

Basking in Their Glory? Expressive Partisanship among
People of Color Before and After the 2020 U.S. Election
Appendix

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1 Research Design Details

Data We use panel data from an online survey fielded two weeks before and three weeks after the 2020 Presidential Election. We contracted YouGov to collect a sample of 650 Black and 650 Latino eligible voters.¹

Appendix 3 details our human subjects protocols. All Wave 1 respondents were re-contacted for Wave 2, with attrition at 34%. Appendix 4 discusses attrition and implications for external validity of our results.

Measures Our main outcome is partisan identity. We measure this attachment with previously-validated items that capture expressive components of partisan identification (Leach et al., 2008). Survey respondents were asked to express agreement (on a 7-point Likert scale) with the statements "I identify as [Democrat / Republican / Independent / Other]", and "I am glad to be ...". We combine these two items in an additive index. Full details on all survey items are in Appendix 2.

We measure support for Biden or Trump with a series of questions. We begin by asking if they voted early, and if so, if they voted for Biden or Trump. If they had not voted at the time of wave 1, we ask if they plan to vote, and if so, if they plan to vote for Biden or Trump. If they do not plan to vote, we ask if they prefer Biden or Trump. In our sample, 87% of Black and 65% of Latino respondents are Biden supporters, which is similar to percentages in the overall US population. Respondents who do not answer these questions and do not express a preference for Biden or Trump are excluded from the analysis.

Empirical Strategy The 2020 election result was beyond any one individual's control and therefore exogenous to their partisan identity. However, support for a specific candidate is likely to be endogenous to people's attachments. This poses a challenge for causal inference from cross-sectional comparisons between PoC with(out) a preferred winning candidate. We

¹Wave 1 was in the field from October 20 through November 2, 2020. The election was November 3, 2020. Wave 2 was in the field from December 1 through December 13, 2020.

solve this inferential challenge by comparing the differential change between the identities of Biden and Trump supporters before and after the election. This lets us account for fixed (un)observed individual characteristics that may influence identity strength and election salience, such as the pre-existing levels of political engagement and sense of belonging. By comparing identity changes between Biden and Trump supporters, we isolate the effect of having a preferred candidate win the presidency from other dynamics, such as the respective political campaigns.

Particularly, we use a linear model with the following form:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 D_t + \beta_2 D_t' X_i + \lambda_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where D_t indicates the timing t of the post-election survey wave and X_i indicates that individual i self-identified as a Biden supporter during the pre-election survey wave. λ_i is an individual-level fixed effect, which accounts for time-invariant individual characteristics that may determine both identity attachment and preference over candidates/salience of election results. The standard errors ϵ_{it} are clustered at the level of the individual to account for individual's identity dependence across survey waves.

β_2 is the quantity of interest, which captures the effect of having a preferred candidate win the presidency on attachment to a partisan identity. Causal identification of such an effect relies on the assumption that the partisan attachment of Biden and Trump supporters would have followed parallel trends in the absence of the election result. While our 2-wave panel survey does not allow us to test this assumption, we can confirm no pre-election differences in the level of partisan attachment across Biden and Trump supporters. In our measure of attachment with range 0–1, Biden supporters have an average value of 0.816 and Trump supporters of 0.833. The p-value of the difference in these means is 0.55, therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of means. Such an absence of statistical difference in pre-election expressive partisanship levels, provides suggestive evidence of common trends, and strengthens our confidence in the estimation method.

