A1 Appendix Tables and Figures

Appendix Table 1: Effect of state legislative service on career progression to Congressional candidacy and representation

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Bandwidth: 0.05				
Won state legis. seat	0.044***	0.026***	0.021**	0.010**
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)
N	8,146	8,146	8,146	8,146
R^2	0.043	0.038	0.038	0.025
Panel B: Bandwidth: 0.10				
Won state legis. seat	0.035***	0.023***	0.019***	0.008**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)
N	16,074	16,074	16,074	16,074
R^2	0.033	0.027	0.027	0.018
Panel C: Bandwidth: 0.20				
Won state legis. seat	0.036***	0.025***	0.023***	0.009***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)
N	31,657	31,657	31,657	31,657
R^2	0.031	0.024	0.025	0.017
Panel D: Bandwidth: 0.30				
Won state legis. seat	0.037***	0.026***	0.025***	0.009***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
N	45,692	45,692	45,692	45,692
R^2	0.031	0.023	0.024	0.017

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

The matching process uses a modified bigram string comparator to assess the probability that two names across the list of state legislature candidates and federal primary or general elections records are the same. On order to increase the true match rate and reduce false positives, the process takes the set of unique names in both datasets, puts all characters in upper case, jointly matches separated first and last names, and requires a match on the first letter of the last name. The matching process results in a score that ranges from zero to one indicating the share of all bigrams that match across the two sets of names. Those with a score of "1" are perfect matches and were kept, and those with a score of .7 but less than 1 were reviewed individually to assess whether the match was correct or not. This threshold

Appendix Table 2: Statistics on name matching process across state and federal elections records

Statistic at matching stage	**State to Primaries**	**State to House and Senate General**
Number unique names in State Elections Records	93,762	93,762
Number of unique names in Federal Elections Records	23,223	11,673
Number of perfect matches	3,116	2,198
Number of imperfect matches with bigram distance $\geq$.7	1,182	698
Number of imperfect matches verified as true matches	275	182
Number of imperfect matches discarded	907	516
Fraction of state candidates with match $\geq$.7	0.046	0.031
Fraction of perfect matches among match $\geq$.7	0.73	0.76
Fraction of discarded among imperfect matches	0.77	0.74

Note: This table shows statistics of the name matching process across the state legislature candidates data and the federal primary and general elections records.

for review was chosen based on the authors' prior experience matching names using similar methods, in which true matches below a score of .9 were rare. The table below characterizes the sample sizes at each stage of the process. Only a minority of records in the list of state legislature candidates were matched with a score of .7 or greater: 4.7% to primary records, and 3.2% to general elections. But of those with a score of .7 or greater, the majority were perfect matches: 70% among primary records, and 75% among general election records. The manual review of imperfect matches resulted in only a minority of potential matches being accepted as true: 78% of imperfect matches were discarded among the primary records, and 75% were discarded among the general elections records. Most of those matches kept as true resulted from slight variations in non-meaningful characters in the name string, such as spaces, hyphens, the appearance of a middle name or initial alongside the first name, or the shortening of full first or middle names names to shorter versions, nicknames, or initials. When there was ambiguity in an imperfect match, background research was undertaken to match times, places, and other available information on the potentially matched names. Even a slight degree of remaining ambiguity in the likelihood of the match resulted in discarding the match.

Appendix Table 5 contains estimations analogous to those in Table 3 using Senate primary and general election outcomes. Appendix Table 6 replicates the analysis in Table 3 using a

Appendix Table 3: Effect of state legislative service on career progression to Congressional candidacy and representation - expanded sample

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won state legis. seat	0.032***	0.023***	0.022***	0.008***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Outcome mean	0.038	0.024	0.024	0.009
Outcome s.d.	0.191	0.153	0.152	0.092
Bandwidth	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.29
N	57,528	64,860	62,270	78,030
R^2	0.032	0.024	0.024	0.016

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 4: Effect of state legislative service on career progression to Senate candidacy and representation - expanded sample

	Ever:			
	Ran for Senate primary	Won Senate primary	Ran for Senate general	Won Senate general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won state legis. seat	0.004***	0.002**	0.002***	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
DV mean, bandwidth sample	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.001
DV SD, bandwidth sample	0.082	0.059	0.058	0.029
Bandwidth	0.23	0.3	0.29	0.27
N	62,890	78,988	77,736	73,272
R^2	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.004

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

logit specification; results hold in statistical significance as well as substantive interpretation. Appendix Table 13 enters the individual components of the professionalism index separately into the specification, interacting them with the indicator for having won a close election while controlling for the main effect. Across salary, session length, and overall expenditures per legislator, each coefficient is statistically significant for each outcome with similar magnitudes in effect size.

