Is "Constitutional Veneration" an Obstacle to Constitutional Amendment?

Appendix

Control and Treatment Questions

Respondents were randomly assigned to the control or treatment condition where they received questions regarding the two policy issues. The order of the questions was randomized.

Control

Would you favor a measure that grants public and private employees across the country the right to organize and bargain collectively through labor unions, as long as the measure were written so that it would not alter the basic structure of federal labor law or fundamentally interfere with the ability of employers to manage their workers? If approved, this measure would change federal law to reflect the new policy. Would you favor or oppose this measure that would change federal law?

Would you favor a measure that requires a 2/3 majority vote of the US House of Representatives and the US Senate in order for the federal government to impose new or additional federal taxes on taxpayers or to increase the rate of federal taxation, as long as the measure were written so that it would not fundamentally interfere with the government's ability to fund essential services? If approved, this measure would change federal law to reflect the new policy. Would you favor or oppose this measure that would change federal law?

Treatment

Would you favor an amendment to the United States Constitution that grants public and private employees across the country the right to organize and bargain collectively through labor unions, as long as the amendment were written so that it would not alter the basic structure of federal labor law or fundamentally interfere with the ability of employers to manage their workers? If approved, this amendment would change the United States Constitution to reflect the new policy. Would you favor or oppose this amendment that would change the United States Constitution?

Would you favor an amendment to the United States Constitution that requires a 2/3 majority vote of the US House of Representatives and the US Senate in order for the federal government to impose new or additional taxes on taxpayers or to increase the rate of federal taxation, as long as the amendment were written so that it would not fundamentally interfere with the government's ability to fund essential services? If approved, this amendment would change the United States Constitution to reflect the new policy. Would you favor or oppose this amendment that would change the United States Constitution?

"Constitution Works"

On the pre-election wave of the 2016 CCES, respondents were asked the following question (the distribution of responses is presented in Appendix Figure 1).

Please indicate which of the following statements comes closest to your view:

- The US Constitution works well today and does not need to be changed

- Although the US Constitution still works, it needs some minor changes to better address present day circumstances

- The US Constitution is outdated and needs major changes to make it adequate to today's challenges

Appendix Figure 1: Distribution of responses to the "Constitution Works" question.

Appendix Table 1 presents the average support for the constitutional status quo in the control and treatment conditions among respondents who believed the Constitution is outdated, needs minor changes, or works well and does not need to be changed. For both the collective bargaining and 2/3 majority conditions, the treatment effect increases in strength moving across the categories from those who think the Constitution is outdated to those who think it only needs minor changes to those who think it works well.

| | Support the Status Quo | | |
	Control	Treatment	Difference
Collective Bargaining			
Outdated	0.38	0.28	-0.10
	$(N = 37)$	$(N = 47)$	$(p = 0.33)$
Minor Changes	0.40	0.49	0.09
	$(N = 180)$	$(N = 212)$	$(p = 0.07)$
Works Well	0.60	0.79	0.19
	$(N = 182)$	$(N = 164)$	$(p < 0.01)$
2/3 Majority			
Outdated	0.49	0.45	-0.04
	$(N = 37)$	$(N = 47)$	$(p = 0.72)$
Minor Changes	0.46	0.60	0.14
	$(N = 180)$	$(N = 212)$	$(p = 0.01)$
Works Well	0.45	0.69	0.24
	$(N = 182)$	$(N = 164)$	$(p < 0.01)$

Appendix Table 1: Average support for the constitutional status quo among respondents who think the constitution is "outdated", "needs some minor changes", or "works well today and does not need to be changed." Support for the status quo is coded as "0" if the respondent supported the hypothetical propositions and "1" if they opposed it. P-values are associated with two-tailed t-tests.

Appendix Table 2 presents results from a linear probability model regressing support for the constitutional status quo on treatment assignment, "Constitution Works" response (1=out-

dated, 2=minor changes, 3= works well), and the interaction of the two. The interaction formally tests whether the treatment effect differs depending on one's feelings about the Constitution. The significant interactions suggest this is the case in both the collective bargaining and 2/3 majority conditions.

