

When Do Sources Persuade?

The Effect of Source Credibility on Opinion Change

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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A Pre-test

A.1 Source name

We pre-tested the name of 24hr Nation against a couple of alternative made-up names to find the option least familiar to people and perceived as least ideological. Familiarity was measured with the question “We are curious about which news outlets you are familiar with. Which of the following do you recognize?” with response options “recognize” and “do not recognize.” Perceived ideology was measured with the question “Whether you know the sources we have shown you or not, can you tell us whether you think they are more liberal or conservative?” with a seven-point scale from “Extremely liberal” (0) to “Extremely conservative” (6). The pre-test with 450 subjects showed that 24hr Nation was the best mix of being unfamiliar to people and perceived as neutral (cf. Figure 1).




Figure 1: Recognition and perceived ideology of five sources (pretest)

A.2 Credibility stimuli

We also pre-tested three credibility stimuli, namely one about the made-up source receiving a “Free Press Award,” one about the source’s score at “Media Checkup” and one that described the source as being the most popular among US congress members of both parties. Figure 2 shows that all stimuli were very similar in their effect compared to the control group. We therefore chose the first two that seemed intuitively most realistic. They are described in greater detail in Section C.




Figure 2: Effects of possible credibility stimuli (pretest)


B Deviations from pre-analysis plan

- We changed the name of the variable “feeling of warmth” into “favorability” in all hypotheses.
- In H2a and H3a, we changed “The op-ed treatment will...” to “The short-time work op-ed treatment will...”
- Hypotheses H1d-f are not mentioned in the main text because results are practically identical to H1a-c (see Table 13 below).

C Stimuli

All stimuli screenshots were designed to be responsive for use on mobile phones.

C.1 Credibility treatment



(a) Low credibility

(b) High credibility

Figure 3: Screenshots used in Credibility Treatment Wave 1

24hr-nation.com

A website that reports news on American politics and elections but has promoted false and unsubstantiated content.

Ownership and Financing

24hr Nation, based in Washington, D.C., has been owned by the Anderson Family since 2010. The family supports a range of causes through a network of foundations, but specifics about beneficiaries of their largesse are difficult to confirm. It is also unclear to what extent the foundation is involved in editorial decisions related to 24hr Nation's coverage.

24hr Nation generates revenue through advertisements and clickbait headlines. According to our research, its readership is mainly driven by links from online advertising networks, bots on social media, and promoted referrals placed on other websites.

Content

24hr Nation frequently rewrites newswire content and existing articles, often without attribution and in a sensationalist manner. This practice is occasionally supplemented by "exclusives" summarizing unverified rumors. Its "About" page states that the site seeks to "understand and unearth hidden evidence and enhance everybody's [sic] understanding," and no information is provided about the editorial team. It has repeatedly published debunked claims that have later been amplified by other sites that Media Checkup has found to be unreliable.



Proceed with caution: This website severely violates basic standards of credibility and transparency.

Score: 12.5/100

- ✗ Does not repeatedly publish false content (22 points)
- ✗ Gathers and presents information responsibly (18)
- ✗ Regularly corrects or clarifies errors (12.5)
- ✗ Handles the difference between news and opinion responsibly (12.5)
- ✗ Avoids deceptive headlines (10)
- ✗ Website discloses ownership and financing (7.5)
- ✓ Clearly labels advertising (7.5)
- ✗ Reveals who's in charge, including any possible conflicts of interest (5)
- ✓ The site provides names of content creators, along with either contact or biographical information (5)

(a) Low credibility

24hr-nation.com

A website that reports news on American politics and elections and publishes daily newsletters for Washington insiders.

Ownership and Financing

24hr Nation, based in Washington, D.C., has been majority-owned by the Anderson Family Foundation since 2010. The foundation, which supports a wide range of philanthropic causes, was set up by Wallace Anderson, Jr. in 1925. According to its charter, it is not involved in the editorial decisions of 24hr Nation.

24hr Nation generates revenue through advertisements and subscriptions. According to our research, its subscriptions have increased significantly over the last two years among people who work in both government and a variety of business industries.

Content

24hr Nation has a strong Washington-based focus on breaking news about politics and policy, with an emphasis on scoops of national relevance. As described on its About page, the site aims "to be the dominant source for politics and policy in power centers around the nation, where access to reliable information, nonpartisan journalism and real-time tools informs and engages the citizenry."



This website adheres to all nine of NewsGuard's standards of credibility and transparency.

Score: 100/100

- ✓ Does not repeatedly publish false content (22 points)
- ✓ Gathers and presents information responsibly (18)
- ✓ Regularly corrects or clarifies errors (12.5)
- ✓ Handles the difference between news and opinion responsibly (12.5)
- ✓ Avoids deceptive headlines (10)
- ✓ Website discloses ownership and financing (7.5)
- ✓ Clearly labels advertising (7.5)
- ✓ Reveals who's in charge, including any possible conflicts of interest (5)
- ✓ The site provides names of content creators, along with either contact or biographical information (5)

(b) High credibility

Figure 4: Screenshots used in Credibility Treatment Wave 2

C.2 Non-partisan issue persuasion treatment

C.2.1 Persuasion condition



Figure 5: Screenshot shown in non-partisan persuasion treatment

Why the U.S. government should consider “short-time work” policies to fight unemployment during the pandemic

For the first time, the U.S. government is subsidizing companies to hold on to their workers. However, the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) that Congress passed to fight unemployment in the coronavirus economic crisis is having trouble delivering benefits. To understand what is going on, it's helpful to understand how European governments approach the same problem: through “short-time work” (STW) policies. The PPP program in the United States is plausibly more generous to those it helps than its European equivalents. However, it's having a harder time fighting unemployment. That's both because of its design and because of the U.S. government's weaknesses. The PPP is supposed to keep people working by loaning funds to small- and medium-sized businesses. According to the bill, the United States will forgive the loan if businesses use it for payroll costs, mortgage interest, rent, and utilities payments — so long as the borrowing firm keeps the same number of workers. Europe is adopting a different approach. What are called “short-time work policies” directly compensate workers when their hours are reduced. That lets firms avoid layoffs and their associated costs by instead reducing employees' hours. These policies aren't new: Germany has had them for decades, using them in economic downturns to compensate workers whose hours are reduced by paying between 60 and 87 percent of net earnings lost. Our research shows that the U.S. program is comparatively generous to the firms it helps, paying 100 percent of employees' earnings up to \$100,000. So why has the U.S. program been less effective in reducing unemployment? The answer doesn't lie in the level of support to individual workers, but in the program's design and administration. German STW is a general legal entitlement: The government has to subsidize all firms and workers that fulfill the criteria for support. Unlike their U.S. equivalents, German firms aren't fighting over a limited pool of funds. Finally, it isn't just the size of the assistance package that counts: it is how it is delivered. Over the last several decades, the United States has either shrunk its state capacity or failed to build it, especially around providing social benefits. In Europe, by contrast, governments have enough administrative capacity to deliver comprehensive help swiftly and directly.

C.2.2 Control condition




Figure 6: Screenshot shown in non-partisan persuasion treatment (control)

Why hiking is good for your health

The experience of hiking is unique, research suggests, conveying benefits beyond what you receive from typical exercise. Not only does it oxygenate your heart, it helps keep your mind sharper, your body calmer, your creativity more alive, and your relationships happier. And, evidence suggests that being around trees may provide extra benefits, perhaps because of certain organic compounds that trees exude that boost our mood and our overall psychological well-being. Hiking in nature is so powerful for our health and well-being that some doctors have begun prescribing it as an adjunct to other treatments for disease. As one group of researchers puts it, “The synergistic effect of physical activity and time spent in nature make hiking an ideal activity to increase overall health and wellness.” Hiking involves something many other forms of exercise don’t: trails. That means it requires navigating in a world that’s not totally predictable. Slippery dirt, overhanging branches and hidden obstacles, trail markers, and wild animals crossing your path — all of the things you might encounter on a trail — require micro- and macro-adjustments to your route, which is good for your brain.

C.3 Partisan issue persuasion treatment

C.3.1 Pro-Democrat condition



Figure 7: Screenshot shown in partisan persuasion treatment (guns, pro-Democrat)

That Assault Weapon Ban? It Really Did Work

Since the ban was lifted in 2004, gun massacres involving military-style weapons are way up. Recent mass shootings have revived demands for meaningful gun control. But many opponents of a renewed federal ban on assault weapons, led by the National Rifle Association, say the earlier ban, from 1994 to 2004, made no difference. New research shows otherwise.

Researchers found that public mass shootings — defined as incidents in which a gunman killed at least six people in public — dropped during the decade of the federal ban. Yet, in the 15 years since the ban ended, the trajectory of gun massacres has been sharply upward, largely tracking the growth in ownership of military-style weapons and high-capacity magazines.

Using the Mother Jones mass shooting database, they identified the number of gun massacres over a 35-year period. Compared with the decade before its adoption, the federal assault weapon ban in effect from September 1994 through 2004 was associated with a 25 percent drop in gun massacres (from eight to six) and a 40 percent drop in fatalities (from 81 to 49).

This decline is plausible because assault weapons are semiautomatic firearms designed for rapid fire and combat use, and large-capacity magazines increase the number of rounds that can be fired without reloading. In the decade after the ban ended, there was a 347 percent increase in fatalities in gun massacres, even as overall violent crime continued downward.

Similarly, fatalities per shooting incident fell during the assault weapon ban and have risen sharply since. With increasingly potent and readily available weaponry, the average number of people who die in a gun massacre has increased by 81 percent in just five years. Assault weapons were used in at least 11 of the 15 gun massacres since 2014; at least 234 of the 271 people who died in gun massacres since 2014 were killed by weapons prohibited under the federal assault weapons ban.

The extraordinary increase in the body count from public gun massacres since the end of the federal assault weapons ban and the passage of a federal immunity statute for the gun industry has one obvious explanation: the brazen promotion and the proliferating, loosely regulated, highly profitable sales of the most desirable and effective weaponry for committing mass murder.



