## Supporting Information for

# 'Rallies around the Flag-Draped Coffins: The Electoral Effects of Security Force Casualties in Terror Attacks'

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# A Data

This study is based on a district-level dataset, with 970 observations. The motivation for choosing districts as the level of observation and analysis is the fact that the funerals for security force casualties take place at this level, often in the courtyard of the biggest mosque in the district centres.

The dataset has 31 variables, which fall under three main components: election results, security force casualties, and district characteristics. The first and the last come mostly from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr), unless otherwise stated below. The component on security force casualties originates from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020).

## A.1 Election results

The data on election results comes from the TurkStat website. There were no changes in the district borders between the two elections in 2015. Hence, scraping the results for the 7 June and 1 November 2015 elections from the TurkStat website, I then merged the relevant variables together for each district.

## A.2 Security force casualties

Security force casualties are officially named in Turkey; the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey announces military deaths while the General Directorate of Security are responsible for announcing police deaths. However, both institutions remove these state-

ments from their websites soon after the incidents, and there is no official cumulative data on casualties in the period under analysis.

An alternative source is the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020), which records individual events of organised violence as reported in the international media. Based on the relevant records in this dataset, I then searched the electronic archives of three major sources of Turkish news—two newspapers, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet, as well as the Cihan News Agency—for the time period between the two general elections in 2015. The aim of this additional step was twofold: (a) to validate the existing observations in the original dataset and (b) to code new variables of interest for this study.

This resulted in 153 observations of security force casualties in terror attacks among the military and police forces, excluding the village guards—paramilitaries recruited to protect their own village. Five of these casualties were missing in the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset, version 20.1.

## A.3 District characteristics

The dataset also includes a number of variables on district characteristics. Most importantly, these include *Recruitment Pool*, which is, as discussed in the main text, an important control for the likely unequal probabilities of being assigned to the treatment groups among districts with high or low numbers of people in the security forces in the first place.

## A.4 Variables and descriptive statistics

Table S1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the analysis in the main text, where *Post-test* is the dependent variable.

Table S1: Descriptive statistics

| | Mean | SD | Median | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-test | 52.97 | 19.00 | 54.70 | 2.00 | 95.90 |
| Treatment | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Multiple Treatment | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Pre-test | 44.39 | 17.18 | 45.60 | 1.20 | 90.70 |
| Recruitment Pool | 6.57 | 10.85 | 2.25 | 0.09 | 88.25 |
| Non-terror Funeral | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Attack District | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Kurdish District | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| AKP District | 0.63 | 0.48 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Higher Education | 7.27 | 4.34 | 6.23 | 1.46 | 36.85 |
| Electoral Margin | 4.74 | 5.16 | 2.86 | 0.07 | 32.64 |
| Turnout | 85.59 | 4.23 | 86.20 | 67.00 | 98.80 |

*Post-test*. A variable measuring the support for the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 1 November 2015 election, calculated by dividing the number of votes cast for the AKP by the total number of valid votes cast in each district. This is the dependent variable in the main text.

Note that there are different dependent variables for further analyses in this Supporting Information, and therefore *Post-test* might refer to different quantities in some tables. For example, in Tables S13 to S15, *Post-test* refers to the vote shares of the three main opposition parties in the 1 November 2015 election.

*Treatment*. A binary variable coded as 1 for districts with *one or more* funerals between 7 June and 1 November 2015 for members of security forces killed in terror attacks. Out

of the 970 districts in Turkey, 123 had at least one funeral within this time frame between the two general elections.

*Multiple Treatment.* A binary variable coded as 1 for districts with *more than one* funeral between 7 June and 1 November 2015 for members of security forces killed in terror attacks. Out of the 123 treated districts, 21 were treated multiple times.

*Pre-test.* A variable measuring the support for the governing AKP in the 7 June 2015 election, calculated by dividing the number of votes cast for the AKP by the total number of valid votes cast in each district.

Note that *Pre-test* might refer to different quantities in some tables in this Supporting Information. For example, in Tables S13 to S15, *Pre-test* refers to the vote shares of the three main opposition parties in the 7 June 2015 election.

