

# Supplementary Material

## SM-1: Background Information for Surveys

**December 2011 Survey:** Before the survey was fielded, twelve focus groups of 7-10 members each were conducted to test reactions to the experimental prompt. One objective was to ensure that stressing Yayi's Bariba identity – when he is theoretically a Nago – would not create dissonance. When the prompt was read out loud, first with the Nago cue and second with the Bariba cue, not a single issue of dissonance was raised. Note that the prompt did not attempt to convince respondents that Yayi was a Nago or a Bariba. Instead, it highlighted one identity versus another by referring to Yayi's parents (“Born of a Bariba mother” or “Born of a Nago father”). In that way, the prompt cued respondents to one aspect of Yayi's identity, without necessarily creating a contradiction.

The survey was then fielded in December-January 2011-2012. The timing of the survey administration was ideal in two ways. First, it occurred 9 months after the presidential election, hence not at a time when ethnic identities are most salient (Eifert et al. 2010). The estimated effects captured by this survey thus likely represent a lower-bound of the true effect. Second, December is the most temperate time of year in Benin: the dry season has begun, but the difficult Harmattan winds are not yet in full swing in Cotonou, making survey sampling and administration relatively easier.

Relying on a random-walk protocol through the thirteen districts, or *arrondissements*, of Cotonou, three enumerators administered the survey experiment during four weeks in December 2011-January 2012. Landmarks were selected in each of the city's thirteen *arrondissements*. These were used as starting points in a random-walk protocol instructed to three local enumerators. Enumerators were randomly assigned to landmarks each day. The proportion of total landmarks in a given *arrondissement* did not match its population proportion. Indeed, two criteria were prioritized: first, since the survey was administered during the weekday, and residents were thus unlikely to be home, busy commercial centers were sought out; second, since the survey aimed to block randomize by a respondent's region of origin and Cotonou is located in the South, a disproportionate number of Northerners were sought out. No data exist on the distribution of the Cotonou population by residents' ethnic identity; therefore, I relied on conversations with enumerators and focus group respondents to identify those *arrondissements* with the greatest concentration of Northerners (the 5th and the 11th).

In sum, the sampling methodology used here prioritized the detection of treatment effects among various ethnic groups. The subsequent regression analysis therefore uses survey weights based on the 2002 Benin Census population proportions of Cotonou's *arrondissements*. A total 763 potential respondents were approached, and  $N = 600$  respondents were sampled, yielding a response rate of 78.64%. Table SM-1 in the Supplementary Material provides summary statistics for all variables in the analysis.

To recruit participants, enumerators read the following script: “Hello, my name is X and I work on a research project that seeks to understand social and political relations in Benin society today.

To this end, I am conducting a short survey that asks questions about economic, social, and political relations. To thank you for your participation, we offer a compensation of CFA400 at the end of the questionnaire. Furthermore, you should know that this survey remains anonymous at all times, meaning that I will never ask you for your name. Do you wish to participate?” Given that Benin’s GDP per capita in 2011 was \$802 current USD (See <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=BENIN>), this represents close to half the daily GDP per capita.

The results displayed in Tables 1 and SM-3 are robust to the following tests: (1) Twenty of the 600 surveys have been coded as problematic, in that – due to an administrative error – they did not follow the pre-determined randomization sequence for treatment assignment. When we run the analysis on a sub-sample that excludes these problematic surveys, the main results hold; (2) Fixed-effects logit models may yield biased estimators; the analysis is run on a linear model, and the results hold; (3) Results may be driven by a cluster effect: are all Bariba sampled, or all Yoruba sampled, derived from the same cluster such that they all share the same attitudes? Table SM-6 in the Supplementary Material summarizes the extent to which the Bariba and Yoruba sampled stem from a single random-walk. It indicates that this is unlikely to be the case. (4) Finally, comparing the ethnic treatments to the control condition may not sufficiently isolate the *ethnic* effect. Indeed, each treatment also cues a family relationship: to what extent are respondents reacting to a characterization of President Yayi as a son? Two responses increase our confidence that the effects are due to ethnic, rather than family cueing. First, if family – rather than ethnic – cueing were driving our observed differences in support for Yayi between control and treatment conditions, we would not expect to find heterogeneous effects between coethnic and non-coethnic respondents. Yet we do find such heterogeneous effects, casting doubt on the claim that the observed differences in support for Yayi are due to family cueing, and have no ethnic quality whatsoever. Second, a comparison of means for the two treatments across specific coethnic groups indicates that support moves in the direction expected by coethnic cueing. In the Supplementary Material, Table SM-7, support for Yayi among his coethnic Bariba is just over 88% under the (non-coethnic) Nago cue; it jumps to over 96% under the (coethnic) Bariba cue. Similarly, support for Yayi among his coethnic Yoruba is 54% under the Bariba (non-coethnic) cue; it jumps to just over 74% under the Nago (coethnic) cue. The small sample sizes preclude statistically significant results, but these jumps in support are what we would expect by coethnic cueing. If family cueing were doing the work, we would need an explanation for why allusions to Yayi’s father increase support among the Yoruba but decrease support among the Bariba, when both ethnic groups are patrilineal. The only way these patterns make sense is if we allow ethnic cueing to play a role.