OPINION

Of Course Trump's Tariffs Hurt U.S. Manufacturing

By THE 24HR NATION EDITORIAL BOARD

OCT. 10, 2020 | 9 AM

Figure 8: Screenshot shown in partisan persuasion treatment (protectionism, pro-Democrat)

Of Course Trump's Tariffs Hurt U.S. Manufacturing.

Protectionism isn't helping its intended beneficiaries, new research shows.

It's common for advocates of protectionism to argue that while trade restrictions may not be good for the economy as a whole, they are needed to bolster some important national interest. In the U.S., they claim that Donald Trump's trade war would help manufacturing workers even if it increased consumer prices and slowed overall economic growth.

But the latest evidence suggests that the manufacturing industry isn't benefiting from the trade war. Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce, economists at the Federal Reserve Board, studied the effects of the unusual tariff escalation imposed by the U.S. against its trading partners — China, most notably — that began in 2018. Their study compared industries such as electrical lighting equipment, motor vehicle manufacturing, and forging and stamping — some more affected by tariffs and others less — to assess the effects on employment, output and prices.

The study found that, if viewed in isolation, the protection from import competition provided by the tariffs does increase manufacturing employment in the immediate term.

But this is missing the most important part of the story. Tariffs also increase the costs businesses face to purchase the goods they need for production, which the economists estimated reduces employment in affected industries by 1.1 percent. These rising costs suppress employment more than protection from import competition supports it.

The economists also took into account the "tit-for-tat" quality of the trade war, which began in early 2018, when the U.S. announced tariffs on imported washing machines and solar panels. Retaliation by China and other trading partners hurt the competitiveness of U.S. firms overseas, suppressing manufacturing employment by more than protection from imports boosted it.

Taking these factors into account, the Fed study found that manufacturing employment was reduced by 1.4 percent as a consequence of the trade war. Beyond reducing manufacturing employment, the study concluded that producer prices increased, but that manufacturing output did not. So the tariffs didn't just hurt the economy as a whole, but damaged the manufacturing sector specifically.

In the future, the U.S. should pursue a strategy of multilateral engagement to address China's harmful conduct. And the U.S. should compete with China by out-innovating it, not by building protectionist walls that hurt American households and workers.

C.3.2 Pro-Republican condition




Figure 9: Screenshot shown in partisan persuasion treatment (guns, pro-Republican)

The assault weapons ban didn't work. A new version won't, either

There is no denying that the AR-15 is the most easy to use and the most lethal gun available to civilians. Those of us who defend the 2nd Amendment right to own guns must reckon with this technological reality.

But we can't find common ground with gun safety advocates as long as they use shoddy arguments and manipulated statistics to cloud the debate. A case in point is the widely cited work of Louis Klarevas, a professor at the University of Massachusetts at Boston whose 2016 book, *Rampage Nation: Securing America From Mass Shootings*, has lately bolstered calls for a renewal of the 1994 assault weapons ban, which lapsed in 2004.

Until Klarevas came along, virtually all researchers had concluded that it was impossible to discern what, if any, positive effect the ban's prohibition of rifles with "military-style features" had on crime or mass shooting incidents. This is why many gun-control advocacy groups, including Sandy Hook Promise, do not include a ban on their list of legislative priorities. The last ban was politically costly for Democrats and, as a ProPublica investigation reported in 2014, gun control experts said there was no evidence it saved lives.

Rampage Nation has energized proponents of a new ban by making the spectacular claim that, contrary to the consensus, the original was responsible for a remarkable 37% decline in mass shooting fatalities. But there's a serious flaw in Klarevas' result: There are few actual "assault weapons" of any type in his dataset, either pre- or post-ban. Klarevas and his allies are taking an apparent drop in fatalities from what are mostly handgun shootings and attributing this lowered body count to the 1994 legislation.

We cross-referenced Klarevas's dataset with Mother Jones' list of U.S. mass shootings and with news reports. What I found was that for the decade prior to the ban, only two of the 19 mass shootings in Klarevas' dataset involved civilian versions of military rifles. As for the decade during which the ban was in place, only three actually involved assault weapons. These numbers are far too small for any sort of statistical inference, especially if you're trying to build a case for banning tens of millions of legally owned rifles.

If passed, a new ban will once again succeed in frustrating gun owners with pointless, feel-good regulations, while saving no lives.



Give Trump's Tariffs a Fair Test

By THE 24HR NATION EDITORIAL BOARD
OCT. 10, 2020 | 9 AM

Figure 10: Screenshot shown in non-partisan persuasion treatment (protectionism, pro-Republican)

Give Trump's Tariffs a Fair Test

Critics of President Trump's transformational trade policies continue to insist that the tariffs are hindering rather than helping the boom. Citing forecasts like the latest from the Federal Open Market Committee, they have tarred the Trump tariffs as price inflators, job killers and growth destroyers. Yet with each new tariff—on dishwashers, solar panels, aluminum, steel and more than \$300 billion of Chinese imports—the economy remains robust, wages continue to rise, and inflation stays muted.

Why have the gloom-and-doom forecasters been so wrong? The errors come from flaws in traditional economic models. While a tariff on steel, for example, might boost employment in that industry, the price of steel would rise for car makers downstream, which would then suffer lower production and fewer jobs—or so these models typically go.

Yet these effects are scarcely found in aggregate macroeconomic statistics. Before the coronavirus pandemic led to a temporary pause in growth, the economy added more than seven million jobs during the Trump presidency. Median household income hit a record \$66,000 last year, and income inequality dropped sharply as the lowest earners got the largest proportional gains.

Critics also overlook the ways the U.S. has suffered under open trade. Research by economists like MIT's David Autor has illustrated the socioeconomic harm caused by expanded trade with China in the 2000s, which contributed to the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs and the hollowing out of many Midwest and Southern communities. What followed was an associated rise in the rates of divorce, drug addiction, crime, depression and death.

The national-security externalities associated with Trump trade policy may be even more consequential. A case in point is the tariffs being used as leverage to defend America's technological crown jewels from being forcibly transferred to Chinese companies—from artificial intelligence and robotics to quantum computing and blockchain. These industries comprise the core of the next generation of military defense systems. One must ask the antitariff forecasters: Where are the benefits of a freer and more secure American homeland counted in your models?

An honest, modern analysis of the Trump tariffs would appropriately discount short-term price impacts and dynamically score the many long-term positive effects. Americans should welcome this analysis warmly—especially in the heartland, where the predictions of the anti-tariff forecasters seem so out of touch with the realities of the Trump economy.

C.3.3 Control condition




Figure 11: Screenshot shown in non-partisan persuasion treatment (guns, control)

Sauces in cooking

Travis Lett often steals. Of course, the only person this pensive chef ever steals from is himself. At Gjelina, his Los Angeles, USA restaurant with a large, ever-changing menu, “We’re constantly appropriating elements from dishes we’ve done in the past to create new combinations,” he said. There’s a lesson here: To improve your cooking, learn how to make and use sauce like a professional. Five basic types of sauces appear over and over again on menus and in cookbooks that feature the kind of vegetable-heavy, flavor-dense food that cooks and eaters favor today: yogurt sauce, pepper sauce, herb sauce, tahini sauce and pesto. Master each one, and you’ll immediately have access to the dozens of variations that descend from them, too.

Think of them as the new mother sauces, an updated version of the five mother sauces of French cuisine. Armed with one of these five sauces, the home cook can go on and cook what he or she is most comfortable cooking: roast chicken, grilled steak or fish, roasted vegetables, a pot of beans or rice. The right sauce will transform the distinct elements of a dish into a unified statement of taste.



Figure 12: Screenshot shown in non-partisan persuasion treatment (protectionism, control)

Mattresses and sleep aids are now high-tech

This morning, like most mornings, I looked at my phone. The screen read, "26." "Only a 26?" I thought. Then I realized my mistake: I'd forgotten to switch it on until 2:45 a.m.

"It" is Beddit, a device that sits underneath my fitted sheet and tracks my heart rate and movement while I sleep. Each morning, I'm awarded a score — a 100 is perfect, a zero means you did not sleep at all. Before technology started trying to fix sleep, it ruined it.

New gadgets can tell us what we're doing wrong. Sleep isn't just what we do when we're not doing anything: It's a market, a massive and trendy economy that's selling something we can't live without.

The appeal of these services is obvious. The ease of booting up your smartphone and accomplishing such a boring, adult purchase — complete with a customization quiz, no less — is far more appealing than the alternative.

"The mattress industry was overdue for disruption and the direct-to-consumer e-commerce wave is just starting to crescendo," says Matt Hayes, head of marketing at Leesa. "There's definitely been a mattress revolution over the last five years," says Saatva's Joshi.

D Measures

The table below shows question wording and response options for all variables. We re-coded some of these raw measures as follows:

- The perceived bias scale went from “1 - Tends to favor the liberal side” to “5 - Tends to favor the conservative side.” We folded it so that values on both ends of the original scale represent most bias.
- The three measures favorability, trust, perceived bias loaded strongly on a principle component (explaining 62.25 percent of the variance), so we created an averaged index for the analysis of heterogeneous effects.
- The gun control battery loaded strongly on a principal factor (explaining 71.06 percent of the variance).
- The protectionism battery also loaded on a principal component, but yielded inter-item correlations opposite to what we expected. For example, supporting Trump’s tariffs correlated with believing that international trade was good for jobs for U.S. workers. As it is difficult to make sense of an index based on these correlations, we deviated from our pre-registration here and did not create any average index. Instead, we used the item “Overall, do you think these increased tariffs between the U.S. and its trading partners have been positive or negative for the United States?”
- The digital-literacy battery loaded strongly on a principal factor and we created an average index for the analysis of heterogeneous effects.