*Recruitment Pool.* A count variable measuring the number of male residents in their 20s in each district at the end of 2014.

Note that this variable is coded in thousands. Correlation analyses show that the age bin 20–29 (i.e., number of men in their 20s) is a better predictor than alternative bins—such as 20–24 or 25–29 on their own, or various other combinations of the bins in the original TurkStat data.

*Non-terror Funeral.* State funerals are held not only for the terror victims among the security forces, but also for those who die from other causes during their service. There were 42 such cases, where the deaths were related to, for example, hearth attacks, traffic

accidents, or lightning strikes. This variable is coded as 1 for the 36 districts where their funerals took place.

*Attack District.* A binary variable coded as 1 for districts with one or more terror attacks between 7 June and 1 November 2015 that resulted in one or more security force casualties. Out of the 970 districts in Turkey, terror attacks with security force casualties occurred in 47 districts.

*Kurdish District.* A binary variable coded as 1 for districts in the predominantly Kurdish provinces (Aydın, 2004)—Adıyaman, Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Erzurum, Hakkari, Iğdır, Kars, Malatya, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Şanlıurfa, and Şırnak.

*AKP District.* A binary variable coded as 1 for districts won by the AKP in the 2014 Turkish *local* elections.

*Higher Education.* A variable measuring the share of the district population with university education at the end of 2014.

*Electoral Margin.* A variable measuring the electoral marginality of the last seat in each electoral district in the 7 June 2015 election, calculated as the percentage of votes needed either to win, or to defend, the last seat.

Note that, as a rule, provinces are the electoral districts in the general elections in Turkey. For the elections under analysis, the only exceptions were the three largest provinces, which were divided into smaller electoral districts due to their size: İstanbul had 3 electoral districts while Ankara and İzmir had two each. Confusion may arise

as *electoral* and *administrative* districts are different units. The latter is the unit of observation and analysis in this study.

*Turnout.* A variable measuring the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in each district in the 7 June 2015 election.

Note that this variable is labelled as *Pre-test* in Table S10, which presents the regression models of turnout in the 1 November 2015 election (*Post-test*).

## A.5 Randomisation checks

Table S2 presents randomisation checks for both *Treatment* and *Multiple Treatment*, showing that the assignment of casualties was uncorrelated with several *pre-treatment* district characteristics, except for the number of male residents in their twenties. The estimates for *Recruitment Pool* are positive and statistically significant in all models. This means that the probability of districts to receive casualties was not identical: as it stands to reason, the districts with high numbers of potential security force recruits were more likely to be treated with funerals. However, once *Recruitment Pool* is controlled for, we see that the treatment and control districts become comparable in terms of pre-treatment characteristics.

Table S2: Regression models of treatment allocation

| | Treatment | | Multiple Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.007* | 0.007* | 0.003* | 0.003* |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Pre-test | | 0.001 | | 0.000 |
| | | (0.001) | | (0.000) |
| Kurdish District | | –0.008 | | –0.011 |
| | | (0.040) | | (0.018) |
| AKP District | | –0.011 | | –0.008 |
| | | (0.028) | | (0.010) |
| Higher Education | | 0.000 | | 0.001 |
| | | (0.003) | | (0.001) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.001 | | 0.001 |
| | | (0.002) | | (0.001) |
| Turnout | | –0.001 | | –0.001 |
| | | (0.003) | | (0.001) |
| Constant | 0.080*** | 0.106 | 0.001 | 0.079 |
| | (0.013) | (0.301) | (0.006) | (0.103) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.054 | 0.058 | 0.056 | 0.060 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

# B Complete Table

For reasons of brevity and space, the regression table in the main text (Table 1) reports only a summary of the results. The complete results are available in Table S3.

