

Online Appendix

*Bridging the Partisan Divide on Immigration Policy Attitudes
through a Bipartisan Issue Area: The Case of Human
Trafficking*

A Background Literature

A.1 Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Human Trafficking

Immigration is a highly contentious feature of globalization. In the United States, only 22 percent of Americans want immigration levels to increase (Gallup 2015), while the majority of Americans view trade as beneficial, and support open trade (Saad 2014). Visible presidential candidates are rewarded in the polls for anti-immigrant positions. President Donald Trump noted that Mexican immigrants are “bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists,” and has promised to build a wall along the Mexican border (Borntrager 2015; Trump and Pence 2016). Comments like these helped Trump win both the Republican Party presidential nomination and the general election.¹ This phenomenon is true globally as well. Far-right parties in countries such as Austria, France, and Switzerland have effectively rallied voters by embracing anti-immigrant messages. Anti-immigrant concerns also compelled many citizens of the United Kingdom to vote to extricate itself from the European Union (Frayer 2016).²

Previous research on the source of negative attitudes towards immigrants have focused on the role of cultural and economic threat. With respect to the former explanation, some have argued that individuals oppose immigration due to concerns that foreigners threaten their “national identity” or their traditional “way of life” (e.g., Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008); Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990); Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong (1997); Fetzer (2000); Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007); Kinder and Kam (2010); Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sanborn (2011); McLaren (2001)). The second explanation—economic threat—has emphasized the import of economic self-interest, arguing that a principal source of apprehension about the entry of foreigners are concerns that immigrants negatively impact the local economy and/or local natives’ job prospects (e.g., Dustmann and Preston (2001); Harwood (1986); Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo (2013); Mayda (2006); Scheve and Slaughter (2001)).

Two promising levers to foster more positive immigration attitudes have had modest results at best: (1) intergroup contact and (2) interventions designed to foster empathy (Batson and Ahmad 2009). The rich work on intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954) posits that intergroup contact can increase perspective-taking and reduce intergroup prejudice. Recent research has explored whether contact could be a mechanism by which anti-immigrant sentiment could be ameliorated. Interestingly, Newman, Hartman, and Taber (2012) found that contact with immigrants can actually increase feelings of cultural threat and increase hostility toward immigrants. Given that increased empathy towards an outgroup is a mechanism by which animosity towards that outgroup can be reduced (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006), other researchers have explored whether interventions (e.g., media campaigns) to increase empathy towards immigrants could have a powerful effect on attitudes towards immigrants. Attempts to heighten empathetic connections to immigrants, however, have been found to have a polarizing effect, heightening levels of animosity towards immigrants among those who are already less approving of immigrants (Gubler, Karpowitz, Monson, and Romney 2014). A recent study has raised the potential of a third lever (Facchini, Margalit, and Nakata 2016): deploying information campaigns to share the potential social and economic benefits from immigration. A large-scale experiment in Japan, show that in some circumstances informing individuals about the benefits of immigration can induce higher levels of support of more

¹Following his first anti-immigrant comments, positive views of Trump doubled, and nearly 60 percent of Republicans had a favorable view of Trump (Craighill and Clement 2015).

²Other mainstream parties, such as the Liberals in Australia, the Conservatives in Britain, the UMP in France, and Forza Italia in Italy, have taken stances against immigration in appeals to the electorate (Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013).

lax immigration policies.

We consider a fourth lever: using a bridging frame between immigration and another issue area to alter immigration attitudes. Namely, we posit that an important issue area like combatting human trafficking that would be helped by a more open immigration policy could cultivate more positive immigration attitudes. Human trafficking is legally defined as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (Palermo Protocol 2013). Although not every human trafficking victim is an immigrant, immigration, particularly illegal immigration, is an important component of the human trafficking problem. Human trafficking often involves issues around human smuggling, unsafe migration stemming from deceptive labor agencies, temporary workers, and asylum seekers (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2013). For instance, many men and women migrate with the help of labor brokers and manpower agencies to work as domestic servants, construction workers, or other low-skill laborers due to difficult immigration laws, and subsequently face conditions indicative of forced labor such as the withholding of passports, restrictions on movement, non-payment of wages, threats, deprivation of food and sleep, and physical or sexual abuse.³

B Data Collection Description

B.1 Study 1

The survey experiment was fielded through Survey Sampling International (SSI) between February 28, 2015, through March 5, 2015 (Bonilla and Mo 2018).⁴ The experiment and relevant survey questions were inserted in a larger omnibus survey, and given to 653 respondents with the treatment randomly and blindly assigned using the Qualtrics survey platform randomization feature ($N_{control} = 344$ and $N_{treatment} = 309$).⁵ SSI is a sampling firm with a large sample of American adults. SSI maintains a large online participant sample, and targets panel members such that the respondent pool creates a census-matched sample. To help ensure a representative sample, respon-

³In Nepal, of the 800 labor recruitment agencies licensed by the Department of Labor in 2008, 220 had their licenses revoked for deceptive practices. The government also reported 400 cases filed under the Foreign Employment Act on behalf of workers for deceptive recruitment practices that may have lead to human trafficking, including 137 cases against manpower agencies (USDS 2009).

⁴The survey questionnaire can be found in the Dataverse (Bonilla and Mo 2018).

⁵Unless respondents had an item non-response in a relevant measure, they are included in analysis. This leaves a treated sample of $N = 305$ and a control sample of $N = 340$ for all relevant measures. As eight individuals dropped out of the study early, the completion response rate (APPOR RR1) for the study is 98.8%. No respondents opted out of the survey because they did not consent to the research. List-wise deletion was employed when respondents refused to respond to individual questions.

dents were also screened for general demographic information on the front end of the survey.^{6,7} Random assignment between treatment conditions was successful. When we test for balance between the experimental conditions, we see that there is no difference between the control group and the treatment group with regards to demographic characteristics (Table C.2).

While both the treatment and control condition articles are fictional, the description of trafficking resemble actual newspaper articles in print.⁸ Respondents were asked to read the article assigned to them carefully, and to check a box indicating they had done so.

B.1.1 Manipulation Check

Before analyzing treatment effects, it is important to conduct a manipulation check to assess whether the treatment had the intended effect of linking immigration with human trafficking. Namely, we leverage the following question to verify whether the treatment was successful: “If you had to say, what is the most pressing problem in the area of human trafficking?”⁹ Six response options were provided: “human rights,” “immigration,” “labor rights,” “national security,” “women’s rights,” and “other.” As designed, we find that respondents who were given the immigration treatment are five percentage points more likely to select immigration as the most pressing problem in the area of human trafficking instead of any other area ($\beta = 0.05; p = 0.04$ (one-sided test)).¹⁰

⁶We used a quota system to screen out respondents that would cause various demographic groups to become over-represented in our sample. Because of this, 35 respondents were screened out of the survey after the initial set of demographic questions, but before they had received the treatment and dependent variable questions.

⁷A summary of demographic information can be found in Table C.1 in Online Appendix C. Overall, the sample closely matches demographics found in other nationally representative surveys. The median age in our sample is 49, 51 percent of the sample is female, 77 percent of the sample is white, and the median household in our sample has an income of \$50,000-\$74,999. In the 2014 Community Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration Supplement (the CPS survey released closest to the distribution of the SSI survey), the median respondent age is 48, 52.1 percent of respondents are female, 81.3 percent of the sample identifies as white, and the median household income is between \$50,000–\$59,000. Party and religion are not found in government surveys, but can be compared with the American National Election Study 2012 Time Series data. 52.6 percent of the ANES sample identifies more with the Democratic Party, and 33.9 percent identifies more with the Republican Party. The SSI sample skews slightly more Republican compared to the ANES sample. 38.9 percent of the sample identifies more with the Democratic Party and 40.1 percent of the sample identifies more with the Republican Party. The SSI sample also contains fewer religious identifiers; 84.5 percent of the ANES sample identifies with a religion, whereas 75 percent of the SSI sample identifies with a religion.

