Online Appendix
Does Accommodation Work? Mainstream Party Strategies and the Success of Radical Right Parties

Contents

A. Samples

A.1. Selection Rules

We define as *mainstream parties* all parties of the social democratic, christian democratic, conservative and liberal party families that attracted at least 5% of the popular vote in a given election. Our codings are vastly based on the classifications of the MARPOR project. However, we deviate in couple of instances. In particular, we classify the Finnish Centre Party (KESK) and the Swedish Centre Party (C) as liberal parties instead of agrarian parties, which is in line with their core ideology and their group affiliation in the European Parliament.

Our definition of *radical right parties* follows the widely used approaches put forward by Mudde (2007) and Art (2011), who define (populist) radical right parties in terms of both substantive/positional ideological features (nativism) and non-positional ideological features (populism or anti-elitism). While our study purely focuses on the positional or programmatic appeal of the radical right, this definition allows for the inclusion of parties sometimes treated as 'borderline' cases in the extant literature, such as the British UK Independence Party (UKIP) or the Norwegian Progress Party (Mudde 2007). While these parties may vary in the intensity and kind of their nativist appeals, they still serve as functional equivalents within their national party systems (Mudde 2016).

A.2. Macro Study

Country	Year	Mainstream Parties	MSP % Votes	RRP % Votes
AT	1990	SPÖ, ÖVP	74.84	16.63
	1994	SPÖ, LIF, ÖVP	68.56	22.5
	1995	SPÖ, LIF, ÖVP	71.86	21.89
	1999	SPÖ, ÖVP	60.11	26.91
	2002	SPÖ, ÖVP	78.81	10.01
	2006	SPÖ, ÖVP	69.67	15.15
	2008	SPÖ, ÖVP	55.24	28.24
	2013	SPÖ, ÖVP	50.81	24.04
	2017	SPÖ, NEOS, ÖVP	63.63	25.97
BE-VL	1981	SP, PVV, CVP	44.59	1.1
	1985	SP, PVV, CVP	46.59	1.41
	1987	SP, PVV, CVP	45.88	1.9
	1991	SP, PVV, CVP	40.77	6.58
	1995	SP, VLD, CVP	42.88	7.83
	1999	SP, VLD, CD&V	37.94	9.87
	2003	sp.aOSPIRI', VLD, CD&V	43.51	11.68
	2007	sp.a, openVLD, CD&V	36.9	11.99
	2010	sp.a, openVLD, CD&V	28.72	7.76
BE-WA	1987	PS, PRL, PSC	33.07	0.12
	1991	PS, PRL, PSC	29.37	1.05
	1995	PS, PRLOFDF, PSC	29.86	2.28
	1999	PS, PRLOFDFOMCC, PSC	26.18	1.45
	2003	PS, MR, PSC	29.89	1.98
	2007	PS, MR, PSC	29.44	1.97
	2010	PS, MR, PSC	28.5	0.51
CH	1991	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	57.68	15.21
	1995	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	59.08	18.12
	1999	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	58.24	24.38
	2003	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	54.44	27.61
	2007	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	49.79	29.43
	2011	SPS/PSS, FDP/PLR, CVP/PDC, BDP/PBD	51.55	26.56
	2015	SPS/PSS, FDP/PLR, CVP/PDC	46.95	29.39
DE	1987	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	90.41	0.6
	1990	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	88.31	2.44
	1994	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	84.74	1.86
	1998	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	82.32	3.31
	2002	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	84.39	1.03
	2005	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	79.25	2.15
	2009	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	71.4	2.02
	2013	SPD, CDU/CSU	67.2	6.2
	2017	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	64.18	12.64
DK	1979	SD, RV, V, KF	68.68	11.01
	1981	SD, RV, V, CD, KF	72.03	8.91

	1984	SD, V, RV, KF	72.61	3.59
	1987	SD, V, RV, KF	66.92	4.77
	1988	SD, RV, V, KF	66.52	8.96
	1990	SD, V, KF, CD	74.25	6.44
	1994	SD, V, KF	72.88	6.43
	1998	SD, V, KF	68.86	9.83
	2001	SD, V, RV, KF	74.59	12.56
	2005	SD, V, RV, KF	74.32	13.25
	2007	SD, RV, V, KF	67.24	13.86
	2011	SD, RV, V	61.08	12.32
FI	2003	SSDP, SK, KD, KK	73.05	1.57
	2007	SSDP, SK, KK	66.81	4.05
	2011	SSDP, SK, KK	55.25	19.05
FR	1978	PS, UDF, RPR	67.64	0.29
	1981	PS, UDF,	76.76	0.18
	1986	PS, , UDF	73.97	9.83
	1988	PS, , UDF	74.21	9.79
	1993	PS, RPR, UDF	58.9	12.68
	1997	PS, RPR, UDF	56.97	14.93
	2002	PS, UMP	58.66	11.12
	2007	PS, MoDem, UMP	71.89	4.29
	2012	PS, UMP	56.47	13.6
	2017	PS, EM!	51.43	13.2
GB	1987	SDP, Labour, , Conservatives	95.7	0
	1992	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	94.17	0.04
	1997	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	90.65	0.46
	2001	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	90.62	1.67
	2005	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	89.59	2.96
	2010	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	88.12	5.03
	2015	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	75.16	12.65
	2017	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	89.7	1.84
IT	1983	PCI, PSI, PRI, DC	78.42	6.8
	1987	PSI, PCI, DC	75.14	5.92
	1992	PSI, PDS, DC	59.37	14.02
	1994	PDS, PPI, FI	52.45	13.48
	1996	PDS, AD, PPI, FI	54.28	26.64
	2001	DS, MODL, FI	60.49	16.36
	2006	Ulivo, UDC, FI	60.78	16.47
	2008	PD, UdC, PdL	76.07	8.06
	2013	SC, PD, PdL	55.29	6.05
NL	1982	PvdA, VVD, CDA	82.86	0.83
	1986	PvdA, D'66, VVD, CDA	91.41	0.53
	1989	PvdA, D'66, VVD, CDA	89.65	0.92
	1994	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	81.64	2.82
	1998	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	81.03	0.61
	2002	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	63.58	17
	2003	PvdA, VVD, CDA	73.88	5.7
	2006	PvdA, VVD, CDA	62.38	6.1
	2010	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	60.66	15.45
	2012	PvdA, D'66, VVD, CDA	67.96	10.08
	2017	PvdA, D'66, VVD, CDA	51.59	13.06
NO	1989	DnA, KrF, H	65	13.04
	1993	DnA, KrF, H	61.82	6.28
	1997	DnA, KrF, H	63	15.3
	2001	DnA, KrF, H	57.91	14.64
	2005	DnA, V, KrF, H	59.48	22.06
	2009	DnA, KrF, H	58.16	22.91
	2013	Ap, V, KrF, H	68.47	16.35
SE	1991	SAP, CP, FP, KdS, MSP	84.39	6.73
	1994	SAP, CP, FP, MSP	82.47	1.24
	1998	SAP, CP, Kd, MSP	76.19	0.53
	2002	SAP, FP, CP, Kd, MSP	83.85	1.44
	2006	SAP, CP, FP, Kd, MSP	83.23	2.93
	2010	SAP, FP, CP, Kd, MSP	79.94	5.7
	2014	SAP, CP, FP, MSP	65.87	12.86

A.3. Micro Study

Country	Year	MSP	MSP % Votes	RRP	RRP % Votes	Survey
AT	2013	SPÖ, ÖVP	50.81	FPÖ, BZÖ	24.04	CSES 4
	2017	SPÖ, NEOS, ÖVP	63.63	FPÖ	25.97	AUTNES 2017
BE-VL	1991	SP, PVV, CVP	40.77	FNb,	6.58	BGES 1991
	1995	SP, VLD, CVP	42.88	VB	7.83	BGES 1991
	1999	SP, VLD, CD&V	37.94	FNb, Agir	9.87	BGES 1995
	2003	sp.a-SPIRIT, VLD, CD&V	43.51	VB	11.68	BGES 1995
	2007	sp.a, openVLD, CD&V	36.9	FNb, Agir	11.99	BGES 1999
BE-WA	1991	PS, PSC	21.23	VB	1.05	BGES 1999
	1995	PS, PSC	19.6	FNb,	2.28	CSES 2
	1999	PS, PSC	16.04	VB	1.45	CSES 2
	2003	PS, MR, PSC	29.89	FNb,	1.98	BGES 2007
	2007	PS, MR, PSC	29.44	VB	1.97	BGES 2007
CH	1991	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	57.68	SVP	15.21	SELECTS 1991
	1995	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	59.08	SVP	18.12	SELECTS 1995
	1999	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	58.24	SVP	24.38	SELECTS 1999
	2003	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	54.44	SVP	27.61	CSES 2
	2007	SPS/PSS, FDP/PRD, CVP/PDC	49.79	SVP	29.43	CSES 3
	2011	SPS/PSS, FDP/PLR, CVP/PDC, BDP/PBD	51.55	SVP	26.56	CSES 4
	2015	SPS/PSS, FDP/PLR, CVP/PDC	46.95	SVP	29.39	SELECTS 2015
DE	1994	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	84.74	Rep	1.86	GFPS 1994
	2002	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	84.39	Rep, NPD	1.03	CSES 2
	2005	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	79.25	Rep, NPD, DVU	2.15	CSES 3
	2009	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	71.4	Rep, NPD, DVU	2.02	CSES 3
	2013	SPD, CDU/CSU	67.2	AfD, Rep, NPD	6.2	CSES 4
	2017	SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU	64.18	AfD, NPD	12.64	GLES 2017
DK	1987	SD, RV, V, KF	66.92	FrPd	4.77	EVP DK
	1988	SD, RV, V, KF	66.52	FrPd	8.96	EVP DK
	1990	SD, V, KF, CD	74.25	FrPd	6.44	EVP DK
	1994	SD, V, KF	72.88	FrPd	6.43	EVP DK
	1998	SD, V, KF	68.86	FrPd, DF	9.83	EVP DK
	2001	SD, RV, V, KF	74.59	DF	12.56	CSES 2
	2005	SD, V, RV, KF	74.32	DF	13.25	DES 2005
	2007	SD, RV, V, KF	67.24	DF	13.86	CSES 3
	2011	SD, RV, V	61.08	DF	12.32	DES 2011
FI	2003	SSDP, SK, KD, KK	73.05	PS	1.57	CSES 2
	2007	SSDP, SK, KK	66.81	PS	4.05	CSES 3
	2011	SSDP, SK, KK	55.25	PS	19.05	CSES 3
FR	1997	PS, RPR, UDF	56.97	FN	14.93	FNES 1997
	2007	PS, MoDem, UMP	71.89	FN	4.29	CSES 3
	2012	PS, UMP	56.47	FN	13.6	CSES 4
	2017	EM!, PS	51.43	FN	13.2	FES 2017
GB	2005	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	89.59	UKIP, BNP	2.96	CSES 2
	2010	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	88.12	UKIP, BNP	5.03	BES 2010
	2015	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	75.16	UKIP	12.65	CSES 4
	2017	Labour, LibDems, Conservatives	89.7	UKIP	1.84	BES 2017
IT	1996	PDS, PPI, FI	48.44	LN, FT-MSI	26.64	ITANES 1996
	2001	DS, FI	45.98	LN, FT-MSI	16.36	ITANES 2001
	2006	Ulivo, UDC, FI	60.78	LN	16.47	CSES 2
	2008	PD, UdC, PdL	76.07	LN	8.06	ITANES 2008
	2013	PD, SC, PdL	55.29	LN, FT-MSI, CP	6.05	ITANES 2013
NL	1989	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	89.65	CD	0.92	DPES 1989
	1994	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	81.64	CD	2.82	DPES 1994
	1998	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	81.03	CD	0.61	DPES 1998
	2002	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	63.58	LPF, CD	17	CSES 2
	2006	PvdA, VVD, CDA	62.38	PVV, LPF	6.1	CSES 3
	2010	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	60.66	PVV, LPF	15.45	CSES 3
	2012	PvdA, VVD, D'66, CDA	67.96	PVV	10.08	DPES 2012
	2017	PvdA, D'66, VVD, CDA	51.59	PVV, FvD	13.06	DPES 2017
NO	1989	DnA, KrF, H	65	FrP	13.04	EVP NO
	1993	DnA, KrF, H	61.82	FrP	6.28	EVP NO
	1997	DnA, KrF, H	63	FrP	15.3	EVP NO
	2001	DnA, KrF, H	57.91	FrP	14.64	CSES 2
	2005	DnA, V, KrF, H	59.48	FrP	22.06	CSES 3
	2009	DnA, KrF, H	58.16	FrP	22.91	CSES 3
	2013	Ap, V, KrF, H	68.47	FrP	16.35	CSES 4
SE	1991	SAP, CP, FP, KdS, MSP	84.39	ND	6.73	SNES 1991
	1994	SAP, CP, FP, MSP	82.47	ND	1.24	SNES 1994
	2006	SAP, CP, FP, Kd, MSP	83.23	SD	2.93	CSES 3
	2010	SAP, CP, FP, Kd, MSP	79.94	SD	5.7	SNES 2010
	2014	SAP, CP, FP, MSP	65.87	SD	12.86	CSES 4

