

Overseas Credit Claiming and Domestic Support for Foreign Aid Online Appendix

Pre-Registered Analysis

We preregistered this study in the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) registry under the name “In the Eyes of Donor Publics: Evaluating the Branding of Foreign Assistance (Pilot)” (Registry ID listed on title page).

In the preregistration document, we labeled the five treatment conditions as follows:

C1: no video; full control

T1: Video of Smiling Sun Clinic with no branding. Respondents are informed that the clinic is a British foreign aid project.

T2: Video of Smiling Sun Clinic with “UKAID—From the British People” at the bottom of the full video. No other branding treatment included. Respondents are informed that the clinic is a British foreign aid project.

T3: Same as T2 with the addition of information and photos that highlight in-country branding of the Clinics. Text in video says “When the British Government funds projects like the Smiling Sun Clinics, they often require that the project show the “UKAID” logo.

T4: Same as T3 with the addition of information about the strategic value of branding. After the T3 language and picture of the Smiling Sun Clinic displaying a UKAID logo, the text continues: “The goal is to enhance the visibility of UKAID’s projects, to advance the UK’s other foreign policy goals, and to improve the UK’s image in Bangladesh.”

In the main text, we use the phrases “pure control” for C1, “control video” for T1, “branded video” for T2, “highlighted video” for T3, and “strategic video” for T4. We use the same terminology here.

In the preregistration document, we registered three primary hypotheses related to these five treatment conditions and two hypotheses describing heterogeneous treatment effects:

H1: If respondents in the donor public are provided with more information about UKAID branding, they should be more likely to say that foreign aid should increase. Support for aid increases should be highest as the amount of information about branding increases across the treatment groups (T2-T4).

H1a: This effect will be greater for conservatives relative to all other respondents.

H2: If respondents are informed about the strategic benefits of aid (T4), they should be less likely than all other respondents to think that aid is an effective tool to reduce poverty.

H3: If respondents receive more information about branding and the strategic benefits of aid, they should be more likely to approve of the foreign policy performance of the current government. Support for aid increases should be highest as the amount of information about branding increases across the treatment groups (T2-T4).

H3a: This effect will be greater for conservatives relative to all other respondents.

Table 5 in the main text presents the results for a test of H1 and H1a. As can be seen in the relatively similar point estimates across treatment conditions and the insignificant chi-squared tests, we do not find evidence for the strong version of H1 in which support is increasing monotonically across the treatment conditions. We find evidence that the highlighted video treatment improves support for the specific foreign aid project that we study and perhaps for foreign aid in general among conservatives, a finding that partially supports H1a.

In Appendix Table 1, we recreate Table 5 but include regression estimates of the differences across all combinations of treatment conditions. As described in the main text, the results here show that the evidence for H1 and H1a is concentrated in the comparisons between the highlighted video and the control video. We can also see some evidence of stronger reactions to the highlighted video as compared to the basic branded video among conservatives. For all three outcomes included in Appendix Table 1, we see a sizeable positive difference in responses among conservatives who have seen the highlighted video as compared to conservatives who have seen the branded video. This difference is statistically significant for the outcome related to expanding the Smiling Sun Clinics to other countries.

Among conservatives, we also see generally disconfirming evidence for the idea that that strategic video will lead to additional support beyond the branded or highlighted video. For all three outcomes, conservatives are less likely to provide a positive response when they have been assigned to the strategic video condition as compared to the highlighted video condition; this difference is marginally statistically significant for the question about expanding the Smiling Sun Clinics to other countries.

The table also shows how, for the third outcome variable that measures general support for foreign aid, the videos had a surprising negative effect on responses (particularly among conservatives). We had not anticipated that this might be a possible outcome when we preregistered the analysis. We have subsequently conducted a diagnostic analysis of these results, and we explore why this might have happened in a separate paper.

In Appendix Table 2, we report results related to H2, the hypothesis that information about the strategic benefits of aid will depress perceptions of aid effectiveness. We look first at respondents willingness to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with the statement that “foreign aid is an effective tool for reducing poverty,” then their willingness to agree or disagree with the statement that “foreign aid is an important way of addressing global health problems” and finally their responses to a question about whether the U.K. government does a good job or a bad job of “ensuring that foreign aid is well spent by the countries that receive it.”