Appendix Table 5: Effect of state legislative service on career progression to Senate candidacy and representation

	Ever:			
	Ran for Senate primary	Won Senate primary	Ran for Senate general	Won Senate general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won state legis. seat	0.005**	0.003*	0.003*	0.001*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
DV mean, bandwidth sample	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.001
DV SD, bandwidth sample	0.08	0.058	0.057	0.03
Bandwidth	0.19	0.25	0.23	0.24
N	30,325	39,449	36,248	37,674
R^2	0.009	0.007	0.007	0.005

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 6: Effect of state legislative service on career progression to Congressional candidacy (logit model)

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won state legis. seat	0.979***	1.110***	1.019***	1.340***
	(0.150)	(0.172)	(0.191)	(0.389)
N	34,316	41,628	34,178	30,939

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted.

In Table 20 we display how state legislative professionalism varies by state. Within each column of professionalism component, we include all codings for each state within our sample. For instance, Alabama was both at one point "low" and later "medium" in overall professional-

Appendix Table 7: Effect of state legislative service on career progression to Congressional candidacy and representation: Sample of candidates with a previous loss

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won state legis. seat	0.028***	0.018**	0.020***	0.009*
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)
N	7,736	7,887	8,568	9,983
R^2	0.050	0.038	0.037	0.037

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress among a sample of candidates who previously lost a state legislature election. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 8: Effect of state legislative service and term limits: Primary elections

	Ever:			
	Ran for House Primary	Ran for House Primary	Won House Primary	Won House Primary
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won	0.024	0.037***	0.012	0.026***
	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.005)
Sample:	Term Limited	Not Term Limited	Term Limited	Not Term Limited
Bandwidth	0.26	0.21	0.21	0.22
N	3,376	30,608	2,718	31,566
R^2	0.047	0.030	0.040	0.024

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but splits the sample by states with or without term limits. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 9: Effect of state legislative service and term limits: General elections

	Ever:			
	Ran for House General	Ran for House General	Won House General	Won House General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won	0.006	0.024***	0.001	0.009***
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.002)
Sample:	Term Limited	Not Term Limited	Term Limited	Not Term Limited
Bandwidth	0.22	0.19	0.22	0.17
N	2,879	27,616	2,954	24,902
R^2	0.038	0.025	0.035	0.018

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but splits the sample by states with or without term limits. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 10: Effect of state legislative service on career progression to Congressional candidacy - Upper chamber

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won state legis. seat	0.075***	0.047***	0.046***	0.019***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Bandwidth	0.24	0.2	0.22	0.26
N	9,517	7,996	8,521	10,215
R^2	0.052	0.040	0.039	0.028

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress. The sample is limited to individuals who are elected to their legislature's lower chamber only. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 11: Effect of state legislative service on career progression to Congressional candidacy - Lower chamber

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won state legis. seat	0.024***	0.017***	0.015***	0.006**
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Bandwidth	0.22	0.2	0.19	0.2
N	25,422	23,632	22,355	23,566
R^2	0.028	0.024	0.025	0.023

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress. The sample is limited to individuals who are elected to their legislature's lower chamber only. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 12: Effect of state legislative service interacted with separate professionalism components

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won	0.040***	0.028***	0.025***	0.010***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Won * salary	0.009	0.006	0.005	0.008***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Won * Sess. length	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Won * Expend.	0.008	0.007	0.007	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Bandwidth	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.2
N	32,521	39,407	32,393	29,344
R^2	0.032	0.024	0.025	0.019

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but includes an interaction with a globally unit-standardized professionalism score for the state-chamber-year based on Bowen and Greene (2014). The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 13: Effect of state legislative service interacted with state legislative professionalism

