**Appendix A. Comparative and American Examples of Populist Rhetoric During the Pandemic**


**Health Risk/Anti-Elite: Risk Reducing**

Conflict between populist leaders and the medical establishment has been central throughout the pandemic and has been fueled by disagreement about the magnitude of the health risk. Throughout the crisis, several prominent populist politicians have downplayed the risk. Brazil's President Jair Bolsonaro compared the coronavirus to a downpour that would leave most people wet and dismissed fears of contamination as "nonsense" (Guardian 2020b). In Mexico, President Andres Manuel López Obrador also downplayed the virus. "Pandemics… won't do anything to us," López Obrador stated at the beginning of the crisis (LA Times 2020).  In Belarus, president Lukashenko described of Covid-19 as "yet another psychosis" (Rodgers 2020). During the first months of the crisis, President Donald Trump consistently downplayed the severity of the Covid-19 crisis. "It's going to disappear one day. One day, it's like a miracle, it will disappear," Trump stated in a press conference on February 28, 2020 (Collinson 2020).

In their effort to minimize perceptions of the pandemic's health risk, populists also blamed other elites for exaggerating the risks. In a rally in South Carolina held in February 2020, Donald Trump referred to the pandemic as a "Democratic hoax." In a Tweet on March 29, 2020, Trump made the following accusation:

The Fake News Media and their partner, the Democrat Party is doing everything within its semi-considerable power (it used to be greater!) to inflame the CoronaVirus situation, far beyond what the facts would warrant. Surgeon General, "The risk is low to the average American."

The conflict between Trump and health policy experts over the importance of masks also minimized health risks associated with the virus. In one of the earliest public interventions following the onset of the pandemic, Trump discouraged Americans from wearing masks. "The average healthy American does NOT need to go out and buy a mask," wrote Trump on Twitter on February 29, 2020. Trump repeatedly pushed back against medical experts' recommendations to mandate the wearing of masks. "The use of a mask is voluntary, you don't have to do it," Trump asserted during a news conference in April (USA Today, 2020a). Defying recommendations from health experts, Vice President Pence, the chair of the Coronavirus task force, defied requirements to wear masks in public events (CNBC 2020). Although the President's rhetoric around mask usage became more mixed during the summer of 2020, with Trump sometimes suggesting that wearing masks is a patriotic act (Smith 2020), he retweeted a video of a woman falsely asserting that the use of masks is ineffective and that there is a cure for Covid-19 on July 27, 2020.


**Economic Risk/Anti-Elite: Risk Reducing**

A related strategy has been the effort to minimize perceptions about economic risks associated with the pandemic. In many instances, this rhetorical strategy complemented efforts to push back against lockdowns and prioritize keeping the economy open irrespective of the costs in human life. In Brazil, President Bolsonaro told workers to go back to work against the advice of his Health Minister in late March 2020, dismissing the Coronavirus as "hysteria" (Reuters 2020a; Wall Street Journal 2020). In Austria, the FPÖ opposed lockdowns as "sign of political mismanagement" (Bauer 2020). In the United States, President Trump has repeatedly downplayed the magnitude of the economic risk, praising the strength and resilience of the US economy.

In mid-April, President Trump sent a flurry of all-cap Tweets lashing out at states with strict social distancing restrictions. "LIBERATE MICHIGAN!" and "LIBERATE VIRGINIA," Trump wrote on April 17, 2020. On repeated occasions, Trump pressured governors to reopen businesses, and even cheered people who took to the streets to defy shutdown orders (USA Today 2020b). In pursuing these strategies, Trump attacked other elites (non-aligned governors) for emphasizing high economic risks associated with the crisis. Other statements reinforced his claim that the economic risks associated with the pandemic are low. "Economy and jobs are growing MUCH faster than anyone (except me!) expected. Job growth is biggest in history. China Virus Mortality Rate is among the LOWEST of any country. Shaping up for a good third quarter and a great next year! NASDAQ at new record high, 401k's way up!!!!", Trump wrote on July 8, 2020.

**Health Risk/Anti-Foreign: Risk Enhancing**

But not all strategies pursued by populist politicians during the pandemic have downplayed the severity of the risks. The pandemic has presented populists with opportunities to amplify their anti-foreign rhetoric. By scapegoating foreign governments, international organizations and even migrants as causes for the pandemic, populist leaders have enhanced perceptions of economic and health risks.

One important policy decision adopted at the beginning of the crisis was the decision to close borders. While the decision to close borders has been adopted by most countries, populist leaders have used this opportunity to embrace theories that attribute the intention to spread the virus to foreign countries or actors. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán attempted to scapegoat migrants for the origin of the virus. As the first Coronavirus patient reported in Hungary appeared to be an Iranian student, the Orbán government fell back on its anti-foreign rhetoric, claiming that "migration is responsible for the spread of the epidemic" (Inotai 2020). The government followed up on this measure, ordering Iranian foreign students into custody and preparing their deportation papers. In a speech on July 22, 2020, Németh Szilárd, Hungary's minister of defense, further elaborated the connection between migration and the Covid pandemic, noting an increase in the number of illegal migrants caught by Hungarian authorities following the pandemic's onset. According to Szilárd, migrants coming from areas with the highest risk of infection are "invited to Hungary by NGOs, Brussels and domestic actors" (Mandiner.hu 2020). In the United States, Trump restricted travel to China on January 31, 2020, within two weeks of the first confirmed case in the United States. Congratulating himself on this decision, President Trump noted on Twitter on March 2, 2020, "I closed the Country down to China many weeks ahead of what almost every one recommended."

The origin of the pandemic in Wuhan gave populists ample opportunities for scapegoating. In Italy, Lega leader Salvini shared video online about Chinese origin of virus (Drogo 2020). President Donald Trump has used a variety of terms to refer to the new virus, including Chinese virus or Wuhan virus. During his first public rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Trump referred to the virus as "Kung Flu," riffing on the name of Kung Fu, a Chinese martial artist (Coleman 2020). Undercutting reports from his national intelligence agencies, Trump went even further and affirmed that the virus originated in the Wuhan Institute of Technology (BBC 2020). Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton, a strong ally of President Donald Trump, advanced the theory that the virus originated in a scientific lab, casting doubt on the claim that the virus spread from a local food market in Wuhan, China:

Just a few miles away from that food market is China's only biosafety level four super-laboratory that researches human infectious diseases. [...] We don't have evidence that this disease originated there but because of China's duplicity and dishonesty from the beginning, we need to at least ask the question to see what the evidence says (Guardian 2020a).