Wave	Variable	Question	Response options
W1 pre-treatment	Age	How old are you?	Drop-down input
W1 pre-treatment	Gender	What is your gender?	male, female, other
W1 pre-treatment	Education	What is the highest level of school or degree you have completed?	12th grade without diploma or less; High school graduate with diploma or equivalent; Some college but no degree, or associate degree in college; Bachelor’s degree; Master’s degree, professional school degree, or doctorate degree
W1 pre-treatment	Partisanship	Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?	Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; No preference
W1 pre-treatment	Partisanship leaners	Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?	Strong; Not very strong
W1 pre-treatment	Partisanship leaners	Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?	Strong; Not very strong
W1 pre-treatment	Partisanship leaners	Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?	Republican; Democratic

Wave	Variable	Question	Response options
W1 pre-treatment	Race	Here is a list of five race categories. Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be:	White; Black or African-American; American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
W1 pre-treatment	Media trust	In general, how much trust and confidence do you have in the mass media – such as newspapers, news web sites, TV and radio – when it comes to reporting the news fully, accurately, and fairly?	A great deal; A fair amount; Not very much; None at all
W1 pre-treatment	Facebook use	In the past week, on average, approximately how much time PER DAY have you spent actively using Facebook?	None; Less than 10 minutes per day; 10-30 minutes per day; 31-59 minutes per day; 1-2 hours per day; 2-3 hours per day; More than 3 hours per day
W1 pre-treatment	Digital literacy 1	How familiar are you with the following computer and Internet-related items? 0 means “no understanding” and 5 means “full understanding” of the item. [items: Phishing, Hashtag, JPG, Malware, Cache, RSS]	1: No understanding; 2; 3; 4; 5: Full understanding
W1 pre-treatment	Digital literacy 2	I prefer to ask friends how to use any new technological gadget instead of trying to figure it out myself.	Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Slightly disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Slightly agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
W1 pre-treatment	Digital literacy 3	I feel like information technology is a part of my daily life.	Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Slightly disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Slightly agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
W1 pre-treatment	Digital literacy 4	Using information technology makes it easier to do my work.	Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Slightly disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Slightly agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

Wave	Variable	Question	Response options
W1 pre-treatment	Digital literacy 5	I often have trouble finding things that I've saved on my computer.	Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Slightly disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Slightly agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
W1 pre-treatment	Ideology	We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?	Extremely liberal; Liberal; Slightly liberal; Moderate; middle of the road; Slightly conservative; Conservative; Extremely conservative
W1 & W2 post-treatment	Favorability towards a source	How would you rate the following media sources on a feeling thermometer?	0 - 100
W1 & W2 post-treatment	Trust towards a source	Generally speaking, to what extent do you trust information from the following media sources?	Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; A great deal; Don't Know
W1 & W2 post-treatment	Perceived bias of a source	In presenting the news dealing with political and social issues, do you think the following sources deal fairly with all sides, or do they tend to favor one side?	1 - Tends to favor the liberal side; 2; 3; 4; 5 - Tends to favor the conservative side; Don't Know
W2 post-treatment	Support for short-time work policies	Do you agree or disagree that the United States should adopt 'short-time work' policies designed to keep employees on companies' payrolls and compensate workers for reduced hours?"	Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
W2 post-treatment & W3 post-treatment	Attitudes on gun control 1	Do you support or oppose stricter gun control laws in the United States?	Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support
W3 post-treatment	Attitudes on gun control 2	What do you think is more important — to protect the right of Americans to own guns, or to regulate gun ownership?	Protect the right to own guns; Regulate gun ownership
W3 post-treatment	Attitudes on gun control 3	Do you support or oppose a nationwide ban on the sale of assault weapons?	Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

Wave	Variable	Question	Response options
W3 post-treatment	Attitudes on gun control 4	Do you support or oppose a nationwide ban on the possession of handguns?	Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support
W3 post-treatment	Attitudes on economic protectionism 1	As you may know, the Trump administration has increased tariffs or fees on imported goods from a number of countries. In response, some of these countries have increased tariffs on American goods. Overall, do you think these increased tariffs between the U.S. and its trading partners have been positive or negative for the United States?	Very negative; Somewhat negative; Neither negative nor positive; Somewhat positive; Very positive
W3 post-treatment	Attitudes on economic protectionism 2	Do you think U.S. trade with other countries has a positive or negative effect on [items: U.S. economic growth, The prices Americans pay for products, American businesses, Jobs for U.S. workers, Relations with other countries]	Very negative; Somewhat negative; Neither negative nor positive; Somewhat positive; Very positive

E Sample statistics and attrition

E.1 Survey timing




Figure 13: Distribution of days between surveys

The sample of U.S. respondents was recruited by Dynata with a quota set on partisanship. We further filtered out respondents who failed to pass an attention check at the beginning of the survey ($n = 684$). Wave 1 was fielded on October 14 and closed on October 21; Wave 2 was in the field October 22 - 28; Wave 3 between October 29 and November 2. The median difference between starting dates in Wave 1 and 2 was 3.97 days; 5.85 days between Wave 2 and 3; 9.42 days between 1 and 3. Figure 13 shows the distributions of days between the waves.

E.2 Demographics and attrition

Table 2 below shows sample statistics in comparison with the US population, and changes across waves. The Consort-style flowchart in Figure 14 shows at what points and in which treatment arms participants dropped out. We also test attrition formally: First, we are interested whether attrition rates differ across treatments; and second, whether attrition patterns differ along sociodemographics. To answer the first question, we regress participating in wave 2 on wave 1 treatment assignment (only comparing high- and low-credibility assignment), and participating in wave 3 on wave 2 treatment assignment. We then test the null hypothesis that the treatment coefficient is zero by comparing this observed statistic with its empirical distribution under random reassignments of treatment. This null cannot be rejected (W2: $p = 0.996$; W3: $p = 1.000$) so we conclude that the attrition rate is not affected.

Second, we regress treatment status at the beginning of waves 2 and 3 on a number of sociodemographics, testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero and comparing this observed statistic with its empirical distribution under random reassignments of treatment. For Wave 2, we compare people who were assigned to the high-credibility condition in Wave 1 to those assigned to the low-credibility condition in Wave 1. For Wave 3, we compare those assigned to the persuasion condition to those in the control condition. Again, both tests reveal that the observed attrition patterns are not asymmetrical enough to be attributed to anything but chance (W2: $p = 0.595$; W3: $p = 0.735$).

variable	values	Population	Sample		
			Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Age	18-25	0.12	0.03	0.03	0.02
	26-34	0.16	0.05	0.05	0.05
	35-54	0.34	0.21	0.22	0.21
	55-64	0.17	0.28	0.29	0.29
	65+	0.21	0.43	0.42	0.43
Gender	Female	0.51	0.49	0.48	0.47
Education	12th grade without diploma	0.11	0.01	0.01	0.01
	High school	0.29	0.14	0.14	0.13
	Some college	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.29
	Bachelor's degree	0.21	0.33	0.33	0.34
	Master's degree or above	0.12	0.23	0.23	0.24
Party identification	Democrat	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.32
	Republican	0.26	0.26	0.28	0.28
	Independent/Other/None	0.41	0.41	0.39	0.40

Table 2: Demographics of population and sample/waves




Figure 14: Attrition flow across waves

F Treatment balance

Tables 3, 4, 5 show that random assignment results in treatment groups well-balanced on age, gender, education and party identification.

Variable	Value	Condition		
		Control	High	Low
Age (median)		63.00	62.00	62.00
Gender (prop.)	Female	0.51	0.49	0.48
Education (prop.)	12th grade without diploma	0.01	0.01	0.01
	High school	0.14	0.15	0.15
	Some college	0.30	0.29	0.27
	Bachelor's degree	0.32	0.34	0.33
	Master's degree or above	0.23	0.21	0.24
Party ID (prop.)	Democrat	0.35	0.32	0.32
	Republican	0.25	0.25	0.28
	Independent/Other/None	0.40	0.42	0.40

Table 3: Balance statistics credibility treatment (W1)

Variable	Value	Condition	
		Hiking	Shortwork
Age (median)		62.00	62.00
Gender (prop.)	Female	0.49	0.48
Education (prop.)	12th grade without diploma	0.01	0.01
	High school	0.14	0.13
	Some college	0.29	0.28
	Bachelor's degree	0.31	0.36
	Master's degree or above	0.25	0.22
Party ID (prop.)	Democrat	0.34	0.32
	Republican	0.27	0.28
	Independent/Other/None	0.39	0.39

Table 4: Balance statistics persuasion treatment (W2)

Variable	Value	Condition		
		Control	High	Low
Age (median)		63.00	62.00	62.00
Gender (prop.)	Female	0.51	0.49	0.48
Education (prop.)	12th grade without diploma	0.01	0.01	0.01
	High school	0.14	0.15	0.15
	Some college	0.30	0.29	0.27
	Bachelor's degree	0.32	0.34	0.33
	Master's degree or above	0.23	0.21	0.24
Party ID (prop.)	Democrat	0.35	0.32	0.32
	Republican	0.25	0.25	0.28
	Independent/Other/None	0.40	0.42	0.40

Table 5: Balance statistics persuasion treatment (W2)

G Main results

Tables 6 through 15 show regressions for the results described in the main text. The upper panel of Figure 15 plots the treatment means for hypotheses H1d - H1f, specified in the pre-analysis plan but not treated in the main text, as results do not differ from H1a - H1c.