B. Measures

B.1. Party Positions

Considerable methodological debates surround the use of MARPOR data (see e.g. Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov 2009; Meyer 2013; Adams et al. 2019). Nevertheless, party programs are often the product of intense intra-party debates and should, thus, provide reliable estimates of parties' policy orientations. Moreover, they remain the only data covering time periods sufficient to investigate parties' policy positions in a long-term perspective, which increases the credibility of our analyses. Similarly to existing approaches in the literature (e.g. Abou-Chadi 2016), we focus on a specific subset of MARPOR items to approximate party positions on immigration. We follow the established procedure of retrieving party positions as a weighted aggregate of positive and negative statements in their manifestos (e.g. Budge 2001). Specifically, we follow the approach detailed in Lowe et al. 2011 of constructing log odds-ratio scales from positive and negative references to distinct political issues, which acknowledges that additional positive or negative statements in manifestos are more weighty in informing voters about a party's policy position when the overall number of statements on an issue is low and when the ratio between positive and negative statements is balanced.

Using this scaling approach, we calculate three different measures of party positions that gauge mainstream parties' stances on the radical right's core issue domain:

- **National identity**
  - *Data:* This measure is based on data from the MARPOR Project (Volkens et al. 2019), which covers nearly all mainstream parties in a given election.
  - *Items: per601* (National way of life: positive), *per602* (National way of life: negative), *per607* (Multiculturalism: positive) and *per608* (Multiculturalism: negative)
  - *Party positions:*

  $$\text{pos}_{p^j} = \log\left(N_{p^j}^{601} + N_{p^j}^{608} + .5\right) - \log\left(N_{p^j}^{602} + N_{p^j}^{607} + .5\right)$$

  - *Party salience scores:*

  $$\text{sal}_{p^j} = \log\left(N_{p^j}^{601} + N_{p^j}^{602} + N_{p^j}^{607} + N_{p^j}^{608} + 1\right) - \log\left(N_{p^j}^{\text{total}}\right)$$

- **Multiculturalism (Abou-Chadi 2016):**
  - *Data:* This measure is based on data from the MARPOR Project (Volkens et al. 2019), which covers nearly all mainstream parties in a given election.
  - *Items: per607* (Multicultarilism: positive) and *per608* (Multiculturalism: negative)
  - *Party positions:*

  $$\text{pos}_{p^j} = \log\left(N_{p^j}^{608} + .5\right) - \log\left(N_{p^j}^{607} + .5\right)$$

  - *Party salience scores:*

  $$\text{sal}_{p^j} = \log\left(N_{p^j}^{607} + N_{p^j}^{608} + 1\right) - \log\left(N_{p^j}^{\text{total}}\right)$$

- **Immigration (Dancygier and Margalit 2020):**
  - *Data:* This measure is based on the novel data base Immigration in Party Manifestos (IPM) (Dancygier and Margalit 2020), which covers only the two (sometimes three) largest mainstream parties in a given election. This data set offers a detailed overview of party positions on immigration, coding, akin to the coding scheme of the MARPOR project, both negative and positive references to immigration across 30 different categories.
  - *Categories:* Civil liberties, Culture and identity, Deportation, Economic integration, Education, Equal treatment, Gay rights, Housing, Illegal immigration, Immigration policy, Integration, Islam, Jobs, Language, Law and order, National security, Other economic, Other, Overpopulation, Religion, Slaughtering of animals, Spatial clustering, Tolerance and racism, Voting rights Wages, Welfare system, Women's issues.
  - *Items:* For each category k, N_{pj}^{k+} gives the number of quasi-sentences with favorable references to immigration in that category while N_{pj}^{k-} gives the number of unfavorable mentions. *Party positions:*

$$\text{pos}_{pj} = \log\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} N_{pj}^{k+} + .5\right) - \log\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} N_{pj}^{k-} + .5\right)$$

  - *Party salience scores:*

$$\text{sal}_{pj} = \log\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} N_{pj}^{k+} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} N_{pj}^{k-} + 1\right) - \log\left(N_{pj}^{\text{total}}\right)$$

- **Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality (Meguid 2005, 2008):**
  - *Data:* This measure is based on data from the MARPOR Project (Volkens et al. 2019), which covers nearly all mainstream parties in a given election.
  - *Items: per601* (National way of life: positive), *per602* (National way of life: negative), *per603* (Traditional morality: positive), *per604* (Traditional morality: negative), *per607* (Multiculturalism: positive) and *per608* (Multiculturalism: negative), *per605* (Law and order: positive), and *per705* (underprivileged minority groups: positive),
  - *Party positions:*

$$\text{pos}_{pj} = \log\left(N_{pj}^{601} + N_{pj}^{603} + N_{pj}^{605} + N_{pj}^{608} + .5\right) - \log\left(N_{pj}^{602} + N_{pj}^{604} + N_{pj}^{607} + N_{pj}^{705} + .5\right)$$

  - *Party salience scores:*

$$\text{sal}_{pj} = \log\left(N_{pj}^{601} + N_{pj}^{602} + N_{pj}^{603} + N_{pj}^{604} + N_{pj}^{605} + N_{pj}^{607} + N_{pj}^{608} + N_{pj}^{705} + 1\right) - \log\left(N_{pj}^{\text{total}}\right)$$

- **Additional notes for all measures:**
  - N_{pj}^{item} denotes the number of quasi-sentences in a party p's manifesto for election j at time t.
  - Positional shifts are calculated as first differences: $\Delta\text{pos}_{pj} = \text{pos}_{pj_t} - \text{pos}_{pj_{t-1}}$

- Salience shifts are calculated as first differences: $\Delta \mathrm{sal}_{p^j} = \mathrm{sal}_{p^{j_t}} - \mathrm{sal}_{p^{j_{t-1}}}$

B.2. Moderators

- **Radical right life cycle:** We divide the life cycle of radical right parties into three phases: Marginalization phase, breakthrough phase, and consolidation phase.

  Marginalization phase: We define radical right parties as marginal competitors with little electoral relevance when they fail to score at leat 5% of the vote in national elections. Most emergent radical right parties fall into this category prior to experiencing their breakthrough. The only instance in our sample where a country saw the radical right fall into marginalization after breakthrough is Sweden in the early 1990s (New Democracy).

  Breakthrough phase: The first time radical right parties exceed 5% of the vote in a national election marks the beginning of the breakthrough phase. Following their initial electoral breakthrough, parties remain in the breakthrough phase through the next two national elections. If they receive 5% of the vote in the two subsequent national elections, they move to the consolidation phase. If they fail to attract 5% of the vote in one or both of the two subsequent national elections, they go back to the marginalization phase.

  Consolidation phase: Following Art (2011), we conceptualize consolidation as electoral persistence: The radical right in a given country can be viewed as consolidated once radical right parties receive at least 5% of the vote in at least three consecutive national elections.

  Whenever existing parties that previously attracted more than 5% of the vote morphed into radical right parties through ideological transformations (e.g. the Austrian FPÖ from 1986, the Swiss SVP from the early 1990s, or the Norwegian FrP from 1987), we consider them to be in the breakthrough phase starting with the first election they competed as a radical right party. This yields the following classification displayed in Table 3.

- **Time Trend:** We test for a linear time trend in the effect of accommodative policy shifts by using election years as a moderator.

- **Cordon sanitaire:** Following Art (2011) and van Spanje (2018), we observe when mainstream parties erect cordons sanitaires against radical right challengers, that is, when they systematically rule out cooperation with radical right parties. We thus arrive at the coding scheme presented in Table 4 for the years in our sample.