By emphasizing the foreign origin of the virus, these types of messages may increase subjective perceptions of risk, as the ability of individual respondents to influence the actions of foreign hostile governments is diminished. Populist anti-foreign messages further enhance these perceptions of vulnerability, through two additional rhetorical strategies. One widely used analogy is the analogy of war. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán repeatedly used the metaphor of war planning to describe the strategies of his government (Gorondi 2020). An additional strategy deployed by populists is to invoke foreign intentionality in spreading the virus.  Speaking in front of the General Assembly of the United Nations in September, President Trump accused China of  "unleash[ing] this plague onto the world... In the earliest days of the virus, China locked down travel domestically, while allowing flights to leave China and infect the world," Trump asserted (White House 2020).

Far-right movements in other countries also embraced theories emphasizing the culpability of foreigners in intentionally spreading the pandemic. A report on the various splinter far-right movements published by the German parliament summarized the variety of theories for the sources of the virus circulating in the far-right milieu in Germany. Some of these theories alleged that the virus was a biological weapon which is likely to kill first and foremost persons with white skin. Many of the theories embraced by these far-right groups considered foreign organizations responsible for creating the virus. These included Bill Gates, Israel or the WHO (Deutscher Bundestag 2020).

**Economic Risk/Anti-Foreign: Risk Enhancing**

Other populists blamed foreigners not simply for the health costs of the pandemic but also for the economic costs, with some even going so far as to suggest the pandemic was a deliberate economic attack.

In India, prime minister Modi also used the pandemic to emphasize the economic risk that China posed to the country. In April 2020, India announced that FDI from countries with whom it shares a land border would require prior government approval to prevent "opportunistic" take-overs during the pandemic, in a move that was widely viewed as a rebuke to China (Reuters 2020b). In Spain, Vox leaders accused the government of China of trying to impose a collective tyranny on Europe (Osuna and Rama 2021). In the United States, Republic Attorney Generals in Missouri and Mississippi attempt to sue China for the economic toll of the pandemic (Schallhorn 2021).

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**Appendix B. Research Plan from Anonymized IRB Protocol**

**Protocol Title: Risk and Support for the Welfare State in an Era of Populism: Evidence from the Covid-19 Pandemic**

**Version Date: 6/3/2020**

**Note: We have italicized and bolded the section of the research plan that makes clear our a priori expectations.**

<div style="border:1px solid black; text-align:center">

SECTION IV: RESEARCH PLAN

</div>

1.    **Statement of Purpose:** State the scientific aim(s) of the study, or the hypotheses to be tested.

The recent Covid-19 pandemic has fundamentally disrupted economic activity and has resulted in over 100,000 fatalities. In the United States context, governors and media organizations have provided messaging about the pandemic that has sometimes minimized and sometimes augmented the level of health and economic risk posed by the pandemic. The goal of this study is to examine whether exposure to risk-minimizing and risk-augmenting messages changes citizens' preferences regarding policy responses and the welfare state more broadly.

2.    **Background:** Describe the background information that led to the plan for this project. **Provide references** to support the expectation of obtaining useful scientific data.

Recent conceptualizations of the welfare state recognize that it is an institution that pools risks across the population more than an institution that redistributes income across classes (Baldwin 1990; Mares 2003, 2005). An important determinant of individual-level social policy preference is exposure to risk (Rehm 2011; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger 2012).

The Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically increased the economic and health risks to which citizens are exposed in ways that could potentially increase their support for more expansive and more redistributive social policy. In particular, public health policy generates externalities that might generate particularly large shifts in support for welfare policy, even amongst those who expect to be net contributors (Carnes and Mares 2007). As a result, the literature would lead us to expect higher support for expansive and redistributive social policy as a result of Covid-19.

However, not all Americans are receiving the same messages about the risks associated with Covid-19. We started this project by qualitatively reviewing the messaging provided by governors across the United States, considering the messages provided on their web pages and in their interviews with the media. *Some governors have provided "technocratic" messaging on the economic and health risks of Covid-19, focusing on the economic and health facts to date. Other governors have created an augmented sense of risk in their messages by tying the pandemic to foreign countries. Other governors have created a diminished sense of risk by questioning the extent of the economic and health threat. The latter two types are divergent manifestations of populist politics (Muller 2016), with one emphasizing the foreign causes of the pandemic and the other undercutting elite expertise.*

*As a result of the prominence of these two forms of populist messaging in the United States in 2020, it is possible that the economic and health risks created by Covid-19 will have different effects on support for welfare policies than they would have had in another period.* One challenge in assessing whether populist messaging moderates the effects of risks on support for redistribution is that the types of individuals exposed to these messages differ systematically. To overcome this challenge, we propose a survey in which respondents are randomly assigned to the different types of messaging and then subsequently asked about their support for social policy and the welfare state.

3.       **Research Plan:** Summarize the study design and research procedures using non-technical language that can be readily understood by someone outside the discipline. If working with a Non-Government Organization (NGO) or other organization, be sure to highlight which are research-only activities and which activities would occur regardless of the research. If working with survey firms, please specify what research activities the research firm will be responsible for.