⁸Respondents were debriefed at the end of the study. They were told that the newspaper articles were fictitious, with the caveat that all of the information contained in the articles were based on real news content.

⁹This question was asked after the human trafficking outcome measures of interest, and before the question on immigration.

¹⁰Given that all of the answer options we provided (human rights, immigration, labor rights, national security, and women’s rights) are related to human trafficking, it is not surprising that the magnitude of our manipulation check question is not substantial. A person may be more convinced that immigration is important after receipt of the treatment, but believe that women’s rights or labor rights or another one of the options we provided is more important.

Thus, there is a statistically significant difference between the frequency with which respondents in the treatment group link human trafficking and immigration, providing reassurance that the treatment condition had the intended bridging effect.

B.1.2 Measures

Complete question wordings of our key outcome measures are presented in Table B.1. All questions were coded such that higher response indicates higher levels of concerns for human trafficking and support for an increase in immigration flow. Participants’ party identification was measured through a sequence of questions, where participants were first asked: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” (response options: “Republican,” “Democrat,” “Independent,” and “Other”). Those who answered “Republican” or “Democrat” were then asked the follow-up question: “Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]?” (response options: “strong” and “not very strong”). Participants who answered the first question with either “Independent” or “Other” were subsequently asked: “Do you think of yourself as CLOSER to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?” (response options: “Republican Party,” “Neither,” and “Democratic Party”). Responses were combined to create a seven-point scale, where higher values reflect stronger identification with the Democratic Party. For our analyses, we constructed a binary party scale for the two major parties (Republican and Democrat). Here, “Strong Republicans,” “Not Very Strong Republicans,” and those who are “Closer to the Republican Party,” were coded as Republicans. Likewise, “Strong Democrats,” “Not Very Strong Democrats,” and those who are “Closer to the Democratic Party,” were coded as Democrats. We omitted individuals who identify with neither party for subgroup analyses that consider Republicans and Democrats separately.

Table B.1: Outcome Measures (Study 1)

| Question Label | Question |
|------------------|---|
| Concern | How much concern do you feel about human trafficking? Response Options: (1) Not a concern at all; (2) A little concern; (3) Some concern; (4) A lot of concern; (5) A great deal of concern |
| Problem | How big of a problem do you think human trafficking is in the United States? Response Options: (1) Not a problem at all; (2) A slight problem; (3) A moderate problem; (4) A big problem; (5) A very big problem |
| Immigration Rate | Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be... Response Options: (1) Decreased a lot; (2) Decreased a little; (3) Left the same as it is now; (4) Increased a little; and (5) Increased a lot |

B.2 Study 2

The survey experiment was fielded through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk using Qualtrics between May 4 and June 10 of 2017, resulting in a sample of 987 adults.¹¹ Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is

¹¹The survey questionnaire can be found in the Dataverse (Bonilla and Mo 2018).

a convenience sample, and as such, there are some limitations to the external validity of Study 2. Nonetheless, Mechanical Turk has become a widely used mode of experimental research in the social sciences, and results are generally found to be quite similar to more representative samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). A summary of demographic characteristics of our sample can be found in Table E.1 of Online Appendix E.¹²

Amazon has developed premium qualifications that allow us to block randomize the treatments by political ideology to respondents, as respondents identify themselves as liberal or conservative to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Thus, randomization was assigned to respondents separately by ideology using the Qualtrics survey platform randomization feature. Although party identification is not perfectly predicted by identification of liberals or conservatives, there is a very strong correlation between the two measures of partisan leanings (Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012). It follows that in our sample we find correlation between ideology and party identification to be 0.83. While not every respondent identified with a party, individuals who leaned toward a party were included as partisans, and individuals who were not close to either party were dropped from the study. This left 912 remaining respondents ($N_{Control} = 250$, $N_{Bridging} = 242$, $N_{Learning} = 247$, and $N_{Values} = 248$; $N_{Republicans} = 450$ and $N_{Democrats} = 462$).¹³ When we test for balance between the conditions, we find that there are no meaningful demographic differences by treatment condition (Table E.2 in Online Appendix E).

Between fielding Study 1 and Study 2, the 2016 presidential election campaign raised the frequency and intensity of public discourse around immigration (Bowman, O’Neil, and Sims 2016). As the Trump campaign made immigration a particularly salient and divisive topic, we included a retrospective measure of one’s support for Donald Trump in the study. We asked respondents which candidate they voted for in the 2016 election: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Jill Stein, Gary Johnson, or another candidate. The effects of the treatments are considered both with and without demographic control measures, though we included the control for whether the respondent voted for Trump in all analyses, as we find a lack of balance for support for Donald Trump across experimental conditions (Table E.2 in Online Appendix E). Each analyses is run with robust standard errors, and all regression tables can be found in Online Appendix F.

B.2.1 Experimental Conditions

The provided information in all conditions indicate that human trafficking victims are coerced and exploited, and is careful to neither specify the race or source country of victims nor make a particular category of victimization more salient (e.g., sex trafficking as opposed to labor trafficking), as both dimensions of trafficking affect public opinions (Bonilla and Mo N.d.).

To disambiguate how much of the attitude change derives from proximity to an issue individuals care about and how much derives from learning about the immigration process, we included a “learning treatment” that refers to smuggling rather than human trafficking.¹⁴ Smuggling is distinct from trafficking and involves paying someone to transport or arrange for transport across the border

¹²The median age in our sample is 38, 49.5 percent of the sample is female, 91.8 percent of the sample is white, and the median household in our sample has an income of \$50,000-\$74,999. The Mechanical Turk sample is younger, less female, more white, and has a higher income than a representative sample of American adults. This corresponds to what Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) find.

¹³Using the APPOR RR1 definition of completion rate, 100% of respondents who identified with a political party completed the survey once they opted-in.

¹⁴A bridging treatment necessarily includes some element of learning. By connecting human trafficking and immigration, respondents necessarily learn some new element of immigration. As noted

(UNODC 2017; U.S. Department of State 2006). Like traffickers, smugglers operate under illicit conditions and can also exploit immigrants; however, smugglers differ from traffickers in that they do not force their clients to perform labor—whether physical or sexual. Moreover, smugglers do not necessarily seek to exploit or deceive the individuals they are smuggling; transporting individuals who seek them out to cross a border illicitly is not equivalent to enslaving individuals. Nevertheless, while smugglers are distinct from traffickers, there are instances where smugglers can turn into traffickers (Watch 2015). The learning treatment intends to replicate what individuals might learn about the immigrant process without directly pairing immigration with the bipartisan issue of human trafficking.¹⁵ Note that smuggling is not a bipartisan issue area, as the act of smuggling is usually discussed in the context of addressing illegal immigration, a polarized issue area. As such, we can determine whether bridging changes opinions because it simply causes individuals to learn something new about immigration—that immigrants may be victims—or because the bipartisan issue of human trafficking influences attitudes on a partisan issue.

Finally, we included a treatment condition to help clarify whether the human trafficking treatment effect observed in Study 1 is simply due to an increased expression of empathy for immigrants. Feinberg and Willer (2015) demonstrate that conservatives are more likely to respond to appeals based on moral frames of loyalty and patriotism rather than liberal values of fairness. With Republicans being our proxy for individuals with negative immigration attitudes, we constructed a “values treatment” that simply seeks to generate empathy by talking about how today’s immigrants are looking to pursue the American Dream like immigrants in the past, making salient a value set that is consistent with the values of Republicans (Khazan 2017).