- **Competitive environment:** For all mainstream party in our sample, we establish whether its immigration position on the log-odds scale is liberal (< 0) or restrictive (≥ 0). For any given mainstream party, we then determine the most liberal and the most restrictive immigration policy positions held by its respective mainstream competitors (if the total number of mainstream parties is ≥ 3) or the position held by its sole mainstream competitor (if the total number of mainstream parties is 2). Based on this information, we define the competitive environment that a given mainstream party faces as follows:
  - *Liberal* when all other mainstream parties hold liberal positions on immigration policy (if the total number of mainstream parties is ≥ 3) or when the

Country	Marginalization	Breakthrough	Consolidation
AT	—	1990-1994	1995-2017
BE-VL	1981-1987	1991-1999	2003-2010
BE-WA	1987-2010	—	—
CH	—	1991-1999	2003-2015
DE	1987-2013	2017	—
DK	—	1979-1984	1987-2011
FI	1999-2007	2011	—
FR	1978-1981	1986-1993	1997-2017
GB	1987-2005	2010-2017	—
IT	—	—	1983-2013
NL	1982-1998	2002-2006	2010-2017
NO	—	1989-1997	2001-2013
SE	2002-2006	1991-1998	—
		2010-2014	—

Table 3: *Radical right life cycles by country.*

Country	No Cordon Sanitaire	Cordon Sanitaire
AT	1990-2017	—
BE-VL	—	1981-2010
BE-WA	—	1987-2010
CH	1991-2015	—
DE	—	1987-2017
DK	1979-2011	—
FI	2003-2011	—
FR	—	1978-2017
GB	—	1987-2017
IT	1983-2013	—
NL	2002-2017	1982-1998
NO	1989-2013	—
SE	—	1991-2014

Table 4: *Cordons sanitaires against radical right parties by country.*

sole mainstream competitor holds a liberal position (if the total number of mainstream parties is 2)

- *Mixed* when some mainstream competitors hold liberal positions and some mainstream competitors hold restrictive positions on immigration policy (only if the total number of mainstream parties is ≥ 3)

- *Rightist* when all other mainstream parties hold restrictive positions on immigration policy (if the total number of mainstream parties is ≥ 3) or when the sole mainstream competitor holds a restrictive position (if the total number of mainstream parties is 2)

- **Party family:** To test for heterogeneity in the effects of accommodative policy shifts between proximate and non-proximate mainstream parties, we subset our analyses to parties of the mainstream left (social democrats) and mainstream right (conservatives, christian democrats, and selected right-liberal parties: The Swiss FDP, the Danish V, and the Dutch VVD).

- **Party system issue salience:** We calculate the systemic salience of the immigration issue domain as a weighted average of the party-specific salience scores in a given electoral context (using each of the four measures described in Section B.1 in turn), where parties' vote shares in the corresponding elections serve as weights.

- **Past position:** For parties' past positions on the immigration issue domain, we simply use parties' position scores from the previous election, $\text{pos}_{p^j t-1}$ (using each of the four measures described in Section B.1 in turn).

B.3. Control Variables

- **Vote shares** $(t-1)$**:** For every given mainstream party, we control for its size in the legislative cycle leading up to an election as well as for the (cumulative) size of its radical right competitors.

- **Government status** $(t-1)$**:** For every mainstream party in the sample, we assign one of three categories that applies to the legislative cycle leading up to a given election:

  - *Opposition* if the party was in opposition prior to the election.

  - *Government* if the party was in government prior to the election.

  - *Government with RRP Participation* if the party was part of a government that included, or was support by, radical right parties.

- **Unemployment:** To control for the macro-economic situation, we use unemployment rates provided by Teorell et al. (2019) and the International Labor Organization (2018). We control for levels at $t-1$ and changes from $t-1$ to t.

- **Share of foreign population:** In order to control for fluctuating migration rates, we add the share of foreign citizens - here, we extend data provided by Golder (2003) with more recent information from Eurostat (2018). We control for levels at $t-1$ and changes from $t-1$ to t.

- **Moderators:** Additionally, all models include the following variables: The radical right life cycle, cordon sanitaire, competitive environment (as an interaction effect of the most liberal and most restrictive positions), and party system issue salience.

C. Summary Statistics

C.1. Macro Study

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Count	Unique Obs.	% NA
RRP Vote Change	0.84	5.52	-18.2	16.39		108	0
Party Strategies							
National Identity $(t-1)$, pos	0.27	1.63	-4.81	4.29		351	0
ΔNational Identity, pos	0.03	1.81	-4.65	7.11		351	0
National Identity $(t-1)$, sal	-4.05	1.04	-7	-1.47		351	0
ΔNational Identity, sal	0.08	1.07	-3.02	3.57		351	0
Cultural Protectionism $(t-1)$, pos	1.02	1.51	-4.01	5.07		351	0
ΔCultural Protectionism, pos	0.07	1.45	-4.13	4.47		351	0
Cultural Protectionism $(t-1)$, sal	-2.44	0.67	-5.21	-0.89		351	0
ΔCultural Protectionism, sal	0.04	0.67	-3.02	2.69		351	0
Anti-Multiculturalism $(t-1)$, pos	-0.63	1.54	-4.81	3.37		351	0
ΔAnti-Multiculturalism, pos	0.08	1.75	-5.72	5.88		351	0
Anti-Multiculturalism $(t-1)$, sal	-4.56	1.06	-8.23	-1.73		351	0
ΔAnti-Multiculturalism, sal	0.05	1.09	-3.39	3.57		351	0
Immigration $(t-1)$, pos	-0.69	1.42	-4.67	3.56		206	41.31
ΔImmigration, pos	0.05	1.3	-4.67	3.86		186	47.01
Immigration $(t-1)$, sal	-3.95	1.08	-7.58	-1.52		206	41.31
ΔImmigration, sal	0.1	1.02	-2.83	3.77		186	47.01
Party-Level Control Variables							
MSP % Votes $(t-1)$	20.04	11.58	0	48.79		351	0
Government status $(t-1)$							
in opposition	0.44				156	351	0
in gov't	0.44				156	351	0
in gov't with RRP	0.11				39	351	0
Mainstream competitors' strategies, continuous (t)							
National Identity (min)	-1.32	1.63	-5.6	3.37		351	0
National Identity (max)	1.25	1.37	-2.36	4.29		351	0
Cultural Protectionism (min)	-0.55	1.37	-5.2	3.88		351	0
Cultural Protectionism (max)	1.95	1.19	-1.2	5.07		351	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (min)	-1.87	1.58	-5.73	2.9		351	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (max)	0.31	1.41	-4.04	5		351	0
Immigration (min)	-0.93	1.38	-4.67	3.56		308	12.25
Immigration (max)	-0.35	1.44	-4.67	4.44		308	12.25
Mainstream competitors' strategies, discrete (t)							
National Identity (restrictive)	0.29				102	351	0
National Identity (mixed)	0.58				204	351	0
National Identity (liberal)	0.13				45	351	0
Cultural Protectionism (restrictive)	0.39				136	351	0
Cultural Protectionism (mixed)	0.61				215	351	0
Cultural Protectionism (liberal)	0.00				0	351	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (restrictive)	0.23				82	351	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (mixed)	0.57				199	351	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (liberal)	0.2				70	351	0
Immigration (restrictive)	0.36				112	307	0
Immigration (mixed)	0.15				47	307	0
Immigration (liberal)	0.48				148	307	0
Country-level Control Variables							
RRP % Votes $(t-1)$	8.55	7.96	0	29.43		108	0
Systemic Salience National Identity	-3.87	0.81	-6.13	-2.12		108	0
Systemic Salience Cultural Protectionism	-2.38	0.42	-3.36	-1.29		108	0
Systemic Salience Anti-Multiculturalism	-4.46	0.83	-6.49	-2.27		108	0
Systemic Salience Immigration	-3.78	0.95	-6.91	-2.12		96	11.11
Cordon Sanitaire against RRP	0.51				55	108	0
Radical Right Life Cycle							
Marginalization	0.28				30	108	0
Breakthrough	0.41				44	108	0
Consolidation	0.31				34	108	0

Table 5: *Summary statistics, macro-level study.*

C.2. Micro Study

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Count	Unique Obs.	% NA
Vote Switching							
From RRP	0.02				2544	144545	0
Neither	0.95				137947	144545	0
To RRP	0.03				4054	144545	0
Party Strategies							
National Identity $(t-1)$, pos	0.32	1.59	-4.81	4.29		228	0
ΔNational Identity, pos	0	1.75	-4.65	5.91		228	0
National Identity $(t-1)$, sal	-3.96	1.06	-7	-1.73		228	0
ΔNational Identity, sal	0.15	1.05	-3.02	3.57		228	0
Cultural Protectionism $(t-1)$, pos	1.2	1.46	-2.94	5.07		228	0
ΔCultural Protectionism, pos	-0.08	1.44	-4.1	4.47		228	0
Cultural Protectionism $(t-1)$, sal	-2.32	0.64	-5.21	-0.89		228	0
ΔCultural Protectionism, sal	0.02	0.62	-2.14	2.52		228	0
Anti-Multiculturalism $(t-1)$, pos	-0.59	1.6	-4.81	3.37		228	0
ΔAnti-Multiculturalism, pos	0.04	1.83	-5.72	5.88		228	0
Anti-Multiculturalism $(t-1)$, sal	-4.46	1.11	-8.23	-1.73		228	0
ΔAnti-Multiculturalism, sal	0.13	1.09	-3.39	3.57		228	0
Immigration $(t-1)$, pos	-0.66	1.51	-4.33	3.56		135	40.79
ΔImmigration, pos	0	1.27	-3.33	3.1		117	48.68
Immigration $(t-1)$, sal	-3.84	1.12	-7.58	-1.52		135	40.79
ΔImmigration, sal	0.16	1.04	-2.79	3.77		117	48.68
Party-Level Control Variables							
MSP % Votes $(t-1)$	19.42	10.61	0	43.82		228	0
Government status $(t-1)$							
in opposition	0.41				94	228	0
in gov't	0.43				97	228	0
in gov't with RRP	0.16				37	228	0
Mainstream competitors' strategies, continuous (t)							
National Identity (min)	-1.47	1.72	-5.6	3.37		228	0
National Identity (max)	1.33	1.3	-2.36	4.29		228	0
Cultural Protectionism (min)	-0.52	1.3	-4.14	3.88		228	0
Cultural Protectionism (max)	1.98	1.06	-0.22	5.07		228	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (min)	-2.07	1.66	-5.73	2.9		228	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (max)	0.46	1.52	-4.04	5		228	0
Immigration (min)	-1.01	1.45	-4.33	3.56		189	17.11
Immigration (max)	-0.34	1.49	-4.33	3.56		189	17.11
Mainstream competitors' strategies, discrete (t)							
National Identity (restrictive)	0.25				58	228	0
National Identity (mixed)	0.64				146	228	0
National Identity (liberal)	0.11				24	228	0
Cultural Protectionism (restrictive)	0.38				86	228	0
Cultural Protectionism (mixed)	0.61				139	228	0
Cultural Protectionism (liberal)	0.01				3	228	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (restrictive)	0.19				44	228	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (mixed)	0.62				141	228	0
Anti-Multiculturalism (liberal)	0.19				43	228	0
Immigration (restrictive)	0.34				64	189	0
Immigration (mixed)	0.17				33	189	0
Immigration (liberal)	0.49				92	189	0
Country-level Control Variables							
RRP % Votes $(t-1)$	9.4	8.08	0	29.43		70	0
Systemic Salience National Identity	-3.76	0.84	-6.13	-2.12		70	0
Systemic Salience Cultural Protectionism	-2.3	0.4	-3.28	-1.29		70	0
Systemic Salience Anti-Multiculturalism	-4.36	0.85	-6.49	-2.27		70	0
Systemic Salience Immigration	-3.58	0.93	-6.91	-2.12		59	15.71
Cordon Sanitaire against RRP	0.46				32	70	0
Radical Right Life Cycle							
Marginalization	0.29				20	70	0
Breakthrough	0.47				33	70	0
Consolidation	0.24				17	70	0