We propose a nationally representative survey of Americans in which respondents are randomly assigned to the different types of messaging and then subsequently asked about their support for social policy and the welfare state. In particular, respondents will be exposed to one of 7 frames, as indicated in Table 1 below. The columns corresponding to the typology we developed based on our qualitative review of actual messaging from American governors: technocratic messaging, populist messaging type I: threat enhancing, populist messaging type II: threat mitigating (There is also a pure control). The rows correspond to whether the respondents receive a frame about the economic or health risk posed by Covid. Note that all of these messages have been designed so that they reflect messages provided by multiple American politicians during the pandemic.

| | Technocratic messaging | Populist messaging type I: Threat enhancing | Populist messaging type II: Threat mitigating | Pure Control |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic risks | The United States is experiencing unprecedented levels of unemployment. More than 40 million Americans have filed for unemployment benefits since March. | The United States is experiencing unprecedented levels of unemployment. More than 40 million Americans have filed for unemployment benefits since March. This virus amounts to an economic attack on the United States by foreign countries. | While the current pandemic has affected the employment situation of many Americans, the economic recession has resulted from hasty decisions of different governors to close down states. There are countless jobs waiting for those willing to go back to them. | |

| Health risks | The COVID-19 virus is an extremely deadly virus that will spread extremely quickly. No medical cure exists at this time. | The COVID-19 virus is an extremely deadly virus that will spread extremely quickly. No medical cure exists at this time, as the virus is novel and is closely tied to the work of scientists in foreign labs. | While the current pandemic has affected the health of many Americans, the media has vastly exaggerated the threat of COVID-19. It is time to reduce this misinformation about health risks. | |

Respondents will be randomly assigned to each of the 7 possible frames with equal probability. After the frame, respondents will be asked "As the pandemic is unfolding, Congress is considering additional policies to mitigate the hardships associated with the crisis. We would like to hear your opinion about these policies." We will then ask them a series of questions about their support for various policy responses in the areas of unemployment, health and social insurance.

**Note: We made two slight changes in the prompts between the IRB filing in June and the survey fielding in September. We updated the unemployment numbers from 40 million to 50 million, and we substituted the specific references to governors and the media with the broader term elites.**

**Appendix C. Ethics Statement**

This study was designed to examine whether exposure to two distinct types of populist messaging alters the relationship between risk exposure and support for the welfare state demonstrated in earlier scholarship (based on previous less populist time periods). In particular, we hypothesized that populist anti-foreign messaging would augment perceptions of risk but that populist anti-elite messaging would depress perceptions of risk. We viewed an experimental manipulation as necessary to answer this question, as the types of individuals exposed to these messages differ systematically in non-experimental settings. In our study, respondents were randomly assigned to the different types of messaging, including ones hypothesized to reduce risk perceptions. As a result, *our principal ethical concern was that respondents might leave the study with a depressed sense of the risks posed by Covid-19.* Below, we describe the steps we took to mitigate this risk.

We developed the risk frames by qualitatively reviewing the messaging provided by governors across the United States on Covid-19 in the first half of 2020, considering the messages provided on their web pages and in their interviews with the media. During this review, we categorized messaging into three categories: technocratic, populist anti-foreign (risk enhancing) and populist anti-elite (risk reducing). *We developed the frames used in the experiment to be broadly reflective of a particular type of appeal as employed by American governors.* Although President Donald Trump frequently employed both types of populist appeals during this time period, we did not include his messaging in this categorization, as it is particularly extreme and frequently factually inaccurate.[1] Insofar as Trumps' messaging is an extreme case, we did not judge it prudent – from either an ethical standpoint or from the research design standpoint of trying to understand the effects of populism more broadly in the United States– to base our frames on it. This means the effects of Trump's versions of anti-foreign and anti-elite rhetoric could be larger than the effects of the frames we manipulate in our study.

In order to mitigate any possibility that respondents might leave the study with a reduced sense of the risk posed by Covid, we focused on re-setting respondents' risk assessment in the debriefing they received after the framing experiment. Respondents were debriefed on the health risks posed by Covid immediately after we measured their expressed support for social protection, reducing the possibility of respondents would not be debriefed due to attrition.

Specifically, respondents received the following debriefing message with the goal of resetting their risk levels:

"Containing the spread of COVID-19 is critically important for public health and safety. Please follow the advice of public health officials and continue to practice social distancing. You can find more information at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html"

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[1] There are parallels in the discourse used by Trump and the governors most closely allied with him, but the discourse of Trump-aligned governors was consistently less extreme than Trump's during this time period.

On the same screen, respondents were provided with both an e-mail and phone number for a research assistant and asked to contact them if they had "any questions about this research or its procedures, risks, or benefits." They were also provided an e-mail, phone number and written address for the university's IRB. We did not receive any follow-ups about the ethics of the survey instrument through either the research assistant or the IRB.[2]

Respondents were told "If you have any other comments or responses about the study, please enter them in the space below." We carefully monitored these comments for evidence that respondents' sense of risk was depressed by the survey. Of the 2000 respondents who took the survey, 7 respondents left comments that indicated they did not view Covid-19 as very risky, ranging from a comment that indicated severe misinformation ("The pandemic is fake as the CDC, a private non-government agency has announced and has recently concluded") to a factually correct comment that indicated the respondent viewed Covid-19 to be low risk ("continued closures and lockdowns will impede the ability for the population to develop immunity"). These 7 respondents were equally distributed across the 7 treatment arms (including the technocratic arms and the pure control), and so we feel confident our frames did not cause the depressed risk of these respondents.

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[2] The research assistant received one complaint that the "incentive" provided by the survey firm was slightly different than described. This issue was immediately reported to the survey firm.

**Appendix D: Instructional Manipulation Checks in Survey**

In this appendix, we discuss the attention rates in our survey as measured by Instructional Manipulation Checks (IMCs). The attention rates compare well to other nationally representative surveys in the United States.

We included two instructional manipulation checks (IMCs) to gauge respondents' attention on our survey. IMCs gauge respondents' attention to questions by providing long instructions that need to be read in full before responding, with the questions designed to lead respondents who skip portions of the instructions to give the wrong response (Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko 2009). IMCs can be used to gauge data quality and average respondent attention. They should not be used to drop respondents, which can induce unrepresentativeness in samples (Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014; Alvarez, Atkeson, Levin and Li 2019). Most survey experts recommend using multiple IMCs, as respondents who fail one may still perform well on average; Berinsky, Margolis and Sances (2014) show that respondents who pass a portion of the IMCs in their survey generate treatment effects similar to those who pass all tests. Scholars who have used screeners on nationally representative samples have reported between 38 and 76% passage rates for individual IMCs (Clifford and Jerit 2015; Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014).