We find little support for H2. For the first two questions, the responses to the strategic video are indistinguishable from the responses to the control, branded, or highlighted video. For the second question, the responses are, if anything, more positive, and these comparisons come close to conventional levels of statistical significance (e.g., the strategic video versus the control video: $\delta=0.16$, $p < 0.11$; the strategic video versus the highlighted video: $\delta=0.15$, $p < 0.11$). For the third question, we see that the strategic video evokes a more positive reaction than the branded video or the control video, complementing the results presented in the paper that show the more positive reactions to the highlighted video when compared to the control video. The highlighted video and the strategic video also yield better perceptions of aid monitoring relative to the pure control, whereas once again, respondents who see any video are more likely to disagree with the statement that foreign aid is an effective tool for reducing poverty when compared to respondents in the pure control condition.

In sum, we find no evidence that our direct presentation of information about the strategic benefits of aid undermines people's perceptions of aid effectiveness. Indeed the highlighted video and the strategic video both increase respondents' likelihood of agreeing with the statement that the U.K. does a good job of ensuring that aid is well spent. We again find evidence that the videos challenge people's priors about foreign aid (as measured in the pure control condition), which is the subject of a companion paper.

In Appendix Table 3, we look at two outcomes related to perceptions of foreign policy performance. Asking about the Conservative government in power in the United Kingdom at the time of the survey, we asked respondents to assess on a scale from 1 to 5 how well the government was performing overall on foreign policy and specifically with regard to foreign aid. Respondents could move sliders by 0.1 units between the endpoints of 1 and 5.

Overall, we find relatively little support for H3. There is some evidence that H3 and H3a are supported when looking at the perceptions of foreign policy overall and reactions to the strategic video among conservatives. For that group of respondents, seeing the strategic video – relative to seeing the control video or branded video and relative to being assigned to the pure control group – leads to more positive perceptions of how the government is handling foreign policy. These differences are not found, however, for the other video conditions or for the other outcome variable.

	“To what extent should the UK increase its support for SSCs?” (1...5)			“Should the UK fund projects like the SSCs in other countries?” (0/1)			“Should the government spend more, the same amount, or less money to help people in poor countries?” (1...3)		
	All	Conservative	Liberal	All	Conservative	Liberal	All	Conservative	Liberal
Pure Control							2.53 N=195	2.32 N=81	2.69 N=112
Control Video	3.50 N=141	3.16 N=62	3.76 N=78	0.82 N=141	0.71 N=62	0.91 N=78	2.39 N=141	2.10 N=62	2.62 N=78
Branded Video	3.45 N=145	3.22 N=59	3.61 N=83	0.85 N=145	0.71 N=59	0.94 N=83	2.45 N=146	2.14 N=59	2.67 N=83
Highlighted Video	3.51 N=149	3.44 N=64	3.56 N=84	0.88 N=149	0.84 N=64	0.92 N=84	2.46 N=151	2.28 N=64	2.60 N=84
Strategic Video	3.54 N=142	3.29 N=42	3.65 N=99	0.88 N=142	0.71 N=42	0.94 N=99	2.51 N=144	2.17 N=42	2.66 N=99
p-value from chi-squared test	0.799	0.757	0.612	0.506	0.234	0.829	0.816	0.590	0.561
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>									
Control Video versus Pure Control							-0.15* (0.08)	-0.24* (0.13)	-0.07 (0.10)
Branded Video versus Pure Control							-0.09 (0.08)	-0.24** (0.12)	-0.02 (0.09)
Highlighted Video versus Pure Control							-0.08 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.09)
Strategic Video versus Pure Control							-0.02 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.08)
Branded Video versus Control Video	-0.05 (0.10)	0.09 (0.16)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.09)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.09)	0.04 (0.13)	0.05 (0.10)
Highlighted Video versus Control Video	0.02 (0.10)	0.27* (0.15)	-0.19* (0.12)	0.06 (0.04)	0.15** (0.07)	0.01 (0.04)	0.07 (0.08)	0.19 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.10)
Strategic Video versus Control Video	0.04 (0.10)	0.12 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.11)	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.09)	0.03 (0.04)	0.12 (0.09)	0.07 (0.15)	0.04 (0.10)
Highlighted Video versus Branded Video	0.08 (0.09)	0.24 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.04 (0.04)	0.17** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.08)	0.20 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.09)
Strategic Video versus Branded Video	0.10 (0.10)	0.08 (0.18)	0.04 (0.11)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.001 (0.04)	0.07 (0.08)	0.06 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.09)
Strategic Video versus Highlighted Video	0.02 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.16)	0.08 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.14* (0.08)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.15)	0.07 (0.09)
Any Branded Video versus Both Controls							-0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.06)