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	13.42*** (1.26)	13.83*** (1.20)	0.53*** (0.08)	0.57*** (0.07)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.08)
Low-credibility condition	-14.81*** (1.30)	-14.51*** (1.22)	-0.55*** (0.07)	-0.51*** (0.07)	0.37*** (0.08)	0.34*** (0.08)
Age		-0.16** (0.06)		-0.01** (0.00)		
Media trust		6.28*** (0.98)		0.42** (0.06)		
Facebook use		0.42 (0.58)		0.14*** (0.03)		
Race (white)		-7.48** (2.45)				
Partisanship						0.07** (0.03)
High-credibility * age		0.14 (0.09)		0.01** (0.01)		
Low-credibility * age		-0.28** (0.09)		-0.00 (0.00)		
High-credibility * media trust		0.46 (1.41)		-0.04 (0.08)		
Low-credibility * media trust		-5.00*** (1.42)		-0.30*** (0.07)		
High-credibility * Facebook use		2.13* (0.84)		-0.01 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * Facebook use		1.42 (0.86)		-0.03 (0.04)		
High-credibility * White		0.50 (3.82)				
Low-credibility * White		-5.93 (4.59)				
High-credibility * Partisanship						0.01 (0.03)
Low-credibility * Partisanship						-0.04 (0.03)
Intercept	37.82*** (0.86)	37.70*** (0.82)	1.12*** (0.06)	1.10*** (0.06)	0.86*** (0.06)	0.88*** (0.06)
R ²	0.17	0.26	0.15	0.28	0.07	0.10
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.26	0.15	0.27	0.06	0.09
Num. obs.	2322	2319	1650	1648	832	832
RMSE	25.66	24.21	1.14	1.05	0.85	0.84

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table 6: Models H1a - H1c

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	-1.35 (1.61)	-0.22 (1.10)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)
Low-credibility condition	0.49 (1.63)	1.14 (1.12)	0.09 (0.07)	0.11* (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)
Partisanship		-2.55*** (0.58)		-0.09*** (0.03)		0.11*** (0.02)
Ideology		-3.87*** (0.72)		-0.16*** (0.03)		0.01 (0.03)
Media trust		17.20*** (1.16)		0.84*** (0.05)		-0.20*** (0.04)
Digital literacy		2.59** (0.85)				
High-credibility * partisanship		-0.42 (0.81)		-0.01 (0.04)		-0.01 (0.03)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.42 (0.84)		-0.01 (0.04)		-0.01 (0.03)
High-credibility * ideology		0.79 (1.05)		0.06 (0.05)		0.02 (0.04)
Low-credibility * ideology		0.28 (1.05)		0.01 (0.05)		0.02 (0.04)
High-credibility * media trust		1.18 (1.59)		0.08 (0.07)		-0.07 (0.05)
Low-credibility * media trust		0.45 (1.62)		-0.02 (0.07)		-0.02 (0.05)
High-credibility * digital literacy		-1.09 (1.17)				
Low-credibility * digital literacy		-0.77 (1.20)				
Intercept	52.62*** (1.14)	52.06*** (0.79)	1.95*** (0.05)	1.92*** (0.04)	1.10*** (0.03)	1.11*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.54	0.00	0.54	0.00	0.27
Adj. R ²	-0.00	0.54	0.00	0.54	-0.00	0.27
Num. obs.	2448	2443	2351	2349	1933	1932
RMSE	32.89	22.34	1.46	0.99	0.82	0.70

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 7: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (NYT)

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	0.23 (1.37)	0.74 (1.23)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Low-credibility condition	1.98 (1.38)	2.03 (1.25)	0.14* (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Education		2.74** (0.92)		0.15*** (0.04)		
Partisanship		-1.12* (0.49)				0.04** (0.01)
Media trust		10.08*** (1.18)		0.53*** (0.04)		
Digital literacy		4.18*** (0.92)		0.21*** (0.04)		
High-credibility * education		0.81 (1.26)		0.04 (0.06)		
Low-credibility * education		-0.38 (1.28)		-0.01 (0.06)		
High-credibility * partisanship		0.43 (0.67)				0.01 (0.02)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.00 (0.71)				0.02 (0.02)
High-credibility * media trust		1.38 (1.65)		0.04 (0.07)		
Low-credibility * media trust		0.14 (1.72)		0.04 (0.06)		
High-credibility * digital literacy		-1.94 (1.33)		-0.12 (0.06)		
Low-credibility * digital literacy		-1.92 (1.36)		-0.07 (0.06)		
Intercept	56.84*** (0.97)	56.67*** (0.87)	2.14*** (0.04)	2.15*** (0.04)	0.91*** (0.03)	0.92*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.23	-0.00	0.02
Num. obs.	2447	2443	2345	2341	1861	1861
RMSE	27.87	25.02	1.27	1.12	0.79	0.79

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 8: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (WSJ)

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	-1.52 (1.34)	-0.67 (1.08)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.13** (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)
Low-credibility condition	1.53 (1.37)	1.96 (1.12)	0.07 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)
Partisanship		-1.86** (0.45)		-0.04* (0.02)		0.04 (0.02)
Media trust		14.59*** (1.06)		0.70*** (0.05)		-0.22*** (0.04)
Facebook use		1.20* (0.53)		0.06* (0.02)		
Ideology						0.06* (0.03)
High-credibility * partisanship		0.71 (0.61)		0.03 (0.03)		0.00 (0.03)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.19 (0.65)		-0.01 (0.03)		0.01 (0.03)
High-credibility * media trust		1.31 (1.43)		0.05 (0.06)		-0.08 (0.06)
Low-credibility * media trust		-0.50 (1.55)		-0.00 (0.07)		0.04 (0.06)
High-credibility * Facebook use		-0.22 (0.72)		-0.01 (0.03)		
Low-credibility * Facebook use		0.22 (0.74)		-0.01 (0.03)		
High-credibility * ideology						-0.01 (0.04)
Low-credibility * ideology						0.05 (0.04)
Intercept	51.81*** (0.94)	51.40*** (0.77)	1.87*** (0.04)	1.86*** (0.03)	0.73*** (0.03)	0.74*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.35	0.01	0.36	0.00	0.23
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.35	0.01	0.36	0.00	0.23
Num. obs.	2443	2441	2346	2344	1777	1776
RMSE	27.39	22.18	1.22	0.98	0.82	0.72

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 9: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (USA Today)

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	14.56*** (1.44)	14.74*** (1.39)	0.79*** (0.09)	0.79*** (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.07)	-0.28*** (0.07)
Low-credibility condition	-13.31*** (1.52)	-13.68*** (1.46)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.48*** (0.07)	0.50*** (0.08)	0.50*** (0.08)
Age		-0.18** (0.07)		-0.00 (0.00)		
Media trust		5.67*** (1.05)		0.40*** (0.06)		
Facebook use		1.76** (0.65)		0.10** (0.04)		
Race (white)				-0.42* (0.18)		
High-credibility * age		0.27** (0.10)		0.02** (0.01)		
Low-credibility * age		-0.20 (0.11)		-0.01* (0.01)		
High-credibility * media trust		-0.42 (1.57)		-0.08 (0.09)		
Low-credibility * media trust		-4.28** (1.57)		-0.29*** (0.08)		
High-credibility * Facebook use		1.29 (0.97)		0.04 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * Facebook use		0.81 (0.99)		0.00 (0.05)		
High-credibility * white				0.52 (0.27)		
Low-credibility * white				0.08 (0.27)		
Intercept	40.15*** (0.98)	40.29*** (0.94)	1.18*** (0.06)	1.19*** (0.06)	0.90*** (0.06)	0.90*** (0.06)
R ²	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.28	0.15	0.15
Adj. R ²	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.27	0.15	0.15
Num. obs.	1822	1821	1269	1268	779	779
RMSE	26.22	25.24	1.18	1.11	0.80	0.80

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 10: Models H1d - H1f

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	14.56*** (1.44)	14.74*** (1.39)	0.79*** (0.09)	0.79*** (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.07)	-0.28*** (0.07)
Low-credibility condition	-13.31*** (1.52)	-13.68*** (1.46)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.48*** (0.07)	0.50*** (0.08)	0.50*** (0.08)
Age		-0.18** (0.07)		-0.00 (0.00)		
Media trust		5.67*** (1.05)		0.40*** (0.06)		
Facebook use		1.76** (0.65)		0.10** (0.04)		
Race (white)				-0.42* (0.18)		
High-credibility * age		0.27** (0.10)		0.02** (0.01)		
Low-credibility * age		-0.20 (0.11)		-0.01* (0.01)		
High-credibility * media trust		-0.42 (1.57)		-0.08 (0.09)		
Low-credibility * media trust		-4.28** (1.57)		-0.29*** (0.08)		
High-credibility * Facebook use		1.29 (0.97)		0.04 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * Facebook use		0.81 (0.99)		0.00 (0.05)		
High-credibility * white				0.52 (0.27)		
Low-credibility * white				0.08 (0.27)		
Intercept	40.15*** (0.98)	40.29*** (0.94)	1.18*** (0.06)	1.19*** (0.06)	0.90*** (0.06)	0.90*** (0.06)
R ²	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.28	0.15	0.15
Adj. R ²	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.27	0.15	0.15
Num. obs.	1822	1821	1269	1268	779	779
RMSE	26.22	25.24	1.18	1.11	0.80	0.80

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 11: Persistence of credibility treatment in Wave 3

	H2a		H2b	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Intercept	3.28*** (0.03)	3.28*** (0.03)	3.28*** (0.05)	3.28*** (0.03)
Persuasion condition	0.07 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.07 (0.07)	0.08 (0.04)
Partisanship		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.02)
Ideology		-0.08** (0.03)		-0.08** (0.03)
Media trust		0.23*** (0.04)		0.23*** (0.04)
Persuasion * partisanship		-0.00 (0.03)		-0.00 (0.03)
Persuasion * ideology		0.01 (0.04)		0.02 (0.04)
Persuasion * media trust		0.02 (0.05)		0.03 (0.05)
High-credibility condition			0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
Low-credibility condition			-0.00 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.08 (0.11)	0.03 (0.10)
Persuasion * high-credibility			-0.07 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.10)
R ²	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.13
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.12
Num. obs.	1877	1877	1877	1877
RMSE	0.97	0.91	0.97	0.91

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 12: Models H2a - H2b

	H3a		H3b	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Intercept	3.42*** (0.04)	3.41*** (0.03)	3.48*** (0.06)	3.41*** (0.03)
Persuasion condition	0.19*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.09 (0.08)	0.20*** (0.05)
Partisanship		-0.03 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.02)
Ideology		-0.12*** (0.03)		-0.12*** (0.03)
Media trust		0.23*** (0.04)		0.23*** (0.04)
Persuasion * partisanship		-0.02 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)
Persuasion * ideology		0.03 (0.04)		0.04 (0.04)
Persuasion * media trust		-0.04 (0.06)		-0.04 (0.06)
High-credibility condition			-0.06 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)
Low-credibility condition			-0.14 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.08)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.12 (0.12)	0.07 (0.11)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.20 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)
R ²	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.15
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.15
Num. obs.	1635	1635	1635	1635
RMSE	1.02	0.95	1.02	0.95