We show the precise presentation of the attention checks in on survey in Figure D1 below. Our first attention check asked "People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. When processing your answers from this survey, we want to make sure that you are paying attention. To show that is the case, answer both "extremely interested" and "not interested at all" from the choices below." Respondents who chose both "extremely interested" and "not interested at all" are considered to have passed this attention check. 71 % of respondents answered both "extremely interested" and "not interested at all".

Our second IMC is a replication of one of the IMC used in Berkinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014. It asked respondent: "We would like to know a little more about your preferences. Specifically, we want to make sure that you are reading the questions that we ask. To confirm that you are, please choose both green and pink even if you prefer some other color. What is your favorite color?". Respondents who chose both green and pink are considered to have passed this attention check.[1] 72 % of respondents passed the test. This number compares favorably to the 69 % who passed this IMC in the original Berkinsky, Margolis and Sances (2014) sample.

Overall, the pass rates for our two IMCs suggest high survey attentiveness. We find that 86 % of the sample passed at least one of the IMCs, and 57 % of the sample passed both. In addition, we find that levels of attention tended to be good across partisan groups, as reported in Table D1 below.

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[1] In Berinsky, Margolis and Sances (2014), respondents were asked to select Green and Red.

Table D1. Attention Checks Pass Rate By Partisanship.

| | Passed Attention Check 1 | Passed Attention Check 2 | Passed 1 Attention Check | Passed Both Attention Checks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Independents | 82% | 78% | 93% | 67% |
| Democrats | 74% | 78% | 89% | 63% |
| Republicans | 70% | 71% | 85% | 56% |

Figure D1. Attention Check Questions on Survey



People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. When processing your answers from this survey, we want to make sure that you are paying attention. To show that is the case, answer both "extremely interested" and "not interested at all" from the choices below.

Extremely interested

Very interested

Moderately interested

Slightly interested

Not interested at all

We would like to know a little more about your preferences. Specifically, we want to make sure that you are reading the questions that we ask. To confirm that you are, please choose both green and pink even if you prefer some other color.

What is your favorite color?

Blue

Brown

Green

Orange

Pink

Purple

Red

None of the above

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**Appendix E: Supplementary Survey Caveats and Findings**

In October 2020, we conducted a supplementary online survey intended to collect additional information on the mechanism by which our treatments influenced redistributive preferences. The survey was launched on October 15th, 2020. Unfortunately, the survey firm made an error in setting up the algorithms for the sampling, returning an initial sample on October 20th, 2020 that was two thirds Republican (with Democrats and Independents making up the remaining third). When we pointed this out, the firm subsequently went back to the field to collect surveys from demographic groups that historically skew Democratic (young people, minorities), completing surveying on November 3, 2020. The final survey frame is still slightly skewed Republican, but less so than initially (47 % Republican).

In addition to this sampling issue, the final sample for the supplementary survey demonstrated significantly lower attention rates than our main survey, with particularly low attention for respondents who identified as Republican, as demonstrated in Table E1 below.  As discussed in Appendix D, we included two instructional manipulation checks in our initial survey, and we included the same two IMCs in the supplementary survey. In the initial survey, we observed that 71 % of respondents passed the first IMC and 72 % of respondents passed the second IMC, with 86 % of the sample passing at least one IMC and 57 % of the sample passing both. In contrast, in the supplementary survey, we found that 55% of respondents passed the first IMC and 62% of respondents passed the second IMC, with 73 % of the sample passing at least one IMC and 45 % of the sample passing both. The lack of attentiveness was particularly notable in the subgroup that identified as Republican, where only 47 % of respondents passed the first attention check and only 57 % of respondents passed the second attention check. Unfortunately, this group is also overrepresented in the survey, due to the sampling issue discussed in the previous paragraph.

As a result of these sampling and attention issues, we treat the results from the supplementary survey with considerable caution. In particular, observed null effects in this sample could be driven by inattention. We note that we can replicate our main results within the Democrat and Independent sample, but not within the Republican sample, which is not surprising given the extremely low attention rates in this group (Table E2 and Figure E3 below).

With these caveats, we present the results from the supplementary survey on the attitudes and beliefs triggered by our experimental prompts. In particular, we were interested in assessing the effects of the prompts on respondents' beliefs about the health and economic risk posed by the coronavirus, their attitudes towards trade and their attitudes toward immigration. We expect our experimental prompts to differentially affect respondents' beliefs about risk. We are agnostic about whether they should *also* differentially affect respondents' attitudes toward globalization, although this might suggest that the prompts also trigger concerns about thick policy positions, potentially setting off a complex relationship between these positions and attitudes toward redistribution. If the differential effect is *only* observed on beliefs about globalization, this would suggest the prompts are operating primarily by triggering thicker policy positions on globalization rather than via the hypothesized mechanism.

We measured respondents concern about health risk by asking them "How worried are you about you or someone in your household falling ill as a result of the coronavirus?" with possible responses: Not at all worried = 1, Slightly worried=2, Fairly worried=3 or Very worried =4. We measured respondents concerns about economic risk by asking them "How worried are you about your own employment situation and/or the employment situation of other members of your household? These kind of worries include concerns about the possibility of losing work or not finding work" with equivalent possible

responses. We combine these two outcomes into an aggregate measure of pandemic worry, also on a 1-4 scale.

We measured respondents' attitudes toward trade/economic integration by asking them "Now we would like to ask you a question about the relationship between the United States and other countries. Some people claim that we should expand our economic relationship with other countries, while others advocate we should reduce that relationship. What do you think we should do?" We measured anti-trade attitudes by coding possible responses as follows: Greatly expand economic relationships = 1, Somewhat expand economic relationships = 2, Current economic relationships are about right=3, Somewhat reduce economic relationships =4, and Greatly reduce economic relationships = 5.

We measured respondents' attitudes toward immigration policy by asking them "In a world after the pandemic, how should the United States approach its immigration policy?" We measured anti-immigration attitudes by coding possible responses as follows: Immigration to the United States should be strongly reduced = 1, Immigration to the United States should be reduced = 2, The immigration policy of the United States should remain unchanged =3, Immigration to the United States should be increased =4, and Immigration to the United States should be strongly increased = 5.