**August 2012 Survey:** This survey also took place in Cotonou, but instead of over-sampling particular demographic groups, it collected a representative sample of respondents, based on the 2002 Census. Indeed, with a smaller budget, the December 2011 oversampled certain areas to ensure a large enough number of Northerners would be sampled. But the August 2012 survey, with a larger budget and sample size, sampled proportionally to the 2002 Census. Landmarks were chosen across Cotonou’s thirteen districts, in proportion to the population distribution of each district based on the 2002 Census. Random-walk instructions were generated via random-number generator, and randomly assigned to enumerators. A total 1,126 people were

approached and a total N=1,104 completed the survey, for a response rate of 98%. Higher response rates in 2012 are due to the fact that compensation in the August 2012 survey was 2.5 times greater than compensation in the December 2011 survey – and, in both cases, potential participants were told how much they would be compensated at the beginning of the interaction.

Table SM-1: Summary Statistics for 2011 Survey

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
Male	0.500	0.500	0	1	600
Muslim	0.413	0.493	0	1	600
Christian	0.440	0.497	0	1	600
Animist	0.138	0.346	0	1	600
Religiosity	3.594	0.678	1	4	588
Years in Cotonou	13.996	11.114	0.008	62	599
Without Food	1.306	0.688	1	5	599
Car	0.728	0.445	0	1	600
Education	4.062	1.976	0	7	600
Enumerator 1	0.333	0.472	0	1	600
Enumerator 2	0.333	0.472	0	1	600
Enumerator 3	0.333	0.472	0	1	600
Control	0.333	0.472	0	1	600
Bariba cue	0.337	0.473	0	1	600
Nago cue	0.330	0.471	0	1	600
Bariba respondents	0.135	0.342	0	1	599
Yoruba/Nago respondents	0.154	0.361	0	1	599
Non Co-ethnic respondents	0.710	0.454	0	1	600

*Notes:* *Male* is a binary variable that captures the proportion of male respondents in the sample. *Muslim* is a binary variable that captures the proportion of Muslim respondents in the sample. *Christian* is a binary variable that captures the proportion of Christian respondents in the sample. *Animist* is a binary variable that captures the proportion of Animist respondents in the sample. *Religiosity* is an ordinal variable ranging from “1” (Religion has no importance in the respondent’s life) to “4” (Religion has a lot of importance in the respondent’s life). *Years in Cotonou* counts the number of years the respondent has lived in Cotonou. *Without Food* is an ordinal variable ranging from “1” (the respondent has never gone without food in the past month) to “5” (the respondent has always gone without food in the past month). *Car* is a binary variable that captures the proportion of respondents in the sample who own a car or a motorcycle. *Education* is an ordinal variable ranging from “0” (the respondent has had zero years of education, formal or informal) to “7” (the respondent has completed university education). *Enumerator 1*, *Enumerator 2*, and *Enumerator 3* are enumerator dummies. *Control*, *Bariba cue* and *Nago cue* capture the three treatment conditions. *Bariba respondents*, *Yoruba/Nago respondents*, *Non Co-ethnic respondents* capture, respectively, members of the Bariba and Yoruba co-ethnic groups, and of ethnic groups that are not co-ethnic with President Yayi.