B.2.2 Manipulation Check

Our bridging treatment worked as intended. We asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the idea that “solving the issue human trafficking will require immigration reform.”¹⁶ We see an 11-percentage point elevation in agreement for individuals who received the bridging treatment ($p < 0.000$), a smaller 9-percentage point elevation for individuals who received the learning treatment ($p = 0.001$), and no change in agreement for those who received the values treatment ($\beta = -0.004$; $p = 0.88$).¹⁷ As predicted, individuals who received the bridging treatment message are more likely than those who received the control and the values treatment messages

elsewhere, the relationship between human trafficking and strict immigration policy is not intuitive. Even though experts agree that strict immigration policies increase chances of trafficking, this conclusion is typically not reached by non-experts (Feingold 2005). Sometimes non-trafficking experts expect harsher immigration laws to curb trafficking can be seen in recent assertions that building Trump’s proposed wall on the Mexican border will help anti-trafficking efforts; anti-trafficking experts unanimously disagree with these claims (Sperber 2017). We spell out the relationship here so that individuals understand how the issues are related. Not doing so could cause respondents to assume a relationship that leads to erroneous conclusions about the relationship.

¹⁵The valuation noted in the treatment (Table 2) for the global smuggling industry comes from IOM (2013).

¹⁶This question was asked after both the human trafficking and immigration measures of interest were asked.

¹⁷When we consider the Republican sample and Democratic Party sample separately, we observe that the bridging treatment worked as intended for both samples. The bridging treatment elevates agreement (Republicans: $\beta = 0.08$; $p = 0.04$; Democrats: $\beta = 0.11$; $p = 0.002$), the learning treatment elevates agreement (Republicans: $\beta = 0.07$, $p = 0.07$; Democrats: $\beta = 0.11$, $p = 0.001$), and the values treatment makes no difference (Republicans: $\beta = -0.02$; $p = 0.55$; Democrats:

to understand a link between trafficking and immigration policies. Individuals who received the learning treatment message also perceive a linkage between trafficking and immigration, though for Republican respondents, the detected effect narrowly misses the standard levels of significance.

B.2.3 Measures

Complete question wordings and response options of our key outcome measures in Study 2 are presented in Table B.2. Again, all questions were coded such that higher response indicates higher levels of concerns for human trafficking, and positive immigration attitudes. To consider the mechanism by which a bridging, learning, and/or values treatment impacts immigration attitudes, we consider measures of economic threat, cultural threat, and ingroup-centric beliefs (Table B.3). Economic threat was measured by asking if respondents thought that “people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out.” Cultural threat was measured by asking if America’s cultural life is enhanced or undermined by immigrants. We also investigated how ingroup-centric beliefs shift, as higher levels of ingroup-centric beliefs are shown to correspond to more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Gubler 2013). Ingroup-centric beliefs were measured through three sets of questions: negativity toward the outgroup, preference for the ingroup, and a sense of victimization by immigrants. We modified the scale to a three-question version focusing on the U.S. context as in Gubler et al. (2014). The first question measured outgroup beliefs by asking whether illegal immigrants are violent. The second question measured attitudes toward the ingroup by asking if respondents thought legal residents were better than undocumented residents. The last question was about perceptions of victimization, and assessed whether respondents believed that legal residents suffer more from illegal immigration than illegal immigrants do.

$\beta = -0.01; p = 0.85$).

Table B.2: Outcome Measures (Study 2)

| Question Label | Question |
|----------------------------|---|
| Immigration Rate | Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be... Response Options: (1) Decreased a lot; (2) Decreased a little; (3) Left the same as it is now; (4) Increased a little; and (5) Increased a lot |
| Mexican Border Wall | Do you favor or oppose building a wall along the United States border with Mexico? Response Options: (1) Strongly favor; (2) Favor; (3) Oppose; (4) Strongly oppose |
| Unaccompanied Children | As you may know, thousands of children from Central America who entered the U.S. illegally have been apprehended at the U.S. border. What do you think should happen to the unaccompanied children from Central America who have been illegally crossing the border into the U.S.? Should they be allowed to stay in the U.S. while awaiting an immigration hearing, even if it takes a long time, or should they be returned to their own country as soon as possible? Response Options: (1) Returned to own country as soon as possible; (2) Allowed to stay while awaiting an immigration hearing |
| Path to Citizenship | Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be regarding illegal immigrants currently residing in the United States? Should the government: (1) Deport all illegal immigrants; (2) Allow illegal immigrants to remain in the U.S. as guest workers for a limited time; (3) Allow illegal immigrants to become permanent residents (and eligible to apply to become U.S. citizens) if they meet criteria like learning English and paying their back taxes; Allow illegal immigrants to become permanent residents (and eligible to apply to become U.S. citizens) with no requirements |
| Illegal Immigration Policy | Do you favor or oppose Congress passing a bill to give some illegal immigrants living in the U.S. a path to legal status? Response Options: (1) Strongly oppose; (2) Oppose; (3) Favor; (4) Strongly favor |

Table B.3: Mediating Variables (Study 2)

| Question Label | Question |
|-----------------|---|
| Economic Threat | Most people who come to live in the U.S. work, pay taxes, and use health and social services. Do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out? Response Options: Sliding scale with (1) Generally take more out; (7) Generally put more in |
| Cultural Threat | Would you say that America’s cultural life is generally undermined or enhanced by people coming to live here from other countries? Response Options: Sliding scale with (1) Cultural life undermined; (7) Cultural life enhanced |
| Outgroup | In general, illegal immigrants are violent. (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Moderately disagree; (3) Slightly disagree; (4) Neither agree nor disagree; (5) Slightly agree; (6) Moderately agree; (7) Strongly agree |
| Ingroup | Legal U.S. residents are better than illegal US residents in all respects. (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Moderately disagree; (3) Slightly disagree; (4) Neither agree nor disagree; (5) Slightly agree; (6) Moderately agree; (7) Strongly agree |
| Victim | Legal residents of the U.S. have suffered more from illegal immigration than have illegal immigrants. (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Moderately disagree; (3) Slightly disagree; (4) Neither agree nor disagree; (5) Slightly agree; (6) Moderately agree; (7) Strongly agree |

C Study 1: Sample Description

C.1 Descriptive Tables

Table C.1: Summary Statistics (Study 1)

| Variable | Observations | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------|-----------------------|-----|-----|
| Concern | 653 | 4.01 | 0.91 | 1 | 5 |
| Problem | 653 | 3.71 | 0.99 | 1 | 5 |
| Immigration Rate | 650 | 1.73 | 1.22 | 1 | 5 |
| Age | 653 | 48.29 | 16.69 | 18 | 86 |
| Female | 653 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: Up to \$10,000 | 645 | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: \$10,000 to \$19,999 | 645 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: \$20,000 to \$29,999 | 645 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: \$30,000 to \$39,999 | 645 | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: \$40,000 to \$49,999 | 645 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: \$50,000 to \$74,999 | 645 | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: \$75,000 to \$99,999 | 645 | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: \$100,000 to \$149,999 | 645 | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| Income: \$150,000 or More | 645 | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| White | 653 | 0.77 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 |
| Party Identification | 645 | 3.07 | 2.02 | 0 | 6 |
| Republican | 514 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Religiosity | 653 | 0.75 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 |
| College Degree | 653 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |

Notes: Religiosity is coded 1 if a respondent identifies a religion, and 0 otherwise. Party identification is coded on a seven-point scale with higher values corresponding to identification with the Republican Party. Republican is coded 1 if a respondent identifies with the Republican Party, and 0 if a respondent identifies with the Democratic Party.