Table 6: *Summary statistics, micro-level study. Vote switching information based on post-imputation sample.*

D. Data Structure and Modeling Strategies

Disaggregating Mainstream Parties

In our *macro-level analyses*, we replicate each outcome – changes in radical right vote shares – by the number of relevant mainstream parties in a given election. Consequently, outcomes do not vary within elections, and thus the explanatory power of our models stem from comparisons across electoral contexts. We use *fractional frequency weights*[5] for stacked observations such that each stacked observation is weighted by the inverse number of times the outcome is replicated. For instance, in an electoral context with three mainstream parties (and thus three replications of the same outcome Y_i), each entry in the model's likelihood function will be weighted by 1/3. This yields a (deterministic) mixture model. As opposed to treating one outcome (change in radical right vote share) to 100% as the outcome of a single data generating process – e.g.:

$$\Delta \text{Vote Share}_{\text{FPÖ 2017}} = f(\Delta \text{Policy Strategy}_{\text{ÖVP 2017}})$$

we treat one observation as the outcome of three distinct data-generating processes (each reflecting the policy strategies of a single mainstream party) to 33.3% each, e.g.:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta \text{Vote Share}_{\text{FPÖ 2017}} = &0.33 \times f(\Delta \text{Policy Strategy}_{\text{ÖVP 2017}}) \\
&+ 0.33 \times f(\Delta \text{Policy Strategy}_{\text{NEOS 2017}}) \\
&+ 0.33 \times f(\Delta \text{Policy Strategy}_{\text{SPÖ 2017}})
\end{aligned}$$

As a result of the use of these fractional frequency weights, the weights strictly sum to $\sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i = 108$, which means that even though we use information from 351 observations, the number of effective entries in the likelihood sums to 108, where each radical right vote share change, although explained by a mixture of several data generating processes, has a weight of exactly one. Additionally, we use election-clustered standard errors to account for dependencies among observations from the same electoral context.

The benefit of this approach is that it allows to study the effects of party strategies for any number of mainstream parties competing with the radical right at the same time. This is particularly useful for contexts of fragmented party systems which defy the logic of 'triangular' party competition (see Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Our approach thus generalizes the standard model in which radical right success is modeled as the function of *one* mainstream competitor's strategy by pooling across *all* relevant mainstream parties in a given electoral context. We then implement more refined approaches focusing on party system *configurations* (e.g., Meguid 2005) by conditioning each parties' policies on its competitive environment.

The benefits of disaggregating mainstream parties are even more pronounced in our *micro-level analyses.* Here, our quantity of interest are *aggregate dyadic losses, gains, and net transfers* between a given mainstream party and the radical right. These aggregate-level quantities of interest are estimated via party-election random intercepts in hierarchi-

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5. We do so using Stata's `iweight` option, one of the few pre-implemented software solutions that allows for the use of genuine fractional frequency weights (as opposed to relative/analytical weights). However, users can also use the more widespread relative/analytical weights along with clustered standard errors that adjust for the stacking of observations within electoral contexts to produce virtually identical results.

cal linear models. Importantly, these are genuinely dyadic quantities – they are different for each radical right-mainstream party dyad in a given electoral context.

For illustration, consider the following voter transition matrix from the Austrian National Election Study 2017, which shows vote choices across six categories – the center-left SPÖ, the liberal NEOS, the center-right ÖVP, the radical right FPÖ, as well as other parties and non-voters across the two consecutive elections of 2013 (rows) and 2017 (columns):

	SPÖ	NEOS	ÖVP	OTH	FPÖ	NON
SPÖ	196	10	33	29	44	15
NEOS	0	16	26	5	3	3
ÖVP	6	6	210	2	30	6
OTH	37	11	25	73	9	9
FPÖ	3	4	59	4	97	5
NON	34	13	42	20	32	49

Now, consider dyadic voter transfers between the SPÖ and the FPÖ:

- 44 respondents who voted for the SPÖ in 2013 voted for the FPÖ in 2017 (3.7% of the sample); the FPÖ's aggregate gross gains from the SPÖ are thus 0.037

- 3 respondents who voted for FPÖ in 2013 voted for the SPÖ in 2017 (0.2% of the sample); the FPÖ's aggregate gross losses to the SPÖ are thus 0.002

- As a corollary, the FPÖ's net transfers with the SPÖ are $0.037 - 0.002 = +0.035$, a dyadic net gain of 3.5 percentage points

The FPÖ's dyadic voter transfers with the ÖVP, of course, look very different:

- 30 respondents who voted for the ÖVP in 2013 voted for the FPÖ in 2017 (2.6% of the sample); the FPÖ's gross gains from the ÖVP are thus 0.026

- 59 respondents who voted for FPÖ in 2013 voted for the ÖVP in 2017 (5.1% of the sample); the FPÖ's gross losses to the ÖVP are thus 0.051

- As a corollary, the FPÖ's net transfers with the ÖVP are $0.025 - 0.051 = -0.026$, a net loss of 2.6 percentage points

Lastly, the FPÖ's dyadic voter transfers with the NEOS would yet again be different. As dyadic quantities, aggregate losses, gains, and net transfers thus require a stacking by mainstream parties; otherwise, they could not be estimated for each unique dyad. This explains why our vote switching models involve $J = 228$ mainstream-radical right dyads and not simply 108 radical right parties.

The circumstance that the lowest level of our hierarchical models features $\sum_{j=1}^{J} N_j \approx 468,000$ observations (i.e., the sum of survey respondents across all party dyads) follows the standard logic of hierarchical/multi-level modeling: A mainstream parties' gross gains, gross losses, and net transfers with the radical right are not fixed quantities that we can simply observe (like vote shares), but estimates that need to be retrieved from survey data. We estimate these quantities per random intercepts in hierarchical linear

models. The intercepts at the level of the $J = 228$ election-specific mainstream-radical right dyads capture the aggregate quantities of interest – dyadic gross gains, gross losses, and net transfers on the basis of many respondents in the corresponding electoral context. Running such a hierarchical model on the 468,000 level-1 observations is superior to simply running an aggregate-level model on the 228 pre-calculated means of these dyadic net transfers, as the uncertainty involved in the aggregation from the lower to the upper level is considered in the estimation of the upper-level model. As such, our modeling strategy is more statistically principled than a naive two-step estimation.

Pooling Radical Right Parties

In some electoral contexts, multiple radical right parties compete at the same time, though usually at most one radical right party manages to achieve notable records of electoral success. We deliberately choose not to treat each radical right parties' success as an outcome of its own. Instead of analyzing the effect of a given mainstream party's strategy separately for two radical right challengers, we thus pool the success of 'the radical right' and treat it as one observation.

We make this choice because disaggregating (changes in) radical right vote shares across multiple parties can lead to highly misleading inferences. Consider the following example with two mainstream parties, A and B, and two radical right parties, M and N. Suppose A maintains a centrist position on immigration whereas B shifts two points to the right. M maintains a low level of support at 2% of the vote whereas N, a new party, goes from 0% to 12%. Following our approach, one would conclude that the average shift of one point two the right coincides with an increase in radical right vote shares of 12 percentage points, which we believe to be an accurate characterization of the observed pattern.

Alternatives where each radical party were treated as an observation of its own, however, may result in drastically different inferences. A regression of changes in vote shares on policy shifts, for instance, would produce an estimate of half the size, averaging across vote share changes of 0 and 12 percentage points. In a more drastic form where not one, but three marginal radical right parties maintained their vote share, the estimate would drop to a quarter of its original magnitude. A fixed effects approach, regressing within-demeaned levels in vote shares on within-demeaned policy positions, would produce even more misleading results: As A's position would be a unit above, and B's position a unit below the average position while M's vote share would be five percentage points above and N's five percentage points below the national average, the resulting estimate would be zero.

We thus opt for an approach that pools radical right parties' success and relies explicitly on *changes* in radical right vote shares and party positions. This also mirrors the logic of our micro-level analyses of vote switching as closely as possible. As a consequence of this modeling strategy, we also need to capture predictors specific to multiple individual radical right parties – specifically, cordon sanitaires and radical right life cycles – at the election-level. For *cordon sanitaires*, we choose to focus on the largest radical right party. This is because larger parties are arithmetically more important for prospective government formation and its chances of joining government are likely most important in conditioning electoral responses to mainstream party policy strategies on immigration. For *radical right life cycles*, we consider path dependencies within party systems. Take the Dutch LPF, for instance. After its thunderous breakthrough in 2002, the party only maintained a vote shares of barely over 5% in the 2003 election (and ultimately imploded in the 2006 election). Yet, Geert Wilders' newly founded PVV attracted a sizable vote

share in 2006, following directly in the LPF's footsteps and actively learning from its failures (see, e.g., Art 2011; de Lange and Art 2011). Therefore, even though 2012 marked the first time one and the same radical right *party* maintained a vote share of at least 5% in three consecutive elections, we consider the 2006 election in which *the radical right* passed this criterion, and thus consider 2006 the end of the breakthrough phase for the Dutch radical right.