Table S3: Main regression models, completing Table 1

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 1.028* | 1.089** | 1.257** | 1.261** |
| | (0.412) | (0.365) | (0.470) | (0.407) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –1.471* | –1.121* |
| | | | (0.716) | (0.510) |
| Pre-test | 1.084*** | 1.061*** | 1.084*** | 1.061*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.015) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.020 | 0.051** | 0.023 | 0.053** |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.523 | | –0.502 |
| | | (0.405) | | (0.397) |
| Attack District | | –0.970 | | –1.006 |
| | | (0.976) | | (0.979) |
| Kurdish District | | 3.293*** | | 3.288*** |
| | | (0.764) | | (0.755) |
| AKP District | | 2.075*** | | 2.068*** |
| | | (0.316) | | (0.316) |
| Higher Education | | –0.120** | | –0.119** |
| | | (0.036) | | (0.036) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.017 | | 0.018 |
| | | (0.034) | | (0.034) |
| Turnout | | –0.148** | | –0.149** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.052) |
| Constant | 4.590*** | 17.003*** | 4.578*** | 17.072*** |
| | (0.878) | (4.681) | (0.875) | (4.697) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.960 | 0.969 | 0.960 | 0.970 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

# C Robustness Checks

This section provides a series of six checks on the robustness of the results reported in the main text.

## C.1 Entropy balancing

Could the imbalances between the treatment and control districts be driving the results? The entropy balancing method offers an opportunity to remove these imbalances completely (Hainmueller, 2012). Table S4 presents the mean values of the control variables used in the main text, before and after entropy balancing. It shows that this process has been successful—the procedure achieves a perfect balance.

Table S4: Treatment and control means, before and after entropy balancing

| | Before Matching | | After Matching | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Treatment | Control | Treatment | Control |
| Recruitment Pool | 13.17 | 5.61 | 13.17 | 13.17 |
| Non-terror Funeral | 0.10 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Attack District | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Kurdish District | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| AKP District | 0.65 | 0.63 | 0.65 | 0.65 |
| Higher Education | 8.42 | 7.10 | 8.42 | 8.42 |
| Electoral Margin | 4.27 | 4.81 | 4.27 | 4.27 |
| Turnout | 85.63 | 85.58 | 85.63 | 85.63 |

With the weights obtained from this balancing procedure, the regression models in Table S5 estimate the effects of *Treatment* and *Multiple Treatment* on the government vote share. Note that this exercise still follows the pre-test, post-test design used in the main text. The results are very similar to the ones reported in the main text as well—both in statistical and practical terms. According to the second model, while the

government vote share increases in the funeral places of terror victims, this effect reverses in the towns with repeated casualties. The magnitude of these changes are very similar to each other—about 1.1 to 1.2 percentage points.

Table S5: Regression models based on entropy balancing

| | (1) | | (2) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coefficient | Std. Error | Coefficient | Std. Error |
| Treatment | 0.960* | (0.417) | 1.160* | (0.478) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –1.154* | (0.586) |
| Pre-test | 1.090*** | (0.014) | 1.089*** | (0.014) |
| Constant | 4.639*** | (0.624) | 4.709*** | (0.623) |
| N | 970 | | 970 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.951 | | 0.951 | |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. The data is adjusted with the entropy balancing weights. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

## C.2 Single treatment

In the main text, Table 1 distinguishes the effect of the initial from repeated casualties by including the two binary variables together in the same regression models (Models 3 and 4): *Treatment* (districts with *one or more* casualties) and *Multiple Treatment* (districts with *more than one* casualty). Table S6 provides an alternative way to test the effect of initial casualties: coding *Single Treatment* as 1 for the districts that received only one casualty and 0 for all the others (including those with multiple casualties). It shows that the evidence for the relevant hypothesis is robust as the results point to an increase in government vote share, by about 1.2 to 1.3 percentage points, in districts with a single casualty.