Table C.2: Balance Tests (Study 1)

| | Mean | | P-Value | |
|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| | Control (1) | Treatment (2) | (1) vs. (2) (3) | Balance (4) |
| Republican Sample | | | | |
| Age | 0.485 (0.022) | 0.463 (0.022) | 0.490 | 0.259 |
| Female | 0.452 (0.043) | 0.569 (0.046) | 0.065 | 0.162 |
| Income | 0.398 (0.024) | 0.355 (0.022) | 0.195 | 0.424 |
| White | 0.874 (0.029) | 0.862 (0.032) | 0.780 | 0.818 |
| Religiosity | 0.830 (0.032) | 0.845 (0.034) | 0.747 | 0.907 |
| College Degree | 0.474 (0.043) | 0.431 (0.046) | 0.497 | 0.553 |
| Democratic Sample | | | | |
| Age | 0.447 (0.020) | 0.391 (0.023) | 0.064 | 0.171 |
| Female | 0.503 (0.042) | 0.508 (0.046) | 0.936 | 0.977 |
| Income | 0.338 (0.023) | 0.292 (0.021) | 0.144 | 0.134 |
| White | 0.703 (0.038) | 0.653 (0.044) | 0.380 | 0.432 |
| Religiosity | 0.703 (0.038) | 0.720 (0.041) | 0.765 | 0.889 |
| College Degree | 0.517 (0.042) | 0.508 (0.046) | 0.888 | 0.989 |

Notes: Column (3) reports the p-values from a simple difference-in-means t-test for each demographic variable by experimental condition. Column (4) reports the p-values from an F-test of whether the treatment arm predicts the balance variable of interest.

C.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests

Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests shows that perceptions of the scope of the human trafficking problem is equivalent for Republicans and Democrats ($p=0.408$), and concern for human trafficking is marginally lower among Republicans ($p=0.038$); however, Republicans differ substantially from Democrats on attitudes toward immigration rates ($p < 0.000$).

D Study 1: Regression Tables

Table D.1: Concern for Human Trafficking (Study 1)

| | <i>Dependent Variable: Concern</i> | | | | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Republican Sample | | Democrat Sample | | Full Sample | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) |
| Republican | | | | | -0.07** (0.03) | -0.07** (0.03) |
| Treatment X Republican | | | | | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) |
| Age | | -0.00 (0.06) | | -0.02 (0.05) | | -0.01 (0.04) |
| Female | | 0.09*** (0.03) | | 0.05** (0.03) | | 0.07*** (0.02) |
| Income | | 0.02 (0.07) | | 0.09* (0.05) | | 0.05 (0.04) |
| White | | -0.02 (0.04) | | -0.04 (0.03) | | -0.04* (0.02) |
| Religiosity | | 0.09** (0.04) | | 0.01 (0.03) | | 0.04* (0.02) |
| College Degree | | 0.00 (0.03) | | -0.05* (0.03) | | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.72*** (0.02) | 0.62*** (0.06) | 0.79*** (0.02) | 0.79*** (0.04) | 0.79*** (0.02) | 0.75*** (0.03) |
| Observations | 251 | 251 | 263 | 263 | 514 | 514 |
| Adjusted R^2 | -0.00 | 0.03 | -0.00 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.04 |

Notes: The dependent variable is respondent's concern for human trafficking, recorded on a five-point scale. The outcome and control values are recoded so they range from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating more concern for human trafficking. Party identification is represented by *Republican*, which is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies as a Republican and 0 if the respondent identifies as a Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.2: Scope of Human Trafficking Problem (Study 1)

| | <i>Dependent Variable: Scope of Problem</i> | | | | | |
|------------------------|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Republican Sample | | Democrat Sample | | Full Sample | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) |
| Republican | | | | | -0.06* (0.03) | -0.06** (0.03) |
| Treatment X Republican | | | | | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.02 (0.04) |
| Age | | -0.07 (0.06) | | 0.00 (0.06) | | -0.03 (0.04) |
| Female | | 0.02 (0.04) | | 0.09*** (0.03) | | 0.06*** (0.02) |
| Income | | -0.04 (0.07) | | 0.03 (0.06) | | 0.00 (0.05) |
| White | | 0.09 (0.05) | | 0.00 (0.03) | | 0.03 (0.03) |
| Religiosity | | 0.06 (0.05) | | -0.01 (0.03) | | 0.02 (0.03) |
| College Degree | | -0.02 (0.03) | | -0.06* (0.03) | | -0.04* (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.64*** (0.02) | 0.56*** (0.08) | 0.70*** (0.02) | 0.68*** (0.04) | 0.70*** (0.02) | 0.67*** (0.04) |
| Observations | 251 | 251 | 263 | 263 | 645 | 645 |
| Adjusted R^2 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.02 |

Notes: The dependent variable is how much of a problem the respondents think human trafficking is, recorded on a five-point scale. The outcome and control values are recoded so they range from 0 to 1 with higher values meaning human trafficking is a greater problem. Party identification is represented by *Republican*, which is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies as a Republican and 0 if the respondent identifies as a Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table D.3: Immigration Rate (Study 1)

| | <i>Dependent Variable: Immigration Rate</i> | | | | | |
|------------------------|---|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Republican Sample | | Democrat Sample | | Full Sample | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | 0.11*** (0.04) | 0.10*** (0.04) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) |
| Republican | | | | | -0.21*** (0.04) | -0.18*** (0.03) |
| Treatment X Republican | | | | | 0.10** (0.05) | 0.13** (0.05) |
| Age | | -0.39*** (0.08) | | -0.18** (0.07) | | -0.29*** (0.06) |
| Female | | -0.03 (0.04) | | -0.08** (0.03) | | -0.05** (0.03) |
| Income | | -0.04 (0.08) | | 0.01 (0.06) | | -0.03 (0.05) |
| White | | -0.13** (0.06) | | -0.06 (0.04) | | -0.07** (0.03) |
| Religiosity | | 0.01 (0.05) | | -0.03 (0.03) | | -0.02 (0.03) |
| College Degree | | 0.02 (0.04) | | 0.09*** (0.03) | | 0.07** (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.30*** (0.03) | 0.61*** (0.08) | 0.51*** (0.02) | 0.64*** (0.05) | 0.51*** (0.02) | 0.70*** (0.04) |
| Observations | 251 | 251 | 263 | 263 | 514 | 514 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.03 | 0.16 | -0.00 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.16 |

Notes: The dependent variable is whether respondents think immigration levels should increase, remain the same, or decrease, recorded on a five-point scale. The outcome and control values are recoded so they range from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating that immigration rates should increase. Party identification is represented by *Republican*, which is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies as a Republican and 0 if the respondent identifies as a Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