E. Regression Tables

	Overall	Mainstream Right	Mainstream Left	RRP Life Cycle	Cordon Sanitaire	Competitive Environment	Systemic Salience	Linear Time Trend
Intercept	18.17 [6.39,29.95]	19.87 [5.83,33.92]	3.95 [-10.03,17.93]	18.23 [6.49,29.98]	18.26 [6.47,30.06]	19.02 [6.51,31.52]	18.09 [6.24,29.93]	-145.92 [-366.18,74.34]
Position (t − 1)	-0.26 [-0.57,0.05]	-0.33 [-0.83,0.16]	-0.72 [-1.80,0.35]	-0.26 [-0.56,0.04]	-0.26 [-0.57,0.05]	-0.34 [-0.68,-0.01]	-0.26 [-0.58,0.05]	-0.27 [-0.58,0.03]
ΔPosition	0.04 [-0.30,0.37]	-0.21 [-0.68,0.26]	-0.13 [-0.89,0.64]	-0.15 [-0.94,0.64]	0.14 [-0.40,0.69]	-0.22 [-0.95,0.51]	-0.25 [-1.82,1.32]	-31.67 [-86.92,23.57]
Salience (t − 1)	0.28 [-0.28,0.84]	1.64 [0.26,3.01]	-1.07 [-2.55,0.41]	0.29 [-0.27,0.85]	0.27 [-0.29,0.83]	0.37 [-0.19,0.93]	0.29 [-0.27,0.85]	0.29 [-0.29,0.87]
ΔSalience	-0.18 [-0.65,0.30]	0.82 [-0.29,1.92]	-0.41 [-2.07,1.24]	-0.18 [-0.69,0.32]	-0.20 [-0.67,0.28]	-0.16 [-0.61,0.29]	-0.18 [-0.66,0.30]	-0.19 [-0.67,0.28]
MSP % Votes (t − 1)	-0.02 [-0.05,0.00]	-0.03 [-0.12,0.07]	0.06 [-0.10,0.22]	-0.02 [-0.05,0.00]	-0.02 [-0.05,0.00]	-0.02 [-0.05,0.00]	-0.02 [-0.05,0.00]	-0.03 [-0.05,-0.00]
Gov't status: in gov't	0.45 [-0.48,1.38]	-0.90 [-2.45,0.64]	1.40 [-0.37,3.16]	0.43 [-0.49,1.35]	0.45 [-0.47,1.38]	0.47 [-0.45,1.40]	0.45 [-0.49,1.39]	0.47 [-0.47,1.41]
Gov't status: in gov't with RRP	-0.13 [-3.02,2.77]	-1.89 [-5.80,2.01]	-11.89 [-28.77,5.00]	-0.14 [-3.07,2.80]	-0.17 [-3.14,2.80]	-0.06 [-3.15,3.04]	-0.13 [-3.01,2.75]	-0.31 [-3.22,2.59]
Competitors' Positions (min)	-1.12 [-1.73,-0.51]	-1.29 [-2.00,-0.59]	-0.83 [-1.74,0.07]	-1.12 [-1.74,-0.51]	-1.11 [-1.72,-0.50]		-1.11 [-1.72,-0.50]	-1.08 [-1.72,-0.43]
Competitors' Positions (max)	0.27 [-0.42,0.97]	0.65 [-0.33,1.62]	-0.03 [-0.99,0.92]	0.27 [-0.43,0.97]	0.27 [-0.43,0.96]		0.27 [-0.43,0.92]	0.22 [-0.47,0.92]
Competitors' Positions (min) times Competitors' Positions (max)	0.15 [-0.12,0.42]	0.18 [-0.20,0.55]	-0.01 [-0.43,0.41]	0.14 [-0.13,0.41]	0.14 [-0.13,0.41]		0.15 [-0.12,0.41]	0.15 [-0.12,0.41]
RRP % Votes (t − 1)	-0.95 [-1.21,-0.69]	-1.00 [-1.25,-0.75]	-1.01 [-1.31,-0.72]	-0.95 [-1.20,-0.69]	-0.95 [-1.21,-0.69]	-0.95 [-1.21,-0.69]	-0.95 [-1.21,-0.69]	-0.96 [-1.22,-0.70]
Systemic Salience	1.15 [-0.41,2.71]	-0.01 [-2.01,1.99]	1.16 [-0.96,3.28]	1.13 [-0.45,2.71]	1.15 [-0.40,2.71]	1.22 [-0.39,2.84]	1.12 [-0.44,2.69]	1.20 [-0.36,2.76]
Cordon Sanitaire	-2.55 [-7.56,2.45]	-2.47 [-7.86,2.93]	-5.35 [-10.38,-0.33]	-2.57 [-7.58,2.43]	-2.46 [-7.50,2.59]	-1.19 [-6.54,4.16]	-2.59 [-7.60,2.42]	-2.08 [-7.22,3.05]
Phase: Consolidation	3.26 [0.48,6.04]	3.91 [1.14,6.68]	3.51 [0.55,6.47]	3.24 [0.46,6.01]	3.32 [0.55,6.10]	3.62 [0.84,6.41]	3.28 [0.52,6.05]	2.42 [-0.33,5.17]
Phase: Marginalization	-6.57 [-9.10,-4.04]	-6.69 [-9.25,-4.12]	-6.86 [-10.02,-3.71]	-6.53 [-9.03,-4.03]	-6.58 [-9.13,-4.02]	-6.71 [-9.28,-4.13]	-6.55 [-9.10,-4.00]	-6.11 [-8.59,-3.64]
Unemployment (t − 1)	0.16 [-0.29,0.61]	0.21 [-0.30,0.72]	0.10 [-0.40,0.61]	0.16 [-0.30,0.62]	0.15 [-0.29,0.60]	0.13 [-0.33,0.59]	0.16 [-0.29,0.61]	0.17 [-0.27,0.61]
ΔUnemployment	-0.03 [-0.56,0.50]	0.02 [-0.56,0.60]	0.11 [-0.49,0.71]	-0.02 [-0.55,0.52]	-0.02 [-0.56,0.51]	-0.08 [-0.63,0.48]	-0.03 [-0.56,0.50]	0.02 [-0.52,0.57]
Foreign-born (t − 1)	0.43 [-0.62,1.47]	0.46 [-0.66,1.59]	1.31 [-0.02,2.64]	0.41 [-0.64,1.46]	0.42 [-0.63,1.46]	0.38 [-0.75,1.51]	0.43 [-0.62,1.48]	0.21 [-0.90,1.32]
ΔForeign-born	0.00 [-1.31,1.32]	0.06 [-1.33,1.44]	-0.04 [-1.35,1.26]	-0.02 [-1.34,1.30]	-0.02 [-1.33,1.29]	0.24 [-1.04,1.52]	0.02 [-1.30,1.34]	-0.29 [-1.59,1.00]
Phase: Consolidation times ΔPosition				0.34 [-0.59,1.28]				
Phase: Marginalization times ΔPosition				0.08 [-0.72,0.89]				
Cordon Sanitaire times ΔPosition					-0.20 [-0.84,0.45]			
Competitive Environment: Mixed						2.24 [0.39,4.08]		
Competitive Environment: Liberal						1.73 [-0.25,3.70]		
Competitive Environment: Mixed times ΔPosition						0.20 [-0.57,0.97]		
Competitive Environment: Liberal times ΔPosition						0.02 [-0.86,0.90]		
ΔPosition times Systemic Salience							-0.07 [-0.44,0.30]	
Systemic Salience							0.00 [0.00,0.00]	
Year								0.08 [-0.03,0.20]
ΔPosition times Year								0.02 [-0.01,0.04]
Position (t − 1)								
ΔPosition times Position (t − 1)								
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N_countries	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
N_elections	108	108	106	108	108	108	108	108
N_parties×elections	351	165	110	351	351	351	351	351

Table 7: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for panel 1 of Fig. 2.

Table 8: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for panel 2 of Fig. 2 based on $S = 5000$ simulations from $M = 5$ imputations.