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Interaction with salary				
Interaction	0.016***	0.012***	0.011***	0.010***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Panel B: Interaction with session length				
Interaction	0.011**	0.009**	0.009**	0.006***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Panel C: Interaction with expenditures				
Interaction	0.018***	0.013***	0.013***	0.009***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
N	34,072	41,336	33,937	30,721
R^2	0.032	0.025	0.026	0.020

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but includes an interaction with a globally unit-standardized professionalism score for the state-chamber-year based on Bowen and Greene (2014). The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 14: Effect of state legislative service and ideological extremity by party, Democrats

	Ever:			
	Ran for House Primary	Won House Primary	Run for House General	Win House General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won	0.031**	0.026**	0.023*	0.008
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.005)
Ideological Extremity	0.007*	0.006	0.006	0.0005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Won x Extremity	0.007	0.012	0.010	0.005*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Bandwidth	0.21	0.19	0.2	0.21
N	4,759	4,262	4,490	4,770
R^2	0.038	0.039	0.038	0.037

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but limits the sample based on availability of CF scores for ideologically from Bonica (2019). The median year is 2002 and the data coverage is from 1990-2008. The CF scores, after taking the absolute value, have been standardized to have mean zero. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 15: Effect of state legislative service and ideological extremity by party, Republicans

	Ever:			
	Ran for House Primary	Won House Primary	Run for House General	Win House General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won	0.034**	0.034***	0.033***	0.013*
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Ideological Extremity	0.014**	0.008	0.008**	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Won x Extremity	0.005	0.012	0.010	0.009**
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Bandwidth	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.17
N	4,258	4,516	4,735	3,473
R^2	0.049	0.037	0.040	0.027

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but limits the sample based on availability of CF scores for ideologically from Bonica (2019). The median year is 2002 and the data coverage is from 1990-2008. The CF scores, after taking the absolute value, have been standardized to have mean zero. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 16: Effect of state legislative service among states with term limits

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won	0.037***	0.024***	0.023***	0.011***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Professionalism	−0.012***	−0.007*	−0.008**	−0.004**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Ever Won x Professionalism	0.009	0.006	0.006*	0.007***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Bandwidth	0.25	0.22	0.26	0.25
N	25,522	23,205	26,586	26,343
R^2	0.027	0.021	0.022	0.016

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but subsets the sample to only those states that ever adopt term limits. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the subsample and the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 17: Effect of state legislative service and revolving door restrictions by professionalism

	Ever Ran for House General	Ever Ran for House General
	(1)	(2)
Won	0.010	0.030***
	(0.007)	(0.010)
Rev. Door Restriction	0.004	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Ever Won x Rev. Door	0.010	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Bandwidth	0.18	0.26
Sample:	Low Professionalism	High Professionalism
N	3,877	6,066
R^2	0.030	0.023

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but includes an interaction with a globally unit-standardized professionalism score for the state-chamber-year based on Bowen and Greene (2014). The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. The sample is split by whether the state is a high or low professionalism legislature. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 18: Effect of state legislative service on career progression: No controls

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won state legis. seat	0.036***	0.025***	0.023***	0.009***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Outcome mean	0.035	0.021	0.022	0.008
Outcome s.d.	0.183	0.145	0.146	0.088
Bandwidth	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.2
N	34,265	41,701	34,119	30,944
R^2	0.017	0.012	0.012	0.008

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

This table reports estimates of the effect of an additional state legislative term on individuals' career progression to Congress. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table 19: Effect of state legislative service, professionalism and delegation size

	Ever:			
	Ran for House primary	Won House primary	Ran for House general	Won House general
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won	0.019***	0.013***	0.012**	−0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Delegation Size	0.002*	0.001**	0.002***	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Bandwidth	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.2
N	34,316	41,628	34,178	30,939
R^2	0.033	0.026	0.027	0.021

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but includes an interaction with a globally unit-standardized professionalism score for the state-chamber-year based on Bowen and Greene (2014) and a control for the size of the state's House delegation (time-varying). The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

ism, expenditures, and session length. In general, there is substantial cross-sectional variation in state professionalism and within-state variation in professionalism over time.