E Study 2: Sample Description

E.1 Descriptive Tables

Table E.1: Summary Statistics (Study 2)

| | Observation | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|--------|--------------------|---------|---------|
| Republican Party Sample | | | | | |
| <i>Demographics</i> | | | | | |
| Age | 450 | 42.916 | 12.568 | 19 | 81 |
| Female | 450 | 0.427 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| Income | 450 | 6.191 | 3.005 | 1 | 14 |
| White | 450 | 0.918 | 0.275 | 0 | 1 |
| Religiosity | 450 | 2.018 | 1.785 | 0 | 5 |
| Voted For Trump | 450 | 0.738 | 0.440 | 0 | 1 |
| College Degree | 450 | 0.482 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| <i>Outcome Measures</i> | | | | | |
| Immigration Rate | 450 | 0.279 | 0.257 | 0 | 1 |
| Mexican Border Wall (Against) | 450 | 0.258 | 0.296 | 0 | 1 |
| Unaccompanied Children | 450 | 0.333 | 0.472 | 0 | 1 |
| Path to Citizenship | 450 | 0.369 | 0.319 | 0 | 1 |
| Illegal Immigration Policy | 450 | 0.450 | 0.318 | 0 | 1 |
| Immigration Attitudes Index (IAI) | 450 | 0.338 | 0.247 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Threat | 450 | 0.741 | 0.244 | 0 | 1 |
| Cultural Threat | 450 | 0.603 | 0.286 | 0 | 1 |
| Outgroup | 450 | 0.403 | 0.272 | 0 | 1 |
| Ingroup | 450 | 0.563 | 0.327 | 0 | 1 |
| Victim | 450 | 0.644 | 0.308 | 0 | 1 |
| Percent Victims | 450 | 22.718 | 19.508 | 0 | 100 |
| Percent Asylum Seekers | 450 | 25.229 | 20.930 | 0 | 100 |
| Concern | 450 | 0.718 | 0.261 | 0 | 1 |
| Problem | 450 | 0.668 | 0.264 | 0 | 1 |
| Democratic Party Sample | | | | | |
| <i>Demographics</i> | | | | | |
| Age | 462 | 38.634 | 12.146 | 19 | 88 |
| Female | 462 | 0.437 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Income | 462 | 5.545 | 2.835 | 1 | 14 |
| White | 462 | 0.768 | 0.422 | 0 | 1 |
| Religiosity | 462 | 0.777 | 1.353 | 0 | 5 |
| Voted For Trump | 462 | 0.032 | 0.177 | 0 | 1 |
| College Degree | 462 | 0.532 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| <i>Outcome Measures</i> | | | | | |
| Immigration Rate | 462 | 0.588 | 0.251 | 0 | 1 |
| Mexican Border Wall (Against) | 462 | 0.829 | 0.260 | 0 | 1 |
| Unaccompanied Children | 462 | 0.768 | 0.422 | 0 | 1 |
| Path to Citizenship | 462 | 0.660 | 0.231 | 0 | 1 |
| Illegal Immigration Policy | 462 | 0.794 | 0.248 | 0 | 1 |
| Immigration Attitudes Index (IAI) | 462 | 0.728 | 0.209 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Threat | 462 | 0.386 | 0.269 | 0 | 1 |
| Cultural Threat | 462 | 0.253 | 0.236 | 0 | 1 |
| Outgroup | 462 | 0.153 | 0.206 | 0 | 1 |
| Ingroup | 462 | 0.247 | 0.286 | 0 | 1 |
| Victim | 462 | 0.269 | 0.288 | 0 | 1 |
| Percent Victims | 460 | 31.800 | 22.720 | 0 | 91 |
| Percent Asylum Seekers | 460 | 27.922 | 23.053 | 1 | 100 |
| Concern | 462 | 0.728 | 0.251 | 0 | 1 |
| Problem | 462 | 0.680 | 0.239 | 0 | 1 |

Table E.2: Balance Tests (Study 2)

| | Mean | | | | P-Value | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| | Control (1) | Bridging (2) | Learning (3) | Values (4) | (1) vs. (2) (5) | (1) vs. (3) (6) | (1) vs. (4) (7) | (2) vs. (3) (8) | (2) vs. (4) (9) | (3) vs. (4) (10) | Balance (11) |
| Republican Sample | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Age | 0.283 (0.012) | 0.280 (0.013) | 0.281 (0.014) | 0.288 (0.014) | 0.873 | 0.929 | 0.766 | 0.950 | 0.667 | 0.719 | 0.973 |
| Female | 0.484 (0.045) | 0.398 (0.048) | 0.387 (0.046) | 0.430 (0.047) | 0.200 | 0.140 | 0.409 | 0.874 | 0.637 | 0.520 | 0.448 |
| Income | 0.412 (0.020) | 0.423 (0.023) | 0.403 (0.023) | 0.361 (0.021) | 0.719 | 0.786 | 0.082 | 0.554 | 0.045 | 0.176 | 0.206 |
| White | 0.934 (0.023) | 0.874 (0.033) | 0.946 (0.022) | 0.912 (0.027) | 0.120 | 0.713 | 0.524 | 0.064 | 0.360 | 0.328 | 0.232 |
| Religiosity | 1.918 (0.156) | 1.990 (0.183) | 2.000 (0.163) | 2.167 (0.174) | 0.763 | 0.717 | 0.288 | 0.968 | 0.485 | 0.486 | 0.752 |
| Voted For Trump | 0.779 (0.038) | 0.806 (0.039) | 0.631 (0.046) | 0.737 (0.041) | 0.620 | 0.013 | 0.455 | 0.004 | 0.230 | 0.087 | 0.017 |
| College Degree | 0.525 (0.045) | 0.456 (0.049) | 0.495 (0.048) | 0.447 (0.047) | 0.310 | 0.659 | 0.237 | 0.568 | 0.895 | 0.472 | 0.620 |
| Democratic Sample | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Age | 0.218 (0.013) | 0.242 (0.012) | 0.240 (0.013) | 0.236 (0.013) | 0.185 | 0.250 | 0.357 | 0.866 | 0.709 | 0.836 | 0.570 |
| Female | 0.491 (0.049) | 0.430 (0.045) | 0.458 (0.046) | 0.376 (0.045) | 0.361 | 0.624 | 0.085 | 0.666 | 0.401 | 0.207 | 0.359 |
| Income | 0.343 (0.020) | 0.371 (0.021) | 0.346 (0.020) | 0.337 (0.020) | 0.324 | 0.898 | 0.852 | 0.393 | 0.244 | 0.756 | 0.636 |
| White | 0.783 (0.040) | 0.793 (0.037) | 0.763 (0.039) | 0.735 (0.041) | 0.849 | 0.719 | 0.406 | 0.570 | 0.291 | 0.627 | 0.730 |
| Religiosity | 0.774 (0.133) | 0.860 (0.133) | 0.602 (0.111) | 0.872 (0.126) | 0.649 | 0.319 | 0.592 | 0.139 | 0.947 | 0.109 | 0.392 |
| Voted For Trump | 0.028 (0.016) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.051 (0.020) | 0.050 (0.020) | 0.063 | 0.393 | 0.386 | 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.988 | 0.082 |
| College Degree | 0.528 (0.049) | 0.529 (0.046) | 0.551 (0.046) | 0.521 (0.046) | 0.993 | 0.737 | 0.918 | 0.735 | 0.908 | 0.652 | 0.973 |

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The last column displays the p-value from a joint orthogonality test of all four treatment arms. Columns (5)-(10) report the p-values from a difference-in-means t-test for each observable demographic variable by the two specified experimental conditions.

E.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests

Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we find that concern for human trafficking and perceptions of the scope of the human trafficking problem is equivalent for Republicans and Democrats ($p = 0.997$ and $p = 0.26$, respectively), but that support for a more open immigration policy, according to an index of each of the five outcome measures, is very different by party ($p < 0.000$).