	Collective Bargaining	2/3 Majority
Treatment	−0.182	−0.130
	(0.124)	(0.127)
Constitution Works	0.145***	−0.015
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Treatment * Works	0.127**	0.126**
	(0.051)	(0.053)
Constant	0.146	0.494***
	(0.091)	(0.093)
N	822	822

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Appendix Table 2: Opposition (in favor of maintaining the constitutional status quo) to the hypothetical constitutional amendments.

System Justification

On the pre-election wave of the 2016 CCES, respondents were given a shortened battery from Jost, Liviatan, van der Toorn, Ledgerwood, Mandisodza & Nosek (2010) in order to measure their level of political system justification. The order of the questions was randomized. Respondents were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale how much they agreed or disagreed with each of the statements, with 1 = "strongly agree," 9 = "strongly disagree," and 5 = "neither agree nor disagree." The questions marked with "*" below are reverse-scored.

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below.

- *The American political system is the best system there is*

- *The system of checks and balances insures that no one branch of government can ever pursue unreasonable or illegal activities*

- *Radical changes should be made in order to have a truly democratic political system in our country**

- *The political system lacks legitimacy because of the power of special interests**

- *The two-party electoral system is democracy at its best*

- *The political system is unfair and cannot be trusted**

To create a system justification score for each subject, we summed their responses to each of the questions with higher values of the score associated with stronger system justification. The score ranges from 6 to 54 with a mean of 29.06 and median of 30. A histogram of the score is presented below in Appendix Figure 2. We classified those subjects with a score at

or above the third quartile (35) as "high" political system justifiers.

Appendix Figure 2: Distribution of Political System Justification Scores.

Appendix Table 3 shows the average support for the constitutional status quo in the control and treatment conditions among low and high system justifiers and Appendix Table 4 presents results from a linear probability model regressing support for the constitutional status quo on treatment assignment, the system justification score, and the interaction of the two. In addition to the binary measure, we also ran the regressions using the continuous system justification score (columns 2 and 4). The interaction is not significant for either version of the measure, suggesting the effect of the treatment does not differ depending on how strongly subjects justify the political system.

7

	Support the Status Quo		
	Control	Treatment	Difference
Collective Bargaining			
Low Political SJ	0.45	0.55	0.09
	($N = 290$)	($N = 302$)	($p = 0.02$)
High Political SJ	0.59	0.68	0.09
	($N = 109$)	($N = 121$)	($p = 0.16$)
2/3 Majority			
Low Political SJ	0.43	0.62	0.18
	($N = 290$)	($N = 302$)	($p < 0.01$)
High Political SJ	0.52	0.62	0.10
	($N = 109$)	($N = 121$)	($p = 0.14$)

Appendix Table 3: Average support for the constitutional status quo among high and low political system justifiers. Support for the status quo is coded as "0" if the respondent supported the hypothetical propositions and "1" if they opposed it. P-values are associated with two-tailed t-tests.

	Collective Bargaining		**2/3 Majority**	
Treatment	0.095**	0.118	0.181***	0.216*
	(0.041)	(0.118)	(0.040)	(0.118)
High Political SJ	0.135**		0.088	
	(0.055)		(0.055)	
Treatment * High Political SJ	−0.004		−0.085	
	(0.077)		(0.077)	
Political SJ		0.010***		0.002
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Treatment * Political SJ		−0.001		−0.002
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Constant	0.452***	0.203**	0.434***	0.398***
	(0.029)	(0.085)	(0.029)	(0.085)
N	822	822	822	822

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Appendix Table 4: Opposition (in favor of maintaining the constitutional status quo) to the hypothetical constitutional amendments.

Union Membership and Tax Preferences

One possible critique of our analysis is that respondents may not think the issues of collective bargaining and balanced budgets are important enough to warrant amending the Constitution. If the issues are not generally salient, however, they nonetheless may be personally important for some respondents. In the case of collective bargaining rights, for example, the broader public might not view the issue as an important one, but it likely is salient for one group in particular: union members. In principle, we would expect union members or those who have union members in their family to be supportive of the hypothetical collective bargaining amendment proposal—they are more likely to consider establishing greater security for collective bargaining rights an issue important enough to justify amending the Constitution. Something similar holds for the amendment proposal that would require a legislative supermajority to approve tax increases. This issue might be important for respondents concerned about budget shortfalls but who strongly prefer offsetting them with spending cuts rather than raising taxes.