Table S6: Regression models with single treatment

| | All Districts Included | | Excluding the Multiply-Treated | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Single Treatment | 1.266** | 1.255** | 1.237* | 1.236** |
| | (0.470) | (0.404) | (0.473) | (0.412) |
| Pre-test | 1.084*** | 1.061*** | 1.084*** | 1.061*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.022 | 0.053** | 0.027 | 0.056** |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.495 | | –0.378 |
| | | (0.394) | | (0.417) |
| Attack District | | –1.012 | | –1.045 |
| | | (0.977) | | (0.983) |
| Kurdish District | | 3.287*** | | 3.332*** |
| | | (0.753) | | (0.755) |
| AKP District | | 2.067*** | | 2.094*** |
| | | (0.316) | | (0.325) |
| Higher Education | | –0.119** | | –0.118** |
| | | (0.036) | | (0.037) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.018 | | 0.017 |
| | | (0.034) | | (0.034) |
| Turnout | | –0.149** | | –0.148** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.052) |
| Constant | 4.579*** | 17.084*** | 4.573*** | 16.933*** |
| | (0.875) | (4.686) | (0.880) | (4.709) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 949 | 949 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.960 | 0.970 | 0.959 | 0.969 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

## C.3 Quadratic treatment

This subsection provides an alternative test for the claim that security force casualties have a non-linear effect on government vote share. The models in Table S7 include an untransformed count variable *Treatments* (number of funerals in each district). In addition, Models 3 and 4 include the square of the same variable, *Treatments Squared*, allowing for non-linearity tests. As both variables are statistically significant, with the former being positive and the latter negative, the results confirm that the effect is indeed non-linear: the initially positive effect turns into negative with multiple casualties.

Table S7: Regression models with quadratic treatment

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatments | 0.459 | 0.570* | 1.639* | 1.522** |
| | (0.260) | (0.229) | (0.650) | (0.544) |
| Treatments Squared | | | –0.583* | –0.472* |
| | | | (0.282) | (0.215) |
| Pre-test | 1.085*** | 1.061*** | 1.084*** | 1.061*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.022 | 0.052** | 0.022 | 0.052** |
| | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.503 | | –0.465 |
| | | (0.410) | | (0.396) |
| Attack District | | –0.961 | | –0.986 |
| | | (0.977) | | (0.978) |
| Kurdish District | | 3.293*** | | 3.294*** |
| | | (0.773) | | (0.761) |
| AKP District | | 2.078*** | | 2.071*** |
| | | (0.317) | | (0.316) |
| Higher Education | | –0.121** | | –0.118** |
| | | (0.037) | | (0.036) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.017 | | 0.017 |
| | | (0.034) | | (0.034) |
| Turnout | | –0.148** | | –0.148** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.052) |
| Constant | 4.605*** | 17.022*** | 4.592*** | 17.007*** |
| | (0.880) | (4.683) | (0.878) | (4.683) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.959 | 0.969 | 0.960 | 0.969 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

## C.4 Treatment timing

The treatment timing was not homogeneous across the treated units—while the earliest funeral took place 117 days before the second election on 1 November 2015, the latest was only five days before this post-test. To check whether the differences in government vote share were driven by the heterogeneity in treatment timing, Table S8 introduces two new control variables: (a) the mean and (b) the minimum number of days between the funerals and the November 2015 election, considering that some districts received the treatment more than once. Because they are set to 0 for the untreated districts, these variables are equivalent of the interactions of time and treatment. Their coefficients are statistically insignificant across the models, indicating that the differences in government vote share were not driven by the heterogeneity in treatment timing.

Table S8: Regression models with treatment timing

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 0.671 | 1.828** | 0.387 | 1.474** |
| | (0.728) | (0.541) | (0.679) | (0.493) |
| Timing (Mean) | 0.006 | –0.012 | | |
| | (0.012) | (0.009) | | |
| Timing (Minimum) | | | 0.011 | –0.007 |
| | | | (0.012) | (0.009) |
| Pre-test | 1.084*** | 1.061*** | 1.084*** | 1.061*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.020 | 0.051** | 0.020 | 0.051** |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.016) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.481 | | –0.511 |
| | | (0.408) | | (0.408) |
| Attack District | | –0.961 | | –0.960 |
| | | (0.977) | | (0.978) |
| Kurdish District | | 3.303*** | | 3.298*** |
| | | (0.765) | | (0.766) |
| AKP District | | 2.091*** | | 2.084*** |
| | | (0.315) | | (0.314) |
| Higher Education | | –0.121** | | –0.120** |
| | | (0.036) | | (0.036) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.017 | | 0.017 |
| | | (0.034) | | (0.034) |
| Turnout | | –0.148** | | –0.148** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.052) |
| Constant | 4.589*** | 17.010*** | 4.588*** | 17.002*** |
| | (0.878) | (4.681) | (0.877) | (4.682) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.960 | 0.969 | 0.960 | 0.969 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