Note that we compare respondents by their preference between Biden and Trump, which was the most prominent race on the 2020 general election ballot. We cannot fully assess whether identity attachments after the election are solely due to this presidential contest rather than other down ballot elections. Our estimates of having a preferred candidate winning the presidency ($\hat{\beta}_2$) would be overestimated if for example, Biden supporters may have had their preferred senator, governor or mayor win, while Trump supporters had their preferred candidates on down ballot races lose. The estimates would be underestimated if the opposite was true. This dynamic is, however, unlikely, as not *every* Biden supporter had their down ballot preferred candidates win, while not *every* Trump supporter had their down ballot preferred candidates lose. For example, assuming that a strong Democrat prefers a Democratic candidate over a Republican, a strong Democrat in Montana had their preferred candidate for governor lose, while a strong Democrat in North Carolina had their preferred candidate for governor win. In other words, on average we would expect the share of Democratic Biden supporters with winning down-ballot preferred candidates to be similar to the share of non-Democratic Trump supporters who had their preferred down-ballot candidates win. Such an expectation ameliorates the concern of possible bias due to results from down ballot elections. Moreover, because American political behavior has become substantially more nationalized (Hopkins, 2018), it is possible that because voters are far more engaged with and knowledgeable about the presidential race, than their local races, the results of the local elections may have had little affect on voters' identity as partisans. For these reasons, it is unlikely that our estimates of having a preferred candidate win the presidency would be biased by down ballot results.

2 Survey Questionnaire

Pre-Election Wave Only

[RACE] What racial group best describes you? (White; Black or African American; Asian or Asian American; American Indian, Alaskan Native or Indigenous; Mixed race; other [open-entry]). Are you of Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin? (Yes; No)

The following questions were used to determine whether to use Hispanic/Latino or Black/African American when presenting the rest of the survey to respondents.

The most frequently used terms to describe persons of Latin American descent living in the United States are ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino.’ Of the two, which do you prefer, or do you not care about this terminology? (Hispanic, Latino, Either is acceptable, Don’t care, DK/NA)

The most frequently used terms to describe persons of African descent living in the United States are ‘Black’ and ‘African American.’ Of the two, which do you prefer, or do you not care about this terminology? (Black, African American, Either is acceptable, Don’t care, DK/NA)

[GENDER] How would you describe your gender? (Male; Female; Other [open-entry])

[EDUCATION] What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? (Less than high school; High school (diploma or GED equivalent); Associate degree; Bachelor’s degree; Master’s degree; Doctoral degree; Professional degree (e.g. JD or MD))

[AGE] How old are you? (scroll down with numbers from 15-140)

[IMMIGRANT GENERATION] Were you born in the mainland United States, Puerto Rico or some other country? Where were your parents born? Were they born in the US, was one born in the US, or were both born in another country? (Both parents born in the US; One parent born in the US; Neither parent born in the US; Don’t know)

[COETHNIC NETWORK] How would you describe your friends? Are they Mostly Black/Latino, Mostly White, Mixed Black/Latino and White, Mixed Black and Latino, Mostly Asian, Mixed Black/Latino and Asian, Other, Mix of all of the above.

How would you describe your co-workers? Are they Mostly Black/Latino, Mostly White, Mixed Black/Latino and White, Mixed Black and Latino, Mostly Asian, Mixed Black/Latino and Asian, Other, Mix of all of the above.

[REGISTERED] Are you registered to vote in the US? (Yes; No)

[TRUMP/BIDEN SUPPORTER] 0 - Trump supporter, 1 - Biden supporter

Compiled from a series of questions about vote choice, depending on whether respondents had already voted or planned to vote.

Which presidential candidate did you vote for? (Biden, Trump, Other, Undecided) Which presidential candidate will you vote for? (Biden, Trump, Other, Undecided) Even if you do not support either candidate, if you had to choose today between Trump and Biden, who would you prefer the most? (Biden, Trump) Even if you will not vote, if you had to choose today between Trump and Biden for President, who would you prefer the most? (Biden, Trump)

[PARTYID] Thinking about politics, do you usually consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent? (Democrat, Republican, Independent, No preference, Other party[open-entry]) Would you call yourself a Strong Democrat or a Not very strong Democrat? (Strong, Not very strong) Would you call yourself a Strong Republican or a Not very strong Republican? (Strong, Not very strong) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party? (Closer to Democratic, Closer to Republican, Neither)