Appendix Table 1. Support for Foreign Aid. Top panel presents means for the pure control condition and each of the four video treatment conditions. Middle panel presents the p-value for a χ^2 test of H_0 : independence of treatment conditions from responses to question. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from regression models with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison and subject pool fixed effects; robust standard errors in parentheses. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

	Agreement that “foreign aid is an effective tool for reducing poverty” (1...5)	Agreement that “foreign aid is an important way of addressing global health problems” (1...5)	U.K. does a good job of ensuring that foreign aid is well spent (1...5)
Pure Control	3.84 (0.06) N=194	4.09 (0.06) N=194	2.90 (0.06) N=196
Control Video	3.64 (0.08) N=141	4.06 (0.07) N=141	2.98 (0.08) N=141
Branded Video	3.64 (0.08) N=146	4.14 (0.07) N=146	2.91 (0.08) N=146
Highlighted Branding Video	3.69 (0.07) N=150	4.07 (0.07) N=150	3.14 (0.07) N=151
Strategic Branding Video	3.61 (0.08) N=142	4.22 (0.07) N=142	3.18 (0.07) N=144
p-value from chi-squared test	0.42	0.66	0.20
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>			
Control Video versus Pure Control	-0.20** (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)
Branded Video versus Pure Control	-0.21* (0.11)	0.05 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)
Highlighted Video versus Pure Control	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.24** (0.10)
Strategic Video versus Pure Control	-0.22** (0.11)	0.12 (0.09)	0.29*** (0.10)
Branded Video versus Control Video	0.0004 (0.12)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.11)
Highlighted Video versus Control Video	0.06 (0.11)	0.003 (0.10)	0.16 (0.11)
Strategic Video versus Control Video	-0.02 (0.12)	0.16 (0.10)	0.21** (0.11)
Highlighted Video versus Branded Video	0.05 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.23** (0.11)
Strategic Video versus Branded Video	-0.03 (0.12)	0.08 (0.10)	0.26** (0.11)
Strategic Video versus Highlighted Video	-0.08 (0.11)	0.15 (0.09)	0.04 (0.10)

Appendix Table 2. Views on Aid Effectiveness. Top panel presents means for the pure control condition and each of the four video treatment conditions. Middle panel presents the p-value for a χ^2 test of H_0 : independence of treatment conditions from responses to question. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from regression models with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison and subject pool fixed effects; robust standard errors in parentheses. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