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 13: Models H3a - H3b

	H4a (guns)		H4b (economic protectionism)	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Pro-Democrat persuasion	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.08)*	-0.19 (0.08)*	-0.20 (0.06)***
Pro-Republican persuasion	0.01 (0.10)	0.00 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.11 (0.06)
Gender (female)		-0.30 (0.12)**		
Age		-0.01 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
Education		-0.15 (0.06)*		-0.19 (0.05)***
Partisanship		0.18 (0.05)***		0.22 (0.03)***
Ideology		0.25 (0.06)***		0.11 (0.05)*
Media trust		-0.47 (0.07)***		-0.25 (0.07)***
Facebook use		0.07 (0.04)*		
Race (American Indian)		1.89 (0.78)*		
Race (Asian)		-0.29 (0.24)		
Pro-Democrat * gender		0.08 (0.16)		
Pro-Republican * gender		-0.02 (0.17)		
Pro-Democrat * age		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.00)
Pro-Republican * age		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.00)
Pro-Democrat * education		0.03 (0.09)		0.13 (0.06)*
Pro-Republican * education		0.03 (0.09)		0.12 (0.06)*
Pro-Democrat * partisanship		-0.10 (0.06)		-0.09 (0.05)
Pro-Republican * partisanship		-0.05 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.04)
Pro-Democrat * ideology		0.02 (0.08)		0.08 (0.07)
Pro-Republican * ideology		0.01 (0.08)		0.04 (0.06)
Pro-Democrat * Media trust		-0.06 (0.11)		-0.02 (0.09)
Pro-Republican * Media trust		0.01 (0.10)		-0.00 (0.09)
Pro-Democrat * Facebook use		0.02 (0.06)		
Pro-Republican * Facebook use		-0.08 (0.05)		
Pro-Democrat * race (American Indian)		-0.51 (0.89)		
Pro-Republican * race (American Indian)		-1.47 (1.04)		
Pro-Democrat * race (Asian)		-0.23 (0.36)		
Pro-Republican * race (Asian)		-0.01 (0.37)		
Intercept	-0.00 (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)	2.79 (0.05)***	2.79 (0.04)***
R ²	0.00	0.39	0.01	0.39
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.38	0.01	0.39
Num. obs.	1631	1630	1635	1635
RMSE	1.65	1.30	1.25	0.99

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 14: Models H4a - H4b

	H5a (guns)		H5b (economic protectionism)	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Pro-Democrat persuasion	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.06)**
Pro-Republican persuasion	-0.22 (0.16)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.18 (0.12)	0.10 (0.06)
High-credibility condition	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.10)
Low-credibility condition	0.17 (0.18)	0.03 (0.09)	0.11 (0.14)	0.02 (0.11)
Pro-Democrat * High-credibility	0.01 (0.24)	-0.02 (0.15)	0.10 (0.19)	0.15 (0.15)
Pro-Republican * High-credibility	0.56 (0.24)*	0.20 (0.14)	0.56 (0.18)**	0.40 (0.14)**
Pro-Democrat * Low-credibility	-0.44 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.19)	0.02 (0.15)
Pro-Republican * Low-credibility	0.11 (0.25)	0.05 (0.14)	0.33 (0.18)	0.30 (0.14)*
Partisanship		0.02 (0.03)		0.22 (0.03)***
Ideology		0.14 (0.04)**		0.12 (0.05)*
Media trust		-0.15 (0.05)**		-0.24 (0.07)***
Guns attitude W2		0.81 (0.04)***		
Age				-0.00 (0.00)
Education				-0.20 (0.05)***
Pro-Democrat * partisanship		0.05 (0.05)		-0.09 (0.05)
Pro-Republican * partisanship		0.03 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.04)
Pro-Democrat * ideology		-0.05 (0.06)		0.08 (0.07)
Pro-Republican * ideology		-0.04 (0.06)		0.04 (0.06)
Pro-Democrat * media trust		0.05 (0.08)		-0.02 (0.09)
Pro-Republican * media trust		0.01 (0.08)		0.00 (0.09)
Pro-Democrat * guns attitude W2		-0.03 (0.06)		
Pro-Republican * guns attitude W2		-0.01 (0.06)		
Pro-Democrat * age				-0.01 (0.00)
Pro-Republican * age				-0.01 (0.00)
Pro-Democrat * education				0.13 (0.07)*
Pro-Republican * education				0.13 (0.06)*
Intercept	0.02 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.04)	2.77 (0.09)***	2.79 (0.04)***
R ²	0.01	0.67	0.02	0.40
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.66	0.02	0.39
Num. obs.	1631	1630	1635	1635
RMSE	1.65	0.96	1.25	0.98

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 15: Models H5a - H5b

H Persistence and decay

Figure 15 shows the effect of the credibility treatment on favorability, trust and perceived bias in Wave 2 (upper panel) and Wave 3 (lower panel). The lower panel illustrates that the effects persist quite strongly: Effect sizes are still between 0.448 and 0.720 of the effect sizes in Wave 2. To further investigate the strength of decay, we split the sample at the median time passed between W2 and W3, and rerun the model for the two groups separately. Despite the decay from W2 and W3, Table 16 does not show and significant decay depending on how much time passed for W3 participants.




Figure 15: Treatment means related to H1d - H1f, and same outcomes in Wave 3

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	< med. time	> med. time	< med. time	> med. time	< med. time	> med. time
Intercept	35.86*** (1.46)	36.89*** (1.44)	1.04*** (0.09)	0.96*** (0.08)	1.05*** (0.09)	0.95*** (0.09)
High-credibility condition	7.11** (2.19)	5.94** (2.10)	0.45*** (0.13)	0.52*** (0.13)	-0.35** (0.12)	-0.03 (0.12)
Low-credibility condition	-6.60** (2.20)	-8.94*** (2.18)	-0.23* (0.12)	-0.25* (0.11)	0.21 (0.12)	0.50*** (0.12)
R ²	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08
Num. obs.	785	790	533	509	326	319
RMSE	25.46	24.82	1.11	1.14	0.83	0.84

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 16: Models for perceived credibility in Wave 3, separate by time between surveys

I Robustness checks

One threat to the robustness of our results is that subjects might be suspicious of the made-up source and google it. We therefore asked subjects at the very end of the survey whether at any point they “searched for 24hr Nation online.” Tables 17 through 25 present all our models without those who admitted googling the source. Further, we manually coded the open feedback of all three waves for any indication that people were suspicious of the authenticity of the source. Tables 26 through 34 through show results without those expressing suspicion. Results change only for the persuasion treatment in wave 2, which shows small main effects in both unadjusted and saturated model when excluding those who admitted to googling the source.

Last, a lack of attention could result in a treatment not actually received. Directly after the op-ed about short-time work, we asked respondents in the treatment group: “What country do people think would be a good model for short-term work policy in the US?” (response options “Germany,” “Poland,” “Italy,” “Canada,” “India”). 71.6 percent passed this attention check. Control group respondents, who read about the benefits of hiking were asked: “According to the article you just read, why does hiking differ from other types of exercise?” (response options “Benefits for wellness and mood,” “Need for different equipment,” “Safety concerns,” “Cost and distance barriers”). 84.64 percent passed this check. To examine whether our results are different for those to which the treatment was administered successfully, we first ran an instrumental-variable model, the endogenous regressor being an indicator taking a value of one for those in the treatment group who passed the attention check and zero for everyone else, and the treatment the instrumental variable. The results for H2a-b remain unchanged, see Table 35.

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	13.85*** (1.28)	14.12*** (1.23)	0.60*** (0.08)	0.63*** (0.07)	-0.16* (0.08)	-0.19* (0.08)
Low-credibility condition	-14.25*** (1.30)	-14.07*** (1.25)	-0.47*** (0.07)	-0.46*** (0.07)	0.34*** (0.08)	0.31*** (0.08)
Age		-0.14* (0.06)		-0.01** (0.00)		
Media trust		5.79*** (0.99)		0.37*** (0.07)		
Race (white)		-6.90** (2.52)				
Facebook use				0.13*** (0.04)		
Partisanship						0.09** (0.03)
High-credibility * age		0.06 (0.09)		0.01* (0.01)		
Low-credibility * age		-0.32*** (0.09)		-0.01 (0.00)		
High-credibility * media trust		1.06 (1.47)		0.02 (0.08)		
Low-credibility * media trust		-4.74** (1.46)		-0.27*** (0.08)		
High-credibility * White		1.17 (3.98)				
Low-credibility * White		-7.28 (4.72)				
High-credibility * Facebook use				-0.02 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * Facebook use				-0.02 (0.04)		
High-credibility * Partisanship						0.00 (0.03)
Low-credibility * Partisanship						-0.04 (0.03)
Intercept	36.93*** (0.86)	36.89*** (0.83)	1.03*** (0.06)	1.02*** (0.06)	0.87*** (0.07)	0.89*** (0.07)
R ²	0.17	0.25	0.15	0.27	0.07	0.11
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.25	0.15	0.27	0.06	0.10
Num. obs.	2199	2197	1558	1556	766	766
RMSE	25.19	24.06	1.11	1.03	0.85	0.83

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table 17: Models H1a - H1c, without those googling source