## C.5 Treatment source

As discussed in the main text, there was also a differentiation in the source of the treatment—while 148 casualties occurred in attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the remaining five were inflicted by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS; 4) or the Free Syrian Army (FSA; 1). All five exceptions led to funerals in districts that were treated only once. In other words, no district was treated by multiple sources of political violence.

Could the differences in government vote share be driven by the heterogeneity in treatment source? The robustness check in this subsection suggests not. The regression models in Table S9 are based on a subset of the data, where casualties by the ISIS and FSA are excluded. The results remain the same as in the main text.

Table S9: Regression models with PKK-inflicted treatment only

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 0.833* | 0.908** | 1.038* | 1.059** |
| | (0.390) | (0.330) | (0.426) | (0.362) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –1.262* | –0.938* |
| | | | (0.632) | (0.466) |
| Pre-test | 1.083*** | 1.061*** | 1.083*** | 1.061*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.015) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.021 | 0.051** | 0.023 | 0.053** |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.471 | | –0.454 |
| | | (0.394) | | (0.387) |
| Attack District | | –0.920 | | –0.951 |
| | | (0.971) | | (0.973) |
| Kurdish District | | 3.217*** | | 3.212*** |
| | | (0.722) | | (0.716) |
| AKP District | | 2.048*** | | 2.042*** |
| | | (0.314) | | (0.314) |
| Higher Education | | –0.116** | | –0.115** |
| | | (0.035) | | (0.035) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.020 | | 0.020 |
| | | (0.034) | | (0.034) |
| Turnout | | –0.141** | | –0.142** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.052) |
| Constant | 4.628*** | 16.407*** | 4.619*** | 16.475*** |
| | (0.878) | (4.677) | (0.875) | (4.692) |
| N | 965 | 965 | 965 | 965 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.961 | 0.970 | 0.961 | 0.970 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

## C.6 Turnout

Differences in turnout could have affected the government vote share even if no one actually changed their position to rally behind or against the government between the two elections. However, there is little evidence of this in the data. Table S10 presents four regression models of turnout, where the dependent variable is the district-level turnout in the November 2015 election. Here *Pre-test* is the turnout in the June 2015 election. While *Treatment* is significant at the 5% level in the first model, this disappears in models with controls variables and/or *Multiple Treatment*.

Table S10: Regression models of electoral turnout

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 0.505* | 0.363 | 0.531 | 0.394 |
| | (0.249) | (0.220) | (0.269) | (0.248) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –0.163 | –0.200 |
| | | | (0.354) | (0.356) |
| Pre-test | 0.853*** | 0.833*** | 0.853*** | 0.833*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.030) | (0.039) | (0.030) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.025** | 0.027** | 0.025** | 0.027** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | 0.335 | | 0.339 |
| | | (0.247) | | (0.245) |
| Attack District | | –0.473 | | –0.479 |
| | | (0.439) | | (0.436) |
| Kurdish District | | –2.170*** | | –2.170*** |
| | | (0.631) | | (0.632) |
| AKP District | | 1.168*** | | 1.166*** |
| | | (0.197) | | (0.197) |
| Higher Education | | –0.027 | | –0.027 |
| | | (0.031) | | (0.031) |
| Electoral Margin | | –0.066** | | –0.066** |
| | | (0.021) | | (0.021) |
| Constant | 12.791*** | 14.688*** | 12.796*** | 14.697*** |
| | (3.437) | (2.632) | (3.440) | (2.635) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.706 | 0.781 | 0.706 | 0.781 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

# D Further Analyses

This section provides further analyses of the data, in addition to those reported in the main text.