F Study 2: Regression Tables

Table F.1: Human Trafficking Attitudes by Party Identification (Study 2)

| | Identify with Republican Party | | | | Identify with Democratic Party | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | Concern | | Scope of Problem | | Concern | | Scope of Problem | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Bridging | 0.015 (0.035) | 0.002 (0.034) | 0.016 (0.036) | 0.005 (0.033) | 0.052* (0.031) | 0.048 (0.030) | 0.072** (0.032) | 0.066** (0.031) |
| Learning | -0.002 (0.034) | -0.018 (0.032) | -0.027 (0.034) | -0.044 (0.033) | 0.002 (0.032) | 0.001 (0.031) | 0.002 (0.035) | 0.002 (0.034) |
| Values | -0.039 (0.035) | -0.054 (0.035) | -0.028 (0.035) | -0.047 (0.034) | -0.069** (0.034) | -0.083** (0.034) | -0.041 (0.034) | -0.054 (0.033) |
| Voted For Trump | 0.036 (0.029) | 0.014 (0.027) | -0.014 (0.027) | -0.044 (0.027) | -0.059 (0.075) | -0.061 (0.069) | -0.056 (0.068) | -0.077 (0.064) |
| Age | | 0.134 (0.085) | | 0.138* (0.082) | | -0.016 (0.082) | | 0.063 (0.088) |
| Female | | -0.128*** (0.026) | | -0.091*** (0.025) | | -0.097*** (0.022) | | -0.096*** (0.023) |
| Income | | -0.046 (0.055) | | -0.012 (0.055) | | -0.080 (0.051) | | -0.102* (0.054) |
| White | | -0.035 (0.050) | | 0.007 (0.047) | | -0.020 (0.028) | | 0.002 (0.028) |
| Religiosity | | 0.016** (0.007) | | 0.030*** (0.007) | | 0.010 (0.008) | | 0.014 (0.009) |
| College Degree | | 0.010 (0.026) | | -0.043* (0.024) | | -0.008 (0.023) | | -0.043* (0.024) |
| Constant | 0.648*** (0.033) | 0.704*** (0.067) | 0.738*** (0.031) | 0.730*** (0.066) | 0.686*** (0.024) | 0.776*** (0.044) | 0.721*** (0.024) | 0.800*** (0.043) |
| Observations | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.001 | 0.078 | -0.004 | 0.082 | 0.029 | 0.069 | 0.022 | 0.077 |

Notes: A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table F.2: Support for Immigration Among Republican Party Identifiers (Study 2)

| | Immigration Rate | Mexican Border Wall | Unaccompanied Children | Illegal Immigration Policy | Path to Citizenship | Immigration Attitudes Index | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Bridging | 0.082** (0.032) | 0.080** (0.031) | 0.087** (0.037) | 0.084** (0.037) | 0.100* (0.060) | 0.090 (0.061) | 0.042 (0.042) | 0.034 (0.042) | 0.051 (0.041) | 0.040 (0.041) | 0.072** (0.029) | 0.066** (0.030) |
| Learning | 0.089*** (0.032) | 0.089*** (0.031) | 0.025 (0.033) | 0.025 (0.032) | 0.020 (0.060) | 0.016 (0.061) | 0.017 (0.041) | 0.010 (0.041) | -0.008 (0.042) | -0.015 (0.042) | 0.029 (0.030) | 0.025 (0.030) |
| Values | 0.035 (0.031) | 0.034 (0.031) | 0.018 (0.032) | 0.020 (0.032) | 0.025 (0.058) | 0.020 (0.058) | 0.018 (0.041) | 0.012 (0.040) | -0.027 (0.041) | -0.034 (0.041) | 0.014 (0.030) | 0.011 (0.029) |
| Voted For Trump | -0.158*** (0.028) | -0.161*** (0.027) | -0.340*** (0.033) | -0.340*** (0.032) | -0.300*** (0.052) | -0.303*** (0.053) | -0.156*** (0.034) | -0.170*** (0.034) | -0.187*** (0.035) | -0.200*** (0.035) | -0.228*** (0.027) | -0.235*** (0.027) |
| Age | | -0.225*** (0.084) | | -0.225** (0.090) | | -0.240 (0.149) | | 0.004 (0.099) | | -0.072 (0.097) | | -0.152** (0.072) |
| Female | | 0.023 (0.024) | | 0.011 (0.025) | | -0.029 (0.046) | | -0.043 (0.031) | | -0.029 (0.031) | | -0.013 (0.023) |
| Income | | 0.048 (0.052) | | 0.094* (0.054) | | 0.026 (0.096) | | 0.077 (0.066) | | 0.065 (0.067) | | 0.062 (0.048) |
| White | | -0.009 (0.038) | | -0.014 (0.052) | | -0.079 (0.080) | | -0.031 (0.054) | | -0.051 (0.047) | | -0.037 (0.037) |
| Religiosity | | 0.024*** (0.007) | | 0.010 (0.007) | | 0.011 (0.013) | | 0.022** (0.009) | | 0.019** (0.009) | | 0.017*** (0.006) |
| College Degree | | -0.000 (0.024) | | -0.022 (0.026) | | -0.017 (0.045) | | -0.006 (0.031) | | -0.042 (0.031) | | -0.018 (0.023) |
| Constant | 0.347*** (0.030) | 0.345*** (0.057) | 0.478*** (0.038) | 0.502*** (0.067) | 0.521*** (0.059) | 0.655*** (0.113) | 0.466*** (0.039) | 0.455*** (0.075) | 0.586*** (0.042) | 0.638*** (0.071) | 0.479*** (0.031) | 0.519*** (0.052) |
| Observations | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.091 | 0.127 | 0.256 | 0.268 | 0.074 | 0.072 | 0.039 | 0.053 | 0.063 | 0.071 | 0.166 | 0.186 |

Notes: A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table F.3: Support for Immigration Among Democratic Party Identifiers (Study 2)

| | Immigration Rate | Mexican Border Wall | Unaccompanied Children | Illegal Immigration Policy | Path to Citizenship | Immigration Attitudes Index | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Bridging | 0.083*** (0.032) | 0.089*** (0.032) | -0.010 (0.032) | -0.007 (0.032) | 0.034 (0.057) | 0.047 (0.057) | -0.003 (0.030) | -0.004 (0.030) | 0.009 (0.030) | 0.004 (0.031) | 0.023 (0.025) | 0.026 (0.025) |
| Learning | 0.120*** (0.033) | 0.123*** (0.033) | 0.047 (0.032) | 0.041 (0.032) | 0.056 (0.057) | 0.058 (0.057) | 0.037 (0.032) | 0.033 (0.032) | 0.034 (0.031) | 0.030 (0.031) | 0.059*** (0.027) | 0.057*** (0.027) |
| Values | 0.023 (0.032) | 0.029 (0.032) | 0.004 (0.033) | 0.006 (0.033) | 0.045 (0.057) | 0.045 (0.057) | 0.006 (0.031) | 0.009 (0.031) | 0.029 (0.030) | 0.027 (0.030) | 0.021 (0.027) | 0.023 (0.026) |
| Voted For Trump | -0.279*** (0.067) | -0.263*** (0.070) | -0.546*** (0.053) | -0.522*** (0.052) | -0.524*** (0.120) | -0.478*** (0.118) | -0.184** (0.078) | -0.180** (0.079) | -0.368*** (0.077) | -0.366*** (0.077) | -0.380*** (0.056) | -0.362*** (0.057) |
| Age | | -0.252*** (0.086) | | -0.084 (0.098) | | -0.415*** (0.150) | | -0.021 (0.080) | | -0.014 (0.084) | | -0.157** (0.072) |
| Female | | -0.012 (0.022) | | -0.031 (0.023) | | -0.074* (0.040) | | -0.014 (0.023) | | -0.053** (0.023) | | -0.037* (0.019) |
| Income | | 0.014 (0.052) | | 0.047 (0.050) | | -0.176* (0.094) | | 0.077 (0.050) | | 0.099* (0.055) | | 0.012 (0.044) |
| White | | 0.045* (0.027) | | 0.019 (0.026) | | 0.026 (0.046) | | 0.031 (0.027) | | 0.026 (0.028) | | 0.029 (0.023) |
| Religiosity | | -0.010 (0.009) | | -0.037*** (0.010) | | -0.012 (0.015) | | -0.023*** (0.009) | | -0.015* (0.009) | | -0.020*** (0.007) |
| College Degree | | 0.034 (0.023) | | 0.026 (0.023) | | 0.094** (0.040) | | 0.001 (0.022) | | 0.017 (0.024) | | 0.034* (0.019) |
| Constant | 0.539*** (0.024) | 0.549*** (0.044) | 0.836*** (0.024) | 0.853*** (0.039) | 0.751*** (0.044) | 0.876*** (0.073) | 0.656*** (0.023) | 0.635*** (0.042) | 0.787*** (0.020) | 0.764*** (0.041) | 0.714*** (0.018) | 0.735*** (0.034) |
| Observations | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.067 | 0.087 | 0.134 | 0.168 | 0.041 | 0.065 | 0.015 | 0.030 | 0.062 | 0.077 | 0.103 | 0.133 |