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	-1.05 (1.65)	0.10 (1.13)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)
Low-credibility condition	1.18 (1.67)	1.68 (1.16)	0.11 (0.08)	0.12* (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)
Partisanship		-2.46*** (0.61)		-0.08** (0.03)		0.11*** (0.02)
Ideology		-4.06*** (0.75)		-0.17*** (0.03)		
Media trust		17.17*** (1.19)		0.84*** (0.05)		-0.22*** (0.04)
High-credibility * partisanship		-0.50 (0.86)		-0.02 (0.04)		0.01 (0.02)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.52 (0.87)		-0.02 (0.04)		0.00 (0.02)
High-credibility * ideology		0.89 (1.11)		0.07 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * ideology		0.48 (1.08)		0.02 (0.05)		
High-credibility * media trust		1.36 (1.65)		0.08 (0.07)		-0.06 (0.05)
Low-credibility * media trust		0.65 (1.66)		-0.01 (0.07)		-0.01 (0.05)
Intercept	51.81*** (1.16)	51.30*** (0.82)	1.91*** (0.05)	1.89*** (0.04)	1.10*** (0.03)	1.11*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.53	0.00	0.54	0.00	0.27
Adj. R ²	-0.00	0.53	0.00	0.54	-0.00	0.27
Num. obs.	2321	2319	2225	2223	1814	1813
RMSE	32.71	22.45	1.45	0.99	0.82	0.70

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 18: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (NYT), without those googling source

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	0.81 (1.40)	1.23 (1.26)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Low-credibility condition	2.92* (1.41)	2.87* (1.28)	0.16* (0.07)	0.13* (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Education		2.86** (0.94)		0.14*** (0.04)		
Partisanship		-1.07* (0.51)				0.04* (0.02)
Media trust		9.68*** (1.24)		0.52*** (0.05)		-0.01 (0.04)
Digital literacy		4.14*** (0.94)		0.20*** (0.04)		
Gender (female)				-0.14 (0.08)		-0.18** (0.07)
Age						0.01* (0.00)
High-credibility * education		0.01 (1.29)		-0.01 (0.06)		
Low-credibility * education		-0.28 (1.32)		-0.01 (0.06)		
High-credibility * partisanship		0.41 (0.70)				-0.00 (0.03)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.34 (0.73)				0.02 (0.03)
High-credibility * media trust		2.06 (1.72)		0.07 (0.07)		-0.07 (0.06)
Low-credibility * media trust		0.23 (1.78)		0.06 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.06)
High-credibility * digital literacy		-1.78 (1.36)		-0.13* (0.06)		
Low-credibility * digital literacy		-1.56 (1.39)		-0.07 (0.06)		
High-credibility * gender				-0.08 (0.12)		0.18 (0.10)
Low-credibility * gender				0.04 (0.12)		0.09 (0.09)
High-credibility * age						-0.00 (0.00)
Low-credibility * age						-0.00 (0.00)
Intercept	56.07*** (0.99)	55.97*** (0.90)	2.12*** (0.05)	2.13*** (0.04)	0.91*** (0.03)	0.91*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.23	-0.00	0.03
Num. obs.	2320	2316	2222	2218	1742	1741
RMSE	27.71	24.90	1.27	1.12	0.80	0.79

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 19: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (WSJ), without those googling source

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	-1.05 (1.37)	-0.27 (1.11)	-0.15* (0.06)	-0.14** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.10* (0.04)
Low-credibility condition	2.12 (1.39)	2.50* (1.15)	0.08 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)
Partisanship		-1.96*** (0.46)				0.04 (0.02)
Media trust		14.09*** (1.10)		0.75*** (0.04)		-0.24*** (0.04)
Ideology						0.08* (0.03)
High-credibility * partisanship		0.73 (0.63)				0.01 (0.03)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.23 (0.67)				0.01 (0.03)
High-credibility * media trust		1.85 (1.49)		0.03 (0.05)		-0.08 (0.06)
Low-credibility * media trust		-0.18 (1.61)		0.02 (0.06)		0.06 (0.06)
High-credibility * ideology						-0.02 (0.04)
Low-credibility * ideology						0.04 (0.04)
Intercept	51.08*** (0.96)	50.74*** (0.80)	1.85*** (0.04)	1.85*** (0.04)	0.72*** (0.03)	0.73*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.34	0.01	0.35	0.00	0.25
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.33	0.01	0.35	0.00	0.24
Num. obs.	2316	2315	2222	2221	1665	1664
RMSE	27.25	22.27	1.21	0.98	0.82	0.71

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 20: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (USA Today), without those googling source

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	14.98** (1.47)	15.20** (1.43)	0.81** (0.09)	0.77** (0.09)	-0.33** (0.08)	-0.35** (0.08)
Low-credibility condition	-12.81** (1.54)	-13.35** (1.49)	-0.44** (0.08)	-0.50** (0.08)	0.46** (0.08)	0.42** (0.08)
Age		-0.16* (0.07)				0.01** (0.00)
Media trust		5.55** (1.08)		0.39** (0.07)		
Facebook use		1.34* (0.65)				
High-credibility * age		0.25* (0.10)				-0.01* (0.00)
Low-credibility * age		-0.17 (0.11)				0.00 (0.00)
High-credibility * media trust		0.09 (1.63)		-0.05 (0.10)		
Low-credibility * media trust		-4.39** (1.62)		-0.24** (0.08)		
High-credibility * Facebook use		1.05 (1.00)				
Low-credibility * Facebook use		0.99 (1.00)				
Intercept	39.38** (0.99)	39.54** (0.96)	1.12** (0.06)	1.17** (0.06)	0.92** (0.06)	0.94** (0.06)
R ²	0.16	0.21	0.18	0.23	0.15	0.19
Adj. R ²	0.16	0.21	0.18	0.22	0.15	0.18
Num. obs.	1698	1697	1170	1170	706	706
RMSE	25.73	24.95	1.16	1.12	0.81	0.79

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 21: Models H1d - H1f, without those googling source

	H2a		H2b	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Persuasion condition	0.09*	0.10*	0.09	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)
High-credibility condition			0.02	0.04
			(0.08)	(0.07)
Low-credibility condition			-0.00	0.03
			(0.08)	(0.07)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.07	0.04
			(0.11)	(0.10)
Persuasion * high-credibility			-0.06	-0.13
			(0.11)	(0.11)
Partisanship		-0.02		-0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Ideology		-0.08**		-0.08**
		(0.03)		(0.03)
Media trust		0.21***		0.21***
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Persuasion * partisanship		-0.01		-0.00
		(0.03)		(0.03)
Persuasion * ideology		0.02		0.03
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Persuasion * media trust		0.04		0.05
		(0.06)		(0.06)
Intercept	3.26***	3.25***	3.25***	3.25***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.12
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.11
Num. obs.	1749	1749	1749	1749
RMSE	0.96	0.91	0.96	0.90

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 22: Models H2a - H2b, without those googling source

	H3a		H3b	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Persuasion condition	0.22*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.14 (0.08)	0.23*** (0.05)
High-credibility condition			-0.04 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)
Low-credibility condition			-0.13 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.08)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.05 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.18 (0.13)	0.15 (0.12)
Partisanship		-0.05* (0.02)		-0.04 (0.02)
Ideology		-0.10** (0.03)		-0.11*** (0.03)
Media trust		0.21*** (0.04)		0.21*** (0.05)
Persuasion * partisanship		-0.01 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)
Persuasion * ideology		0.03 (0.05)		0.03 (0.05)
Persuasion * media trust		-0.04 (0.06)		-0.04 (0.07)
Intercept	3.39*** (0.04)	3.38*** (0.03)	3.44*** (0.06)	3.38*** (0.03)
R ²	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.14
Num. obs.	1507	1507	1507	1507
RMSE	1.01	0.94	1.01	0.94

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 23: Models H3a - H3b, without those googling source

	H4a (guns)		H4b (economic protectionism)	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Intercept	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	2.79 (0.06)***	2.80 (0.04)***
Pro-Democrat persuasion	-0.20 (0.11)	-0.22 (0.08)**	-0.23 (0.08)**	-0.24 (0.06)***
Pro-Republican persuasion	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)
Gender (female)		-0.35 (0.12)**		
Age		-0.00 (0.00)		
Education		-0.19 (0.06)**		-0.21 (0.05)***
Partisanship		0.17 (0.05)***		0.22 (0.03)***
Ideology		0.25 (0.06)***		0.09 (0.05)
Media trust		-0.49 (0.07)***		-0.24 (0.07)***
Facebook use		0.08 (0.04)*		
Pro-Democrat * gender		0.02 (0.17)		
Pro-Republican * gender		0.06 (0.18)		
Pro-Democrat * age		-0.01 (0.01)		
Pro-Republican * age		-0.01 (0.01)		
Pro-Democrat * education		0.06 (0.09)		0.13 (0.07)*
Pro-Republican * education		0.11 (0.09)		0.10 (0.06)
Pro-Democrat * partisanship		-0.11 (0.07)		-0.11 (0.05)*
Pro-Republican * partisanship		-0.01 (0.06)		-0.02 (0.04)
Pro-Democrat * ideology		0.05 (0.08)		0.11 (0.07)
Pro-Republican * ideology		-0.03 (0.08)		0.06 (0.06)
Pro-Democrat * Media trust		-0.09 (0.11)		-0.07 (0.09)
Pro-Republican * Media trust		-0.01 (0.11)		-0.08 (0.09)
Pro-Democrat * Facebook use		-0.01 (0.06)		
Pro-Republican * Facebook use		-0.07 (0.06)		
R ²	0.00	0.39	0.01	0.41
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.38	0.01	0.40
Num. obs.	1503	1502	1507	1507
RMSE	1.65	1.30	1.24	0.97

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 24: Models H4a - H4b, without those googling source