Figure E1 shows that prompts have differential effects on respondents' level of concern about the pandemic, largely in line with our expectations. Respondents who are exposed to the anti-foreign prompts are considerably more worried than either respondents who are exposed to the anti-elite prompts or respondents who are exposed to the technocratic prompt (p=0.054 and p=0.096 respectively). It is important to note that we present identical statistics about the pandemic in the technocratic and anti-foreign prompts and yet the anti-foreign prompt generates significantly greater concern. We expected anti-elite prompts to generate less concern than the technocratic prompt but – although average concern is estimated to be slightly lower in the anti-elite group – the difference is not statistically significant.

Figure E1.  Respondent Subjective Risk by Treatment



Average Subjective Insecurity by Treatment

In contrast, Figure E2 shows that our treatments do not generate differential effects on respondents' attitudes toward trade and immigration. For example, consider the left-hand panel of Figure E2. The Anti-Foreign prompt generates the highest anti-trade attitudes, but it does not generate significantly higher anti-trade attitudes than the technocratic prompt, the anti-elite prompts or even the pure control group. Similarly, in the right-hand panel of Figure E2, the three treatment conditions do not generate significantly different pro-immigration attitudes. In fact, the only significantly difference is between the pure control condition and the technocratic condition (p=0.096), suggesting a neutral presentation of the risks of the pandemic may increase pro-immigration attitudes.

Figure E2. Respondent Anti-Trade and Pro-Immigration Attitudes by Treatment



Table E1. Instructional Manipulation Check Pass Rates

|  | Supplementary Survey Passed Attention Check 1 | Supplementary Survey Passed Attention Check 2 | Supplementary Survey Passed 1 Attention Check | Supplementary Survey Passed Both Attention Checks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Independents | 65% | 66% | 80% | 51% |
| Democrats | 62% | 68% | 78% | 52% |
| Republicans | 47% | 57% | 67% | 37% |

Table E2. Replication of Main Results (Democrat and Independent Sample Only)

| | Shock = Health | | Shock = Economic | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.10 (0.08) | -0.04 (0.11) | -0.11 (0.08) | -0.15 (0.10) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | -0.19$^*$ (0.08) | 0.00 (0.11) | -0.20 (0.08) | -0.12 (0.10) |
| Technocratic | -0.11 (0.08) | -0.00 (0.11) | -0.11 (0.08) | -0.09 (0.10) |
| Shock | -0.22$^{**}$ (0.08) | 0.08 (0.21) | -0.06 (0.09) | -0.02 (0.16) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X Shock | | -0.21 (0.26) | | 0.13 (0.23) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | | -0.56$^*$ (0.26) | | -0.28 (0.24) |
| Technocratic X Shock | | -0.32 (0.27) | | -0.06 (0.25) |
| Constant | 3.77$^{**}$ (0.07) | 3.67$^{**}$ (0.09) | 3.71$^{**}$ (0.07) | 3.70$^{**}$ (0.08) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) – (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) | | 0.31$^+$ (0.17) p=0.061 | | 0.37$^+$ (0.19) p=0.055 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | | 0.08 (0.17) p=0.652 | | 0.14 (0.20) p=0.495 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | | -0.23 (0.18) p=0.198 | | -0.23 (0.21) p=0.268 |
| Observations | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 |
| Standard errors in parentheses $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$ | | | | |

Figure E3. Replication of Main Results (Democrat and Independent Sample Only)

**Table F1.  Correlates of Health and Employment Shocks**

|  | (1) Covid Health Shock | (2) Employment shock |
|---|---|---|
| Female | -0.03$^{+}$ | -0.06$^{**}$ |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Age | -0.01$^{**}$ | -0.01$^{**}$ |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Hispanic | 0.16$^{**}$ | 0.21$^{**}$ |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Black | 0.09$^{*}$ | 0.12$^{**}$ |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| HH Income Category | 0.00$^{**}$ | 0.00 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Trump Supporter | 0.07$^{**}$ | 0.06$^{**}$ |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| High School or Less | -0.04$^{+}$ | -0.03 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| College Degree | 0.02 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Graduate Degree | 0.12$^{**}$ | 0.10$^{**}$ |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.48$^{**}$ | 0.55$^{**}$ |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Observations | 1686 | 1686 |
| $R^2$ | 0.20 | 0.21 |

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$

**Table F2. Measuring Support for Government Protection**

| Type of Support | Question Wording |
|---|---|
| Unemployment (Coverage Extension) | Do you support a proposal to extend unemployment benefits even to people currently ineligible for unemployment insurance? These expenditures will have to be paid by higher federal taxes in the future. |
| Unemployment (Duration Extension) | Do you support a proposal to allow people to collect unemployment benefits until the pandemic is over and a vaccine is in place? It may take up to three years until scientists develop a vaccine for the new virus. These expenditures will have to be paid by higher federal taxes in the future. |
| Health (Coverage Extension) | Do you support a proposal to extend COVID hospital treatment even to people without health insurance? These expenditures will have to be paid by higher federal taxes in the future. |
| Health (Testing Extension) | Do you support a proposal to provide free COVID-19 vaccinations even to people without health insurance? These expenditures will have to be paid by higher taxes in the future. |
| Social Security (Coverage Extension) | Do you support a proposal to extend social security benefits even to people who have not previously paid social security taxes? These expenditures will have to be paid by higher taxes in the future. |
| Response choices for all questions were: 1=Strongly oppose; 2=Oppose; 3=Neither support nor oppose; 4=Support; 5=Strongly support. ||