	Overall	Mainstream Right	Mainstream Left	RRP Life Cycle	Cordon Sanitaire	Competitive Environment	Systemic Salience	Linear Time Trend	Past Position
Intercept	0.92 [-0.50, 2.41]	-0.22 [-2.25, 1.92]	0.68 [-2.15, 3.63]	0.94 [-0.50, 2.46]	0.89 [-0.49, 2.35]	0.66 [-0.62, 2.04]	0.93 [-0.50, 2.42]	-6.89 [-54.00, 43.65]	1.01 [-0.40, 2.51]
Position ($t-1$)	0.02 [-0.07, 0.12]	0.06 [-0.10, 0.22]	-0.08 [-0.40, 0.24]	0.03 [-0.07, 0.12]	0.02 [-0.07, 0.12]	0.03 [-0.06, 0.12]	0.03 [-0.07, 0.12]	0.02 [-0.08, 0.11]	0.02 [-0.07, 0.12]
ΔPosition	0.04 [-0.04, 0.13]	0.01 [-0.14, 0.16]	0.04 [-0.16, 0.24]				0.07 [-0.28, 0.43]	-16.69 [-35.07, 1.79]	0.04 [-0.04, 0.12]
Salience ($t-1$)	-0.04 [-0.22, 0.15]	0.04 [-0.34, 0.45]	-0.37 [-0.82, 0.08]	-0.02 [-0.20, 0.16]	-0.03 [-0.20, 0.15]	-0.03 [-0.20, 0.15]	-0.04 [-0.22, 0.14]	-0.03 [-0.21, 0.15]	-0.03 [-0.22, 0.14]
ΔSalience	-0.02 [-0.19, 0.15]	0.11 [-0.25, 0.47]	-0.27 [-0.69, 0.15]	-0.01 [-0.18, 0.16]	-0.01 [-0.18, 0.15]	-0.02 [-0.19, 0.14]	-0.02 [-0.19, 0.15]	-0.02 [-0.18, 0.14]	-0.03 [-0.20, 0.14]
MSP % Votes ($t-1$)	0.02 [0.00, 0.03]	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]	0.03 [-0.02, 0.08]	0.02 [0.00, 0.03]	0.02 [0.00, 0.03]	0.02 [0.01, 0.03]	0.02 [0.01, 0.03]	0.02 [0.01, 0.03]	0.02 [0.01, 0.03]
Gov't status: in gov't	0.27 [0.04, 0.51]	0.09 [-0.38, 0.58]	0.37 [-0.17, 0.91]	0.27 [0.03, 0.50]	0.28 [0.04, 0.52]	0.27 [0.04, 0.52]	0.27 [0.02, 0.52]	0.26 [0.01, 0.50]	0.28 [0.04, 0.51]
Gov't status: in gov't with RRP	0.16 [-0.30, 0.62]	-0.17 [-0.85, 0.53]	1.12 [-0.46, 2.71]	0.16 [-0.31, 0.61]	0.14 [-0.31, 0.60]	0.14 [-0.30, 0.59]	0.16 [-0.30, 0.62]	0.18 [-0.26, 0.62]	0.13 [-0.34, 0.57]
Competitors' Positions (min)	-0.05 [-0.18, 0.08]	-0.17 [-0.37, 0.02]	-0.00 [-0.25, 0.24]	-0.05 [-0.18, 0.09]	-0.04 [-0.17, 0.08]		-0.05 [-0.18, 0.09]	-0.05 [-0.19, 0.09]	-0.04 [-0.17, 0.09]
Competitors' Positions (max)	-0.04 [-0.19, 0.12]	0.11 [-0.13, 0.34]	-0.10 [-0.38, 0.19]	-0.03 [-0.19, 0.12]	-0.04 [-0.19, 0.11]		-0.03 [-0.20, 0.13]	-0.04 [-0.21, 0.12]	-0.03 [-0.19, 0.12]
RRP % Votes ($t-1$)	-0.07 [-0.11, -0.03]	-0.09 [-0.16, -0.03]	-0.07 [-0.14, -0.01]	-0.07 [-0.11, -0.03]	-0.07 [-0.11, -0.02]	-0.06 [-0.11, -0.02]	-0.07 [-0.11, -0.03]	-0.07 [-0.11, -0.02]	-0.07 [-0.11, -0.03]
Systemic Salience	0.12 [-0.18, 0.43]	-0.16 [-0.67, 0.36]	0.49 [-0.11, 1.07]	0.10 [-0.21, 0.41]	0.13 [-0.17, 0.43]	0.11 [-0.17, 0.40]	0.12 [-0.17, 0.43]	0.10 [-0.19, 0.40]	0.13 [-0.18, 0.43]
Cordon Sanitaire	0.02 [-0.61, 0.65]	0.03 [-0.80, 0.83]	0.25 [-0.88, 1.45]	0.01 [-0.65, 0.66]	-0.00 [-0.63, 0.60]	0.00 [-0.59, 0.57]	0.02 [-0.61, 0.65]	0.04 [-0.55, 0.64]	0.02 [-0.60, 0.64]
Phase: Consolidation	0.44 [-0.10, 0.98]	0.61 [-0.16, 1.40]	0.68 [-0.23, 1.53]	0.47 [-0.09, 1.03]	0.41 [-0.14, 0.94]	0.39 [-0.14, 0.99]	0.46 [-0.11, 1.02]	0.37 [-0.21, 0.95]	0.46 [-0.11, 1.01]
Phase: Marginalization	-0.85 [-1.42, -0.26]	-1.31 [-2.17, -0.46]	-1.20 [-2.18, -0.17]	-0.80 [-1.40, -0.24]	-0.83 [-1.40, -0.29]	-0.76 [-1.36, -0.18]	-0.83 [-1.38, -0.26]	-0.88 [-1.34, -0.22]	-0.81 [-1.34, -0.22]
Unemployment ($t-1$)	-0.05 [-0.15, 0.05]	-0.04 [-0.20, 0.10]	-0.08 [-0.23, 0.07]	-0.06 [-0.16, 0.04]	-0.04 [-0.14, 0.06]	-0.04 [-0.15, 0.06]	-0.05 [-0.15, 0.05]	-0.05 [-0.15, 0.05]	-0.06 [-0.16, 0.04]
ΔUnemployment	-0.11 [-0.21, -0.01]	-0.11 [-0.27, 0.05]	-0.14 [-0.29, 0.01]	-0.11 [-0.21, -0.02]	-0.11 [-0.21, -0.01]	-0.09 [-0.18, 0.00]	-0.11 [-0.21, -0.01]	-0.11 [-0.21, -0.01]	-0.12 [-0.22, -0.02]
Foreign-born ($t-1$)	0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]	0.06 [-0.03, 0.15]	0.04 [-0.12, 0.21]	0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]	0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]	0.04 [-0.02, 0.11]	0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]	0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]	0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]
ΔForeign-born	0.05 [-0.18, 0.28]	0.01 [-0.34, 0.34]	-0.04 [-0.38, 0.33]	0.04 [-0.19, 0.28]	0.08 [-0.14, 0.31]	0.04 [-0.21, 0.27]	0.05 [-0.17, 0.27]	0.04 [-0.18, 0.26]	0.06 [-0.16, 0.28]
Competitors' Positions (min × max)	-0.03 [-0.08, 0.03]	-0.02 [-0.11, 0.08]	-0.05 [-0.15, 0.07]	-0.03 [-0.08, 0.02]	-0.02 [-0.08, 0.03]		-0.03 [-0.08, 0.03]	-0.03 [-0.08, 0.03]	-0.03 [-0.08, 0.03]
ΔPosition | Breakthrough				-0.02 [-0.15, 0.12]					
ΔPosition | Consolidation				0.07 [-0.05, 0.18]					
ΔPosition | Marginalization				0.05 [-0.10, 0.20]					
ΔPosition | No Cordon					-0.02 [-0.13, 0.09]				
ΔPosition | Cordon					0.09 [-0.01, 0.20]				
Competitive Environement: Mixed						0.20 [-0.16, 0.58]			
Competitive Environement: Liberal						0.23 [-0.30, 0.77]			
ΔPosition | Restrictive Env.						0.10 [-0.03, 0.23]			
ΔPosition | Mixed Env.						0.00 [-0.10, 0.11]			
ΔPosition | Liberal Env.						0.01 [-0.23, 0.23]			
ΔPosition × Systemic Salience							0.01 [-0.08, 0.10]		
ΔPosition × Year								0.01 [-0.00, 0.02]	
Year								0.00 [-0.02, 0.03]	
ΔPosition × Position ($t-1$)									0.02 [-0.02, 0.05]
$\sigma_{\text{parties} \times \text{elections}}$	0.0068	0.0070	0.0039	0.0068	0.0068	0.0068	0.0068	0.0068	0.0068
$\sigma_{\text{countries}}$	0.0041	0.0059	0.0051	0.0043	0.0040	0.0046	0.0041	0.0043	0.0040
$\sigma_{\text{elections}}$	0.0040	0.0042	0.0111	0.0041	0.0037	0.0031	0.0040	0.0038	0.0041
σ_{residual}	0.1198	0.1282	0.1244	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198
$N_{\text{countries}}$	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
$N_{\text{elections}}$	70	70	68	70	70	70	70	70	70
$N_{\text{parties} \times \text{elections}}$	228	111	68	228	228	228	228	228	228
$N_{\text{individuals}}$	144545	144545	140037	144545	144545	144545	144545	144545	144545
$N_{\text{parties} \times \text{individuals}}$	468539	233298	140037	468539	468539	468539	468539	468539	468539

Table 9: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for panel 2 of Fig. 2 based on $S = 5000$ simulations from $M = 5$ imputations.