To test whether our treatment increased support among those for whom our hypothetical constitutional amendments would be highly salient, we used CCES pre-election wave questions about union membership and budget priorities. To identify union families, we used the CCES questions asking whether the respondent or a member of the respondent's family is currently or formerly was a member of a labor union. For our measure of budget priori-

ties, we used the CCES questions asking how respondents would rank their budget priorities among three potential choices: cutting defense spending, cutting domestic spending, and raising taxes. We compare those who prioritized cutting spending above raising taxes, ranking raising taxes third, to those who ranked raising taxes either first or second. Although this measure not ideal as an indicator of the personal salience of the issue, it at least allows us to identify those respondents who in principle should be more supportive of efforts to make raising taxes difficult and thus should be more supportive of the amendment proposal.

	Support the Status Quo		
	Control	Treatment	Difference
Collective Bargaining			
Not Union	0.57	0.62	0.05
	$(N = 245)$	$(N = 256)$	$(p = 0.22)$
Union Household	0.36	0.52	0.16
	$(N = 151)$	$(N = 165)$	$(p < 0.00)$
2/3 Majority			
Taxes	0.50	0.63	0.13
	$(N = 242)$	$(N = 247)$	$(p < 0.00)$
No Taxes	0.39	0.59	0.20
	$(N = 148)$	$(N = 167)$	$(p < 0.00)$

Appendix Table 5: Average support for the constitutional status quo among union members and those prioritizing cutting spending over raising taxes. Support for the status quo is coded as "0" if the respondent supported the hypothetical propositions and "1" if they opposed it. P-values are associated with two-tailed t-tests.

As the t-test results presented in Appendix Table 5 show, we observe substantively large and statistically significant treatment effects among union members and their families (top panel) as well as those who prioritize spending cuts over tax increases in addressing budget deficits (bottom panel). This analysis indicates our treatment effects likely are not explained merely

by the low profile of the issue domains involved in the amendment proposals. Individuals are reluctant to support amending the Constitution on issues that are personally salient to them and, in the case of the collective bargaining rights proposal, even on issues that might personally benefit them.

Respect for the Constitution

At the beginning of the Lucid survey, respondents answered the battery developed by Brown & Pope (2019) to measure respect for the Constitution. The questions were broken up into three sections. In the first section, respondents were asked to mark whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement, with 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree," 3 = "neither agree nor disagree," 4= "agree," and 5 = "strongly agree."

Here are several different things that people might say about the US Constitution.

- *The US Constitution is an enduring document that deserves our respect*

- *The people who wrote the US Constitution were only looking out for themselves*

- *The US Constitution is an outdated document that needs to be modernized.*

- *The people who wrote the US Constitution were wise and visionary*

- *We should amend the US Constitution more frequently so that it addresses modern concerns.*

In the second section, respondents were asked to move a slider ranging from 0 to 100 to indicate which position they agreed with more closely:

Which of the following two statements comes closest to your view of how the US Constitution should be interpreted by the courts?

- *Judges should base their rulings on what they believe the US Constitution means in today's world*

- *Judges should base their rulings on what they believe the US Constitution meant*

when originally written

In the third section, respondents were asked:

*Would you say the US Constitution is amended too much, not enough, or about the right amount?*

where the response options where 1 = "too much," 2 = "About the right amount," and 3 = "Not enough."

We constructed a constitutional respect score for each subject using loadings from a factor analysis. Appendix Table 6 presents the results from a factor analysis based on a one- and two-factor model. Since the sum of squared loadings from the two-factor model suggests that the second factor is not warranted, we construct a score based on a one-factor model (as do Brown & Pope (2019)).

	Two Factors		One Factor
	Factor 1	**Factor 2**	**Factor**
The Constitution is enduring	0.48	0.52	0.46
Framers were looking out for themselves	0.65	0.31	0.66
The Constitution is outdated	0.86	0.05	0.90
The Constitution was written by visionary people	0.56	0.44	0.54
The Constitution should be amended more often	0.81	-0.27	0.78
The Constitution is amended too much	0.62	-0.36	0.58
Judicial originalism	0.57	-0.34	0.54
SS loadings	3.08	0.88	2.97
Prop variance	0.44	0.12	0.43

Appendix Table 6: Results from a one and two factor model (unrotated). All questions have been re-coded such that higher values reflect greater respect for the Constitution.