Appendix Table 20

state	Professionalism	Expenditures	Salary	Session Length
Alabama	low / med	low / med	low	low / med
Alaska	high	high	high / med	high
Arizona	high	high / med	med	high
Arkansas	low	low / med	med	low
California	high	high	high	high
Colorado	high / med	med	high / med	high
Connecticut	high / med	med	med	high
Delaware	med	low	high / med	low / med
Florida	high / med	high	high / med	low
Georgia	low / med	low / med	med	low
Hawaii	high / med	high	high / med	med
Idaho	low / med	low	low / med	med
Illinois	high	high	high	high / med
Indiana	low / med	med	med	low / med
Iowa	med	low / med	med	high
Kansas	low	low / med	low	med
Kentucky	low	med	low	low / med
Louisiana	high	high	high	high
Maine	low / med	low	low	med
Maryland	high / med	high / med	high	med
Massachusetts	high	high / med	high	high
Michigan	high	high	high	high
Minnesota	med	high / med	high	low / med
Mississippi	med	low	low / med	med
Missouri	high / med	low / med	high / med	high
Montana	low	low	low	low / med
Nebraska	med	high / med	med	high / med
Nevada	low / med	high / med	low	low / med
New Hampshire	low	low	low	low
New Jersey	high / med	high	high	low / med
New Mexico	low	low / med	low	low
New York	high	high	high	high
North Carolina	med	low / med	low / med	high / med
North Dakota	low	low	low	low
Ohio	high	high / med	high	high
Oklahoma	high / med	med	high	high / med
Oregon	med	high / med	med	med
Pennsylvania	high	high	high	high / med
Rhode Island	low / med	low / med	low / med	high / med
South Carolina	high / med	low / med	high / low / med	high
South Dakota	low	low	low	low
Tennessee	med	med	med	low / med
Texas	med	high	low / med	low / med
Utah	low	low	low	low
Vermont	low / med	low	low	high
Virginia	low / med	med	med	low
Washington	high / med	high	high / med	low / med
West Virginia	low / med	low / med	low / med	low / med
Wisconsin	high	high	high	high / med
Wyoming	low	low	low	low

Ideological extremity is now recognized as an increasingly prominent feature of U.S. subnational politics (Hall, 2015). (Hall, 2019) finds a consistent relationship between extremity and seeking state legislative office, but a remaining question is whether state legislative expe-

rience vaults ideological moderates and extremists to the national stage at the same rate. To test whether this is the case, we interact the unit-standardized absolute value of an individual candidate's extremity score (based on campaign finance (CF) scores from Bonica (2019)) with the indicator for having won the election.[28] We see that the effect of being one standard deviation more ideologically extreme increases the likelihood of ever contesting for higher office by about one third (0.009 over a main effect of 0.027). This effect is sizeable, as it means the effect of state legislative service on upward career progression for those in the upper tail of extremity are observed running up at nearly double the rate of candidates of average extremity. This finding is consistent with Hall (2019) in that more extreme legislators ultimately run for higher office; however, we highlight the fact that this is true when these legislators are as-if randomly assigned to state legislative service.[29]

Appendix Table 21: Effect of state legislative service and ideological extremity

	Ever:			
	Ran for House Primary	Won House Primary	Run for House General	Win House General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won	0.034**	0.034***	0.033***	0.013*
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Ideological Extremity	0.014**	0.008	0.008**	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Won x Extremity	0.005	0.012	0.010	0.009**
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Bandwidth	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.17
N	4,258	4,516	4,735	3,473
R^2	0.049	0.037	0.040	0.027

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: This table reports the same model specifications as in Table 3, but limits the sample based on availability of CF scores for ideologically from Bonica (2019). The median year is 2002 and the data coverage is from 1990-2008. The CF scores, after taking the absolute value, have been standardized to have mean zero. The dependent variable is equal to one if the candidate ever runs in the election listed in the column header and is zero otherwise. The sample contains all first-time state legislative elections within the optimal bandwidth based on the Calonico et al. (2019) algorithm. All regressions include state and election year fixed effects, a linear term in the election margin as well as its interaction with the indicator for having won, and the full set of candidate and election controls. Estimations are triangular kernel-weighted. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.

Figure 1 displays a plot showing the representativeness of the sample of close elections relative to the sample of all elections in our data. One concern might be that certain states are

[28]Bonica (2019) CF scores were merged with the legislative elections data used elsewhere by state, district, chamber and name. Manual checking was done to rectify multiple matches when they occurred.