Notes: A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table F.4: Support for Immigration by Party Identification (Study 2)

| | (1) | (2) |
|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Bridging | 0.026 (0.025) | 0.024 (0.025) |
| Learning | 0.056** (0.027) | 0.055** (0.027) |
| Values | 0.018 (0.027) | 0.016 (0.027) |
| Republican | -0.214*** (0.035) | -0.218*** (0.035) |
| Bridging X Republican | 0.046 (0.039) | 0.048 (0.039) |
| Learning X Republican | -0.030 (0.040) | -0.032 (0.041) |
| Values X Republican | -0.005 (0.040) | -0.002 (0.040) |
| Voted For Trump | -0.250*** (0.025) | -0.252*** (0.025) |
| Female | | -0.023 (0.015) |
| Income | | 0.042 (0.033) |
| White | | 0.006 (0.020) |
| Religiosity | | 0.001 (0.005) |
| College Degree | | 0.014 (0.015) |
| Constant | 0.710*** (0.018) | 0.694*** (0.027) |
| Observations | 912 | 912 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.499 | 0.499 |

Notes: A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table F.5: Threat Attitudes by Party Identification (Study 2)

| | Identify with Republican Party | | | Identify with Democratic Party | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Economic Threat (1) | (2) | Cultural Threat (3) | Cultural Threat (4) | Economic Threat (5) | Economic Threat (6) | Cultural Threat (7) | Cultural Threat (8) |
| Bridging | -0.072** (0.031) | -0.071** (0.031) | -0.021 (0.039) | -0.013 (0.039) | -0.011 (0.035) | -0.013 (0.035) | 0.023 (0.030) | 0.022 (0.030) |
| Learning | -0.067** (0.030) | -0.069** (0.030) | -0.015 (0.035) | -0.014 (0.035) | -0.021 (0.036) | -0.018 (0.036) | -0.019 (0.032) | -0.017 (0.032) |
| Values | -0.017 (0.030) | -0.014 (0.030) | 0.041 (0.038) | 0.040 (0.037) | -0.001 (0.035) | -0.006 (0.036) | 0.010 (0.033) | 0.009 (0.033) |
| Voted For Trump | 0.129*** (0.027) | 0.127*** (0.027) | 0.143*** (0.032) | 0.146*** (0.031) | 0.359*** (0.047) | 0.342*** (0.046) | 0.240*** (0.074) | 0.224*** (0.072) |
| Age | | 0.042 (0.088) | | 0.071 (0.087) | | 0.039 (0.093) | | 0.087 (0.084) |
| Female | | -0.016 (0.025) | | 0.023 (0.028) | | -0.019 (0.025) | | 0.026 (0.022) |
| Income | | 0.034 (0.051) | | -0.114* (0.060) | | -0.085 (0.060) | | -0.054 (0.052) |
| White | | 0.055 (0.043) | | 0.106** (0.048) | | -0.000 (0.031) | | -0.010 (0.026) |
| Religiosity | | -0.010 (0.007) | | -0.018** (0.008) | | 0.018* (0.010) | | 0.014* (0.008) |
| College Degree | | -0.015 (0.025) | | -0.044 (0.027) | | -0.030 (0.026) | | -0.035 (0.022) |
| Constant | 0.684*** (0.029) | 0.642*** (0.062) | 0.495*** (0.037) | 0.467*** (0.072) | 0.383*** (0.026) | 0.416*** (0.047) | 0.242*** (0.023) | 0.244*** (0.042) |
| Observations | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.065 | 0.064 | 0.047 | 0.085 | 0.049 | 0.056 | 0.026 | 0.034 |

Notes: A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table F.6: Ingroup-Centric Beliefs by Party Identification (Study 2)

| | Identify with Republican Party | | | | | Identify with Democratic Party | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Outgroup (1) | Outgroup (2) | Ingroup (3) | Ingroup (4) | Victim (5) | Victim (6) | Outgroup (7) | Outgroup (8) | Ingroup (9) | Ingroup (10) | Victim (11) | Victim (12) |
| Bridging | -0.101*** (0.036) | -0.105*** (0.035) | -0.086* (0.045) | -0.086* (0.045) | -0.109*** (0.041) | -0.099*** (0.041) | -0.035 (0.028) | -0.032 (0.028) | -0.056 (0.039) | -0.060 (0.039) | -0.054 (0.037) | -0.055 (0.038) |
| Learning | -0.038 (0.035) | -0.041 (0.034) | -0.063 (0.043) | -0.066 (0.043) | -0.029 (0.037) | -0.028 (0.036) | -0.059** (0.028) | -0.048* (0.028) | -0.082** (0.039) | -0.078** (0.039) | -0.090** (0.038) | -0.084** (0.037) |
| Values | -0.060* (0.035) | -0.070** (0.034) | -0.017 (0.043) | -0.024 (0.043) | -0.016 (0.040) | -0.017 (0.039) | -0.027 (0.030) | -0.025 (0.030) | -0.050 (0.040) | -0.052 (0.040) | -0.056 (0.039) | -0.058 (0.039) |
| Voted For Trump | 0.164*** (0.028) | 0.167*** (0.028) | 0.169*** (0.035) | 0.171*** (0.035) | 0.173*** (0.033) | 0.179*** (0.033) | 0.109** (0.047) | 0.094* (0.048) | 0.244*** (0.076) | 0.227*** (0.076) | 0.406*** (0.071) | 0.393*** (0.071) |
| Age | | -0.218*** (0.084) | | -0.127 (0.102) | 0.046 (0.098) | 0.046 (0.098) | | -0.141** (0.067) | | 0.108 (0.101) | | 0.012 (0.100) |
| Female | | -0.011 (0.026) | | -0.015 (0.031) | 0.015 (0.029) | 0.015 (0.029) | | 0.023 (0.019) | | 0.042 (0.027) | | 0.025 (0.027) |
| Income | | -0.145*** (0.055) | | -0.127* (0.068) | -0.159** (0.062) | -0.159** (0.062) | | -0.051 (0.045) | | 0.059 (0.064) | | -0.028 (0.060) |
| White | | -0.025 (0.041) | | 0.032 (0.052) | 0.097* (0.057) | 0.097* (0.057) | | 0.007 (0.023) | | -0.038 (0.033) | | -0.038 (0.032) |
| Religiosity | | -0.003 (0.007) | | -0.007 (0.009) | -0.012 (0.008) | -0.012 (0.008) | | 0.038*** (0.009) | | 0.029** (0.012) | | 0.029*** (0.011) |
| College Degree | | -0.042* (0.025) | | -0.028 (0.033) | 0.011 (0.029) | 0.011 (0.029) | | -0.014 (0.019) | | -0.018 (0.028) | | -0.037 (0.027) |
| Constant | 0.330*** (0.032) | 0.506*** (0.062) | 0.477*** (0.042) | 0.569*** (0.079) | 0.553*** (0.039) | 0.520*** (0.076) | 0.181*** (0.022) | 0.191*** (0.038) | 0.287*** (0.030) | 0.240*** (0.050) | 0.308*** (0.028) | 0.329*** (0.051) |
| Observations | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.078 | 0.104 | 0.056 | 0.059 | 0.067 | 0.083 | 0.010 | 0.062 | 0.024 | 0.043 | 0.064 | 0.079 |