We classified those subjects with a factor score at or above the third quartile (0.89) as having a "high" level of respect for the constitution. A histogram of the score is presented below in Appendix Figure 3.

Appendix Figure 3: Distribution of Constitutional Respect Scores.

Appendix Table 7 shows the average support for the constitutional status quo in the control and treatment conditions among those with low and high levels of respect for the Constitution. Appendix Table 8 presents results from a linear probability model regressing support for the constitutional status quo on treatment assignment, constitutional respect score, and the interaction of the two. In addition to the binary measure, we re-ran the regressions using the continuous respect score (columns 2 and 4).

14

	Support the Status Quo		
	Control	Treatment	Difference
Collective Bargaining			
Low Respect	0.25	0.27	0.02
	$(N = 132)$	$(N = 120)$	$(p = 0.76)$
High Respect	0.62	0.89	0.27
	$(N = 37)$	$(N = 47)$	$(p < 0.01)$
2/3 Majority			
Low Respect	0.49	0.55	0.06
	$(N = 132)$	$(N = 120)$	$(p = 0.36)$
High Respect	0.51	0.72	0.21
	$(N = 37)$	$(N = 47)$	$(p = 0.05)$

Appendix Table 7: Average support for the constitutional status quo among those with a high and low level of respect for the constitution. Support for the status quo is coded as "0" if the respondent supported the hypothetical propositions and "1" if they opposed it. P-values are associated with two-tailed t-tests.

	Collective Bargaining		**2/3 Majority**	
Treatment	0.017	0.085*	0.058	0.094*
	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.054)
High Respect	0.372***		0.021	
	(0.080)		(0.092)	
Treatment * High Respect	0.255**		0.152	
	(0.109)		(0.125)	
Respect		0.196***		0.019
		(0.037)		(0.041)
Treatment * Respect		0.062		0.103*
		(0.051)		(0.057)
Constant	0.250***	0.343***	0.492***	0.498***
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.038)
N	336	336	336	336

$^{***}p < .01$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{*}p < .1$

Appendix Table 8: Opposition (in favor of maintaining the constitutional status quo) to each of the hypothetical constitutional amendments.

Appendix Table 7 shows that for both the collective bargaining and 2/3 majority conditions, the treatment is significant among those with high respect and is much stronger than among those with lower levels of respect. However, based on Appendix Table 8, the difference in the treatment effect between those with high and low levels of respect for the constitution is only significant in the collective bargaining condition.

Political and Constitutional Knowledge

Examining whether the treatment effects differ based on respondents' political or constitutional knowledge may yield some additional insights into the interpretation of our results. To test this possibility, we utilize political knowledge questions taken from the CCES pre-election wave as well as pre-treatment questions gauging knowledge of the Constitution in the Lucid survey.

Because we did not have the space to include a battery of constitutional knowledge questions on our CCES survey, we are constrained to use the general political knowledge questions asked as a part of CCES's common content questions. Although this is not ideal, it should give us at least some analytical leverage. For the CCES sample, we used the answers to two questions asking about party control of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

*Which party has a majority of seats in the House of Representatives?*

- *Republicans*

- *Democrats*

- *Neither*

- *Not sure*

Which party has a majority of seats in the Senate?

- *Republicans*

- *Democrats*

- Neither

- Not sure

Just over 62% of respondents knew the party in control of the House and 59% knew the party in control of the Senate. Importantly, the cronbach alpha for the two questions is 0.92, suggesting strong internal consistency, and the responses to the two questions are highly correlated (0.85). Since both questions were similarly difficult, our measure of political knowledge for the CCES sample is the number of questions respondents answered correctly (0, 1, or 2) and a histogram of the measure is presented below in Appendix Figure 4.

Appendix Figure 4: Distribution of political knowledge in the CCES sample.