[29]In Appendix Tables **??** and **??** we separate the sample by Democrat and Republican candidates and run the same model specification as Table 21. This robustness check addresses concerns with using the absolute value of common space ideological scores, which may produce measurement error when both parties are pooled together. We find effects of similar magnitude in the split sample results, though somewhat less precise due to the smaller sample. The primary conclusion remains the same.

Appendix Figure 1: Share of elections in close-won sample and full sample, by state



Note:

disproportionately represented in the sample of close elections, limiting the generalizability of the LATE estimate from the regression discontinuity. This plot makes it clear that on average states are accurately represented in the sample of close elections relative to the red dashed line (which has a slope of 1).

Figures 3(a) through 3(d) display the same empirical regression discontinuity plots as above except for Senate elections. Table 5 displays the results from the regression discontinuity on the same outcomes with the same specification as the main results in the manuscript. As both the figures and the tables show, barely winning a state legislative election have little-to-no effect on an individual's probability of later running for or winning a Senate election.

Appendix Figure 2: Regression Discontinuity Plots: Running for and winning Senate Elections



(a) Run in Senate Primary



(b) Win Senate Primary



(c) Run in Senate General



(d) Win Senate General Election

Note: These plots show empirical regression discontinuity plots on four outcomes related to running or winning Senate elections. The fitted lines are second order polynomials. The plots include 95% confidence intervals calculated from a linear regression of the raw data within the optimal bandwidths on each side of the cutoff.

To assess how the effect of state legislative service on upward candidacy changes over time, we display the mean rate of running in a house election and winning a house election by decade in Table 22. This table shows the sample average remains positive but shrinks over time, which is partly due to sample truncation as we will not have observed all candidates who ultimately run for Congress as the sample gets later. In Figure 3 we show coefficient estimates from RD regressions of the same form presented in the main analysis. However, we subset the sample by decades which necessarily restricts the sample size. Despite the smaller sample size, the coefficients remain positive and largely statistically significant. Taken together, this suggests that despite large scale changes to the political environment over time (e.g., Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Carson et al., 2019), the LATE estimate of random assignment to state legislative experience has remained the same.

Appendix Table 22: Running for higher office by decade

Decade	**Ever Run for House**	**Ever Win House Election**
1960s	0.028	0.011
1970s	0.025	0.010
1980s	0.019	0.008
1990s	0.020	0.008
2000s	0.015	0.005

Note: This table shows the mean rate of running for House on the left and the mean rate for winning a House election on the right, split by decade.

Appendix Figure 3: Effect of state legislative service by decade



(a) Ever run in House election



(b) Ever win House election

Note: This figure displays coefficient estimates from regression discontinuity specifications identical to the primary specification. The data are split by decade with the full sample estimate on top. 95% confidence intervals are included.

Figure 4 displays maps of state legislative districts (lower) and congressional districts following the 2000 census redistricting. The top map plots state districts, filling them in based on how many of the elections in our sample fall in the RD bandwidth relative to the total number of elections in our sample for that district. The darkest color indicates all elections within this time period were in the RD sample and thus competitive. In the bottom map we fill the congressional districts based on Cook-PVI, a measure of competitiveness. The darkest color districts have average Cook-PVIs of less than or equal to 2.5 in this time period, making them proverbial swing districts. These figures serve to demonstrate that there is substantial variation in where competitive state legislative districts fall – and which are in the regression

discontinuity sample – relative to congressional districts which are also competitive. This helps to alleviate concerns about the generalizability of the LATE estimate by showing that the LATE captures substantially different kinds of districts and not just districts that fall in competitive congressional districts.

Appendix Figure 4: Competitive elections in state legislative versus congressional districts



(a) State legislative districts – lower house



(b) Congressional districts

Note: Each map is constructed using shape files following the 2000 census redistricting (2001-2011). In each map, darker shaded areas indicated more competitive elections. The state legislative district lower house map on the top is missing shape files for Minnesota, Nebraska, Vermont and Massachusetts. We are missing state legislative election data for Louisiana. Shading is determined by what proportion of the total elections in our sample fall within the regression discontinuity bandwidth. On the bottom is the congressional district map, where shading is determined by Cook-PVI averaged within the 2001-2011 period. The most competitive districts have a Cook-PVI less than or equal to 2.5. We are grateful to Jason Windett for sharing state legislative district shape files.