	H5a (guns)		H5b (economic protectionism)	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Pro-Democrat persuasion	-0.11 (0.17)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.26 (0.13)*	-0.24 (0.06)***
Pro-Republican persuasion	-0.21 (0.17)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.24 (0.12)*	0.07 (0.06)
High-credibility condition	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.11)
Low-credibility condition	0.17 (0.19)	0.03 (0.10)	0.07 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.11)
Pro-Democrat * High-credibility	0.06 (0.25)	-0.00 (0.15)	0.15 (0.19)	0.23 (0.15)
Pro-Republican * High-credibility	0.52 (0.25)*	0.13 (0.15)	0.60 (0.18)**	0.47 (0.15)**
Pro-Democrat * Low-credibility	-0.40 (0.25)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.19)	0.10 (0.16)
Pro-Republican * Low-credibility	0.06 (0.26)	0.03 (0.14)	0.40 (0.19)*	0.38 (0.15)**
Partisanship		0.02 (0.04)		0.22 (0.04)***
Ideology		0.14 (0.05)**		0.10 (0.05)*
Media trust		-0.16 (0.05)**		-0.23 (0.07)***
Guns attitude W2		0.80 (0.05)***		
Education				-0.21 (0.05)***
Pro-Democrat * partisanship		0.04 (0.05)		-0.11 (0.05)*
Pro-Republican * partisanship		0.05 (0.05)		-0.03 (0.04)
Pro-Democrat * ideology		-0.03 (0.06)		0.11 (0.07)
Pro-Republican * ideology		-0.06 (0.06)		0.06 (0.06)
Pro-Democrat * media trust		0.04 (0.08)		-0.07 (0.09)
Pro-Republican * media trust		-0.01 (0.08)		-0.07 (0.09)
Pro-Democrat * guns attitude W2		-0.02 (0.07)		
Pro-Republican * guns attitude W2		-0.01 (0.06)		
Pro-Democrat * education				0.13 (0.07)*
Pro-Republican * education				0.10 (0.06)
Intercept	0.05 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.04)	2.80 (0.09)***	2.80 (0.04)***
R ²	0.01	0.67	0.02	0.41
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.66	0.02	0.40
Num. obs.	1503	1502	1507	1507
RMSE	1.65	0.96	1.23	0.96

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table 25: Models H5a - H5b, without those googling source

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	13.45*** (1.27)	13.82*** (1.21)	0.54*** (0.08)	0.57*** (0.07)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.15* (0.08)
Low-credibility condition	-14.64*** (1.31)	-14.39*** (1.23)	-0.54*** (0.07)	-0.51*** (0.07)	0.36*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.08)
Age		-0.16** (0.06)		-0.01** (0.00)		
Media trust		6.31*** (0.98)		0.42*** (0.06)		
Facebook use		0.36 (0.58)		0.14*** (0.03)		
Race (white)		-7.43** (2.46)				
Partisanship						0.07** (0.03)
High-credibility * age		0.14 (0.09)		0.01** (0.01)		
Low-credibility * age		-0.28** (0.09)		-0.00 (0.00)		
High-credibility * media trust		0.40 (1.42)		-0.03 (0.08)		
Low-credibility * media trust		-4.95*** (1.43)		-0.30*** (0.08)		
High-credibility * Facebook use		2.24** (0.84)		-0.01 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * Facebook use		1.47 (0.86)		-0.03 (0.04)		
High-credibility * White		0.48 (3.82)				
Low-credibility * White		-5.86 (4.59)				
High-credibility * Partisanship						0.01 (0.03)
Low-credibility * Partisanship						-0.03 (0.03)
Intercept	37.83*** (0.86)	37.74*** (0.82)	1.12*** (0.06)	1.10*** (0.06)	0.86*** (0.06)	0.89*** (0.06)
R ²	0.17	0.26	0.15	0.28	0.06	0.09
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.26	0.15	0.27	0.06	0.09
Num. obs.	2304	2301	1639	1637	830	830
RMSE	25.66	24.22	1.14	1.05	0.85	0.84

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table 26: Models H1a - H1c, without suspicious respondents

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	-1.10 (1.62)	-0.22 (1.11)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)
Low-credibility condition	0.67 (1.64)	1.25 (1.13)	0.10 (0.07)	0.11* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)
Partisanship		-2.61*** (0.59)		-0.10*** (0.03)		0.11*** (0.02)
Ideology		-3.81*** (0.72)		-0.14*** (0.03)		0.01 (0.03)
Media trust		17.56*** (1.15)		0.82*** (0.05)		-0.20*** (0.04)
Education				0.13*** (0.04)		
Digital literacy				0.09* (0.04)		
High-credibility * partisanship		-0.33 (0.83)		-0.01 (0.04)		-0.01 (0.03)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.27 (0.84)		-0.01 (0.04)		-0.01 (0.03)
High-credibility * ideology		0.73 (1.06)		0.04 (0.05)		0.02 (0.04)
Low-credibility * ideology		0.16 (1.05)		0.00 (0.05)		0.02 (0.04)
High-credibility * media trust		0.91 (1.59)		0.09 (0.07)		-0.06 (0.05)
Low-credibility * media trust		0.41 (1.62)		-0.02 (0.07)		-0.02 (0.05)
High-credibility * Education				-0.06 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * Education				-0.05 (0.05)		
High-credibility * digital literacy				-0.07 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * digital literacy				0.01 (0.05)		
Intercept	52.36*** (1.14)	51.90*** (0.80)	1.93*** (0.05)	1.92*** (0.03)	1.10*** (0.03)	1.12*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.54	0.00	0.55	0.00	0.27
Adj. R ²	-0.00	0.53	0.00	0.55	-0.00	0.27
Num. obs.	2430	2428	2333	2328	1916	1915
RMSE	32.89	22.44	1.46	0.98	0.82	0.70

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 27: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (NYT), without suspicious respondents

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	0.36 (1.38)	0.78 (1.24)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Low-credibility condition	2.24 (1.39)	2.28 (1.26)	0.14* (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Education		2.75** (0.92)		0.14** (0.04)		
Partisanship		-1.12* (0.49)				0.04** (0.01)
Media trust		10.06*** (1.19)		0.54*** (0.04)		
Digital literacy		4.15*** (0.92)		0.20*** (0.04)		
Gender (female)				-0.16* (0.08)		
High-credibility * education		0.77 (1.27)		0.02 (0.06)		
Low-credibility * education		-0.25 (1.29)		0.00 (0.06)		
High-credibility * partisanship		0.41 (0.67)				0.01 (0.02)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.11 (0.71)				0.02 (0.02)
High-credibility * media trust		1.39 (1.66)		0.04 (0.07)		
Low-credibility * media trust		0.02 (1.72)		0.04 (0.06)		
High-credibility * digital literacy		-1.87 (1.33)		-0.13* (0.06)		
Low-credibility * digital literacy		-1.66 (1.36)		-0.07 (0.06)		
High-credibility * gender				-0.08 (0.12)		
Low-credibility * gender				0.07 (0.12)		
Intercept	56.69*** (0.97)	56.55*** (0.88)	2.14*** (0.04)	2.15*** (0.04)	0.91*** (0.03)	0.92*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.23	-0.00	0.02
Num. obs.	2429	2425	2327	2323	1843	1843
RMSE	27.91	25.05	1.27	1.12	0.80	0.79

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 28: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (WSJ), without suspicious respondents

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	-1.33 (1.34)	-0.59 (1.08)	-0.15* (0.06)	-0.14** (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)
Low-credibility condition	1.77 (1.37)	2.16 (1.12)	0.07 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)
Partisanship		-1.90** (0.45)				0.04 (0.02)
Media trust		14.58** (1.06)		0.75*** (0.04)		-0.22** (0.04)
Facebook use		1.19* (0.53)				
Ideology						0.07* (0.03)
High-credibility * partisanship		0.75 (0.61)				0.00 (0.03)
Low-credibility * partisanship		-0.22 (0.66)				0.01 (0.03)
High-credibility * media trust		1.28 (1.44)		0.01 (0.05)		-0.08 (0.06)
Low-credibility * media trust		-0.47 (1.56)		0.01 (0.05)		0.04 (0.06)
High-credibility * Facebook use		-0.19 (0.73)				
Low-credibility * Facebook use		0.21 (0.74)				
High-credibility * ideology						-0.01 (0.04)
Low-credibility * ideology						0.05 (0.04)
Intercept	51.67*** (0.95)	51.31*** (0.77)	1.86*** (0.04)	1.86*** (0.03)	0.73*** (0.03)	0.75*** (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.35	0.01	0.35	0.00	0.23
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.35	0.01	0.35	0.00	0.23
Num. obs.	2425	2423	2328	2327	1762	1761
RMSE	27.41	22.17	1.22	0.98	0.82	0.72

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 29: Models RQ1a - RQ1c (USA Today), without suspicious respondents

	Favorability		Trust		Perceived bias	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
High-credibility condition	14.57*** (1.44)	14.66*** (1.39)	0.79*** (0.09)	0.77*** (0.08)	-0.29*** (0.08)	-0.29*** (0.08)
Low-credibility condition	-13.13*** (1.53)	-13.58*** (1.47)	-0.48*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	0.48*** (0.08)	0.48*** (0.08)
Age		-0.18** (0.07)		-0.01 (0.00)		
Media trust		5.91*** (1.05)		0.42*** (0.06)		
Facebook use		1.69** (0.65)		0.09* (0.04)		
High-credibility * age		0.26** (0.10)		0.02** (0.01)		
Low-credibility * age		-0.19 (0.11)		-0.01* (0.01)		
High-credibility * media trust		-0.73 (1.57)		-0.11 (0.09)		
Low-credibility * media trust		-4.39** (1.57)		-0.30*** (0.08)		
High-credibility * Facebook use		1.27 (0.97)		0.04 (0.05)		
Low-credibility * Facebook use		0.87 (0.99)		0.01 (0.05)		
Intercept	40.26*** (0.98)	40.45*** (0.94)	1.18*** (0.06)	1.21*** (0.06)	0.91*** (0.06)	0.91*** (0.06)
R ²	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.27	0.14	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.15	0.21	0.17	0.27	0.14	0.14
Num. obs.	1806	1805	1259	1258	773	773
RMSE	26.16	25.19	1.18	1.11	0.80	0.80

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 30: Models H1d - H1f, without suspicious respondents

