping One Province at a Time

Notes: The dots represent the point estimates, and lines 95% confidence intervals.

Section IV: Evidence on Updating

Table A4.1: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Beliefs in Officials' Integrity on Support for Central Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome Variable		Support Central Party	
	Coeff.	Coeff.	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)	(B.C.S.E.)
Beliefs in Officials' Integrity	0.484***	0.454***	0.411***
	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.060)
Demographic Controls	No	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	7.996	7.996	8.000
Outcome S.D.	1.839	1.839	1.840
Observations	7062	7062	6623
N of Clusters	25	25	25
R2	0.046	0.128	0.148

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A4.2: Estimates of the Marginal Effect of Corruption Investigations in Different Levels of Prior Beliefs in Officials' Integrity (Using Stata's interflex Package)

Outcome Variable	Support Central Party							
Bin	X0	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI	Bootstrap S.E.	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI
1	2.2633	0.0000	0.0005	-0.0010	0.0010	0.0003	-0.0005	0.0005
2	2.4426	-0.0007	0.0002	-0.0011	-0.0003	0.0003	-0.0013	-0.0001
3	2.8148	-0.0045	0.0004	-0.0053	-0.0037	0.0015	-0.0074	-0.0016

Table A4.3: Causal Mediation Analysis (Treatment: N of Corruption Investigations; Mediator: Beliefs in Officials' Integrity; Outcome: Support for Central Party)

Effect	Mean	[95% C.I.]	
ACME	-0.0003	-0.0005	-0.0002
Direct Effect	-0.0017	-0.0024	-0.0010
Total Effect	-0.0020	-0.0028	-0.0014
% of Total Effect Mediated	15.8134	11.6221	23.6541

Notes: We conduct a causal mediation analysis (Imai at al. 2011) to examine how Beliefs in Officials' Integrity serves as a mediator between corruption investigations and regime support. We control for provincial fixed effects and demographic variables, including male, age, years of education, urban, Han, and Party member.

Section V: Evidence on Social Media Consumption

We use social media news consumption to proxy for their exposure to news about corruption investigations.[2] We again use the provincial mean of *Social Media News Consumption* in the 2014 survey to enable us to retain our DID framework. One concern is that social media consumption might be a result of corruption investigations. Including social media consumption would therefore introduce posttreatment bias. In Appendix Table A5.1, we test whether the number of corruption investigations would change people's social media news consumption and find the effect to be precisely zero. Another concern is that social media consumption might be correlated with prior beliefs in officials' integrity because people who are exposed to more social media news (as opposed to official news) would have lower levels of prior beliefs in officials' integrity (Zhu, Lü, and Shi 2012). But if this is the case, it makes us less likely to find a negative effect of corruption investigations when social media consumption is high (and prior beliefs are low). Appendix Figure A5.1 shows the correlation between prior beliefs in officials' integrity and social media news consumption (both measured as provincial means). The correlation coefficient is small and not significant. We hence specify a model with the triple interaction (*Year 2014*×*N of Corruption Investigations*×*Social Media News Consumption*), and Appendix Figure A5.2 and Table A5.2 show how the treatment effect differs for people who have different exposure to social media news.

[2] In the questionnaire, we use "news of the country" (国家大事) as a euphemism for politics. We want to know if respondents are knowledgeable about political events like the anti-corruption campaign but "politics" is seen as too sensitive. Previous experience indicates people either say they are not interested in politics or simply do not answer the question. Reading about news of the country is therefore a proxy for being politically knowledgeable.

Table A5.1: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Corruption Investigations on Social Media News Consumption

	(1)
Outcome Variable	Social Media News Consumption
	Coeff.
	(B.C.S.E.)
N of Corruption Investigations	0.015
	(0.010)
Demographic Controls	Yes
Province FE	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.226
Outcome S.D.	0.418
Observations	3872
N of Clusters	25
R2	0.263

*Clustered bootstrap standard errors at the provincial level in parentheses. P values based on two-tailed tests, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

Table A5.2: Estimates of the Marginal Effect of Corruption Investigations in Different Levels of Social Media News Consumption (Using Stata's interflex Package)

Outcome Variable	Support Central Party							
Bin	X0	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI	Bootstrap S.E.	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI
1	0.1734	0.0007	0.0006	-0.0005	0.0019	0.0002	0.0003	0.0012
2	0.2727	-0.0002	0.0005	-0.0012	0.0007	0.0003	-0.0008	0.0004
3	0.3973	-0.0006	0.0001	-0.0007	-0.0004	0.0009	-0.0023	0.0012



Figure A5.1: Scatterplot of Prior Beliefs in Officials' Integrity and Social Media News Consumption



Figure A5.2: Marginal Effect of Corruption Investigations at Different Levels of Social Media News Consumption

Notes: This graph plots the marginal effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of corruption investigations on *Support Central Party* at three (low, medium, and high) different levels of social media news consumption (provincial mean). The bars refer to the distribution of the moderator.

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