## D.1 Government strongholds

A plausible hypothesis is that the effect of security force casualties on a party's vote share depends upon the pre-existing strength of that party in a given district. Specifically, governments might be better positioned to rally the townspeople behind them in districts where they are already strong. However, the data does not support this hypothesis.

Table S11 includes interactions between *Treatment* or *Multiple Treatment* on the one hand, and *Pre-test* on the other—measuring the pre-existing government strength in terms of the electoral baseline in the June 2015 election. As an alternative, Table S12 presents regression models where the interactions are with *AKP District* (districts where the governing AKP won the local elections in 2014) instead.

Out of the eight coefficients of interest that these tables have, only one is statistically significant, which points to the opposite direction of the above hypothesis—suggesting that the negative effect of receiving more than one casualty was particularly strong in the districts where the AKP was in local government. The remaining coefficients are substantively small and statistically insignificant. They also have inconsistent signs.

Table S11: Regression models with interaction terms, constructed with *Pre-test*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 0.774 | 2.096 | 1.256** | 1.262** |
| | (1.675) | (1.374) | (0.471) | (0.407) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –3.791* | –0.232 |
| | | | (1.848) | (1.010) |
| Treatment × Pre-test | 0.006 | –0.022 | | |
| | (0.035) | (0.029) | | |
| Multiple Treatment × Pre-test | | | 0.056 | –0.021 |
| | | | (0.040) | (0.022) |
| Pre-test | 1.084*** | 1.063*** | 1.083*** | 1.061*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.020 | 0.050** | 0.023 | 0.053** |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.564 | | –0.517 |
| | | (0.396) | | (0.399) |
| Attack District | | –0.997 | | –1.006 |
| | | (0.976) | | (0.979) |
| Kurdish District | | 3.331*** | | 3.299*** |
| | | (0.757) | | (0.754) |
| AKP District | | 2.085*** | | 2.068*** |
| | | (0.315) | | (0.315) |
| Higher Education | | –0.119** | | –0.119** |
| | | (0.036) | | (0.036) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.018 | | 0.018 |
| | | (0.034) | | (0.034) |
| Turnout | | –0.146** | | –0.148** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.052) |
| Constant | 4.612*** | 16.732*** | 4.605*** | 17.017*** |
| | (0.898) | (4.720) | (0.882) | (4.695) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.960 | 0.969 | 0.960 | 0.970 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S12: Regression models with interaction terms, constructed with *AKP District*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 0.644 | 1.157* | 1.274** | 1.259** |
| | (0.557) | (0.525) | (0.440) | (0.407) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –1.296 | –0.383 |
| | | | (0.764) | (0.505) |
| Treatment × AKP District | 0.654 | –0.106 | | |
| | (0.797) | (0.699) | | |
| Multiple Treatment × AKP District | | | –0.064 | –1.287* |
| | | | (0.775) | (0.641) |
| Pre-test | 1.049*** | 1.061*** | 1.049*** | 1.060*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.015) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.013 | 0.051** | 0.016 | 0.053** |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.526 | | –0.493 |
| | | (0.400) | | (0.386) |
| Attack District | | –0.973 | | –1.011 |
| | | (0.976) | | (0.979) |
| Kurdish District | | 3.297*** | | 3.295*** |
| | | (0.762) | | (0.752) |
| AKP District | 2.159*** | 2.089*** | 2.236*** | 2.101*** |
| | (0.386) | (0.324) | (0.395) | (0.325) |
| Higher Education | | –0.120** | | –0.120** |
| | | (0.036) | | (0.036) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.017 | | 0.018 |
| | | (0.034) | | (0.034) |
| Turnout | | –0.148** | | –0.149** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.052) |
| Constant | 4.813*** | 16.999*** | 4.756*** | 17.064*** |
| | (0.846) | (4.684) | (0.838) | (4.703) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.962 | 0.969 | 0.962 | 0.970 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

## D.2 Other parties

Do security force casualties affect the electoral prospects of non-government parties as well? The 2015 elections returned the same four parties to the Turkish parliament in November as in June: the conservative AKP was accompanied by the social-democrat Republican People's Party (CHP), far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the left-wing Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP).