Post-Election Wave Only

[RACIAL RESPECT 1] Joe Biden's victory over Donald Trump indicates that Black/Latino people like me are respected in US politics. (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[PARTISAN RESPECT 1] Joe Biden's victory over Donald Trump indicates that Democrats/Republicans/ Independents like me are respected in US politics. (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[RACIAL RESPECT 2] The election of Joe Biden over Donald Trump means that the voices of Black/Latino people like me do matter. (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[PARTISAN RESPECT 2] The election of Joe Biden over Donald Trump means that the voices of Democrats/Republicans/Independents like me do matter. (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

Both Survey Waves

[PANDEMIC EMPLOYMENT] Due to the coronavirus outbreak, has someone you know personally been laid off from their job? (Yes, No)

[EMPLOY] What is your current work status? (Working outside the home, in person; Working from home; Unemployed due to coronavirus; Unemployed, not due to coronavirus; Lost some to all of business due to coronavirus; Lost some to all of business, not due to

coronavirus; Student; Retired; Other [open text]

[RACIAL IDENTITY 1] I identify as Black/Latino (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[NATIONAL IDENTITY 1] I identify as American (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[PARTISAN IDENTITY 1] I identify as a Democrat/Republican/Independent (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[RACIAL IDENTITY 2] I am glad to be Black/Latino (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[NATIONAL IDENTITY 2] I am glad to be American (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[PARTISAN IDENTITY 2] I am glad to be a Democrat/Republican/Independent (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree)

[BEHAVIOR] The right to vote is one of the most important rights in America's democracy. In recent years there have been lots of debates from Democrats, Republicans and Independents alike about whether there are enough protections for equal voting rights. Would you be interested in contacting your senator to express your support for more protection for equal voting rights? (No, thank you; Yes, I am interested)

Please use the space below to express to your senator your support for equal voting rights.
The research team will send your entry in a letter to your senator.

3 Human Subjects Details

Both survey waves included an informed consent disclosure that clarified, per IRB guidelines, the precise process of the surveys. We did not anticipate any harm from participating in the studies and there was no deception of respondents.

One way we intervene in political processes is by forwarding letters from our respondents to their senators. This is a standard form of political participation that allows respondents to voice their views, which is a positive thing. Yet, writing these letters is completely optional and there is no reason to believe that respondents would suffer any stress or harm from having this option. Moreover, we should note that these letters are unlikely to have major political impacts on senators' decision-making, which means we are not actively intervening in the policy-making process.

Our subjects for both waves were recruited by YouGov. These respondents are people who have agreed to be part of YouGov's panel and receive survey invitations. Each invitation offers the respondent a modest incentive (cash, or points redeemable for merchandise) for completion, and invitees can skip surveys if they do not wish to participate. The exact compensation is determined by YouGov and is not revealed to the research team.

4 Survey attrition

In Table 4.1 we present a comparison of pre-election characteristics across respondents that did and did not answered the post-election survey. A test of difference in means of characteristics across these two groups, suggests that respondents that did not answer Wave 2 differ in some characteristics from respondents that did answer Wave 2. Those that answered Wave 2 are older, have lower unemployment rate, higher family income, lower COVID-19 affect, higher likelihood of being registered to vote, and of expressing interest in politics. Our estimates are, therefore, representative of PoC respondents who are more educated and more engaged in politics.

Table 4.1: Comparison of average individual characteristics across respondents who did and did not answer the post-election survey wave

	Did not answer Wave 2	Did answer Wave 2	Difference in means	p-value of Diff in means
Male	0.486	0.429	-0.057	0.140
Age	35.860	51.228	15.368	0.000
White	0.225	0.295	0.070	0.047
Hispanic	0.491	0.477	-0.014	0.725
At most high school degree	0.532	0.456	-0.076	0.054
Unemployed	0.333	0.181	-0.152	0.000
Family income above US median	0.132	0.218	0.086	0.004
COVID-19 affect	1.793	1.553	-0.240	0.049
Immigrant generation	2.664	2.729	0.066	0.189
Coethnic network	0.554	0.477	-0.077	0.144
Democrat	0.689	0.756	0.067	0.054
Republican	0.162	0.127	-0.035	0.214
Biden supporter	0.689	0.756	0.067	0.054
Registered to vote	0.745	0.930	0.185	0.000
Interest in politics	0.651	0.788	0.137	0.000
Swing state	0.374	0.378	0.004	0.917
N	222	614		

Notes: The table compares average individual-level characteristics, measured during the pre-election wave, across respondents that did not answer the post-election wave and respondents that did.