**Table F3. Balance Statistics**

| | (1) Control | | (2) Technocratic | | (3) Antielite | | (4) Antiforeign | | Diff | Diff | Diff | Diff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | mean | sd | mean | sd | mean | sd | mean | sd | (2)-(1) | (3)-(1) | (4)-(1) | (3)-(4) |
| Female | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.54 | 0.50 | -0.04 | 0.03 | 0.03 | -0.00 |
| Age | 52.38 | 17.56 | 52.55 | 16.36 | 52.56 | 17.11 | 52.85 | 16.47 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.47 | -0.29 |
| Hispanic | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0.09 | 0.28 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.00 | -0.01 |
| Black | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0.08 | 0.26 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Income Cat. | 12.68 | 6.98 | 13.42 | 7.01 | 12.24 | 7.25 | 12.50 | 7.08 | 0.74 | -0.44 | -0.18 | -0.26 |
| Trump.Voter(2016) | 0.43 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.09* | -0.04 |
| High School (Less) | 0.17 | 0.38 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0.17 | 0.38 | -0.01 | -0.03 | 0.00 | -0.03 |
| College Degree | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.03 | -0.01 | -0.03 | 0.01 |
| Graduate Degree | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 0.44 | -0.01 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.03 |
| Health Shock | 0.30 | 0.36 | 0.29 | 0.36 | 0.30 | 0.36 | 0.30 | 0.37 | -0.02 | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 |
| Employment Shock | 0.27 | 0.40 | 0.26 | 0.37 | 0.26 | 0.35 | 0.25 | 0.34 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.01 |

$^{+} p < 0.10$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$

Figure F1. Average Support for Redistribution by Employment Risk Exposure (Alternative Cut-Off)



Note: This figure shows average support for redistribution with middle and high categories instead divided at 0.7, which represents a level at which both the individual and another family member have lost jobs (rather than 0.87, which was the break identified by the Hartigan natural break method).

Figure F2. Continuous Distribution of Economic Risk by Treatment Condition



*Note: This figure shows the continuous distribution of the economic risk variable by treatment conditions. As the treatment effects were randomly assigned, we expect similar distributions. This figure confirms this and shows substantial overlap even in the tails of the distribution.*

Table F4A. Results with Outcome Variable = Proportion Support Redistribution (3+=Supportive)

| | Shock = Health | | Shock = Economic | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) DV = Pandemic social protection | (2) DV = Pandemic social protection | (3) DV = Pandemic social protection | (4) DV = Pandemic social protection |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.08* (0.04) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.04) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.05 (0.04) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.04 (0.04) |
| Technocratic | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.06 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.04) |
| Shock | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.16* (0.08) | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.05 (0.07) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X Shock | | 0.24** (0.09) | | 0.11 (0.09) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | | 0.07 (0.09) | | 0.02 (0.09) |
| Technocratic X Shock | | 0.23* (0.09) | | 0.06 (0.09) |
| Constant | 0.76** (0.03) | 0.81** (0.03) | 0.76** (0.03) | 0.77** (0.03) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) – (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) | | 0.14* (0.06) p=0.012 | | 0.09 (0.06) p=0.122 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | | -0.01 (0.05) p=0.846 | | 0.02 (0.05) p=0.686 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | | -0.15** (0.06) p=0.009 | | -0.07 (0.06) p=0.235 |
| Observations | 1995 | 1995 | 1995 | 1995 |

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$

Table F4B. Results with Outcome Variable = Proportion Support Redistribution (Above 3=Supportive)

| | Shock = Health | | Shock = Economic | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) DV = Pandemic social protection | (2) DV = Pandemic social protection | (3) DV = Pandemic social protection | (4) DV = Pandemic social protection |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.02 | -0.08$^+$ | -0.01 | -0.04 |
| | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | -0.02 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Technocratic | 0.04 | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Shock | 0.05$^+$ | -0.11 | 0.07$^*$ | 0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.08) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X Shock | | 0.23$^*$ | | 0.11 |
| | | (0.10) | | (0.10) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | | 0.10 | | 0.00 |
| | | (0.10) | | (0.10) |
| Technocratic X Shock | | 0.22$^*$ | | 0.04 |
| | | (0.10) | | (0.09) |
| Constant | 0.61$^{**}$ | 0.66$^{**}$ | 0.60$^{**}$ | 0.61$^{**}$ |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) – (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) | | 0.10$^+$ (0.06) p=0.099 | | 0.09 (0.07) p=0.202 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | | -0.05 (0.06) p=0.402 | | -0.00 (0.06) p=0.977 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | | -0.15$^*$ (0.06) p=0.016 | | -0.09 (0.06) p=0.161 |
| Observations | 1995 | 1995 | 1995 | 1995 |
| Standard errors in parentheses $^+$ $p < 0.10$, $^*$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$ | | | | |

*Note: In these models, we have dichotomized the outcome variable, which throws away some information on respondent preferences but allows us to interpret effects as changes in the proportion of respondents supporting redistribution. Because it is not obvious how to code respondents in the middle category of the initial variable, who neither support nor oppose increasing taxes to increase social policy spending, we have dichotomized the outcome variable both ways in Table F4A (3=Supportive) and Table F4b (3=Unsupportive).*

Figure F3. Proportion Support Redistribution by Health Risk Exposure



*Note: This bar chart shows the differences in support for redistribution using the dichotomous outcome measure (with responses 3 or greater coded as supportive and less than 3 coded as non-supportive). Among those with high risk exposure, 80 percent support redistribution in anti-foreign treatment compared to 62 percent in the anti-elite treatment.*

Figure F4. Proportion Support Redistribution by Economic Risk Exposure



Note: This bar chart shows the differences in support for redistribution using the dichotomous outcome measure (with responses 3 or greater coded as supportive and less than 3 coded as non-supportive). Among those with high risk exposure, 87 percent support redistribution in anti-foreign treatment compared to 68 percent in the anti-elite treatment.