Figure S1 visualises the overall ideological stances of these parties, based on expert evaluations in 2014 (Figure S1a) or party manifestos in 2015 (Figure S1b), where higher values indicate stances further to the right.

Tables S13 to S15 replicate the regression models in the main text for the three parties in opposition. The results show that, when considered individually, these parties were affected neither by an initial terror casualty nor by repeated casualties. The estimates for *Treatment* and *Multiple Treatment* are relatively small, and they are not statistically significant.

The same result applies to the right-wing parties as a group, as presented in Table S16. Here the pre- and post-test variables are calculated as the district-wise sum of vote shares of the three right-wing parties—the AKP, MHP, and the Felicity Party (SP)—with more than one per cent of the vote in either of the elections.

Finally, Table S17 presents alternative regression models, adjusted with entropy balancing weights. These models return null results as well: there is no evidence that

casualties affect the vote share of other parties individually, or that of right-wing parties together.

These null results are in line with the assumption that rally effects are non-partisan. Accordingly, the public rallies behind their governments (Chowanietz, 2011) or government institutions (Parker, 1995) as well as the President (Mueller, 1973) not because they represent a particular party or ideology but because they represent the country at a given point in time. Nevertheless, the results here are at odds with one of the main findings in the existing literature, that there is a positive relationship between casualties in terror attacks and public support for right-wing parties (Berrebi & Klor, 2006, 2008; Gould & Klor, 2010; Kibris, 2011).

(a) CHES left-right position




(b) MARPOR rile score




Figure S1: Ideological stances of the four parties represented in the Turkish parliament after the 2015 elections. *Notes*: Higher values indicate stances further to the right in both figures. Error bars in the top figure represent standard deviations. *Sources*: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES; Polk et al., 2017) and Manifesto Project (MARPOR; Volkens et al., 2020).

Table S13: Regression models of CHP vote share

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | –0.145 | –0.119 | –0.116 | –0.077 |
| | (0.190) | (0.207) | (0.212) | (0.225) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –0.183 | –0.276 |
| | | | (0.357) | (0.419) |
| Pre-test | 1.029*** | 1.027*** | 1.029*** | 1.027*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.014) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.018** | –0.004 | 0.018** | –0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.010) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | 0.781* | | 0.786* |
| | | (0.355) | | (0.353) |
| Attack District | | 0.423 | | 0.414 |
| | | (0.475) | | (0.475) |
| Kurdish District | | 1.126* | | 1.125* |
| | | (0.515) | | (0.514) |
| AKP District | | –0.443* | | –0.445* |
| | | (0.208) | | (0.208) |
| Higher Education | | 0.121*** | | 0.121*** |
| | | (0.025) | | (0.025) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.059* | | 0.059* |
| | | (0.023) | | (0.023) |
| Turnout | | 0.026 | | 0.026 |
| | | (0.026) | | (0.026) |
| Constant | –0.694** | –3.852 | –0.697** | –3.840 |
| | (0.213) | (2.211) | (0.213) | (2.214) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.978 | 0.980 | 0.978 | 0.980 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S14: Regression models of MHP vote share

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | –0.053 | 0.021 | –0.228 | –0.140 |
| | (0.337) | (0.288) | (0.345) | (0.300) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | 1.177 | 1.101 |
| | | | (0.903) | (0.839) |
| Pre-test | 0.726*** | 0.723*** | 0.724*** | 0.722*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.033) | (0.026) | (0.033) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.016* | –0.002 | 0.014 | –0.005 |
| | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.010) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.187 | | –0.205 |
| | | (0.362) | | (0.362) |
| Attack District | | –0.062 | | –0.030 |
| | | (0.422) | | (0.433) |
| Kurdish District | | –0.389 | | –0.405 |
| | | (0.523) | | (0.516) |
| AKP District | | –1.299*** | | –1.288*** |
| | | (0.315) | | (0.313) |
| Higher Education | | 0.040 | | 0.039 |
| | | (0.028) | | (0.027) |
| Electoral Margin | | –0.095** | | –0.096** |
| | | (0.034) | | (0.034) |
| Turnout | | 0.050 | | 0.051 |
| | | (0.036) | | (0.036) |
| Constant | –0.382 | –3.452 | –0.343 | –3.476 |
| | (0.345) | (2.986) | (0.329) | (2.969) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.871 | 0.887 | 0.871 | 0.888 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S15: Regression models of HDP vote share