While attrition poses a challenge for the external validity of our results, particularly, we cannot answer whether our results generalize to less educated and less politically engaged PoC, it does not pose a problem for the internal validity of our results. Our empirical strategy compares the post-election change in identity attachment across Biden and Trump supporters. Reassuringly, we do not find evidence that pre-election support for Biden significantly predicts the probability of responding Wave 2 (Table 4.2). Moreover, the interactions between pre-election support for Biden and all the other characteristics presented in Table 4.1 do not explain participation in Wave 2. The F-statistic for the joint hypothesis test is 1.19 and the corresponding p-value is 0.28. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of these interactions are zero, suggesting that there is no differential attrition—that is, there are no differences in characteristics between Biden and Trump supporters that did answer Wave 2.

Finally, our empirical strategy minimizes potential bias from attrition by controlling for observed characteristics and for all other unobserved individual-level variables that may be related to both identity and salience of election results. In sum, the results of these tests and the fact that our estimation method controls for observed and unobserved time-fixed individual-level characteristics strengthens the internal validity of our results.


Table 4.2: Probability of responding the post-election survey by support for Biden

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Respondent answered Wave 2	
	(1)
(Intercept)	0.68*** (0.03)
bidem	0.07 (0.04)
R ²	0.00
Num. obs.	836

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether the respondent answered the post-election survey. *Biden supporter* indicates a respondent's choice for Biden over Trump in the pre-election survey. The estimates are from a linear probability model. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

5 Additional Figures and Tables

Figure 5.1 displays the distribution (and the means, depicted with vertical lines) of the expressive partisanship measure before and after the 2020 election for Biden and Trump supporters. The difference in distribution of the expressive partisanship of Biden supporters after the election, suggests that the increase in average partisanship is mostly driven by supporters who prior to the election expressed a weak to moderate partisan identity.



Notes: vertical lines indicate the average value of the expressive partisanship of Biden and Trump supporters.

Figure 5.1: Distribution of expressive partisanship

Our main analysis includes the observations of every respondent that registered a preference for Biden or Trump, and that answered the question on partisan (racial, national) identity on either (or both) of the survey waves. This implies that the specification of the models that include individual-level fixed effects are giving zero weight to the observations that did not register an answer to the outcome variable in both of the survey waves. In turn,

Table 5.1: Effects of a Preferred Candidate Win on PoC Identity Attachments

	Main Outcome		Placebo Outcome			
	Partisan ID		National ID		Racial ID	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Biden supporter	-0.026 (0.017)		-0.067*** (0.020)		0.054** (0.019)	
Post-election	-0.032° (0.017)	-0.032 (0.024)	0.004 (0.016)	0.004 (0.022)	0.014 (0.017)	0.014 (0.024)
Post election x Biden supporter	0.065*** (0.019)	0.065* (0.027)	0.021 (0.018)	0.017 (0.025)	0.010 (0.019)	0.008 (0.026)
Average Trump supporter ID	0.839	0.839	0.895	0.895	0.841	0.841
R ²	0.008	0.764	0.016	0.817	0.024	0.767
Num. obs.	1210	1210	1203	1203	1214	1214
N Clusters	605	605	606	606	611	611
Individual FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

The dependent variable is a scaled [0,1] index of identity attachment based on items "I identify as..." and "I am glad to be...". *Biden supporter* indicates preference for Biden over Trump and *post-election* after election survey. Individual-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *Average Trump supporter ID* is Trump supporters' pre-election mean attachment. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ° $p < 0.1$

the estimated coefficients of these models should be exactly the same as the coefficients from a regression that would exclude observations from respondents that did not registered an answer for the outcome variable in both surveys. In Table 5.1, we present our main results, excluding respondents who did not answer the identification questions in both of the survey waves, and show that the estimated coefficients are the same than those from the models that include individual-level fixed effects in our main result in Table 1 of the main text.