	Overall	Mainstream Right	Mainstream Left	RRP Life Cycle	Cordon Sanitaire	Competitive Environment	Systemic Salience	Linear Time Trend	Past Position
Intercept	0.60 [-0.78, 2.05]	-0.67 [-2.54, 1.27]	0.77 [-1.63, 3.30]	0.65 [-0.74, 2.14]	0.58 [-0.79, 2.04]	0.32 [-0.97, 1.68]	0.60 [-0.77, 2.07]	-2.02 [-47.71, 47.04]	0.74 [-0.62, 2.18]
Position ($t-1$)	0.14 [0.06, 0.22]	0.22 [0.08, 0.36]	-0.14 [-0.41, 0.13]	0.14 [0.06, 0.22]	0.14 [0.06, 0.22]	0.14 [0.06, 0.22]	0.14 [0.06, 0.22]	0.13 [0.05, 0.21]	0.14 [0.06, 0.22]
ΔPosition	0.08 [0.01, 0.15]	0.10 [-0.02, 0.23]	-0.03 [-0.20, 0.14]				0.12 [-0.17, 0.45]	-13.47 [-28.42, 1.48]	0.08 [0.01, 0.15]
Salience ($t-1$)	-0.08 [-0.23, 0.06]	0.02 [-0.30, 0.35]	-0.47 [-0.85, -0.07]	-0.07 [-0.21, 0.07]	-0.08 [-0.22, 0.06]	-0.08 [-0.22, 0.06]	-0.08 [-0.23, 0.06]	-0.08 [-0.21, 0.07]	-0.08 [-0.23, 0.07]
ΔSalience	-0.05 [-0.19, 0.09]	0.08 [-0.21, 0.37]	-0.36 [-0.71, 0.00]	-0.04 [-0.17, 0.10]	-0.04 [-0.18, 0.09]	-0.05 [-0.19, 0.08]	-0.05 [-0.19, 0.09]	-0.05 [-0.18, 0.09]	-0.07 [-0.21, 0.07]
MSP % Votes ($t-1$)	0.03 [0.02, 0.04]	0.05 [0.03, 0.07]	0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]	0.03 [0.02, 0.04]	0.03 [0.02, 0.04]	0.03 [0.02, 0.04]	0.03 [0.02, 0.04]	0.03 [0.02, 0.04]	0.03 [0.02, 0.04]
Gov't status: in gov't	0.20 [0.00, 0.40]	0.02 [-0.38, 0.40]	0.28 [-0.17, 0.71]	0.20 [0.00, 0.39]	0.21 [0.01, 0.40]	0.19 [-0.01, 0.39]	0.20 [0.02, 0.38]	0.19 [-0.00, 0.38]	0.20 [0.00, 0.39]
Gov't status: in gov't with RRP	0.09 [-0.32, 0.47]	-0.37 [-0.92, 0.20]	0.60 [-0.76, 1.96]	0.10 [-0.30, 0.47]	0.08 [-0.31, 0.45]	0.09 [-0.28, 0.46]	0.09 [-0.31, 0.48]	0.10 [-0.27, 0.47]	0.05 [-0.36, 0.43]
Competitors' Positions (min)	-0.06 [-0.17, 0.06]	-0.21 [-0.37, -0.04]	0.01 [-0.19, 0.22]	-0.06 [-0.18, 0.06]	-0.05 [-0.17, 0.07]		-0.06 [-0.18, 0.07]	-0.07 [-0.19, 0.06]	-0.05 [-0.17, 0.07]
Competitors' Positions (max)	-0.03 [-0.16, 0.11]	0.15 [-0.06, 0.34]	0.02 [-0.23, 0.26]	-0.03 [-0.19, 0.11]	-0.03 [-0.18, 0.11]		-0.03 [-0.17, 0.11]	-0.03 [-0.17, 0.10]	-0.03 [-0.16, 0.11]
RRP % Votes ($t-1$)	-0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]	-0.07 [-0.12, -0.01]	-0.05 [-0.11, 0.01]	-0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]	-0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]	-0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]	-0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]	-0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]	-0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]
Systemic Salience	0.01 [-0.26, 0.29]	-0.26 [-0.68, 0.15]	0.45 [-0.08, 0.94]	-0.02 [-0.30, 0.26]	0.02 [-0.26, 0.29]	-0.02 [-0.28, 0.24]	0.01 [-0.26, 0.27]	-0.01 [-0.27, 0.26]	0.02 [-0.25, 0.29]
Cordon Sanitaire	-0.01 [-0.66, 0.67]	-0.19 [-1.08, 0.64]	0.13 [-0.84, 1.16]	-0.02 [-0.71, 0.68]	-0.03 [-0.71, 0.64]	-0.01 [-0.66, 0.61]	-0.01 [-0.66, 0.67]	0.01 [-0.61, 0.64]	-0.01 [-0.65, 0.66]
Phase: Consolidation	0.51 [0.01, 1.02]	0.54 [-0.12, 1.22]	0.55 [-0.21, 1.30]	0.56 [0.03, 1.09]	0.50 [-0.02, 1.03]	0.52 [-0.02, 1.06]	0.52 [-0.01, 1.06]	0.48 [-0.07, 1.03]	0.51 [-0.01, 1.04]
Phase: Marginalization	-0.93 [-1.52, -0.38]	-1.25 [-2.02, -0.47]	-1.19 [-2.01, -0.28]	-0.89 [-1.48, -0.34]	-0.92 [-1.50, -0.39]	-0.86 [-1.46, -0.36]	-0.93 [-1.54, -0.36]	-0.96 [-1.54, -0.45]	-0.87 [-1.40, -0.29]
Unemployment ($t-1$)	-0.06 [-0.15, 0.04]	-0.05 [-0.18, 0.08]	-0.05 [-0.18, 0.08]	-0.06 [-0.16, 0.03]	-0.05 [-0.14, 0.05]	-0.06 [-0.15, 0.04]	-0.06 [-0.15, 0.04]	-0.06 [-0.16, 0.03]	-0.06 [-0.16, 0.03]
ΔUnemployment	-0.11 [-0.20, -0.01]	-0.10 [-0.22, 0.03]	-0.09 [-0.22, 0.04]	-0.11 [-0.20, -0.01]	-0.10 [-0.19, -0.01]	-0.09 [-0.17, 0.00]	-0.10 [-0.19, -0.01]	-0.11 [-0.20, -0.01]	-0.11 [-0.20, -0.02]
Foreign-born ($t-1$)	0.02 [-0.05, 0.10]	0.05 [-0.05, 0.14]	0.04 [-0.11, 0.17]	0.02 [-0.06, 0.10]	0.03 [-0.05, 0.10]	0.03 [-0.04, 0.11]	0.02 [-0.05, 0.10]	0.02 [-0.05, 0.09]	0.02 [-0.05, 0.10]
ΔForeign-born	0.07 [-0.13, 0.28]	0.12 [-0.17, 0.41]	-0.04 [-0.34, 0.26]	0.08 [-0.13, 0.28]	0.10 [-0.11, 0.31]	0.06 [-0.15, 0.27]	0.08 [-0.14, 0.29]	0.07 [-0.15, 0.28]	0.09 [-0.12, 0.30]
Competitors' Positions (min × max)	-0.02 [-0.07, 0.02]	0.02 [-0.06, 0.09]	-0.02 [-0.11, 0.07]	-0.03 [-0.07, 0.02]	-0.02 [-0.07, 0.03]		-0.02 [-0.07, 0.03]	-0.02 [-0.07, 0.03]	-0.02 [-0.07, 0.03]
ΔPosition | Breakthrough				-0.01 [-0.13, 0.10]					
ΔPosition | Consolidation				0.13 [0.03, 0.22]					
ΔPosition | Marginalization				0.10 [-0.04, 0.21]					
ΔPosition | No Cordon					0.04 [-0.05, 0.14]				
ΔPosition | Cordon					0.11 [0.02, 0.20]				
Competitive Environement: Mixed						0.26 [-0.07, 0.57]			
Competitive Environement: Liberal						0.41 [-0.06, 0.90]			
ΔPosition | Restrictive Env.						0.13 [0.02, 0.24]			
ΔPosition | Mixed Env.						0.06 [-0.03, 0.14]			
ΔPosition | Liberal Env.						-0.00 [-0.18, 0.19]			
ΔPosition × Systemic Salience							0.01 [-0.06, 0.09]		
ΔPosition × Year								0.01 [-0.00, 0.01]	
Year								0.00 [-0.02, 0.02]	
ΔPosition × Position ($t-1$)									0.03 [0.00, 0.06]
$\sigma_{\text{parties}\times\text{elections}}$	0.0055	0.0058	0.0045	0.0054	0.0055	0.0055	0.0055	0.0055	0.0055
$\sigma_{\text{countries}}$	0.0042	0.0045	0.0034	0.0043	0.0042	0.0045	0.0042	0.0042	0.0041
$\sigma_{\text{elections}}$	0.0054	0.0067	0.0102	0.0056	0.0052	0.0048	0.0053	0.0052	0.0055
σ_{residual}	0.0946	0.1009	0.1003	0.0946	0.0946	0.0946	0.0946	0.0946	0.0946
$N_{\text{countries}}$	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
$N_{\text{elections}}$	70	70	68	70	70	70	70	70	70
$N_{\text{parties}\times\text{elections}}$	228	111	68	228	228	228	228	228	228
$N_{\text{individuals}}$	144545	144545	140037	144545	144545	144545	144545	144545	144545
$N_{\text{parties}\times\text{individuals}}$	468539	233298	140037	468539	468539	468539	468539	468539	468539

	Overall	Mainstream Right	Mainstream Left	RRP Life Cycle	Cordon Sanitaire	Competitive Environment	Systemic Salience	Linear Time Trend	Past Position
Intercept	-0.63 [-1.37, 0.12]	-0.95 [-2.17, 0.32]	0.12 [-1.01, 1.33]	-0.59 [-1.33, 0.18]	-0.64 [-1.37, 0.11]	-0.63 [-1.26, 0.04]	-0.61 [-1.35, 0.15]	-2.41 [-25.11, 21.54]	-0.59 [-1.33, 0.18]
Position ($t-1$)	0.11 [0.05, 0.16]	0.15 [0.05, 0.25]	-0.04 [-0.17, 0.09]	0.11 [0.05, 0.16]	0.11 [0.05, 0.16]	0.11 [0.05, 0.16]	0.10 [0.05, 0.16]	0.11 [0.05, 0.16]	0.10 [0.05, 0.16]
ΔPosition	0.04 [-0.00, 0.09]	0.10 [0.01, 0.18]	-0.06 [-0.15, 0.03]				0.10 [-0.09, 0.29]	1.78 [-8.44, 11.91]	0.04 [-0.01, 0.09]
Salience ($t-1$)	-0.04 [-0.16, 0.06]	-0.02 [-0.27, 0.22]	-0.08 [-0.27, 0.10]	-0.04 [-0.15, 0.07]	-0.05 [-0.15, 0.06]	-0.05 [-0.16, 0.05]	-0.05 [-0.15, 0.06]	-0.05 [-0.15, 0.06]	-0.04 [-0.15, 0.06]
ΔSalience	-0.01 [-0.11, 0.09]	-0.00 [-0.23, 0.21]	-0.08 [-0.26, 0.09]	-0.02 [-0.12, 0.09]	-0.02 [-0.11, 0.09]	-0.02 [-0.12, 0.08]	-0.02 [-0.11, 0.09]	-0.01 [-0.11, 0.09]	-0.02 [-0.12, 0.08]
MSP % Votes ($t-1$)	0.01 [0.01, 0.02]	0.02 [0.01, 0.04]	-0.01 [-0.03, 0.01]	0.01 [0.01, 0.02]	0.01 [0.01, 0.02]	0.01 [0.00, 0.02]	0.01 [0.01, 0.02]	0.01 [0.01, 0.02]	0.01 [0.01, 0.02]
Gov't status: in gov't	-0.04 [-0.19, 0.10]	-0.02 [-0.30, 0.26]	-0.12 [-0.35, 0.10]	-0.05 [-0.19, 0.09]	-0.05 [-0.19, 0.10]	-0.05 [-0.19, 0.10]	-0.04 [-0.19, 0.11]	-0.05 [-0.20, 0.10]	-0.04 [-0.19, 0.10]
Gov't status: in gov't with RRP	-0.10 [-0.35, 0.15]	-0.15 [-0.51, 0.19]	-0.59 [-1.27, 0.06]	-0.09 [-0.33, 0.17]	-0.10 [-0.35, 0.16]	-0.09 [-0.34, 0.18]	-0.09 [-0.34, 0.16]	-0.10 [-0.36, 0.17]	-0.11 [-0.36, 0.14]
Competitors' Positions (min)	-0.02 [-0.08, 0.04]	-0.02 [-0.12, 0.08]	0.00 [-0.10, 0.11]	-0.02 [-0.09, 0.05]	-0.02 [-0.08, 0.04]		-0.02 [-0.09, 0.05]	-0.01 [-0.09, 0.05]	-0.01 [-0.08, 0.05]
Competitors' Positions (max)	0.03 [-0.05, 0.10]	0.03 [-0.10, 0.16]	0.10 [-0.03, 0.22]	0.02 [-0.07, 0.10]	0.03 [-0.05, 0.10]		0.02 [-0.06, 0.11]	0.02 [-0.06, 0.11]	0.02 [-0.06, 0.10]
RRP % Votes ($t-1$)	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]	0.05 [0.01, 0.08]	0.02 [-0.01, 0.05]	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]
Systemic Salience	-0.13 [-0.29, 0.02]	-0.17 [-0.47, 0.13]	-0.04 [-0.28, 0.19]	-0.14 [-0.30, 0.01]	-0.14 [-0.30, 0.01]	-0.14 [-0.29, -0.00]	-0.13 [-0.29, 0.03]	-0.14 [-0.29, 0.02]	-0.13 [-0.29, 0.02]
Cordon Sanitaire	-0.07 [-0.41, 0.27]	-0.20 [-0.76, 0.31]	-0.22 [-0.64, 0.23]	-0.07 [-0.41, 0.25]	-0.05 [-0.38, 0.27]	-0.05 [-0.39, 0.27]	-0.07 [-0.40, 0.27]	-0.07 [-0.41, 0.26]	-0.08 [-0.41, 0.25]
Phase: Consolidation	-0.04 [-0.34, 0.23]	-0.16 [-0.56, 0.28]	-0.10 [-0.50, 0.30]	-0.01 [-0.26, 0.26]	0.00 [-0.25, 0.27]	-0.01 [-0.27, 0.25]	-0.04 [-0.30, 0.21]	-0.03 [-0.31, 0.22]	-0.04 [-0.28, 0.23]
Phase: Marginalization	-0.08 [-0.34, 0.21]	0.02 [-0.48, 0.53]	0.10 [-0.30, 0.51]	-0.05 [-0.33, 0.22]	-0.07 [-0.35, 0.20]	-0.10 [-0.35, 0.16]	-0.08 [-0.35, 0.20]	-0.07 [-0.35, 0.21]	-0.07 [-0.35, 0.21]
Unemployment ($t-1$)	0.01 [-0.03, 0.06]	0.01 [-0.07, 0.09]	0.02 [-0.04, 0.09]	0.01 [-0.03, 0.06]	0.01 [-0.04, 0.05]	0.01 [-0.03, 0.06]	0.02 [-0.03, 0.06]	0.01 [-0.03, 0.06]	0.01 [-0.03, 0.06]
ΔUnemployment	0.03 [-0.02, 0.07]	0.04 [-0.04, 0.12]	0.05 [-0.02, 0.11]	0.03 [-0.02, 0.07]	0.02 [-0.02, 0.07]	0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]	0.03 [-0.02, 0.07]	0.03 [-0.02, 0.07]	0.02 [-0.02, 0.07]
Foreign-born ($t-1$)	-0.01 [-0.06, 0.02]	-0.02 [-0.08, 0.05]	-0.01 [-0.07, 0.05]	-0.02 [-0.05, 0.02]	-0.02 [-0.06, 0.02]	-0.02 [-0.05, 0.02]	-0.02 [-0.05, 0.02]	-0.02 [-0.06, 0.02]	-0.02 [-0.06, 0.02]
ΔForeign-born	0.04 [-0.07, 0.15]	0.10 [-0.07, 0.27]	0.01 [-0.15, 0.17]	0.04 [-0.07, 0.15]	0.03 [-0.08, 0.13]	0.05 [-0.05, 0.16]	0.04 [-0.07, 0.14]	0.04 [-0.06, 0.15]	0.05 [-0.06, 0.15]
Competitors' Positions (min × max)	0.02 [-0.01, 0.05]	0.03 [-0.02, 0.08]	0.02 [-0.03, 0.07]	0.02 [-0.01, 0.04]	0.02 [-0.01, 0.04]		0.02 [-0.01, 0.05]	0.02 [-0.01, 0.05]	0.02 [-0.01, 0.04]
ΔPosition | Breakthrough				0.00 [-0.07, 0.08]					
ΔPosition | Consolidation				0.07 [0.01, 0.13]					
ΔPosition | Marginalization				0.03 [-0.04, 0.11]					
ΔPosition | No Cordon					0.07 [0.01, 0.14]				
ΔPosition | Cordon					0.01 [-0.05, 0.07]				
Competitive Environment: Mixed						0.00 [-0.18, 0.18]			
Competitive Environment: Liberal						0.12 [-0.15, 0.39]			
ΔPosition | Restrictive Env.						0.05 [-0.02, 0.11]			
ΔPosition | Mixed Env.						0.05 [-0.01, 0.11]			
ΔPosition | Liberal Env.						0.01 [-0.11, 0.14]			
ΔPosition × Systemic Salience							0.02 [-0.03, 0.06]		
ΔPosition × Year								-0.00 [-0.01, 0.00]	
Year								0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]	
ΔPosition × Position ($t-1$)									0.01 [-0.01, 0.03]
$\sigma_{\text{parties}\times\text{elections}}$	0.0042	0.0048	0.0013	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042
$\sigma_{\text{countries}}$	0.0000	0.0000	0.0022	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
$\sigma_{\text{elections}}$	0.0028	0.0044	0.0031	0.0028	0.0027	0.0026	0.0027	0.0029	0.0028
σ_{residual}	0.0726	0.0780	0.0728	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726
$N_{\text{countries}}$	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
$N_{\text{elections}}$	70	70	68	70	70	70	70	70	70
$N_{\text{parties}\times\text{elections}}$	228	111	68	228	228	228	228	228	228
$N_{\text{individuals}}$	144545	144545	140037	144545	144545	144545	144545	144545	144545
$N_{\text{parties}\times\text{individuals}}$	468539	233298	140037	468539	468539	468539	468539	468539	468539