Appendix Table 9 presents results from a linear probability model regressing support for the constitutional status quo on treatment assignment, political knowledge, and the interaction of the two. The interaction is not significant in either condition, suggesting the effect of the treatment does not differ depending on subjects' political knowledge.

	Collective Bargaining	2/3 Majority
Treatment	0.150**	0.146**
	(0.062)	(0.062)
Political Knowledge	0.043	0.042
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Treatment * Political Knowledge	−0.041	0.012
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Constant	0.432***	0.403***
	(0.046)	(0.045)
N	821	821

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Appendix Table 9: Opposition (in favor of maintaining the constitutional status quo) to the hypothetical constitutional amendments.

In the Lucid survey, we asked questions designed to probe knowledge of the US Constitution. Specifically, we asked respondents the following questions:

For how many years is a member of the US House of Representatives elected – that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a US House member?

- *2*

- *4*

- *6*

- 8

For how many years is a member of the US Senator elected – that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a US Senator?

   - 2

   - 4

   - 6

   - 8

How much of a majority is required for the US Senate and US House to override a presidential veto?

   - One-half

   - Two-thirds

   - Three-fourths

   - Three-fifths

Which part of the US Constitution is referred to as the "Bill of Rights"?

   - Article I

   - Article II

   - Article III

   - Amendments 1-10

   - Amendments 13-15

Do you happen to know if children born to illegal immigrants in the US are automatically US citizens, or are they NOT automatically US citizens?

- *Yes, automatically become citizens*

- *No, do not automatically become citizens*

Nearly 45% of respondents knew the length of a full term for a member of the US House of Representatives and 60% knew it for a member of the US Senate. Just over 55% correctly answered that Amendments 1-10 to the US Constitution are referred to as the Bill of Rights, 79% knew children born to illegal immigrants are automatically US citizens, and nearly 81% knew the majority required to override a presidential veto.

To take into account that some questions were more difficult than others, we estimate a two parameter logistic IRT model. The results are presented below in Appendix Table 10.

	Difficulty	Discrimination
House Term	0.26	1.23
Senate Term	-0.46	1.03
Veto Override	-3.02	0.49
Birthright Citizenship	-3.32	0.40
Bill of Rights	-0.18	1.47

Appendix Table 10: Difficulty and discrimination parameter estimates from a two parameter logistic IRT model.

Appendix Figure 5: Item characteristic curves.

Appendix Figure 6: Item information curve.

22

The difficulty parameter estimates reflect that the veto override and birthright citizenship questions are considerably easier to answer than the other three questions and the discrimination parameter estimates suggest that the bill of rights and congressional term questions do a good job of differentiating between subjects with higher versus lower levels of knowledge about the Constitution. This is also illustrated by the item characteristic curves plotted in Appendix Figure 5 – low knowledge respondents tend to incorrectly answer these three questions and high knowledge respondents tend to answer them correctly. The bell-shaped item information curve presented in Appendix Figure 6 suggests that our five question battery is a good overall measure of constitutional knowledge. Our measure of constitutional knowledge is the factor score for the two parameter model. The distribution of the factor score is presented in Appendix Figure 7.

Appendix Table 11 presents results from a linear probability model regressing support for the constitutional status quo on treatment assignment, constitutional knowledge score, and the interaction of the two. The interaction is not significant for the measure, suggesting the effect of the treatment does not differ depending on the level of subjects' knowledge of the Constitution. This suggests that alternative explanations that would expect differential treatment effects based on political or constitutional knowledge likely are not plausible.

Consider, for example, one alternative explanation we outlined in the main text – that our results in fact illustrate that respondents are rationally weighing the costs associated with

Appendix Figure 7: Distribution of the constitutional knowledge measure for the the Lucid sample.