Table 5.2 presents the coefficients of a linear regression of identity attachments on the indicator variables for post-election and Biden supporter, and their interaction. Column (1) compares the partisan attachment between Latino Biden and Trump supporters before and after the election, and Column (2) introduces individual fixed effects to account for time-invariant individual characteristics. Columns (3), (4) are the analogous to (1), (2) for Black respondents. We find that the post election increase in partisan attachment of Biden supporters is similar across Latino and Black respondents.

Table 5.2: Effects of a Preferred Candidate Win on PoC Identity Attachments by Ethnicity

	Latino respondents		Black respondents	
	Partisan ID			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Biden supporter	-0.039° (0.020)		0.011 (0.027)	
Post-election	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.028 (0.032)	0.008 (0.033)	-0.044 (0.037)
Post election × Biden supporter	0.077** (0.025)	0.065° (0.037)	0.031 (0.035)	0.076° (0.041)
R ²	0.014	0.807	0.009	0.832
Num. obs.	689	689	746	746
N Clusters	399	399	431	431
Individual FE	N	Y	N	Y

The dependent variable is a simple sum index of attachment to partisan identity based on the items "I identify as..." and "I am glad to be...". *Biden supporter* is an indicator variable for preference for Biden over Trump. *post-election* is an indicator variable for post-election survey wave. Individual-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ° $p < 0.1$

In Table 5.3 we present our main results excluding from the comparison group Trump supporters who do not identify as Republican, as they may not respond in similar ways to the election result as those Trump supporters who identify as Republican. The results are consistent with those presented in Table 1 of the main text, albeit with loss of statistical power, given the reduction in sample size, and a somewhat smaller DiD estimate equivalent to an increase of Biden supporters' expressive partisanship of 5.5%.

6 Convergence between political and social identities: The importance of subgroup respect

Our main result suggests expressive partisanship increased after the election among Democratic Biden supporters. Given that expressive partisanship draws its intensity from the

Table 5.3: Effects of a Preferred Candidate Win on PoC Identity Attachments, Excluding non-Republican Trump Supporters

	Main Outcome		Placebo Outcome			
	Partisan ID		National ID		Racial ID	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Biden supporter	-0.029 (0.021)		-0.081*** (0.022)		0.039° (0.022)	
Post-election	0.014 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.035)	0.021 (0.024)	0.003 (0.036)	0.020 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.033)
Post election x Biden supporter	0.034 (0.027)	0.047 (0.037)	0.021 (0.026)	0.017 (0.038)	0.013 (0.026)	0.024 (0.035)
Average Trump supporter ID	0.851	0.851	0.899	0.899	0.848	0.848
R ²	0.012	0.836	0.022	0.860	0.014	0.835
Num. obs.	1259	1259	1250	1250	1255	1255
N Clusters	726	726	725	725	723	723
Individual FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

The dependent variable is a scaled [0,1] index of identity attachment based on items "I identify as..." and "I am glad to be...". *Biden supporter* indicates preference for Biden over Trump and *post-election* after election survey. Individual-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *Average Trump supporter ID* is Trump supporters' pre-election mean attachment. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ° $p < 0.1$

alignment of social (e.g., race/ethnicity) and political (e.g., Democrats) categories, it is possible that the increased expressive partisanship is explained, in part, by social identities, specifically by the extent to which a social subgroup is respected by broader society. To more closely evaluate this possibility, we conduct an observational mediation analysis that assesses whether the 2020 election result affected expressive partisanship through a belief that one’s racial groups is respected. We find that Democratic Biden supporters who are more likely to believe that Biden’s victory signals respect for their racial group are more likely to have increased their expressive partisanship after the election, which further highlights the connection between political and social (racial/ethnic) identities among PoC.