Table 10: *Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for panel 2 of Fig. 2 based on $S = 5000$ simulations from $M = 5$ imputations.*

F. Robustness Checks

F.1. Alternative Measures

### Measure 1: National Identity

Figure 1: *Reprint of Fig. 2, which uses the "National Identity" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 2: Anti-Multiculturalism

Figure 2: *Robustness check using the "Multiculturalism" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 3: Immigration

Figure 3: *Robustness check using the "Immigration" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 4: Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality

Figure 4: *Robustness check using the "Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

F.2. Jackknifing across Alternative Measures (Macro)

Measure 1: National Identity

Figure 5: *Jackknifing by countries using the "National Identity" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Figure 6: *Jackknifing by elections using the "National Identity" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 2: Anti-Multiculturalism

Figure 7: *Jackknifing by countries using the "Multiculturalism" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Figure 8: *Jackknifing by elections using the "Multiculturalism" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 3: Immigration

Figure 9: *Jackknifing by countries using the "Immigration" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Figure 10: *Jackknifing by elections using the "Immigration" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 4: Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality

Figure 11: *Jackknifing by countries using the "Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Figure 12: *Jackknifing by elections using the "Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

F.3. Macro-level Findings Replicated on Subsample of the Micro-level Analysis

Measure 1: National Identity

Figure 13: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated on the same subsample as the micro-level study (70 elections, 228 mainstream parties) and using the "National Identity" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 2: Anti-Multiculturalism

Figure 14: Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated on the same subsample as the micro-level study (70 elections, 228 mainstream parties) and using the "Multiculturalism" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Measure 3: Immigration

Figure 15: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated on the same subsample as the micro-level study (70 elections, 228 mainstream parties) and using the "Immigration" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 4: Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality

Figure 16: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated on the same subsample as the micro-level study (70 elections, 228 mainstream parties) and using the "Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

F.4. Replication with Control for Public Opinion

Measure 1: National Identity

Figure 17: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated with control for public opinion on immigration (Caughey, O'Grady, and Warshaw 2019) and using the "National Identity" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 2: Anti-Multiculturalism

Figure 18: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated with control for public opinion on immigration (Caughey, O'Grady, and Warshaw 2019) and using the "Multiculturalism" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 3: Immigration

Figure 19: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated with control for public opinion on immigration (Caughey, O'Grady, and Warshaw 2019) and using the "Immigration" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 4: Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality

*Figure* 20: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated with control for public opinion on immigration (Caughey, O'Grady, and Warshaw 2019) and using the "Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

F.5. Average Mainstream Party Shifts

Note: This test looks at the *average* position shifts of all mainstream parties in a given electoral context. The units of analysis are thus elections, not party-elections. We therefore exclude all conditional specifications that involved interactions with mainstream party characteristics, i.e., the position previously held by each mainstream party, the competitive environment from the perspective of each mainstream party, and the mainstream right/left subsets.

Measure 1: National Identity

Figure 21: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated with average shifts and positions of all mainstream parties contesting the respective elections and using the "National Identity" measure described in Section B.1. Party-specific controls and interaction terms not included. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 2: Anti-Multiculturalism

Figure 22: Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated with average shifts and positions of all mainstream parties contesting the respective elections and using the "Multiculturalism" measure described in Section B.1. Party-specific controls and interaction terms not included. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Measure 3: Immigration

Figure 23: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated with average shifts and positions of all mainstream parties contesting the respective elections and using the "Immigration" measure described in Section B.1. Party-specific controls and interaction terms not included. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 4: Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality

Figure 24: Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Estimated with average shifts and positions of all mainstream parties contesting the respective elections and using the "Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality" measure described in Section B.1. Party-specific controls and interaction terms not included. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.

F.6. Replication with Main RRP Only

Note: Instead of pooling all available radical right parties within a given electoral context, this test uses the change in vote shares (macro-level) and voter transfer data (micro-level) for the electorally strongest radical right party only.

### Measure 1: National Identity

Figure 25: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Based on vote share change and voter transfer data for the strongest radical right party within each electoral context, using the "National Identity" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 2: Anti-Multiculturalism

Figure 26: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Based on vote share change and voter transfer data for the strongest radical right party within each electoral context, using the "Multiculturalism" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

Measure 3: Immigration

Figure 27: Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Based on vote share change and voter transfer data for the strongest radical right party within each electoral context, using the "Immigration" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Measure 4: Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality

Figure 28: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Based on vote share change and voter transfer data for the strongest radical right party within each electoral context, using the "Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.*

F.7. Replication across 1000 Random Subsets using One Mainstream Party Per Election at a Time

Note: Instead of stacking mainstream parties and applying fractional frequency weights to adjust for the replication of identical outcomes, these specifications explain the 108 unique changes in radical right vote shares as a function of the policy shifts of exactly one mainstream party per election. This is repeated across $S = 1000$ random samples, each composed of a different selection of one mainstream party per electoral context. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.

Measure 1: National Identity

Figure 29: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Regression of the 108 unique changes in radical right vote shares as a function of the policy shifts of exactly one mainstream party per election, repeated across $S = 1000$ random selections of one mainstream party per electoral context. Uses the "National Identity" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 2: Anti-Multiculturalism

Figure 30: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Regression of the 108 unique changes in radical right vote shares as a function of the policy shifts of exactly one mainstream party per election, repeated across $S = 1000$ random selections of one mainstream party per electoral context. Uses the "Multiculturalism" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 3: Immigration

Figure 31: *Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Regression of the 108 unique changes in radical right vote shares as a function of the policy shifts of exactly one mainstream party per election, repeated across $S = 1000$ random selections of one mainstream party per electoral context. Uses the "Immigration" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.*

Measure 4: Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality

Figure 32: Robustness check of the first column of Fig. 2. Regression of the 108 unique changes in radical right vote shares as a function of the policy shifts of exactly one mainstream party per election, repeated across $S = 1000$ random selections of one mainstream party per electoral context. Uses the "Cultural Protectionism & Traditional Morality" measure described in Section B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Statistically insignificant estimates are represented in gray, statistically significant estimates are shown in black.

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