	“On a scale from 1 to 5, ... how [has] the Conservative government ... handled ... Overall Foreign Policy?”			“On a scale from 1 to 5, ... how [has] the Conservative government ... handled ... Foreign Aid?”		
	All	Conservative	Liberal	All	Conservative	Liberal
Pure Control	2.56 N=194	2.87 N=81	2.32 N=112	2.62 N=194	2.81 N=81	2.48 N=112
Control Video	2.54 N=141	2.82 N=62	2.32 N=78	2.58 N=141	2.72 N=62	2.47 N=78
Branded Video	2.46 N=145	2.76 N=59	2.26 N=83	2.64 N=145	2.82 N=59	2.51 N=83
Highlighted Video	2.58 N=149	2.88 N=64	2.35 N=84	2.65 N=149	2.81 N=64	2.53 N=84
Strategic Video	2.52 N=142	3.15 N=42	2.26 N=99	2.60 N=142	2.92 N=42	2.48 N=99
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>						
Control Video versus Pure Control	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.15)	0.0001 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.006 (0.12)
Branded Video versus Pure Control	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.05 (0.09)	0.04 (0.14)	0.03 (0.11)
Highlighted Video versus Pure Control	0.02 (0.09)	0.003 (0.14)	0.04 (0.11)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.13)	0.06 (0.11)
Strategic Video versus Pure Control	-0.03 (0.09)	0.30* (0.16)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.005 (0.09)	0.14 (0.17)	0.005 (0.10)
Branded Video versus Control Video	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.07 (0.10)	0.13 (0.15)	0.04 (0.13)
Highlighted Video versus Control Video	0.04 (0.10)	0.07 (0.16)	0.04 (0.11)	0.06 (0.09)	0.10 (0.14)	0.07 (0.12)
Strategic Video versus Control Video	-0.01 (0.10)	0.34** (0.17)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.03 (0.10)	0.21 (0.17)	0.01 (0.11)
Highlighted Video versus Branded Video	0.12 (0.10)	0.15 (0.16)	0.10 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.03 (0.15)	0.02 (0.11)
Strategic Video versus Branded Video	0.07 (0.10)	0.36** (0.18)	0.007 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.11)
Strategic Video versus Highlighted Video	-0.05 (0.10)	0.25 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.09 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.11)

Appendix Table 3. Support for Government. Top panel presents means for the pure control condition and each of the four video treatment conditions. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from regression models with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison and subject pool fixed effects; robust standard errors in parentheses. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$. Because the outcome variables here take on values between 1 and 5 by tenths of a unit, we omit the chi-squared test.

Sample Demographics

Below we offer descriptive, demographic statistics that allow us to compare our study sample with one that resulted from a nationally representative survey collected by the Political Science Association in 2015 in the United Kingdom. We find that our study sample has a slightly higher share of women and has a lower mean age than the nationally representative survey. Compared to the PSA survey sample, our sample is more diverse in terms of ethnic background and has a lower proportion of people with earnings of more than £20,000. In terms of educational attainment, the proportion of respondents who have achieved at least their A-levels is slightly higher than in the PSA survey; our sample skews young and female.

	Study Sample (2016)	Nationally-representative Political Science Association Survey (2015)
Female	0.62	0.53
Age	31	49
Ethnicity: White	0.83	0.92
Household Income: over £20,000	0.56	0.77
Education: Completed A-levels (Secondary Schooling)	0.51	0.46

Appendix Table 4. Demographic Descriptive Statistics. Values represented as proportions or mean value for age.

Appendix 5: Information about Subjects and Context per JEPS Guidelines

- Eligibility and exclusion criteria for participants.

To be eligible to participate in the survey, participants had to be registered subjects in any of the three laboratory subject pools at the universities of Essex, Oxford, and Edinburgh. To register for either of the three subject pools, the minimum age is 18 years. Because our study only focuses on UK nationals, we excluded participants who did not hold UK citizenship through an initial screener question.

- Why was this subject pool selected? Who was eligible to participate in the study? What would result in the exclusion of a participant? Were any aspects of recruitment changed (such as the exclusion criteria) after recruitment began? Other relevant specifics of the population: e.g., large public university vs. small private university; geographic location; etc.

We selected the subject pools across the two public and one private universities in the UK to increase the number of participants and to increase the regional coverage of our sample. Eligible participants had to be registered with any of the three subject pools, be at least 18 years of age, and hold UK citizenship. To determine UK citizenship we asked survey respondents a screener question at the very beginning. If they indicated that they did not hold UK citizenship the survey was automatically terminated and subjects received a debriefing that explained why they were excluded from the study.

- Procedures used to recruit and select participants.

Across the three laboratory subject pools, lab managers recruited subjects by sending out emails to registered lab subjects, inviting them to participate in the survey.

- Recruitment dates defining the periods of recruitment and when the experiments were conducted.

Across the three university labs, subjects were recruited and participated in the survey experiment during the months of March, April, and May 2016.

- Settings and locations where the data were collected. In the field, lab, classroom, or some other specialized setting?

This was a one-time online survey experiment that subjects completed on their own computers.