In this section, we describe the details of the mediation analysis. However, before continuing to that, we note first that the evidence we present from that analysis is at best suggestive: we did not measure racial respect in the pre-election wave, and therefore we cannot identify the effects of the election results on racial respect. Moreover, we did not randomly assign respondents to beliefs of racial respect, and therefore we cannot causally identify the mediation paths. In sum, we cannot make sure that there are no third variables explaining the relationship between racial respect and change in expressive partisanship after the election. Notwithstanding, we present evidence from an observational mediation analysis that assumes the same pre-election racial respect level for all respondents.

Measuring racial respect We combine two items from the post-election survey which asked respondents whether they believe Biden’s victory means that people like them, in terms of their racial identities, are respected. Full question wording is in Appendix 2. We then scale this measure to range 0 and 1.

Mediation analysis Our mediation analysis follows the approach outlined by (Baron and Kenny, 1986). There are two key assumptions to identify the mediation effect of racial respect on partisan identification. First, after controlling for relevant individual characteristics, there can be no other factors simultaneously affecting the salience of the result of the election and

Biden supporters’ partisan identity salience. Second, after controlling for relevant individual characteristics, there can be no other factors simultaneously affecting Biden supporters’ sense of racial respect and their partisan identity. We account for these assumptions by conducting the mediation analysis within the difference-in-differences framework employed in our main analysis; including individual-level fixed effects in each of the steps of the mediation approach described below. Admittedly, we make a strong assumption—all observations have the same pre-election racial respect value (equal to the median point in the measure range)—and furthermore, any time-varying confounders would restrict our ability to identify mediation effects.

Results from mediation analysis Results from this mediation analysis are in Table 6.1. The first step for the mediation analysis is to estimate the effect of the election result on the expressive partisanship of Biden supporters (as in our main analysis based on Equation 1). In this case, we observe in Column (1) of Table 6.1 that the election result strengthens the expressive partisanship of Democratic Biden supporters: the estimated difference-in-differences coefficient is 0.063 and statistically significant at conventional levels. Next, we test whether the election results are associated with Democratic Biden supporters’ sense of racial respect. In Column (2), the positive and statistically significant difference-in-differences coefficient suggests that it does. The final step of the mediation analysis, in Column (3), estimates the effect of the election result on the expressive partisanship of Democratic Biden supporters controlling for the racial respect measure. With this final step, we would obtain suggestive evidence that the election result effect on the expressive partisanship of Biden supporters travels via racial respect, if the difference-in-differences coefficient shrinks compared to the coefficient in Column (1), and is no longer statistically significant. The estimated difference-in-differences coefficient in Column (3) is smaller than that in Column (1) (0.034 vs. 0.063) and is not statistically significant, suggesting that the election result effect on the partisanship of Biden supporters may happen, in part, through an increased sense of racial respect.

Table 6.1: Observational Mediation Analysis via Racial Respect

	Partisan ID	Racial Respect	Partisan ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Biden supporter			
Post-election	-0.032 (0.027)	-0.247*** (0.035)	-0.015 (0.027)
Post election x Biden supporter	0.063* (0.030)	0.460*** (0.039)	0.031 (0.034)
Racial respect			0.006 (0.004)
R ²	0.828	0.720	0.830
Num. obs.	1427	1427	1427
N Clusters	830	830	830
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y

The dependent variables are a scaled [0,1] index of identity attachment (Columns (1), (3)) and of racial respect (Column (2)). *Biden supporter* indicates preference for Biden over Trump and *post-election* after election survey. *Racial Respect* is the raw measure of racial respect (used as control variable in Column (3)). Individual-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes observations from respondents that registered an answer for the questions on expressive partisanship, and racial respect. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ° $p < 0.1$

This suggests that partisanship may function as an expressive identity, which is connected to other relevant social identities for PoC.

7 Recommended Reporting Standards: checklist

- A. Hypotheses: Included in main text as Theoretical expectations.
- B. Subjects and Context: Included in main text and appendix.
- C. Allocation method: Difference-in-differences analysis of partisanship before and after the 2020 US Presidential election.
- D. Treatments: 2020 US Presidential election result.
- E. Results: Included in main text (with the exception of the CONSORT flow diagram, which is not applicable).

F. Funding: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and University of Washington (professor research accounts)

References for Appendix

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