Notes: A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table F.7: Potential Mediators of Effect Among Republican Party Identifiers (Study 2)

| | IAI (1) | Outgroup (2) | IAI (3) | Ingroup (4) | IAI (5) | Victim (6) | IAI (7) | Econ. Threat (8) | IAI (9) |
|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Bridging | 0.072** (0.029) | -0.101*** (0.036) | 0.038 (0.027) | -0.086* (0.045) | 0.044* (0.026) | -0.109*** (0.041) | 0.027 (0.025) | -0.072** (0.031) | 0.038 (0.026) |
| Learning | 0.029 (0.030) | -0.038 (0.035) | 0.015 (0.028) | -0.063 (0.043) | 0.008 (0.028) | -0.029 (0.037) | 0.016 (0.025) | -0.067** (0.030) | -0.003 (0.027) |
| Values | 0.014 (0.030) | -0.060* (0.035) | -0.007 (0.027) | -0.017 (0.043) | 0.008 (0.026) | -0.016 (0.040) | 0.007 (0.024) | -0.017 (0.030) | 0.006 (0.026) |
| Voted For Trump | -0.228*** (0.027) | 0.164*** (0.028) | -0.172*** (0.025) | 0.169*** (0.035) | -0.174*** (0.026) | 0.173*** (0.033) | -0.157*** (0.024) | 0.129*** (0.027) | -0.167*** (0.025) |
| Outgroup | | | -0.340*** (0.039) | | | | | | |
| Ingroup | | | | | -0.322*** (0.030) | | | | |
| Victim | | | | | | | -0.412*** (0.033) | | |
| Economic Threat | | | | | | | | | -0.479*** (0.042) |
| Constant | 0.479*** (0.031) | 0.330*** (0.032) | 0.591*** (0.031) | 0.477*** (0.042) | 0.633*** (0.030) | 0.553*** (0.039) | 0.707*** (0.029) | 0.684*** (0.029) | 0.807*** (0.038) |
| Observations | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.166 | 0.078 | 0.294 | 0.056 | 0.337 | 0.067 | 0.410 | 0.065 | 0.373 |

Notes: A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. For the “outgroup” measure, the Sobel Test has a p-value of 0.008 and 46.74 percent of the total effect is mediated (ACME=0.03; see columns (1)-(3)). For the “ingroup” measure, the Sobel Test has a p-value of 0.06 and 37.77 percent of the total effect is mediated (ACME=0.03; columns (1), (4), (5)). Finally, for the “victim” measure, the Sobel Test p-value is 0.009 and 60.48 percent of total effect is mediated (ACME=0.05; columns (1), (6), (7)). When examining the economic threat measure, the Sobel Test p-value is 0.02 and 46.89 percent of total effect is mediated (ACME=0.035; columns (1), (8), (9)).

Table F.8: Perceptions of Victim/Asylum Seeker Count by Party Identification (Study 2)

| | Identify with Republican Party | | | | Identify with Democratic Party | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Percent Victims (1) | Percent Victims (2) | Percent Asylum Seekers (3) | Percent Asylum Seekers (4) | Percent Victims (5) | Percent Victims (6) | Percent Asylum Seekers (7) | Percent Asylum Seekers (8) |
| Bridging | 1.421 (2.598) | 0.643 (2.564) | 1.328 (2.890) | 0.498 (2.812) | 3.148 (3.031) | 3.121 (3.079) | -0.499 (2.970) | -0.494 (2.979) |
| Learning | -0.895 (2.455) | -1.668 (2.429) | 3.788 (2.818) | 2.771 (2.758) | 3.922 (2.970) | 3.872 (2.956) | 1.764 (3.020) | 1.602 (2.950) |
| Values | 0.119 (2.513) | -0.747 (2.493) | -0.508 (2.673) | -1.676 (2.670) | 4.394 (3.061) | 3.742 (3.152) | 3.452 (2.975) | 2.554 (3.004) |
| Voted For Trump | -9.050*** (2.444) | -10.227*** (2.444) | -2.714 (2.499) | -4.003 (2.437) | -12.324*** (4.537) | -12.626*** (4.326) | -1.454 (6.838) | -1.269 (6.626) |
| Female | | -5.201*** (1.917) | | -7.245*** (1.999) | | -4.794** (2.184) | | -6.102*** (2.203) |
| Income | | -0.687 (3.555) | | -5.707 (4.245) | | -8.586* (4.981) | | -10.357** (4.878) |
| White | | -3.936 (3.722) | | -3.305 (3.251) | | -0.584 (2.576) | | -2.549 (2.638) |
| Religiosity | | 1.578*** (0.529) | | 1.445** (0.585) | | 0.252 (0.858) | | 0.026 (0.825) |
| College Degree | | -0.292 (1.853) | | -0.037 (2.000) | | -1.685 (2.219) | | -2.337 (2.266) |
| Constant | 29.260*** (2.684) | 33.778*** (4.930) | 26.122*** (2.871) | 33.314*** (4.669) | 29.264*** (2.188) | 35.718*** (3.812) | 26.768*** (2.056) | 36.514*** (3.613) |
| Observations | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 460 | 460 | 460 | 460 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.033 | 0.069 | 0.002 | 0.047 | 0.005 | 0.016 | -0.004 | 0.020 |

Notes: The outcome measures indicate the proportion of the immigrant population that are comprised of victims and asylum seekers. A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table F.9: Support for Immigration (IAI) by Education Attainment (Study 2)

| | Identify with Republican Party | | Identify with Democratic Party | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Bridging | 0.030 (0.040) | 0.016 (0.040) | 0.038 (0.037) | 0.037 (0.037) |
| Learning | 0.048 (0.042) | 0.040 (0.042) | 0.046 (0.043) | 0.049 (0.044) |
| Values | 0.028 (0.042) | 0.020 (0.042) | 0.020 (0.042) | 0.024 (0.042) |
| College Degree | -0.000 (0.040) | -0.027 (0.040) | 0.032 (0.037) | 0.041 (0.037) |
| Bridging X College Degree | 0.092 (0.059) | 0.107* (0.059) | -0.028 (0.050) | -0.029 (0.049) |
| Learning X College Degree | -0.039 (0.060) | -0.029 (0.059) | 0.022 (0.055) | 0.008 (0.056) |
| Values X College Degree | -0.032 (0.059) | -0.023 (0.058) | 0.002 (0.054) | -0.007 (0.055) |
| Voted For Trump | -0.227*** (0.027) | -0.237*** (0.027) | -0.370*** (0.057) | -0.366*** (0.057) |
| Female | | -0.010 (0.023) | | -0.033* (0.019) |
| Income | | 0.071 (0.048) | | 0.022 (0.044) |
| White | | -0.050 (0.037) | | 0.019 (0.023) |
| Religiosity | | 0.017*** (0.006) | | -0.021*** (0.007) |
| College Degree | | 0.000 (.) | | 0.000 (.) |
| Constant | 0.479*** (0.038) | 0.489*** (0.055) | 0.697*** (0.028) | 0.702*** (0.038) |
| Observations | 450 | 450 | 462 | 462 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.170 | 0.186 | 0.102 | 0.120 |

Notes: The outcome measures is the immigration attitude index (IAI). A control for Trump support is included in all specifications given imbalance in Trump support by experimental condition and the salience of immigration in the Trump agenda. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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