	Collective Bargaining	2/3 Majority
Treatment	0.116**	0.105*
	(0.053)	(0.054)
Constitutional Knowledge	0.010	0.037
	(0.059)	(0.060)
Treatment * Constitutional Knowledge	0.130	0.062
	(0.082)	(0.084)
Constant	0.331***	0.497***
	(0.037)	(0.038)
N	336	336

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Appendix Table 11: Opposition (in favor of maintaining the constitutional status quo) to the hypothetical constitutional amendments.

using constitutional means to pursue policy changes and making a calculated choice to reject the amendment proposals, given the heightened uncertainty associated with the difficulty of undoing the amendment in the event it has unintended consequences. We have addressed this concern in other ways in the main paper text and in this Appendix (see below). Additionally, to the extent this explanation assumes at least some constitutional knowledge, another way to address it is to examine whether treatment effects differ based on knowledge, with the expectation that we would see larger treatment effects among those respondents exhibiting higher levels of political or constitutional knowledge. That we find no significant difference in treatment effects based on respondents' level of knowledge offers more evidence that this explanation does not provide the best interpretation of our results.

Difficulty Changing the Constitution

Even though we designed the control and treatment language to reassure respondents that the proposed amendment would not upset the policy status quo, there may be a lingering concern that the treatment resulted greater support for the constitutional status quo because it still prompted respondents to think the amendment would be difficult to undo if there are unforeseen consequences. To test this, we included in the CCES survey a post-treatment question asking respondents to indicate how difficult they believe it is to change federal law and the US Constitution. Respondents used a 100 point drag-and-drop scale ranging from zero (representing it is "not at all difficult" to change) to 100 (indicating it is "very difficult" to change) to rate the difficulty of changing both the Constitution and federal law. If our treatment effects are attributable to the increased sense of uncertainty associated with changing the Constitution, then we would expect it to prime the respondents receiving it, making them especially attuned to the difficulty of amending the Constitution and therefore more likely to rate the Constitution as difficult to amend relative to their counterparts in the control group. As Appendix Table 12 indicates, however, respondents assigned to the treatment condition (highlighting constitutional change) are no more likely to rate the Constitution as difficult to amend than those in the control group (emphasizing federal legal change). This suggests that respondents assigned to the treatment group were not thinking about amendment difficulty when considering the amendment proposals. We note, however, the table also reflects that respondents generally grasped that the Constitution is harder to

change than federal law.

	Difficulty in Changing		
	Control	Treatment	Difference
Constitution	71.40	72.22	0.81
	$(N = 372)$	$(N = 382)$	$(p = 0.68)$
Law	52.48	51.15	-1.33
	$(N = 368)$	$(N = 375)$	$(p = 0.47)$

Appendix Table 12: Difference in means. P-values are associated with two-tailed t-tests.

Lucid Attention Checks

As part of the Lucid survey conducted on December 13, subjects were required to pass two attention checks in order to participate. Attention checks were especially important given the documented inattention among Lucid respondents during the COVID-19 pandemic (Peyton, Huber & Coppock 2020).

The first attention check stated:

For our research, careful attention to survey questions is critical! We thank you for your care.

after which, subjects were asked to respond that they understood:

    - I understand

    - I do not understand

Those that did not respond *I understand* were not able to continue with the survey.

The second attention check asked:

People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. We are testing whether people read the questions. To show that you have read this much, answer both "extremely interested" and "very interested."

    - Extremely interested

    - Very interested

- Moderately interested

- Slightly interested

- Not interested at all

Those that did not answer *extremely interested* and *very interested* were not allowed to continue with the survey.

In order to participate in the Lucid survey conducted on December 25, subjects were required to answer a question correctly based on a Mock Vignette Check (MVC). The exact wording of the MVC comes from from Kane, Velez & Barabas (2020).

Next, we would like to ask you questions on a different topic. Please read the following passage from a recent magazine article.

A Passage from a Recent Magazine Article:

A new law regarding hazardous vegetation (such as trees, bushes, plants, etc.) has been in effect since early this year after being passed by the local city council. The law, which requires brush-clearing for properties, gives the county the power to hire contractors to remove hazardous vegetation if property owners do not comply with the law, and then charge property owners for the work done. This legislation eventually received total support from the board of supervisors. However, the original law had been changed after residents criticized a first draft of the proposal, citing concern over potentially massive fines for property owners and other

issues. But the late adoption of the law complicated the timing of its enforcement, creating uncertainty over how forcefully to push property owners to clear their brush when summer temperatures, and fire danger, are high.

What was the topic of the magazine article you just read?

- *Insect traps*

- *Forest protection*

- *Hazardous vegetation*

- *Climate change*

- *Sewage routing*

- *Property taxes*

Subjects that did not answer *hazardous vegetation* were not allowed to continue with the survey.