Table F5. Results Excluding Friends' Covid Exposure from Measure of Health Shock

| | Shock= Health Shock, Excluding Friends |
|---|---|
| | (1) DV = Pandemic social protection |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.18* (0.08) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | -0.12 (0.09) |
| Technocratic | -0.03 (0.09) |
| Shock | -0.42* (0.20) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X Shock | 0.88** (0.23) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | 0.36 (0.24) |
| Technocratic X Shock | 0.57* (0.24) |
| Constant | 3.55** (0.07) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) – (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) | 0.46** (0.16) p=0.004 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | 0.17 (0.16) p=0.284 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | -0.29+ (0.17) p=0.09 |
| Observations | 1995 |
| Standard errors in parentheses $^+ p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01$ | |

Table F6. Results by Sub-Group: Presidential Candidate Support

| | Group=Trump Supporter | | Group=Non-Trump Supporter | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Shock=Health | Shock=Economic | Shock=Health | Shock=Economic |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.18 | 0.07 | -0.12 | -0.14 |
| | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | -0.08 | -0.01 | -0.11 | -0.06 |
| | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Technocratic | -0.15 | 0.12 | 0.01 | -0.00 |
| | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Shock | -0.17 | 0.40 | -0.37 | -0.29 |
| | (0.28) | (0.40) | (0.27) | (0.21) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X Shock | 1.01$^{**}$ | 0.33 | 0.31 | 0.45 |
| | (0.32) | (0.44) | (0.32) | (0.27) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | 0.40 | 0.25 | 0.13 | -0.10 |
| | (0.34) | (0.43) | (0.34) | (0.30) |
| Technocratic X Shock | 0.90$^{**}$ | 0.10 | 0.19 | 0.29 |
| | (0.33) | (0.42) | (0.35) | (0.32) |
| Constant | 3.20$^{**}$ | 3.02$^{**}$ | 3.80$^{**}$ | 3.77$^{**}$ |
| | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) – (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) | 0.52$^{**}$ (0.19) p=0.007 | 0.17 (0.22) p=0.432 | 0.18 (0.21) p=0.401 | 0.47$^{*}$ (0.23) p=0.043 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | 0.09 (0.18) p=0.601 | 0.18 (0.20) p=0.367 | -0.01 (0.23) p=0.977 | 0.02 (0.25) p=0.939 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | -0.42$^{*}$ (0.19) p=0.027 | 0.01 (0.18) p=0.950 | -0.18 (0.25) p=0.466 | -0.45 (0.28) p=0.104 |
| Observations | 958 | 958 | 1037 | 1037 |

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$

Table F7. Results by Sub-Group: Education

| | Group=Highly Educated | | Group=Less Educated | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Shock=Health | Shock=Economic | Shock=Health | Shock=Economic |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.25[+] | -0.07 | -0.22 | -0.10 |
| | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.14) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | -0.19 | -0.04 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Technocratic | -0.05 | 0.14 | -0.06 | 0.03 |
| | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.16) | (0.15) |
| Shock | -0.30 | 0.13 | -0.48[+] | -0.10 |
| | (0.28) | (0.26) | (0.28) | (0.36) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X Shock | 0.84** | 0.42 | 0.62[+] | 0.22 |
| | (0.32) | (0.31) | (0.35) | (0.41) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | 0.46 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| | (0.34) | (0.31) | (0.39) | (0.47) |
| Technocratic X Shock | 0.55 | 0.02 | 0.47 | 0.16 |
| | (0.34) | (0.31) | (0.39) | (0.47) |
| Constant | 3.58** | 3.44** | 3.49** | 3.39** |
| | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) – (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) | 0.32[+] (0.18) p=0.077 | 0.34[+] (0.20) p=0.086 | 0.38 (0.28) p=0.181 | 0.05 (0.32) p=0.879 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | 0.08 (0.18) p=0.648 | 0.20 (0.20) p=0.304 | -0.00 (0.284) p=0.996 | -0.08 (0.33) p=0.813 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | -0.24 (0.20) p=0.231 | -0.14 (0.20) p=0.480 | -0.38 (0.32) p=0.234 | -0.13 (0.38) p=0.741 |
| Observations | 919 | 919 | 766 | 766 |
| Standard errors in parentheses [+] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ | | | | |

Table F8. Results by Sub-Group: Income

| | Group=High Income | | Group=Low Income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Shock=Health | Shock=Economic | Shock=Health | Shock=Economic |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection | DV = Pandemic social protection |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.35* | -0.02 | -0.12 | -0.10 |
| | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | -0.26+ | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.06 |
| | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| Technocratic | -0.15 | 0.12 | -0.00 | 0.04 |
| | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.12) |
| Shock | -0.44+ | 0.39+ | -0.27 | -0.30 |
| | (0.26) | (0.21) | (0.29) | (0.23) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X Shock | 0.94** | 0.05 | 0.70* | 0.74** |
| | (0.31) | (0.28) | (0.33) | (0.28) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | 0.60+ | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.21 |
| | (0.32) | (0.31) | (0.35) | (0.32) |
| Technocratic X Shock | 0.72* | -0.09 | 0.36 | 0.20 |
| | (0.31) | (0.26) | (0.37) | (0.34) |
| Constant | 3.64** | 3.38** | 3.49** | 3.48** |
| | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.09) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) – (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) | 0.26 (0.18) p=0.163 | 0.20 (0.23) p=0.392 | 0.69** (0.22) p=0.002 | 0.49* (0.24) p=0.039 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | 0.03 (0.18) p=0.871 | 0.00 (0.20) p=0.996 | 0.23 (0.23) p=0.313 | 0.40 (0.27) p=0.135 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | -0.23 (0.19) p=0.228 | -0.20 (0.22) p=0.359 | -0.46+ (0.26) p=0.070 | -0.09 (0.30) p=0.762 |
| Observations | 1056 | 1056 | 939 | 939 |