	H2a		H2b	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Intercept	3.28*** (0.03)	3.28*** (0.03)	3.27*** (0.05)	3.28*** (0.03)
Persuasion condition	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.04)	0.06 (0.07)	0.08 (0.04)
Partisanship		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.02)
Ideology		-0.07** (0.03)		-0.07** (0.03)
Media trust		0.23*** (0.04)		0.23*** (0.04)
Persuasion * partisanship		-0.00 (0.03)		-0.00 (0.03)
Persuasion * ideology		0.01 (0.04)		0.01 (0.04)
Persuasion * media trust		0.03 (0.06)		0.04 (0.05)
High-credibility condition			0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
Low-credibility condition			-0.00 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.08 (0.11)	0.03 (0.10)
Persuasion * high-credibility			-0.07 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.10)
R ²	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.12
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.12
Num. obs.	1860	1860	1860	1860
RMSE	0.97	0.91	0.97	0.91

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 31: Models H2a - H2b, without suspicious respondents

	H3a		H3b	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Intercept	3.42*** (0.04)	3.41*** (0.03)	3.48*** (0.06)	3.41*** (0.03)
Persuasion condition	0.19*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.09 (0.08)	0.20*** (0.05)
Partisanship		-0.03 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.02)
Ideology		-0.12*** (0.03)		-0.12*** (0.03)
Media trust		0.23*** (0.04)		0.23*** (0.04)
Persuasion * partisanship		-0.03 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)
Persuasion * ideology		0.04 (0.04)		0.04 (0.04)
Persuasion * media trust		-0.03 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.06)
High-credibility condition			-0.05 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)
Low-credibility condition			-0.14 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.08)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.10 (0.12)	0.06 (0.11)
Persuasion * high-credibility			0.20 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)
R ²	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.15
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.15
Num. obs.	1619	1619	1619	1619
RMSE	1.02	0.95	1.02	0.95

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 32: Models H3a - H3b, without suspicious respondents

	H4a (guns)		H4b (economic protectionism)	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Pro-Democrat persuasion	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.08)*	-0.19 (0.08)*	-0.20 (0.06)**
Pro-Republican persuasion	-0.00 (0.10)	0.01 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.11 (0.06)
Gender (female)		-0.28 (0.12)*		
Age		-0.01 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
Education		-0.16 (0.06)**		-0.20 (0.05)***
Partisanship		0.17 (0.05)***		0.22 (0.03)***
Ideology		0.26 (0.06)***		0.11 (0.05)*
Media trust		-0.49 (0.08)***		-0.25 (0.07)***
Facebook use		0.07 (0.04)		
Digital literacy		0.11 (0.06)		
Race (American Indian)		1.88 (0.75)*		
Race (Asian)		-0.27 (0.23)		
Pro-Democrat * gender		0.10 (0.17)		
Pro-Republican * gender		-0.04 (0.17)		
Pro-Democrat * age		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.00)
Pro-Republican * age		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.00)
Pro-Democrat * education		0.02 (0.09)		0.13 (0.07)*
Pro-Republican * education		0.04 (0.09)		0.12 (0.06)*
Pro-Democrat * partisanship		-0.09 (0.06)		-0.09 (0.05)
Pro-Republican * partisanship		-0.04 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.04)
Pro-Democrat * ideology		0.00 (0.08)		0.08 (0.07)
Pro-Republican * ideology		-0.01 (0.08)		0.04 (0.06)
Pro-Democrat * Media trust		-0.07 (0.11)		-0.02 (0.09)
Pro-Republican * Media trust		0.02 (0.11)		-0.00 (0.09)
Pro-Democrat * Facebook use		0.01 (0.06)		
Pro-Republican * Facebook use		-0.08 (0.05)		
Pro-Democrat * Digital literacy		0.02 (0.09)		
Pro-Republican * Digital literacy		-0.10 (0.08)		
Pro-Democrat * race (American Indian)		-0.26 (0.86)		
Pro-Republican * race (American Indian)		-1.45 (1.02)		
Pro-Democrat * race (Asian)		-0.22 (0.37)		
Pro-Republican * race (Asian)		-0.04 (0.37)		
Intercept	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	2.80 (0.05)***	2.80 (0.04)***
R ²	0.00	0.39	0.01	0.39
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.38	0.01	0.39
Num. obs.	1615	1611	1619	1619
RMSE	1.65	1.30	1.25	0.99

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 33: Models H4a - H4b, without suspicious respondents

	H5a (guns)		H5b (economic protectionism)	
	Unadjusted	Saturated	Unadjusted	Saturated
Pro-Democrat persuasion	-0.04 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.06)**
Pro-Republican persuasion	-0.24 (0.16)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.20 (0.12)	0.10 (0.06)
High-credibility condition	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.10)
Low-credibility condition	0.16 (0.18)	0.03 (0.09)	0.11 (0.14)	0.02 (0.11)
Pro-Democrat * High-credibility	0.02 (0.25)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.11 (0.19)	0.15 (0.15)
Pro-Republican * High-credibility	0.58 (0.24)*	0.20 (0.14)	0.58 (0.18)**	0.41 (0.14)**
Pro-Democrat * Low-credibility	-0.42 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.19)	0.03 (0.15)
Pro-Republican * Low-credibility	0.11 (0.25)	0.05 (0.14)	0.34 (0.18)	0.31 (0.14)*
Partisanship		0.02 (0.03)		0.22 (0.03)***
Ideology		0.14 (0.04)**		0.11 (0.05)*
Media trust		-0.15 (0.05)**		-0.25 (0.07)***
Guns attitude W2		0.81 (0.04)***		
Pro-Democrat * partisanship		0.05 (0.05)		-0.09 (0.05)
Pro-Republican * partisanship		0.03 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.04)
Pro-Democrat * ideology		-0.05 (0.06)		0.08 (0.07)
Pro-Republican * ideology		-0.04 (0.06)		0.05 (0.06)
Pro-Democrat * media trust		0.05 (0.08)		-0.02 (0.09)
Pro-Republican * media trust		0.01 (0.08)		0.00 (0.09)
Pro-Democrat * guns attitude W2		-0.03 (0.06)		
Pro-Republican * guns attitude W2		-0.01 (0.06)		
Age				-0.00 (0.00)
Education				-0.20 (0.05)***
Pro-Democrat * age				-0.01 (0.00)
Pro-Republican * age				-0.01 (0.00)
Pro-Democrat * education				0.13 (0.07)*
Pro-Republican * education				0.13 (0.06)*
Intercept	0.05 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.04)	2.78 (0.09)***	2.80 (0.04)***
R ²	0.01	0.66	0.02	0.40
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.66	0.02	0.39
Num. obs.	1615	1614	1619	1619
RMSE	1.65	0.97	1.25	0.98

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 34: Models H5a - H5b, without suspicious respondents

	H2a	H2b
	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	3.28*** (0.03)	3.28*** (0.05)
Persuasion condition received	0.11 (0.06)	0.12 (0.11)
High-credibility condition		0.02 (0.07)
Low-credibility condition		-0.00 (0.08)
Persuasion condition received * high-credibility		0.10 (0.15)
Persuasion condition received * high-credibility		-0.13 (0.15)
R ²	0.00	0.01
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	1874	1874
RMSE	0.97	0.97

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$


Table 35: Models H2a - H2b, persuasion treatment as instrumental variable

J Heterogeneity

Without specifying clear expectations, we also pre-registered a method to search for for heterogeneity along unspecified dimensions (RQ2). Specifically, we use Bayesian causal forests (BCF), which allow for nonlinear modeling of heterogeneous treatment effects while applying regularization to minimize the likelihood of false positives. We include partisanship, ideology, age, media trust, Facebook use, digital literacy and, for the gun control outcome, pre-treatment gun control support. The causal forests are estimated using the `bcf` R package.

Figure 16 shows heterogeneity of the credibility treatment on perceptions of 24hr Nation. For this analysis, we use the principal component of the three outcomes favorability, trust and perceived bias, which explains 0.62 percent of the variance. Panel (A) depicts heterogeneity of the *high-credibility treatment* compared to the control. Respondents who are more Republican, more conservative, older, show less media trust, use Facebook less and are less digitally literate are more affected by the high-credibility treatment: they perceive 24hr Nation more positively when treated. Panel (B) shows how the effect of the *low-credibility treatment* with the control. Figure 17 shows heterogeneity of the *non-partisan issue persuasion treatment*, separately for those in the high-credibility and those in the low-credibility condition. Figure 17 shows heterogeneity of the *protectionism pro-Republican persuasion treatment* vs. control, separately for those in the high-credibility and those in the low-credibility condition; Figure 17 the same for the pro-Democrat persuasion vs. control. Figure 18 shows heterogeneity of the *guns pro-Republican persuasion treatment* vs. control, separately for those in the high-credibility and those in the low-credibility condition; Figure 19 the same for the pro-Democrat persuasion vs. control.

(A) High-credibility treatment vs. control



(B) Low-credibility treatment vs. control





Figure 16: Credibility treatment heterogeneity (Outcome: standardized trust index)

(A) Persuasion vs. control high-credibility condition



(B) Persuasion vs. control low-credibility condition





Figure 17: Non-partisan persuasion treatment heterogeneity (outcome: standardized short-time work attitude)

(A) Anti-protectionism persuasion vs. control in high-credibility condition



(B) Anti-protectionism persuasion vs. control in low-credibility condition





Figure 18: Protectionism persuasion treatment heterogeneity (outcome: standardized protectionism attitude)

(A) Pro-protectionism persuasion vs. control in high-credibility condition



(B) Pro-protectionism persuasion vs. control in low-credibility condition





Figure 19: Credibility treatment heterogeneity (outcome: standardized protectionism attitude)

(A) Anti-guns persuasion vs. control in high-credibility condition



(B) Anti-guns persuasion vs. control in low-credibility condition





Figure 20: Credibility treatment heterogeneity (outcome: standardized gun attitude index)

(A) Pro-guns persuasion vs. control in high-credibility condition



(B) Pro-guns persuasion vs. control in low-credibility condition




Figure 21: Credibility treatment heterogeneity (outcome: standardized gun attitude index)