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | –0.374 | –0.217 | –0.367 | –0.233 |
| | (0.208) | (0.230) | (0.228) | (0.263) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –0.046 | 0.103 |
| | | | (0.548) | (0.449) |
| Pre-test | 0.906*** | 0.932*** | 0.906*** | 0.932*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.017) | (0.013) | (0.017) |
| Recruitment Pool | –0.007 | –0.025*** | –0.007 | –0.025*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.018 | | –0.020 |
| | | (0.436) | | (0.435) |
| Attack District | | 2.003* | | 2.006* |
| | | (0.827) | | (0.829) |
| Kurdish District | | –2.863** | | –2.864** |
| | | (0.901) | | (0.900) |
| AKP District | | –0.676** | | –0.675** |
| | | (0.200) | | (0.201) |
| Higher Education | | 0.001 | | 0.001 |
| | | (0.016) | | (0.016) |
| Electoral Margin | | 0.016 | | 0.016 |
| | | (0.028) | | (0.028) |
| Turnout | | 0.153*** | | 0.153*** |
| | | (0.039) | | (0.039) |
| Constant | –0.740*** | –13.297*** | –0.741*** | –13.300*** |
| | (0.115) | (3.377) | (0.116) | (3.379) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.986 | 0.989 | 0.986 | 0.989 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S16: Regression models of right-wing vote share

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 0.125 | 0.028 | 0.347 | 0.168 |
| | (0.407) | (0.354) | (0.432) | (0.376) |
| Multiple Treatment | | | –1.447 | –0.926 |
| | | | (0.967) | (0.628) |
| Pre-test | 0.946*** | 0.965*** | 0.946*** | 0.966*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Recruitment Pool | 0.027 | 0.075*** | 0.030* | 0.076*** |
| | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.013) |
| Non-terror Funeral | | –0.870 | | –0.854 |
| | | (0.566) | | (0.570) |
| Attack District | | –1.210 | | –1.237 |
| | | (0.894) | | (0.897) |
| Kurdish District | | 5.114*** | | 5.117*** |
| | | (0.898) | | (0.900) |
| AKP District | | 1.366*** | | 1.355*** |
| | | (0.348) | | (0.348) |
| Higher Education | | –0.185*** | | –0.184*** |
| | | (0.046) | | (0.046) |
| Electoral Margin | | –0.127* | | –0.127* |
| | | (0.055) | | (0.054) |
| Turnout | | –0.174* | | –0.175* |
| | | (0.071) | | (0.071) |
| Constant | 5.525*** | 19.103** | 5.495*** | 19.117** |
| | (1.207) | (6.300) | (1.201) | (6.320) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| Clusters | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.959 | 0.973 | 0.959 | 0.973 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S17: Regression models of non-government party vote share, based on entropy balancing

| | CHP | MHP | HDP | RW |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Treatment | –0.184 | –0.059 | –0.254 | 0.480 |
| | (0.209) | (0.300) | (0.260) | (0.466) |
| Multiple Treatment | 0.044 | 1.431 | –0.210 | –1.090 |
| | (0.347) | (0.798) | (0.496) | (1.020) |
| Pre-test | 1.030*** | 0.702*** | 0.886*** | 0.926*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.023) | (0.014) | (0.013) |
| Constant | –0.451** | 0.086 | –0.722*** | 7.087*** |
| | (0.150) | (0.391) | (0.174) | (0.857) |
| N | 970 | 970 | 970 | 970 |
| $R^2$ | 0.981 | 0.841 | 0.983 | 0.953 |

*Notes*: All models are OLS regressions. The data is adjusted with the entropy balancing weights. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

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