Table SM-2: Balance Tests of the 2011 Survey

Pre-treatment variable	Control	Bariba	Nago	Bariba-Control	Nago-Control
Male	49.00	47.52	53.54	-1.48	4.54
Muslim	44.50	41.58	37.88	-2.92	-6.62
Christian	41.00	42.08	48.99	1.08	7.99
Animist	14.50	14.36	12.63	-0.14	-1.87
Religiosity	3.62	3.61	3.55	-0.01	-0.08
Years in Cotonou	13.15	14.12	14.72	0.97	1.57
Without Food	1.30	1.25	1.37	-0.05	0.07
Car	70.00	77.23	71.21	7.23	1.21
Education	3.97	4.42	3.79	0.45*	-0.18
Enumerator 1	36.50	25.74	37.88	-10.76*	1.38
Enumerator 2	34.00	35.64	30.30	1.64	-3.70
Enumerator 3	29.50	38.61	31.82	9.11^	2.32

Notes: ^, \* and \*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.

Table SM-3: Average treatment effects on Yayi vote, regression analysis

	DV: Vote for Yayi			
	Full Sample		Coethnic Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Coethnic cue	1.012* (0.469)	1.086* (0.477)	0.933^ (0.555)	0.995^ (0.568)
Enumerator fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	599	599	173	173

*Notes:* The table above presents survey-weighted logit estimates. The dependent variable *Vote for Yayi* is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the respondent claimed that she would vote for Yayi, and “0” otherwise. *Coethnic cue* takes the value “1” if the respondent is Bariba and receives the Bariba cue or if the respondent is Yoruba and receives the Nago cue, and “0” otherwise. ^, \* and \*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. President Yayi is a Nago through his paternal line and a Bariba through his maternal line. The Nago are a sub-group of the Yoruba and are indigenous to the southeastern and central parts of the country, while the Bariba are indigenous to the northern part of the country.

Table SM-4: Average treatment effects on Yayi vote, regression analysis with pre-treatment controls

	DV: Vote for Yayi			
	Full Sample		Coethnic Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Coethnic cue	1.069* (0.477)	1.005^ (0.536)	0.965^ (0.568)	1.134^ (0.613)
Enumerator fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
All pretreatment controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	599	585	173	169

*Notes:* The table above presents survey-weighted logit estimates. The dependent variable *Vote for Yayi* is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the respondent claimed that she would vote for Yayi, and “0” otherwise. *Coethnic cue* takes the value “1” if the respondent is Bariba and receives the Bariba cue or if the respondent is Yoruba and receives the Nago cue, and “0” otherwise. The full list of pre-treatment controls includes the sex, religion, religiosity, poverty and education levels of the respondent, as well as the number of years the respondent has lived in Cotonou. ^, \* and \*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. President Yayi is a Nago through his paternal line and a Bariba through his maternal line. The Nago are a sub-group of the Yoruba and are indigenous to the southeastern and central parts of the country, while the Bariba are indigenous to the northern part of the country.

Table SM-5: Average treatment effects on Yayi vote, regression analysis on non-coethnic sample (Placebo Test)

	DV: Vote for Yayi			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Any ethnic cue	0.089 (0.365)	0.038 (0.358)	0.054 (0.355)	0.156 (0.379)
Enumerator fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education control	No	No	Yes	Yes
All pretreatment controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	425	425	425	415

*Notes:* The table above presents survey-weighted logit estimates. The dependent variable *Vote for Yayi* is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the respondent claimed that she would vote for Yayi, and “0” otherwise. *Any ethnic cue* takes the value “1” if the respondent received either the *Bariba* or the *Nago* cue, and “0” otherwise. The full list of pre-treatment controls includes the sex, religion, religiosity, poverty and education levels of the respondent, as well as the number of years the respondent has lived in Cotonou.  $\hat{\cdot}$ , \* and \*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. President Yayi is a Nago through his paternal line and a Bariba through his maternal line. The Nago are a sub-group of the Yoruba and are indigenous to the southeastern and central parts of the country, while the Bariba are indigenous to the northern part of the country.



Table SM-6: Testing the cluster effect

	Size (%) of largest proportion	
	(1)	(2)
	Bariba sample	Yoruba sample
(1) Single enumerator (3 total)	38.27	43.48
(2) Single date (20 total)	9.88	9.78
(3) Single landmark (60 total)	4.94	4.35
(4) Single district (13 total)	44.44	27.17

*Notes:* The quantities above illustrate the largest proportion (%) of sampled Bariba (column 1) and Yoruba (column 2) interviewed by a single enumerator (row 1), interviewed on a single date (row 2), drawn from a single landmark (row 3), and drawn from a single district of Cotonou (row 4).