Immediately prior to assignment to the treatment or control conditions, subjects in both the December 13 and 25 Lucid surveys were asked to complete a MVC in order to test whether the treatment effect was attenuated due to inattention. The exact wording of the MVC comes from from Kane, Velez & Barabas (2020).

Next, we would like to ask you additional questions on a different topic. Please read the following passage from a recent magazine article.

A Passage from a Recent Magazine Article:

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the industry's regulator, will require all ships to cut the level of sulfur in their engine emissions beginning January 1st. The limit reduces the sulfur dioxide (SO2) that ships emit into the atmosphere via the ship's funnel. Therefore, policymakers expect that there will be a reduction in the SO2 that finds its way into the air. It may seem like a small change, but the effects will ripple across the oil value chain. For example, many ships will comply by investing in scrubbers that strip the sulfur out of the exhaust. But, there is a lot of worry over the possibility that ships will divert air pollutants directly into the sea, leading to greater pollution in the ocean. The other issue is that the regulation does not currently require refiners to remove the sulfur at its origin.

What was the topic of the magazine article you just read about?

- *Industrial chemical solutions*

- *New steel tariffs*

- *Sulfur reductions*

- *Plane cargo limits*

- *Air travel regulations*

- *Fishing licensing reform*

31

Which organization, according to the magazine article, was responsible for the rule change?

    - National Science Foundation

    - International Maritime Organization

    - International Monetary Fund

    - Industrial Manufacturing Organization

    - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association

    - Government Accountability Office

What, according to the magazine article, is a possible consequence of the rule change being discussed?

    - Increased pollution into the oceans

    - Decreased profits for business

    - Increased corruption in government

    - Increased health risks of citizens

    - All of the above

    - None of the above

Appendix Figure 8 displays the treatment effect for the full sample regardless of how they answered the MVC as well as based on whether subjects answered MVC questions correctly. It is clear from the figure that inattentiveness reduced the effect of the treatment, especially in the 2/3 majority condition. In order to balance having a reasonable sample size and

reducing the effect of inattentiveness, we restricted our analysis to those who answered the

first MVC question correctly (*sulfur reductions*).

Appendix Figure 8: Treatment Effects by MVC Questions Answered Correctly.

Balance Tests

	Control	Treatment	p-value
Study 1 (CCES)			
Political SJ	28.71	29.54	0.14
High Political SJ	0.24	0.29	0.10
Constitution Works	2.29	2.28	0.79
Outdated	0.12	0.11	0.56
Minor Changes	0.47	0.50	0.27
Works Well	0.41	0.39	0.46
Conservative	0.35	0.38	0.46
Liberal	0.31	0.30	0.55
Republican	0.25	0.26	0.80
Democrat	0.39	0.36	0.38
Age	46.40	50.85	0.00
Union Household	0.39	0.39	0.97
Study 2 (Lucid)			
Constitutional Respect	-0.06	0.06	0.26
High Respect	0.22	0.28	0.19
Republican	0.34	0.28	0.22
Democrat	0.33	0.41	0.12
Age	50.76	53.53	0.14

Appendix Table 13: Means for CCES and Lucid sample treatment and control groups. P-values indicate whether or not the control and treatment groups are significantly different on the characteristic of interest.

References

Brown, Adam R. & Jeremy C. Pope. 2019. "Measuring and Manipulating Constitutional Evaluations in the States: Legitimacy Versus Veneration." *American Politics Research* 47(5):1135–1161.

Jost, John T., Ido Liviatan, Jojanneke van der Toorn, Alison Ledgerwood, Anesu Mandisodza & Brian A. Nosek. 2010. "System Justification: How Do We Know It's Motivated?" *The Psychology of Justice and Legitimacy: The Ontario Symposium* pp. 173–203.

Kane, John V, Yamil R Velez & Jason Barabas. 2020. "Analyze the Attentive & Bypass Bias: Mock Vignette Checks in Survey Experiments.".

Peyton, Kyle, Gregory A. Huber & Alexander Coppock. 2020. "The Generalizability of Online Experiments Conducted During the COVID-19 Pandemic.".