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table F9. Results by Sub-Groups: Support Republicans and Support Democrats

| | Group=Support Republicans | | Group=Support Democrats | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Shock=Health | Shock=Economic | Shock=Health | Shock=Economic |
| | (1) DV = Pandemic social protection | (2) DV = Pandemic social protection | (3) DV = Pandemic social protection | (4) DV = Pandemic social protection |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.07 (0.20) | 0.19 (0.18) | -0.12 (0.14) | -0.01 (0.14) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | 0.17 (0.20) | 0.31 (0.19) | -0.00 (0.14) | -0.01 (0.14) |
| Technocratic | 0.05 (0.21) | 0.29 (0.18) | -0.08 (0.14) | -0.05 (0.14) |
| Shock | -0.29 (0.39) | 0.11 (0.39) | -0.76$^{**}$ (0.27) | -0.62$^{**}$ (0.18) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X Shock | 1.27$^{**}$ (0.42) | 0.69 (0.43) | 0.86$^{**}$ (0.32) | 0.67$^{**}$ (0.24) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | 0.50 (0.44) | 0.13 (0.47) | 0.25 (0.34) | 0.30 (0.27) |
| Technocratic X Shock | 1.10$^{*}$ (0.44) | 0.48 (0.42) | 0.60$^{+}$ (0.34) | 0.61$^{*}$ (0.24) |
| Constant | 3.09$^{**}$ (0.17) | 2.95$^{**}$ (0.16) | 4.05$^{**}$ (0.11) | 3.96$^{**}$ (0.11) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) – (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) | 0.52$^{*}$ (0.21) p=0.014 | 0.44$^{+}$ (0.24) p=0.068 | 0.49$^{*}$ (0.20) p=0.016 | 0.38$^{+}$ (0.22) p=0.080 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | 0.06 (0.19) p=0.777 | 0.12 (0.19) p=0.525 | 0.21 (0.20) p=0.287 | 0.10 (0.20) p=0.604 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-Elite X Shock) - (Tech + Tech X Shock) | -0.47$^{*}$ (0.22) p=0.036 | -0.32 (0.23) p=0.157 | -0.28 (0.23) p=0.221 | -0.28 (0.22) p=0.217 |
| Observations | 666 | 666 | 721 | 721 |

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$

*Note: Respondents are coded as supporting Republicans if they said they had a lot or a great deal of trust that Republicans in Congress to act in the best interest of the public, and they are coded as supporting Democrats if they said they had a lot or great deal of trust in Democrats in Congress to act in the best interest of the public.*

# Appendix G.

## Table G1. Effects of Populist Messages on Support for Unemployment Benefits, Health Benefits and Extending Social Security

| | Shock = Health | | | Shock = Economic | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1)<br>DV =<br>Unemployment<br>Benefits | (2)<br>DV =<br>Health Benefits | (3)<br>DV =<br>Social<br>Security | (4)<br>DV =<br>Unemployment<br>Benefits | (5)<br>DV =<br>Health Benefits | (6)<br>DV =<br>Social Security |
| Populist Anti-Foreign | -0.24* | -0.22* | -0.33** | -0.11 | -0.05 | -0.23* |
| | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.12) |
| Populist Anti-Elite | -0.20+ | -0.06 | -0.17 | -0.15 | 0.03 | -0.21+ |
| | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.12) |
| Technocratic | -0.13 | -0.03 | -0.23+ | -0.04 | 0.14 | -0.17 |
| | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.12) |
| Shock | -0.17 | -0.54** | 0.14 | 0.20 | -0.13 | 0.33 |
| | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.24) | (0.26) | (0.19) | (0.26) |
| Populist Anti-Foreign X<br>Shock | 0.91** | 0.73** | 0.98** | 0.59* | 0.22 | 0.80** |
| | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.28) | (0.30) | (0.23) | (0.30) |
| Populist Anti-Elite X Shock | 0.37 | 0.25 | 0.47 | 0.24 | -0.07 | 0.74* |
| | (0.26) | (0.25) | (0.29) | (0.32) | (0.24) | (0.31) |
| Technocratic X Shock | 0.64* | 0.52* | 0.75** | 0.40 | -0.05 | 0.61* |
| | (0.27) | (0.24) | (0.29) | (0.29) | (0.24) | (0.30) |
| Constant | 3.17** | 3.96** | 2.65** | 3.06** | 3.84** | 2.60** |
| | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.10) |
| H1: (Anti-For + Anti-For X<br>Shock) – (Anti-Elite +<br>Anti-Elite X Shock) > 0 | 0.50***<br>(0.16)<br>p=0.002 | 0.33*<br>(0.15)<br>p=0.031 | 0.35*<br>(0.17)<br>p=0.045 | 0.38+<br>(0.20)<br>p=0.052 | 0.21<br>(0.17)<br>p=0.206 | 0.04<br>(0.18)<br>p=0.828 |
| H2a: (Anti-For + Anti-For<br>X Shock) – (Tech + Tech X<br>Shock) > 0 | 0.16<br>(0.16)<br>p=0.332 | 0.02<br>(0.14)<br>p=0.901 | 0.13<br>(0.18)<br>p=0.475 | 0.12<br>(0.17)<br>p=0.468 | 0.08<br>(0.17)<br>p=0.616 | 0.13<br>(0.18)<br>p=0.448 |
| H2b: (Anti-Elite + Anti-<br>Elite X Shock) – (Tech +<br>Tech X Shock) < 0 | -0.34+<br>(0.18)<br>p=0.053 | -0.31*<br>(0.16)<br>p=0.050 | -0.22<br>(0.19)<br>p=0.232 | -0.26<br>(0.19)<br>p=0.183 | -0.13<br>(0.17)<br>p=0.468 | 0.09<br>(0.19)<br>p=0.614 |
| Observations | 1995 | 1995 | 1992 | 1995 | 1995 | 1992 |

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

*Note: In Table G1, we disaggregate support for different types of social protection, considering whether our experimental messages differentially affect support for unemployment benefits, health benefits and social security expansion among risk-exposed respondents. Both unemployment benefits and health benefits are forms of social protection that directly mitigate risks related to the pandemic. In contrast, social security provides insurance against a form of risk (aging) that is not impacted by the pandemic. As a result, we might expect pandemic-related messaging to have less effect in moderating the effects of pandemic risk on demand for social security. We consistently observe higher support for redistribution among risk-exposed respondents if they received the anti-foreign treatment as compared to the anti-elite treatment, and the effect is statistically significant at conventional levels in 4 of 6 models. We also consistently observe higher support for redistribution among risk-exposed respondents if they received the anti-foreign treatment as compared to the technocratic treatment, although these differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. We observe that anti-elite messages decrease support for redistribution in all but the last model (which considers whether the treatments also affect demand for social security among respondents exposed to high employment risk); the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels in the first two models.*