Table SM-7: Average treatment effects for Yayi’s coethnic groups, difference-of-means

	Vote for Yayi		
	Bariba cue (a)	Nago cue (b)	Difference (b)-(a)
(1) Bariba sample	0.961 (N=23)	0.887 (N=35)	-0.074 ( $p = 0.354$ )
(2) Yoruba/Nago sample	0.540 (N=30)	0.745 (N=28)	0.205 ( $p = 0.243$ )

*Notes:* The variable *Vote for Yayi* is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the respondent claimed that she would vote for Yayi, and “0” otherwise. Tests of statistical significance are survey-weighted two-tailed t-tests. President Yayi is Nago through his paternal line and Bariba through his maternal line. The Nago are a sub-group of the Yoruba and are from the southeastern and central parts of the country. The Bariba are from the northern part of the country.

Table SM-8: Average treatment effects, difference-of-means (replication)

	Vote for Yayi		
	Control (a)	Coethnic cue (b)	Difference (b)-(a)
(1) Full sample	0.455 (N=429)	0.818 (N=44)	0.364*** ( $p = 0.000$ )
(2) Coethnic sample	0.718 (N=78)	0.818 (N=44)	0.100 ( $p = 0.220$ )
	Control (a)	Any ethnic cue (b)	Difference (b)-(a)
(3) Non-coethnic sample	0.441 (N=118)	0.373 (N=233)	-0.067 ( $p = 0.225$ )

*Notes:* The variable *Vote for Yayi* is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the respondent claimed that she would vote for Yayi, and “0” otherwise. “Coethnic cue” is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the respondent received a coethnic cue and “0” otherwise. The coethnic sample includes only Yoruba and Bariba respondents. The non-coethnic sample includes only non-Yoruba and non-Bariba respondents. President Yayi is a Nago from his paternal line and Bariba from his maternal line. The Nago are a sub-group of the Yoruba and are indigenous to the Southeastern and Central parts of the country. The Bariba are indigenous to the Northern part of the country.

Table SM-9: Average treatment effects on Yayi vote, regression analysis (replication)

	DV: Vote for Yayi			
	Full Sample		Coethnic Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Coethnic cue	1.686*** (0.403)	1.774*** (0.408)	0.570 (0.465)	0.532 (0.516)
Enumerator fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	473	473	122	111

*Notes:* The table above presents logit estimates. The dependent variable *Vote for Yayi* is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the respondent claimed that she would vote for Yayi, and “0” otherwise. *Coethnic cue* takes the value “1” if the respondent is Bariba and receives the Bariba cue or if the respondent is Yoruba and receives the Nago cue, and “0” otherwise.  $\hat{\cdot}$ , \* and \*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. President Yayi is a Nago through his paternal line and a Bariba through his maternal line. The Nago are a sub-group of the Yoruba and are indigenous to the southeastern and central parts of the country, while the Bariba are indigenous to the northern part of the country.

Table SM-10: Manipulation check: difference-of-means

Respondent knows that...	Control	Bariba Cue	Nago Cue	Bariba-Control	Nago-Control	
Yayi's mother is Bariba	46.36 (N=151)	89.27 (N=317)	46.69 (N=317)	42.92** ( $p = 0.000$ )	0.33 ( $p = 0.947$ )	
Yayi's father is Nago	66.45 (N=155)	68.35 (N=316)	92.16 (N=319)	1.90 ( $p = 0.679$ )	25.71** ( $p = 0.000$ )	
	Bar. Short	Bar. Long	Nago Short	Nago Long	Bar. (Long-Short)	Nago (Long-Short)
Yayi's mother is Bariba	89.31 (N=159)	89.24 (N=158)	46.54 (N=159)	46.84 (N=158)	-0.07 ( $p = 0.985$ )	0.29 ( $p = 0.958$ )
Yayi's father is Nago	65.41 (N=159)	71.34 (N=157)	90.00 (N=160)	94.34 (N=159)	5.93 ( $p = 0.259$ )	4.34 ( $p = 0.150$ )

*Notes:* The relevant sample size for this analysis is only  $N = 793$  because the remaining questionnaires were used for a different embedded experiment. All treatment assignments were random.

Table SM-11: Manipulation check by ethnic group

Ethnic group	Proportion (%) who know father is Nago			Proportion (%) who know mother is Bariba		
	Control	Nago Cue	Difference	Control	Bariba cue	Difference
Bariba (N=95)	100.00 (N=13)	100.00 (N=27)	0.00 (N/A)	76.92 (N=13)	87.88 (N=33)	10.96 ( $p = 0.363$ )
Yoruba (N=184)	88.00 (N=25)	89.09 (N=55)	1.09 ( $p = 0.888$ )	56.00 (N=25)	82.61 (N=46)	26.61* ( $p = 0.015$ )
Non Co-Ethnic (N=354)	58.12 (N=117)	91.98 (N=237)	33.86** ( $p = 0.000$ )	40.71 (N=113)	90.76 (N=238)	50.05** ( $p = 0.000$ )



Figure SM-1: Vote for President Yayi (2006 Elections – Run-off)




Figure SM-2: Vote for President Yayi (2011 Elections – First and only round)






Figure SM-3: Cotonou Residents on their President's Ethnic Identity (%), 2007 and 2012

*Notes:* These data are drawn from two surveys conducted in Cotonou, the economic capital of Benin, in July 2007 and again in August 2012. Survey administrators were given random-walk instructions to recruit respondents throughout the city. In 2007, the city was divided into twenty equal, arbitrarily delineated but geographically contiguous areas. A landmark was arbitrarily chosen as the approximate center of each area. Each enumerator was assigned one landmark per half-day, and instructed to return to the landmark after five random-walk iterations (e.g., after completing five questionnaires). In 2012, landmarks were chosen in proportion with the population distribution across the city's thirteen *arrondissements*, or districts. Each enumerator was again assigned one landmark per day, and instructed to return to the landmark after six random-walk iterations (e.g., after completing six questionnaires). Random-walk instructions were generated via a random-number generator. In July 2007, President Yayi had been in office for just about one year. In August 2012, President Yayi had been recently reelected, and in office for six years. In these surveys, no ethnic cueing preceded this open-ended question.

# Recommended Reporting Standards for Experiments

## Hypotheses

- What question(s) was (were) the experiment designed to address? Does coethnic cueing increase expressed political support toward a real-world political actor?
- What are the specific hypotheses to be tested?
  - A coethnic cue (“Bariba” for Bariba respondents and “Nago” for Nago/Yoruba respondents) will increase support relative to the control condition.
  - A non-coethnic cue (“Bariba” or “Nago” for respondents who are neither Bariba or Nago/Yoruba) will have no statistically discernible effect relative to the control condition.

## Subjects and Context

- Eligibility and exclusion criteria for participants: any adult Beninois citizen 18 years of age and over.
- Procedures used to recruit and select participants: see article.
- Recruitment dates defining the periods of recruitment: December 19, 2011 to January 13, 2012.
- Settings and locations where the data were collected: Cotonou, Benin.
- Response rate: see article.

## Allocation Method

- Details of the procedure used to generate the assignment sequence: A random ordering of numbers was created for each of the two blocking categories. This was programmed in R.
- Details of procedure: surveys were divided into three types (Control, Nago, Bariba) and randomly ordered. Two blocking categories (North, South) were specified.
- Evidence of random assignment: see Supplementary Material. Group assignment proportions were equal across blocks.
- Blinding: Participants were not aware of condition assignments. The enumerators administering the survey were aware of condition assignment, but had no control over it; they were handed surveys in the randomized order, and simply followed the ordering.

## Treatments

- Description of the interventions: see article.
- How and when manipulations were administered: pen-and-paper delivery.

## Results

- Outcome measures and covariates: see Table [SM-1](#).
- Which analyses were pre-specified: average treatment effects were pre-specified, though not pre-registered.
- Participant flow diagram: beyond the initial response rate, which is provided in the text, participants did not drop out and were not excluded.
- Statistical analysis: see article.
- Other information: the experiment was reviewed and certified as exempt by the IRB. The protocol was not pre-registered. Funding came from the author's home institution, which played no role in the experiment. A replication dataset will be available upon publication.